Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the (...) constitutive elements of one’s life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the (...) contrast between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives involved in virtue and in its practice as understood by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us. (shrink)

Presenting a contemporary interpretation of stoicism, the essay draws on Agnes Heller's philosophy of existential choice in order to outline a reconstructed stoic theory of happiness and a pneumatic ethics addressing the context and dynamics of cybernetically structured societies in which vocational (professional) ethics play a declining role.

By the third millennium of its history, humanity has experienced most of the possible ideas, projects, utopias of achievement of social happiness, the basis of which is freedom: freedom as a social phenomenon, individual freedom, that is, existential.

In this brilliant and revolutionary collection of fourteen major essays that draw from more than twenty-five years of painstaking research, M. Guy Thompson regales us with a stunning revisioning of conventional psychoanalysis that deepens our understanding of the human condition. Integrating the most seminal existentialist philosophers, including Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, with the most forward thinking psychoanalysts over the past century, including Freud, Laing, Bion, Winnicott, and Lacan, Thompson offers a profound yet deeply personal vision of what psychoanalysis can be (...) in the twenty-first century.In this fascinating volume, Thompson explores such concepts as experience, authenticity, will, happiness, and agency by utilizing a wide range of thinkers, including the ancient Greeks, but always in his singular voice. Exquisitely lucid and engaging to read, Thompson deftly lures us into thoughtful and enlightening territory typically inaccessible to the general reader. This compelling integration of continental philosophy and psychoanalysis will be of interest not only to psychoanalytic practitioners of all persuasions, but to psychotherapists generally and their patients, as well as philosophers, social scientists, and any student of the human condition. (shrink)

Kant's ideas about, questions, and challenges to the Western tradition of philosophy reverberate into the third century of the reception of his texts. The writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the twentieth-century French existential and hermeneutic phenomenologist, are interlaced with engagements with Kant's ideas. Often these incidents are marked by Merleau-Ponty's critique, yet there is a noticeable recurrence of his efforts to contend with Kant's philosophy. In Merleau-Ponty's course notes, Nature (2002), he wrestles with Kant's version of nature in the Critique (...) of Judgment (1790), specifically citing ?the happy accident? between sensibility and the understanding. This opens upon realms of metaphysical thought that remain deeply contentious within Kantian scholarship. An interrogation of this ?happy accident? leads to insights about Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of an existentialized metaphysics the implications of which shed light on theology and the judgment of God. (shrink)

Ricœur lectured and wrote for over twenty years on negation (‘Do I understand something better if I know what it is not, and what is not-ness?') and never published his extensive writings on this subject. Ricœur concluded that there are multiple forms of negation; it can, for example, be the other person (Plato), the not knowable nature of our world (Kant), the included opposite (Hegel), apophatic spirituality (Plotinus on not being able to know God) and existential nothingness (Sartre). Ricœur, (...) working on Kant, Hegel and Sartre, decided that all these forms of negation are incompatible and also fatally flawed because they fail to resolve false binaries of negative: positive. Alison Scott-Baumann demonstrates how Ricœur subsequently incorporated negation into his linguistic turn, using dialectics, metaphor, narrative, parable and translation in order to show how negation is in us, not outside us: language both creates and clarifies false binaries. He bestows upon negation a strong and central role in the human condition, and its inevitability is reflected in his writings, if we look carefully. Ricœur and the Negation of Happiness draws on Ricœur's published works, previously unavailable archival material and many other sources. Alison Scott-Baumann argues that thinking positively is necessary but not sufficient for aspiring to happiness - what is also required is affirmation of negative impulses: we know we are split by contradictions and still try to overcome them. She also demonstrates the urgency of analysing current socio-cultural debates about wellbeing, education and equality, which rest insecurely upon our loose use of the negative as a category mistake. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre argues that human beings are fundamentally incomplete. Self-consciousness brings with it a presence-to-self. Human beings consequently seek two things at the same time: to possess a secure and stable identity, and to preserve the freedom and distance that come with self-consciousness. This is an impossible ideal, since we are always beyond what we are and we never quite reach what we could be. The possibility of completion haunts us and we continue to search for it even when we (...) are convinced it can never be achieved. Sartre suggests that we have to continue seeking this ideal in the practical sphere, even when our philosophical reflection shows it to be an impossibility. Sartre puts this existential dilemma in explicitly theological terms. 'God' represents an ideal synthesis of being and consciousness which remains a self-contradictory goal. This dilemma remains unresolved in his thinking. (shrink)

Albert Camus and Rachel Bespaloff had an undeniable influence on the existential thought of the twentieth century. The former, by claiming the world to be silent to our search for meaning, based the concept of happiness in the inherent value of life. The latter grounded her happiness in music and transcendence rather than in the acceptance of the absurd human condition, though the two thinkers seem to agree on the importance of subjective contemplation. In this article, I (...) will offer a reading of Camus’s works that emphasizes his view of happiness in awareness of the absurd. I will then argue for the ethical and political challenges that such happiness causes. Finally, by putting into dialogue the philosophies of Camus and Bespaloff, I wish to show that the two thinkers advocate for the possibility of happiness despite the suffering of the world, and show that this concept, understood as contemplation, can be rooted in the absurd as well as in transcendence. (shrink)

This essay narrates what I have learned from Søren Kierkegaard & John Dewey about teaching philosophy. It consists of three sections: 1) a Deweyan pragmatist’s translation of Kierkegaard’s religious insights on Christianity, as a way of life, into ethical insights on philosophy, as a way of life; 2) a brief description of the introductory course that I teach most frequently: Ethics, Happiness, & The Good Life; and 3) an exploration of three spiritual exercises from the course: a) self-cultivation by (...) means of writing in an Ethics Notebook, b) an “existential experiment” in which we practice one of Aristotle’s virtues for a week, and c) a 15-hour service-learning component. (shrink)

