In The General Will is Citizenship, Jason Neidleman advances a republican conception of citizenship, which is described and defended through a piercing analysis of the general will in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, leaders of the French Revolution, and Restoration-era liberals. Neidleman explains that the "general will" is the will members of society have qua citizen, as opposed to the will they have qua private individual. It encapsulates tensions fundamental to egalitarian politics—tensions between individual autonomy and the collective good, between (...) voluntarism and virtue, between popular will and rational will. (shrink)

SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...) rule governing our thinking activity. To state my point I shall mainly concentrate on perceptual thoughts and emphasize how they are contextually related to the external world. (shrink)

How can political theory respond to the challenges of mass action in the Anthropocene? In this article, I review criticisms of the recent work of William Connolly and respond by way of a particular mode of theory revision that can be found in Connolly’s work of the last 15 years. I argue that Connolly’s recent work marks a strategic turn in his thought, emphasizing the relationship between revisions to theory and practical experimentation in politics. In the second section, I (...) illustrate this relationship by revising Connolly’s notion of the ‘climate general strike’ in light of failures of climate strikes in recent years. Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of mass strikes guides the revisions advanced in this section. In the third section, I move up a level of abstraction to think through how this suggested revision to climate strike strategy can feed into alterations and clarifications of key concepts in Connolly’s political theory. (shrink)

Shepard has argued that a universal law should govern generalization across different domains of perception and cognition, as well as across organisms from different species or even different planets. Starting with some basic assumptions about natural kinds, he derived an exponential decay function as the form of the universal generalization gradient, which accords strikingly well with a wide range of empirical data. However, his original formulation applied only to the ideal case of generalization from a single encountered stimulus to a (...) single novel stimulus, and for stimuli that can be represented as points in a continuous metric psychological space. Here we recast Shepard's theory in a more general Bayesian framework and show how this naturally extends his approach to the more realistic situation of generalizing from multiple consequential stimuli with arbitrary representational structure. Our framework also subsumes a version of Tversky's set-theoretic model of similarity, which is conventionally thought of as the primary alternative to Shepard's continuous metric space model of similarity and generalization. This unification allows us not only to draw deep parallels between the set-theoretic and spatial approaches, but also to significantly advance the explanatory power of set-theoretic models. Key Words: additive clustering; Bayesian inference; categorization; concept learning; contrast model; features; generalization; psychological space; similarity. (shrink)

A venerable philosophical tradition claims that only language users possess concepts. But this makes conceptual thought out to be an implausibly rarified achievement. A more recent tradition, based in cognitive science, maintains that any creature who can systematically recombine its representational capacities thereby deploys concepts. But this makes conceptual thought implausibly widespread. I argue for a middle ground: it is sufficient for conceptual thought that one be able to entertain many of the thoughts produced by recombining one’s (...) representational capacities, so long as one can do this apart from a direct confrontation with the represented states of affairs. (shrink)

Isaac Newton, in popular imagination the Ur-scientist, was an outstanding humanist scholar. His researches on, among others, ancient philosophy, are thorough and appear to be connected to and fit within his larger philosophical and theological agenda. It is therefore relevant to take a closer look at Newton’s intellectual choices, at how and why precisely he would occupy himself with specific text-sources, and how this interest fits into the larger picture of his scientific and intellectual endeavours. In what follows, we shall (...) follow Newton into his study and look over his shoulder while reading compendia and original source-texts in his personal library at Cambridge, meticulously investigating and comparing fragments and commentaries, and carefully keeping track in private notes of how they support his own developing ideas. Indeed, Newton was convinced that precursors to his own insights and discoveries were present already in Antiquity, even before the Greeks, in ancient Egypt, and he puts a lot of time and effort into making the point, especially, and not incidentially, in the period between the first and the second edition of the Principia. A clear understanding of his reading of the classic sources therefore matters to our understanding of its content and gestation process. In what follows we will confine ourselves to the classical legacy, and investigate Newton’s intellectual intercourse with it. (shrink)

The Warring States period was without doubt a time when reason thrived. The Confucians, Mohists, and Daoists, respectively, displayed three of its intellectual inclinations. One was reason with an exceptionally prominent moral flavor, and the cultivation of human character as its object. It calls on men to uphold the dignity, tranquillity, and loftiness of their inner selves. One was reason with a very strong practical flavor, and the realization of beneficent profit as its object. It leads men to address ways (...) of maintaining the stability of society, material wealth to support men's livelihoods, and individual survival. Apart from these two, there was reason that has spiritual transcendence and human immortality as its object, and which was manifested as a tendency toward anti-intellectualism. It tries to protect individual survival and freedom of the spirit, despite social pressures. As for those mystical ideas and techniques that seemed absurd, they gradually regressed into simplistic ceremonies, fables, and symbols among the cultural workers who pursued reason. The psychological attitude of "sacrificing to spirits as if they were present" led many cultural aristocrats to distance themselves from mystical ideas and techniques. Mysticism gradually disappeared from among men of culture, especially once it became increasingly difficult for those divination methods and technical arts, used merely to satisfy concrete needs, to avoid the scrutiny of reason. Some late Warring States period texts can help us understand the direction this way of thinking took. "Xian xue" in the Hanfeizi says,When the shaman priests pray for someone, they say, "May you live a thousand autumns and ten thousand years!" But the "thousand autumns and ten thousand years" are only a noise dinning on the ear: No one has ever proven [zheng] that such prayers add so much as a day to anyone"s life. For this reason people despise the shaman priests.". (shrink)

