This chapter contains section titled: Godlessness Devalued Being: the Stripping of the Signs Idolized Autonomy: Eclipse of Transcendence as Other Transcendences The Antinomy of Autonomy and Transcendence Dark Origins and Transcendence as Other Will to Power and the Counterfeit Double of “yes” Return to Zero: Coming to Nothing.

‘Godless’ was never a neutral term: in 1528 William Tindale talked of ‘godlesse ypocrites and infidels’ and a ‘godless generation’ is one that has turned its back on God and the paths of righteousness. An atheist, by contrast, a new and self-conscious atheist perhaps, might now wear the term as a badge of pride, to indicate their rejection both of belief and the implication of moral turpitude. Traditionally, though, those who declared themselves ‘atheist’ had a hardly better press than the (...) ‘godlesse’, since ‘atheism’ was and in some cases still is considered a form of intellectual and moral shallowness: thus Sir Francis Bacon offers a bluff refinement of the Psalmist's verdict on the fool who says in his heart that there is no God: The Scripture saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God ; it is not said, The fool hath thought in his heart ; so he rather saith it, by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it. (shrink)

Eamonn Callan; Godless Moral Education and Liberal Tolerance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 267–281, https://doi.or.

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

This essay provides a comprehensive overview of Charles Darwin's evolutionary theorizing about the natural origins of religion. More specifically, it argues that Darwin's commitment to locating elementary forms of the religious life in non-human animals was informed by his desire to sever the connection between the moral status of being human and the anthropological status of having a religion. The essay concludes that when we carefully examine the Darwinian solution to the evolutionary puzzle of religion, we discover how his naturalist (...) project was structured in quite fundamental ways by his normative commitments. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Angel of Death, Being as Gift God and Posthumous Mind Out of Nothing: Porosity and the Urgency of Ultimacy Redoubled Beginning: Elemental Yes Idiotic Rebirth Aesthetic Recharging Erotic Outreaching Agapeic Resurrection.

A new approach to the theism-scientism divide rooted in a deeper form of atheism. -/- Western philosophy is stuck in an irresolvable conflict between two approaches to the spiritual malaise of our times: either we need more God (the “turn to religion”) or less religion (the New Atheism). In this book, Brook Ziporyn proposes an alternative that avoids both totalizing theomania and atomizing reductionism. What we need, he argues, is a deeper, more thoroughgoing, even religious rejection of God: an affirmative (...) atheism without either a creator to provide meaning or finite creatures in need of it—a mystical atheism. -/- In the legacies of Daoism and Buddhism as well as Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bataille, Ziporyn discovers a critique of theism that develops into a new, positive sensibility—at once deeply atheist and richly religious. Experiments in Mystical Atheism argues that these “godless epiphanies” hold the key to renewing philosophy today. (shrink)

Responding to Gil Anidjar's “Jesus and Monotheism” and its posing of the “Christian Question,” in this paper I return to Freud's Moses and Monotheism and its narrative of Jewish self-division. In highlighting the retroactive formation of identity, I note both its temporal dimension and the force of exclusivity it generates. This reading suggests a contrast between such theo-political communities, with their legacies of affiliation, and Christian self-absolution (the refusal of constitutive self-division) with its image of a new man. I take (...) a brief detour through Marx and Schmitt to examine the founding structures of secular modernity and the entanglement of liberalism with Christianity. Pursuing a hint offered by Anidjar that Christianity is not quite a tradition, I conclude that for Freud, the “Christian question” emerges as a kind of enigma: the dream of a community divorced from human modes of transmission, unbound by legacies of filiation to the past, and replacing the collective memory of a people with the end of human collectivity. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between the novelist/philosopher Ayn Rand (TheFountainhead,AtlasShrugged) and the broader conservative movement in the twentieth-century United States. Although Rand was often dismissed as a lightweight popularizer, her works of radical individualism advanced bold arguments about the moral status of capitalism, and thus touched upon a core issue of conservative identity. Because Rand represented such a forthright pro-capitalist position, her career highlights the shifting fortunes of capitalism on the right. In the 1940s, she was an inspiration to (...) those who struggled against the New Deal and hoped to bring about a new, market-friendly political order. As a second generation of conservatives built upon these sentiments and attempted to tie them to a defense of Christian tradition, Rand's status began to erode. Yet by the late 1960s, Rand's once-revolutionary defense of capitalism had become routine, although she herself remained a controversial figure. The essay traces the ways in which Rand's ideas were assimilated and modified by key intellectuals on the right, including William F. Buckley, Jr, Whittaker Chambers, and Gary Wills. It identifies the relationship between capitalism and Christianity as a fundamental dilemma for conservative and right-wing thinkers. By treating Rand as an intellectual and cultural leader of significant import, the essay broadens our understanding of the American right beyond the confines of conservatism, and re-establishes the primacy of the 1930s, and 1940s, to its ideological formation. Responding to a paucity of scholarship on Rand, the essay offers an analysis and summary of Rand's ideas, and argues that despite her outsider status, Rand's work both embodied and shaped fundamental themes of right-wing thought throughout the century. (shrink)