Shestov's name appears from time to time in existentialist literature. Camus, for example, refers approvingly to Shestov in The Myth of Sisyphus: "Shestov... tracks down, illuminates, and magnifies the human revolt against the irremediable." Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy was translated earlier into French and into Danish in 1947, and German in 1949. The Danes received Shestov's book with great appreciation, and were particularly happy about his attempt to relate Kierkegaard to such diverse thinkers as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Hegel, (...) Spinoza, Luther, and others. And that is what Shestov's work on Kierkegaard is fundamentally all about, an attempt to place Kierkegaard in the history of philosophical and theological thought. Shestov is appreciative of Kierkegaard as the great champion of the revelational character of the Christian faith. Revelation stands over against reason, and the truths of one cannot be reconciled with the truths of the other. Shestov attempts to set in opposition the proponents of a rationalistic philosophy, Socrates, Spinoza, Hegel, and Kant, and the advocates of Biblical faith, Job, Abraham, Paul, Luther, and Kierkegaard, arguing that a reconciliation is impossible. One must choose to live the life of "the knight of faith," rather than attempt to find answers to, or reasons for, life's ambiguities. The author employs a methodological device much in vogue among Kierkegaard scholars in the 30s and 40s, i.e., he employs Kierkegaard's own life and experiences as a model to analyze and clarify theological conundrums. Kierkegaard's unhappiness is related to the human problem of suffering, just as Kierkegaard attempts at knowledge fail because he had forgotten the Biblical truth that "all that is not faith is sin." Finally, man must reject Spinoza's injunction "Do not laugh, do not weep, do not condemn, but understand." Not understanding, but faith. Kierkegaard's own life reveals an alternation between those polar opposites.--W. A. J. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Background Theory of Delusion and Existential PhenomenologyRichard G. T. Gipps (bio) and John Rhodes (bio)KeywordsPhenomenology, psychological explanation, epistemology, schizophreniaSituating and Clarifying the PaperThe commentaries of Nassir Ghaemi and Giovanni Stanghellini help to sketch out the intellectual landscape of philosophical perspectives in psychiatry, and situate our paper within it. A happy convergence between the analytical philosophy perspective from which we were writing, and the existential–phenomenological paradigm described (...) by both authors, is the result. Stanghellini in particular carefully describes three main theories of existential deformations, tracing delusion formation back to either (i) a disturbance of meaning synthesis conceived as a dysfunction of a Husserlian consciousness, (ii) a disturbance of pre-reflective self-consciousness resulting in a kind of paralyzing hyperreflexivity, and (iii) (Stanghellini’s preferred model) a disturbance of embodiment. This final account views delusion as springing from a failure in the subject’s corporeal and praxical being-in-the-world. As the subject’s practical, pre-reflective grip on the world is loosened, so their minds become unconstrained by that understanding and practical rationality immanent within that grip, and thought, now unconstrained, starts to travel through delusional worlds. Stanghellini accordingly views our model as an example of a disembodiment theory, which allows it to overcome the disadvantages of the first two models, which may both, in their own ways, overvalue the rôle of (disturbances of) reflective consciousness in the formation (and delusional deformation) of everyday understanding.Being situated within a preexisting landscape has both its benefits and its disbenefits, the principle example of the latter being the potential assimilation of anything new to what has already been said. Thus, although we are grateful to our commentators for placing us on the larger historical and conceptual map, it may be helpful to briefly rehearse our motivations for drawing on the philosophical ideas of the Bedrock and Background in our theory of delusion. Our paper was primarily motivated by a concern that current, psychologically mainstream, cognitive models of delusion, although helpfully drawing our attention to common reasoning and perceptual deficits in the person with psychosis, fail to adequately account for what is delusional about delusions. It was, in [End Page 321] particular, to account for the certainty with which the deluded person clings to often quite extraordinary beliefs that we drew on the epistemological notion of the background. And although this epistemological notion fits quite neatly with ontological concerns regarding the embodied and praxical character of human existence, it is the particular epistemic rôle that it played in our theory—to do with the extraratiocinative constraint on judgement provided by the Background—that we wish to stress here.We return to this shortly, but first wish to comment briefly on two specific considerations raised by the commentaries. The first concerns Stanghellini’s claim that, for us, “when studying delusions, the focus should be on providing an adequate framework for understanding, rather than providing empirical hypotheses to be tested” (2008, 311–314). It seems to us, however, that both are equally important. What we wished to stress, however, was that empirical hypothesis testing may be led astray if it is not informed by an adequate framework for understanding. For example, most cognitive psychological experiments on delusions concern themselves with the individual’s ability to make appropriate guesses (e.g., regarding the color of beads in a bag), and their tendency to jump to conclusions; they do not concern themselves with the kinds of extraordinary conviction and certainty met with in delusion. The risk run by empirical researchers of cognitive factors in delusion is that a lack of a prior adequate theorization of delusion makes for accounts that are ultimately only of the formation, not of delusion in particular but rather of false or unusual beliefs more generally. An analytical approach, however, can help to explicate the ways in which the psychiatric concept of delusion fails to be adequately characterized by the quite general ‘external criteria’ of delusion (as Jaspers [1963] called them: falsity, stubbornness, uncommon), and aids in the construction of empirical hypotheses this time constrained by an understanding of the true ‘internal criteria’ of psychotic belief. Such an approach helps to spell out the... (shrink)

This study contends that existentialism is the perennial philosophy thus going against the assumption that it is a school of more recent provenance. Anthologies or introductory texts used begin with Kierkegaard and go on to emphasize Nietzsche, Sartre, and Heidegger. This book reflects a more catholic mapping, including three thinkers from the classical period , who are argued to be just as 'existential' as more modern thinkers and indeed influence the latter in important ways. Also included are three Americans (...) who are rarely considered existentialists. Furthermore, the book has a pedagogical emphasis, reflecting students' points-of-view: what they learn, how they react, questions they have, and how in general existentialism meets their education needs and expectations. It is, therefore, necessarily interdisciplinary in character, pointing out implications of existentialism for education, concerns like happiness, war and peace, democracy, sexuality, and terrorism. (shrink)

Bringing readers from aww to awful! in a matter of seconds, I Don't Really Love You seamlessly blends images of charming pets with hilarious, soul-crushing captions about the existential dread that seems to permeate daily life. Darkly humorous one-liners, from "Birthdays don't matter" to "Inadequacy haunts me endlessly," will peek out from behind the forms of calm cats and happy-go-lucky puppies, creating an unexpected contrast that takes readers on a journey from delightful to depressing (and back again!) Pet lovers (...) and humor lovers will be captivated in equal measure, with more than 75 full-color photographs of cats and dogs in a range of breeds, alongside an off-beat, subversive voice. With the perfect attitude for our rapidly changing world, this quirky book will make readers laugh out loud (after sending them crawling under the covers to contemplate their existence). (shrink)

What does it mean to be an adult? In this original and compelling work, John Russon answers that question by leading us through a series of rich reflections on the psychological and social dimensions of adulthood and by exploring some of the deepest ethical and existential issues that confront human life: intimacy, responsibility, aging, and death. Using his knowledge of the history of philosophy along with the combined resources of psychology, sociology, and anthropology, he explores the behavioral challenges of (...) becoming an adult and examines the intimate relationships that are integral to healthy development. He also studies our experiences of time and space, which address both aging and the crucial role that our material environments play in the formation of our personalities. Of special note is Russon's provocative assessment of the economic and political contexts of contemporary adult life and the distinctive problems they pose. Engaging and accessible, Adult Life is for anyone seeking the profound lessons our human culture has learned about living well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Crisis of Meaning in Sartor Resartus—Thomas Carlyle's Pioneering Work in Articulating and Addressing the Existential ConfrontationFrank Martelawhat i call an "existential confrontation" is the encounter with the possibility that human life is absurd: created for no purpose and devoid of any lasting value or meaning. It is "the hour of terror at the world's vast meaningless grinding" that William James (Will to Believe 173) examines, described by (...) Todd May (xi) as "the confrontation of our need for meaning with the unwillingness of the Universe to yield it to us." This confrontation with the existential void and the potential absurdity of human existence is often not just an intellectual dilemma, but felt as a deep personal crisis accompanied by melancholia, angst, nausea, or even suicidal thoughts. Young William James confessed in a letter to a friend that "all last winter" he "was on the continual verge of suicide" (quoted in Gunnarsson), writing later that "too much questioning" leads "to the edge of the slope" wherein lies "nightmare or suicidal view of life" (James, "Is Life Worth Living?" 6). Similarly, Leo Tolstoy (54) reports how his inability to identify a lasting meaning of life drove him to a "state of lunacy" where "the best I could do was to hang myself."Despite a few earlier allusions—most famously the Book of Ecclesiastes proclaiming that "all is vanity and a striving after wind," and Shakespeare's Macbeth lamenting that life is "a tale told by an idiot … signifying nothing"—the existential confrontation is predominantly a modern phenomenon (Martela, A Wonderful Life). The modern history of descriptions of existential confrontations start at the turn of the nineteenth century, and includes Søren Kierkegaard's Sickness Unto Death, Leo Tolstoy's A Confession, Fyodor Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, Camus's Outsider, Sartre's Nausea, and T. S.Eliot's The Waste Land.There are many responses that the confrontation with the existential void has generated. Sartre embraced the lack of values imposed from outside and [End Page 80] emphasized human freedom. Human beings are "cast into this world … condemned to be free" without any "luminous realm of values" providing "justification or excuse," as Sartre famously summarized in "Existentialism Is a Humanism" (29). Other responses range from Søren Kierkegaard's leap of faith and William James's will to believe to Albert Camus's happiness from absurdity.While some of the responses end up finding a new way of connecting with God and faith, and others are explicitly atheistic, embracing the "death of God," a common thread in most responses is an acknowledgment of the situatedness of human experience and an emphasis placed on human subjectivity and the opportunity to live one's life more authentically. While existentialism, broadly conceived, is often seen as the central philosophical tradition dealing with the existential void, the confrontation was very much alive in the United States as well, visible in both literature and philosophy. As already alluded, William James had an existential confrontation in his youth, writing about the topic in "Is Life Worth Living" and other essays in Will to Believe. There has also been much back-and-forth between Europe and the United States around these themes, with the influences crossing the Atlantic on many occasions. For example, William James cites Thomas Carlyle in Will to Believe, while Sartre cites William James in Nausea, when discussing themes related to the existential confrontation. Similarly, Emerson inspired Nietzsche who inspired Josiah Royce. Typically, the histories tracing the early encounters with the existential confrontation acknowledge Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, and Fyodor Dostoevsky as key nineteenth-century predecessors to Existentialism, as all faced directly the question of the meaning of life and the dreadful possibility that life might not have any meaning or value to it.However, there is a key author usually not mentioned in these histories, despite the fact that he played a pivotal role in introducing existentialist themes to the English-speaking audience, coining the phrase "meaning of life" in the English language. Thus, in writing the prehistory of Existentialism, we need to examine Thomas Carlyle and his Sartor Resartus, which has been described by literary historians as "one of... (shrink)