Isaac Newton, in popular imagination the Ur-scientist, was an outstanding humanist scholar. His researches on, among others, ancient philosophy, are thorough and appear to be connected to and fit within his larger philosophical and theological agenda. It is therefore relevant to take a closer look at Newton’s intellectual choices, at how and why precisely he would occupy himself with specific text-sources, and how this interest fits into the larger picture of his scientific and intellectual endeavours. In what follows, we shall (...) follow Newton into his study and look over his shoulder while reading compendia and original source-texts in his personal library at Cambridge, meticulously investigating and comparing fragments and commentaries, and carefully keeping track in private notes of how they support his own developing ideas. Indeed, Newton was convinced that precursors to his own insights and discoveries were present already in Antiquity, even before the Greeks, in ancient Egypt, and he puts a lot of time and effort into making the point, especially, and not incidentially, in the period between the first and the second edition of the Principia. A clear understanding of his reading of the classic sources therefore matters to our understanding of its content and gestation process. In what follows we will confine ourselves to the classical legacy, and investigate Newton’s intellectual intercourse with it. (shrink)

Within Rousseau scholarship there is serious disagreement concerning the correct way to understand Rousseau's social and political thought. For many, Rousseau does not allow for individual liberty, and also, for many, he is a muddled, confused, and inconsistent thinker. I would like to argue that Rousseau does allow for individual liberty and that his major social and political doctrines are much more consistent than is usually thought to be the case. In my view, Rousseau is a very careful (...) thinker, but his thought is difficult to understand and it is often misunderstood. (shrink)

We should not admit categorial restrictions on the significance of syntactically well formed strings. Syntactically well formed but semantically absurd strings, such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number’, can express thoughts; and competent thinkers both are able to grasp these and ought to be able to. Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, though Evans himself restricted it, should be viewed as a fully general constraint on concept possession and propositional thought. For (a) even well (...) formed but semantically cross-categorial strings often do possess substantive inferential roles; (b) hearers exploit these inferential roles in interpreting such strings metaphorically; (c) there is no good reason to deny truth-conditions to strings with inferential roles. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the features of a hybrid expressivist view that has the resources to straightforwardly address issues about logical embedding and the connection between moral judgment and motivation. Following Mark Schroeder’s work in assessing the merits of current hybrid views and proposals made by Dan Boisvert, Michael Ridge, and David Copp, it briefly reviews why the hybrid expressivist may be optimistic about “having it both ways.” However, it argues that the current set of assumptions that lead to optimism also (...) lead to a kind of entangling problem. This arises from assumptions about the generalized structure of the mental states associated with moral thought and language. In response it proposes that agents can possess generalized noncognitive attitudes toward types rather than propositions involving universals. The chapter suggests that this modified hybrid expressivism can explain the connection between morality and motivation without being committed to the strongest forms of internalism. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with the problem of applying the notion of rigidity to general terms. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke has clearly suggested that we should include some general terms among the rigid ones, namely, those common nouns semantically correlated with natural substances, species and phenomena, in general, natural kinds -'water', 'tiger', 'heat'- and some adjectives -'red', 'hot', 'loud'. However, the notion of rigidity has been defined for singular terms; after all, the notion that Kripke has provided (...) us with is the notion of a rigid designator. But general terms do not designate single individuals: rather, they apply to many of them. In sum, the original concept of rigidity cannot be straightforwardly applied to general terms: it has to be somehow redefined in order to make it cover them. As is known, two main positions have been put forward to accomplish that task: the identity of designation conception, according to which a rigid general term is one that designates the same property or kind in all possible worlds, and the essentialist conception, which conceives of a rigid general term as an essentialist one, namely, a term that expresses an essential property of an object. My purpose in the present paper is to defend a particular version of the identity of designation conception: on the proposed approach, a rigid general term will be one that expresses the same property in all possible worlds and names the property it expresses. In my opinion, the position can be established on the basis of an inference to the best explanation of our intuitive interpretation and evaluation, relative to counterfactual circumstances, of statements containing different kinds of general terms, which is strictly analogous to our intuitive interpretation and evaluation, relative to such circumstances, of statements containing different kinds of singular ones. I will argue that it is possible to offer a new solution to the trivialization problem that is thought to threaten all versions of the identity of designation conception of rigidity. Finally, I will also sketch a solution to the so-called 'over-generalization and under-generalization problems', both closely related to the above-mentioned one. (shrink)

I reply to comments by David Miguel Gray and Grant Gillett concerning my paper, ‘The Generality Constraint and the Structure of Thought’.

In recent publications Paolo Virno and Carlo Vercellone have called attention to Marx’s category of the general intellect in theGrundrisse, and to the unprecedented role its diffusion plays in contemporary capitalism. According to Virno, the flourishing of the general intellect, which Marx thought could only take place within communism, characterises post-Fordist capitalism. Vercellone adds that Marx’s account of the real subsumption of living labour under capital is obsolete in contemporary cognitive capitalism. Both authors regard Marx’s value theory as historically (...) obsolete. I argue that these views rest on a confusion of value and wealth, a neglect of Marx’s account of the role of ‘free gifts’ to capital, an underestimation of the role of the general intellect in the period prior to the rise of post-Fordism/cognitive capitalism, and an underestimation of the restrictions on the diffusion of the general intellect in contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

I present Georges Bataille’s general economy and trace to what extent it draws on Vladimir Vernadsky’s work The Biosphere and Friedrich Nietzsche’s power ‘ontology.’ I also situate Bataille’s thoughts within contemporary planetary thinking, such as Gaia theory, and highlight some of the potential in thinking global ecology in the light of a Dionysian understanding of the biosphere.

