Our self-concept is constantly faced with self-relevant information. Prevailing research suggests that information's valence plays a central role in shaping our self-views. However, the need for stability within the self-concept structure and the inherent alignment of positive feedback with the pre-existing self-views of healthy individuals might mask valence and congruence effects. In this study (N = 30, undergraduates), we orthogonalized feedback valence and self-congruence effects to examine the behavioral and electrophysiological signatures of self-relevant feedback processing and self-concept (...) updating. We found that participants had a preference for integrating self-congruent and dismissing self-incongruent feedback, regardless of its valence. Consistently, electroencephalography results revealed that feedback congruence, but not feedback valence, is rapidly detected during early processing stages. Our findings diverge from the accepted notion that self-concept updating is based on the selective incorporation of positive information. These findings offer novel insights into self-concept dynamics, with implications for the understanding of psychopathological conditions. (shrink)

Theoretical minimal RNA rings are candidate primordial genes evolved for non‐redundant coding of the genetic code's 22 coding signals (one codon per biogenic amino acid, a start and a stop codon) over the shortest possible length: 29520 22‐nucleotide‐long RNA rings solve this min‐max constraint. Numerous RNA ring properties are reminiscent of natural genes. Here we present analyses showing that all RNA rings lack dinucleotide CG (a mutable, chemically instable dinucleotide coding for Arginine), bearing a resemblance to known CG‐depleted genomes. CG (...) in “incomplete” RNA rings (not coding for all coding signals, with only 3–12 nucleotides) gradually decreases towards CG absence in complete, 22‐nucleotide‐long RNA rings. Presumably, feedback loops during RNA ring growth during evolution (when amino acid assignment fixed the genetic code) assigned Arg to codons lacking CG (AGR) to avoid CG. Hence, as a chemical property of base pairs, CG mutability restructured the genetic code, thereby establishing itself as genetically encoded biological information. (shrink)

Epistemologists spend a great deal of time thinking about how we should respond to our evidence. They spend far less time thinking about the ways that evidence can be acquired in the first place. This is an oversight. Some ways of acquiring evidence are better than others. Many normative epistemologies struggle to accommodate this fact. In this article I develop one that can and does. I identify a phenomenon – epistemic feedback loops – in which evidence acquisition has gone (...) awry, with the result that even beliefs based on the evidence are irrational. Examples include evidence acquired under the influence of confirmation bias and evidence acquired under the influence of cognitively penetrated experiences caused by implicit bias. I then develop a theoretical framework which enables us to understand why beliefs that are the outputs of epistemic feedback loops are irrational. Finally, I argue that many popular approaches to epistemic normativity may need to be abandoned on the grounds that they cannot comfortably explain feedback loops. The scope of this last claim is broad: it includes almost all contemporary theories of justified/rational belief and of the epistemology of cognitive penetration. (shrink)

Implicit bias training (IBT) is now frequently provided by employers, in order to raise awareness of the problems related to implicit biases, and of how to safeguard against discrimination that may result. However, as Atewologun et al (2018) have noted, there is very little systematicity in IBT, and there are many unknowns about what constitutes good IBT. One important issue concerns the tone of information provided regarding implicit bias. This paper engages this question, focusing in particular on the (...) observation that much bias training is delivered in exculpatory tone, emphasising that individuals are not to blame for possessing implicit biases. Normative guidance around IBT exhorts practitioners to adopt this strategy (Moss-Racusin et al 2014). However, existing evidence about the effects of moralized feedback about implicit bias is equivocal (Legault et al 2011; Czopp et al 2006). Through a series of studies, culminating in an experiment with a pre-registered analysis plan, we develop a paradigm for evaluating the impact of moralized feedback on participants’ implicit racial bias scores. We also conducted exploratory analyses of the impact on their moods, and behavioural intentions. Our results indicated that an exculpatory tone, rather than a blaming or neutral tone, did not make participants less resistant to changing their attitudes and behaviours. In fact, participants in the blame condition had significantly stronger explicit intentions to change future behaviour than those in the ‘no feedback’ condition (see experiment 3). These results indicate that considerations of efficacy do not support the need for implicit bias feedback to be exculpatory. We tease out the implications of these findings, and directions for future research. (shrink)

“Implicit bias” is a term of art referring to relatively unconscious and relatively automatic features of prejudiced judgment and social behavior. While psychologists in the field of “implicit social cognition” study “implicit attitudes” toward consumer products, self-esteem, food, alcohol, political values, and more, the most striking and well-known research has focused on implicit attitudes toward members of socially stigmatized groups, such as African-Americans, women, and the LGBTQ community.[1] For example, imagine Frank, who explicitly believes that women and men are (...) equally suited for careers outside the home. Despite his explicitly egalitarian belief, Frank might nevertheless implicitly associate women with the home, and this implicit association might lead him to behave in any number of biased ways, from trusting feedback from female co-workers less to hiring equally qualified men over women. Psychological research on implicit bias is relatively recent (§1), but a host of metaphysical (§2), epistemological (§3), and ethical questions (§4) about implicit bias are pressing.[2]. (shrink)

The frontal feedback model argues that the sudden appearance of art and advancing technologies around 40,000 years ago in the hominid archaeological record was the end result of a recent fundamental change in the functional properties of the hominid brain, which occurred late in that brain's evolution. This change was marked by the switching of the driving mechanism behind the global, dynamic function of the brain from an "object-centered" bias, reflective of nonhuman primate and early hominid brains, to (...) a "self-centered" bias, reflective of modern Homo sapiens and perhaps late Homo erectus brains. Such a change in the global-functional properties of the brain was provided for by the progressive enlargement of the primate frontal lobe throughout its evolution. In late-developing hominids, this progressive enlargement effectively succeeded in reversing the preferred direction of information flow in the highest association areas of the neocortex from a caudo-rostral bias to a rostro-caudal bias. It was this reversal specifically that provided for the ability of humans to use symbolic thought in the creative expression of art, language, and the development of advancing technologies. Part 2 discusses the specific changes in the brain that occurred as a result of the reversal and how those changes were and are manifested as human abilities and experience. (shrink)

