Selon Heidegger, la phénoménologie ne serait pas une école de pensée ni un mouvement philosophique, mais la pure possibilité de "répondre en son temps à ce qui est à penser". Pourquoi s'occuperait-on dès lors de l'histoire des diverses doctrines qui en revendiquent le titre? Mais peut-on parler de "la" phénoménologie? Plutôt que de présupposer une telle identité, on s'attache ici à une reconstruction possible de l'homonymie des phénoménologies, en prêtant attention à l'incessant remaniement de la logique qu'elles opèrent en (...) relation avec la question du langage. Ce qui se trame alors sous le double nom de "phénoménologie" et de "grammaire", c'est l'histoire d'un motif qui, de Lambert à Husserl en passant par Kant, Hegel et Brentano, hante la philosophie moderne jusque dans ses "déconstructions". S'ouvre ainsi la possibilité d'une lecture de la Recherche que Husserl consacre à "l'idée de grammaire pure logique", attentive à la synonymie des diverses grammaires philosophiques qui traversent l'histoire. On suit alors un chemin indiqué par Platon et Aristote, qui conduit des Alexandrins à Frege, des grammaires spéculatives à Peirce, de Port-Royal à Russell. Non que la question grammaticale ait le même sens, se réfère à la même chose, prétende à la même vérité dans chacune de ces formes de pensée, mais parce que la question de la grammaire renvoie toujours à cette autre: à quelles conditions le sens, la référence et la vérité sont-ils possibles? (shrink)

Cet article maintient que l’intérêt de Husserl pour le développement d’une logique pure en tant que théorie de la science limite sa conception de l’ontologie. L’ontologie formelle est, pour Husserl, une théorie formelle des objets de connaissance, dont les catégories fondamentales sont celles de substance, propriété et relation. En outre, les ontologies régionales évoluent au sein des limites catégorielles définies par l’ontologie formelle. Mais une telle ontologie laisse de côté les activités et les processus de tout genre, parmi lesquels (...) le plus important est celui de l’ « avoir à l’esprit ». La phénoménologie transcendantale, en revanche, s’occupe de l’être-conscient-du-monde, un être-conscient qui est cependant inséparable de l’être-dans-le-monde. Cette phénoménologie se situe sur le même terrain ontologique que l’ontologie fondamentale de Heidegger. Mais alors, bien que la notion husserlienne d’ontologie soit limitée par le rôle dominant attribué à la logique en tant que théorie de la science et à la connaissance vraie qui lui est propre, il y a plus d’ontologie chez Husserl que dans son « ontologie ». (shrink)

Cette étude examine la thèse soutenant la présence d’une structure syntaxique au sein de l’expérience antéprédicative, développée par Husserl dans Expérience et jugement, relativement au projet de la grammaire pure logique élaborée dans la IV e Recherche logique. L’idée défendue est que le dernier Husserl réhabilite ou réévalue certaines thèses de cette IV e Recherche dans le cadre de la théorie de l’expérience antéprédicative dont il est fait état dans la I ère section d’Expérience et jugement. Il s’agit (...) alors pour Husserl de réussir à penser la façon dont les principes syntaxiques régissant le jugement constituent la réplique de la structure propre à l’expérience antéprédicative. (shrink)

Respect for language, as everyone acknowledges, is a constant of French culture. It is no less clear, however, that the appraisal of language and of its powers and the notion formed of its essential nature vary from epoch to epoch. Intense philosophical, scientific and literary preoccupation with language and the age-old problems it raises is undoubtedly one of the most significant characteristics of pre-romanticism. The traditional respect for language, manifest İn discussions of inversion and of the importance of signs in (...) the formation of ideas, is gradually transformed, when these discussions have run their course, into a cult of language in general and of the word in particular. Indeed, by much insistence on the primordial importance of language in the act of knowledge, thinkers such as Locke and Condillac, and after them Voltaire, Diderot, Maupertuis, Rousseau, Garat, and many others, eventually endow the instrument of thought with an autonomy that thought itself, subjugated by matter, was in danger of losing. “ Ah! Monsieur “, exclaims Diderot, combien notre entendement est modifi・ par les signes.” Minds seem to pass, at this critical moment of European reflection, from a purely intellectual conception of language—which, moreover, the Grammaire de Port-Royal barely distinguished from logic—to a mythological conception of its principal functions. (shrink)

"This volume . . . provides wonderful insight into Adorno's understanding of Kant and also allows us to see more clearly the role Kant's thought played in ...

