The co-evolutionary concept of Three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctly) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the trends of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution (...) by two gear mechanism ˗ gene-cultural co-evolution and techno- humanitarian balance. The resultant each of them can estimated by the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization/dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). (shrink)

Stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens (SESH) is a superposition of three different adaptive data arrays: biological, socio-cultural and technological modules, based on three independent processes of generation and replication of an adaptive information – genetic, socio-cultural and symbolic transmissions (inheritance). Third component SESH focused equally to the adaptive transformation of the environment and carrier of SESH. With the advent of High Hume technology, risk has reached the existential significance level. The existential level of technical risk is, by (...) definition, an evolutionary risk as possible leads to the genesis of disappearance of humanity as a species. The emergence of bioethics has to consider as a form of modern (transdisciplinary) scientific concept and sociocultural adaptation for regulate human identity in the global-evolutionary transformation and performs the function of self-preservation. (shrink)

Stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens (SASH) is a result of the integration in the three-module fractal adaptations based on three independent processes of generation, replication, and the implementation of adaptations — genetic, socio-cultural and symbolic ones. The evolutionary landscape SASH is a topos of several evolutionary multi-dimensional vectors: 1) extraversional projective-activity behavioral intention (adaptive inversion 1), 2) mimesis (socio-cultural inheritance), 3) social (Machiavellian) intelligence, 4) the extension of inter-individual communication beyond their own social groups and (...) their own species in the rest of the world, 5) the symbolic system of communication (symbolic inheritance), 6) spiritualistic trans- formation of emotionally-shaped components of mentality, 7) the dominance of the rationalist thought mentality (enhancer of adaptive inverse 1), 8) a recursive distribution of projective-activity intentions on the man himself his genome, psyche and culture (Adaptive Inversion 2), 9) introversional reorientation of the vector of cognitive activity (adaptive inversion 3). (shrink)

Mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the system stable evolutionary strategy Homo sapiens – genetic and cultural coevolution techno-cultural balance – are analyzed. оe main content of the study can be summarized in the following the- ses: stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens includes superposition of three basic types (biological, cultural and technological) of adaptations, the integrity of the system provides by two coevolutionary ligament its elements – the genetic-cultural coevolution and techno-cultural balance, the system (...) takes as result of by develop- ment of genetic and information technologies by advent of genetic and informa- tion technologies extremely unstable conūguration; a harbinger of a radical change in the mechanisms of global evolution religion is a consequence of structural and functional organization of the human psyche; it played (along with science and technology) the role of socio-cultural adaptation of the human mind are present a number of ideas or concepts (the idea of God, including) the genesis of that ideas is associated with the interaction of two information systems, that appear to each other as information substrates – emotional, and verbal-logical (discursive) forms; evolution of the mentality has two nodes, that corresponding to the dominance of rationalism or religion in spiritual culture; the problem of rational justiūcation of religion in modern science is presented by two alternative methodologies – evo- lutionary epistemological and metaphysical-ontological ones; both methodologies are incompatible in a logical perspective; in the evolutionary epistemological im- pact concept of religion and science are equal and alternative building blocks of a stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens, and their balance sheet pro. (shrink)

The subject of the essay is the genesis of the evolutionary strategy of стратегииHomo sapiens(SESH)as a carrier element of the transformation of technology and ethics into the main factors of anthropogenesis and the evolution of complex, self-organizing human-dimension systems.

The co-evolutionary concept of three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to other ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution (...) by two gear mechanism — genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian balance. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). (shrink)

Attempt of trans-disciplinary analysis of the evolutionary value of bioethics is realized. Currently, there are High Tech schemes for management and control of genetic, socio-cultural and mental evolution of Homo sapiens (NBIC, High Hume, etc.). The biological, socio-cultural and technological factors are included in the fabric of modern theories and technologies of social and political control and manipulation. However, the basic philosophical and ideological systems of modern civilization formed mainly in the 17–18 centuries and are experiencing ever-increasing and destabilizing (...) risk-taking pressure from the scientific theories and technological realities. The sequence of diagnostic signs of a new era once again split into technological and natural sciences’ from one hand, and humanitarian and anthropological sciences’, from other. The natural sciences series corresponds to a system of technological risks be solved using algorithms established safety procedures. The socio-humanitarian series presented anthropological risk. Global bioethics phenomenon is regarded as systemic socio-cultural adaptation for technology-driven human evolution. The conceptual model for meta-structure of stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens (SESH) is proposes. In accordance to model, SESH composed of genetic, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist modules, and global bioethics as a tool to minimize existential evolutionary risk. An existence of objectively descriptive and value-teleological evolutionary trajectory parameters of humanity in the modern technological and civilizational context (1), and the genesis of global bioethics as a system social adaptation to ensure self-identity (2) are postulated. -/- . (shrink)