Previous research suggests that implicit sequence learning is superior for believers in the paranormal and individuals with increased cerebral dopamine. Thirty-five healthy participants performed feedback-guided anticipations of four arrow directions. A 100-trial random sequence preceded two 100-trial biased sequences in which visual targets on trial t tended to be displaced 90° clockwise or counter-clockwise from those on t − 1. ISL was defined as a positive change during the course of the biased run in the difference between pro-bias (...) and counter-bias responses. It was hypothesized that this difference would be greater for believers in the paranormal than for skeptics, for those who received dopamine than for those who received placebo, and for believers who received dopamine than for the other groups. None of the hypotheses were supported by the data. It is suggested that a simple binary guessing task with a focus on prediction accuracy during early trials should be considered for future explorations. (shrink)

Reinforcement learning relies on the reward prediction error (RPE) signals conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system. Previous studies showed that dopamine plays an important role in both positive and negative reinforcement. However, whether various reinforcement processes will induce distinct learning signals is still unclear. In a probabilistic learning task, we examined RPE signals in different reinforcement types using an electrophysiology index, namely, the feedback-related negativity (FRN). Ninety-four participants were randomly assigned into four groups: base (no money incentive), positive reinforcement (...) (presentation of money rewards), negative reinforcement (removal of money losses), and combined reinforcement (money rewards and removal of money losses) groups. In addition, in order to evaluate the engagement of emotional activity in the different reinforcement processes, Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X) scales were applied before and after the experiment to detect the emotional changes. The results showed that there was no difference between groups in the dopamine-related learning bias. However, compared to the other three groups, negative reinforcement elicited smaller FRN (the difference-wave measure) during the learning, stronger positive affect and joviality, and less fatigue after the learning, in which the difference between the negative and positive reinforcement groups was smaller. The results indicated that pure avoidance motivation may induce distinct emotional fluctuations, which influence the feedback processing. (shrink)

The commodity market plays a vital role in boosting the economy. Investors make decisions based on market knowledge and ignore cognitive biases. These cognitive biases or judgment errors have a significant effect on investment decisions. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the effect of emotional intelligence on decision-making. In addition, optimism bias and risk perception are the intervening variables between emotional intelligence and decision-making. So, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by examining the mediating role of optimism (...) bias and risk perception. The data were collected from the respondents of the commodity market and the 370 questionnaires were distributed among the investors, of which 337 respondents gave their feedback. The convenience base sampling technique is used due to the easy access of respondents, time factor, and cost factor. Data entered into the SPSS Statistics Version 26 and PROCESS macro model 6 were used for serial mediation. AMOS was used for the validity and model-fit analysis. The results of this study aligned with the literature that there is a significant effect of emotional intelligence on decision-making. It also observed that optimism bias has a positive effect on decision-making. The finding of this study will be helpful for the brokers, the government, and especially the investors. This study also proposed that future studies on the stock exchange and real estate market comparative analysis can be conducted. (shrink)

This paper argues that humans possess unique cognitive abilities due to the presence of a functional system that exists in the human brain that is absent in the non-human brain. This system, the frontal feedback system, was born in the hominin brain when the great phylogenetic expansion of the prefrontal cortex relative to posterior sensory regions surpassed a critical threshold. Surpassing that threshold effectively reversed the preferred direction of information flow in the highest association regions of the neocortex, producing (...) the frontal feedback system. This reversal was from the caudo-rostral bias characteristic of non-human, or pre-human, brain dynamics to a rostro-caudal bias characteristic of modern human brain dynamics. The frontal feedback system works through frontal motor routines, or action schemes, manipulating the release and reconstruction of stored sensory memories in posterior sensory areas. As an obligatory feature of frontal feedback, a central character, or self, emerges within this cortical network that manifests itself as agent in these reconstructions as well as in the experience of sensory perceptions. Dynamical-systems modeling of cortical interactions is combined in the paper with recent neuroimaging studies of “resting-state” brain activity to bridge the gap between microscopic and macroscopic levels of cortical behavior. This synthesis is used to support the proposal of an information flow reversal occurring in the hominin brain and also to explain how such a reversal generates the wide variety of cognitive and experiential phenomena that many consider to be uniquely human. (shrink)

In this chapter we argue that emotions are mediated in an incomplete way in online social media because of the heavy reliance on textual messages which fosters a rationalistic bias and an inclination towards less nuanced emotional expressions. This incompleteness can happen either by obscuring emotions, showing less than the original intensity, misinterpreting emotions, or eliciting emotions without feedback and context. Online interactions and deliberations tend to contribute rather than overcome stalemates and informational bubbles, partially due to prevalence (...) of anti-social emotions. It is tempting to see emotions as being the cause of the problem of online verbal aggression and bullying. However, we argue that social media are actually designed in a predominantly rationalistic way, because of the reliance on text-based communication, thereby filtering out social emotions and leaving space for easily expressed antisocial emotions. Based on research on emotions that sees these as key ingredients to moral interaction and deliberation, as well as on research on text-based versus non-verbal communication, we propose a richer understanding of emotions, requiring different designs of online deliberation platforms. We propose that such designs should move from text-centred designs and should find ways to incorporate the complete expression of the full range of human emotions so that these can play a constructive role in online deliberations. (shrink)

Attention is automatically allocated to stimuli that are opposite in valence to the current motivational focus (Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). We tested whether this incongruency effect is due to affective–motivational counter-regulation or to an increased salience of stimuli that mismatch with cognitively activated information. Affective processing biases were assessed with a search task in which participants had to detect the spatial position at which a positive or negative stimulus was presented. In the motivational condition, positive or negative (...) affective–motivational states were induced by performance feedback after each trial. In the cognitive activation condition, participants memorised the word “good” or “bad” during the search task. The affective incongruency effect was replicated in the motivational condition, whereas an affective congruency effect obtained in the cognitive activation condition. These findings support an explanation of affective incongruency effects in terms of automatic counter-regulation that is motivational in nature. (shrink)

