Digitalization and the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will bring about substantial changes in all aspects of life. This happens in a world marked by the poisonous synergy of five Ps, polarization, populism, protectionism, post‐truth, patriarchy, as well as an ambiguous interplay of secularization and new visibility of religion.If development of AI is to be beneficial for people and planet a number of challenges must be met. In this regard, religion‐and‐science dialogue needs improvement in making things not only intellectually (...) but also spiritually fit. Ethics should be involved from the beginning rather than being called upon first when problems arise. Faith communities have a prophetical, diaconal, ethical, and theological role.Based on the characterization of life as a fourfold web of relationality, personal, social, political, as well as global issues are identified and discussed. These include mental health disorders, addiction, manipulation, and self‐exploitation. Reflections on leadership suggest resilience, coexistence, and hope as theological key components for navigating the uncharted realms of the digital age. (shrink)

The Commentary on the Psalms is a monumental work which for more than thirty years consumed the energies of Augustine as exegete. The extraordinary quantity of this work as well as the exceptional number of manuscript traditions which it has spawned has delayed until now the production of a critical edition carried out according to the exacting criteria of modern textual criticism. The part of the editorial project which the Vienna Academy entrusted to the Patristic Institute, the «Augustinianum» has now (...) been completed in five volumes published in the CSEL series. The editor’s intention was to incorporate the progress made in modern textual criticism to the specific case of Augustine’s treatment of the Psalms, giving due attention to the peculiar characteristics both of the text and of the manuscript tradition. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the practical complexity of accountability in health care by focusing on a particular crisis affecting one NHS trust in the UK, that of insufficient beds to meet demand. It is presented through the eyes of five middle managers with nursing backgrounds. Although the focus is on their words, their expressions of distress and their awareness of conflict, these lead to a commentary highlighting some of the relationships between theory and practice, policy (...) making and implementation, and, in the final analysis, compulsion and choice. The managers seemed to work within four main patterns of provider accountability: public, professional, pecuniary and personal. These four Ps of accountability created incompatibilities in the accountability process, but the conclusion attempts to draw the threads together to suggest a possible way forward. In order to protect confidentiality, pseudonyms are used for the NHS trust and the interviewees, and some personal details have been disguised. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception ( mānasapratyakṣa ), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] ( mānasa ) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally (...) called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ ( idam iti jñānam ). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense. (shrink)