The monograph is an English, expanded and revised version of the book Cheshko, V. T., Ivanitskaya, L.V., & Glazko, V.I. (2018). Anthropocene. Philosophy of Biotechnology. Moscow, Course. The manuscript was completed by me on November 15, 2019. It is a study devoted to the development of the concept of a stable evolutionary human strategy as a unique phenomenon of global evolution. The name “An Evolutionary Metaphysics (Cheshko, 2012; Glazko et al., 2016). With equal rights, this (...) study could be entitled “Biotechnology as a result and factor of the evolutionary processˮ. The choice in favor of used “The Evolutionary Metaphysics of Human Enhancement Technologiesˮ was made in accordance with the basic principle of modern post-academician and human-sized science, a classic example of which is biotechnology. The “Metaphysics of Evolution” and “Evolutionary Metaphysics” concepts are used in several ways in modern philosophical discourse. In any case, the values contain a logical or associative reference to the teleological nature of the evolutionary process (Hull, 1967, 1989; Apel, 1995; Faye, 2016; Dupre, 2017; Rose, 2018, etc). In our study, the “evolutionary metaphysics” serves to denote the thesis of the rationalization and technologization of global evolution and anthropogenesis, in particular. At the same time, the postulate of an open future remains relevant in relation to the results of the evolutionary process. The theory of evolution of complex, including the humans system and algorithm for its constructing are а synthesis of evolutionary epistemology, philosophical anthropology and concrete scientific empirical basis in modern science. ln other words, natural philosophy is regaining the status bar element theoretical science in the era of technology-driven evolution. The co-evolutionary concept of 3-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based оn the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined bу descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot bе instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of blological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution Ьу two gear mechanism genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian balance. The resultant each of them сап estimated Ьу the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization / dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the blological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). It is seem necessary to make three clarifications. First, logical construct, “evolutionary metaphysics” contains an internal contradiction, because it unites two alternative explanatory models. “Metaphysics”, as a subject, implies deducibility of the process from the initial general abstract principle, and, consequently, the outcome of the development of the object is uniquely determined by the initial conditions. Predicate, “evolutionary”, means stochastic mechanism of realizing the same principle by memorizing and replicating random choices in all variants of the post-Darwin paradigm. In philosophy, random choice corresponds to the category of “free will” of a reasonable agent. In evolutionary theory, the same phenomenon is reflected in the concept of “covariant replication”. Authors will attempt to synthesize both of these models in a single transdisciplinary theoretical framework. Secondly, the interpretation of the term “evolutionary (adaptive) strategyˮ is different from the classical definition. The difference is that the adaptive strategy in this context is equivalent to the survival, i.e. it includes the adaptation to the environment and the transformation (construction) of the medium in accordance with the objectives of survival. To emphasize this difference authors used verbal construction “adaptiveˮ (rather than “evolutionaryˮ) strategy as more adequate. In all other cases, the two terms may be regarded as synonymous. Thirdly, the initial two essays of this series were published in one book in 2012. Their main goal was the development of the logically consistent methodological concept of stable adaptive (evolutionary) strategy of hominines and the argumentation of its heuristic possibilities as a transdisciplinary scientific paradigm of modern anthropology. The task was to demonstrate the possibilities of the SESH concept in describing and explaining the evolutionary prospects for the interaction of social organization and technology (techno-humanitarian balance) and the associated biological and cultural mechanisms of the genesis of religion (gene-cultural co-evolution). In other words, it was related to the sphere of cultural and philosophical anthropology, i.e. to the axiological component of any theoretical constructions describing the behavior of self-organizing systems with human participation. In contrast, the present work is an attempt to introduce this concept into the sphere of biological anthropology and, consequently, its main goal is to demonstrate the possibility of verification of its main provisions by means of procedures developed by natural science, i.e. refers to the descriptive component of the same theoretical constructions. The result of this in the future should be methods for assessing, calculating and predicting the risk of loss of biological and cultural identity of a person, associated with a permanent and continuously deepening process of development of science and technology. (shrink)

The co-evolutionary concept of tri-modal stable evolutionary strategy (SESH) of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of human evolution by two gear mechanism (...) ˗ genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian balance. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. The mechanism of influence of each module on the evolution of the two remaining modules of SESH a priori can be twofold: (1) informational co-evolution (direct selective pressure); (2) semantic co-evolution (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio- cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). More rapidly evolving autonomous element of the co-evolutionary pair becomes making sense factor for the partner. Semantic co-evolution is the discrete acquisition of adaptive significance of individual alleles by changing socio-cultural types, manifested as an increase in the genetic variability of populations of Homo sapiens, and domesticated species parallel to socio-culturogenesis. The socio- cultural landscape leads to drastically difference of direction in biological evolution of Atlantic and East-Slavic ethnicities/civilizations. (shrink)

Sources of evolutionary risk for stable strategy of adaptive Homo sapiens are an imbalance of: (1) the intra-genomic co-evolution (intragenomic conflicts); (2) the gene-cultural co-evolution; (3) inter-cultural co-evolution; (4) techno-humanitarian balance; (5) inter-technological conflicts (technological traps). At least phenomenologically the components of the evolutionary risk are reversible, but in the aggregate they are in potentio irreversible destructive ones for biosocial, and cultural self-identity of Homo sapiens. When the actual evolution is the subject of a rationalist control (...) and/or manipulation, the magnitude of the 4th and 5th components of the evolutionary risk reaches a level of existential significance. (shrink)