This book is concerned with the alleged capacity of the human mind to arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world on the basis of pure reason without any dependence on sensory experience. Most recent philosophers reject the view and argue that all substantive knowledge must be sensory in origin. Laurence BonJour provocatively reopens the debate by presenting the most comprehensive exposition and defence of the rationalist view that a priori insight is a genuine basis for knowledge. This important (...) book will be at the centre of debate about the theory of knowledge for many years to come. (shrink)

I lay down a system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness.

In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.

This new translation of the first Critique forms part of a fifteen-volume English-language edition of the works of Immanuel Kant under the general editorship of this volume’s editor-translators, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. The edition, which is almost complete by now, comprises all of Kant’s published works along with extensive selections from his literary remains, his correspondence, and student transcripts of his lecture courses in metaphysics, ethics, logic, and anthropology. The Cambridge edition aims at a consistent English rendition of Kant’s (...) works, both within a given volume and across volumes. In terms of scope and detail, the Cambridge edition is unrivaled in any language, except for the authoritative Academy edition begun under the directorship of Wilhelm Dilthey in 1900, which, however, is still not completed and several volumes of which are in serious need of re-editing. In one case, that of the Opus postumum, the best edition currently available seems to be the one in the Cambridge edition. (shrink)

The paper argues that existing interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as an "analysis of experience" (e.g., those of Kitcher and Strawson) fail because they do not properly appreciate the method of the work. The author argues that the Critique provides an analysis of the faculty of reason, and counts as an analysis of experience only in a derivative sense.

In the Philebus, Socrates maintains two theses about the relationship between pleasure and the good life: the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is better than the unmixed life of intelligence, and: the unmixed life of intelligence is the most divine. Taken together, these two claims lead to the paradoxical conclusion that the best human life is better than the life of a god. A popular strategy for avoiding this conclusion is to distinguish human from divine goods; on such a (...) reading, pleasure has merely instrumental value, and it benefits human beings only as a result of their imperfect nature. I argue that certain ‘pure’ pleasures are full-fledged, intrinsic goods in the Philebus, which are even worthy of the gods . This positive evaluation of pure pleasure results from a detailed examination of pleasure, which reveals that different types of pleasures have fundamentally different natures. (shrink)

Introduction -- Overview -- Theism, simplicity, and properly anthropocentric metaphysics -- Materialism and dualism -- The power, knowledge, and motives of the primordial God -- The existence of the primordial God -- God changes -- Understanding evil -- The Trinity -- The Incarnation -- Concluding remarks.

In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant explicitly states that his motivation for writing this work is to make room for faith or the practical employment of reason . How does Kant accomplish this? The topics of God and the immortality of the soul do not arise until the conclusion of the antinomies. How does Kant get from the desire to make room for faith to its fulfilment in the latter parts of (...) the first Critique? A common response to this question is a discussion of the constitutive and regulative employment of the ideas of reason. It is this distinction that sustains Kant's attempt at reconciling empirical knowledge and moral discourse. The constitutive and regulative analysis, however, has its roots deep within the initial stages of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is, in fact, the mathematical/dynamical distinction, which Kant introduces early in the analytic, that makes possible the constitutive/regulative distinction. Not only has the mathematical/ dynamical distinction itself been disregarded, but the relation between the mathematical/dynamical and the constitutive/ regulative has been almost universally ignored by commentators. If a commentator does mention the mathematical/dynamical distinction, it is usually in a dismissive tone. Walsh, for example, calls the distinction ‘hard to interpret’ and ignores it for the rest of his commentary. (shrink)

"Les Dilemmes de la métaphysique pure" de Charles Renouvier. Philosophe français (1815-1903).

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic “third way” between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses—distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between derivational and functional reduction—I (...) define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism . I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse au rapport que la grammaire entretient avec la langue, la métalangue et la linguistique, en prenant le cas de l’enseignement de l’anglais langue seconde. Il tente de comprendre d’où vient ce sentiment de non-maîtrise que le mot « grammaire », parfois redouté, suscite chez les apprenants (élèves ou étudiants, les étudiants stagiaires MEEF et même parfois les enseignants de l’anglais langue seconde). Dès lors, quelle grammaire enseigner et quels critères retenir pour enseigner efficacement la (...) grammaire de l’anglais? L’analyse met à jour l’existence d’un double paradoxe, propre à la grammaire en général, et spécifique à la grammaire anglaise, et émet l’hypothèse que ces paradoxes sont liés à la fois aux représentations de la grammaire et à l’usage de la métalangue. Elle avance que le véritable enjeu de la grammaire, et de son enseignement, est de définir les contours de la grammaticalité. Si celle-ci s’évalue à l’épreuve de la langue, a-t-on besoin de « règles » grammaticales? L’article montre que la grammaire linguistique de l’anglais s’inscrit dans la tension entre ces deux exigences. Il propose pour conclure quelques pistes concrètes pour promouvoir l’enseignement de la grammaire de l’anglais, langue seconde, de manière fructueuse et efficace. (shrink)