A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins’ argument.

This chapter focuses on Thomas Hobbes’ theories of public religion. It argues that Hobbes’ particular take on the fundamental threat of religiously inspired violence to the security and civil peace of Europe allowed him to make a set of novel assertions about the proper relationship between state and religion, without any reference to the divine. The Hobbesian approach to public religion is essential to understanding the nature of the Enlightenment. It also opens up a historical perspective on an approach to (...) contemporary conflicts over public religion. This perspective is preferable to the approach most widely adopted in the West: that spelled out in the works of John Locke. (shrink)

In Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God, Harold Netland advances a critical-trust approach to religious experience. This approach raises important questions about what Michael Martin has called “negative religious experiences.” Netland responds by attacking Martin’s “negative principle of credulity,” but I argue that Netland’s response can be undermined if we take negative religious experiences not as experiences of God as absent, but as experiences of the world as godless. On this understanding, there is no need for a negative principle (...) of credulity; the ordinary principle still applies and puts pressure on Netland’s response. I then raise concerns with Netland’s “argument from fulfilled expectations,” even as part of a cumulative case argument. Ultimately, I propose that careful attention to the impact of Christ on our Western moral framework might help to resolve both concerns. (shrink)

I myself and Marek Siemek could never accept the philosophical standpoint of the other, nevertheless we agreed with each other in a very important respect. For both of us philosophy was always a vital questioning, and not a kind of neutral science about the world. To Marek Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was the starting point, to me Martin Heidegger, later Frierich Nietzsche; Marek wanted to create a new unified explanation of our world, I have denied to possibility of such a (...) unified explanation.To make my attitude comprehensible, I gave in this paper a kind of report on the conference at which in different talks the crisis of our world was discussed. The standpoints of the early György Lukács, that of Edmund Husserl, and Heidegger, and that of Carl Schmidt were interpreting. All of them wanted to give a kind of solution to our existential crisis. To me the name of Nietzsche was lacking; I think namely that only Niettzsche was the philosopher at the beginning of our crisis of modernity, who could see: the “last man” who killed God, cannot do anything else as to accept his existential crisis. There is no solution. (shrink)

Suppose there is no God. This might imply that human life is meaningless, that there are no moral obligations and hence people can do whatever they want, and that the notions of virtue and vice and good and evil have no place. Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is possible. (...) Naturally, the author sees virtue in a Godless universe as different from virtue in a Christian universe, and he develops naturalistic accounts of humility, charity, and hope. The moral landscape in a Godless universe is different from the moral landscape in a Christian universe, but it does indeed exist. Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe is a tour of some of the central landmarks of this under-explored territory. (shrink)

. John Cottingham suggests that “only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives.” Two main reasons for endorsing this proposition are assessed: the religious origins of conscience, and the need to explain its normative authority. I argue that Graeco-Roman conceptions of conscience cast doubt on this first historical claim, and that secular moral realisms can account for the obligatoriness of conscience. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for an objective (...) foundation for conscience which emerges from these debates should be embraced by both secular and religious ethicists alike. (shrink)