The coronavirus pandemic, like its predecessors - AIDS, Ebola, etc., is evidence of the evolutionary instability of the socio-cultural and ecological niche created by mankind, as the main factor in the evolutionary success of our biological species and the civilization created by it. At least, this applies to the modern global civilization, which is called technogenic or technological, although it exists in several varieties. As we hope to show, the current crisis has less ontological as well as epistemological (...) roots; its reason lies in the main evolutionary trends in the development of science as a social institution. It was only later that epistemological factors were transformed into existential-ontological factors associated with the asymmetry of the existence of civilization and our biosocial nature. The perception or ignorance of a risk factor as a real fact is determined by the presence or absence of knowledge about it. In other words, risk is the result of the integration of the corresponding ontological concept into the general categorical structure. The plurality of such structures is a hallmark of multidisciplinary ontologies, each of which is associated with its own factual continuum. The aim of this study was to conceptually model for support relativistic parameter of evolutionary efficiency of stable evolutionary human strategy (SESH) in its techno-rationalistic module. The meaning of this term is equivalent to the category of scientific and technological development. (shrink)

The theory of evolution of complex, including the humans system and algorithm for its constructing are a synthesis of evolutionary epistemology, philosophical anthropology and concrete scientific empirical basis in modern science,. In other words, natural philosophy is regaining the status bar element theoretical science in the era of technology-driven evolution. The co-evolutionary concept of 3-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value (...) of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctly) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism ˗ genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian balance. The resultant each of them can estimated by the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization/dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). (shrink)

From Chernobyl to Fukushima, it became clear that the technology is a system evolutionary factor, and the consequences of man-made disasters, as the actualization of risk related to changes in the social heredity (cultural transmission) elements. The uniqueness of the human phenomenon is a characteristic of the system arising out of the nonlinear interaction of biological, cultural and techno-rationalistic adaptive modules. Distribution emerging adaptive innovation within each module is in accordance with the two algorithms that are characterized by (...) the dominance of vertical (transgenerational) and horizontal (infection, contagion) adaptive streams of information, respectively. Evolutionary risk is the result of an imbalance of autonomous adaptive systems have an essential attribute of adaptibe strategy of Homo. Technological civilization inherent predisposition to overcome their dependence on biological and physical components. This feature serves as an enhancer of the evolutionary generating conjugate with the scientific and technological development risk We can assume the existence of an intention of Western mentality to a high priority (positive or negative) of technological modifications micro-social environment and post- Soviet (East Slavic) mentality to modification of macro-social system. (shrink)

An evolutionary theory of socialization suggests that children from father-absent families will mature earlier, and form less-stable pair bonds, compared with those from father-present families. Using a sample of about 1,000 persons the recent study focuses on elements of father-absent children’s behavior that could be better explained by a Darwinian approach than by rival social science theories. As a result of their enhanced interest in male competition, father-absent boys were found to engage in rule-breaking behavior more intensively than (...) father-present boys. Compared with father-present children, adolescents from widowed households (both boys and girls) showed a higher intensity of various kinds of noncompliant behavior, which can be linked to their earlier maturation. School attendance, age at marriage, and marital success proved to be influenced by the children’s early family experiences, governed by adapted evolutionary strategies. Father-absent daughters conceived more children than those whose fathers were present during their childhood. As evolutionary theory predicts, reproductive behavior of individuals from divorced households differed from that of individuals who grew up in widowed households. Finally, the strong correlation found between spontaneous abortion/stillbirths and family arrangement indicates that father absence has certain direct impacts on the neurohormonal processes of child development. (shrink)

Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by (...) biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks and the. (shrink)

The evolutionary origin of human pair-bonds is uncertain. One hypothesis, supported by data from forgers, suggests that pair-bonds function to provision mothers and dependent offspring during lactation. Similarly, public health data from large-scale industrial societies indicate that single mothers tend to wean their children earlier than do women living with a mate. Here we examine relations between pair-bond stability, alloparenting, and cross-cultural trends in breastfeeding using data from 58 “traditional” societies in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). Analyses show (...) that stable conjugal relationships were associated with significantly later weaning among the societies in the SCCS. The relationship between pair-bond stability and age at weaning was not mediated by women’s ability to provision themselves or women’s kin support. Availability of alloparental care was also inversely related to age at weaning, and the association was not significantly reduced after controlling for frequency of divorce. This study indicates that among a woman’s kin relationships, a pair-bond with a child’s father is especially supportive of breastfeeding. These cross-cultural findings are further evidence that human pair-bonds may have evolved to support lactation. (shrink)

David Buss’s Sexual Strategies Theory is one of the major evolutionary psychological research programmes, but, as I try to show in this paper, its theoretical and empirical foundations cannot yet be seen to be fully compelling. This lack of cogency comes about due to Buss’s failure to attend to the interactive nature of his subject matter, which leads him to overlook two classic and well known issues of game theoretic and evolutionary biological analysis. Firstly, Buss pays insufficient attention (...) to the fact that, since mate choice is a cooperative decision, what is adaptive for the two sexes individually is irrelevant to the evolutionary explanation of our sexual strategies; instead, all that matters is what is adaptive given the choices made by the other sex. Secondly, Buss does not pay enough attention to the difference between polymorphic and monomorphic evolutionarily stable states in his attempt to empirically confirm his theory. Because of this, the data he presents and analyses are unable to show that natural selection is the most important element in the explanation of the origins of our sexual strategies. In this way, I try to make clear that, at least as things stand now, Buss has failed to provide compelling grounds for thinking that Sexual Strategies Theory can make a major contribution to human psychology. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the analysis of the maximin principle, which is one of the key theoretical concepts of John Rawls’s theory of justice, and the problem that this principle creates for any attempt to provide a naturalistic interpretation of Rawls’s concept of fairness . Analysis shows that maximin principle is, in fact, incompatible with the Bayesian decision theory. This paper is intended to show that recent breakthroughs in evolutionary game theory could help to reconcile the maximin principle (...) with a certain naturally emerging and evolutionary stable pattern of human social behaviour.Keywords: Maximin principle, Nash bargaining game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, learning rules. (shrink)

