This paper examines how a person’s life may be shaped by living with a sense of the mystery of reality. What virtues, if any, are encouraged by such a sense? The first section rehearses a radical ”doctrine of mystery’, according to which reality as it anyway is, independently of human perspectives, is ineffable. It is then argued that a sense of mystery may provide ”measure’ for human lives. For it is possible for a life to be ”consonant’ with this sense (...) -- through exercising humility, for example -- and even to emulate mystery. A further section corrects a misunderstanding about the connection between a sense of mystery and the virtues it invites, while a final section considers the relationship between living with mystery and religious faith. (shrink)

The fact that the mystical experience is a repetitive phenomenon in different social, cultural and religious structures in different periods and has a mysterious element in it has caused that mysticism has taken its place among the basic subjects of the field since the first periods of psychology of religion. One of the sections of The Varieties of Religious Experience, which is regarded as the main source of the area, is mysticism. In general, "mystical experience" is considered as a subcategory (...) of "religious experience", which is a wider area. For this reason, it also carries the characteristics of religious experience. Due to these common features, it can be seen that they are used in place of each other in the literature. If the religious experience is defined as the experience of the individual at the time of encounter with the sacred, such experience can be obtained in two ways. In the “religion-based mystical experience”, which is the first way, institutional or established religious thoughts and understandings and holly writings are influential. The second way, “non-religious or natural mystical experience”, can be said to be spiritual quests that individual needs play an important role in them are effective. Personality is used as one of the basic variables in social and health sciences in general, and in psychology because it is among the main subjects in particular. The common emphasis of research on personality is that the phenomenon is extremely complicated. Despite its widespread use, the abstraction of the concept has been influenced by the diversity of the researchers' perspectives and this has led to a lack of clear consensus on the definition. However, in order to investigate the phenomenon in recent periods, dimensional approaches that their basic assumption is personality can be categorized under certain factors have begun to be preferred. In this study, HEXACO was used, because it was thought that it could make a more detailed measurement of personality. The sample of this study is composed of 345 students studying at Erciyes University Theology Faculty in 2017-2018 academic year. When looked at the gender distribution of the sample, the rate of male students was 21.2% (n=73); and the rate of female students was 78.8% (n=272). This reflects the current situation in the faculty. The average age was 21,13 (sd=1,761). The age range is 18-26. Class distribution was 23,5% (n = 81) in Preparatory class; 15.4% (n = 53) in first-grade; 19.4% (n = 67) in second-grade; 18.3% (n=63) in third grade (n = 63); and 23.5% (n = 81) in the fourth grade. It has been noted that distributions are homogeneous in terms of class variables. The "Mystical Experience Scale" which is developed by Ralph W. Hood to measure the criteria which are offered by Walter T. Stace and which must be in the mystical experience has been used in determining the tendency of mystical experience. Hood et al. have reported reasonable reliabilities for subscales based on 3-factor solution. Alpha coefficients of the original scale were ,76, ,69, and ,76 for the extrovertive mysticism, introvertive mysticism and religious interpretation respectively. The adaptation of the scale to Turkish culture and the validity and reliability study were carried out by Mehmet Süheyl Unal as a graduate thesis and it was stated that the Alpha coefficient was ,89. In this study, the Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of scale is ,91. HEXACO, developed by Lee and Ashton, was used to determine personality traits. The scale was adapted to Turkish by Wasti, Lee, Ashton and Somer. The scale consists of Honesty-humility (H), Emotionality (E), eXtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to experience (O) factors. Pearson Moments Multiplication Correlation Analysis was performed to determine if there is a relationship between mystical experience tendencies and personality traits when the data were analyzed in accordance with the aim of the study. Later, it was tried to determine the power of explaining the variables with Multiple Linear Regression Analysis. In addition, One-way ANOVA was used to determine whether there was any relationship between significance levels. Moreover, descriptive statistics of relevant variables are included in the study. Findings show that participants have the highest average to Positive Affect (m=3,69; sd.=,77) and the lowest average to Temporal/Spatial Quality (m=2,94; sd.=,89) factor in terms of mystical experience. Additively, they obtained close values in Ego Quality, Noetic Quality and Ineffability factors. When the students were evaluated in terms of gender, it was seen that there was a difference in level of significance only in terms of Unifying Quality (t=1,770; p=,028). ANOVA analysis was carried out to determine whether there was any variation in class variable. As a result of this analysis, it is seen that all of the factors are significantly differentiated in terms of class variable. From the standing point of class variable, it is seen that the first grades differed negatively compared to the other classes. According to the data, the scores on the mystical experience scale for preparation and first grade are high while the averages for the next grade are falling. There is no difference on level of significance between age and mystical experience factors, the last independent variable. When looked at the correlations among mystical experience factors, it is understood that all of the factors are in a meaningful relationship with each other. The highest correlation is between Religious Quality and Ineffability (r=,661); the lowest correlation is between the Unifying Quality and the Temporal/Spatial Quality (r=,346). Among the six factors of HEXACO that have been developed to determine the personality traits, the students have the highest average on Humility-Honesty (m=3,76; sd.=,55); the lowest average on eXtraversion (m=3,04; sd.=0,65). In terms of gender, there is a statistically significant difference in factors of Humility-Honesty (t=,606; p=,004), Emotionality (t=,334; p=,000), and Constientiousness (t=,022; p=,033). There is no significant difference between class and age variables and personality traits. According to Linear Regression analysis, Agreeableness, Constientiousness and Openness to Experience factors of personality traits are predictive of mystical experience in a significant level statistically. Personality dimensions that are most related to mystical experience as a result of analysis are Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience. When the mystical experience is compared with the personality traits, it is concluded that Openness to Experience factor is related to all the factors of the mystical experience except for the Ineffability. Although the relationship is regarded as weak in terms of correlation, it is an important finding that there are positive relations in between. In other words, as personality traits evolve, the mystical experience level also increases. The lack of a similar work in the literature in this respect removes the possibility of making comparisons. (shrink)