In Britain, as in many other countries across Europe, non-religion has now replaced Christianity as the cultural default, especially among younger age groups. There is for the first time a no-religion majority, and only around half the overall population now express belief in some kind of God. And while religion continues to feature prominently in children's education in countries like the UK, schools are, increasingly, making space in the classroom for nonreligious stances toward life. But as of yet, there has (...) been scant scholarly attention accorded to what this development means for children, and families with young children. Religion has long been seen as an important aspect of an upbringing that stresses character development and good moral conduct. What does such an upbringing look like when children grow up non-religious? This book explores how, when, where, and with whom children learn to be non-religious, paying particular attention to the everyday practices through which non-religion is transmitted from parents-and, in some cases, school teachers-to children. In this book, Strhan and Shillitoe draw on their extensive ethnographic fieldwork in family homes and in children's schools, and on in-depth interviews with children, parents, and school teachers in three contrasting sites in England. The views of the children themselves (mostly aged 7-11 years old, a period when children become aware of their identities and worldviews) are taken seriously alongside those of their caregivers and instructors. The authors argue that nonreligious children and their parents are motivated by an ethics focused on equality, compassion, and social justice-values seen as unconnected to churches and other religious institutions. (shrink)

Within this paper, I examine Godless normative realism, a naturalistic explanation of morality given by Erik Wielenberg and determine whether the theory poses a threat to abductive moral arguments for the existence of God. In particular, I argue that Wielenberg’s theory is a possible explanation for the existence of moral facts and that it offers a motivation for one to act morally, but that theism, as a whole, remains a better explanation for the moral aspects of the world. To do (...) so, I defend the legitimacy of weak forms of DCT, identify a few areas in which Godless normative realism fails to explain moral aspects of the world, and conclude with a few reasons for thinking that the explanatory scope of theism is superior to that of Wielenberg’s theory. I conclude that abductive moral arguments for the existence of God remain largely unscathed by Godless normative realism. (shrink)

Many people describe themselves as secular rather than religious, but they often qualify this statement by claiming an interest in spirituality. But what kind of spirituality is possible in the absence of religion? In this book, Michael McGhee shows how religious traditions and secular humanism function as 'schools of wisdom' whose aim is to expose and overcome the forces that obstruct justice. He examines the ancient conception of philosophy as a form of ethical self-inquiry and spiritual practice conducted by a (...) community, showing how it helps us to reconceive the philosophy of religion in terms of philosophy as a way of life. McGhee discusses the idea of a dialogue between religion and atheism in terms of Buddhist practice and demonstrates how a non-theistic Buddhism can address itself to theistic traditions as well as to secular humanism. His book also explores how to shift the centre of gravity from religious belief towards states of mind and conduct. (shrink)

The religious crisis experienced by the present mankind is neither the first nor the last in its history. But it looks more sharp, more general, and above all - deeper, because it reaches the very roots of religion, God. This crisis is present in the West, where freedom is predominantly dominated and dominated, and where man can develop as it is profitable, as well as in the East, where for decades the communist regime led a persistent and fierce ideological war, (...) trying to eliminate everything that concerned God. It seemed that the fall of the Marxist-Communist system would lead to a violent manifestation of a religious sensation here, responding to the demands of the human spirit. Unfortunately, such hopes were not fulfilled. The atmosphere of a certain freedom soon changed the first signs of enthusiastic religious interest in religious chaos, and finally, as could be foreseen, left a free space for the crazy pursuit of well-being and all the benefits that the Western civilization was embracing. This was the result of a pathetic, even tragic financial situation, which was the consequence of the management of the communist regime and the inevitable legacy of Marxist despotism, which required the complete rejection of religion and its absence in human life. (shrink)

