In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 37.1 (2004) 1-20 [Access article in PDF] Endoxa, Epistemological Optimism, and Aristotle's Rhetorical Project Ekaterina V. Haskins Communication Department Boston College Aristotle's crucial role in institutionalizing the art of rhetoric in the fourth century BCE is beyond dispute, but the significance of Aristotle's rhetorical project remains a point of lively controversy among philosophers and rhetoricians alike. There are many ways of reading and evaluating (...) Aristotle's Rhetoric that depend on the philosophical, theoretical, and pedagogical purposes of the scholar.1 Most philosophical and rhetorical exegeses of the Rhetoric, however, while focusing on the text's connections to Aristotle's corpus and to the rhetorical tradition before and after Aristotle, seem to lack a critical perspective on Aristotle's relationship with his cultural context. Yet, like other parts of Aristotle's encyclopedic intellectual endeavor, much of Rhetoric 's cultural content was provided by endoxa, "reputable or received opinions."Since G. E. L. Owen's essay "Tithenai ta phainomena" (1961) many scholars have accepted the claim that endoxa, rather than empirical observations, are the source of Aristotle's own philosophical principles. The "linguistic" turn within Aristotelian studies has drawn attention to the role of "facts" of language and ordinary experience within Aristotle's philosophical method. As a result, a view of Aristotle as a hard-core empiricist has given way to a picture of a humanist who is attuned to the nuances of his cultural milieu. Still, this new portrait fails to take into account that Aristotle's manner of selecting and categorizing his linguistic resources allows him to transform what we would consider cultural beliefs into natural, and hence, atemporal premises. This pattern can be explained by Aristotle's "epistemological optimism," in itself a blend of several cultural assumptions about perception in general and vision in particular, the function of language, and the cyclical nature of human history. Part of this essay's objective, then, will be an explanation of these components of Aristotle's epistemological optimism. By appreciating Aristotle's difference [End Page 1] on these issues from our modern assumptions, we will be in a better position to understand why Aristotle relies on endoxa on all three levels of philosophical discourse (theoretical science, moral philosophy, and productive arts of poetics and rhetoric). Aristotle remains consistent in his treatment of endoxa throughout; rhetoric, however, presents a major challenge to Aristotle's epistemological optimism and his conception of language. I shall argue that Aristotle recognized this challenge and that he answered it by isolating proofs and rhetorical genres from their linguistic medium (lexis ), and postulating linguistic transparency (sapheneia ) as a stylistic norm. I. Aristotle's openness to appearances (phainomena ) and opinions (endoxa ) was accorded prominence especially thanks to the work of G. E. L. Owen and Martha Nussbaum. Owen was first to defend a linguistic translation of Aristotle's phainomena as "ordinary beliefs" and "appearances" against the then-prevalent rendition "observed facts." In so doing he asserted the crucial impact of the philosopher's cultural context on the formation of speculative discourse. Owen (1961) nonetheless demanded that phainomena be understood as empirical observations in Aristotle' treatises on biology and meteorology (84-86), so as to preserve the methodological and epistemological distinctions between inquiries into the natural world, on the one hand, and the world inhabited by human agents, on the other. Nussbaum (1986) went much further than Owen in asserting the role of phainomena and endoxa in Aristotle's inquiry. Unlike Owen, Nussbaum sees no fundamental difference between "experiences" of a philosopher and linguistic expressions of cultural beliefs and interpretations—his discursive data—from which Aristotle constructs his philosophical accounts. Nussbaum's chief (and highly influential) claim is that Aristotle's method is marked by a deep concern for the experiential world of his fellow men and their language. Aristotle's philosophical insights into the human condition, on this reading, echo and amplify classical Greek tragedy, despite the austere diction of Aristotle's extant treatises.Owing to this openness to the world of ordinary beliefs, Aristotle seems to depart from the Eleatic and Platonic distrust of human... (shrink)

Although Thomas Aquinas assumes that all knowledge begins in the senses, he maintains that substantial forms and the essences of material things are not apparent to the senses. Clearly, the noetic of abstraction per se cannot account for our knowledge of them. Thomas often says that they are “unknown in themselves” but “become known” through their accidents. The author argues that properties, or proper accidents — namely, accidents that are interconvertible with a subject — play a crucial role in this (...) obscure area of Thomas’s thought. Beginning with an examination of the property in logic , the author goes on to examine Thomas’s accounts of heat as a property of fire, and the powers of the soul as properties of its essence. Thomas maintains that such properties flow from the essence by a causal relation that he calls resultatio, but that their coexistence with the essence is absolutely necessary in a quasi-logical manner . Finally, the author suggests that in Thomas’s view, accidents really do make the hidden quiddities of their subjects known: knowing created things through their accidents is not at all like knowing God through creatures. (shrink)

This article compares investigations of the process of vision that were made in early nineteenth-century Britain and the German lands. It is argued that vision studies differed significantly east and west of the North Sea. Most of the German investigators had a medical background and many of them had a firm grasp of contemporary philosophy. In contrast, the British studies on vision emerged from the context of optics. This difference manifested itself in the conceptual tools for the analysis of vision, (...) deception and illusion and shaped the experiments on visual phenomena that were carried out. Nevertheless, both in Britain and in the German lands vision studies were driven by the same impetus, by epistemological concerns with the nature and reliability of knowledge acquisition in experience. The general epistemological conclusions drawn from researches on vision and deception were optimistic. Precisely because mechanisms of deception and illusion could be uncovered, the possibility of acquiring empirical knowledge could be secured. (shrink)

Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...) like-minded philosophers—or stick with closure and surrender to relevantist claims of failure in truth-preservation aimed at classical rules of inference. Classicist closure advocates find the promise of a way out of the dilemma in the works of Roy Sorensen and John Hawthorne. The paper argues against their pro-closure move and renews Robert Audi’s call for a theory of closure-failure. (shrink)