For Kant and for feminists, self-respect is a morally central and morally powerful concern. In this paper I focus on some questions about the relation of self-respect to two other stances toward the self, humility and arrogance. Just as arrogance is usually treated as a serious vice, so humility is widely regarded as an important virtue. Indeed, it is supposed to be the virtue that opposes arrogance, keeping it in check or preventing it from developing in the first place. I’ve (...) argued elsewhere that, on Kant’s account, arrogance is a vice of disrespect for other people and for oneself. Humility is not, however, unproblematic from a Kantian perspective, and he is more concerned to identify bad forms of it than to praise it as a virtue or recommend it as a cure for arrogance. Feminist ethics draws our attention to the ways in which character traits, attitudes, beliefs, and stances take on differential moral valences in contexts of oppression, and what might be a virtue for members of dominant groups can be vices for members of subordinate groups. How, then, are we to understand and assess humility? The upshot of Kantian and feminist analyses is two-fold: First, humility is not the virtue opposing arrogance; rather, self-respect is. Second, humility is at best an ancillary, instrumental, contextual virtue and the servant of self-respect; but at worst, it is as serious a vice as arrogance, indeed, an aspect of it. (shrink)

This paper addresses the importance of words and of surrendering words, and so will consider both the philosophical and axiological potential of ineffability, both of which imply epistemic humility. On the one hand, epistemic humility implicates surrendering ill-fitting and limited constructs; this reflects a project of unknowing, a condition for a more authentic knowing, driven less by rigid categories and argument and more by humility and love. On the other hand, epistemic humility—as an observable phenomenon in the world’s religious traditions—has (...) axiological value and thus should be cultivated: it subverts an arrogant knowing which too often is the seed of destructive conflict. (shrink)

This article advocates for the inclusion of theistic beliefs in the study of humility and intellectual humility and recommends the construct of worldview as a promising resource for this endeavor. The promise of this approach is tested by exploring the contrasting worldviews of three religious traditions: Buddhism, Christianity, and atheism. In so doing, the ontological and anthropological turn of these worldviews will be contrasted with implications for research on humility drawn.

Intellectual humility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectual humility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multidisciplinary investigation.

