It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1–3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety (...) of moral vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the “ought implies can” principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a “blame implies can” principle. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Michele Moody-Adams’ critique of the ‘inability thesis’, according to which some cultures make the resources for criticizing injustice ‘unavailable’ to their members. I investigate Moody-Adams’ alternative ‘affected ignorance’ thesis. Using the example of slavery in ancient Greece, I consider two potential candidates for affected ignorance which involve, respectively, ‘unawareness’ and ‘mistaken moral weighing’; in neither, I hold, may one ascribe culpability to those involved.

In this paper I will argue, following Moody-Adams’s paper “Culture, responsibility and affected ignorance,” that inability does not excuse in general, but against Moody-Adams I will argue that this is not because of “affected ignorance” but simply because of responsibilities individual agents have by virtue of belonging to and participating in the collective actions of a certain kind of collective. Excusability has been misdiagnosed as depending on whether the ignorance of wrongdoing involved is culpable or non-culpable.

If moral responsibilities prescribe how agents ought to behave, are there also intellectual responsibilities prescribing what agents ought to believe? Many theorists have argued that there cannot be intellectual responsibilities because they would require the ability to control whether one believes, whereas it is impossible to control whether one believes. This argument appeals to an “ought implies can” principle for intellectual responsibilities. The present paper tests for the presence of intellectual responsibilities in social cognition. Four experiments show that intellectual responsibilities (...) are attributed to believe things and that these responsibilities can exceed what agents are able to believe. Furthermore, the results show that agents are sometimes considered responsible for failing to form true beliefs on the basis of good evidence, and that this effect does not depend on the seriousness of the consequences for failing to form a belief. These findings clarify when and how responsibilities for belief are attributed, falsify a conceptual entailment between ability and responsibility in the intellectual domain, and emphasize the importance of objective truth in intellectual evaluations. (shrink)

We report on an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in two classes of patients suffering from depression. Developing a method of second-person hermeneutic phenomenology, we articulate the distinctive combination of temporal agility and temporal inability characteristic of the experience of severely depressed patients. We argue that a cluster of decision-specific temporal abilities is a critical element of decision-making capacity, and we show that loss of these abilities is a risk factor distinguishing severely depressed patients from mildly/moderately depressed patients. We (...) explore the legal and clinical consequences of this result. (shrink)

In P v Cheshire West, Lady Hale stated that an act that would deprive an able-bodied or able-minded person of their liberty would do the same to a mentally or physically disabled person. Throughout the judgement, there is no definition of what liberty is, which makes defining an act that would deprive a person of it difficult. Ideas of liberty are described in terms of political liberty within a society, the state of being free from external influence and individual autonomy. (...) This essay explores various philosophical ideas of liberty and what a legitimate constraint of liberty is. It will be argued that defining liberty in terms external influence from other human agents undermines the impact of natural inability on a person’s ability to fulfil their intrinsic desires—a true constraint of liberty is any which prohibits a person from acting in the way they desire. If liberty is not the same for all, it follows that a deprivation of liberty differs between different agents. Although the government must protect personal liberty, it is important to recognise that an act that may deprive an able-bodied or minded person of their liberty, may in fact promote the liberty of a disabled persons. It will be argued that acts that allow a disabled person to act out desires that they ordinarily would not be able to perform, do not deprive them of their liberty. (shrink)