The effects of lexical context on phonological processing are pervasive and there have been indications that such effects may be modulated by attention. However, attentional modulation in speech processing is neither well documented nor well understood. Experiment 1 demonstrated attentional modulation of lexical facilitation of speech sound recognition when task and critical stimuli were identical across attention conditions. We propose modulation of lexical activation as a neurophysiologically plausible computational mechanism that can account for this type of modulation. Contrary to the (...) claims of critics, this mechanism can account for attentional modulation without violating the principle of interactive processing. Simulations of the interactive TRACE model extended to include two different ways of modulating lexical activation showed that each can account for attentional modulation of lexical feedback effects. Experiment 2 tested conflicting predictions from the two implementations and provided evidence that is consistent with bias input as the mechanism of attentional control of lexical activation. (shrink)

Existing research shows that people can improve their decision skills by learning what experts paid attention to when faced with the same problem. However, in domains like financial education, effective instruction requires frequent, personalized feedback given at the point of decision, which makes it time‐consuming for experts to provide and thus, prohibitively costly. We address this by demonstrating an automated feedback mechanism that allows amateur decision‐makers to learn what information to attend to from one another, rather than from (...) an expert. In the first experiment, eye movements of N = 100 subjects were recorded while they repeatedly performed a standard behavioral finance investment task. Consistent with previous studies, we found that a significant proportion of subjects were affected by decision bias. In the second experiment, a different group of N = 100 subjects faced the same task but, after each choice, they received individual, machine learning‐generated feedback on whether their pre‐decision eye movements resembled those made by Experiment 1 subjects prior to good decisions. As a result, Experiment 2 subjects learned to analyze information similarly to their successful peers, which in turn reduced their decision bias. Furthermore, subjects with low Cognitive Reflection Test scores gained more from the proposed form of process feedback than from standard behavioral feedback based on decision outcomes. (shrink)

This paper examines the ways in which social scientific discourse and classification interact with the objects of social scientific investigation. I examine this interaction in the context of the traditional philosophical project of demarcating the social sciences from the natural sciences. I begin by reviewing Ian Hacking’s work on interactive classification and argue that there are additional forms of interaction that must be treated.

The conception of conscience that dominates discussions in bioethics focuses narrowly on private regulation of behaviour resulting from explicit attitudes. It neglects to mention implicit attitudes and the role of social feedback in becoming aware of one's implicit attitudes. But if conscience is a way of ensuring that a person's behaviour is in line with her moral values, it must be responsive to all aspects of the mind that influence behaviour. There is a wealth of recent psychological work demonstrating (...) the influence of implicit attitudes on behaviour. A necessary part of having a well-functioning conscience must thus be awareness and regulation of one's implicit attitudes in addition to one's explicit attitudes; this cannot be done by an individual in isolation. On my revised conception of conscience, heeding social feedback, being emotionally self-aware and engaging in self-monitoring are important for the possession of a well-functioning conscience. Health professionals may need specific training to help them develop and maintain a well-functioning conscience, which should involve cultivation of awareness of implicit attitudes, emphasis on social feedback and techniques to enable better control over them. (shrink)

We present three experiments using a novel problem in which participants update their estimates of propensities when faced with an uncertain new instance. We examine this using two different causal structures (common cause/common effect) and two different scenarios (agent‐based/mechanical). In the first, participants must update their estimate of the propensity for two warring nations to successfully explode missiles after being told of a new explosion on the border between both nations. In the second, participants must update their estimate of the (...) accuracy of two early warning tests for cancer when they produce conflicting reports about a patient. Across both experiments, we find two modal responses, representing around one‐third of participants each. In the first, “Categorical” response, participants update propensity estimates as if they were certain about the single event, for example, certain that one of the nations was responsible for the latest explosion, or certain about which of the two tests is correct. In the second, “No change” response, participants make no update to their propensity estimates at all. Across the three experiments, the theory is developed and tested that these two responses in fact have a single representation of the problem: because the actual outcome is binary (only one of the nations could have launched the missile; the patient either has cancer or not), these participants believe it is incorrect to update propensities in a graded manner. They therefore operate on a “certainty threshold” basis, whereby, if they are certain enough about the single event, they will make the “Categorical” response, and if they are below this threshold, they will make the “No change” response. Ramifications are considered for the “categorical” response in particular, as this approach produces a positive‐feedback dynamic similar to that seen in the belief polarization/confirmation bias literature. (shrink)

The emergence of signaling systems has been observed in numerous experimental and real-world contexts, but there is no consensus on which shared mechanisms underlie such phenomena. A number of explanatory mechanisms have been proposed within several disciplines, all of which have been instantiated as credible working models. However, they are usually framed as being mutually incompatible. Using an exemplar-based framework, we replicate these models in a minimal configuration which allows us to directly compare them. This reveals that the development of (...) optimal signaling is driven by similar mechanisms in each model, which leads us to propose three requirements for the emergence of conventional signaling. These are the creation and transmission of referential information, a systemic bias against ambiguity, and finally some form of information loss. Considering this, we then discuss some implications for theoretical and experimental approaches to the emergence of learned communication. (shrink)

We show that if any number of variables are allowed to be simultaneously and independently randomized in any one experiment, log2(N ) + 1 experiments are sufficient and in the worst case necessary to determine the causal relations among N ≥ 2 variables when no latent variables, no sample selection bias and no feedback cycles are present. For all K, 0 < K <.