This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...) dependence relations. ————Part 1 leads in an axiomatic step-by-step development from the elementary classical truth value semantics of a sentential-logical language, called ‘L’, (chapter 1) to the elementary Kolmogorov probability semantics of L (chapter 2), which is then extended to four axiomatic semantical theories of dependence relations between the formulae of L. First the elementary Kolmogorov probability semantics of L is extended to a theory, called ‘Kdd’, of the relations of deductive dependence and deductive independence between formulae of L (chapter 3). Then Kdd is extended to a theory, called ‘Kpd1’, of the degree to which formulae of L probabilistically depend on each other in regard to a given probability distribution on the set of all formulae of L (chapter 4). Kpd1, in its turn, gets extended to a theory, called ‘Kpd2’, of the relations of probabilistic dependence and independence, relativized to unary Kolmogorov probability functions defined on L (chapter 5). Then Kpd2 is extended to a theory, called ‘Kid’, of the relations of inductive dependence and inductive independence, again relativized to unary Kolmogorov probability functions defined on L (chapter 6). Finally, Kid is extended to a theory, called ‘Kpid’, of the relations of purely inductive positive and negative dependence, relativized to unary Kolmogorov probability functions defined on L (chapter 7). ——Chapter 1, which deals with the familiar notions of truth value functions, tautologies, consequence relations and relations of logical opposition, is naturally the shortest chapter of part 1.——In chapter 2, the elementary classical semantics of L is extended to the elementary Kolmogorov probability semantics of L, i.e. to an axiomatic theory of unary and of binary Kolmogorov probability functions defined on the set of formulae of L. Because of the elementary character of this theory, chapter 2 is also rather short.——Chapter 3 introduces the first theory on dependence relations, to wit: Kdd, the theory of deductive (in)dependence between formulae of L. I follow here the well-known idea of Popper and Miller, who have used it in a famous discussion on the nature of probabilistic support for their arguments that probabilistic support is deductive, not inductive. I develop Kdd in the form of about 100 theorems, making ample use of the fact that deductive independence is nothing but subcontrary opposition, and close with a remark on the fundamental difference between deductive and logical dependence—two relations the ideas of which are all too easily mixed up.——Chapters 4 and 5 deal extensively with the traditional ideas of probabilistic (in)dependence, applied to formulae rather than to events. As always, I proceed axiomatically in a step-by-step process under systematic viewpoints and obtain about 300 theorems in this way. In the formulation of the theorems, I took special care to state clearly and expressly so-called tacit assumptions, especially those concerning the probability values of the formulae said to be dependent on each other. These assumptions are usually missing in the literature, due either to economy of writing or to sloppiness of thinking. Presumably, both chapters contain little that is new, their value lying more in the systematic grouping and organic development of the theorems than in the newness of these.——In chapter 6, I extend the axiomatic theory about probabilistic (in)dependence which has been elaborated in chapter 5, to an axiomatic theory of inductive (in)dependence by requiring of the relation of inductive (in)dependence that it be probabilistic (in)dependence, but not also logical implication or logical opposition. I point out the differences between probabilistic and inductive (in)dependence by means of some 60 theorems and close my examination of inductive (in)dependence by considering its relationship to the notion of support in the philosophy of science.——Finally, in chapter 7, the last of part 1, I take the step from inductive dependence to what I call ‘purely inductive dependence’ by combining the idea of inductive dependence with that of deductive independence in a way which is suggested by writings of Popper and Miller. I arrive at two noteworthy theorems. Firstly, there is indeed no purely inductive support. But secondly, and perhaps amazingly, countersupport is purely inductive.————Whereas the probabilistic framework of part 1 of the present work is Kolmogorov probability semantics, the framework of part 2 is Popper probability semantics, which is not only worth examining as a fascinating alternative to orthodox Kolmogorov probability semantics, but also allows us to examine dependence relations more deeply, than Kolmogorov probability semantics does. Part 2 leads—again in an axiomatic step-by-step development—from the basic Popper probability semantics of L, called ‘Pb’, (chapter 8) via a probabilistic theory of logical attributes, called ‘Ps’, (chapter 9) to four axiomatic semantical theories of dependence relations between the formulae of L. First, Ps is extended to a theory, called ‘Pdd’, of the relations of deductive dependence and deductive independence between formulae of L (chapter 10). Then Pdd is extended to a theory, called ‘Ppd’, of (in all) 20 relations of probabilistic (in)dependence, relativized to binary Popper probability functions defined on L (chapter 11). Ppd, in its turn, is extended to a theory, called ‘Pid’, of (in all) 10 relations of inductive dependence, again relativized to binary Popper probability functions defined on L (first part of chapter 12). Finally, Pid is extended to a theory, called ‘Ppid’, of (in all) 15 relations of purely inductive positive and negative dependence, relativized to binary Popper probability functions defined on L (second part of chapter 12).——Chapter 8, the first chapter of part 2 of the present work, is entirely preparatory. It introduces the axioms and about 180 theorems (150 of them together with their proofs) of basic Popper probability semantics in order to set this kind of semantics under way.——Then, in chapter 9, basic Popper probability semantics is extended to a probabilistic theory of logical properties of and relations between the formulae of L. Although I think that the way I did this extension is of some interest in itself, the main task of chapter 9 is again a preparatory one: to yield the indispensable lemmata (about 90 in number) for the theorems concerning probabilistic dependence relations in chapter 11 and concerning inductive dependence relations in chapter 12.