In this article I will argue that there are two theories of distributive justice hidden in Walzer's Spheres of Justice. The first one emphasises the separation of distributive spheres. It tries to formulate distributive criteria by sticking faithfully to sphere‐specificity. I shall refer to this theory as ‘pure pluralism’. The second theory downplays the separation of spheres and emphasises ‘across spheres’ or ‘between spheres’ criteria instead. I shall call this theory ‘mitigated pluralism’. Mitigated pluralism has become popular among Walzer's (...) friendly critics who apparently do not want to charge him with a distributive theory as clear and rigid as pure pluralism. Although I consider myself another friendly critic, I shall argue in favour of pure pluralism. (shrink)

This essay examines lines of connection between disgust, the effect of disciplines upon such intensive appraisals, political action, and the shape of ethical responsiveness. Philosophies that espouse purity in moral ity or politics mask these lines of connection; they thereby disparage the sig nificance of techniques of the self to ethical and political life. Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt provide the two main figures through whom these themes are explored. Arendt and Kant are brought into relation with each other through (...) the way each comes to terms with disgust and common sense. Kant's attempt to purify morality draws upon the spontaneity of common sense even more than it does upon a set of transcendental arguments. The Kantian metaphysic of the supersensible and the sensible then authorizes a concept of morality that almost removes the will beyond the reach of disci plines. But aporias he confronts within the will may bring these tactics back in. Arendt, while rising above the command conception of morality pro jected by Kant through her invocation of gratitude for being and appre ciation of new beginnings, reinstates purity in the concept of 'the political'. Arendt's drive to bracket the body - often treated as an assemblage of com pulsive moods and interests - from the realm of ethical and political life also disparages tactics by the self on the self. To challenge the metaphysic of the supersensible and the sensible with a metaphysic of the infrasensible and the sensible is to confirm the nobility of such tactics. The presentation of this alternative perspective calls into question the pretension of many contemporaries to be 'post-metaphysical'; it also helps to show why meta physical pluralism sets a condition for a politics of plurality attuned to the velocity and scope of late-modern life. Key Words: amygdala • Arendt • body • common sense • Deleuze • ethics • Kant • metaphysics • plurality • Spinoza. (shrink)

This article defends a pure functionalist theory of territorial jurisdiction according to which a state’s moral right to rule over a territory rests on its present moral performance as a freedom‐enabling institutional structure. A common objection against functionalist theories is that they cannot explain why it matters that one particular state has exclusive jurisdiction over a certain territory. This deficiency is often associated with the annexation challenge, which is supposed to show that functionalist theories cannot deal adequately with cases (...) of annexation. Against this line of criticism, I argue that the pure functionalist justification of the right to rule is capable of tackling challenges related to particularity and annexation. First, the pure functionalist theory explains why it is important that one particular state rules over a given territory. It also tells us what set of laws and what government we should comply with. Second, the pure functionalist justification of the right to rule entails sufficient conceptual resources to account for the wrongdoing involved in annexation. Although the theory deems past wrongs irrelevant for the justification of the right to exercise jurisdiction on a territory, it is adequately sensitive to historical injustice. (shrink)

I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the (...) fact that I downplay faculty analysis as an essential characteristic of the critique. The third has to do with my claim that the Critique of Pure Reason aims to show that metaphysics is capable of architectonic unity, where this unity is only achievable when we construe metaphysics according to the worldly concept of philosophy. (shrink)

This book discusses and analyses the contribution of mind-independent individual literary pure possibilities in exploring and understanding actual reality. The relationship between literary imagination, literary possibilities, and actual reality poses a major philosophical problem in the field of metaphysics of literature. In a detailed analysis of some literary masterpieces (by Proust, Kafka, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Thomas Mann, Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner), I attempt to demonstrate that actual reality actualizes or “imitates” literary pure possibilities. Hence, such masterpieces should be (...) treated not as romans a clef but, instead, as paradigm-cases on whose basis we grasp and understand actual reality. (shrink)