The prevailing conception of language is often called "the received view." Though ubiquitous, Louis S. Berger demonstrates its flaws and the difficulties it raises for other disciplines, such as philosophy and physics. In Language and the Ineffable, Berger develops an unconventional model of human development: ontogenesis. A radical and generative feature of the model is the premise that the neonate's world is holistic, boundary-less, unimaginable, and impossible to describe; in other words, ineffable. This study unsettles the foundations of sacrosanct beliefs (...) about language and a host of other disciplines in the process. (shrink)

1. Philosophical background: iteration, ineffability, reflection. There are at least two heuristic motivations for the axioms of standard set theory, by which we mean, as usual, first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC): the iterative conception and limitation of size (see Boolos, 1989). Each strand provides a rather hospitable environment for the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe is ineffable, which is our target in this paper, although the motivation is different in each case.

Philosophers have been troubled by the apparent tension between humility and knowledge of one's excellence. However, humility is compatible with knowledge of one's merit because of the moral perspective in which humility is embedded. The perspective has four dimensions: radical dependence, moral comparison with other people, moral ideals, and objective valuation of things in the world. Recourse to this moral perspective also enables clarification of the relationship between humility and other virtues; what is wrong with arrogance; the (...) role of belief of God in humility; and the difference between being humbled and being humiliated. (shrink)

Existing research on leader humility primarily demonstrates its positive effects. This study challenges this view by proposing the potential negative effects of leader humility on followers’ behaviors. Furthermore, this paper employs the person-situation interactionist perspective to extend the research on integrating followers’ personality traits and leader humility. Specifically, this study proposed that leader humility triggers their followers’ sense of power; moreover, this study wagers that whether followers’ sense of power encourages self-interested or prosocial behavior in followers depends on their (...) particular Machiavellian traits. The theoretical model was tested using the time-lagged supervisor–subordinate matched data obtained. Our findings revealed that follower Machiavellianism fosters the relationship between a sense of power and self-interested behavior but it weakens the relationship between a sense of power and prosocial behavior. Thus, this study provides a better understanding regarding the effect of follower personality and leader humility on follower behavioral reactions. (shrink)

This paper takes a closer look at the phenomenon of the ineffability of God from a purely logical perspective. In doing so, it pursues two main objectives. First, as to this day many philosophers speak – without hesitation – of the ‘paradox’ of ineffability closely associated with Liar-like sentences, it clarifies the situation by showing that ineffability is by no means paradoxical in the strict logical sense. Secondly, it uses a new information-theoretic approach in order to clearly distinguish between (...) what is called ‘substantial’ and ‘non-substantial’ predicates, a distinction which finally allows for a rendering of the dogma of ineffability which does not entail contradiction. (shrink)

Humility is regarded as beneficial for individuals, relationships, and society. It is believed to increase well-being and tolerance of difference and enhance interpersonal relationships. Educating for humility could be regarded as an important element and goal of education as it helps students realise their limitations and consider different (even opposite) perspectives. However, as with other virtues, humility may be conceptualised and expressed differently across diverse cultural communities. Similarly, how to educate for humility may look different in schools around the world. (...) This special issue includes varied explorations of the philosophical and theoretical roots underpinning different conceptions of humility and their implications for education. Taken together, the papers in this issue provide a foundation for understanding the importance of humility across cultural and historical traditions of past and present, particularly those of western and Chinese societies. As such, this special issue can be informative to colleagues in virtue ethics, comparative philosophy, and moral education, as well as others who are interested in understanding contexts and meanings of humility around the world, in society and education today. (shrink)

This paper takes a closer look at the phenomenon of the ineffability of God from a purely logical perspective. In doing so, it pursues two main objectives. First, as to this day many philosophers speak – without hesitation – of the ‘paradox’ of ineffability closely associated with Liar-like sentences, it clarifies the situation by showing that ineffability is by no means paradoxical in the strict logical sense. Secondly, it uses a new information-theoretic approach in order to clearly distinguish between (...) what is called ‘substantial’ and ‘non-substantial’ predicates, a distinction which finally allows for a rendering of the dogma of ineffability which does not entail contradiction. (shrink)