While praising Agamben for his attempt to formulate a radically immanentist conception of redemption, Negri nevertheless points out that Agamben’s novel vision of redemption, according to which the world in which we live is also a source of possibility, remains singularly unproductive. This is because in Agamben’s universe, according to Negri, productive power is attributed to sovereign power alone, thus leaving no room for a radically inventive and transformative activity – except in the guise of passive marginal resistance. In this (...) article, I will discuss how the dialectic of immanence and transcendence implied in Agamben’s identification of the irreparably profane world with God throws into relief what is at stake in his singular conception of redemption. If nothing is more urgent in the contemporary state of exception in which we allegedly live today than finding a way to wrench from it a potential for transformation, as Agamben claims, this is because the present regime of mastery succeeds in creating through this very lawlessness an interminable status quo, immune to all change. In examining the implications of Agamben’s analysis of the self-generating immanentism of the state of exception, I explore the possibility that his commitment to redemption might make a contribution to contemporary theorisations of resistance by identifying the difficulties of contemporary immanentist theories of resistance, such as Negri’s, in finding a way out of the present impasse and by developing the basis for an explanation of how the restoration of the possible is given only through the restoration of always-already missed opportunities. (shrink)

This book aims to apply recent thinking in philosophy to the age-old problem of the meaning of life, and to do so in a way that is useful to atheists, agnostics, and humanists. The book reorients the search for meaning away from a search for purpose and toward a search for what truly matters, and criticizes our society's prevailing theory of value, the preference satisfaction theory of the economists. It next argues that emotions are our best guides to what matters (...) in life, and shows how emotional judgments about what matters can be true. Finally it discusses how a meaningful life can be lived, describes the role of justice, freedom, identity, and culture in its construction, and compares the meaningful with the happy life. Andrew Kernohan has a Ph.D in philosophy from the University of Toronto and is an Adjunct Professor at Dalhousie University. He is the author of Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression (Cambridge University Press, 1998) and various articles in professional philosophy journals. (shrink)

Erik J. Wielenberg draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism, according to which there are objective ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. He goes on to develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge.

The Soviet government utilized a variety of tactics while attempting to secularize the U.S.S.R. Oppression of the Russian Orthodox Church demonstrates how interconnected faith and the former tsarist regime were. It is ironic that while trying to wipe out religion, the Bolsheviks replacement methods carried religious-type qualities as well.

The discussion in this paper sets out from two thoughts, one a straightforward empirical observation, the other a worry. The observation is that many who do not believe in God nevertheless regard certain pieces of religious music, such as Bach’s B minor Mass, as among the greatest works of art. The worry is that there must be something compromised or incomplete in the atheist’s experience of such works. Taken together, these thoughts would seem to point to the sceptical conclusion that (...) the high regard in which many atheists hold works such as the B minor Mass must itself be compromised, or in some way unwarranted. The majority of the paper is devoted to clarifying the initial worry through the investigation of a series of (failed) attempts to avoid the sceptical conclusion, before — at the end of the paper — we argue that, for at least one sort of atheist, there is, after all, a mode of engagement with great religious music that might afford an experience of it which would underwrite his judgement that the work is, indeed, great. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, by Erik J. Wielenberg.

This special issue of Sophia, titled Living without God: A Multicultural Spectrum of Atheism, deals with the intricate issue of approaching atheism—methodologically as well as conceptually—from the perspective of cultural pluralism. What does ‘atheism’ mean in different cultural contexts? Can this term be applied appropriately to different religious discourses which conceptualize God/gods/Goddess/goddesses in hugely divergent ways? Or would that rather be a sort of hegemonic homogenization of all possible modalities of living without God, as Jessica Frazier argues? Is my ‘God’ (...) the same as yours? If not, then how can your atheism be the same as mine? In other words, this issue of Sophia raises the question: Is it not high time that we proposed a comparative study of atheism alongside that of religions, rather than believing that atheism is centered in the ‘Western’ experience? Besides, how can we explore the modalities of atheist religiosity such as we find in Buddhism and Jainism and also, arguably, in certain forms of Hinduism, as far as the Indic traditions are concerned? How might these negotiations of atheism across the multicultural spectrum interrogate our tendency to place atheism within the context of the binary opposition of science and religion? Besides, there is a need to focus on the philosophical negotiations between atheism, theism and agnosticism and the discourses that emerge from such dialogues, including that of postsecularity. (shrink)

This article is a short book review of Erik Wielenberg's book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.