——Chapter 10 brings the extension of Ps to the theory Pdd of deductive (in)dependence. Only half a dozen theorems are noted here for later use in the Pdd-extensions Ppd and Ppid. In view of the over 100 theorems already gained on this topic in the Kolmogorovian framework (cf. chapter 3), a similar extensive elaboration of Pdd would have been superfluous.——Chapter 11 is the most important one of part 2. It consists of a systematic comparison of 20 probabilistic (in)dependence concepts by means of about 230 theorems, obtained within the axiomatic theory Ppd, which is built up as an extension of Pdd. The main points of comparison were: differences in logical strength; reflexivity and symmetry; behaviour under the condition that the probability values of the formulae in question are extreme. It turned out that each of the examined concepts violates a strong and straightforward version of the intuitive requirement that probabilistic dependence should go with logical dependence. Whereas the corresponding chapter 5 in part 1 of the present work may not have led to new theorems, chapter 11 yields dozens of them in the process of comparison of concepts of dependence and independence which had—as far as I know—never before been treated in a single theoretical framework. With Popper probability semantics, this framework has become available, and here I have simply made full use of it.——In chapter 12, I extend the theory Ppd of probabilistic (in)dependence to the theories Pid and Ppid of inductive and purely inductive dependence, in a way very similar to that in which I have extended the theory Kpd2 to the theories Kid and Kpid in chapters 6 and 7. The first main result of Kpid (roughly: there is no purely inductive support) could be repeated for four of the five purely inductive positive dependence relations considered in chapter 12, whereas the second main result of Kpid (roughly: there is purely inductive countersupport ) could be repeated for each of the five examined purely inductive negative dependence relations. Chapter 12 closes with a brief recapitulation and critical discussion of the main results. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Apsines and Pseudo–ApsinesMalcolm HeathThis essay addresses a problem with the authorship of the rhetorical treatise traditionally attributed to Apsines,1 and explores the possibilities which open up if we reject that attribution. We know that a great deal of rhetorical literature was in circulation in late antiquity without reliable indication of authorship. Some texts, such as the Anonymus Seguerianus, have survived with no name attached. Others survive with the wrong (...) name: only two of the five parts of the Hermogenean canon are likely to be by Hermogenes himself.2 In some cases alternative attributions are found: as we shall see, one of the pseudo–Hermogenean texts (On Invention) was also attributed to Apsines. Sometimes alternative attributions are recorded in the manuscripts: the first of the two treatises on epideictic attributed to Menander Rhetor is ascribed in a supralinear variant in one manuscript to "Menander or Genethlius";3 neither attribution is likely to be correct. One manuscript of the short treatise on epicheiremes preserved under the name of Minucianus notes that it is ascribed in another source to Nicagoras;4 the confusion may have arisen from a patronymic, since the younger Minucianus was son and father of sophists named Nicagoras. In the case of the pseudo–Dionysian Art of Rhetoric we can see a false attribution coming into being: the anonymous author's references to his own On Imitation (364.24, 383.22 Usener/Radermacher) prompted a scholiast to identify him conjecturally with Dionysius of Halicarnassus.5 One of the sources used by [End Page 89] Georgius, a commentator on Hermogenes of (probably) the fifth century, was "an unascribed treatise, which they attribute to Aquila" ().6 Other examples of false or uncertain attribution could be cited. These facts do not warrant indiscriminate skepticism about the authorship of rhetorical texts; but caution is in order, and we should weigh seriously possible grounds for doubting a traditional attribution.Treatise AThe treatise traditionally attributed to Apsines (to avoid prejudging the question of authorship let us call it "Treatise A") discusses the parts of a speech: prologue, narrative, arguments, epilogue. This was a standard format; Syrianus refers to "a myriad others" who have written on the subject (2.11.6–10 Rabe; cf. PS 205.8–10 Rabe). Other extant examples include the epitome of Rufus, the Anonymus Seguerianus, and the pseudo–Hermogenean On Invention. In his work on stasis Hermogenes himself seems to look forward to such a text when he promises to return to one point in more detail in a discussion of the prologue (53.12–13 Rabe). This promise is not redeemed in any extant work of his; Syrianus inferred that Hermogenes had written "on the parts of the political speech" (2.3.2–7) but evidently had no firsthand knowledge of such a work.The Traditional AttributionThe Apsines to whom Treatise A is attributed is generally identified with Valerius Apsines of Gadara, a friend of Philostratus (VS 628). From the Suda (A4735) we gather that he studied with Heraclides of Lycia in Smyrna and with Basilicus in Nicomedia, held a sophistic chair in Athens, and was elevated to consular rank under Maximinus (A.D. 235–38).7 A complimentary reference to Basilicus in the introduction to [End Page 90] the treatise (331.7 = 217.5–6) encourages this identification. But we know of at least three other sophists with the same name. The Suda mentions two:1. Apsines of Athens, father of the sophist Onasimus (A4734).2. Apsines, son of the Athenian sophist Onasimus (A4736).From Eunapius we know of3. Apsines the Spartan, a rival of Julian of Cappadocia and a distinguished (482, with an entertaining anecdote about the rivalry at 483–85). Eunapius' Apsines the Spartan may well be identical with the Suda's Apsines son of Onasimus, since the Suda's entry on Onasimus (O327) describes him as "of Cyprus or Sparta" and lists a technical work (addressed, presumably, to his son) among his writings.8 An older theory which identified Apsines of Gadara with the father of Onasimus has generally been abandoned on chronological grounds, since the Suda gives the reign of Constantine as Onasimus' floruit.9 [End Page 91]A... (shrink)