As one of the most important episodes of change in the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) was a phase when the state and its political and ideological formation witnessed structural transformation and reforms. During this period, privy councils were instituted at every level, as one of the basic changes in decision-making and the legislation process of the Ottoman State. Meclis-i Âlî-i Umûmî (the Supreme Council-General) is located at the top of the counsulting hierarchy of councils at the administrative piramid, (...) instituted in 1838. The Supreme Council-General also functioned as an equivalent to that of a “senate” of the modern parliament for the first time in this transition period. (shrink)

Mereology is the theory of the relation “being a part of”. The first exact formulation of mereology is due to the Polish logician Stanisław Leśniewski. But Leśniewski’s mereology is not first-order axiomatizable, for it requires every subset of the domain to have a fusion. In recent literature, a first-order theory named General Extensional Mereology can be thought of as a first-order approximation of Leśniewski’s theory, in the sense that GEM guarantees that every definable subset of the domain has a (...) fusion, and this has been achieved by positing an axiom schema which in effect defines infinitely many axioms. Intuitively, in order to range over every definable subset, such an axiom schema seems unavoidable. But this paper will show that GEM is finitely axiomatizable and that all we need are just finitely many instances of the said axiom schema. (shrink)

As cognitive architectures move to account for increasingly complex real‐world tasks, one of the most pressing challenges involves understanding and modeling human multitasking. Although a number of existing models now perform multitasking in real‐world scenarios, these models typically employ customized executives that schedule tasks for the particular domain but do not generalize easily to other domains. This article outlines a general executive for the Adaptive Control of Thought–Rational (ACT–R) cognitive architecture that, given independent models of individual tasks, schedules and (...) interleaves the models' behavior into integrated multitasking behavior. To demonstrate the power of the proposed approach, the article describes an application to the domain of driving, showing how the general executive can interleave component subtasks of the driving task (namely, control and monitoring) and interleave driving with in‐vehicle secondary tasks (radio tuning and phone dialing). (shrink)

n his Lectures on the Histmy 0f Philosophy Hegel credits Rousseau with an cpoch-making innovation in the realm 0f practical philosophy, an innovation said to consist in thc fact that Rousseau is thc first thinker t0 recognize "the free will" as thc fundamental principle 0f political philosophy} Since Hcgcl’s 0wn practical philosophy is explicitly grounded in an account 0f thc will and its freedom, Hcgcl’s assertion is clearly intended as an acknowledgment 0f his deep indebtedness t0 R0usscau’s social and political (...) thought. What is not s0 clear, however, is how this indebtedness is t0 bc understood: What precisely docs it mean t0 say that the political theories 0f Hegel and Rousseau share the same first principlc? In this paper I intend t0 follow up 0n this interpretive suggestion 0f Hcgcl’s by claborating, much more explicitly than he himself docs, thc sense in which R0usscau’s political thought is founded 011 thc principle 0f the "frcc wiil." While accomplishing this task will put us in a better position t0 clarify thc obscurc philosophical strategy behind Hcgcl’s 0wn social theory, my primary interest here is t0 illuminate thc foundations 0f R0usscau’s political thought, especially its account 0f the connection between freedom and the general will. I argue that it is necessary t0 distinguish two ways in which Rousseau takes the general will t0 secure, or realize, thc freedom of individual citizens, namely, by functioning as an embodiment as well as a precondition of such freedom. Understanding both 0f these points will lead us t0 scc: that R0usscau’s thought rests 0n two distinct, though not incompatible, accounts 0f how citizens whose actions are constrained by thc general will are in fact subject 0nly to their 0wn wills and therefore free in their 0bcdience to thc general will. As we shall scc, these two accounts arc implicitly based upon distinct conceptions 0f political freedom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 2, November 2000, pp. 279-289 Explaining General Ideas JANET BROUGHTON Hume declared himself a scientist of man; his aim was to identify the principles according to which our impressions give rise to our thoughts, beliefs, passions and actions. He took it that there are things about these products of experience that need to be explained, and as a scientist of man he aimed to (...) provide the needed explanation by finding principles that govern the operations of the mind. In what follows I want to consider Hume's account of general ideas, and I want especially to raise the question what it is about them that he wants to explain. In order to see what Hume thinks he should explain about our general ideas, we need first to see what sort of explanatory resources he thinks are available. In the introduction to the Treatise, he proposes to undertake a study of human nature, a study of the particular kind that he calls science of man. He is going to study the human mind using "careful and exact experiments"1 gleaned up from a "cautious observation of human life" as it appears in the "common course of the world" (T xix). The outcome will be the discovery of "principles," and Hume aims to render them "as universal as possible," "explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes" (T xvii). By itself this sounds awfully bland. How does it differ from the generalizations any of us might make about human mental life? On one common understanding of Hume, the answer is that he is studying objects we don't ordinarily talk about, using a method of observation we don't ordinarily use. He is studying what Locke called "ideas": the items of which a person is immeJanet Broughton is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720-2390, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 280 Janet Broughton diately aware, and which depend on that awareness for their existence. He is studying them by using his power of introspection, the power by which a person may become immediately aware of his own ideas. I have argued elsewhere2 that Hume's term, 'perception,' isn't meant to refer to Lockean ideas but to people's states of mind as we ordinarily understand them: dateable episodes of consciousness of a great many types, including episodes of seeing, touching, smelling, tasting and hearing objects in the world around us. Nor, I have argued, does Hume's "cautious observation of human life" (T xix) invariably or even usually take the form of introspection. Rather, the scientist of man attends to a range of the features of perceptions that we notice from time to time in ordinary life. What distinguishes the activities of the scientist of man from those of the ordinary observer of human mental life is that the scientist of man attends mainly just to this range of features, and reflects upon them in a sustained and systematic way. The features to which he gives his attention are, I believe, these: force and vivacity; content compounded from simple elements; and the kinds of sequences or patterns in which perceptions with such-and-such content having such-and-such force and vivacity occur. Of these three features, the most puzzling by far, I think, is content; I will be exploring aspects of content as I attempt to identify what it is about general ideas that the scientist of man wants to understand. To put it crudely, we must see what Hume thinks impressions already contain if we want to see what it is about general ideas he wants to explain. In the first part of Book I of the Treatise, Hume sets out the basic distinctions and principles upon which he will draw: the distinctions between impressions and ideas, between simple and complex perceptions, between impressions of sensation and those of reflection, and between ideas of memory and of imagination; and the principles that our simple ideas are derived from resembling simple impressions, and that our ideas are associated via relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation. After clarifying the notion of relations, Hume concludes part i by... (shrink)