This article evaluates Karl Popper's contribution to analytic philosophy, and outlines some of the contradictions in his work which make it difficult to locate in any particular tradition. In particular, the article investigates Popper's own claims to be a member of the rationalist tradition. Although Popper described himself as a member of this tradition, his definition of it diverged quite radically from that offered by other supporters of rationalism, like, for example, Mach, Carnap, and the logical positivists of the Vienna (...) Circle. The reason for this was that Popper believed the rationalist tradition, if it were to remain coherent and relevant, needed to overcome the dilemma posed by Hume's problem of induction. Popper believed that this problem rendered conventional understandings of rationalism, science, and inductive reasoning incoherent. This article suggests that Popper's principal contribution to modern philosophy was to reconfigure the rationalist tradition in such a way as to circumvent the problem of induction while preserving the rationalist commitment to reason, rational debate, and objective knowledge. Popper's reconfiguration of the epistemological bases of the rationalist tradition challenged dominant understandings of rationalist and analytic philosophy, and may be appropriately understood as part of a wider move among philosophers like Quine and Putnam to challenge conventional understandings of analytic philosophy, and of what philosophy itself could and could not achieve. It also informed a vision of social and political life (and of the social and political sciences) as rooted in principles of freedom, equality, and rational debate, but which cannot be fit within the traditional ideological landscape. (shrink)

The process of making ethical judgments is much more complex than studying only personal moral philosophy variables (idealism and relativism). The renewed interest in epistemic values (virtue and vice epistemology) in contemporary philosophy has shown significant relevance to understanding ethical behavior and such values may be better predictors than studying only idealism and relativism. The purpose of this exploratory study is to examine employees’ personal moral philosophies, optimism, epistemic values, and various organizational unethical practices as compared to their managers. (...) We used Rawwas’ items of epistemology in this study. The sample consisted of 262 managers and employees. The results revealed that managers were more sensitive to organizational unethical practices, scored less on epistemic vices, less on absolutism, and more on exceptionalism than employees were. However, there was no difference between managers and employees related to moderate and minor unethical organizational practices, situationism, subjectivism, optimism, and epistemic virtues. We provided discussion of the results and implications. (shrink)

Neopragmatist epistemology rejects any significant distinction between ethics and the sciences. The idea is that in ethics, we acquire knowledge in similar ways as in the natural sciences. Quine/duhem holism applies to both fields, which explains why the aim of reaching reflective equilibrium is prominent in many meta-ethical accounts: As in the sciences, our ethical system of belief is constrained by logic, observation, coherence, simplicity and parsimony. Whereas considerations of beauty (an important ingredient of scientific methodology) are irrelevant in ethical (...) epistemology, emotions play an essential role; these, in turn, do not matter in the sciences. (shrink)

McKenna’s version of non-ideal inquiry epistemology combines pessimism about the epistemic capacities of individuals with certain forms of optimism about the influence of social institutions on our epistemic lives. I suggest that the latter may amount to a problematic idealisation of the sort McKenna is trying to steer epistemology away from; moreover, a more thoroughgoing pessimism about the epistemic influence of institutions may make it clearer why we should value and strive for a degree of intellectual autonomy, even if (...) this is limited in scope and comes at a cost. I close by briefly considering two proposals that an inquiry epistemology that takes these points on board might make. (shrink)

In What Should We Be Online, Karen Frost-Arnold advocates an approach to epistemic virtues that resists pessimism about the possibility of our online epistemic agency being responsible and socially just. On the basis of a veritist epistemology, her proposal overcomes both responsibilist individualism and the socio-structural critique that delegates all responsibility to institutional transformations. The author identifies in online lurking an activity unique to online epistemic agency that can provide exposure to messages from people discriminated against by epistemic injustices. For (...) Frost-Arnold, moreover, this implies the possibility of the lurker experiencing epistemic frictions that will favour a more reliable willingness to be fair in giving credit to the testimonies of those discriminated against. In this note I will qualify this optimistic stance, arguing the epistemic individualism that underlies it. I will point to a group virtue model as a possible solution. En What Should We Be Online, Karen Frost-Arnold defiende una cierta aproximación a las virtudes epistémicas que resista al pesimismo acerca de la posibilidad de que nuestra agencia epistémica online sea responsable y justa. Sobre la base de una epistemología veritista, su propuesta supera tanto el individualismo responsabilista como la crítíca socio-estructural que delega toda responsabilidad en transformaciones institucionales. La autora identifica en el online lurking una actividad exclusiva de la agencia epistémica online capaz de proporcionar una exposición a mensajes de personas discriminadas por injusticias epistémicas. Para Frost-Arnold, a su vez, esto implica la posibilidad de que el lurker experimente fricciones epistémicas que favorecerán una disposición más fiable a ser justos a la hora de dar crédito a los testimonios de personas discriminadas. En esta nota matizaré esta postura optimista, alegando el individualismo epistémico que subyace. Apuntaré a un modelo de virtudes grupales como posible solución. In Who Should We Be Online, Karen Frost-Arnold advocates an approach to epistemic virtues that resists pessimism about the possibility of our online epistemic agency being responsible and socially just. On the basis of a veritist epistemology, her proposal overcomes both responsibilist individualism and the socio-structural critique that delegates all responsibility to institutional transformations. The author identifies in online lurking an activity unique to online epistemic agency that can provide exposure to messages from people discriminated against by epistemic injustices. For Frost-Arnold, moreover, this implies the possibility of the lurker experiencing epistemic frictions that will favour a more reliable willingness to be fair in giving credit to the testimonies of those discriminated against. In this note I will qualify this optimistic stance, arguing the epistemic individualism that underlies it. I will point to a group virtue model as a possible solution. (shrink)