The Jungian concept of archetypes is of immense value for critically distinguishing what is potentially of universal practical value in religious and other cultural traditions, and separating this from the dogmatic elements. However, Jung encumbered the concept of archetypes with debatable constructions like the 'collective unconscious' that are unnecessary for understanding their practical function. This book puts forward a far-reaching new theory of archetypes that is functional without being reductive. At the centre of this is the idea that archetypes are (...) adaptations to help us maintain inspiration over time. Humans are such distractable beings that they need constant reminders to maintain integration with their most sustainable intentions: reminders using the profound power of symbol linked to embodied experience. This multi-disciplinary book weaves together religious studies, ethical philosophy, the psychology of bias, the neuroscience of brain lateralisation, the linguistics of embodied meaning, the feedback loops of systems theory, with a lifetime's experience of Buddhist practice and appreciation of symbolism in the arts: all with the aim of producing a fresh understanding of the role of archetypes in religion and beyond, that can also be directly applied in practice. (shrink)

Assessing national levels of happiness has become an important research and policy issue in recent years. We examined happiness and satisfaction in Ireland using phone text messaging to collect large-scale longitudinal data from 3,093 members of the general Irish population. For six consecutive weeks participants’ happiness and satisfaction levels were assessed. For four consecutive weeks (weeks 2 to 5) a different random third of the sample got feedback on the previous week's mean happiness and satisfaction ratings. Text messaging proved (...) a feasible means of assessing happiness and satisfaction, with almost three quarters (73%) of participants completing all assessments. Those who received feedback on the previous week’s mean ratings were eight times more likely to complete the subsequent assessments than those not receiving feedback. Providing such feedback data on mean levels of happiness and satisfaction did not systematically bias subsequent ratings either towards or away from these normative anchors. Texting is a simple and effective means to collect population level happiness and satisfaction data. (shrink)

We studied how people attribute action outcomes to their own actions under conditions of uncertainty. Participants chose between left and right keypresses to produce an action effect , while a computer player made a simultaneous keypress decision. In each trial, a random generator determined which of the players controlled the action effect at varying probabilities, and participants then judged which player had produced it. Participants’ effect control ranged from 20% to 80%, varied blockwise, and they could use trial-by-trial feedback (...) to optimize the accuracy of their agency judgments. Participants tended to attribute action effects to themselves , probably reflecting a rational guessing strategy of always naming the more likely player. However, participants systematically neglected information favoring the computer player as the agent, even under conditions where this bias could only harm judgment accuracy. We conclude that agency biases have both rational and irrational components. (shrink)

Gendered stereotypes persist in American classrooms despite efforts to create equitable learning environments. Within this qualitative study, we examined both teachers’ and administrators’ perceptions of gender in the classroom and present the data of the continued gender bias among some educators in their own words. The data showed teachers and administrators attributed conflict styles based upon gender and consistently reference boys conflict resolution style as “over quickly” in contrast to girls conflict resolution style. Likewise, participants’ gendered perceptions extended to (...) the kinds of feedback they expected girls and boys to prefer. Additionally, our findings show that participants misunderstood or lacked knowledge of scientifically sound research and participants described changing the curriculum in a single-sex class/school to use stereotypical topics and activities for student engagement. The authors suggest this data should open a discussion between education scholars and practitione... (shrink)

We consider a situation in which individuals search for accurate decisions without direct feedback on their accuracy, but with information about the decisions made by peers in their group. The “wisdom of crowds” hypothesis states that the average judgment of many individuals can give a good estimate of, for example, the outcomes of sporting events and the answers to trivia questions. Two conditions for the application of wisdom of crowds are that estimates should be independent and unbiased. Here, we (...) study how individuals integrate social information when answering trivia questions with answers that range between 0% and 100%. We find that, consistent with the wisdom of crowds hypothesis, average performance improves with group size. However, individuals show a consistent bias to produce estimates that are insufficiently extreme. We find that social information provides significant, albeit small, improvement to group performance. Outliers with answers far from the correct answer move toward the position of the group mean. Given that these outliers also tend to be nearer to 50% than do the answers of other group members, this move creates group polarization away from 50%. By looking at individual performance over different questions we find that some people are more likely to be affected by social influence than others. There is also evidence that people differ in their competence in answering questions, but lack of competence is not significantly correlated with willingness to change guesses. We develop a mathematical model based on these results that postulates a cognitive process in which people first decide whether to take into account peer guesses, and if so, to move in the direction of these guesses. The size of the move is proportional to the distance between their own guess and the average guess of the group. This model closely approximates the distribution of guess movements and shows how outlying incorrect opinions can be systematically removed from a group resulting, in some situations, in improved group performance. However, improvement is only predicted for cases in which the initial guesses of individuals in the group are biased. (shrink)

Human cognition and behavior are dominated by symbol use. This paper examines the social learning strategies that give rise to symbolic communication. Experiment 1 contrasts an individual-level account, based on observational learning and cognitive bias, with an inter-individual account, based on social coordinative learning. Participants played a referential communication game in which they tried to communicate a range of recurring meanings to a partner by drawing, but without using their conventional language. Individual-level learning, via observation and cognitive bias, (...) was sufficient to produce signs that became increasingly effective, efficient, and shared over games. However, breaking a referential precedent eliminated these benefits. The most effective, most efficient, and most shared signs arose when participants could directly interact with their partner, indicating that social coordinative learning is important to the creation of shared symbols. Experiment 2 investigated the contribution of two distinct aspects of social interaction: behavior alignment and concurrent partner feedback. Each played a complementary role in the creation of shared symbols: Behavior alignment primarily drove communication effectiveness, and partner feedback primarily drove the efficiency of the evolved signs. In conclusion, inter-individual social coordinative learning is important to the evolution of effective, efficient, and shared symbols. (shrink)

Reputation is often seen as central to the coordination of transactions in sharing economy platforms. Participants perform a double role regarding reputation management: while engaging in exchanges with other peers, they build their individual ‘reputation capital’ and simultaneously execute community oversight. In Couchsurfing (CS), a network often cited as paradigmatic of the sharing economy, there is, however, a clear bias for positive references. In the digital economy literature, participants’ friendly behaviour is understood as motivated by self-interest and an incentive (...) to maintain a positive reputation. Social research on reputation in CS attributes the bias to fear of retaliation, but also hints at norms of reciprocity leading travellers to require positive feedback for hospitality. This article analyses the lived experience of reputation management in CS and argues that participants seek to reconcile direct and general reciprocity. It proposes breaking these practices down into boundary-work and creative avoidance and argues these result in insufficient protection of inexperienced participants against problematic members. (shrink)