The paper argues that the view that the particular quantifier is ‘existentially loaded’ is a relatively new one historically and that it has become entrenched in modern philosophical logic for less than happy reasons.

우리 사회는 전례 없는 고령화 시대에 접어들었다. 지속적으로 진행되는 노화는 여러 가지 부정적인 감정을 동반한다. 우리가 살아가는 인생의 각 시기는 누구나 자신에게는 처음의 시간이다. 나이가 든다고 저절로 지혜로워지는 것은 아니다. 나이가 들면 우리는 삶의 가장 본질적인 부분을 다루는 철학에 관심을 갖게 마련이다. 반면 우리 사회에서 노년기에 대한 논의는 복지 분야에 집중되어 있기에 보다 풍성한 철학적 담론이 요청된다. 본 논문은 노년이 삶을 예술작품으로 조형함으로써 자존감을 회복하는 길을 모색하고자 한다. 리쾨르에 따르면 자기존중은 곧 자기해석이다. 자존감은 자기가 해석할 수 있는 능력을 가졌으며 선한 (...) 삶을 목표로 심사숙고한 선택을 따를 줄 아는 존재라는 것을 인정할 때 얻어진다. 이는 자신이 선한 삶을 추구하며 살아가는 윤리적 주체임을 증명하는 일이다. 자기존중은 타자를 배려해야 얻을 수 있기에 타자로 말미암아 만들어지는 자기해석이다. 자기해석과 실천이 따를 때 연륜은 성숙과 확장의 능동적인 과정이 되어 예술로서의 삶을 조형하게 될 것이다. 노년은 많은 사회적 관계들보다는 진정성이 있는 소수의 관계에 집중해야 할 때이다. 친애에 대한 해석학적 고찰은 노년담론에서 시사하는 바가 크다. 본고는 리쾨르의 자기성 형성에 있어서 자기존중과 타자배려의 과정에서 드러나는 조화와 새로움의 생성, 신뢰를 지키는 일관성의 맥락이 실존미학으로 귀결될 수 있음을 증명함으로써 노년에게 예술로서의 삶을 제시하고자 한다. (shrink)

Irene McMullin’s Existential Flourishing (Cambridge University Press, 2018) weaves together virtue ethics and existential phenomenology: the influence of Heidegger and Levinas, in particular, is clear throughout. This paper provides a summary of McMullin’s elegantly argued position and raises a number of possible concerns, particularly regarding the interaction of Aristotelian and Phenomenological assumptions. I focus specifically on the role of the 2nd-person perspective, on the links between exemplars and socialisation, and on the problem of those who, as Nietzsche put (...) it, “are both evil and happy – a species on which the moralists are silent”. (shrink)

One of the most influential historians of ancient philosophy of the past half-century, Pierre Hadot was adept at using ancient philosophers to illuminate the relevance of their ideas to contemporary life. This new edition of _The Present Alone is Our Happiness_, which has been significantly revised and expanded to include two previously untranslated essays, is an ideal introduction to some of Hadot's more scholarly work. In it, we discover that to be an Epicurean is not merely to think like one; (...) it is to adopt a way of living where limiting desires is the condition for happiness. Being an Aristotelian, similarly, is to choose a life that involves contemplation, and being a Cynic is to follow Diogenes in his refusal of quotidian convention and the mentality of ordinary people. If so many ancient philosophers founded schools, Hadot explains, it was precisely because they were proposing how to live life on a daily basis. We learn here that the history of philosophy has been something more than just that of a discourse. The founding texts of Greek philosophy, after all, were notes taken from oral exercises undertaken in concrete circumstances and contexts, most often a dialogue between students and specific interlocutors who meant to shed light on their students' real existence. The immense contribution of this book, which also traces Hadot's own personal itinerary in a touching manner, is to remind us, through direct language and numerous examples, what the theoretical aspect of philosophy often masks: its vital and existential dimensions. (shrink)

In this book of brilliantly erudite and precise discussions, Pierre Hadot explains that for the Ancients philosophy was not reducible to the building of a theoretical system: it was above all a choice about how to live one's life. One of the most influential historians of ancient philosophy in the world today, Hadot is adept at using ancient philosophers to illuminate the relevance of their ideas to contemporary life. In this book, which is an ideal introduction to Hadot's more scholarly (...) _What is Ancient Philosophy?_, we learn that to be an Epicurean is not merely to think like one; it is to adopt a way of living where limiting desires is the condition for happiness. Being an Aristotelian, similarly, is to choose a life that involves contemplation, and being a Cynic is to follow Diogenes in his refusal of quotidian convention and the mentality of ordinary people. If so many Ancient philosophers founded schools, Hadot explains, it was precisely because they were proposing how to live life on a daily basis. We learn here that the history of philosophy has been something more than just that of a discourse. The founding texts of Greek philosophy, after all, were notes taken from oral exercises undertaken in concrete circumstances and contexts, most often a dialogue between students and specific interlocutors who meant to shed light on their students' real existence. The immense contribution of this book, which also traces Hadot's own personal itinerary in a touching manner, is to remind us, through direct language and numerous examples, what the theoretical aspect of philosophy often masks: its vital and existential dimensions. (shrink)

Introduction. Observing the production and consumer area of modern cinematography makes it possible to draw conclusions about the value dominants of modern society, to conduct its sociocultural analysis. Cinema, both auteur and mass, is a way of reflecting and modeling the society spiritual state and its analysis makes it possible to draw quite serious and justified philosophical and social conclusions. The film in a philosophical sense is ontologized by the dominant intention of the era. Such a dominant intention of modernity (...) is hedonism. Pleasure, enjoyment, happiness, according to the humanities, is the basic values of the 21st century society. Cinema is the most comprehensive reaction to the needs of hedonism, since hedonistic prerequisites are to some degree laid down in its technical (movement, photographic phenomenology) and social nature (art and entertainment). In this regard, it seems relevant to conduct a philosophical analysis of the ontological level of modern cinema. The aim of the study is to conduct a philosophical analysis of the ontological level of modern cinema; identify ontological models, variations and combinations of which provide its artistic diversity. Methods: the authors use the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, the phenomenological method, since they identify the sensory intentions that underlie modern cinema. The authors also use the hermeneutic method, since they reveal the hidden meanings of the film, determined by the time and conditions of its creation, as well as the semiotic approach, which makes it possible to analyze the structural-semiotic whole of the film. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the fact that the authors analyze films from philosophical aspects, and not just cultural studies, as is customary. In modern cinema, the authors look for a reflection of the “social soul”, identify those intentions that underlie modern cinema, both auteur and mass. This makes it possible to deduce a typology of film models that have not previously been applied to the analysis of the film process. Results. During the analysis, the authors developed a hedonistic-ontological typology of cinematic models, identified five generative models of cinema, four of which have a hedonistic orientation: an alimentary model that pleases the recipient by intensively stimulating his perceptual sphere; a parkour model that gives pleasure to light and unhindered movement, minimizing the severity and resistance of the environment; an arcade model that provides the viewer the pleasure of victory through virtual immersion in the ups and downs of the “action film”; a detective model that gives the viewer pleasure through the removal of cognitive uncertainty. The fifth model, tentatively called existential, should lead the viewer into a complex philosophical state of being-with-self-self, an experience of one’s own fulfillment, associated with the experience of suffering. However, due to the hedonistic orientations of modern culture, this model is not relevant in the first decades of the 21st century. Conclusions. Philosophical analysis of modern cinema has revealed that at the ontological level it is based on the philosophy of hedonism. Modern cinema delivers the following types of pleasures to the recipient: enjoyment of the flesh of the world, enjoyment of bodily freedom in motion, enjoyment of peace, cognitive enjoyment. (shrink)