The principal aim of Andrew Levine’s most recent book is to defend the ideal of communism. Its strategy is to demonstrate the coherence and desirability of that ideal by invoking Rousseau’s concept of the general will. More specifically, the general will is supposed to provide a model for the kind of cooperation that will take place among members of a communistic society. Since the notion of a general will is itself highly obscure, this book can also be read as an (...) attempt to clarify and flesh out the central concept of Rousseau’s political thought by interpreting it in light of some of Marx’s claims about the nature of communism. Yet the book is both less unified and wider in scope than this description implies. As Levine himself suggests at one point, the book is more accurately described as a collection of essays on a variety of topics, all of which deal in some way with the relation between the normative standards implicit in Marx’s ideal of communism and those that guide liberal political thought. Although this book has many interesting things to say about Rousseau, it is valuable more for its discussion of issues within Marxist political theory than for the light it sheds on Rousseau’s thought itself. While the treatment of Marx’s ideas is both subtle and sympathetic throughout, there are crucial aspects of Rousseau’s project, especially those that do not fit in easily with Marx’s concerns, that are ignored or misunderstood. One example of this is Levine’s misinterpretation of amour-propre—it is said to be the equivalent of Hobbes’s rational egoism —and his consequent failure to appreciate how the desire for recognition from one’s fellow beings figures centrally in Rousseau’s understanding of the basic task faced by political theory. thought.) These interpretive shortcomings diminish in importance, however, if we think of the book as primarily an attempt to clarify and reconstruct Marx’s views on the nature of communism. Viewed from this perspective, the book represents an important part of the author’s ongoing project, begun in several previous books, of rethinking and defending the central ideas of Marxist social thought. (shrink)

It is often thought that some general terms or kind terms, in particular natural kind terms, are rigid designators, and that a properly extended notion of singular-term rigidity can help explain the behaviour of such general terms. In this article, I argue that the only legitimate notion of general-term rigidity is a trivial one and identify some crucial asymmetries between a posteriori necessary truths involving names and a posteriori necessary truths involving general terms. If we pay attention to these (...) asymmetries, it becomes clear that attempts to draw a non-trivial rigid/non-rigid distinction for general terms are bound to fail to offer the explanations we expected. As opposed to singular terms, what is interesting about the behaviour of natural kind terms, even in modal contexts, cannot be accounted for by modal distinctions like rigidity/non-rigidity but must rather track non-modal features. (shrink)

The problem of absolute generality has attracted much attention in recent philosophy. Agustin Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano have assembled a distinguished team of contributors to write new essays on the topic. They investigate the question of whether it is possible to attain absolute generality in thought and language and the ramifications of this question in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.