This exploration of the virtue of accurate self-appraisal in great people as seen by some philosophers argues that a justified belief in one's fundamental superiority need not entail arrogant or egotistical behaviour towards others, but can harmonize with marked tendencies to respectfulness, generosity and understanding, although not with moral permissiveness. Even if accurate self-appraisal means thinking oneself basically better, this virtue can be consistent with social dispositions that contemporary egalitarians admire. ;The proposal to interpret humility as accurate knowledge of one's (...) merits comes from current writers who reject any merit in humility's more traditional associations of self-effacement. The new humility, they claim, can apply to those preeminent in any field, who keep their exceptional merits in perspective in spite of recognizing them. This self-restraint is attributed to an underlying assumption that all persons have equal worth or rights. The thesis disputes the adequacy of this account by noting that moral virtues themselves can be regarded as merits of unrivalled importance and that, with regard to their distribution, people are basically unequal. Consequently, humility in highly moral people might be better seen as a kind of accurate self-estimate that balances an assumption of human equality with an equally crucial awareness that one's moral character and concomitant judgments are basically superior. The assumption of equality is claimed to be fully compatible with the belief in personal superiority and not the sine qua non of moral decency in social relations. ;Aristotle's megalopsuchos, or "great soul," and Spinoza's good person, while not egalitarians, know themselves morally preeminent, yet both possess many still admirable beliefs and traits. The same applies to one interpretation of Nietzsche's noble soul. These thinkers suggest the compatibility of self-preference with respectfulness towards all--sometimes especially towards the weakest--people. Kant's egalitarian view downplays any notion of personal superiority, but not convincingly. Aquinas suggests a tension between humility and moral competence in worldly dealings, but only because he tries to uphold the Aristotelian great soul while not jettisoning the recurrent Christian motif of self-denigration. (shrink)

This essay provides an overview of the ways in which contemporary philosophers have tried to make sense of ineffability as encountered in aesthetic contexts. Section 1 sets up the problem of aesthetic ineffability by putting it into historical perspective. Section 2 specifies the kinds of questions that may be raised with regard to aesthetic ineffability, as well as the kinds of answer each one of those questions would require. Section 3 investigates arguments that seek to locate aesthetic ineffability within (...) the object of aesthetic experiences, i.e. within aesthetic content. Section 4 discusses arguments that seek to locate aesthetic ineffability within the subject of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

Grounded in the canonical gospels and other New Testament passages, especially Philippians 2:1-11, this study offers an account of humility from a Christian perspective.

The virtue of humility is often considered to be at odds with common business practice. In recent years, however, scholars within business ethics and leadership have shown an increasing interest in humility. Despite such attention, the argument for the relevance of humility in business could be expanded. Unlike extant research that focuses on humility as a character-building virtue or instrumentally useful leadership trait, this article argues that humility reflects the interdependent nature of business. Through such an approach, the article gives (...) an extrinsic motivation of the relevance of humility in business, and, from a theoretical point of view, links the intra-personal and intra-organizational perspective on humility to an inter-organizational one. The article contextualizes the virtue of humility by relating it to the economic, cognitive, and moral aspects of business practice and managerial work. It claims that the assumption of self-sufficiency in business is a grave misrepresentation of what business is—a practice characterized by interdependency. Potential links between virtue ethics, leadership, and contextually oriented theories of business, such as stakeholder theory, network theories, and resource dependence theory, are also identified. (shrink)

Humility is widely regarded as a moral excellence and telos, hence, openly inculcated-instructed. Character education in and for humility, however, sits uncomfortably against today’s pedagogical maxims such as self-esteem and self-assertiveness. This article looks into this and other tensions from the perspective of humility as experience (phenomenon) instead of humility as goal. Surveying humility qua experience can help us to understand how the mind directs toward objects of cognition with their content, meaning and axiology. Husserl’s phenomenology and its theory (...) of intuition suggests that humility is a personal belief (doxa) that moral agents construct out of their lived-experiences. Through iterations of similar lived-experiences, humility can become a habitus and, arguably, episteme. This process is detailed by intersecting experience of humility with intentionality, phenomenological reduction, and intersubjectivity. It is argued that, in contemporary education, ‘experience’ is widely accepted as learning content and teaching method. Humility as experience has significant implications for the main schools in curriculum studies, namely traditionalists, conceptualists and phenomenologists. This article claims that inculcating humility poses ethical challenges, and the role of education should instead be to explain and present to learners the phenomenological reality of humility. (shrink)