McKenna’s version of non-ideal inquiry epistemology combines pessimism about the epistemic capacities of individuals with certain forms of optimism about the influence of social institutions on our epistemic lives. I suggest that the latter may amount to a problematic idealisation of the sort McKenna is trying to steer epistemology away from; moreover, a more thoroughgoing pessimism about the epistemic influence of institutions may make it clearer why we should value and strive for a degree of intellectual autonomy, even if (...) this is limited in scope and comes at a cost. I close by briefly considering two proposals that an inquiry epistemology that takes these points on board might make. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to present Aristotle’s attitude to sense-perception. I will refer to this attitude as “perceptual optimism”. Perceptual optimism is, very briefly, the position that the senses give us full access to reality as it is. Perceptual optimism entails perceptual realism, the view that there is a reality out there which is accessible to our senses in some way or other, and the belief that our senses are veridical at least to some extent, (...) but it is more comprehensive than that. For instance, a perceptual optimist does not admit such things as qualities which are perceptible in principle but not by us or bodies too small to be perceptible. In this paper I argue that Aristotle is a perceptual optimist, since he believes that reality, at least in the sublunary sphere, is indeed fully accessible to our senses. In the first and largest part of this paper, I will show, in seven distinct theses, what Aristotle’s perceptual optimism entails. In the second and shorter part, I will put Aristotle’s position in a wider context of his epistemology and show why it was important for him to be a perceptual optimist. (shrink)

All speculations on «the meaning of history» are argued to exceed the epistemological capacities of historical science. Nevertheless, the author argues, such speculations are significant for a philosophy which treats historical development as a real phenomenon. For many philosophies of this sort, freedom of a human-being is the main goal of the historical process. The author notes that such «historical optimism» is in conflict historical practice. And he argues that it can be dangerous if transformed into a slogan.

This book consists of seven chapters containing multiple questions of the global socially epistemological situation in science and higher education. Despite the progress of techno-sciences, we are facing blind flaws in leading systems of knowledge and perception. The global era, in a paradox way, connects the new knowledge of economics, postpolitics, postdemocracy, and biopolitical regulation of live and unpresentable forms of the global geo-located violence. Techno-optimism and techno-dictatorship in the twenty-first century coincide with the ideology of market, biopolitics (...) of mandatory satisfaction, religious revivalism, and collapse of higher education. In order for sciences to recover, it is necessary to make a globally epistemological and moral turn toward the truth. The book shows that, when joint desires of the new economics of knowledge and technology erase epistemology (in a way to assign definitions of knowledge and rules and practices of the public usage of the mind), then the time for epistemology is on its way"--https://www.intechopen.com/books/epistemology-and-transformation-of-knowledge-in-global-age, accessed 06/07/2020. (shrink)

The best arguments for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem all require that when Beauty awakes on Monday she should be uncertain what day it is. I argue that this claim should be rejected, thereby clearing the way to accept the 1/2 solution.

All speculations on «the meaning of history» are argued to exceed the epistemological capacities of historical science. Nevertheless, the author argues, such speculations are significant for a philosophy which treats historical development as a real phenomenon. For many philosophies of this sort, freedom of a human-being is the main goal of the historical process. The author notes that such «historical optimism» is in conflict historical practice. And he argues that it can be dangerous if transformed into a slogan.

The sociologist Georg Simmel and the philosopher Ernst Cassirer developed strikingly similar theories of modernity. Both viewed the transition from a substantialist to a functionalist view of the world as the modern age's distinguishing characteristic. But they interpreted this transition from very different philosophical perspectives. Simmel subscribed to a phenomenalism derived from Mach, whereas Cassirer advocated an objectivism inspired by a particular interpretation of Kant. This epistemological disagreement helps account for the two thinkers’ divergent cultural attitudes. Whereas Simmel viewed (...) the complex structures of modernity as an alienation from the flow of subjective life, Cassirer viewed them as a proper expression of humanity's symbolising capacity. Simmel's cultural pessimism developed into an enthusiasm for radical collective action, especially during the First World War. Cassirer's optimism, conversely, guarded him against this temptation. (shrink)

The prevailing notion that the problem of essential indexicals must be solved through the theory of meaning of attitude ascriptions is incorrect. Well-known attempts to solve the problem along those lines, e.g., the proposals of Lewis and Perry , have rested on the overly optimistic assumption that there is no limit in principle to the access one may have to the contents of someone else’s thoughts, including their knowledge. That assumption is challenged in this essay. The hazards associated with limited (...) accessibility can be and indeed must be alleviated by an epistemological theory in such a way that allows for a new nonsemantic approach to the problem. The following is an outline of the arguments in favor of this approach. In the first part, the problem of essential indexicals and the familiar corollary thesis that such indexicals are not reducible to nonindexicals is briefly reviewed. In the second part, indexical irreducibility is shown to hold for a range of explanations of theoretical rationality in addition to the basic explanations of action in which the irreducibility is typically illustrated. (shrink)

This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...) that such disagreements are rationally irresolvable, and ask whether the Wittgensteinian account of deep disagreement—according to which such disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments—provides adequate support for pessimism. I argue that the answer to this question depends on what hinge commitments are and what our epistemic relation to them is supposed to be. I argue for two core claims. First, that non-epistemic theories of hinge commitments provide adequate support for pessimism. Nevertheless, such theories have highly implausible consequences in the context of deep disagreement. Secondly, at least one epistemic theory of hinge commitments, the entitlement theory, permits optimism about such disagreements. As such, while hinge epistemology is mainly pessimistic about deep disagreement, it doesn’t have to be. (shrink)

This paper addresses an important but relatively unexplored question about the relationship between conceptual ethics and other philosophical inquiry: how does the epistemology of conceptual ethics relate to the epistemology of other, more “traditional” forms of philosophical inquiry? This paper takes as its foil the optimistic thought that the epistemology of conceptual ethics will be easier and less mysterious than relevant “traditional” philosophical inquiry. We argue against this foil by focusing on the fact that that conceptual ethics is a form (...) of normative inquiry. Because of the epistemic difficulties that face normative inquiry, we should not expect conceptual ethics to constitute an epistemic panacea. Instead, although the epistemological upshots can vary from case to case, there are systematic reasons why this shift may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the epistemic difficulties we face in pursuing philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Applied mathematics often operates by way of shakily rationalizedexpedients that can neither be understood in a deductive-nomological nor in an anti-realist setting.Rather do these complexities, so a recent paper of Mark Wilson argues, indicate some element in ourmathematical descriptions that is alien to the physical world. In this vein the mathematical opportunistopenly seeks or engineers appropriate conditions for mathematics to get hold on a given problem.Honest mathematical optimists, instead, try to liberalize mathematical ontology so as to include all physicalsolutions. Following (...) John von Neumann, the present paper argues that the axiomatization of a scientifictheory can be performed in a rather opportunistic fashion, such that optimism and opportunism appear as twomodes of a single strategy whose relative weight is determined by the status of the field to beinvestigated. Wilson's promising approach may thus be reformulated so as to avoid precarious talk about a physicalworld that is void of mathematical structure. This also makes the appraisal of the axiomatic method inapplied matthematics less dependent upon foundationalist issues. (shrink)

