Sobre Filosofia clinica e Reflexões sobre o que é o humano.

Cognitive enhancements in the context of converging technologies. [Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1093, pp. 201-207] [with Anders Sandberg] [pdf].

New medical technologies promise to allow us to transform our core characteristics. Some see these technologies as filled with promise. Others see them as filled with existential risk. David DeGrazia argues that personal identity concerns raised by opponents to enhancement technology fail to impugn attempts by autonomous agents to bring about enhancements with which they autonomously identify. In advancing this argument DeGrazia evaluates five supposedly inviolable core narrative characteristics, concluding that none of these characteristics are in fact inviolable so (...) long as the individual contemplating transformation autonomously identifies with the change they decide to make. Employing insights gleaned from LA Paul’s recent work on the subject of transformative experiences I will argue that at least for some transformations, the prospects for autonomous identification are slim at best. The upshot will be that many of the core narrative traits discussed by DeGrazia will be inviolable in practice, if not in principle. (shrink)

As I read Paula Casal's excellent paper, ‘Sexual Dimorphism and Human Enhancement,’1 three thoughts kept circulating through my mind. First, I found myself largely in agreement with virtually everything she wrote. In particular, if Casal was being accurate and fair in writing that ‘Robert Sparrow alleges that those who…advocate biomedical welfare enhancements are committed to selecting only female embryos because women live longer than men,’1 then she has given compelling reasons for believing that that claim is, on reflection, as (...) ludicrous as it first sounds! In fact, I can think of many additional reasons to those which Casal forcefully adduced for rejecting the view in question, but I do not see the need to present them here, given the abundance of sufficiently compelling reasons Casal already presented.Second, I confess that as I read Casal's article a strong feeling of shame washed over me in virtue of my being a man! Indeed, I found myself thinking that Jonathan Glover's important and chilling book Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century2 was misleadingly, and somewhat unfairly, titled. Heretofore, when I have read Glover's powerful book, which details many of the twentieth century's worst instances of large-scale crimes against humanity, I have often been overcome by a sense of shame of the actions of my species, homo sapiens; but Casal's article suggests that perhaps the scope of my shame has been too wide, and grossly unfair to the distaff members of our species! In the well-worked expression ‘man's inhumanity to man,’ the second use of the word ‘man’ undoubtedly extends to all humans, but the first use overwhelming picks out men insofar as it denotes the actual flesh and blood perpetrators of the horrific actions in question . Accordingly, perhaps a …. (shrink)

The word enhancement is value laden and potentially misleading in the context of genetics. Dictionary definitions of enhance include and The term geneticenhancement would be better replaced with a more neutral term such as to reflect the fact that the consequences of as yet largely untried technology may be beneficial, balanced, or harmful. The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the potential negative consequences of the use of and hence to challenge whether are actually always enhancements. (...) Thus it is necessary to question whether what may appear to be a new means of enhancement may not actually result in any significant change or is less effective than existing means of enhancement; may actually make things worse; or may on some measures actually make some things better, but on other measures or in other senses make things worse. (shrink)

In fascinating recent work, Julian Savulescu and his various co‐authors argue that human love is one of the things we can improve upon using biomedical enhancements. Is that so? This article first notes that Savulescu and his co‐authors mainly treat love as a means to various other goods. Love, however, is widely regarded as an intrinsic good. To investigate whether enhancements can produce the distinctive intrinsic good of love, this article does three things. Drawing on Philip Pettit's recent (...) discussion of ‘robustly demanding goods’, it asks what exactly we intrinsically desire in seeking love; it considers four possible outcomes involving attachment‐enhancements and attachments; and it considers two different pieces of news we might receive about our lovers' attachment to us (that it is, or that it is not, sustained with the help of enhancement‐technologies). Enhancement‐sustained attachment, it is concluded, is less desirable than the intrinsic good of love. (shrink)

Some parents have taken steps to ensure that they have deaf children, a choice that contrasts with the interest that other parents have in enhancing the traits of their children. Julian Savulescu has argued that, morally speaking, parents have a duty to use assisted reproductive technologies to give their children the best opportunity of the best life. This view extends beyond that which is actually required of parents, which is only that they give children reasonable opportunities to form and act (...) on a conception of a life that is good for them. Does the selection of deaf children violate that responsibility? Morally speaking, parents should refrain from using assisted reproductive treatments or prenatal interventions in order to have a child with a disability. Deafness and other disabilities represent intrinsic disadvantages that cannot be offset by other advantages that families and society can offer to people. By the same token, neither should parents seek enhancements of intelligence or physical traits that would undercut intrinsic goods of human life in similar ways. These moral arguments do not, however, sustain the judgment that the law should necessarily interfere with parents' decisions in these matters, even if those choices are morally unwise. (shrink)

