The issue which I wish to address in this paper is the widespread tendency in Anglophone philosophy to insist on a separation between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas or intellectual history. This separation reflects an anxiety on the part of philosophers lest the special character of philosophy will be dissolved into something else in the hands of historians. And it is borne of a fundamental tension between those who think of (...) philosophy's past as a source of ideas and arguments of interest to the present, and those who hold that the philosophy of the past should be studied on its own terms, in relation to its immediate context, without reference to the present. The challenge, then, is to re-historicise the history of philosophy, and to keep the philosophers onside. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, philosophy had come into being in the VIth century with Thales, just as a mere, disinterested pursuit of truth, a curiosity for great problems which were substantially identical with those which Aristotle himself and his school were now raising. This abstract reading is very similar to that which views Greek poets as inspired by "eternal beauty" or by "art's for art sake" and which is nowadays completely discredited and given up by scholars of the history (...) of literature. Against this view the present text pro-poses a new reading of the "archaic" presocratic scientists: in fact, it is about those "sages" who lived on the bound-aries of the Greek-speaking world before the concentration of such people in Periclean Athens. They were closely linked to their native towns where they held high office; here there oral teaching and the public reading of their texts were followed closely by their fellow citizens. Thus the picture of the "cosmic republic" arises: to the "cosmic monarchy" of Homer and Hesiod a different mythical world succeeds. Here the earth, the sea, the sky, the human body and, generally, the "existing thing", all behave like isonomic towns or like the governing body of these towns. Philosophy will arise later, in Athens of the Vth century. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy are increasingly likely to emphasize the extent to which their work offers a pay‐off for philosophers of un‐historical or anti‐historical inclinations; but this defence is less familiar, and often seems less than self‐evident, to intellectual historians. This article examines this tendency, arguing that such arguments for the instrumental value of historical scholarship in philosophy are often more problematic than they at first appear. Using the relatively familiar case study of René Descartes' reading of his scholastic (...) and Aristotelian contemporaries, the article attempts to problematize this notion of pay‐off from an historian's perspective. (shrink)

How does history relate to the past? According to leading historical theorists, the relation to the past in history is reducible to evidential, psychological, practical and retrospective concerns. In contrast, this volume claims that historical relations to the past are irreducible products of the logical commitments of history as method. Ahlskog argues that the method of history shapes and enables relations to past in historical research by invoking past perspectives of meaning for rendering reality intelligible. The (...) book provides a much-needed philosophical clarification of key concepts in one of the most fundamental debates within the humanities today. (shrink)

I. While the history of philosophy seeks to investigate the relationships and consequences of various philosophical systems, the philosophy of the history of philosophy sets itself a higher goal: it searches for the meaning and direction of the development of these products of human thought. A pervasive telos is demanded as the dominant factor hidden in them, in spite of all their variations. But the question is immediately raised: Is such an assumption admissible? Does it (...) not contain a wholly unprovable presupposition, since any effort to establish the direction of the history of philosophy must assume this teleology as a postulate? (shrink)

Questions about the naturalness or unnaturalness of homosexuality are as old as the hills, and the answers have often been used to condemn homosexuals, their behaviors, and their relationships. In the past two centuries, a number of sciences have involved themselves in this debate, introducing new vocabularies, theories, arguments, and data, many of which have gradually helped tip the balance toward tolerance and even acceptance. In this book, philosophers Pieter R. Adriaens and Andreas De Block explore the history and (...) philosophy of the gay sciences, revealing how individual and societal values have colored how we think about homosexuality. The authors unpack the entanglement of facts and values in studies of male homosexuality across the natural and human sciences and consider the extent to which science has mitigated or reinforced homonegative mores. The focus of the book is on homosexuality's assumed naturalness. Geneticists rephrased naturalness as innateness, claiming that homosexuality is innate-colloquially, that homosexuals are born gay. Zoologists thought it a natural affair, documenting its existence in myriad animal species, from maybugs to men. Evolutionists presented homosexuality as the product of natural selection and speculated about its adaptive value. Finally, psychiatrists, who had initially pathologized homosexuality, eventually appealed to its naturalness or innateness to normalize it. Discussing findings from an array of sciences--comparative zoology, psychiatry, anthropology, evolutionary biology, social psychology, developmental biology, and machine learning--this book is essential reading for anyone interested in what science has to say about homosexuality. (shrink)

However, throughout his career he regularly lectured on a wide range of moral and political philosophers of the past. This volume collects these previously unpublished lectures.

In Essays on the History of Ethics Michael Slote collects his essays that deal with aspects of both ancient and modern ethical thought and seek to point out conceptual/normative comparisons and contrasts among different views. Arranged in chronological order of the philosopher under discussion, the relationship between ancient ethical theory and modern moral philosophy is a major theme of several of the papers and, in particular, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and/or utilitarianism feature centrally in (most of) the discussions."--BOOK (...) JACKET. (shrink)

The counter-enlightenment.--The originality of Machiavelli.--The divorce between the sciences and the humanities.--Vico's concept of knowledge.--Vico and the ideal of the enlightenment.--Montesquieu.--Hume and the sources of German anti-rationalism.--Herzen and his memoirs.--The life and opinions of Moses Hess.--Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx, and the search for identity.--The "naïveté" of Verdi.--Georges Sorel.--Nationalism.--A bibliography of Isaiah Berlin.