When visual attention is directed away from a stimulus, neural processing is weak and strength and precision of sensory data decreases. From a computational perspective, in such situations observers should give more weight to prior expectations in order to behave optimally during a discrimination task. Here we test a signal detection theoretic model that counter-intuitively predicts subjects will do just the opposite in a discrimination task with two stimuli, one attended and one unattended: when subjects are probed to discriminate the (...) unattended stimulus, they rely less on prior information about the probed stimulus’ identity. The model is in part inspired by recent findings that attention reduces trial-by-trial variability of the neuronal population response and that they use a common criterion for attended and unattended trials. In five different visual discrimination experiments, when attention was directed away from the target stimulus, subjects did not adjust their response bias in reaction to a change in stimulus presentation frequency despite being fully informed and despite the presence of performance feedback and monetary and social incentives. This indicates that subjects did not rely more on the priors under conditions of inattention as would be predicted by a Bayes-optimal observer model. These results inform and constrain future models of Bayesian inference in the human brain. (shrink)

We have evolved to become who we are, at least in part, due to our general drive to create new things and ideas. When seeking to improve our creations, ideas, or situations, we systematically overlook opportunities to perform subtractive changes. For example, when tasked with giving feedback on an academic paper, reviewers will tend to suggest additional explanations and analyses rather than delete existing ones. Here, we show that this addition bias is systematically reflected in English language statistics (...) along several distinct dimensions. First, we show that words associated with an increase in quantity or number (e.g., add, addition, more, most) are more frequent than words associated with a decrease in quantity or number (e.g., subtract, subtraction, less, least). Second, we show that in binomial expressions, addition-related words are mentioned first, that is, add and subtract rather than subtract and add. Third, we show that the distributional semantics of verbs of change, such as to improve and to transform, overlap more with the distributional semantics of add/increase than subtract/decrease, which suggests that change verbs are implicitly biased toward addition. Fourth, addition-related words have more positive connotations than subtraction-related words. Fifth, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art large language models, such as the Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT-3), are also biased toward addition. We discuss the implications of our results for research on cognitive biases and decision-making. (shrink)

The replicability of findings in experimental psychology can be improved by distinguishing sharply between hypothesis-generating research and hypothesis-testing research. This distinction can be achieved by preregistration, a method that has recently attracted widespread attention. Although preregistration is fair in the sense that it inoculates researchers against hindsight bias and confirmation bias, preregistration does not allow researchers to analyze the data flexibly without the analysis being demoted to exploratory. To alleviate this concern we discuss how researchers may conduct blinded (...) analyses. As with preregistration, blinded analyses break the feedback loop between the analysis plan and analysis outcome, thereby preventing cherry-picking and significance seeking. However, blinded analyses retain the flexibility to account for unexpected peculiarities in the data. We discuss different methods of blinding, offer recommendations for blinding of popular experimental designs, and introduce the design for an online blinding protocol. (shrink)

Decision making in any brain is imperfect and costly in terms of time and energy. Operating under such constraints, an organism could be in a position to improve performance if an opportunity arose to exploit informative patterns in the environment being searched. Such an improvement of performance could entail both faster and more accurate (i.e., reward-maximizing) decisions. The present study investigated the extent to which human participants could learn to take advantage of immediate patterns in the spatial arrangement of serially (...) presented foods such that a region of space would consistently be associated with greater subjective value. Eye movements leading up to choices demonstrated rapidly induced biases in the selective allocation of visual fixation and attention that were accompanied by both faster and more accurate choices of desired goods as implicit learning occurred. However, for the control condition with its spatially balanced reward environment, these subjects exhibited preexisting lateralized biases for eye and hand movements (i.e., leftward and rightward, respectively) that could act in opposition not only to each other but also to the orienting biases elicited by the experimental manipulation, producing an asymmetry between the left and right hemifields with respect to performance. Potentially owing at least in part to learned cultural conventions (e.g., reading from left to right), the findings herein particularly revealed an intrinsic leftward bias underlying initial saccades in the midst of more immediate feedback-directed processes for which spatial biases can be learned flexibly to optimize oculomotor and manual control in value-based decision making. The present study thus replicates general findings of learned attentional biases in a novel context with inherently rewarding stimuli and goes on to further elucidate the interactions between endogenous and exogenous biases. (shrink)

In artificial intelligence literature, “delusions” are characterized as the generation of unfaithful output from reliable source content. There is an extensive literature on computer-generated delusions, ranging from visual hallucinations, like the production of nonsensical images in Computer Vision, to nonsensical text generated by (natural) language models, but this literature is predominantly taxonomic. In a recent research paper, however, a group of scientists from DeepMind successfully presented a formal treatment of an entire class of delusions in generative AI models (i.e., models (...) based on a transformer architecture, both with and without RLHF—reinforcement learning with human feedback, such as BERT, GPT-3 or the more recent GPT-3.5), referred to as auto-suggestive delusions. Auto-suggestive delusions are not mere unfaithful output, but are self-induced by the transformer models themselves. Typically, these delusions have been subsumed under the concept of exposure bias, but exposure bias alone does not elucidate their nature. In order to address their nature, I will introduce a formal framework that clarifies the probabilistic delusions capable of explaining exposure bias in a broad manner. This will serve as the foundation for exploring auto-suggestive delusions in language models. Next, an examination of self- or auto-suggestive delusions will be undertaken, by drawing an analogy with the rule-following problematic from the philosophy of mind and language. Finally, I will argue that this comprehensive approach leads to the suggestion that transformers, large language models in particular, may develop in a manner that touches upon solipsism and the emergence of a private language, in a weak sense. (shrink)

By definition, metacognitive processes may monitor or regulate various stages of first-order processing. By combining causal analysis with hypotheses expressed by other authors we derive the theoretical and methodological consequences of this special relation between metacognition and the underlying processes. In particular, we prove that because multiple processing stages may be monitored or regulated and because metacognition may form latent feedback loops, (1) without strong additional causal assumptions, typical measures of metacognitive monitoring or regulation are confounded; (2) without strong (...) additional causal assumptions, typical methods of controlling for first-order task performance (i.e., calibration, staircase, including first-order task performance in a regression analysis, or analyzing correct and incorrect trials separately) not only do not deconfound measures of metacognition but may even introduce bias; (3) that the first two problems cannot be solved by using simple models of decision-making derived from Signal Detection Theory. We conclude the paper by advocating robust methods of discovering properties of latent mechanisms. (shrink)