As human beings age, they become weak, fragile, and feeble. It is a slowly progressing yet complex syndrome in which old age or some disabilities are not prerequisites; neither does loss of human parts lead to frailty among the physically fit older persons. This paper aims to describe the influences of transhumanist perspectives on human‐technology enhancements and replacements in the transcendence of human frailties, including those of older persons, in which technology is projected to deliver solutions toward transcending these (...) frailties. Through technologies including genetic screening and other technological manipulations, intelligent machines and augmented humans improve, maintain, and remedy human‐linked susceptibilities. Furthermore, other technologies replace parts fabricated through inorganic‐mechanical processes such as 3D‐printing. Advancing technologies are reaching the summit of technological sophistication contributing to the transhumanist views of being human in a technological world. Technologies enhance the transcendence of human frailties as essential expressions of the symbiosis between human beings and technology in a transcendental world. (shrink)

It is argued that justice in some cases provides a pro tanto reason genetically to enhance victims of the genetic lottery. Various arguments--both to the effect that justice provides no such reason and to the effect that while there may be such reasons, they are overridden by certain moral constraints--are considered and rejected. Finally, it is argued that justice provides stronger reasons to perform more traditional medical tasks (treatments), and that therefore genetic enhancements should not play an important role (...) in a public health care system. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades. It promotes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding and evaluating the opportunities for enhancing the human condition and the human organism opened up by the advancement of technology. Attention is given to both present technologies, like genetic engineering and information technology, and anticipated future ones, such as molecular nanotechnology and artificial intelligence.

Multisensory integration can alter information processing, and previous research has shown that such processes are modulated by sensory switch costs and prior experience. Here we report an incidental finding demonstrating, for the first time, the interplay between these processes and experimental factors, specifically the presence of the experimenter in the testing room. Experiment 1 demonstrates that multisensory motor facilitation in response to audiovisual stimuli is higher in those trials in which the sensory modality switches than when it repeats. Those participants (...) who completed the study while alone exhibited increased RT variability. Experiment 2 replicated these findings using the letters “b” and “d” presented as unisensory stimuli or congruent and incongruent multisensory stimuli. Multisensory enhancements were inflated following a sensory switch; that is, congruent and incongruent multisensory stimuli resulted in significant gains following a sensory switch in the monitored condition. However, when the participants were left alone, multisensory enhancements were only observed for repeating incongruent multisensory stimuli. These incidental findings therefore suggest that the effects of letter congruence and sensory switching on multisensory integration are partly modulated by the presence of an experimenter. (shrink)

Advances in biotechnology have enabled interventions in the human organism that promise to increase physical and intellectual perform over the 'normal' or 'natural' boundary, as well as make possible targeted changes in human experience. The author investigates ethical debates surrounding these issues with a particular focus on arguments that employ a normative concept of a person in order to establish that particular interventions are permissible or impermissible. He develops an integrated model that 'maps' of the concept of a human being, (...) thereby bringing the normative elements of the concept to the fore. Nevertheless, with a view to issues of risk and justice, the author argues that anthropological arguments are only one elements of a comprehensive ethics of enhancement. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 7, July 2019, Page 53-55.

It is an imperative within health care, medicine, and public health to restore, preserve, and enhance health. Therefore, it is important to determine what kinds of enhancement are increases in health and what kinds are not. Taking as its point of departure two conceptions of health, namely, “manifest health” and “fundamental health,” the paper discusses various means used to enhance ability and well-being, and if those means, such as wheelchairs, implants, medicines, stimulants, or narcotics, enhance health. The fact that some (...) means that enhance ability or well-being are not usually considered health enhancing, for example, narcotics, constitutes a problem. The paper ends with a discussion of some suggestions about how to distinguish between those enhancements that are health related and those that are not. One plausible idea holds that an enhancement is health related when the substance, or aid, increases ability or well-being, is integrated into the body, and does not harm the individual’s fundamental health. (shrink)