Purpose. Our study aims at developing a conceptual model of transdisciplinary synthesis of philosophical-anthropological, sociopolitical and epistemological aspects of co-evolution of the scientific and technical designs of High Hume class and the socio-cultural / political context in the process of anthropo-socio-cultural genesis. The relevance of the topic is justified by the technologization of all spheres of human existence and the emergence of High Hume class technologies, which can be called technology-driven equally. As a result, the concepts of "bio-power" and (...) "biopolitics" have become ones of the most frequently mentioned in modern philosophical and anthropological discourse and attract increasing attention of philosophers, sociologists, and, in the last decadecades, experts in the field of practical political science and economics (Foucault, Agamben, Žižek, Kebnik, Nadesan, etc.). Theoretical basis. It is problem-theoretical research; We synthesize the results of our publications in recent years. We proceed from the fact that the main question of the informational phase of the development of a technogenic civilization lies in the rationalization and technologization of the evolutionary process, i.e. in the removal of the fundamental ontological antinomy “Evolution versus Reasonable Design”, as a result for modern neoliberal political democracy, biopower and its theoretical understanding (biopolitics) are effective tools and technologies to form of optimal trends of the global evolutionary process, in the framework of this ideological system. We have chosen the comparative conceptual analysis combining with the results of the content analysis of Web publications by the main method of the study. Originality of the research is in the fact that the central core of such a model is the use of a conceptual and terminological apparatus for describing the mechanisms of the progressive evolution of complex systems, known as the “triple spiral” by Ledeisdorf-Itskovich. This allowed us to integrate the bio-power phenomenon into the general scheme of a stable evolutionary strategy of a technogenic civilization. The conclusions. We justified the transformation of biopolitics into the main factor in the global evolution of self-organizing human-sized systems, including the biosphere as a whole. This is achieved through the creation of a specific (bio) ethical system of imperatives and the activities of individuals in relation to themselves and other agents of social actions. Bioethics with a trail of associated conceptual areas (biosociology, bioeconomics, biohistory, etc.) turned out to be the only rationalized regulator of the process of biological and sociocultural evolution. The triple spiral biotechnology – bioeconomy – bioenergy as the material substance of the life of technological civilization is reflected in the ideal world as a triad of bioethics – biosociology – biopolitics. Both triads form closed cycles of evolutionary transformations that transmit and amplify the initial momentum of transformations on each other through a cascade mechanism with positive feedback. (shrink)

Summary. The prerequisites of this study have three interwoven sources, the natural sciences and philosophical and socio-political ones. They are trends in the way of being of a modern, technogenic civilization. The COVID-19 pandemic caused significant damage to the image of the omnipotent techno-science that has developed in the mentality of this sociocultural type.Our goal was to study the co-evolutionary nature of this phenomenon as a natural consequence of the nature of the evolutionary strategy of our biological (...) species. Technological civilization as a cultural-civilizational type is one of the evolutionary options of Homo sapiens, the ontological basis of which is a stable evolutionary strategy (SESH). The latter is capable to spontaneous development and is consisting from biological, sociocultural, and techno-rationalistic modules. Evolutionary risks inextricably linked with it. At present, humankind has entered an era when its existence should be ensured by the meta-system engineering of its own cultural and ecological niche. By such artificially created elements, it implies the design and implementation of ecological systems of various levels of complexity, from the design of elements of such systems (which are biological individuals, populations and species) to the design of a global ecological system (biosphere). At the same time, there is a sharp jump in the value of anthropogenic and technological risk due to a sharp increase in the instability of the structure of ecological systems. We are witnessing a third wave of breaking and reconstruction of the existing relations between the elements of such systems after the Neolithic revolution and great geographical discoveries. Technological innovations led to sharp violations of normal social ecodynamics, leading to outbreaks of new infections, in particular. Theuncontested development of all sectors of controlled evolution technology is the way out of the last such crisis and the prevention of similar ones in the future. There are global nature of the organization of modern technological civilization and the transformation of the biosphere not so much into the noosphere (according to Vernadsky) but into the technosphere that determines the effect of a cascade reaction: any local co-adaptive conflict between elements of a cultural, socio-ecological niche tends to turnglobal and systemic problems. Humanity is constantly forced to make a choice between the stability and adaptability of the technosphere. (shrink)

the problem of estimation of High Hume (NBIC) technogenic evolutionary risks is analysed as part of concept of 3-components evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens.

Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in (...) humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of selfregarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods. D 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

In the article it is argued that contemporary evolutionary ethics – to the extent it accepts sociobiological strategies of naturalizing human morality – faces some serious conceptual and explanatory difficulties. Conceptual difficulty consists in recognizing that “morality” is not the same as “altruism”, but rather comprises several specific elements which distinguish it from both evolutionary and psychological altruism. Explanatory difficulty consists in recognizing that the phenomenon of morality appropriately conceptualized cannot be incorporated into standard sociobiological explanations without (...) endangering some basic assumptions of those explanations, primarily the assumption of “gene selectionism”, as well as the assumption of “evolutionarily stable strategies”. The basic argument is that one cannot retain both the appropriate concept of human morality and key assumptions of sociobiological explanations. (shrink)

MacDonald argues that a suite of genetic and cultural adaptations among Jews constitutes a “group evolutionary strategy.” Their supposed genetic adaptations include, most notably, high intelligence, conscientiousness, and ethnocentrism. According to this thesis, several major intellectual and political movements, such as Boasian anthropology, Freudian psychoanalysis, and multiculturalism, were consciously or unconsciously designed by Jews to promote collectivism and group continuity among themselves in Israel and the diaspora and undermine the cohesion of gentile populations, thus increasing the competitive advantage (...) of Jews and weakening organized gentile resistance. By developing and promoting these movements, Jews supposedly played a necessary role in the ascendancy of liberalism and multiculturalism in the West. While not achieving widespread acceptance among evolutionary scientists, this theory has been enormously influential in the burgeoning political movement known as the “alt-right.” Examination of MacDonald’s argument suggests that he relies on systematically misrepresented sources and cherry-picked facts. It is argued here that the evidence favors what is termed the “default hypothesis”: Because of their above-average intelligence and concentration in influential urban areas, Jews in recent history have been overrepresented in all major intellectual and political movements, including conservative movements, that were not overtly anti-Semitic. (shrink)

A compartmental model is described for the spread of Gambian sleeping sickness in a spatially heterogeneous environment in which vector and human populations migrate between two "patches": the village and the plantations. The number of equilibrium points depends on two "summary parameters": gr the proportion removed among human infectives, and R0, the basic reproduction number. The origin is stable for R0 1. Control strategies are assessed by studying the mix of vector control between the two patches that (...) bring R0 below 1. The results demonstrate the importance of vector control in the plantations. For example if 20 percent of flies are in the village and the blood meal rate in the village is 10 percent, then a 20 percent added vector mortality in the village must be combined with a 9 percent added mortality in the plantations in order to bring R0 below 1. The results are quite insentive to the blood meal rate in the village. Optimal strategies (that minimize the total number of flies trapped in both patches) are briefly discussed. (shrink)

This manuscript considers the transmission dynamics of lymphatic filariasis with some intervention strategies in place. Unlike previously developed models, our model takes into account both the exposed and infected classes in both the human and mosquito populations, respectively. We also consider vaccinated, treated and recovered humans in the presented model. The global dynamics of the proposed model are completely determined by the basic ( $${\mathcal {R}}_0$$ ) and effective reproduction numbers ( $${\mathcal {R}}_e$$ ). We then use Lyapunov function (...) theory to find the sufficient conditions for global stability of both the disease-free equilibrium and endemic equilibrium. The Lyapunov functions show that when the basic reproduction number is less than or equal to unity, the disease-free equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable, and when it is greater than unity then the endemic equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Finally, numerical simulations are carried out to investigate the effects of the intervention strategies and key parameters to the spread of lymphatic filariasis. The numerical simulations support the analytical results and illustrate possible model behavioral scenarios. (shrink)

(1999). A facilitative agenda setting for the evolutionary strategies of the XXI century. World Futures: Vol. 54, Challenges of Evolution at Pat I: The Human Factor in Evolution, pp. 337-353.

Philippe Huneman has recently questioned the widespread application of mechanistic models of scientific explanation based on the existence of structural explanations, i.e. explanations that account for the phenomenon to be explained in virtue of the mathematical properties of the system where the phenomenon obtains, rather than in terms of the mechanisms that causally produce the phenomenon. Structural explanations are very diverse, including cases like explanations in terms of bowtie structures, in terms of the topological properties of the system, or in (...) terms of equilibrium. The role of mathematics in bowtie structured systems and in topologically constrained systems has recently been examined in different papers. However, the specific role that mathematical properties play in equilibrium explanations requires further examination, as different authors defend different interpretations, some of them closer to the new-mechanistic approach than to the structural model advocated by Huneman. In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the explanatory role that mathematics play in Blaser and Kirschner’s nested equilibrium model of the stability of persistent long-term human-microbe associations. We argue that their model is explanatory because: i) it provides a mathematical structure in the form of a set of differential equations that together satisfy an ESS; ii) that the nested nature of the ESSs makes the explanation of host-microbe persistent associations robust to any perturbation; iii) that this is so because the properties of the ESS directly mirror the properties of the biological system in a non-causal way. The combination of these three theses make equilibrium explanations look more similar to structural explanations than to causal-mechanistic explanation. (shrink)

Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoner's dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. (...) The set of mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories :correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories. (shrink)

As a form of the informal economy, countries around the world have different policies towards street vendors. This paper constructs a law enforcement game model composed of the Chengguan, street vendors, and urban residents in China. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we achieved the evolutionary stable equilibrium points under complying with different constraint conditions by solving the replicator dynamic equations of parties in the dynamic system. Through the gradual stability analysis of the equilibrium point, the (...) class='Hi'>stable strategy of the evolutionary game can be calculated. It is found that the flexible law enforcement behavior of urban management departments plays an important leading role in urban street governance. Flexible law enforcement not only requires macro policy arrangements but also tests the executive wisdom of street bureaucrats. (shrink)