“Separation/disassociation from what is dear is suffering . . . ” declares the first noble truth of suffering, in a statement that is overwhelming in its decisiveness and scope, encompassing both the severance of ties to loved ones and the discontinuity of any attempt to hold on to what is pleasant or liked. However, in first-millennium Indian Sanskrit classical lore, Buddhist not excepted, separation comes to mean and convey much more—in terms of emotional phenomena—than just suffering. It is understood in (...) terms of diverse and sometimes excluding emotional phenomena, which are experienced under different (and sometimes contrastive) contexts. In Sanskrit belletristic literature and aesthetics, where lovers’ experience of “love in separation” is listed under the rubric of the erotic emotion, separation comes with its own particular sub-moods, typical landscapes, and associated practices, all of which are extended also under virahabhakti to the religious realm and the highly aestheticized relations with the divine. And in the case of philosophical texts and themes connected with Śramaṇic ideology, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike, a sense of doom regarding one’s impending demise and the inevitable separation from all that is dear becomes a dominant mood, and carries with it normative and moral prescriptions, a theorization of action, and a particular kind of perceptual salience. These various outlooks on separation, however, are not unrelated, and often both come into play within the confines of a single work. This is especially true in the case of the Buddhist belletristic poetical works (mahākāvya) of Aśvaghoṣa (second century CE ), Life of the Buddha (Buddhacarita, BC) and Beautiful Nanda (Saundarananda, SN), in which separation—and here I refer primarily to the term viprayoga in both its concrete sense as the separation from loved ones and its broader existential sense—features as a central theme. Exploring the range of meanings and dynamic use of the term within Aśvaghoṣa’s SN, the first part of this article provides a brief theoretical framework with which to approach Aśvaghoṣa’s understanding of separation and its relation to the emotions. In this regard, I argue that separation, more than just an umbrella term for a cluster of associated feelings and emotions, serves as a unique emotional context—prescribing specific kinds of perceptual and moral saliency, practices and regimes of the self—under which emotional phenomena become meaningful. As such, its analysis may also contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussion about the adequacy of using the very category of emotion in the context of Buddhist literature. Drawing on this framework and focusing on Aśvaghoṣa’s BC, the second part of the article turns to deal specifically with the role he allocates in the work to philosophical moral arguments regarding separation. Through analysis of the workings of a particular recurrent argument that I will call “the argument from separation,” I argue that, in addition to its role in justifying Buddhist ideology, it functions in Aśvaghoṣa’s BC primarily as a self-therapy of the emotions. (shrink)

Bart Schultz argues that utilitarian philosophy must be decolonized and reimagined for the current moment: a time of new and looming existential threats, in a world desperate for social change. Where dominant ethical and political approaches have failed to adequately deal with the enormous challenges we face, utilitarianism - as a set of lived practices, not simply a theoretical construction - may hold out some hope of seriously addressing them. Drawing on alternatives to the well-known Eurocentric story of utilitarianism (...) (and an extensive review and critique of that story) and incorporating the works of Peter Singer, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, Derek Parfit, Martha Nussbaum, and other major philosophers, Schultz crafts a groundbreaking new framework of utilitarianism born of struggle and resistance. (shrink)

This study aimed to explore the role of two models of well-being in the prediction of psychological distress during the COVID-19 pandemic, namely PERMA and mature happiness. According to PERMA, well-being is mainly composed of five elements: positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning in life, and achievement. Instead, mature happiness is understood as a positive mental state characterized by inner harmony, calmness, acceptance, contentment, and satisfaction with life. Rooted in existential positive psychology, this harmony-based happiness represents the (...) result of living in balance between positive and negative aspects of one's life. We hypothesized that mature happiness would be a more prominent protective factor during the present pandemic than the PERMA composite. A total of 12,203 participants from 30 countries responded to an online survey including the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21), the PERMA-Profiler, and the Mature Happiness Scale-Revised (MHS-R). Confirmatory factor analyses indicated that PERMA and mature happiness were highly correlated, but nonetheless, they represented two separate factors. After controlling for demographic factors and country-level variables, both PERMA Well-being and MHS-R were negative predictors of psychological distress. Mature happiness was a better predictor of stress, anxiety, and general distress, while PERMA showed a higher prediction of depression. Mature happiness moderated the relation between the perceived noxious effects of the pandemic and all markers of distress (depression, anxiety, stress, and total DASS-21). Instead, PERMA acted as a moderator in the case of depression and stress. These findings indicate that inner harmony, according to the mature happiness theory, is an essential facet of well-being to be taken into consideration. The results of this study can also orient policies aimed to alleviate the negative effects of the pandemic on mental health through the promotion of well-being. (shrink)

In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser’s theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, (...) while Aquinas believes that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas’ theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach. (shrink)