Researchers and others involved in the research enterprise from 12 African countries met with those working in ethics and oversight in the United States as part of an effort to develop research ethics capacity. Drawing on a wealth of experience among participants, discussions at the meeting revealed five categories of issues that warrant careful attention by those engaged in similar efforts as well as international policymakers and those charged with oversight of research. (1) Principal investigators should build ‘true research teams’ (...) where members of the team are meaningfully involved in decisions regarding the protocol and its implementation. (2)There should be explicit discussion about the ‘standard of care’ at the outset of project planning that includes clarification of the terminology that is being used. (3) While internationally collaborative research may involve populations that have inherent vulnerabilities, it is important to recognize the limitations of host country solutions (such as elaborated consent processes) and look for means to negotiate appropriate protections for those willing to participate. (4) In conducting research involving biological materials it would be prudent to develop material transfer agreements at the outset of the study to clarify expectations and to minimize the likelihood of harm. (5) Those engaged in internationally collaborative research need to be alert to the potential conflicts of interests of host country ethics committees during the approval process and to take measures to manage them if they indeed exist. (shrink)

There are a variety of ways to accomplish a goal. But how we choose to accomplish a goal matters, morally speaking. The focus of my dissertation is on the ways in which the use of pharmacological enhancements should affect our moral evaluations. I’m concerned with this central question: how should our decision to enhance or not affect our evaluation of the act or person in question? I discuss a number of moral evaluations including deontic evaluations of human action, which (...) concern assessments of actions being right, wrong, or obligatory; agent evaluations, which include assessments of how we should treat people; these include assessments of moral responsibility and just punishment; and outcome evaluations which include whether or not the completion of a goal is an achievement or not and whether such an achievement is meaningful or hollow. These latter evaluations have received much less attention and one goal in this dissertation is to remedy that gap in the literature. After carefully examining many of the arguments against the use of pharmacological enhancements and casting doubt on them, I conclude that utilizing various pharmacological enhancements is not only permissible in many contexts but may be obligatory in far more cases than has been previously suggested. (shrink)

This paper begins with a vignette of Juan Carlos, an immigrant to America who works to support his family, attends classes at a community college, and cares for his ill daughter. It argues that an Aristotelian virtue ethicist could condone a safe, legal, and virtuous use of cognitive enhancements in Juan Carlos’s case. The argument is that if an enhancement can lead him closer to eudaimonia, then it is morally permissible to use it. The paper closes by demonstrating how (...) common objections to cognitive enhancement fail to undermine Juan Carlos’s justifiable use of the technology. The particularities of his case make it morally acceptable for him to use enhancements in certain situations. The paper, thus, constructs a limited, positive case for the virtuous use of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancements. (shrink)

This paper explores the degree of privacy athletes can expect and demand in the era of genetic technology in sport. Detecting genetic enhancements in sport, and consequently doping violations, using genetic tests is problematic because testing requires access to athletes' genetic information, and accessing genetic information creates many potential privacy issues and concerns throughout the world. Whether it is morally acceptable to subject athletes to the tests used to detect genetic modifications in sport is taken up in this paper, (...) and I argue that the elite sport movement faces an ethical dilemma since rules prohibit athletes from utilising certain substances, methods and procedures, but the testing methods needed to ensure compliance with the rules are controversial and at odds with a reasonable expectation of privacy. (shrink)

In my general aim to probe a non-reductionist Philosophy of Cognitive Enhancement, considering social self-other relations and the epistemic 2PP in social syn-aesthetic tuning-ins, synchronisations and tuning-outs, this paper amplifies the Aristotelian common sense concept κοινὴ αἲσθησις2 by analysing the concept and metaphor of “resonance”3 in contemporary debates on >resonance< as acoustic and multimodal figure of thought. Resonance as shown in scientific models derived from acoustics will be applied to an aesthetic comunity of sensing and making music together as explored (...) in Alfred Schütz, as well as in social relations in social psychology. Finally, this paper puts resonance to test as well in technical atunements of social relations and closes with the necessary resistance to imposition of social resonance, introduced in this paper as xenoresonance. (shrink)

Better memory, greater motivation and concentration lead to greater productivity, efficiency and performance, all of which are features that are highly valued in a modern society focused on productivity. In the effort for better cognitive abilities, otherwise healthy individuals use cognitive enhancers, medicines for the treatment of cognitive deficits of patients with various disorders and health problems, such as Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, stroke, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder or ageing. The use of these is more common in professions with emphasised cognitive (...) abilities, or in occupations that require more attention, focus and alertness. Their use is also associated with the general working population, in that they are supposed to use them to alleviate the effects of sleep deprivation and to cope with increasing workloads. In the paper, we are addressing the ethical issue and the dilemmas of the use of pharmaceutical enhancements by healthy people who have no medical reason for taking such substances, in the context of improving their cognitive functions. (shrink)