This chapter considers how dynamic brain states continuously fine-tune processing to accommodate changes in behavioural context and task goals. First, the authors review the extant literature suggesting that content-specific patterns of preparatory activity bias competitive processing in visual cortex to favour behaviourally relevant input. Next, they consider how higher-level brain areas might provide a top-down attentional signal for modulating baseline visual activity. Extensive evidence suggests that working memory representations in prefrontal cortex are especially important for generating and maintaining biases (...) in preparatory visual activity via modulatory feedback. Although it is often proposed that such working memory representations are maintained via persistent prefrontal activity, the authors review more recent evidence that rapid short-term synaptic plasticity provides a common substrate for maintaining the content of past experience and the rules for guiding future goal-directed processing. (shrink)

Complex skill learning depends on the joint contribution of multiple interacting systems: working memory (WM), declarative long-term memory (LTM) and reinforcement learning (RL). The present study aims to understand individual differences in the relative contributions of these systems during learning. We built four idiographic, ACT-R models of performance on the stimulus-response learning, Reinforcement Learning Working Memory task. The task consisted of short 3-image, and long 6-image, feedback-based learning blocks. A no-feedback test phase was administered after learning, with an (...) interfering task inserted between learning and test. Our four models included two single-mechanism RL and LTM models, and two integrated RL-LTM models: (a) RL-based meta-learning, which selects RL or LTM to learn based on recent success, and (b) a parameterized RL-LTM selection model at fixed proportions independent of learning success. Each model was the best fit for some proportion of our learners (LTM: 68.7%, RL: 4.8%, Meta-RL: 13.25%, bias-RL:13.25% of participants), suggesting fundamental differences in the way individuals deploy basic learning mechanisms, even for a simple stimulus-response task. Finally, long-term declarative memory seems to be the preferred learning strategy for this task regardless of block length (3- vs 6-image blocks), as determined by the large number of subjects whose learning characteristics were best captured by the LTM only model, and a preference for LTM over RL in both of our integrated-models, owing to the strength of our idiographic approach. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute is obligated to peer review and to post publicly “Final Research Reports” of all funded projects. PCORI peer review emphasizes adherence to PCORI’s Methodology Standards and principles of ethical scientific communication. During the peer review process, reviewers and editors seek to ensure that results are presented objectively and interpreted appropriately, e.g., free of spin.MethodsTwo independent raters assessed PCORI peer review feedback sent to authors. We calculated the proportion of reports in which spin was identified (...) during peer review, and the types of spin identified. We included reports submitted by April 2018 with at least one associated journal article. The same raters then assessed whether authors addressed reviewers’ comments about spin. The raters also assessed whether spin identified during PCORI peer review was present in related journal articles.ResultsWe included 64 PCORI-funded projects. Peer reviewers or editors identified spin in 55/64 submitted research reports. Types of spin included reporting bias, inappropriate interpretation, inappropriate extrapolation of results, and inappropriate attribution of causality. Authors addressed comments about spin related to 47/55 of the reports.Of 110 associated journal articles, PCORI comments about spin were potentially applicable to 44/110 articles, of which 27/44 contained the same spin that was identified in the PCORI research report. The proportion of articles with spin was similar for articles accepted before and after PCORI peer review.DiscussionJust as spin is common in journal articles and press releases, we found that most reports submitted to PCORI included spin. While most spin was mitigated during the funder’s peer review process, we found no evidence that review of PCORI reports influenced spin in journal articles. Funders could explore interventions aimed at reducing spin in published articles of studies they support. (shrink)

The massive acoustic redundancy of minimally contrasting speech sounds, coupled with the auditory integration of psychoacoustically similar acoustic properties produces a highly invariant percept, which cannot be improved by top-down feedback from the lexicon. Contextual effects are also bottom-up but not all entirely auditory and may thus differ in whether they affect sensitivity or only response bias.

This paper brings the intellectual tools of cognitive science to bear on resolving the “paradox of the active user” [Interfacing Thought: Cognitive Aspects of Human–Computer Interaction, Cambridge, MIT Press, MA, USA]—the persistent use of inefficient procedures in interactive tasks by experienced or even expert users when demonstrably more efficient procedures exist. The goal of this paper is to understand the roots of this paradox by finding regularities in these inefficient procedures. We examine three very different data sets. For each data (...) set, we first satisfy ourselves that the preferred procedures used by some subjects are indeed less efficient than the recommended procedures. We then amass evidence, for each set, and conclude that when a preferred procedure is used instead of a more efficient, recommended procedure, the preferred procedure tends to have two major characteristics: (1) the preferred procedure is a well‐practiced, generic procedure that is applicable either within the same task environment in different contexts or across different task environments, and (2) the preferred procedure is composed of interactive components that bring fast, incremental feedback on the external problem states. The support amassed for these characteristics leads to a new understanding of the paradox. In interactive tasks, people are biased towards the use of general procedures that start with interactive actions. These actions require much less cognitive effort as each action results in an immediate change to the external display that, in turn, cues the next action. Unfortunately for the users, the bias to use interactive unit tasks leads to a path that requires more effort in the long run. Our data suggest that interactive behavior is composed of a series of distributed choices; that is, people seldom make a once‐and‐for‐all decision on procedures. This series of biased selection of interactive unit tasks often leads to a stable suboptimal level of performance. (shrink)

We performed an EEG graph analysis on data from 31 typical readers (22.27 ± 2.53 y/o) and 24 dyslexics (22.99 ± 2.29 y/o), recorded while they were engaged in an audiovisual task and during resting-state. The task simulates reading acquisition as participants learned new letter-sound mappings via feedback. EEG data was filtered for the delta (0.5–4 Hz), theta (4–8 Hz), alpha (8–13 Hz), and beta (13–30 Hz) bands. We computed the Phase Lag Index (PLI) to provide an estimate of (...) the functional connectivity between all pairs of electrodes per band. Then, networks were constructed using a Minimum Spanning Tree (MST), a unique sub-graph connecting all nodes (electrodes) without loops, aimed at minimizing bias in between groups and conditions comparisons. Both groups showed a comparable accuracy increase during task blocks, indicating that they correctly learned the new associations. The EEG results revealed lower task-specific theta connectivity, and lower theta degree correlation over both rest and task recordings, indicating less network integration in dyslexics compared to typical readers. This pattern suggests a role of theta oscillations in dyslexia and may reflect differences in task engagement between the groups, although robust correlations between MST metrics and performance indices were lacking. (shrink)