In almost every aspect of life, human being always tries to seek happiness. At the same time, we tend to avoid situations which may lead to unhappiness. In fact, there are two undeniable phenomena that negate this tendency, namely, first, happiness has become a commodity that is packaged, advertised, and marketed. Second, despair and other forms of crisis often understood as the antithesis of happiness are actually the existential experiences of every human being. This obsession towards (...) happiness has also infiltrated into education system so that education is understood as some kind of means providing solutions in order to overcome these forms of unhappiness and despair. In disagreement with it, based on Søren Kierkegaard's ideas, especially in Kierkegaard’s work entitled The Sickness unto Death, Peter Roberts argues that education should embrace despair because apart from being inevitable, despair does not always need to be understood as a problem that requires a solution. Education should not try to overcome it. On the contrary, education should work with it so that humans as despair beings are enabled to understand, identify, acknowledge, and discuss it. This idea is an invitation for every person to critically reflect on despair and to rethink the role of education in such crisis circumstances. For this reason, a revitalization of the pedagogical paradigm is necessary, for example by applying political pedagogy through critical discourse analysis methods that do not tend to remain muted in the face of existential despair, as well as injustice and any other social problems occurred structurally. Abstrak Hampir dalam setiap lini kehidupan, manusia senantiasa mencari kebahagiaan dan di saat yang sama menghindar dari situasi yang mengarah pada ketidakbahagiaan. Padahal, ada dua fenomena yang tak terbantahkan dan menegasi kecenderungan tersebut, yaitu pertama, kebahagiaan telah menjadi layaknya komoditas yang diperjualbelikan, dikemas, dan diiklankan. Kedua, kenestapaan dan bentuk-bentuk krisis lainnya yang sering kali dipahami sebagai antitesis dari kebahagiaan itu sebenarnya merupakan pengalaman eksistensial setiap manusia. Tendensi yang obsesif terhadap kebahagiaan itu juga telah merasuk ke dalam bidang pendidikan sehingga pendidikan dipahami sebagai sarana yang dapat memberi solusi agar dapat mengatasi bentuk-bentuk ketidakbahagiaan dan kenestapaan itu. Terhadap perkara di atas, dengan mendasarkan diri pada gagasan Søren Kierkegaard terutama yang dituangkan dalam The Sickness unto Death, Peter Roberts berargumentasi bahwa pendidikan justru seharusnya memeluk kenestapaan itu karena selain tak terelakkan, kenestapaan tidak perlu selalu dipahami sebagai masalah yang membutuhkan solusi. Pendidikan seharusnya tidak mencoba menghindari realitas kenestapaan, tetapi menanggapinya sehingga manusia sebagai pengada yang nestapa dimungkinkan untuk memahami, mengidentifikasi, mengakui, dan membahasakan keadaan krisis itu. Gagasan tersebut merupakan undangan bagi setiap manusia, bukan hanya bagi pelaku pendidikan, untuk secara kritis berefleksi mengenai kenestapaan dan untuk berpikir ulang mengenai kodrat serta peran pendidikan di tengah situasi krisis. Untuk itu, suatu revitalisasi terhadap paradigma pedagogis menjadi perlu, misalnya dengan menerapkan pedagogi politis melalui metode analisis wacana kritis yang tidak cenderung bungkam di hadapan kenestapaan yang eksistensial, maupun di hadapan ketidakadilan dan ketidakberesan sosial yang sering kali terjadi secara struktural. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to explore an analogy between logic and ethics, as Wittgenstein understands them in the Tractatus. First, I argue that Wittgenstein regards logic as a condition of the possibility of meaning, in the sense that logic makes meaningful language and thought possible. Second, I ask why Wittgenstein calls both logic and ethics ‘transcendental’. I suggest that, while logic is a condition of the possibility of semantic meaning, ethics is a condition of the possibility of (...) class='Hi'>existential meaning. Without ethics, life could not be meaningful. Third, I show that harmony and agreement play a crucial role in Wittgenstein’s accounts of logic and ethics. A meaningful proposition can be true or false, a meaningful life can be happy or unhappy, and both truth and happiness consist in some kind of harmony or agreement with reality. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of understanding of calling in the works of Skovoroda and its significance for the world-views and life choices of contemporary people. The current crisis phenomena are explicated in the light of the points of Skovoroda’s philosophy on the disparity between material and spiritual dimensions of human existence, irrelevance of work, devaluation of self-knowledge, individualism, and consumerism. The result is spiritual slavery and inability of people to respond to the challenges of contemporaneity. According to (...) Skovoroda’s principle of self-knowledge, a person has to hear the internal call of existential truth or “God’s Spirit” which motivates for work, public service, and moral improvement. The author explicates 3 semantic levels in Skovoroda’s philosophy of calling: individual, social, and spiritual. By Skovoroda, calling appears as a natural desire to act in a certain sphere, but its end is in the Kingdom of God. The author presents the results of the research of the experience of calling of contemporary Ukrainians and explicates the typology of that experience. The article states that the revealed structure of calling “desire-abilities-realization-good” corresponds in general with the understanding of calling by Skovoroda. Therefore, this structure is constant over time. Nevertheless and contrary to the ethics of Skovoroda, nowadays, the motivation of self-development prevails over the value of care for common good and spiritual goals in understanding of calling. The comparison of the experience of calling in the minds of student youth in Ukraine and in the USA confirms its identity on the basis of common Judaic-Christian tradition. The differences in the contemporary understanding of calling are determined along the lines of religiosity versus secularity, and Protestantism versus Eastern Christianity. In particular, noted moral rigorism of the protestant understanding of calling as an obligation, whereas Jews and the other Christians conceive calling in the forms of light, easiness, and happiness. The author reasoned the significant motivating and pedagogical capability of the idea of calling in the contemporary world. The article emphasizes the importance of Skovoroda’s critical philosophic attitude towards individualism and consumerism in the direction of overcoming problems of environment, particularly of climate change induced by unstoppable growth of energy consumption, and of anthropological crisis. (shrink)

Author: Konstańczak Stefan Title: EXISTENTIAL MEANING OF SUFFERING IN AXIOLOGY OF WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ (Egzystencjalne znaczenie cierpienia w aksjologii Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 629-642 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, ETHICS, SUFFERING, HAPPINESS, INJUSTICE, MORAL COMPENSATION, MINIMIZING OF SUFFERING, HAPPINESS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The problem of human suffering was not the subject of a separate publication by Władysław Tatarkiewicz. However, such theme matter appeared (...) in a few of his important publications, including his post-doctoral thesis “On inexorability of the good”, after-war publication “On happiness” and a small treatise “Ethical bases of revindication and compensation” justifying Polish claims for reparations after the warfare. Tatarkiewicz made a distinction between physical and spiritual suffering, but each one was always considered as a bad thing. War experience changed his attitude in this matter and therefore he admitted that it is impossible to eliminate suffering from human life and hence he claimed that one can experience happiness even in spite of some negative sensations. Age is not an obstacle to feel it either. However, he pointed out that undeserved suffering justifiably demands a compensation and the lack of it or evasion from redressing the wrong are immoral. One cannot evade a duty of minimizing of suffering because even personal suffering cannot be the reason of drawing back from moral duties fulfillment. (shrink)

I argue that Spinoza endorses "conceptual dependence monism," the thesis that all forms of metaphysical dependence (such as causation, inherence, and existential dependence) are conceptual in kind. In the course of explaining the view, I further argue that it is actually presupposed in the proof for his more famed substance monism. Conceptual dependence monism also illuminates several of Spinoza’s most striking metaphysical views, including the intensionality of causal contexts, parallelism, metaphysical perfection, and explanatory rationalism. I also argue that this (...) priority of the conceptual does not commit Spinoza to forms of idealism or mentalism. The question of how to understand different kinds of metaphysical dependence is quite controversial in Spinoza studies; I address major alternative readings in the notes. But there I also try to draw connections to the growing debate in contemporary discussions about metaphysical dependence, as this topic is a happy point of shared interest between Spinoza and contemporary metaphysicians alike. (shrink)

If we are material beings living in a material world -- and all the scientific evidence suggests that we are -- then we must find existential meaning, if there is such a thing, in this physical world. We must cast our lot with the natural rather than the supernatural. Many Westerners with spiritual inclinations are attracted to Buddhism -- almost as a kind of moral-mental hygiene. But, as Owen Flanagan points out in The Bodhisattva's Brain, Buddhism is hardly naturalistic. (...) In _The Bodhisattva's Brain_, Flanagan argues that it is possible to discover in Buddhism a rich, empirically responsible philosophy that could point us to one path of human flourishing. Some claim that neuroscience is in the process of validating Buddhism empirically, but Flanagan's naturalized Buddhism does not reduce itself to a brain scan showing happiness patterns. "Buddhism naturalized," as Flanagan constructs it, offers instead a fully naturalistic and comprehensive philosophy, compatible with the rest of knowledge -- a way of conceiving of the human predicament, of thinking about meaning for finite material beings living in a material world. (shrink)

Why do people persist in commitments that threaten their happiness, security, and comfort? Why do some of our most central, identity-defining commitments resist the effects of reasoning and critical reflection? Drawing on real-life examples, empirical psychology, and philosophical reflection, this book argues that these commitments involve an ethical stance called devotion, which plays a pervasive—but often hidden—role in human life. Devotion typically involves sacralizing certain values, goals, or relationships. To sacralize a value is to treat it as inviolable (trade-offs (...) with ordinary values are forbidden), incontestable (even contemplating such trade-offs is prohibited), and dialectically invulnerable (no rational considerations can disrupt the agent’s commitment to the value). Philosophy of Devotion offers a detailed philosophical account and defense of these features. Devotion and the sacralization of values can be reasonable; indeed, a life involving meaningful, sustained commitment depends on these stances. Without devotion, we risk an existential condition called normative dissipation, in which all of our commitments become etiolated. Yet devotion can easily go wrong, deforming into the individual and group fanaticism that have become pervasive features of modern social life. The book provides an alternative to fanaticism, investigating the way in which we can express non-pathological forms of devotion. We can be devoted through affirmation and through what is termed the deepening move, which treats the agent’s central commitments as systematically inchoate. Each stance enables a wholehearted form of devotion that nevertheless preserves flexibility and openness, avoiding the dangers of fanaticism on the one hand and normative dissipation on the other. -/- (The attached file contains the introductory chapter.). (shrink)