Assuming that one believes that individuals and states can morally defend values, beliefs, and institutions with force , one logically wants just combatants to possess the physical, mental, and spiritual capacities that will enable them to win the war. On the other hand, being a just combatant in a just war does not morally entitle that combatant to do anything to win that war. The moral requirement for just combatants to fight justly is codified in international law of war and (...) in state-specific legal documents such as the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. While it is almost unequivocally clear to soldiers and civilians who soldiers cannot harm in the performance of their duties, and why these people are exempt from harm, it is less clear what the state itself can morally do to its own soldiers to enhance their chances of victory: can the state do anything to soldiers to give them an advantage on the field of battle?For United States soldiers and their counterparts in most Western liberal democracies, the answer is obviously no. Deeply embedded social and cultural norms in Western democracies mandate that the state set and enforce rigid lines which drill sergeants and earnest commanders cannot cross, even in the name of combat readiness, grounding these norms in notion of basic rights appealed to in the U.S. Constitution. In this essay, I argue against some types of drug-induced internal biotechnical enhancement of soldiers on the grounds that, in the present state of technology, it is not reasonable to suppose that the military can perform such enhancement operations on soldiers without causing irrevocable psychological damage that would certainly and unjustifiably alienate the soldiers from the very society they serve. (shrink)

In my contribution to this book symposium on Emma Gordon’s book Human Enhancement and Well-Being, I discuss and respond to Gordon’s extensive discussion and criticisms of a skeptical argument regarding the desirability of love enhancements that I presented in a 2015 paper. I start by first explaining the overall project of Gordon’s book, make a general comment about her overall approach (which I am broadly sympathetic with), and then proceed to a detailed discussion of Gordon’s critical engagement with my (...) 2015 argument. I defend my argument against Gordon’s interesting criticisms and argue that Gordon has not defused my skeptical challenge to the desirability of love enhancements, but I also end by identifying key points of agreement between me and Gordon. Specific topics discussed include the distinction between ways of loving and causes of loving, the value of ways of loving and the value of the causes of loving, and whether or not the ideal of robust love attachments can be seen as compatible attachments causally dependent on love enhancements. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Darker skin correlates with reduced opportunities and negative health outcomes. Recent discoveries related to the genes associated with skin tone, and the historical use of cosmetics to conform to racist appearance standards, suggest effective skin‐lightening products may soon become available. This article examines whether medical interventions of this sort should be permitted, subsidized, or restricted, using Norman Daniels's framework for determining what justice requires in terms of protecting health. I argue that Daniels's expansive view of the requirements of justice (...) in meeting health needs offers some support for recognizing a societal obligation to provide this kind of ‘enhancement,’ in light of the strong connections between skin tone and health outcomes. On balance, however, Daniels's framework offers compelling reasons to reject insurance coverage for skin‐lightening medical interventions, including the likely ineffectiveness of such technologies in mitigating racial health disparities, and the danger that covering skin‐lightening enhancements would undermine public support for cooperative schemes that protect health. In fact, justice may require limiting access to these technologies because of their potential to exacerbate the negative effects of racism. (shrink)

Current philosophical and legal bioethical reflection on reprogenetics provides little more than a rationalization of the interests of science. There are two reasons for this. First, bioethicists attempt to address ethical issues in a “language of precision” that characterizes science, and this works against analogical and narratological modes of discourse that have traditionally provided guidance for understanding human nature and purpose. Second, the current ethical and legal debate is framed by a public/private distinction that banishes robust norms to the private (...) realm, and leaves a minimalist public discourse of harm avoidance that is insufficient for regulating the science. In this essay, I argue that Mark Hanson's account of anxiety provides a valuable starting point for addressing deficiencies in the current philosophical and legal debate, and it highlights the need for a theological discourse on genetic enhancements. Through an assessment of Joel Shumann's criticism of the public/private distinction, I show how the needed theological discourse should be situated in the context of robust communities, and how such a communitarian inter-ethic is compatible with a variant of liberalism. Finally, I critically assess James Keenan's account of virtue and perfection, in order to outline what a sufficient discourse on reproductive and genetic enhancements requires. (shrink)

“What is a poet? An unhappy person who conceals profound anguish in his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass over them they sound like beautiful music.” These opening lines from Kierkegaard's Either/Or signify a tragic state of affairs because the poet brings joy to others and yet experiences no joy himself. In a similar vein, consider the child prodigy—Bobby Fischer, Shirley Temple, Mozart. Although there is no question that these children were gifted, there (...) is some debate about how happy their childhoods were. There are benefits to just “being a kid,” and it is not clear that these individuals had that opportunity. (shrink)