Aesthetic judgements formed on the basis of testimony are commonly held to be defective, illegitimate, or otherwise problematic. This first book-length treatment of the debate surrounding aesthetic testimony argues for the surprising conclusion that this widespread view is mistaken. Aesthetic testimony is in no way inferior as a source of judgement when compared to either first-hand aesthetic judgement, or testimony concerning non-aesthetic matters. Alongside establishing this position (an extreme form of ‘optimism concerning aesthetic testimony’) this work also responds to (...) the most prominent arguments for the opposing view (‘pessimism concerning aesthetic testimony’). Along the way, it also re-examines our understanding of the norms which govern both judgement and assertion in aesthetics. (shrink)

On an optimistic version of realist moral epistemology, a significant range of ordinary moral beliefs, construed in realist terms, constitute knowledge—or at least some weaker positive epistemic status, such as epistemic justification. The “debunking challenge” to this view grants prima facie justification but claims that it is “debunked” (i.e., defeated), yielding the final verdict that moral beliefs are ultima facie unjustified. Notable candidate “debunkers” (i.e., defeaters) include the so-called “evolutionary debunking arguments,” the “Benacerraf-Field Challenge,” and persistent moral disagreement among epistemic (...) peers. Such defeaters are best treated as higher-order evidence—viz., evidence contesting the merits of the first-order evidence on which moral beliefs are based. This chapter first develops a theory of higher-order defeat in general, which it then applies to debunking in particular. The result: the challenge fails entirely on epistemic grounds—regardless of whether or not its empirical and metaphysical presuppositions are correct. An advantage of this purely epistemic defense over alternative strategies is that the former extends even to laypersons who themselves lack the expertise necessary to formulate an adequate response. However, this leaves open the prospects for non-epistemological interpretations of debunking (e.g., moral or ontological). The chapter therefore concludes with brief suggestions in that direction. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary research in the fields of forestry and sustainability studies often encounters seemingly incompatible ontological assumptions deriving from natural and social sciences. The perceived incompatibilities might emerge from the epistemological and ontological claims of the theories or models directly employed in the interdisciplinary collaboration, or they might be created by other epistemological and ontological assumptions that these interdisciplinary researchers find no reason to question. In this paper we discuss the benefits and risks of two possible approaches, Popperian (...) class='Hi'>optimism and Kuhnian pessimism, to interdisciplinary knowledge integration where epistemological and ontological differences between the sciences involved can be expected. (shrink)

In this essay I wish to discuss the notions of utopia, especially the notion of epistemological utopia as Leszek Kołakowski described it in one of his paper. Epistemological utopia is not tantamount to the conception of perfect and unalterable knowledge. On the contrary, in its realm there is also a place for scepticism, because scepticism is a kind of epistemological utopia but à rebours. Epistemological fundamentalism and scepticism are indeed two opposite attitudes but they finally belong (...) to each other. Nevertheless, no one from these attitudes satisfy our epistemological theory. Bertrand Russell described similar situation in his short essay titled On optimism: we can accept at most together pessimist and optimist, never only one of them. Therefore that situation provides to the necessity of overcoming theoretical field of these two, foundational and sceptical, conceptions. In this article I use Wittgenstein’s ideas to search for a ‘new’ epistemological attitude. (shrink)

This is the first edited scholarly collection devoted solely to the epistemology of democracy. Its 15 chapters, published here for the first time and written by an international team of leading researchers, will interest scholars and advanced students working in democratic theory, the harrowing crisis of democracy, political philosophy, social epistemology, and political epistemology. The volume is structured into three parts, each offering five chapters. The first part, Democratic Pessimism, covers the crisis of democracy, the rise of authoritarianism, public epistemic (...) vices, misinformation and disinformation, civic ignorance, and the lacking quantitative case for democratic decision-making. The second part, Democratic Optimism, discusses the role of hope and positive emotions in rebuilding democracy, proposes solutions to myside bias, and criticizes dominant epistocratic approaches to forming political administrations. The third and final part, Democratic Realism, assesses whether we genuinely require emotional empathy to understand the perspectives of our political adversaries, discusses the democratic tension between mutual respect for others and a quest for social justice, and evaluates manifold top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy making. (shrink)

Novices face a problem when it comes to forming true beliefs about controversial issues that they cannot assess themselves: Who are the trustworthy experts? Elizabeth Anderson offers a set of criteria intended to allow novices to form reliable assessments of expert trustworthiness. All they need to assess experts is a high-school education and access to the internet. In this paper, I argue that novices face a much harder time using her criteria effectively than we would expect or hope. This problem (...) is amplified when novices hold the wrong opinions. Such novices need her criteria the most and are the least likely to use them correctly. Such novices lack knowledge necessary for using the criteria accurately, and are likely to resist correction of their wrong opinions due to cognitive biases. After providing reasons to be skeptical of the effectiveness of her criteria, I propose some supplemental criteria to increase their effectiveness: metacognitive reliability conditions aimed at getting novices to assess themselves in the way that they assess experts. Although these additional criteria show promise, we should be reserved in our optimism. (shrink)

A vast majority of marketing theory and research has focused on relativism and idealism in order to understand ethical behavior. However, making ethical assessments that in turn influence behavior is much more complicated than it appears. One of the most important developments in contemporary philosophy has been the renewed interest in epistemic virtue. Epistemologists contend that belief is an ethical process that is susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one’s own life and personal experiences. Open-mindedness, curiosity, careful thinking, (...) creativity, and intellectual courage are the foundations of epistemic virtues. Closed-mindedness, intellectual overconfidence, unimaginativeness, intellectual conformity, and wishful thinking are among epistemic vices. The purpose of this investigation is to introduce epistemology to marketing ethics by linking it to personal moral philosophies (idealism and relativism) and optimism to explain various ethically challenging organizational behaviors. The items of epistemology were developed and pretested by the lead author of this study. Structural equations (LISREL) analyses found that epistemic virtues and vices are better predictors of ethical behavior than were personal moral philosophies (idealism and relativism), and their influence on mild and severe levels of unethical behaviors was enhanced by the moderator variable, optimism. Implications are designed to develop suggestions for improving ethical behavior in the workplace. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.