I propose and argue for an account of humility in Zhuangzi, which I call perspectival humility. In the opening of the article, I will present a view of humility found in pre-Qin Confucian texts; then, I will explain the idea of Zhuangist humility, which provides a contrast to Confucian humility. Zhuang Zhou does not think that any ideas of right and wrong can be absolutely correct. People must see that their beliefs may not be absolutely correct, and should always consider (...) alternative perspectives. Those who recognise the limitations of their perspective are led to perspectival humility. Moreover, perspectival humility encourages people to learn extensively and to harmonise the differences between other perspectives. The Zhuangist approach takes various perspectives into account and is an inclusive notion of humility that prompts people to appreciate different ways of life, engages in harmonious social relationships, and preserves cultural diversity. (shrink)

This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This is surprising because (...) intellectual humility is often regarded as an antidote to cognitive biases, whereas I claim that a particular cognitive bias (namely, the curse of knowledge) may help foster an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

In their contribution to the rapidly developing field of research on psychedelic medicine, Glenn Cohen and Mason Marks shed light on a frequently overlooked but critical aspect of ethical considera...

Is it possible to forgive oneself? If so, should the person who has done so, for a serious wrongdoing, be fully at peace with herself? Some philosophers, perhaps most famously Hannah Arendt, have denied the coherence of the very idea of self-forgiveness.1 Others, such as Charles Griswold, have recognized it as both coherent and important: a distinct phenomenon from accepting the forgiveness of others, and vital in circumstances where seeking such forgiveness is morally problematic. Yet Griswold still holds self-forgiveness to (...) fall short of what he calls "paradigmatic" forgiveness.2 One of the key ideas behind this article is that part of the problem with understanding self-forgiveness is a mistaken tendency to... (shrink)

Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken (...) for granted by many of theorists about the mind. Within both philosophy and the science of consciousness it is widely held that introspection is generally reliable, at least with respect to the question of one’s current (or immediately prior) conscious states. Without this assumption, we could not make sense of theorists’ widespread use of introspection, both in support of their own position and to undermine that of their opponents. (shrink)

Many of us in the modern world find ourselves implicated in massive, structural harms and injustices. We emit greenhouse gases, which—along with everyone else's emissions—are warming the planet. We buy products that result from bad labor practices. And many of us feel (appropriately, I think) some amount of guilt for our participation, but also find it difficult or impossible to fully extract ourselves from the problematic systems. I call this challenge of determining individual moral responsibility in the face of massive, (...) structural problems “catastrophe ethics.” In this Perspective commentary, I suggest that the ubiquity of catastrophe ethics cases in the modern world justifies adopting a position of moral humility, as we recognize that none of us is morally pure but, rather, we are each choosing our own version of impurity. (shrink)

Some of the most interesting works in virtue ethics are the detailed, perceptive treatments of specific virtues and vices. This chapter aims to develop such work as it relates to intellectual virtues and vices. It begins by examining the virtue of intellectual humility. Its strategy is to situate humility in relation to its various opposing vices, which include vices like arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, haughtiness, and self-complacency. From this list vanity and arrogance are focused on in particular. (...) Humble persons are not distinguished from arrogant persons by being unaware of or unconcerned with entitlements; rather, they lack the arrogance that entails a specific kind of motivation called ‘ego-exalting potency’. Humble people are motivated by pure interests regarding entitlements given their ability to serve as means to some valuable purpose or project. The chapter ends by considering a wide variety of ways intellectual humility can promote the acquisition of epistemic goods. (shrink)

Humility, properly understood as a sense of one's limits, is one of the goods internal to the practice of health care. Humility in Christian tradition has both a relational aspect and an epistemological aspect. Each of these is evident in the practice of medicine. In its relational aspect, humility includes reverance or awe for the grace and strength of patients and their care-givers, a sense that the care-provider is not self-sufficient but needs the care-receiver, and recognition of the worth of (...) those who are oppressed and outcast. In its epistemological aspect, humility is exhibited in respect for the meaning system of the patient and recognition of the limits of medical paradigms and their need for correction from the patient's perspective. The power wielded by the profession of medicine in contemporary society does not preclude the exercise of humility within the profession. Keywords: epistemology, humility, internal goods, practice of medicine, virtue CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Much of the literature from political psychology has focused on the negative traits that are positively associated with affective polarization—e.g., animus, arrogance, distrust, hostility, and outrage. Not as much attention has been focused on the positive traits that might be negatively associated with polarization. For instance, given that people who are intellectually humble display greater openness and less hostility towards conflicting viewpoints (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Hopkin et al., 2014; Porter & Schumann, 2018), one might reasonably expect them to be (...) less polarized. -/- We ran two studies designed to explore the relationship between various forms of humility and polarization. Our chief finding is that people who value humility are prone to what we are calling epistemic polarization—that is, judging the epistemic traits of contrapartisans negatively—which in turn plays a role in polarization more generally. Not only are contrapartisans deemed to have the wrong moral and political beliefs, they are also viewed as less humble and more arrogant, close-minded, and irrational. This makes matters even worse when it comes to the growing partisan divide. In light of our findings, we believe that the novel concept of epistemic polarization that we introduce is a promising target for further investigation. (shrink)