The problem addressed is that of finding a sound characterization of ambiguity. Two kinds of characterizations are distinguished: tests and definitions. Various definitions of ambiguity are critically examined and contrasted with definitions of generality and indeterminacy, concepts with which ambiguity is sometimes confused. One definition of ambiguity is defended as being more theoretically adequate than others which have been suggested by both philosophers and linguists. It is also shown how this definition of ambiguity obviates a problem thought to (...) be posed by ambiguity for truth theoretical semantics. In addition, the best known test for ambiguity, namely the test by contradiction, is set out, its limitations discussed, and its connection with ambiguity's definition explained. The test is contrasted with a test for vagueness first proposed by Peirce and a test for generality propounded by Margalit. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's attack on the natural jurisprudence of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf is well known. But what happened to modern natural jurisprudence after Rousseau not very well known. The aim of this article is to try to show how and why it turned into what Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès called “social science” and the bearing that this Rousseau-inspired transformation has on making sense of ideology, or the moral and political thought of the late eighteenth-century French ideologues.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship ApproachKatherine StrandThomas Regelski, Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship Approach ( Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004)In this recent addition to the world of texts for secondary methods classes, Teaching General Music in Grades 4–8: A Musicianship Approach, Thomas Regelski takes a new look at the challenging task of teaching the pre-adolescent and adolescent age group. This text brings (...) together many of Regelski's earlier writing on topics such as the professionalism of music teaching practice, music education as praxial education, and the operationalization of critical theory in music education. His thoughtful work offers insights and challenges to pre-service and in-service teachers.In the Introduction, Regelski provides a brief history of critical theory in education and describes how he applies critical theory to the profession of music teaching and the experience of musical learning. In this "new view" of education, teachers should seek to be transformative rather than simply transmitting a cultural status quo through status quo methods of teaching. Critical theory in teaching criticizes both the methods and the content in the light of context, student learning needs, praxis, and the situatedness of learning. He argues, as in earlier articles, against what he calls methodolotry: the tendency to adopt a method and follow that method unquestioningly. Rather, he proposes that teachers [End Page 121] should adopt a stance of reflective practitioner, becoming informal action researchers by questioning the value and effectiveness of instructional strategy and curricular content. (Sadly, once introduced, there is no more information about how to engage in action research, nor any encouragement to learn more about the subject.)Educational content should be based on critical theory which, as Regelski argues:... seeks to study the past, but in terms of its implications–positive or negative–for the present and, especially, as a basis for improving society and the individuals who constitute society.... [T]he past is evoked "critically" and selectively and new practices that will become traditions of the future will be initiated.1The job of the teacher is to help students make critical judgments regarding music and the "good time" the musical experience contributes to the students' lives.2 Music classrooms should be considered music laboratories in which children learn through thoughtful, investigatory experiences. Music education should promote life-skills relevant to the student's world, teach functional musical skills, incite interest in unfamiliar musical experiences, and address the pre-adolescent and adolescent student's "need to achieve."3In the first chapter, Regelski argues for "action learning," or learning in which the student is the principal actor. To support his argument, he cites findings in cognitive psychology, philosophical trends of pragmatism, utilitarianism, and humanism, transfer of learning theory, authentic learning and assessment, and constructivist learning theories. This myriad of ideas combine to form the essence of his argument: children in this age group need to develop intentionality in music-making to have a "good time" and instruction should always connect in-school musical learning with a student's real-world musical experiences. The value of action learning lies in the transfer of learning from the classroom to life after school:It advances the skills predictably useful to typical adults throughout life: for example, recreational singing, music reading sufficient to church and community choirs, "making sense" of music and enjoyment through listening, and the like. It is not a survey of disconnected musical generalities, a superficial sampling of music "in general"; boiled down theory, history, appreciation: or the introduction to the "discipline" of music as a "subject" of study for its own sake. Instead, it promotes the broad musicianship skills and positive attitudes for "breaking 100" [as in bowling, the level at which one calls oneself a "musician"] that enable students to be musically independent and active outside of class and after graduation, and to want to be musically active as part of the life well lived [italics added].4 [End Page 122]In the second chapter, Regelski provides an excellent summary of the physical, cognitive, and social development of children from age 9 to 14. Age categories are broken into upper elementary grades 4–6... (shrink)

In this article, I offer a new interpretation for Rousseau’s surprisingly spare use of the phrase “general interest” in his works. My starting point is the very notion of interest in his political thought. For Rousseau, interest is not a matter of calculation but of experience; properly speaking, once we are in the state of society, there is nothing like an individual interest because all our interests are shared with somebody else. And our political interest (our sensitivity to society’s (...) general disorders) is shared with all our fellow citizens. In this regard, I bring to light a clear antinomy between the “common interest” in Rousseau’s Social Contract and the “general interest” as conceptualized by the physiocrats a few years later. By “common interest” Rousseau means the material basis for the democratic formation of a general will (that is, a political will) among the citizens, whereas by “general interest” physiocrats mean the normative language in which a non-democratic political decision claims its legitimacy by appealing to reason. (shrink)

This chapter takes up issues to do with Peter van Inwagen's (1990a) general composition question: what is it for one thing to be a part of another? The chapter begins with some background to do with formal mereology, the study of parts and wholes. In discussing the metaphysics of parts and wholes, it is helpful to have some specialized vocabulary, as well as a well thought‐out mathematical model of a very broad, inclusive theory. The theory of mereology, proposed by (...) the logician Stanislaw Lesniewski and introduced to the widerworld by Goodman and Leonard in an article in the Journal of Symbolic Logic, provides that vocabulary and such a model. These mereologists proposed some basic axioms for the part‐whole relation. Alternatively, the Composition as Identity (CAI) theorist could try to build transitivity into their definition of the part‐whole relation. Finally, the chapter provides some answers to the General Composition Question and considers whether those answers can supply a ground for the correct principles of mereology. (shrink)

The article describes the author's approach to the construction of general-level artificial cognitive agents based on the so-called "semantic supervised learning", within which, in accordance with the hybrid paradigm of artificial intelligence, both machine learning methods and methods of the symbolic ap­ proach and knowledge-based systems are used ("good old-fashioned artificial intelligence"). А descrip­ tion of current proЬlems with understanding of the general meaning and context of situations in which narrow AI agents are found is presented. The definition of semantic (...) supervised learning is given and its relationship with other machine learning methods is described. In addition, а thought experiment is presented, which shows the essence and meaning of supervised semantic learning. (shrink)

Generic statements (‘Tigers have stripes’) are pervasive and developmentally early-emerging modes of generalization with a distinctive linguistic profile. Previous experimental work suggests that generics display a unique asymmetry between the prevalence levels required to accept them and the prevalence levels typically implied by their use. This asymmetry effect is thought to have serious social consequences: if speakers use socially problematic generics based on prevalence levels that are systematically lower than what is typically inferred by their recipients, then using generics (...) will likely exacerbate social stereotypes and biases. This paper presents evidence against the popular hypothesis that this asymmetry effect is unique to generics. Correcting for various shortcomings of previous studies, we found a generalized asymmetry effect across generics and various kinds of explicitly quantified statements (‘most’, ‘some’, ‘typically’, ‘usually’). In addition, to better understand the conditions under which generalized asymmetry effects may exacerbate biases, we examine whether speakers choose generalizing sentences based simply on their acceptance conditions, or are systematically sensitive to the implications likely drawn by their typical recipients. In support of the latter view, we found that, in neutral or cooperative scenarios, speakers reliably choose generalizing sentences whose implied prevalence levels closely match the actual ones. In non-cooperative scenarios, speakers exploit asymmetry effects to further their own goals by choosing generalizing sentences that are strictly true but likely to mislead their recipients. These results refine our understanding of the source of asymmetry effects and the conditions under which they may introduce biased beliefs into social networks. (shrink)