“Naturalized epistemology” is a recent attempt to transform the theory of knowledge into a branch of natural science. Traditional epistemologists object to this proposal on the grounds that it eliminates the distinctively philosophical content of epistemology. In this thesis, I argue that traditional philosophers are justified in their reluctance to accept naturalism, but that their ongoing inability to refute it points to deeper problems inherent in traditional epistemology. I establish my thesis first by critiquing three versions of naturalism, showing that (...) each version either fails to implement its objectives consistently or starts from dubious objectives. “Optimistic naturalism” attempts to use naturalistic methods to give positive answers to traditional epistemological questions (such as by affirming that our beliefs can be justified). This fails because the form of traditional questions requires the concept “belief,” a concept that I argue naturalistic methodology cannot countenance (because of the severe constraints of naturalistic semantic theory). “Pessimistic naturalism,” the version advocated by Quine, is more consistent with naturalistic methodology, but fails because hidden behind its conclusions are assumptions (such as the underdetermination thesis) that cannot themselves be naturalized in the full context of scientific evidence. A final attempt to naturalize epistemology, deflationary naturalism, dispenses with traditional questions entirely, urging that the terms “knowledge” and “justification” be taken as mere pragmatic devices whose use can, nevertheless, be studied scientifically. Curiously, this view fails to take account of important facts about the actual use of those terms, as studied by psychologists. In the end, despite problems with each of these versions, traditional philosophers can learn something from their encounter with naturalism. In the course of showing how various naturalistic doctrines cannot themselves be naturalized, I identify the flaws in traditional epistemology (such as its reliance on a priorism, and its resulting inability to articulate a workable empirical foundationalist theory of justification) that make naturalism harder to challenge. These flaws must be corrected if philosophers are to preserve the autonomy of their discipline. (shrink)

We discuss three philosophically interesting epistemic peculiarities of black hole astrophysics: (1) issues concerning whether and in what sense black holes do exist; (2) how to best approach multiplicity of available definitions of black holes; (3) short (i.e., accessible within an individual human lifespan) dynamical timescales present in many of the recent, as well as prospective, observations involving black holes. In each case we argue that the prospects for our epistemic situation are optimistic.

Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception (...) about new meta-knowledge obtained by thought experimenting. I compare some interpretations of this position and present reasons for favorizing one of them. Conceptualism considers thought experiments as instruments for cleaning our conceptual systems. I argue that this position is in fact not about epistemic value of thought experiments, but about one specific usage of experimental result. (shrink)

The article is devoted to Miguel Servet (Michael Servetus, Spain – Miguel Serveto, also known as Miguel Servet, Miguel Serveto, Revés, or Michel de Villeneuve) – the XVI century Spanish thinker who was recognized as a heretic and burnt at the stake in Geneva in 1553.The author discusses the specifics of Servet’s philosophical system, the scientific background of his system, and his key ideas that have become a matter for auto-da-fė. The author argues that Servet’s concept was aimed to reconstruct (...) the “pure” Christian dogma, although he was not a professional theologist. The author claims that Servet used the deep knowledge in geography, astronomy, medicine, linguistics to create his complex system which was aimed to rescue the mankind from total destruction (Apocalypse). The author claims that Servet’s system could be considered as an example of interdisciplinary approach in the pre-disciplinary epoch. Moreover, Servet’s approach to the problem of personal salvation and the transformation of the humane nature is based on empirical scientific data. Hence, it is appropriate to consider his philosophical system as a mixture of theology, natural science and humanities. (shrink)

The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor encourages the study of many disciplines in order for the soul to acquire knowledge that aids in the restoration of human nature. However, according to Hugh's epistemology much of the acquired knowledge depends upon sensory qualities internalized as images which distract the soul and cause it to degenerate from its original unity. This essay explores the tension between Hugh's educational optimism and Hugh's epistemological pessimism. After considering and rejecting two unsuccessful strategies (...) the soul might pursue for avoiding degeneration and distraction, we shall utilize Hugh's non-representational conception of cognition to develop a plausible intellectual strategy. We shall also build upon some of Hugh's remarks about music to sketch a model of self-knowledge as a kind of proportionality in the soul. (shrink)

Both traditional and recent accounts of the beneficial and therapeutic effects of psychedelic experiences tie these effects to specifically epistemic changes, for example the enabling of spiritual or psychological insight, or disruption of problematic beliefs or thought patterns. While these alleged benefits have sometimes been thought to be facilitated by false or even delusional beliefs (e.g. Pollan 2015), recent philosophical discussion strikes a more optimistic tone, arguing that the epistemic risks involved with psychedelic drug use tend to be relatively benign (...) and outweighed by epistemic benefits (Letheby 2021). In this paper, we seek to nuance this picture by drawing attention to the crucial role played by social factors in determining the epistemic effects of psychedelic experiences. We argue that the very openness of mind and heightened sense of clarity and certainty that is often thought to facilitate the epistemic benefits of psychedelic drug use, also make the user more vulnerable to adverse epistemic influence from the social environment, to a degree not acknowledged in the current literature. Examining the epistemic influences of the social environment is thus important for understanding the necessary precautions of informed consent and overall safe drug use. (shrink)