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1883 Edition.

A popular saying attributed to Aristotle states that ‘medicine begins where philosophy ends’—but this principle does not seem entirely valid for the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, when medicine and philosophy were considered to be integral parts of the same branch of knowledge. For this reason, although today medicine and philosophy are clearly distinct disciplines, historians of ideas cannot study them entirely separately. Indeed, since the early modern era was a period of profound revision of knowledge, (...) probably only a truly interdisciplinary investigation can identify the conceptual shifts and transfers capable of reinstating medicine in its fundamental role in the development of civilisation and modern thought, in particular as a model of a rational knowledge aimed at improving the social good through a fitting interpretation of experience. This article intends to offer arguments in support of such a historiographical approach, and to illustrate certain interesting methodological ideas that emerge from a study in which the history of philosophy and history of medicine cross-pollinate. (shrink)

In the mid-1980s, feminist philosophers began to turn their critical efforts toward reclaiming women in the history of philosophy who had been neglected by traditional histories and canons. There are now scores of resources treating historical women philosophers and reclaiming them for philosophical history. This article explores the four major argumentative strategies that have been used within those reclamation projects. It argues that three of the strategies unwittingly work against the reclamationist end of having women engaged as (...) philosophers. The fourth type, the one that seeks to transform philosophical practice and reconstruct its history, is the only strategy that will result in that engagement because it is the only strategy that pays sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which women have been excluded from philosophy and its history. (shrink)

Traces the origins and development of arithmetic, statistics, geometry, and calculus from the ancient civilizations to the present.

This article brings to light discourses that constituted the education of Asian-American children in California in the second half of the nineteenth century. Guided by Foucaultian ideas and critical race theory, I analyze California public school laws, speeches of a governor-elect and a superintendent, and a report of the board of supervisors, from the 1860s to the 1880s. During this targeted period, the images and narratives of Asian-American children were inscribed with racism. Racializing politics rendered them to be disqualified from (...) attending public schools. Segregated schooling for them was legally ordered and therefore unquestioned. It was a discursive practice implemented on their bodies by dint of a mechanism of a spatial division. This article reveals the shifting dominancy of discourses regarding Asian-American children. Rather than accepting the given historical facts, I intend to reread historical texts in order to rethink the education of Asian-American children through a Foucaultian encounter with critical race theory. Acknowledging different interpretations of the past events is a way of rethinking them and interrogating the history through the revelation of different histories in the education for Asian-American children. (shrink)

The article discusses the origins, formation, and development of the scientific school of chemical physics and nanotechnology in Kazakhstan. The authors describe the achievements of a scientific school that is on par with the best of its kind locally and globally, adding new competitive results of practical relevance to the economic development of the country. The article also highlights the special role of the outstanding scientist Zulkhair Aimukhametovich Mansurov in the development of the methodological foundations of the scientific school, the (...) targeted training of the scientific personnel in the priority areas of the development of Kazakhstani chemical physics, and the creation of nanoscale materials for multifunctional purposes. Also, the main principles of the philosophy of Mansurov’s scientific school are presented. (shrink)

Clinical ethics, like bioethics more generally, until recently has tended to focus on the present and future, with little attention to the history of moral thought about health care that preceded bioethics. As a consequence, clinical ethics and bioethics lack maturity as fields of the humanities. The papers in this year's clinical ethics issue of the Journal put contemporary clinical ethics in critical dialogue with the past, making the former accountable to the latter. The six papers in this issue (...) of the Journal are briefly described, with an emphasis on how they contribute to the maturation of clinical ethics as a field of the humanities. (shrink)

Originally published in Russian in 1981, this unique history of early Soviet philosophy is now available for the first time in English, translated by Frederick Choate.Yehoshua Yakhot (1919-2003) was a professor of philosophy in the Soviet Union until forced to emigrate to Israel in 1975. While in emigration, he finished writing the book begun in Moscow years before. Yakhot's book is essential reading for an understanding of the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism and its devastating impact on every (...) aspect of Soviet thought. Rare among works dealing with this period, Yakhot presents an objective account of the theoretical role of the major figures in the early Soviet Union—including, most significantly, that of Leon Trotsky, co-leader with Lenin of the Russian Revolution of October 1917.The book describes the flourishing of philosophical discussion after the revolution and ensuing Civil War. By 1922, the major theoretical journal Under the Banner of Marxism had been founded at Trotsky's urging. The first two issues contained letters from Trotsky and Lenin that constituted the program of the journal. By the mid-1920s, two contending camps had formed in philosophy: the mechanists and dialecticians. The relatively free debate between them on many complex issues was followed by Stalin's intervention in December 1930. In a ferocious reaction against the theoretical foundations of the October Revolution, Stalin sent countless genuine Marxists to their deaths during the Great Terror of 1936-38. Prior to the opening of the archives in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yakhot presents the largely unknown history of many of the Marxist philosophers victimized by Stalinism.The subjects covered in the book include: the subject matter of Marxist philosophy; the problem of contingency; the principle of partisanship in philosophy; Hegel and Marxist dialectics; Spinoza's place in the discussions of the 1920s and 1930s; the rejection of ideology by Marx and Engels; the influence of Bogdanov's ideas; the inevitable crisis of Soviet ideology; and continued attempts to conceal the crimes of Stalinism in the USSR.This new English edition contains photographs, biographical information, an index and two letters by Trotsky and Lenin. (shrink)