소비사회가 이 세계에 일으키는 근본적인 문제는 사유의 무능이다. 여기에서 사유의 무능이란 소비행위가 가져오는 쾌락에 휩싸여 삶에 대한 성찰을 제대로 수행하지 못하는 사태를 말한다. 이러한 사유의 무능은 오늘날 우리가 직면한 문제들을 해결해 나갈 수 있는 능력 몇 가지를 약화시킨다. 첫째는 관계적 무능이다. 사유의 무능은 타인에 대한 이해와 공감 능력을 약화시킨다. 소비를 통한 감각적 쾌락이 삶의 목적이 되면서 개인은 자신의 이익과 행복을 중심으로 움직이게 된다. 자신의 행동을 타인의 입장에서 생각하지 못하고 타인을 소통의 대상이 아닌 단순히 쾌락 경쟁과 경제적 가치 증식의 대상으로 바라봄으로써 (...) 관계에 무능력해진다. 둘째는 정치적 무능이다. 사유의 무능은 우리들의 관심사를 자질구레한 세속적 쾌락에 집중시킨다. 때문에 우리는 정치에 자발적으로 참여하여 공동의 선을 고민하고 결정해나갈 수 있는 시민적 역량을 제대로 발휘하지 못하게 된다. 셋째는 경제적 무능이다. 사유의 무능은 우리로 하여금 더 큰 욕망의 충족에서 비롯되는 더 큰 쾌락을 위해서는 더 많은 돈이 필요하다는 생각을 내면화하도록 만든다. 동시에 더 많은 돈을 얻기 위해서는 자본주의가 내세우는 경쟁에서 승리해야 한다는 생각을 수용하도록 이끌면서 우리 자신을 소진시키는 경제질서를 개선해나갈 수 있는 능력을 약화시킨다. 마지막으로 환경적 무능이다. 사유의 무능은 우리가 끊임없이 세계를 상품화하고 소비하는 과정에서 거스르게 되는 자연의 속도에 대한 예민한 감각과 비판적 사고를 가로막는다. 때문에 우리는 당면한 심각한 환경문제를 해결해 나갈 수 있는 능력을 제대로 발휘하지 못하게 된다. 우리는 먼저 소비주의와 밀접한 관련을 맺고 있는 자본주의의 역사를 살펴볼 것이다. 이어서 자본주의와 소비주의가 만들어낸 소비사회의 특징을 간략히 정리한 후에 소비사회가 일으키는 몇 가지 무능을 검토할 것이다. 결론에서는 이런 무능들에서 우리가 벗어나기 위해서는 반성적 삶의 복원을 통해 인간의 욕망과 행복에 대한 성찰을 수행하고 소박한 삶의 양식을 추구하는 일이 필요하다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

Mere inability, which refers to what persons are naturally unable to do, is traditionally thought to be distinct from unfreedom, which is a social type of constraint. The advent of biomedical enhancement, however, challenges the idea that there is a clear division between mere inability and unfreedom. This is because bioenhancement makes it possible for some people’s mere inabilities to become matters of unfreedom. In this paper, I discuss several ways that this might occur: first, bioenhancement can exacerbate (...) social pressures to enhance one’s abilities; second, people may face discrimination for not enhancing; third, the new abilities made possible due to bioenhancement may be accompanied by new inabilities for the enhanced and unenhanced; and finally, shifting values around abilities and inabilities due to bioenhancement may reinforce a pre-existing ableism about human abilities. As such, we must give careful consideration to these potential unfreedom-generating outcomes when it comes to our moral evaluations of bioenhancement. (shrink)

The sense of helplessness stands at the very core of the traumatic experience. This paper suggests that a sense of helplessness arises when, despite the functioning of the cognitive system and awareness of circumstances and feelings, an individual is unable to access practical knowledge. As a result, the subject becomes a victim of one’s own inability to perform, or act, in the real world.

My paper has two aims: to underscore the importance of differently time-indexed ‘ought implies can’ principles; and to apply this to the culpable inability problem. Sometimes we make ourselves unable to do what we ought, but in those cases, we may still fail to do what we ought. This is taken to be a serious problem for synchronic ‘ought implies can’ principles, with a simultaneous ‘ought’ and ‘can’. Some take it to support diachronic ‘ought implies can’, with a potentially (...) temporally distinct ‘ought’ and ‘can’. I will argue that this problem is not avoided by diachronic ‘ought implies can’. (shrink)

Psychopaths exhibit diminished ability to grieve. Here I address whether this inability can be explained by the trademark feature of psychopaths, namely, their diminished capacity for interpersonal empathy. I argue that this hypothesis turns out to be correct, but requires that we conceptualize empathy not merely as an ability to relate (emotionally and ethically) to other individuals but also as an ability to relate to past and present iterations of ourselves. This reconceptualization accords well with evidence regarding psychopaths’ intense (...) focus on the temporal present and difficulties in engaging in mental time travel, as well as with the essentially egocentric and identity-based nature of grief. -/- . (shrink)

Amidst the wealth of literature on the topic of moral distress in nursing, a single citation is ubiquitous, Andrew Jameton’s 1984 book Nursing practice. The definition Jameton formulated reads ‘... moral distress arises when one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action’. Unfortunately, it appears that, despite the frequent use of Jameton’s definition of moral distress, the definition itself remains uncritically examined. It seems as if the context (...) of how moral distress arises (i.e. anger, frustration etc.) has been co-opted as its definition. This current work suggests that the current definition is not moral distress as defined by Jameton, but rather, in large part, nursing’s discomfort with moral subjectivity in end-of-life decision making. A critical examination of how the Catholic tradition’s normative ethical framework accounts for moral subjectivity in end-of-life decision making serves to aid nursing’s discomfort and as a starting point to recontextualize moral distress. (shrink)