Nowadays, physicalism is arguably the received view on the nature of mental states. Among the arguments that have been provided in its favour, the inductive one seems to play a pivotal role in the debate. Leveraging the past success of materialistic science, the physicalist argues that a materialistic account of consciousness will eventually be provided, hence that physicalism is true. This article aims at evaluating whether this strategy can provide support for physicalism. According to the standard objection raised against the (...) inductive line of reasoning, the argument would beg the question by assuming some sort of metaphysical uniformity between consciousness and the rest of the natural domain. Here, I concede that there is a way to avoid this criticism. However, I argue that the argument still fails to support physicalism due to a structural problem of justification transmission. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Galen’s Epistemology: Experience, Reason, and Method in Ancient Medicine ed. by R. J. Hankinson and Matyáš HavrdaPatricia MarechalR. J. Hankinson and Matyáš Havrda, editors. Galen’s Epistemology: Experience, Reason, and Method in Ancient Medicine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. 348. Hardback, $99.99; paperback, $36.99.Galen famously says that some things are “securely known” (bebaiôs gnôston) (De optima doctrina I 41.15 Kühn). But how do we know things, and what (...) entitles us to take our beliefs to be securely grounded? An optimist on this point, Galen is not seduced by hyperbolic skeptical concerns and argues that, if we follow a systematic method of inquiry, we will build theories that are not only persuasive and useful, but also true. Unsurprisingly, Galen’s views on knowledge in general and its foundation are deeply informed by debates about the possibility and nature of medical knowledge. His method integrates both rationalist and empiricist insights, thereby overcoming the divide between two of the main medical sects of his time. According to Galen, reason and experience must be combined in medical theory and practice.This much is well known. The eleven essays in this volume take further steps to understand Galen’s scientific method by exploring in detail how reason and experience contribute to scientific discoveries and demonstrations. With the exception of two essays that tackle questions of general epistemological significance—Galen’s take on skepticism (Barnes) and his theory of vision (Ierodiakonou)—the majority of the contributions offer detailed descriptions of how Galen’s method integrates rational tools with experience. Some of the essays offer a close reading of Galen’s methodological discussions on these issues (Kupreeva, Hankinson, Tieleman), while others analyze his method in action by examining concrete cases and applications (Havrda, Singer, Lewis). As is to be expected, most of the essays focus on knowledge in the domain of natural philosophy—specifically, medicine—but one fruitfully extends the discussion to Galen’s ethical writings (Kaufman). The last two essays address the reception of Galen’s scientific methodology in Alexandrian Late Antiquity (Wakelnig) and the Islamic Middle Ages (Koetschet).This is an excellent volume that deepens our efforts to reconstruct Galen’s views on the foundation of epistēmē. One thread stands out. Galen argues that experience (peira) is indispensable to knowing and understanding the natural world. He also claims that experience that is not guided by reason will not take us far in our inquiries. The contributions to the volume allow us to appreciate two further facts about Galen’s views on the nature of experience. On the one hand, for Galen, experience itself is always cognitively and theoretically loaded since it is categorized and filtered through conceptual and linguistic categories. On the other hand, Galen is aware that sensory experiences are fine-grained, and he suggests that fully capturing the content of experience linguistically is hard and, sometimes, impossible. Scientific statements are often only a rough indication of the complex realities observed and felt by doctors and patients. Thus, errors may arise in our choice of terms, in the statement of scientific propositions, and in our classifications of experience. These two points could be in tension, and readers are left with questions pertaining to how both of them feature in Galen’s account of the content of experience. Regardless, the discussions in this volume reveal Galen’s acute sensitivity to issues related to the structure, cognitive penetration, and theory-ladenness of experience, as well as the problematic relationship between sense data and the basic empirical statements in [End Page 657] our scientific theories. These essays, then, further confirm Galen’s sophistication as a philosopher and scientist, and open further avenues for research on these questions.Since I am not able to comment on all the essays in the detail they deserve, I instead offer a brief indication of the contents of each. I hope this will allow the reader to get a sense of the richness and importance of this collection.In chapter 1, Jonathan Barnes addresses Galen’s dismissal of skepticism. While giving due consideration to his opposition to skepticism, Barnes persuasively shows that Galen fails to put skeptical worries... (shrink)

If the much discussed fragmentation of the West means that we can seldom hold constructive moral conversations with our near neighbors, why imagine that comparative ethics is feasible as a critical enterprise with a coherent method? How, more specifically, do we understand the relative merits of naturalism, formalism, and supernaturalism as ethical orientations? The author addresses these questions first by examining the meaning of the quoted terms, then by criticizing the inordinate optimism of most naturalisms and formalisms. The article (...) ends by briefly elaborating and defending a supernaturalist conception of Christian love. As a fruit of the Spirit, agape leaves one neither heteronomous nor autonomous, but holy. Such holiness can move one to appreciate, judiciously, cultures different from one's own. (shrink)

The paper begins as a response to Tom Rockmore's thesis that contemporary pragmatism is a healthy “confusion” of disparate views. While Rockmore sees the need of some of today's pragmatists to provide a motivation for what he calls “epistemic optimism,” I contend that the crucial question of pragmatism, the problem of pragmatism, is the ontological status of pragmatic meaning. Thus rather than a mere “epistemic optimism,” I call upon pragmatists to assert a fallible yet unabashedly metaphysical optimism. (...) The argument supporting this claim is made in the context of Peirce's “The Architecture of Theories.” In “The Architecture of Theories” Peirce opens the door to a pragmatic metaphysics while at the same time committing the error of subordinating truths and reality to “the long run of inquiry.” Rockmore suggest that the solution may lie in a return to Kant's notion of the “powers of the mind.” However, it is my contention that a solution to this problem cannot be found within Kant at all. I shall argue here that until contemporary pragmatism decisively extracts itself from the Kantian paradigm, the pragmatic philosophic value of pragmatic meaning will always be qualified, conditional and ontologically subordinated, having the same effect upon the standing of pragmatism as a philosophy as well. Moreover, I shall endeavor to show that when the Kantian paradigm is finally abandoned, pragmatism's classic difficulties with realism and what Peircc called “the long run” of scientific inquiry can also be resolved. Kantian “powers of the mind” and constructivist “epistemological optimism” would then be transformed into what I shall call unrestricted pragmatism. On the other hand if the Kantian impediment is not overcome, these difficulties will continue to form the basis of a more sceptical and traditionally restricted pragmatism, one which lacks the confidence desired by both Rockmore and myself. (shrink)

Elements... is a collection of seventeen, rather informal talks closely dependent on the aristotelian and thomist metaphysical setting. The author explicitly disregards a historical approach to the subject and in an essentially systematic way tries to argue in favor of a metaphysically pluralist and epistemologically optimist - realist solution. These two options constitute, therefore, the specific limits of the textbook.