This collection of essays is an exercise in comparative philosophy of religion that explores the different ways in which humans express the inexpressible. It brings together scholars of over a dozen religious, literary, and artistic traditions, as part of The Comparison Project's 2013-15 lecture and dialogue series on "religion beyond words." Specialist scholars first detailed the grammars of ineffability in nine different religious traditions as well as the adjacent fields of literature, poetry, music, and art. The Comparison Project's directors then (...) compared this diverse set of phenomena, offering explanations for their patterning, and raising philosophical questions of truth and value about religious ineffability in comparative perspective. This book is the inaugural publication of The Comparison Project, an innovative new approach to the philosophy of religion housed at Drake University (Des Moines, Iowa, USA). The Comparison Project organizes a biennial series of scholar lectures, practitioner dialogues, and comparative panels about core, cross-cultural topics in the philosophy of religion. Specialist scholars of religion first explore this topic in their religions of expertise; comparativist philosophers of religion then raise questions of meaning, truth, and value about this topic in comparative perspective. The Comparison Project stands apart from traditional approaches to the philosophy of religion in its commitment to religious inclusivity. It is the future of the philosophy of religion in a diverse, global world. (shrink)

In this article we confront the ineffability of music to seek out a tenable conception of profound depths being plumbed in many such works. We take our initial bearings from the writings of the late Peter Kivy, who was a musically trained thinker and tackled the subject no less than four times. Our main interest lies in his outright dismissal of the idea. However, the scaffolding of his arguments reveals that he privileges the discursive metier without any evidence in his (...) support. Hence the bulk of the article is devoted to an analysis of the criteria relevant to this form of experience and to the construction of a more tenable perspective. It will be shown that the issue of profundity in music cannot be segregated from the implications of our reactions and responses to literature and, by extension, to the arts as a whole. (shrink)

This article explores how Jean François Lyotard reflects on affect as unrepresentable in relation to contemporary affect theory and specifically post-Deleuzian perspectives and non-representational theories suggesting that we need to invent new theoretical ways of addressing our more-than-textual, multisensual worlds. The essay leans on this conversation to make a political and pedagogical intervention into the terrain of addressing affect in the classroom. It is discussed how Lyotard adds his own contribution to the work of other affect theorists, who are not (...) saying that if we find the right vehicle—literature, art, etc.—we can translate or represent affect, but rather that pedagogy is itself always already an affective event that exceeds representation. Pedagogies of ineffability, as it argued, are those pedagogical practices that do not fall pray into the rhetorics of standardization and homogenization in the name of ‘emotional intelligence’ or ‘effectiveness’, but rather invent affective spaces of learning in which educators and students are opened precariously to the unknown. (shrink)

This cross-sectional mixed method community action study exploring the virtue of humility was conducted as part of a collaborative practical theology project at a pluralistic, ecumenical Mainline Protestant seminary. Students in a spiritual formation graduate class completed quantitative measures of humility, spiritual well-being, differentiation of self, mentalization, and mindfulness, while open-ended qualitative data captured their perspectives about the role of humility in formation. Qualitative results revealed important nuances about emerging religious leaders’ views on humility, including experiencing this virtue as facilitative (...) to their vocational growth, challenging, or some combination of both. Quantitative results documented positive associations between relational capacities and humility, and these links were mediated by mindful awareness. Implications for measuring and promoting holistic spiritual development among emerging religious leaders are discussed. (shrink)

When trying to find the place of humility amongst the virtues, there is a temptation to assimilate humility into a kind of noblesse oblige as if it were a way of being strong and capable with grace. If one attends to the experience of persons one might describe as humbled by their life experiences, then a very different perspective is afforded. In particular, if one examines the way in which certain disabled persons turn experiences of dependency or limitation in (...) productive directions, one is clued into the way in which humility involves not only a realistic appraisal of one’s capabilities or an aversion to ostentatious display, but also a set of values that reflects the value of relationship and interpersonal presence. (shrink)

Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale to assess this conception of IH with related personality constructs. In Studies (...) 1 (n= 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor model – owning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology. (shrink)

There is currently a tremendous surge in interest in the virtue of humility among contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Yet despite its recent popularity, identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for humility has proven quite difficult. Here, drawing on insights from several ‘inattentive’ accounts of humility, I offer a new account that locates the virtue in a transcendent orientation to the self and others such that one sees the self and others in proper perspective. I call this account the transcendent account (...) of humility. (shrink)

Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience (...) corresponds to the amount of information in a conscious state and ineffability corresponds to the amount of information lost at different stages of processing. We describe how attractor dynamics in working memory would induce impoverished recollections of our original experiences, how the discrete symbolic nature of language is insufficient for describing the rich and high-dimensional structure of experiences, and how similarity in the cognitive function of two individuals relates to improved communicability of their experiences to each other. While our model may not settle all questions relating to the explanatory gap, it makes progress toward a fully physicalist explanation of the richness and ineffability of conscious experience—two important aspects that seem to be part of what makes qualitative character so puzzling. (shrink)

With the advent of classical logic we are continuing to observe an adherence to the laws of logic. Moreover, the system of classical logic exhibits a prominent role within analytic philosophy. Given that the laws of logic have persistently endured in actively defining classical logic and its preceding system of logic, it begs the question as to whether it actually proves to be consistent with Islam. To consider this inquiry in a broader manner; it would be an investigation into the (...) consistency between Islam and the logic which has been the predominant driving force of analytic philosophy. Despite the well documented engagement and novel contributions made in the field of logic by Arab and Islamic theologians/logicians, I think this question deserves examination not just in terms of classical logic but also from perspectives which go beyond classical logic, namely, non-classical logic. Doing so, would I believe, retain this inquiry within the purview of analytic philosophy despite the reference to non-classical logic. To be more specific, this question would be directed toward the Islamic theologian who espouses the system of classical logic in attempting to make sense of an absolute ineffable God of Islam. The inquiry would seek to determine if classical logic is consistent (amenable) in making sense of an absolute ineffable God of Islam. This would principally involve an analysis which determines whether the metaphysical assumptions of the laws of logic (more specifically the law of non-contradiction) are consistent in making sense of an absolute ineffable God of Islam. I shall argue that it is inconsistent. I shall establish my position on this matter by demonstrating why classical logic is inconsistent (not amenable) with an absolute ineffable God of Islam. Although, I am principally concerned with classical logic, my argument is as applicable to all earlier systems of logic as much as it is to classical logic. This is on the basis that both systems of logic, namely, all preceding systems and classical logic, consider the laws of logic as defining features. (shrink)

This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine (...) Names . Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore the nature of the logical analysis of Buddhist thought that Graham Priest has offered in his book The Fifth Corner of Four (5of4). The paper traces the development of a logical value in- troduced in 5of4, which Priest has called e. The paper points out that certain criticisms I have made earlier still stand, but focuses on a recon- ceptualization of 5of4 in which these arguments carry less weight. This new perspective on the book, (...) inspired by a response to my arguments by Priest himself, sees the logical analysis of Buddhism as aiming more for an allegorical, suggestive and aesthethic endeavour, rather a purely analytical one. I illustrate this view by focusing on the Ox herding pictures, as interpreted by Priest and Ueda Shizuteru, and I compare it to ideas in the discussion around Critical Buddhism. (shrink)

This article discusses the problem of the ineffable in Damascius’ treatises De principiis and In Parmenidem. I argue that the ineffable—which is the ultimate principle proposed by Damascius—is also the theme that underlies the whole frame of the reality, in his perspective. Each level of reality that he discusses comes into play on the background of the original attempt to suggest the ineffable principle. Each of them—One, unified, soul, material forms, matter and sensible realm—tries to approximate and suggest the (...) previous level and thus, eventually, the ineffable itself. Consequently, each level of reality develops its own degree of ineffability, and therefore presents itself to our mind in an aporetical manner. It is impossible for our mind to reveal in an exhaustive and noncontradictory fashion even the levels closest to us. The aporiai that are specific for every part of reality are eventually consequences of the original aporia of an absolute and unique principle that governs everything. (shrink)

This article aims to examine the perspective on miracles and their relationship to humility offered by the alphabetical collection of Apophthegmata Patrum. For the analysis of this relationship, texts that speak directly or indirectly about humility have been selected and an attempt has been made to organize them into a coherent discourse. Then a significant set of accounts of miracles is analysed, which are seen from the perspective of their relationship with humility.