In this article, I present a substantive proposal about the timing and nature of the final stage of the evolution of full human language, the transition from so-called “protolanguage” to language, and on the origins of a simple protolanguage with structure and displaced reference; a proposal that depends on the idea that the initial expansion of communicative powers in our lineage involved a much expanded role for gesture and mime. But though it defends a substantive proposal, the article also (...) defends and illustrates a methodological proposal too. I argue that language is a special case of a more general phenomenon—cumulative cultural evolution—and while we rarely have direct information about communication, we have more direct information about the cumulative cultural evolution of technical skill, ecological strategies, and social complexity. These same factors also enable us to make a reasonable estimate of the intergenerational social learning capacities of these communities and of the communicative demands these communities face. For example, we can, at least tentatively, identify forms of cooperation that are stable only if third party information is transmitted widely, cheaply, and accurately. So we can use these more direct markers of information accumulation to locate, in broad terms, the period in our evolutionary history during which we became lingual. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory predicts that humans should avoid incest because of the negative effects incest has on individual reproduction: production of defective offspring. Selection for the avoidance of close-kin mating has apparently resulted in a psychological mechanism that promotes voluntary incest avoidance. Most human societies are thought to have rules regulating incest. If incest is avoided, why are social rules constructed to regulate it? This target article suggests that incest rules do not exist primarily to regulate close-kin mating but (...) to regulate inbreeding between more distant kin and sexual relations between affinal relatives. Three evolutionary hypotheses about cousin marriage and affinal kin mating follow from this suggestion: Rules regulating mating between affinal kin are means of paternity protection. Cousin marriage is regulated because, if it occurs, it can concentrate wealth and power within families to the detriment of the powerful positions of rulers in stratified societies and the relatively equal social statuses of most men in egalitarian societies. Tests using the comparative method on a worldwide sample of 129 societies supported the three hypotheses. Two alternative anthropological hypotheses failed to be supported. (shrink)

The stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens and patterns of risks arising in the course of this evolution were discussed in article. These patterns were predicted by Bogdanov’s option of General systems theory.

In her short story “Stable Strategies for Middle Management,” Eileen Gunn imagines a future in which Margaret, an office worker, seeks radical genetic enhancements intended to help her secure the middle-management job she wants. One source of the story’s tension and dark humor is dramatic irony: readers can see that the enhancements Margaret buys stand little chance of making her life go better for her; enhancing is, for Margaret, probably a prudential mistake. This paper argues that our positions in (...) the real world are sufficiently similar to Margaret’s position in Gunn’s fictional world that we should take this story seriously as grounding an argument from analogy for the conclusion that radical genetic enhancements are, for us, probably a prudential mistake. The paper then defends this method. When the question at hand is one of speculative ethics, there is no method better fit to the purpose than argument from analogy to speculative fiction. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Sexual Selection, Women's Preferences, and Mating Intelligence The Seduction Community: Human Excellence and Empowering Social Art in a Post‐Scarcity Era Is It Wrong to Try to Raise Your Mating Intelligence? Is Raising Your Mate Value a Good Thing? A Deflationist Solution to the Problem Conclusion: What About Women?

This is an interdisciplinary article providing an account of a phenomenon that is quite widespread but has been thus far mostly neglected by scholars: the overuse of digital technologies. Digital overuse can be defined as a usage of digital technologies that subjects perceive as dissatisfactory and non-meaningful a posteriori. DO has often been implicitly conceived as one of the main obstacle to so-called digital well-being. The article is structured in two parts. The first provides a definition of the phenomenon and (...) a brief review of the explanations provided by various disciplines, in particular psychology and the evolutionary and behavioural sciences. Specifically, the article distinguishes between the endogenous and exogenous factors underlying digital overuse, that is between causes that seem to be intrinsic to digital technologies, and design techniques intentionally aimed at nudging users towards this behaviour. The second part is devoted to a discussion of the ethical concerns surrounding the phenomenon of the overuse of digital technologies, and how it may be possible to reduce such overuse among users. (shrink)

Human resource management is the most essential thing in an organization. Because superior human resource management can increase competitiveness, for this reason, management needs to study more deeply the resources that can be relied on to compete in a competitive business environment and place leverage on resources that can place the company in a competitive position in the long term. Therefore, human resource management innovation strategies have many managerial implications for business policymakers. The research used a qualitative (...) approach with literature methods (library study), which are appropriate to the current problems. Namely the importance of human resource management strategies to realize superior competitiveness. The results of this research show that human resource management is the heart of corporate or organizational governance. Management strategies and innovations are needed to improve superior and competitive human resources. Steps or forms of innovation strategy for Human Resources (HR): Continuous training in stages and stages, Mastery of technology and digitalization, More active marketing, Forming a solid team, Establishing more comprehensive relationships, Transparency, Committed, Competent, Flexible, and Innovative integrated as a competitive quality. (shrink)