Using a comprehensive quotation from a book of Władysław Krajewski a characteristic of moderate scientism (to be called scientism below) is given. That is the stance I share with Krajewski. I complement the characteristic presenting scientism as an approved by me "naive trust in science". In the main part of the paper I discuss, however, the limitations imposed by contemporary science on the traditional epistemological optimism of scientism.

Fallibilism is a precondition for the conversation between culturally distinct philosophies that comparative philosophy tries to bring about. Without an acknowledgement that our own tradition’s claims may be incomplete or mistaken, we would have no reason to engage members of other communities. Were the early Confucians fallibilists? While some contemporary commentators have seen fallibilism as an essential characteristic of the Confucian tradition, others have argued that the tradition is characterized instead by an “epistemological optimism,” and must be substantially (...) revised if it is to meet the challenges of the modern world. What both sets of commentators have in common is that they see fallibilism as a kind of intellectual virtue. If, to adapt a statement from Peirce, fallibilism’s consequences are antagonistic to Confucianism, then so much the worse for Confucianism. In this paper, I want to look at the issue of fallibilism in the central text of Confucianism, the Analects. At the heart of this text I find a puzzle that complicates both of the above-mentioned views. Confucius’ teachings advocate personal humility, flexibility, and listening to others, on the one hand, while at the same time considering the central teachings themselves to be infallible. In the first half of the paper I look at some textual evidence that shows that Confucius advocates a fallibility of persons but not a full-fledged epistemic one, and in the second half I give an explanation of why this is the case. (shrink)

A ‘pious pessimism’ pervaded much of archaic Greek poetry: ‘It is for the gods to know and men merely to opine’ was the prevailing sentiment. However, in the late 6th century a set of independent-minded individuals began to move away from the older pessimism to embrace a more optimistic and secular outlook. In various ways they maintained that mere mortals could, if they were prepared to undertake the appropriate inquiries, achieve a clear and sure understanding of the entire cosmos. Heraclitus (...) and Parmenides offered the most detailed lines of investigation, but both Pythagoras and Empedocles presented themselves as savants able and willing to impart their wisdom to all those prepared to listen to and embrace their teachings. Among the most important elements in this transition were the concepts of phusis or the essential nature of a th’ing, and the logos or rational account in which that nature could be formulated. -/- . (shrink)

This article explores Kierkegaard’s largely overlooked 1838 paper “Telegraph Messages from a Mousvoyant to a Clairvoyant concerning the Relation between Xnty and Philosophy,” and argues that it can be read as a polemic against the speculative unity of philosophy and Christianity and speculative thought’s epistemological optimism, especially targeting the Danish speculative theologian Hans Lassen Martensen. It will be suggested that the “Telegraph Messages” offer a corrective to this view by separating Christianity and philosophy and underlining the ambiguity of (...) human existence and the paradoxicality of the religious sphere, thus foreshadowing key themes in Kierkegaard’s mature pseudonymous authorship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's EducatorDaniel SchumanChristopher Janaway, Editor. Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 293. Cloth, $65.00.Considering how many English language studies of Nietzsche's thought exist, it is quite remarkable that more has not been written on the question of the influence that Arthur Schopenhauer, his self-described "educator," had on his philosophy. The essays in this important volume (...) go a long way toward filling this vacancy in Nietzsche (and Schopenhauer) scholarship. Christopher Janaway has assembled an impressive group of articles that, taken together, effectively reveal the complexity and depth of Nietzsche's Schopenhauerian inheritance. This collection is both focused and comprehensive. These essays deal with almost all of the major points of agreement and contention between these two philosophers without exaggerating the influence of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche.In his introduction and contributing essay, Janaway highlights some of the general ways in which Schopenhauer exerted an influence on Nietzsche throughout his philosophical development. Janaway argues that despite Nietzsche's steadfast rejection of Schopenhauer's metaphysics there are important ways in which he remained indebted to his mentor even in his later works. For instance, though Schopenhauer embraces the mystical ideal of freeing the intellect from the will, it is his view that in the phenomenal realm the intellect is essentially an instrument of the will. According to Janaway, this claim that the intellect must be "rooted in a living, striving entity" had a profound [End Page 133] influence on Nietzsche's later thought, especially on his 'perspectivism' (35). The second essay in this volume, contributed by Maudemarie Clark, makes the similar claim that Nietzsche's ideas regarding truth and knowledge are grounded in the naturalistic conception of intellect he inherited from Schopenhauer. Clark claims Schopenhauer's philosophy, once divested of its more extreme metaphysical aspects, can be understood as a form of empiricism in which all knowing is "rooted in affect" (74). This is an idea that Clark also takes to be at the heart of Nietzsche's perspectivism.Other essays deal with two issues that were of primary importance to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: aesthetics and morality. Ivan Soll compares their respective aesthetic theories and argues that their views regarding the significance of art are not as dissimilar as Nietzsche himself claimed. They both see art "through the lens of life" and as a way of responding to the suffering that characterizes human existence. However, whereas Schopenhauer sees art as a means of denying the will to life, Nietzsche sees it as means of affirming life in the face of suffering. Like Soll, David Cartwright argues that Nietzsche embraces Schopenhauer's stance on the pervasiveness of suffering in human life. From this standpoint he examines both Nietzsche's criticisms and appropriation of certain elements of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy. Cartwright cleverly argues that Nietzsche's scathing critique of Schopenhauer's asceticism and morality of Mitleid actuallyrelies upon Schopenhauer's methodology and incorporates elements of his pessimism.Pessimism is dealt with in more detail in the essays by Kathleen Higgins and David Berman. Higgins claims that Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's basic conceptions of will are actually quite similar. Both philosophers understand and interpret life in fundamentally voluntaristic terms. However, the two philosophers part ways when it comes to how will is characterized. Schopenhauer's pessimism and Nietzsche's relative optimism, Higgins claims, spring more from a difference in the temperament of the two thinkers, rather than a difference in their conceptions of will. In his essay, David Berman reinforces Higgins' view that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche share the same basic understanding of will even though their evaluations of it differ. However, Berman claims that Nietzsche came to see Schopenhauer as a closet epistemological optimist whose purported pessimism was "being used to protect and insulate him from the world's pain" (190). It is Berman's view that Nietzsche's self-proclaimed recognition of Schopenhauer's pessimism as a kind of "self-deceived" optimism actually cleared the way for Nietzsche to develop his philosophy of power and life affirmation. Whereas Schopenhauer retreats into the false comfort of resignation and denial, Nietzsche's... (shrink)