Bimal Krishna Matilal was interested in the paradoxes of the ineffability of mystical experiences throughout his career. He was all eager to prove that the concept of mysticism in Indian tradition had its own strong logic, which had helped its proponents overcome the charges of being ‘self-refuting’. In various articles, Matilal had analysed various formulations of the logic of ineffability in various systems of Indian philosophy and examined various ways to get out of the logical paradoxes. While discussing the paradox (...) of ineffability, he often refers to the ineffability of the mystical in the Tractatus and maintains that the Tractatus paragraphs T4.003 and 6.522 and Wittgenstein’s letter to Russell, quoted in Anscombe, ‘strike a very familiar note in the heart of the mystics’. His own view in this regard was that ‘ineffability in the sense that something is beyond the reach of all words, is impossible. For in the last analysis it is possible to speak of that which is ineffable, by the word “ineffable” itself’. He discusses also the ways how one can finally avoid the paradoxes of ultimate ineffability. His position is that ‘the so-called ineffable is not really or ultimately ineffable.’ In this paper, there will be an attempt to apply Matilal’s viewpoint on the paradox of ineffability in the Tractatus. This exploration unfolds in three main sections. Matilal’s perspective on the concept of ineffability along with the paradoxes and its solutions in various systems of Indian tradition will be highlighted in the first section and the paradox of ineffability in the Tractatus along with the controversy regarding its interpretation in the second, and finally, in the concluding section, attempts will be made to find a way out of this impasse by applying Matilal’s stance on this matter and see how it allows us to give ‘fresh answers to the questions raised in Western Philosophy’. (shrink)

Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or ‘sticking to one's guns’ in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, (...) courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. (shrink)

Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, (...) courage, grit, and actively open-minded thinking, on the other. We observed positive correlations between measures of conciliationism, intellectual humility, and actively open-minded thinking but failed to find any reliable association between steadfastness, courage, and grit. Our studies reveal that there are at least two important intellectual virtues associated with conciliationist responses to peer disagreement (viz., intellectual humility and actively open-minded thinking) and two vices associated with steadfast responses (intellectual arrogance and myside bias). These findings shed new light on the overall epistemic goodness of the conciliationist perspective. -/- keywords: disagreement, conciliationism, steadfastness, intellectual humility, courage, actively open-minded thinking. (shrink)

According to G. E. Moore, moral expertise requires abilities of several kinds: the ability to factor judgments of right and wrong into (a) judgments of good and bad and (b) judgments of cause and effect, (2) the ability to use intuition to make the requisite judgments of good and bad, and (3) the ability to use empirical investigation to make the requisite judgments of cause and effect. Moore’s conception of moral expertise is thus extremely demanding, but he supplements it with (...) some very simple practical guidance. (shrink)

While it is widely regarded that intellectual humility is among the intellectual virtues, there is as of yet little consensus on the matter of what possessing and exercising intellectual humility consists in, and how it should be best understood as advancing our epistemic goals. For example, does intellectual humility involve an underestimation of one’s intellectual abilities, or rather, does it require an accurate conception? Is intellectual humility a fundamentally interpersonal/social virtue, or might it be valuable to exercise in isolation? To (...) what extent does intellectual humility demand of us an appreciation of how the success of our inquiries depends on features of our social and physical environment beyond our control? These are just a few of the many questions that are crucial to getting a grip on this intellectual virtue and why we might aspire to cultivate it. Furthermore, and apart from the nature and value of humility, it is worthwhile to consider how this notion, properly understood, might have import for other philosophical debates, including those about (for example) scepticism, assertion, epistemic individualism and anti-individualism, and the philosophy of education. This special issue brings together a range of different philosophical perspectives on these and related questions to do with intellectual humility with an aim to contributing to this important and timely topic. (shrink)