Secular arguments for equal and exclusively human worth generally tend to follow one of two strategies. One, which has recently gained renewed attention because of a novel argument by S. Matthew Liao, aims to directly ground worth in an intrinsic property that all humans have in common, whereas the other concedes that there is no morally relevant intrinsic difference between all humans and all other animals, and instead appeals to the membership of all humans in a special kind. In (...) this article, I argue that both strategies necessitate drawing a line that is both arbitrary and implausibly opens a moral gulf between individuals whose difference from one another in terms of empirical reality is entirely unremarkable, providing reasons to reject them that go beyond the standard objections in the literature. I conclude that, if all humans are to be included in the community of equals, we must lay to rest the idea that we can do so without also including a wide range of non-human animals. (shrink)

Recent evolutionary studies on cooperation devote specific attention to non-verbal expressions of emotions. In this paper, I examine Robert Frank’s popular attempt to explain emotions, non-verbal markers and social behaviours. Following this line of work, I focus on the green-beard explanation of social behaviours. In response to the criticisms raised against this controversial ultimate explanation, based on resources found in Frank’s work, I propose an alternative red-beard explanation of human sociality. The red-beard explanation explains the emergence and evolution (...) of emotions, a proximate cause, rather than patterns of behaviour. In contrast to simple evolutionary models that invoke a green-beard mechanism, I demonstrate that the red-beard explanation can be evolutionary stable. Social emotions are a common cause of a social behaviour and a phenotypic marker and therefore cooperative behaviour cannot be suppressed without also changing the marker. (shrink)

Many special problems crop up when evolutionary theory turns, quite naturally, to the question of the adaptive value and causal role of consciousness in human and nonhuman organisms. One problem is that -- unless we are to be dualists, treating it as an independent nonphysical force -- consciousness could not have had an independent adaptive function of its own, over and above whatever behavioral and physiological functions it "supervenes" on, because evolution is completely blind to the difference between (...) a conscious organism and a functionally equivalent (Turing Indistinguishable) nonconscious "Zombie" organism: In other words, the Blind Watchmaker, a functionalist if ever there was one, is no more a mind reader than we are. Hence Turing-Indistinguishability = Darwin-Indistinguishability. It by no means follows from this, however, that human behavior is therefore to be explained only by the push-pull dynamics of Zombie determinism, as dictated by calculations of "inclusive fitness" and "evolutionarily stable strategies." We are conscious, and, more important, that consciousness is piggy-backing somehow on the vast complex of unobservable internal activity -- call it "cognition" -- that is really responsible for generating all of our behavioral capacities. Hence, except in the palpable presence of the irrational (e.g., our sexual urges) where distal Darwinian factors still have some proximal sway, it is as sensible to seek a Darwinian rather than a cognitive explanation for most of our current behavior as it is to seek a cosmological rather than an engineering explanation of an automobile's behavior. Let evolutionary theory explain what shaped our cognitive capacity (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 1996, but let cognitive theory explain our resulting behavior. (shrink)

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at (...) curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation. (shrink)

Interactions between humans and bots are increasingly common online, prompting some legislators to pass laws that require bots to disclose their identity. The Turing test is a classic thought experiment testing humans’ ability to distinguish a bot impostor from a real human from exchanging text messages. In the current study, we propose a minimal Turing test that avoids natural language, thus allowing us to study the foundations of human communication. In particular, we investigate the relative roles of conventions (...) and reciprocal interaction in determining successful communication. Participants in our task could communicate only by moving an abstract shape in a 2D space. We asked participants to categorize their online social interaction as being with a human partner or a bot impostor. The main hypotheses were that access to the interaction history of a pair would make a bot impostor more deceptive and interrupt the formation of novel conventions between the human participants. Copying their previous interactions prevents humans from successfully communicating through repeating what already worked before. By comparing bots that imitate behavior from the same or a different dyad, we find that impostors are harder to detect when they copy the participants’ own partners, leading to less conventional interactions. We also show that reciprocity is beneficial for communicative success when the bot impostor prevents conventionality. We conclude that machine impostors can avoid detection and interrupt the formation of stable conventions by imitating past interactions, and that both reciprocity and conventionality are adaptive strategies under the right circumstances. Our results provide new insights into the emergence of communication and suggest that online bots mining personal information, for example, on social media, might become indistinguishable from humans more easily. (shrink)

This commentary suggests that an equilibrium framework may be retained, in an evolutionary model such as Gintis's and with more satisfactory results, if rationality is relaxed in a slightly different way than he proposes: that is, if decisions are assumed to be related to rewards probabilistically, rather than with certainty. This relaxed concept of rationality gives rise to probabilistic equilibria. (Published Online April 27 2007).