General equilibrium analysis is a theoretical structure which focuses research in economics. On this point economists and philosophers agree. Yet studies in general equilibrium analyses are not well understood in the sense that, though their importance is recognized, their role in the growth of economic knowledge is a subject of some controversy. Several questions organize an appraisal of general equilibrium analysis. These questions have been variously posed by philosophers of science, economic methodologists, and historians of economic thought. Is general (...) equilibrium analysis a theory, a paradigm, a scientific research program, or a set of interrelated theories? Is it not any of these but rather a branch of applied mathematics? Is GE analysis associated with the growth of knowledge, or does it waste intellectual resources? How is it related to other work in economics? Is it connected to, or is it apart from, the concerns of applied economists? (shrink)

Consider a simple form of process reliabilism: S is justified in believing that p if and only if S’s belief that p was formed through a reliable process. Such accounts are thought to face a counter-example in the form of defeaters. It seems possible that a belief might result from a reliable belief forming process and yet be unjustified because one possesses a defeater with respect to that belief. This counter-example is merely apparent. The problem of defeaters is just (...) a special case of the generality problem, i.e., the problem of determining which of the process types instantiated by a process token is relevant to determining that reliability of the process token. Drawing on similarities between cases that involve defeaters and cases that involve adverse local conditions, e.g., a white-out blizzard, I argue that any adequate solution to the generality problem for all cases that don’t involve defeaters will pick out an unreliable process type as relevant in cases that do involve defeaters. Thus, there is no sui generis problem of defeaters for simple process reliablism. (shrink)

It is widely thought that, to be morally responsible for some action or omission, an agent must have had, at the very least, the general ability to do otherwise. As we argue, however, there are counterexamples to the claim that moral responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise. We present several cases in which agents lack the general ability to do otherwise and yet are intuitively morally responsible for what they do, and we argue that such cases raise (...) problems for various kinds of accounts of moral responsibility. We suggest two alternative approaches to thinking about the connection between moral responsibility and abilities to do otherwise, one of which denies that there is any ability-to-do-otherwise requirement on moral responsibility and the other of which requires only an opportunity to do otherwise. We also argue that a general-ability-to-do-otherwise requirement not only faces counterexamples but also lacks positive motivation. (shrink)

examine Nathan Salmon’s solution to the problem of trivialization, as it arises for conceptions of general term rigidity that construe it as identity of designation across possible worlds. I argue that he does not succeed in showing that some alleged general terms, such as “the colour of the sky” are non-rigid, but also that a small class of different examples that he presents, which can be construed as second order descriptions, are indeed non-rigid general terms, although for reasons different from (...) those he thought. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of experimental legal philosophy with a special focus on questions in general jurisprudence, that part of legal philosophy that asks about the concept and nature of law. Much of the experimental general jurisprudence work has tended to follow the questions that have interested general jurisprudence scholars for decades, that is, questions about the relation between legal norms and moral norms. Wholesale criticism of experimental general jurisprudence is scant, but, given existing debates about experimental philosophy generally, (...) one can anticipate where disagreement is likely to occur. Outside of experimental general jurisprudence, there is plenty of vibrant discussion about how experimental results can enrich our understanding of various concepts that figure in everyday legal thought such as causation, intention, consent, or meaning. In the future, experimental legal philosophers should continue to consider the degree to which their project is purely descriptive or whether it is revisionary or pragmatic in its ambitions. Also, future work might consider whether to focus more attention on legal experts. (shrink)

In this first stage of his Ethics Husserl stresses on the theory of value. The teleology seems necessary to him to form the concept of not objectivant act. Nevertheless since the essays after the second world war the striving and volountary end will be more and more central in this ethical thought.

First published in 1961, An Introduction to General Metaphysics presents Gottfried Martin's careful study of many of the passages in Plato and Aristotle which deal with metaphysical problems and in particular with the Platonic Theory of Ideas. He has traced the development of the theory both in early works and in late works such as the Parmenides and the Sophistes; and with equal care he has studied the relative passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics. He has quoted many of these passages at (...) length and has offered a careful account and analysis of the progress of Plato's thought. He has also discussed in a very interesting way the main passages relative to Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Theory of Ideas. This book is a must read for any student of Greek Philosophy and Philosophy in general. (shrink)