As we will show in the present work, the historical development of pure geometry did not arise as a direct “transition” from practical geometry into pure geometry, at least as these are usually understood. We can discern four phases related to this evolution. Initially, we have practical geometry as applied in ancient Greece and other ancient civilizations. This surveyors’ practical geometry was somewhat transformed in “didactic” contexts when applied to problem-solving. This not-so-practical geometry is the direct antecedent of (...) the first form of pure geometry, that of Hippocrates of Chios. Only afterward did pure geometry, as we usually understand it, emerge. The form of pure geometry that we find in Euclid’s Elements. (shrink)

Le Corpus oral et sonore de l’espagnol rural(COSER) est un corpus d’enquêtes orales qui a pour but l’étude de la grammaire dialectale dans la péninsule ibérique. Dans cet article, les caractéristiques du COSER et la méthodologie suivie sont décrites et comparées à celles des atlas pour ce qui concerne la recherche sur la grammaire dialectale. Grâce au COSER, de nombreux aspects syntaxiques peu connus ou totalement ignorés des dialectes espagnols ont pu être étudiés, tels que plusieurs paradigmes pronominaux, (...) la substitution du subjonctif et l’accord neutre de matière. De plus, la répartition géographique de ces aspects a parfois été considérablement élargie, et les explications traditionnelles ont été remplacées par de nouvelles, en se basant sur une meilleure connaissance des données. L’étude de la grammaire dialectale s’avère être une importante source d’information favorisant une meilleure compréhension des nombreux croisements des principes linguistiques, comme l’« Agreement Hierarchy », par exemple, et ouvrant la voie à de nouvelles approches permettant de tester leur validité. (shrink)

In Russell''s Ramified Theory of Types RTT, two hierarchical concepts dominate:orders and types. The use of orders has as a consequencethat the logic part of RTT is predicative.The concept of order however, is almost deadsince Ramsey eliminated it from RTT. This is whywe find Church''s simple theory of types (which uses the type concept without the order one) at the bottom of the Barendregt Cube rather than RTT. Despite the disappearance of orders which have a strong correlation with predicativity, predicative (...) logic still plays an influential role in Computer Science.An important example is the proof checker Nuprl, which is basedon Martin-Löf''s Type Theory which uses type universes. Those type universes,and also degrees of expressions in AUTOMATH, are closely related toorders. In this paper, we show that orders have not disappeared from modern logic and computer science, rather, orders play a crucial role in understanding the hierarchy of modern systems. In order to achieve our goal, we concentrate on a subsystem of Nuprl.The novelty of our paper lies in: (1) a modest revival of Russell's orders, (2) the placing of the historical system RTT underlying the famous Principia Mathematica in a context with a modern system of computer mathematics (Nuprl) and modern type theories (Martin-Löf''s type theory and PTSs), and (3) the presentation of acomplex type system (Nuprl) as a simple and compact PTS. (shrink)

Widely regarded as the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl's Ideas puts forth his revolutionary argument for phenomenology as the foundation of all philosophy and for experience as the source of all knowledge. His work has heavily influenced some of the greatest contemporary thinkers of all time including Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, and has dramatically altered the course of Western Philosophy.

This paper investigates the relationship between James’ radical empiricism and Deleuze’s study of the genesis of sense without a transcendental subject as necessary condition. It shows that James’ concept of pure experience changes the form of relation between mind and world. Considering how to conceptualize experience without a fixed metaphysical or transcendental subject destabilizes ontological identity, leads to a founding conceptual divergence from traditional phenomenology, and motivates Deleuze’s efforts towards transcendental empiricism. The paper reads Deleuze’s work on the genesis (...) of sense in this context, arguing that one important result is an ontological pluralism. Such pluralism is crucial in considering how meaning can be made between and across differences and is in keeping with radical empiricism’s openness to life’s complexity. (shrink)

Buddhism and Hinduism appear to be separated by irreconcilable differences. I argue that this apparent gulf can be overcome. The argument has three main parts. First, I argue that the Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising is not a metaphysical principle of real causation, but a principle of fabrication. Second, I argue that this interpretation of dependent arising enables a unification of the main schools of Buddhism. Third, I argue that Buddhism can be unified fully with Advaita Vedānta, the most important (...) philosophical school of Hinduism, and I argue that a substantial unity can be established between Buddhism and the three main schools of Vedānta. In particular, Buddhism and Vedānta can agree that the highest aim and good consists in the direct realization of an unconditioned and pure mind or consciousness. (shrink)