Is there a way to understand--and, more important, to make use of--the experiences and emotions that we usually think of as being entirely negative? How are we to make sense of life's apparent "non-sense": the loneliness, depression, anxiety, frustration, anger, apathy, and anguish that we are certain to encounter in the course of living? William F. Kraft, a practicing psychotherapist, maintains that we can use all of these experiences in the service of life and fulfillment--once we understand that they are (...) part of the process of growth. It is only when people admit to pain and loneliness, he says, that they can begin to lead meaningful lives. The feelings of nothingness are essential for authentic living--inescapable and even necessary. Dr. Kraft discusses the experience of nothingness--as a fundamental life force and as creative suffering. Then he analyzes the language of nothingness: all the sad words for the bad emotions we meet. He explores the dynamics and meaning of "healthy" and "unhealthy," as applied to our feelings. Proposing that man discovers himself in his sense of nothingness at various stages of his life, Dr. Kraft explores the first emergence into a consciousness of nothingness, in adolescence, as a sense of boredom and cynicism. Next, he deals with the depression, loneliness, and frustration of early adulthood. In full adulthood, maintains the author, the sense of nothingness is banished by commitment and a search for authentic living. Then in middle and old age, he suggests, a positive approach must be forged for experiences of depression, guilt, anguish, and death. In his final chapters Dr. Kraft offers a new psychological approach to death and dying, which are the clearest articulations we know of nothingness. For everyone who thinks that alienation is a symptom of illness, an experience to avoid, or a sign of personal failure, this book is happy--and mandatory--reading.--Adapted from dust jacket. (shrink)

Human suffering is a complex phenomenon that can manifest physically or psychologically. As the negative valence of affective phenomena, with the positive being pleasure or happiness, human suffering could easily be interpreted as something to avoid. Sartre explored existential aspects of human suffering in Being and Nothingness. Examining each occurrence of the word suffering in that work provides a basis for understanding the roles Sartre assigned to it within the human experience and consequently provides a more nuanced appreciation (...) of this complex phenomenon. An electronic copy of Being and Nothingness was searched for all occurrences of the word suffering (N = 50), tabularized using the Key Word In Context (KWIC) approach at the sentence level, resulting in 40 sentences for thematic analysis. That analysis resulted in 5 themes, showing the complexity of suffering in Sartre’s major philosophical work and suggesting that suffering is quintessentially human, unavoidable, and potentially liberating. (shrink)

The aim of this study, which is a field reseach, is to determine the level of religiosity and subjective well-being (SWB) of patients with chronic renal failure who are receiving hemodialysis treatment with a descriptive approach and by using socio-psychological methods and to try to determine the relationship between their religiosity and subjective well-being. The sample of the study consists of 205 individuals who were determined by stratified random sampling method from the patients treated in Turkish Ministry of Health, Hitit (...) University Çorum Erol Olçok Training and Research Hospital and Çorum District Dialysis Units. 54.1% (n=111) of the participants are males and 45.9% (n=94) are females. Data was collected via a “Religiosity Inventory”, developed by Kula, and “Subjective Well-Being Scale”, developed by Dost, to determine participants’ religiosity and subjective well-being as well as a personal information form to determine demographic characteristics. Statistical analysis of the data showed significant differences and relationships between demographic variables, religiosity, and subjective well-being. Moreover, a statistically significant relationship between the levels of religiousness and subjective well-being of the participants was found and that religiosity accounts for 31.9% of subjective well-being variance. The findings of the study show that the major hypotheses and sub-hypotheses have statistically been validated and that religiosity is a significant and important predictor of subjective well-being.Summary: Throughout history, existential questions and the answers sought for these questions have remained important for human beings. Human beings have always wondered about life, meaning of life, death, after death and pursued meaning systems that will satisfy this curiosity. While various thinkers and philosophers put forward opinions about the secrets of life; religion has presented the transcendent dimension to the individual as a source of meaning. Thus, the individual has found the definitive answer to many of his questions about existence in religion, and this sense of certainty has contributed positively to his psychological well-being. However, human beings may also face disasters, diseases or adversities in the natural flow of life and sometimes unexpectedly, such situations make them desperate. Desperation creates a feeling of loneliness in the person and this can trigger a sense of meaninglessness for him. The feeling of vacuum in the inner world of the individual who struggles with difficulty or the sense of meaninglessness somehow affects his subjective well-being.From this perspective the subject of the study is the effect of religiosity levels on subjective well-being of individuals who are struggling with chronic renal failure and have experienced a compelling treatment process such as hemodialysis. The aim of this study is to determine the level of religiosity and subjective well-being of these patients. The sample of the study consists of 205 individuals who were determined by stratified random sampling method from the patients treated in Turkish Ministry of Health, Hitit University Çorum Erol Olçok Training and Research Hospital and Çorum District Dialysis Units.The major hypothesis of the study is “The religiosity levels of hemodialysis patients have a significant effect on their subjective well-being.” Further sub-hypotheses are as follows: 1. Women’s religiosity is higher than men’s. 2. There is a significant relationship between the perception of subjective happiness and religiosity levels of the participants. The subjective happiness perception levels of the individuals with high religiosity scores are also high. 3. There is no significant difference between the SWB levels of the participants according to gender variable. 4. There is a significant relationship between the perception of subjective religiosity and SWB levels of participants. According to this; subjective well-being increases as the person’s self-religious perception levels increase.5. There is a significant positive relationship between the religiosity scores of the participants and SWB scores. 6. Religiosity is a significant predictor of subjective well-being. Thus; the SWB level is expected to increase as the religiosity scores increase.The data of the study was obtained by using Personal Information Form prepared by the researcher, Kula’s Religiosity Inventory and Dost’s Subjective Well-Being Scale. The study was conducted in hospitals. After getting the necessary legal permissions and consent of the patients, the patients were informed about the study and the study was conducted on a voluntary basis. The questionnaires were applied by the researcher in person through face-to-face interviews with patients in hospitals, sometimes on weekdays and sometimes on Saturdays. Together with the physician of the hemodialysis unit, district hospitals were visited to reach the target group receiving treatment in these districts.In accordance with the relational screening model, the data of the study was analyzed with SPSS 16.0 package program. The mean (x̄) and standard deviation (ss) scores of the Religiosity Inventory and Subjective Well-Being Scale were calculated according to independent variables and tables were created. The significance of the difference between the two means obtained from two independent sample groups was determined by independent samples t-test for independent samples. One-way Varayns analysis (ANOVA) was used to test hypotheses about whether there was a difference between the means of more than two sample groups. In case of significant differences between means, LSD test and Tamhane’s T2 test from post-hoc multiple comparison tests were usedand the direction of the differences were determined as such. To determine the relationship between two continuous variables, religiosity and subjective well-being, Pearson Moments Correlation Analysis technique was used, and Simple Linear Regression analysis was performed to determine how much religiosity explains the changes observed in the dependent variable. The significance of the obtained statistics was tested at 0.05 level and bidirectional and the analysis values were presented in sequential tables in accordance with the purpose of the research. It is possible to summarize the findings of the study as follows:• 45.9% (n=94) of the sample are women and 54.1% (n=111) are men. According to subjective evaluations, 55.6% of the sample considers themselves as happy and very happy and 79.5% defines themselves as religious and very religious. According to the findings, subjective religiosity perception is higher in patients than subjective happiness perception. • The sample group has a high level of religiosity ( x̄ =4,3713).• There is a significant difference between gender and general religiosity (t=2,933; p=,004; p 0.05). However there is a difference in the SWB averages of male and female participants, women scored higher (x̄=3,8309) in SWB than men (x̄=3,7135). • A significant relationship has been found between subjective religiosity perception and SWB level of the sample (F=12,345; p=,000, p<0.05). SWB levels increased with increasing subjective religiosity. Further, there is a significant relationship between “slightly religious” (x̄=3,3439), “religious” (x̄=3,7737) and “very religious” (x̄=4,1363) groups and SWB level. There is also a steady increase in the mean scores of SWB from “not at all religious” to “very religious”. • A positive and moderately significant relationship has been found between general religiosity and general SWB (r=,565, p<0.01). • According to the results of regression analysis to determine whether total religiosity in HD patients is a significant predictor of subjective well-being; religiosity explaines 31.9% of the variance in subjective well-being. This result shows that one of the important determinants of SWB in HD patients is religiousness. Religiosity is a significant and important predictor of subjective well-being, and increased religiosity directly affects the SWB levels of HD patients. In addition, the basic hypothesis and sub-hypotheses were validated statistically at the end of the study. (shrink)