O'Donnell, J. R. Anton Charles Pegis on the occasion of his retirement.--Conlan, W. J. The definition of faith according to a question of MS. Assisi 138: study and edition of text.--Spade, P. V. Five logical tracts by Richard Lavenham.--Maurer, A. Henry of Harclay's disputed question on the plurality of forms.--Brown, V. Giovanni Argiropulo on the agent intellect: an edition of Ms. Magliabecchi V 42.--Synan, E. A. The Exortacio against Peter Abelard's Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum.--Fitzgerald, W. Nugae Hyginianae.--Sheehan, (...) M. M. Marriage and family in English conciliar and synodal legislation.--Shook, L. K. Riddles relating to the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium.--Boyle, L. E. The De regno and the two powers.--Colledge, E. A Middle English Christological poem.--Gough, M. R. E. Three forgotten martyrs of Anazarbus in Cilicia.--Häring, N. Chartres and Paris revisited.--Hayes, W. Greek recentiores, (Ps.) Basil, Adversus eunomium, IV-V.--Owens, J. The physical world of Parmenides. (shrink)

What do the victims of tyranny owe each other? In this paper, I examine whether they can be condemned for betraying their friends, and I do so through a novel interpretation of Judith Shklar’s political thought. Shklar is a widely acknowledged and significant influence on non-ideal theory and political realism. However, there is also a previously unnoticed transformation between her early and mature work, for although she remains a sceptic her approach to moral conflict changes from value pluralism to value (...) monism. In addition, it is only in her mature work, as a monist, she believes tyranny cancels obligations of justice. I argue here that Shklar’s monism fails, and this in turn has important implications for political realism and non-ideal theory. While attention has been focused on developing a sceptical critique of ideal theory, this interpretation of Shklar’s work illustrates that greater awareness is needed of the pitfalls of monist strands of scepticism. (shrink)

Alfred Cuzán proposed five “laws of politics” that allegedly govern elections in democracies. Drawing from insights in the general philosophy of science and the philosophy of the social sciences, I argue that—although his empirical evidence is impressive—he failed to develop a convincing argument for calling the five theses “laws.” This article discusses other examples that often are claimed to be “laws of politics” and describes the global picture supporting this analysis.

Why do we have obligations to the community to which we happen to belong? For communitarians, membership does more than provide the context for asking this question. In fact, the simple fact of membership goes some way towards justifying our obligations. According to the strong version of the communitarian thesis, membership is the fundamental consideration justifying political obligation; but for the weaker version, membership is one consideration among others and at times may be the less weighty one. John Horton's theory (...) of associative obligations can be read as moving back and forth between strong and weak communitarianism. His communitarianism is strong when he rejects value pluralism, arguing that one consideration, membership, is fundamental. However, Horton also advances claims that are compatible with not only the weak version of the communitarian thesis but also value pluralism. They suggest that, if membership is one reason among others to justify obligations, it is not fundamental as it can be defeated by other considerations. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes two ways in which to think about the freedom of extremists. Non-pluralists claim to have identified the general rule for resolving moral conflicts, and conceptualize freedom as liberty of action in accordance with that rule. It follows, if extremist violence breaks the rule in question, removing this option does not infringe the freedom of extremists. In contrast, for pluralists there is no one general rule to resolve moral conflicts, and freedom is simply the absence of interference. I (...) argue here that pluralism provides a principled defense of freedom, as it allows us to see that removing options from extremists is worse, on prima facie grounds, than not doing so. Also, non-pluralists cannot show that they have identified the general rule for resolving moral conflicts, and in particular, are forced to rely on quite different principles altogether when justifying paternalistic responses to extremism. (shrink)

In situations where we ought to tolerate what we morally disapprove of we are faced with the following moral conflict: we ought to interfere with X, we ought to tolerate X, we can do either, but we cannot do both. And the aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between toleration as a value commitment and value pluralist and value monist approaches to moral conflict. Firstly, value monists side-step the moral conflict at the heart of toleration. Nonetheless, secondly, (...) it is not the case that toleration as a value commitment is entailed by value pluralism. Rather, the value pluralist line of argument that can be defended is that toleration is simply one value among others, that there is no general rule showing that it has priority over other values, but also that it cannot be excluded altogether as a value. (shrink)