In their recent paper, “Epistemology for Beginners: Two to Five-Year-Old Children’s Representation of Falsity,” Olivier Mascaro and Olivier Morin study the ontogeny of a naïve understanding of truth in humans. Their paper is fascinating for several reasons, but most striking is their claim (given a rather optimistic reading of epistemology) that toddlers as young as two can, at times, recognize false from true assertions. Their Optimistic Epistemology Hypothesis holds that children seem to have an innate capacity to represent a state (...) of affairs truthfully. In the following paper, I investigate the problems this research poses for deflationist theories of truth. Richard Rorty and Huw Price hold that the best way to understand truth or “the truth” is to understand the necessary conditions required for assertoric practice. Both philosophers present unique and very different deflationary theories when it comes to construing truth. I argue that neither philosopher’s approach is successful because they focus on truth and fail to recognize truthfulness as a norm of assertoric practice. I show that truthfulness is the elusive third norm of claim-based discourse and is consistent with Mascaro and Morin’s findings. (shrink)

Resumen En la filosofía de Lakatos existe una tensión entre falibilismo y optimismo epistemológico. En el presente artículo propongo la reconstrucción de dos elementos clave para resolver positivamente esa tensión: una noción de verdad empírica, que neutralice el convencionalismo, y una noción de verdad parcial, que dé cuenta de la creciente verosimilitud de los programas de investigación. Para esto último, reviso un aspecto de la obra de Lakatos frecuentemente ignorado por los críticos: su posición en el debate acerca de las (...) leyes de la naturaleza.There is a tension between fallibilism and epistemological optimism in Lakatos’s philosophy. This article proposes the reconstruction of two key elements to positively resolve such tension: a notion of empirical truth that could neutralize conventionalism, and a notion of partial truth, capable to account for the increasing verisimilitude of research programs. For the latter, I review one aspect of Lakatos’s work often ignored by the critics: his position on the debate regarding laws of nature. (shrink)

What is the relation between past and present, and what role does historical research, writing and thinking play in regards to that relation? Does it, for instance, primarily record the features of objective breaks and continuities between past and future (as A. Danto has it) or does it rather institute those breaks and continuities (as C. Fasolt has recently argued)? Here I stress that historical understanding is a basic dimension of understanding in general, including understanding of the relation of past (...) and future. Historical research, writing and thinking promise indefinite expansion and qualification of that understanding. In contrast to Danto and with Fasolt, I hold that the possibilities of qualification cannot be definitively foreclosed; against Fasolt I urge an epistemological optimism about the consequences of that admission. (shrink)

Descartes' Meditations do not end up sceptical at all. In fact, the sixth meditation displays an intriguing epistemological optimism. Descartes affirms without reservation that knowledge of the external world is possible. The antisceptical argument at the end of the Meditations is often interpreted as a refutation of dream scepticism, with the conclusion that a person in the waking state can also determine that he or she is awake. We examine the logic of the argument in detail and find (...) that this is not the point. Our reconstruction shows that the question of waking or dreaming which seems to be so crucial for Descartes can even be dropped from his argument. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to Nikolay Lossky who was one of the leading Russian philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. We demonstrate the interrelationship between three aspects of Lossky’s philosophy: realism in the theory of knowledge, hierarchical personalism, and supra-naturalistic concept of evolution. We pay attention to the contemporary relevance of Lossky, and we discuss and critique his ideas in light of those of other philosophers. Lossky acknowledges that the subject interacts with being itself and that knowledge (...) is not a shadow or copy of being. His ontology is based on intuitivism and epistemological optimism. Its main categories are God, as the super-systematic principle, and monads. In Lossky’s metaphysics, the idea of abstract ideal principles of being is quite harmoniously combined with personalism. Lossky’s ontology has strong ethical underpinnings. He considers that values are rooted in being and that the evolution of the world is directed by God towards the good. Lossky elaborates a supra-naturalistic concept of evolution. He extrapolates principles of teleological determination, which are fundamental to human existence, on the underlying levels of the world as a whole. Many trends of modern thought are in tune with Lossky’s philosophy, including a return to metaphysics, panpsychism, Platonism, and the desire to unite the religious worldview with new scientific discoveries. (shrink)

The movement for the revival of the Scholastic tradition (Neo-Scholasticism) was a reaction to devastating criticism by the representatives of Enlightenment which led to the destruction of traditional metaphysics and of epistemological optimism, the two pillars of European religious philosophy. Reception of Kantian ideas in Neo-Scholasticism varied from total rejection to its use in renewing the philosophical foundation of religious philosophy. In this regard the legacy of the Polotsk Jesuit Academy was one of the first attempts to interpret (...) Kant’s ideas and confront them in the framework of the Scholastic tradition. It is therefore not irrelevant to look at how Kant’s programmatic ideas were perceived at the Polotsk Jesuit Academy, one of the few centres of Jesuit philosophy that survived in the territory of the Russian Empire in the early nineteenth century. The object of this study is the attempt at a critical analysis of Kant made in the Philosophical Instructions for Students at the Polotsk Academy by the Academy’s professor, Giuseppe Angiolini. Angiolini constantly refers to Kant in his reasoning and sees him as his main ideological rival. The ideas articulated in the Philosophical Instructions influenced the philosophical positions of the Academy’s graduates who in turn made a tangible contribution to the development of the Belarusian intellectual tradition. The relationship between Kant’s ideas and the ideas Angiolini drew from the Scholastic tradition is analysed through the use of the concepts that are common to both trends, such as the transcendental, the empirical and the sensible, self-evident truths and common sense. (shrink)