Jan Narveson has articulated a deeply held, widely shared intuition regarding what moral law has to say about bringing additional people into existence: while we are “in favour of making people happy,” we are “neutral about making happy people.” Various formulations of the Narvesonian intuition (closely related to the person-affecting intuition or restriction) have been widely criticized. This present paper outlines an off-the-beaten-path alternate construction of the intuition—the existence condition—and argues that that particular construction has the resources to avoid some (...) of those criticisms. But still other considerably more widely recognized alternate constructions have been offered as well. Thus John Broome outlines what he calls the neutrality intuition. While Broome finds the underlying intuition “strongly attractive,” he nonetheless argues that the neutrality intuition itself leads us quickly into inconsistency. Wlodek Rabinowicz disagrees. On his view, Broome’s inconsistency argument shows, not that the neutrality intuition is false, but rather that it doesn’t follow, from the fact that the outcome, or possible future or world, that includes the additional person is neither better nor worse than the (otherwise similar) world that excludes that person, that the one world is exactly as good as the other. The better view, according to Rabinowicz, is that, on occasion, and specifically when the coming into existence of additional people is at stake, the one world is incommensurate with the other. What is called the principle of trichotomy is, in other words, false. Difficulties arise, however, when we try to reject that seemingly compelling conceptual principle. This present paper concludes with the argument that the availability of the existence condition—which, together with certain other uncontroversial moral principles and a handful of conceptual principles, forms the existential approach—shows that we can maintain the most intuitive parts of neutrality intuition while avoiding both Broome’s inconsistency worry and Rabinowicz’s commitment to incommensurability. Incommensurability may be correct on other grounds—but not, this present paper argues, on the grounds provided by Broome’s inconsistency argument. (shrink)

The emotions occupy a fundamental place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, the phenomenology of the emotions has until recently remained a relatively neglected topic. The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion is an outstanding guide and reference source to this important and fascinating topic. Comprising forty-nine chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook covers the following topics: historical perspectives, including Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, Levinas and Arendt; contemporary debates, including existential feelings, emotion, affectivity, art and morality; (...) self-directed and individual emotions, including happiness, grief, self-esteem and shame; social emotions, including sympathy, collective emotions, political emotions and aggressive emotions; borderline cases of emotion, including solidarity, trust, pain, and forgiveness and revenge. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy studying phenomenology, ethics and moral psychology and philosophy of psychology, The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion is also suitable for those in related disciplines such as Religion, Sociology and Anthropology. (shrink)

Phenomenology in the United States is in a state of ferment and change. Not all the changes are happy ones, however, for some of the most prominent philosophers of the first generation of phenomenologists have died: in 1959 Alfred Schutz, and within the past two years John \Vild, Dorion Cairns, and Aron Gur witsch. These thinkers, though often confronting a hostile intel lectual climate, were nevertheless persistent and profoundly influential-through their own works, and through their students. The two sources associated (...) with their names, The Graduate Faculty of The New School for Social Research, and the circle around John Wild first at Harvard and later at Northwestern and Yale, produced a sizable portion of the now second gener ation American phenomenological philosophers. In a way, it was the very hostility of the American philo sophical milieu which became an important factor in the ferment now taking place. Although the older, first generation phenome nologists were deeply conversant with other philosophical move ments here and abroad, their efforts at meaningful dialogue were largely ignored. Determined not to remain isolated from the dominant currents of Anglo-American philosophy in par ticular, the second generation opened the way to a dialogue with analytic philosophers, especially through the efforts of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, led by 2 INTRODUCTION such men as James M. Edie and Hubert Dreyfus and, in other respects, Herbert Spiegelberg and Maurice Natanson. (shrink)

We are conditioned to think that love heals wounds, makes us happy, and gives our lives meaning. When the opposite occurs and love causes fracturing, disenchantment, and existential turmoil, we suffer deeply, especially if we feel that love has failed us or that we have failed to experience what others seem so effortlessly to enjoy. In this eloquently argued, psychologically informed book, Mari Ruti portrays love as a much more complex, multifaceted phenomenon than we tend to appreciate--an experience that (...) helps us encounter the depths of human existence. Love's ruptures are as important as its triumphs, and sometimes love succeeds because it fails. At the heart of Ruti's argument is a meditation on interpersonal ethics that acknowledges the inherent opacity of human interiority and the difficulty of taking responsibility for what we cannot fully understand. Yet the fact that humans are often irrational in love does not absolve us of ethical accountability. In Ruti's view, we must work harder to map the unconscious patterns motivating our romantic behavior. As opposed to popular spiritual approaches urging us to live fully in the now, Ruti treats the past as a living component of the present. Only when we catch ourselves at those moments when the past speaks in the present can we keep ourselves from hurting the ones we love. Equally important, Ruti emphasizes transcending our individual histories of pain, an act that allows us to face the unconscious demons that dictate our relational choices. Written with substance and compassion, _The Summons of Love_ restores the enlivening and transformative possibilities of romance. (shrink)

Sex, Love, and Gender is the first volume to present a comprehensive philosophical theory that brings together all of Kant's practical philosophy — found across his works on ethics, justice, anthropology, history, and religion — and provide a critique of emotionally healthy and morally permissible sexual, loving, gendered being. By rethinking Kant's work on human nature and making space for sex, love, and gender within his moral accounts of freedom, the book shows how, despite his austere and even anti-sex, cisist, (...) sexist, and heterosexist reputation, Kant's writings on happiness and virtue (Part I) and right (Part II) in fact yield fertile philosophical ground on which we can explore specific contemporary issues such as abortion, sexual orientation, sexual or gendered identity, marriage, trade in sexual services, and sex- or gender-based oppression. Indeed, Kant's philosophy provides us with resources to appreciate and value the diversity of human ways of loving and the existential importance of our embodied, social selves. Structured on a thematic basis, with introductions to assist those new to Kant's philosophy, this book will be a valuable resource for anyone who cares about these issues and wants to make sense of them. -/- Alternatively: Sex, Love, and Gender identifies a set of possibilities that define human beings’ sexuality. These sets come with their own concepts, which specify how the possibilities are realized and what effects they have on our lives lived together. Partly the task is descriptive. The description has to be plausible. Plausibility comes from the phenomenology (and not the other way around). Partly the task is normative. The normative content also has to be plausible. Plausibility here comes from vindicating the principles that underwrite the possibilities that define human beings’ sexualities and sexual experiences and behaviors lived by human beings and from the philosophical explanations and conclusions that follow. Overall plausibility, then, comes from discursive analysis of alternatives, from a priori argument, and, in the evaluative case, from showing how the Kantian account of a good life fits with reasonable conceptions of goodness consistent with the phenomenology of human lives. Although this exploration leads us, as we will see, to most corners of Kant’s practical philosophy, including his metaethics and metaphysics, the main focus is on an account of human sex, love, and gender explored explicitly with respect to happiness and ethics (virtue) and justice (right). It is because of this focus that the book is divided into two parts: Part 1 (“Human Sexuality and Virtue”) and Part 2 (“Human Sexuality and Right”). (shrink)