Given his commitment to toleration, Edmund Burke is rightly seen as a moral pluralist. What has largely gone unnoticed, however, is his value pluralism. Whereas moral pluralism refers to normative...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Encounter with the Art and Science of MedicineAnonymous Five“Let Nothing Upset YouLet Nothing Frighten YouEverything is ChangingOnly God is Changeless”—St. Theresa of AvilaSt. Teresa’s prayer is on the front cover of each of four binders dedicated to storing insurance authorizations, studies, references, and reports about our daughter’s brain tumor treatment. They represent our experience, what we learned, the information we were given, and the information we sought (...) out. I kept them in case our daughter ever wanted to understand how my husband and I arrived at a decision for her treatment that was in direct opposition to the strong recommendation of her primary treatment team of physicians.On December 10, 2003, I received an urgent call from our daughter’s neurologist requesting that we meet with the doctor late that afternoon. For six months prior to that appointment, our daughter had been telling us about odd sensations with breathing, nausea, and balance. Sometimes she would seem extremely distressed for a short period of time or report that her friends told her about doing or saying things that didn’t make sense and that she didn’t remember. We consulted a series of physicians as her symptoms became steadily more intense and more prevalent. Our family practice physician referred us to an allergy specialist and a pulmonologist. There were a number of tests for allergies and lung problems. As the tests and treatments did not help, our daughter became increasingly unwilling to go to doctor’s appointments. My husband and I were confused and deeply concerned about the lack of progress. The next series of referrals included a gastroenterologist and a neurologist. The gastroenterologist suggested our daughter had partial–complex epilepsy, concurred with our plan to see a neurologist, and mentioned she should have an MRI.I remember the neurologist putting the MRI scans up, pointing to the large dark spot which he called a “large mass” (5 cm), that could be either a cluster of blood vessels or a neoplasm. He said his office had arranged for us to meet a neurosurgeon the following day. We all remember the same thing about that visit—the image of the large dark mass on the scan—and the neurologists flat, brisk tone. We met with the neuro-surgeon the next day. Her team was kind and sympathetic—she was positive, up beat and direct. She did not think this mass was blood vessels. She thought it was a large tumor that needed to be removed right away. Our daughters surgery was scheduled for the following Friday—December 19, 2003. She had turned 15 on November 5.Four and a half hours after our daughter was wheeled into the operating room, her surgeon told us they had removed 98% of the tumor. She said there was no cure, but there was a good prognosis based on the surgical outcome. Several days later, she called us and said she had more data, and it looked like the resection was closer to 90%. The first pathology report, a “first impression” directly after surgery, described our daughter’s tumor as an astrocytoma, probably high grade. Three weeks after surgery, we met with a panel of doctors—two oncologists and radiologist—who explained that based on the final pathology report, our daughter’s tumor was classified as an ependymoma, grade 2. We were dismayed. First, there had been the change in the estimated success of the resection and now a complete shift in both grade and tumor type.The team recommended radiation to follow her surgery, which they said was standard treatment. We began to try to inform ourselves about her tumor. Her father, an agronomist, did an extensive search in PubMed to evaluate and sort through the literature on low–grade gliomas and radiation. What he could find was inconclusive and grim. Most reports in the literature suggested at best delayed mortality at five years after radiation. [End Page E7] Meanwhile, our daughter went through a spinal MRI and the preparatory “fitting” of the mask to immobilize her head during radiation.E7I consulted with a friend who had worked as an EKG tech. She urged... (shrink)

Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, a political and philosophical standpoint that emerges in her mature work, has ostensibly two defining characteristics. It is a sceptical approach that puts cruelty first among the vices. For that reason, it is considered to be both set apart from mainstream liberalism, in particular the liberalism of J. S. Mill and John Rawls, but also an important source of influence for political realists and nonideal theorists. However, I argue here that, in putting cruelty first among (...) the vices, Shklar also offers a value monist approach to political thought, one that she shares with Mill and Rawls as well. Each claims to have identified the general rule for the resolution of moral conflicts, although they disagree about what that rule is. Therefore, Shklar’s mature work combines scepticism with value monism. As such, it represents a radical departure from the value pluralist approach to moral conflict evident in her early work. Her commentators have not noticed either her mature monism or the move away from her earlier value pluralism, and this is explained by a tendency to see her mature work as offering simply a sceptical alternative to mainstream liberalism. (shrink)

An authoritative directive, when it has legitimacy, is a reason to exclude from consideration some of the reasons to act and not to act in this way. One is obliged to obey, even when one disagrees with the directive. Therefore, authority demands deference regarding how one acts, although one is free to think what one likes about that action. How can deference of this kind be compatible with freedom and rationality? That is the so-called moral problem of authority. For some, (...) authority has legitimacy in a deliberative democracy because deference to its rules better meets the demands of freedom and rationality. As I hope to show here, this line of thought does not give an adequate account of authority. If a directive is legitimate only if it has a certain content, as deliberative democrats are saying, one does not defer to but rather merely complies with such a directive. (shrink)