This paper argues that a prominent—and oft-thought to be persuasive—argument against general validity as the best account of validity for languages containing the actuality operator is flawed, the flaw arising out of inadequate attention to the formalisation of mood distinctions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:17. HUME AND ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS In his discussion of abstract ideas in the Treatise, Hume offers what "...may... be thought... a plain dilemma, that decides concerning the nature of those abstract ideas..." He states the dilemma in these words: The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities; which 'tis concluded it cannot do, but either by representing at once all possible (...) sizes and all possible qualities, or by representing no particular one at all. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition, as implying an infinite capacity in the mind, it has been commonly infer'd in favour of the latter; and our abstract ideas have been suppos'd to represent no particular degree either of quality or quantity. (T, 1,1,7,?.18) However, with respect to this dilemma, Hume says: But that this inference is erroneous, I shall endeavor to make appear, first, by proving, that 'tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degrees: And secondly by showing, that tho' the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of quantity and quality, in such a manner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflexion and conversation. (T, 1,1,7, p. 18) The second item Hume claims he is about to prove is aimed at the first disjunct of the above-stated dilemma; more specifically, it is aimed at the claim that (1) An abstract idea (e.g., of a man) represents all possible degrees of quantity and quality (in men) only if the human mind is infinite in capacity. To show that (1) is false, Hume offers his own positive account of how ideas which are particular in nature may nevertheless be general in representation, even though the mind's capacity is finite. The first item Hume sets out to prove is aimed at the second disjunct, and conclusion, of the dilemma; it is aimed, that is, at 18. (2)Abstract ideas represent no particular degree of either quantity or quality. In this paper I will be concerned solely with Hume's attack on (2); it is this attack in which Hume says I "place my chief confidence." (T, I, I, 7, p. 24) I_ As stated, (2) is ambiguous, since it might be taken to mean that abstract ideas fail to represent altogether, or that they fail to represent any quantity or quality however construed. But, I believe, Hume means neither of these; he means, instead, that (2a) Abstract ideas represent non-particular, indeterminate degrees of quantity or quality. Now recall that Hume tries to refute (2a) by establishing, as he says, that (3)It is impossible to conceive any quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of its degrees. But how, by establishing (3), would Hume thereby refute or aid in the refutation of (2a)? And, for that matter, how does he support (3)? Hume's case for (3) consists of three arguments, the respective conclusions of which are most pertinent here. He concludes his first argument by saying that (4)...the general idea of a line...has in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity and quality. (T, 1,1,7, p. 19) The conclusion of the second argument is this : (5)An idea is a weaker impression; and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy or representative.(T, 1,1,7, p. 19) 19. and of the third it is this: (6)Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, tho' the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal.(T, 1,1,7, p. 20) Construed in a fully general way, these conclusions assert that (7)Each idea is determinate with respect to öegree of) quantity and quality. But notice that (7) is not equivalent to, and does not obviously imply, (3). Hence, Hume... (shrink)

This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic (...) aspect of the case for process reliabilism (if any) is already captured by the generality problem. (shrink)

On the fiftieth anniversary of Philosophy and Rhetoric I hope a future for the journal that not only continues to publish scholarship that reflects seriously on the productive possibilities of putting the unique understandings of the human condition delivered by philosophy into contact with the singular insights into the power and perils of speech, writing, and gesture offered up by rhetoric. I also wish for it printed pages on which scholars engage thoughtfully the challenges posed by worlds and loss of (...) worlds. Never before in my lifetime has this task seemed so urgent and so necessary. This article is delivered in that spirit.On 13 July 2013 a jury of six women in Sanford, Florida, returned a verdict of not... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 77-99 [Access article in PDF] Malebranche's Distinction Between General and Particular Volitions Andrew Pessin "God needs no instruments to act," Malebranche writes in Search; "it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will." 1 God acts (...) by willing; so much is clear. But Malebranche goes further, especially in his Treatise, by asserting that (i) only in miracles and the initial creation does God act by "particular volitions," while (ii) God ordinarily acts in nature via laws or "general volitions." This distinction between general and particular volitions is central to Malebranche's theories of divine activity, theodicy, and occasionalism. Nevertheless, I will argue, it has been almost universally misunderstood.The two standard interpretations of Malebranche's expressions "general volition" and "particular volition" are these: (GC) A "general volition" for Malebranche is one whose content is general; a "particular volition" is one whose content is particular. [End Page 77](PC) All divine volitions have particular contents; but a "general volition" is one which is in accord with general laws, while a "particular volition" is one not in accord with general laws. 2Andrew Black offers the following two schemata for volition contents, where (B) also provides the general form of laws of nature: A: Let c be F at t. B: For all created substances x and y and for every time t1, if x is G at t1and x bears relation R to y then there is a time t2 such that t2 bears relation T to t1 and y is F at t2. 3(A) is "particular" insofar as it represents a particular state of affairs, involving a particular substance in a mode at a time; (B) is general in making no such reference. According to (GC), then, when Malebranche's God acts by "general volitions," He has volitions whose content is of the form of (B) (specifically, a law of nature); when He acts by particular volitions His volitions are of the form of (A). According to (PC), both general and particular volitions are of the form of (A), while the former are in accord with laws of nature and the latter aren't.To simplify matters, I will focus on God's activity in the material world; the laws of nature in question will usually be the laws of motion. Further, to avoid terminological confusion, I will refer to volitions of the form of (A) as "particular content volitions," and those of (B) as "general content volitions." The issue before us then is: When Malebranche's God acts by "general volitions," are these general content volitions or particular content volitions? Proponents of (GC) support the former; those of (PC) the latter.Unhappily, almost everything Malebranche says directly on the subject can be interpreted either way. 4 (I'll speculate why at the end.) And admittedly, what Malebranche says more broadly about natural laws and divine volitions is often suggestive of (GC)—so it is no surprise that almost all recent commentators adopt (GC), usually simply assuming it without argument. Still, I shall argue that if one of the interpretations is correct, it is (PC). [End Page 78]My plan in this paper: (1) Offer some prima facie support for (PC); (2) Provide four arguments that (PC) either fits better with, or is alone consistent with, various Malebranchean doctrines; (3) Reply to some recent objections against (PC); (4) Argue that Malebranche's direct reply to Arnauld supports (PC); (5) Offer a conclusion and final thought. 1. Some Prima Facie Support For (PC) Let me first note that Steven Nadler offers various passages which do at least suggest (PC). 5 But that evidence, while strong, is not alone conclusive. For one thing, those passages can perhaps be accommodated by (GC); 6 for another, there are many passages which suggest (GC). So we must go further.Consider, then, Malebranche's primary concern in the Treatise, the... (shrink)