Ethics of any kind basically assume that all human beings by nature aim at happiness. However, this general starting point has to be made concrete in order to be relevant for action, and hence suitable for moral appreciation. What does my happiness consist in? Contrary to what has often been taken for granted, the concrete aim is not instrumental or subsidiary to the overall aim of happiness. To me, my particular aim is rather identical with happiness. (...) The choice I make — if choice it is — indeed constitutes my happiness, i.e. the overall aim that directs my existential choices. This article is focused on the way Aristotelian ethics envisages the concreteness of this overall aim. This is not the concreteness of the means leading to the aim, which has often been discussed in Aristotelian scholarship, but happiness itself, taken as the specific but nevertheless universal aim that I seek to accomplish in my life. The main arguments are taken from Nicomachean Ethics VI and III. These texts, central to any discussion of Aristotle's views on the role of choice and deliberation in acquiring happiness, are re-interpreted, avoiding the deadlock of a debate between intellectualists and non-intellectualists. (shrink)

For a long time, leading European thinkers have denied systematic, theoretical and rational nature of Chinese traditional thinking, unpretentiously reading it as banal moralizing, not supported by any proper philosophical discourse. However, the habitual socioethical label conceals a much deeper problematic of strategic thinking. At its center, there is the question of choosing all sorts of strategies: from everyday life to special technical ones, from personal existential choice to fateful state decisions. The concept of a winning strategy is emblematized (...) by the dramatic plot of a deadly risk but under certain conditions with guaranteed happy end. The strategy of harmony, which is miraculous in its effectiveness, is proposed as a exemplary strategy. It allows you to “step on the tiger’s tail” with impunity. From the point of view of strategic thinking, the criterion of cognitive value of reasoning is its effectiveness, and the most effective is unmistakable prediction, i.e. the ability to predict the outcome of future developments with the help of reasoning. In the ideal case, prognostic reasoning becomes not just plausible but 100% reliable that is an apodictic true inference. Therefore, the highest cognitive status in the Chinese intellectual tradition is endowed with guaranteed error-free prognostic reasoning. This type of reasoning, where the reliability of foresight is guaranteed by the implementation of a certain winning strategy, can be called the prognostic form of deduction. As a result, the dynamism of Chinese logic, which relies on a deliberate staging of the future, is strikingly different from the static nature of the classical image of logic, where logic is no more than a static guardian of correctness of reasoning. On the contrary, the Chinese concept of logic focuses on deriving consequences from strategic considerations regarding the future, actively and purposefully shaped by the subject who at the same time constructing both himself and the world around him. (shrink)

On Being and Becoming offers a new approach to existentialist philosophy and literature, as responding to competing demands for universal truth and the defense of the irreducible singularity of the individual. On Being and Becoming traces the heterogeneity of existentialist thinking beyond the popular wartime philosophers of the Parisian Left Bank, demonstrating their critical dependence on sources from the nineteenth century and their complements in modernist works across the European continent and beyond. While quintessentially modern, existentialism inherits ideas of the (...) past and anticipates challenges of the present. Despite its individualism, existentialist attention to the human self is related to conceptions of world, others, the earth, and the more encompassing concept of being. The predominance of ideas of authenticity, individuality, and self-determination makes any existentialist manifesto self-contradictory, while existentialist thinkers above all wanted to make their philosophy relevant to concrete human existence as it is lived. Prevailing models of existential authenticity life tend to overlook the rich diversity of its prospects, which, as this volume shows, involve not only anxiety, absurdity, awareness of death and of the loss of religious reassurances, but also hope, the striving for happiness, and a sense of the transcendent—all of these grounded our human capacity to create meaning. In spite of the diversity of existentialism, all of its thinkers recognize the self as becoming, and recognize the courage and creativity human individuality demands. On Being and Becoming elaborates pragmatic and philosophical relevance of existentialism for being human in the contemporary world. (shrink)

This essay examines the concept of fate, exploring the causal-normative constraint problem in the existential phenomenology of humanity in _A Dream of Red Mansions_. It studies the structure, content, and origin of the consciousness and experience of fate, as it is illustrated in the phenomenology in the novel, exploring the causal and normative challenges that fate poses to the reality, value, authenticity, happiness, and freedom of a person. Doing so, the essay also demonstrates both the difference and affinity (...) between the Chinese concept of fate and Hindu concept of _karma_, as well as existentialist (Heideggeran) concepts of 'thrownness' and 'existentiality.'. (shrink)

Religious philosopher Panikkar sees wisdom as our universe, our world, our Mother Earth, and as a source of happiness and joy--a dwelling place where people are blessed. Here he discusses wisdom in the context of four different areas: an existential feminine approach; a less fragmented anthropology; its most ancient meaning in philosophy; and the preservation of its identity.

This article tries to make a contribution to a concrete eidetic of thinking by studying the first nine years of Hegels philosophical development in perspective of the question : Which are the origins and how passed the „prehistory” of his later System ? In Tübingen Hegels thought circles round the ideal of a free, noble and happy nation, of which he means to have discovered the -alas ! - lost prototype in the greek paradise. The political and aesthetic-religious nature of (...) this ideal nation is characterized by spontaneous humanity and freedom. Bern is the period of Hegels revolt. On religious level he makes a first effort to play Jesus off against the positivity of the Churches ; on politic-ethical level his philo: ophy of alienation comes into existence. For the more and more growing sharp antithesis between Mastery and Servitude, Nature and Freedom, Freedom and History, God and Man, Hegel tries to find a solution in the glorification of a revolutionary and heroic „Sollen”. The newness of the fragments Hegel wrote in Frankfort , consists chiefly in an implicit „Logic" that manifests itself at once in Hegels analysis of a number of historic-existential phenomena. In virtue of the basic categories, which this logic contains, „the ideal of his youth reflects itself” - to use Hegels own words - in a reflexive „system”. Ideal, fundamental logic and system are, however, - each one in his own, respectively „mythical”, „logical”, „systematical" way -the transcriptions of a preceding or „a priori” interpretation of existence on the ground of fundamental desires and existential options, that can be revealed to a certain extent by an „existential psychoanalysis”. Hegels thought is rooted in the nostalgia for a terrestrial „salvation” : the union through feeling with the maternal Universe by which inner harmony and „beingwith-oneself” is reached. Some beginnings of criticism are addressed to the pre-philosophical options which are the source of inspiration of Hegels first philosophy. His desire for „Beruhigung” excludes every real Transcendent ; the Feeling of Frankfort and the Reason-Knowledge of Jena deny the existence of every Mystery, that is bigger than Man ; Hegels dialectic is an effort to conquer every tragical moment of life by human power within this world ; his analysis of love fail to appreciate the own character of human individuality and community ; Hegels triad is the résumé of a monism of thought, no real Trinity. (shrink)

One of the purposes of intercultural philosophical comparisons is to examine cultural parallels, which helps in understanding existential problems. However, the number of works that have considered the sense of duty and the universe of virtues through an intercontinental comparative approach is limited. The objective of this article is to explore the sense of duty and the conception of virtue in and from the works of the Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 - 43 BC) and the Japanese swordmaster (...) Miyamoto Musashi (1584 - 1645), taking as main works On Duties, by the former, and “Gorin No Sho” and “Dokkôdô”, by the latter. In both, we find convergent theoretical-normative elements regarding the virtuous conduct of the agent, whether he is understood as a citizen, that is, in the social and political context, or whether he is conceived as an individual who grows old on the battlefield. Among the common elements of both positions, the criticism of hedonism, the praise of rationality and the mastery of instincts stand out. However, the authors diverge on the topic related to happiness. (shrink)