Contemporary mate preferences can provide important clues to human reproductive history. Little is known about which characteristics people value in potential mates. Five predictions were made about sex differences in human mate preferences based on evolutionary conceptions of parental investment, sexual selection, human reproductive capacity, and sexual asymmetries regarding certainty of paternity versus maternity. The predictions centered on how each sex valued earning capacity, ambition— industriousness, youth, physical attractiveness, and chastity. Predictions were tested in data from (...) 37 samples drawn from 33 countries located on six continents and five islands. For 27 countries, demographic data on actual age at marriage provided a validity check on questionnaire data. Females were found to value cues toresource acquisitionin potential mates more highly than males. Characteristics signalingreproductive capacitywere valued more by males than by females. These sex differences may reflect different evolutionary selection pressures on human males and females; they provide powerful cross-cultural evidence of current sex differences in reproductive strategies. Discussion focuses on proximate mechanisms underlying mate preferences, consequences for human intrasexual competition, and the limitations of this study. (shrink)

This paper proposes a constrained solution update strategy for multiobjective evolutionary algorithm based on decomposition, in which each agent aims to optimize one decomposed subproblem. Different from the existing approaches that assign one solution to each agent, our approach allocates the closest solutions to each agent and thus the number of solutions in an agent may be zero and no less than one. Regarding the agent with no solution, it will be assigned one solution in priority, once offspring (...) are generated closest to its subproblem. To keep the same population size, the agent with the largest number of solutions will remove one solution showing the worst convergence. This improves diversity for one agent, while the convergence of other agents is not lowered. On the agent with no less than one solution, offspring assigned to this agent are only allowed to update its original solutions. Thus, the convergence of this agent is enhanced, while the diversity of other agents will not be affected. After a period of evolution, our approach may gradually reach a stable status for solution assignment; i.e., each agent is only assigned with one solution. When compared to six competitive multiobjective evolutionary algorithms with different population selection or update strategies, the experiments validated the advantages of our approach on tackling two sets of test problems. (shrink)

Contemporary mate preferences can provide important clues to human reproductive history. Little is known about which characteristics people value in potential mates. Five predictions were made about sex differences in human mate preferences based on evolutionary conceptions of parental investment, sexual selection, human reproductive capacity, and sexual asymmetries regarding certainty of paternity versus maternity. The predictions centered on how each sex valued earning capacity, ambition— industriousness, youth, physical attractiveness, and chastity. Predictions were tested in data from (...) 37 samples drawn from 33 countries located on six continents and five islands. For 27 countries, demographic data on actual age at marriage provided a validity check on questionnaire data. Females were found to value cues toresource acquisitionin potential mates more highly than males. Characteristics signalingreproductive capacitywere valued more by males than by females. These sex differences may reflect different evolutionary selection pressures on human males and females; they provide powerful cross-cultural evidence of current sex differences in reproductive strategies. Discussion focuses on proximate mechanisms underlying mate preferences, consequences for human intrasexual competition, and the limitations of this study. (shrink)

Exploitation is a fundamental element of the parental strategies of many species of birds. Cuckoos, for example, lay their eggs in the nest of other birds, who often unwittingly rear the alien nestlings as their own. Nest parasitism is an efficient reproductive strategy for cuckoos, who do not have to worry about building a nest, incubating their eggs, or feeding their nestlings. But not all hosts respond passively to such intrusions. In response to parasitic cowbirds, for example, robins have (...) evolved the ability to detect and selectively eject alien young from their nests. Human parenting strategies differ sharply from the strategies of cuckoos and robins. Unlike cuckoos, we are reluctant to allow our children to be raised by others. Unlike robins, we knowingly rear strange young. What makes human behavior toward children so different from that of cuckoos and robins? Humans seem to share a number of predispositions that facilitate successful adoptive relationships, and the desire to raise children seems to be pervasive among modern humans. Despite these commonalities, patterns of adoption transactions vary greatly among contemporary human societies. This paper considers the origins and causes of cross-cultural variation in human adoptive behavior from an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

The Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI; Simpson & Gangestad 1991) is a self-report measure of individual differences in human mating strategies. Low SOI scores signify that a person is sociosexually restricted, or follows a more monogamous mating strategy. High SOI scores indicate that an individual is unrestricted, or has a more promiscuous mating strategy. As part of the International Sexuality Description Project (ISDP), the SOI was translated from English into 25 additional languages and administered to a total sample (...) of 14,059 people across 48 nations. Responses to the SOI were used to address four main issues. First, the psychometric properties of the SOI were examined in cross-cultural perspective. The SOI possessed adequate reliability and validity both within and across a diverse range of modern cultures. Second, theories concerning the systematic distribution of sociosexuality across cultures were evaluated. Both operational sex ratios and reproductively demanding environments related in evolutionary-predicted ways to national levels of sociosexuality. Third, sex differences in sociosexuality were generally large and demonstrated cross-cultural universality across the 48 nations of the ISDP, confirming several evolutionary theories of human mating. Fourth, sex differences in sociosexuality were significantly larger when reproductive environments were demanding but were reduced to more moderate levels in cultures with more political and economic gender equality. Implications for evolutionary and social role theories of human sexuality are discussed. Key Words: culture; gender; mating; reproduction; sex differences; sex roles; sexual strategies; sociosexuality. (shrink)

Rationality and evolution are apparently quite different, applying, respectively, to the acts of complex, well-informed individuals and to populations of what may be mindlessly simple entities. So it is remarkable that evolutionary game theory shows the theory of rational agents and that of populations of replicating strategies to be isomorphic. Danielson illustrates its main concepts—evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics—with simple models that apply to biological and social interactions; and he distinguishes biological, economic, and generalist ways of interpreting (...) the theory. Against the background of isomorphism, he considers three ways in which evolution and rationality differ and how two-level models may combine them. He concludes with a survey of the normative significance of the unification of rationality and evolutionary game theory and some speculation about the evolution of human rationality. (shrink)