The author is interested in discussing various aspects of the propositional calculus; in particular, the relationships among the various propositional connectives in various systems of logic such as Intuitionistic and modal are scrutinized. The first three chapters survey the notation to be used and describe the general notion of logistic system; the author then describes the concept of a deductive system in exceptional generality, then treats the connexions of equivalence and independence among such deductive systems in what are essentially (...) algebraic terms. Building on the latter work, he then treats the idea of one system's being an extension of the other, going into the details concerning the fine structure of exactly what sort of extension it is—conservative, consistent, and thus arrives at Lindenbaum's lemma. The equivalence relations of congruence and equipollence among propositional systems form the central core around which Porte's discussion of axiomatizability of systems of connectives constituting various propositional calculi is based. Porte is one of the best of the several young logicians now working in France and this book is useful both as a technical treatise containing a sophisticated treatment of sentential logic, and as a guide to at least one direction and trend of contemporary French logical thought.—P. J. M. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Justice and the General Will:Affirming Rousseau's Ancient OrientationDavid Lay WilliamsThere is much confusion about how to characterize the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His thought has at various times been related to such dissimilar thinkers as Plato and Hobbes. From Plato he is said to have acquired his affinities for community and civic virtue. And one does not have to look too hard to find his praise for the (...) great sage of the Academy: "Plato only purified the heart of man."1 He was often eager to affiliate his ideas with those of antiquity. He yearned for modern society to rekindle the flames of a once-great civilization. "[W]hat keeps us [the moderns] from being men like them [the ancients]? Our prejudices, our base philosophy, and the passions of petty self-interest, concentrated together with egoism in all hearts by inept institutions in which genius never had any share."2 Despite his obvious admiration for the perceived greater ideas of the past, however, Rousseau also expressed some skepticism. James Miller has suggested that he held Plato's theory of the Forms to be unsustainable.3 Allan Bloom has likewise argued that Rousseau's "teaching is not... a revival of those of Plato.... If he admires the practice of antiquity, he does not accept the theory."4This has led many to argue that Rousseau is best understood as student of Thomas Hobbes. Roger D. Masters, for example, has suggested that "Rousseau's principles of political right can... be best described as a reformulation [End Page 383] of Hobbes' conception of the social contract."5 Arthur Melzer also argues, "The purpose of the doctrine Rousseau elaborates in the Social Contract is essentially the same [as Hobbes']."6 This view is argued on the grounds that the General Will is a positive or arbitrary standard, functioning as the primary principle of Rousseau's constructive political program. Yet the vision of Rousseau as a Hobbesian or modernist also merits skepticism. While he employs a social contract, as does Hobbes, he explicitly rejects traditional forms of positivism. "What is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions."7 Whatever one might say about such passages, it at least raises the possibility that Rousseau is no modernist in the Straussian sense of defining Justice as human agreement.Much of what contributes to the conflicting interpretations of Rousseau can be attributed to different understandings of the relative priority and relationship of two central concepts in his writings. One of these is the well-discussed notion of the General Will. The dominant fashion is to read the General Will as a conventional substitute for natural law or transcendent Ideas. According to this reading, the General Will is grounded on nothing more than consent and functions as the first principle of all legitimate political societies. The other term central to Rousseau's program is the far less discussed but equally important concept of Justice. Little has been written on his understanding of Justice and, for that matter, he himself rarely discussed it explicitly. But it, too, could also be considered a primary principle. While it would be foolish to dismiss the importance of the General Will to Rousseau, it would be equally problematic to explore it independently of his Idea of Justice. The question in understanding his work is which of these two principles—the General Will or Justice—is primary or fundamental. If it is the General Will, a case can be made that the Straussians are right, and Rousseau is a positivist. If Justice is prior, on the other hand, then there is reason to believe that he was something much different.I argue that the positivist reading of Rousseau is flawed. Indeed, my thesis is that he is among the greatest and most thorough Platonists of the modern era.8 His rejection of Hobbes is not merely rhetorical. In fact, it represents the [End Page 384] true impetus of his social contract. This contract is designed explicitly to counter Hobbesian positivism. In the same way that Plato responds to Protagoras' positivism with his theory of the Forms, Rousseau responds to Hobbes... (shrink)

From 1905–1908 onward, Russell thought that his new ‘substitutional theory’ provided him with the right framework to resolve the set-theoretic paradoxes. Even if he did not finally retain this resolution, the substitutional strategy was instrumental in the development of his thought. The aim of this paper is not historical, however. It is to show that Russell's substitutional insight can shed new light on current issues in philosophy of mathematics. After having briefly expounded Russell's key notion of a ‘structured (...) variable’, I connect it to two ongoing discussions: the Caesar problem, and absolute generality. (shrink)

The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both are (...) supposed to be just different kinds of generalization from perceptual experience. Specifically, I will argue that the projection of inner experiences to others which is involved in early mind-reading does not imply a computational leap beyond associative generalization from perceptual experience. (shrink)