Rooted in altruism theory, the purpose of the double-blind academic journal peer-review process is to: assess the quality of scientific research, minimize the potential for nepotism, and; advance the standards of research through high-quality, constructive feedback. However, considering the limited, if any, public recognition and monetary incentives that referees receive for reviewing manuscripts, academics are often reluctant to squander their limited time toward peer reviewing manuscripts. If they do accept such invitations, referees, at times, do not invest the appropriate (...) time needed and, as a result, scantily review manuscripts, which adversely affects the quality of the review. In addition, given that authors’ identities are not blind to journal editors, there is the potential for bias toward well-established academics from highly-ranked institutions. As a result of these issues, the aims of the academic journal review process are currently not being fulfilled. To rectify these issues, several recommendations, namely: single-blind the editors, pay reviewers, standardize the review process, increase the acceptance standards at academic conferences, and provide constructive feedback, are offered. (shrink)

Phone calls are an essential communication channel in today’s contact centers, but they are more difficult to analyze than written or form-based interactions. To that end, companies have traditionally used surveys to gather feedback and gauge customer satisfaction. In this work, we study the relationship between self-reported customer satisfaction (CSAT) and automatic utterance-level indicators of emotion produced by affect recognition models, using a real dataset of contact center calls. We find (1) that positive valence is associated with higher CSAT (...) scores, while the presence of anger is associated with lower CSAT scores; (2) that automatically detected affective events and CSAT response rate are linked, with calls containing anger/positive valence exhibiting respectively a lower/higher response rate; (3) that the dynamics of detected emotions are linked with both CSAT scores and response rate, and that emotions detected at the end of the call have a greater weight in the relationship. These findings highlight a selection bias in self-reported CSAT leading respectively to an over/under-representation of positive/negative affect. (shrink)

Group interaction is an essential way of social interaction and plays an important role in our social development. It has been found that when individuals participate in group interactions, the group identity of the interaction partner affects the mental processing and behavioral decision-making of subjects. However, little is known about how deaf college students, who are labeled distinctly different from normal hearing college students, will react when facing proposers from different groups in the ultimatum game and its time course. In (...) this study, we recruited 29 deaf college students who played the UG in which they received extremely unfair, moderately unfair, or fair offers from either outgroup members or ingroup members, while their brain potentials were recorded. The behavioral results showed that group membership did not impact the acceptance rate of deaf college students. But, event-related potential analysis demonstrated an enhanced feedback-related negativity elicited by ingroup members compared to outgroup members. Importantly, we found that under fairness conditions, deaf college students induced more positive P2 and P3 facing ingroup members compared to outgroup members. Our results demonstrated that group membership may modulate the performance of deaf college students in the UG and the existence of ingroup bias among deaf college students. This provides some evidence for the fairness characteristics of special populations, so that to improve the educational integration of colleges and universities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Both Interpersonal and Structural Efforts Are Necessary for Healthcare Professionals to Avoid Committing MicroaggressionsChidiogo Anyigbo (bio)I commend Lauren Freeman and Heather Stewart for acknowledging that the final chapter of Microaggressions and Medicine (2024), chapter 7, which provides practical guide for healthcare workers to avoid committing microaggressions, is a work in progress. The authors primarily focus on "strategies that can be implemented on the interpersonal and environmental levels because this (...) is where we can all immediately make the most impact to reduce microaggressions and their harmful consequences" (189). Presumably, readers of Microaggression and Medicine will by and large be healthcare workers: physicians, nurses, and allied health professionals working in direct patient care settings, and presumably these individuals pick up a book like Microaggression in Medicine to apply it to their own practice. Therefore, it may seem logical to act at the level that is closest to us as readers.The authors highlight seven strategies for reducing microaggressions in the healthcare space:• diversify employees• hire local health advocates, activists, and consultants to offer feedback on clinic design and practices• incorporate micro-cues into medical practices• foster medical humility• practice ethical listening• collaborate with patients as epistemic peers• increase awareness and education for colleagues and staffSome of these strategies occur at a systems level, like diversifying employees, hiring local health advocates, and creating staff educational awareness. Others are intended as steps for individuals to take during patient encounters. All of [End Page 152] these points, however, show how structural and systemic changes are important to address concurrently with taking individual steps. For example, if one makes interpersonal efforts to reduce or avoid microaggressions but is at the same time still operating within systems and structures that reinforce microaggressions, not only will harm continue to be done, but there is also a risk of burnout for the individual trying to make strides despite these harmful systems (as Hambrick and Tang Girdwood [2024] discuss). This may lead individuals to view their interpersonal and environmental efforts as futile because they do not lead to widespread reduction in microaggressions.For example, these structural and systemic strategies can start with institutional and organizational policies, for example, regarding how to respond to patients who harass healthcare professionals or expectations patients can have regarding the care they receive. Not only do patients experience microaggressions from healthcare workers, which is the focus of Freeman and Stewart's book, but healthcare workers can also experience microaggressions from patients (as Hambrick and Tang Girdwood elaborate). Hiring a diverse staff at all levels can certainly help foster a more inclusive environment, but it is not sufficient, and it also can lead to healthcare workers from historically underrepresented groups being the target of microaggressions from patients, their surrogate decision-makers, or their families. Institutional approaches to diversifying the healthcare workforce also need to consider how to best support a diverse healthcare workforce.The authors rightly point out that people of marginalized backgrounds often face a "minority tax" and that they are often the ones expected to do the uncompensated work of calling attention to and leading efforts to address microaggressions in their organization by educating colleagues and staff. As this happens, these more diverse staff may not feel the psychological safety or support needed to stay in the organization. The efforts to develop and maintain psychological safety are led by structural and systemic action, not solely individual herculean efforts. Education is not sufficient if there are no systems and policies in place to support and reinforce the desired behaviors.The concept of choice architecture is often used in business and behavioral economics to describe how to influence the conditions in which people make decisions to reduce bias, oftentimes creating default options that improve well being for many (Meder, Fleischhut, and Osman 2018). For example, this concept has been applied to improving healthy eating behaviors in workplaces (Rantala et al. 2024). There may be similar opportunities to explore how such efforts can be applied to create default action that does not rely on individual action and vigilance to address microaggressions. Choice architecture strategies for addressing microaggressions could perhaps expand the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) framework used for systems-based efforts to be... (shrink)