RésuméSelon le scepticisme anarchiste d'A. John Simmons, il n'y a pas d'obligation d'obéir à la loi dans l’état actuel des choses, car les obligations légales n'ont de légitimité que lorsqu'elles sont volontairement contractées par la plupart ou de nombreux citoyens. Cependant, la sensibilité de Simmons à la diversité des raisons et à la possibilité d'un conflit non résolu suggère une position alternative pluraliste. Celle-ci montre que les fondements de l'autorité légitime sont pluriels et incluent la justice distributive. En outre, même (...) les obligations contractées volontairement peuvent être annulées par des raisons contradictoires, comme lorsque nous sommes liés par le devoir à un régime injuste. (shrink)

As a legitimate authoritative directive is a second-order reason, it defeats conflicting reasons by a process of exclusion. Nonetheless, a legitimate authoritative directive can be defeated by more weighty reasons, including, as I argue in this paper, the more weighty reasons it excludes. This is part of a value pluralist conception of authority, according to which there is no general rule for the resolution of conflicting reasons. And I advance this argument in response to the work of Joseph Raz. Although (...) Raz is a value pluralist, he posits a general rule for the resolution of some conflicts: namely, that an exclusionary reason cannot be defeated by a (more weighty) reason it excludes. This represents a weak version of value pluralism. My argument is that Raz does not succeed in his efforts to show that this general rule either better ensures conformity with reason or that it is justified by commitment to autonomy. (shrink)

This article explores the values that should be promoted in civic education for democracy and also how the promotion of values can be non-coercive. It will be argued that civic education should promote the values of reasonableness, mutual respect and fairness, but also that only public, political reasons count in attempting to justify the content of civic education. It will also be argued that the content of civic education may legitimately be broader than this, including but not restricted to the (...) values of autonomy, integrity, magnanimity, truthfulness and generosity. At the same time, if civic education is seen merely as a means to shape and form future citizens, then the promotion of values in civic education will be a coercive imposition on children and young people. If the promotion of values instead is to be non-coercive it must be defended with reasons that children and young people should be able to accept. (shrink)

Résumé Le problème moral de l'autorité peut s'exprimer ainsi : comment l'autorité, avec la déférence qu'elle implique, peut-elle être compatible avec la liberté et la rationalité? L'approche pluraliste sépare l'obligation politique de l'autorité. Pour les pluralistes, l'autorité est à la fois injustifiable et inutile, et donc l'obligation politique légitime, y compris le devoir d'obéir à la loi, n'implique pas de déférence. Je soutiens qu'il est possible de conserver l'engagement pluraliste envers des motifs de légitimité pluriels, tout en réfutant les objections (...) pluralistes à l'autorité. En conséquence, chaque fois que l'autorité a une légitimité, la question morale de l'autorité exigera une réponse. (shrink)

In recent literature on utopianism, in particular non-ideal and realist work, the distinction between scepticism and non-scepticism has been to the fore. The main concern of this article, in contra...

Postmodernists reject what they call the universalist-rationalist framework of liberalism. When they do defend liberal democracy, they do so in a contextualist manner (within a ‘form of life’) and on the basis of contestation (‘agonism’). Liberals are right to charge postmodernism with self-contradiction, relativism, and immoralism. It is also argued in this article that liberalism and postmodernism are incompatible, and therefore, they cannot be joined together in response to the hegemonic construction of democratic debate. However, liberals are caught in a (...) bind as they insist on impartiality but also believe the exercise of virtue (reasonableness, mutual respect) is a requirement of rational dialogue. This article argues that perfectionism (objectivism) in value judgements is required both to insist that virtuousity is a requirement of rationality and to reject postmodernism. However, it must be possible to separate perfectionism from two features of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism: he is hostile to liberal rights and his contextualism results in relativism. (shrink)

What I refer to here as the dilemma of authority arises when one ought to defer to authority; one ought to act as the more weighty reason demands; one can do either; one cannot do both. For those who reject the possibility of legitimate authority, the dilemma does not arise. Among those who accept legitimate authority, some, including Joseph Raz, presume the conflict can be resolved without remainder. In this paper, I argue that, in a moral conflict of this kind, (...) when one of the reasons for action is defeated but not cancelled, it is rational to feel regret for failing to do what one ought to do. (shrink)