Our attitudes toward human culpability for environmental problems have moral and emotional import, influencing our basic capacities for believing cooperative action and environmental repair are even possible. In this paper, I suggest that having the virtue of forgivingness as a response to environmental harm is generally good for moral character, preserving us from morally risky varieties of pessimism and despair. I define forgivingness as a forward-looking disposition based on Robin Dillon’s conception of preservative forgiveness, a preparation to be (...) deeply and abidingly accepting yet expecting human error. As with other virtues, however, preservative forgiveness is available to some of us more than others; in the second half of this paper, I consider the deep challenge posed by rational pessimism, especially on the part of those who have been given many reasons not to hope for the very moral improvements for which they strive. I conclude that for those of us with the power roles and personal resources especially conducive to environmental activism, preservative forgiveness inclines us to remain engaged in environmental activism with fellow flawed human beings, recognizing our own mutual depredations while committing us to cooperatively respond. (shrink)

The present study tested the hypothesis that centrality of religiosity as defined as the position of an individual’s religious construct system in personality moderates the relationship between the experience of forgiveness by God and forgivingness for others. Participants completed measures of forgiveness by God, forgivingness, and centrality of religiosity. The moderating hypothesis was tested by treating centrality of religiosity both as a continuous variable and as a categorical variable with reference to a typological distinction. Results indicate that centrality (...) of religiosity moderates the positive relationship between forgiveness by God and forgivingness for others, implying that this relation only occurs if the religious construct system is in a central position in personality, but not if it is in a subordinate position. These results underline the importance of considering centrality of religiosity as an individual difference variable. (shrink)

(In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Psychology of Forgiveness, edited by Glen Pettigrove and Robert Enright) This chapter discusses forgiveness conceived as primarily a volitional commitment, rather than an emotional transformation. As a commitment, forgiveness is distal, involving moral agency over time, and can take the form of a speech act or a chosen attitude. The purpose can be a commitment to repair or restore relationships with wrongdoers for their sake or the sake of the relationship, usually by forswearing (...) one’s hostile attitudes toward a particular wrongdoing; the commitment may also be to oneself for one’s own sake, to be a person with a virtue of forgivingness. It can be incident-specific, that is, a response to a particular occasion of harm, or a forward-looking disposition, an aim to cultivate the habit of being a forgiving person in advance. The enabling conditions of forgivingness as a virtue may be more basic master virtues including integrity and humility, motivations that also underpin commitments to be unforgiving, so this chapter concludes with some careful consideration of the ethics of unforgivingness to others, and the commitment to be unforgiving of oneself. (shrink)

This paper constructs a theory of Christian forgiveness and argues that contemporary philosophical analyses of forgiveness have failed to capture its essential character. First, I provide a summary of the general view of forgiveness developed by contemporary philosophers (e.g., Jeffrie Murphy, Jean Hampton, Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald, Paul Hughes, Margaret Holmgren, Trudy Govier, Joanna North, Robert Roberts, and Charles Griswold). Second, I highlight the central differences between these general contemporary views and a genuine Christian conception of forgiveness. Finally, I argue that two (...) reasons for these irreconcilable differences are the following: first, contemporary philosophical analyses have evered the virtue of forgivingness from central Christian virtues, particularly the moral virtue of temperance and the theological virtue of charity; and second, contemporary philosophical analyses’ paradigmatic case does not (and cannot) take into account the proper tri-personal Christian context (i.e., God, victim, and offender) within which Christian forgiveness must be understood. (shrink)

Articles: "Generosity of Spirit" by Joseph Kupfer, "Gratitude and Justice" by Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald, "Humility" by Nancy Snow, "The Practice of Pride" by Tara Smith, "The Cognitive Structure of Compassion" by Martha C. Nussbaum, "Reasons for Love" by Robert C. Solomon, "The Value of Hope" by Luc Bovens, "Patience and Courage" by Eamonn Callan, "Forgivingness" by Robert C. Roberts, "Trust as an Affective Attitude" by Karen Jones.

For Aristotle, some wrongdoers do not deserve blame, and the virtuous judge should extend sungnōmē, a correct judgment about what is equitable, under the appropriate excusing circumstances. Aristotle’s virtuous judge, however, does not forgive; the wrongdoer is excused from blame in the first place, rather than being forgiven precisely because she is blameworthy. Additionally, the judge does not fail to blame because she wishes to be merciful or from natural feeling, but instead, because that is the equitable action to take (...) under the circumstances. Moreover, while Aristotle does claim in his discussions of the virtues of megalopsychia and praotēs that the virtuous person will sometimes fail to become angry at blameworthy wrongdoers, Aristotle’s reasons for repudiating anger or forestalling blame have little to do with the sorts of reasons that one would or could be forgiving for. Although an Aristotelian virtuous agent does let go of anger for her own reasons, she does not forgive. As a result, I argue that since Aristotle’s account of equity entails that forgiveness is positively vicious, forgivingness is not merely a virtue left out of Aristotle’s account, but is in fact incompatible with his account. (shrink)

IntroductionIt is clear that forgiveness is closely related to emotions. Bishop Butler’s “forswearing of resentment” is still the definition most philosophical works on the subject take as their point of departure. Some others disagree but usually only insofar as they focus on another reactive emotion – e.g., moral hatred, disappointment, anger – which we overcome when we forgive.More specifically, according to Roberts the emotion we overcome in forgiveness is anger, see Robert C. Roberts, “Forgivingness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995): (...) 289–306. According to Richards, forgiveness involves overcoming a whole range of negative emotions including sadness, disappointment, frustration as well as resentment; see Norvin Richards, “Forgiveness,” Ethics 99 (1988): 77–97. According to Sher, forgiveness involves overcoming blame; see George Sher, In Praise of Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).There is something striking about the negativity of this approach. Forgiveness i. (shrink)

This book explores the virtues of good character, and includes well-illustrated accounts of generosity, gratitude, compassion, forgivingness, truthfulness, patience, courage, justice, and a sense of duty - relating these traits to human concerns and the emotions that express them in the circumstances of life.