There are a large number of different models of history acceleration. This article discusses the models proposed by S. P. Kapitsa, S. V. Tsirel and A. D. Panov. They are based on the prerequisites of a synergetic methodology, the concepts of Big History and singularity, as well as the interpretation of the acceleration of history as a consistent reduction in the duration of significant historical epochs. The purpose of the paper is to show the unconvincing nature of (...) such an approach as a variant of substantiating the conception of history acceleration. (shrink)

Since the mid-nineteenth century, many philosophers in the "continental" tradition have maintained that philosophy stands in a special relation to its history. Philosophy, they argue, is an inherently historical discipline, and it is impossible to do philosophy well without studying its past. Charles Taylor calls this view "the historical thesis about philosophy." But while the historical thesis is often taken for granted in recent European philosophy, it is notoriously difficult to pin down exactly what (...) it means, or why one might think it is true. This unreflective attitude towards history could be called a crisis, in Edmund Husserl's sense: a certain view of the history of philosophy has been handed down through the continental tradition, but without being adequately argued for, or even understood. ;This dissertation is a diagnosis and critique of the crisis. Its goals are to explain why continental thinking about the history of philosophy has become mired in confusion, and to determine what the tradition must do to come to terms with the crisis. My thesis is that since Hegel, continental thought has understood its relation to the past according to a single model---the model that Hegel himself proposed. But this model is flawed, because it is based on implausible assumptions about the nature of historical knowledge. To respond to the crisis, I argue, we must recognize the ways in which Hegelian assumptions dominate our understanding of history, and rethink them. And I propose an alternative view of historical inquiry, one that I believe avoids the difficulties raised by Hegel's account. ;The dissertation takes the form of a regressive historical narrative. Chapter One examines the arguments advanced for the historical thesis by three prominent contemporary schools: Derridean deconstruction, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and Levinasian ethical thought. I argue that each of these schools is deeply confused about the relation between philosophy and its past. Chapter Two explains how this confused approach to history first arose in Hegel's work on the history of philosophy. Chapters Three and Four describe how a Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy was unwittingly transmitted to contemporary thought via Heidegger and twentieth century hermeneutics. Finally, Chapter Five sketches an alternative to Hegel's view. Hegel believes that knowledge of history is unphilosophical because it is mimetic---that is, it merely imitates a pre-given past. I argue that Hegel is wrong about this. I claim that historical knowledge is in important respects active and productive, and that recognizing this is the first step towards understanding how truth can be genuinely in history. (shrink)

An article publicising the philosophical contributions of German women writers in the late 18th and 19th centuries.

In a recent article Richard Rorty has attempted to juxtapose Heidegger and Dewey. While finding significant points of agreement between the two, and by implication praising much of Heidegger’s work, Rorty also suggests a series of criticisms of Heidegger. The problems which Rorty finds with Heidegger can, I think, all be reduced to one basic criticism, which has two main sides. In Rorty’s view Heidegger can not really differentiate between Being and beings in the way that he wants, and thus (...) can give no sense to the word ‘Being’ other than the old metaphysical one. That is, Being and the ontological difference are metaphysical remnants, the last evaporating presence of the Platonic distinction of the real world and the apparent world. This is indicated in two ways. First, Rorty feels that Heidegger can make no real distinction between philosophy, which they both agree has ended, and ‘thinking’ in the specifically Heideggerian sense. Second, Rorty claims that it is impossible to distinguish ontic from ontological becoming. That is, the various epochs of Being which Heidegger distinguishes are, for Rorty, parasitic upon and reducible to the ordinary history of man’s activity in relation to things, material and social. As such, Heidegger’s account of ontological epochs is a species of idealistic reflection upon the history of man’s activity upon things. (shrink)

Constantin Noica is widely believed to be one of the most original and prominent Romanian thinker of the last fifty years. In 1998, a year after his death, his book De dignitete Europae appeared in German translation. In it Noica tackles the classical philosophy of culture as morphology in Frobensius and Spengler, suggesting an interpretation of European historical cultural epochs from the viewpoint of linguistic-morphological forms: the Middle Ages correspond to the noun, the Renaissance to the adjective, Reformation, Counter-Reformation (...) and Classicism to the adverb, followed by the Pronoun, and the present age to numerals and conjunctions. To what extent can we today, twenty years later, at the time when Romania is entering the European Union, still advocate such philosophical Eurocentrism? (shrink)

Goering writes on the perspectives of her students through contrasting philosophy to unrelated anthological texts which include language arts and history.