Does optimism lead to success? Friends of optimism argue that positive beliefs about ourselves and our future contribute to fitness and mental health, and are correlated with good functioning, productivity, resilience, and pro-social behaviour. Sceptics, instead, claim that when we are optimistic we fail to react constructively to negative feedback, and put ourselves at risk because we underestimate threats. Thus, it is controversial whether optimistic beliefs are conducive to success, intended as the fulfilment of our goals in a given (...) domain. According to the traditional view, optimistic beliefs lead to success when they do not involve any distortion of reality, and according to the trade-off view, they lead to success when they involve a distortion of reality, but a small one. Based on the literature about positive illusions in the perception of romantic partners and in the assessment of future health prospects, I suggest that optimistic beliefs lead to goal attainment when they support agency by contributing to the sense that we are competent and efficacious agents and that our goals are both desirable and attainable. (shrink)

Emotions are foremost self-regulating processes that permit rapid responses and adaptations to situations of personal concern. They have biological bases and are shaped ontogenetically via learning and experience. Many situations and events of personal concern are social in nature. Thus, social exchanges play an important role in learning about rules and norms that shape regulation processes. I argue that (a) emotions often are actively auto-regulating—the behavior implied by the emotional reaction bias to the eliciting event or situation modifies or (...) terminates the situation; (b) certain emotion components are likely to habituate dynamically, modifying the emotional states; (c) emotions are typically intra- and interpersonal processes at the same time, and modulating forces at these different levels interact; (d) emotions are not just regulated—they regulate. Important conclusions of my arguments are that the scientific analysis of emotion should not exclude regulatory processes, and that effortful emotion regulation should be seen relative to a backdrop of auto-regulation and habituation, and not the ideal notion of a neutral baseline. For all practical purposes unregulated emotion is not a realistic concept. (shrink)

Economics plays a significant role in decision-making in contemporary western societies, but its role is increasingly questioned. A recurring topic among the challenges raised by critics is that economics as a discipline lacks sufficient pluralism. That is, it fails to enable, encourage, and respect the use of different ontologies, methodologies, theories, and/or schools of thought to study economic reality. Has this been a productive critique? Does talk about pluralism help identify genuine problems in the discipline? Pluralism in economics could draw (...) support from the current consensus in philosophy that pluralism in science is a good thing. I argue, however, that the claim that economic research is insufficiently pluralist is unlikely to convince economists who believe economics is already pluralist enough and that it does not offer unambiguous recommendations for change. This is because there are too many legitimate ways to interpret how pluralism maps to practice. There are numerous variables that pluralist ideals might focus on—the things that they seek multiple rather than one of—and different interpretations of how many of those variables economics has in practice. Yet, as I go on to argue, this does not mean that talk of pluralism is entirely beside the point, since the reasons pluralists offer for their ideals do help to identify genuine problems in economics. The social epistemic strategies that arguments for pluralism recommend point us to three concrete issues in the way economic research is organised: gender imbalances, a steep internal hierarchy, and a dismissive attitude to outsiders. I show that economic research could be more progressive, representative of the interests of those in society, accepted, and legitimate and less likely to fall into bias if the discipline alleviated its gender imbalances, if it were less hierarchical, and if it had a healthier relationship with outsiders. -/- In chapter 1, I outline the debate about pluralism in economics and explain how my thesis utilises a novel approach to social epistemology to offer a way out of the impasse in which that the debate presently resides. In chapter 2, I explain the different philosophical arguments for pluralism in science and categorise them using the variables they focus on and the reasons they give for pluralism. In chapter 3, I argue that interpreting pluralism as a particular arrangement of variables for economics to attain does not lead to unambiguous recommendations for change because it leaves too much open. Yet, I go on to argue, in chapter 4, that drawing on the reasons for pluralism can provide a set of heuristics for piecemeal evaluations of the social epistemic practices in economics. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I apply these heuristics to economics. I provide evidence that [a] women are outnumbered in economics and face an adverse environment in the discipline, that [b] economics is steeply hierarchical, and that [c] economists form an in-group that assumes superiority and frequently dismisses outside voices. I argue that these three features of economic research block avenues for productive forms of feedback (mechanisms that help to challenge, justify, and refine scientific knowledge), block the interests of certain perspectives being heard, and block public scrutiny of the decisions made by economists. (shrink)

The big-fish-little-pond effect (BFLPE) is the tendency for students to evaluate themselves more favourably when they have high rank in a low rank school than low rank in a high rank school. Research has documented the BFLPE on experienced emotions. We conducted three studies that examined forecasts of how the BFLPE influences other people’s emotions (i.e. empathic forecasts). In Study 1, participants received performance feedback about themselves or another person and reported their own affect or anticipated the other person’s (...) affect. Results extended the BFLPE to empathic forecasting. Moreover, forecasters anticipated that the BFLPE had a stronger influence on negative emotion than it actually did. Study 2 tested whether neglect of group rank underlies the BFLPE in empathic forecasting. Empathic forecasts were strongly influenced by another person’s rank in their group, but only weakly influenced by group rank. Study 3 tested whether extremity of group ranks exacerbates the BFLPE in empathic forecasting. Empathic forecasts were especially favourable (unfavourable) when a target had very high (low) rank in a very low (high) rank group. These data support the BFLPE in empathic forecasting, but also illustrate ways in which it is both similar to and different from actual experience of the effect. (shrink)