If we were to write down all those things that we ordinarily categorise as disabilities, the resulting list might appear to be extremely heterogeneous. What do disabilities have in common? In this paper I defend the view that disabilities should be understood as particular kinds of inability. I show how we should formulate this view, and in the process defend the view from various objections. For example, I show how the view can allow that common kinds of inability (...) are not disabilities, can allow that minor kinds of inability are rightly not described as disabilities, and can allow that socially imposed inabilities need not be disabilities. In the second half of the paper, I show that this theory is superior to rival theories. I criticize the wellbeing theory of disability (Kahane and Savulescu 2009, Savulescu and Kahane 2011, Harris 2001) and conventionalist theories of disability (e.g. Barnes 2016). Finally, I show how the inability theory is consistent with the best versions of the social model of disability. (shrink)

This paper inquires into the inability ofsubjects in English to topicalise. Treatingtopicalisation as a specific case of d-linking,it asks: why don’t subjects topicalise inEnglish? And why cannot they be d-linkedthrough further movement? It concludes thatthe property of [aboutness] of subjects is anunderspecified instance of a more compositederivative effect realised as [topic]. Giventhe ability of objects in English to be readilyd-linked through extraction in CP, theanalysis takes a detailed look at the structuraldifferences between subjects and objects. Itconcludes that d-linking of (...) an argument iscontingent upon the derivational memory ofits prior inclusion within vP that has yielded itsdenotational set-membership. Treating EPPas an A’-operation that embeds one instance ofthe subject-chain into discourse, the inabilityof subjects to topicalise is explained as an “online”denotational dependency on discourse,which lacks the systemic memory of thesubject’s embedding. In turn, their immobilityis treated as a modular dependency betweenthe two subject copies, mediated through Texcluding the one instance of the chain. (shrink)

In the broadest sense, Propositionalism is the view that knowing how to do something first requires our possessing appropriate propositional attitudes about an action. Non-propositionalism concerning knowing how, is the rejection of propositionalism. This distinction, and the rejection of propositionalism is typically traced back to Gilbert Ryle. In the 21st century, propositionalists have tried to turn the tables with a quick and decisive argument against non-propositionalism. According to the argument from pervasive inability, since (1) There are numerous cases in (...) which someone knows how to do something while possessing a pervasive inability to perform the action she knows how to do, and (2) these cases can be unproblematically explained to be instances of knowing how by propositionalism, but (3) these cases cannot be explained to be instances of knowing how by non-propositionalism, therefore (4) non-propositionalism must be rejected in favor of propositionalism. In this paper, through a careful examination of proposed cases, I argue that premise two is not true, and by correcting propositionalists’ mischaracterization of non-propositionalism, I argue that premise three is also not true. As a result, the argument from pervasive inability fails to provide a decision between propositionalism and non-propositionalism concerning knowing how. (shrink)

The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In spite of, or perhaps because of this frequency of use the characterization of moral innocence continues to have varying connotations. As a result, the concept is often used without sufficient heed given to some of its most salient attributes, especially (...) those germane to moral agency and the moral community. In this article I intend to identify these attributes and propose that moral innocence is best defined as an inability to enter the moral community as a result of a trust in moral illusions. The content of the illusions pertains to several factors including one’s role in the moral community, one’s ability to wrong or harm others, the intricacies of one’s moral interaction with others, and the corresponding manifold complexities tangled up with the concepts of good and evil. Maintaining these illusions impedes or even prohibits an appropriate exchange of praise and blame with others. As membership in the moral community requires precisely this ability to engage in such an exchange, moral illusions necessarily give rise to an inability to participate in the moral community. (shrink)

Freud said that 'the essence of neurosis is the inability to tolerate ambiguity.' In this short work, it is explained what this means and why it is true.

In today’s Türkiye, many people use Qur’ānic translations to under-stand the Qur’ān. However, in addition to the problem of translating one language into another, there is also the problem that most translations are not based on any methodology. To translate a word which has a difference in qirāʾāt according to a different imam of qirāʾāt and not according to the preferred imam of qirāʾāt in our country, is one of the consequences of this methodlessness. Such translations cause a word that (...) is not found in the Qur’ānic text to be included in the translations. The study deals with the various qirāʾāt versions of the word “قرْنَ” in the verse 33/33 of Sūrah al-Ahzāb and their reflection in the Turkish Qur’ānic translations. Likewise, the study traces the views on the morphological structure of the word on the axis of qirāʾāt differences and touches upon their impact on the meaning and interpretation of the relevant verse. Then, the translations of this word in the Turkish Qur’ānic translations are analyzed and the qirāʾāt on which these translations are based are pointed out. The information obtained is analyzed through textual analysis and comparison. The study aims to reveal that there is a methodological problem in the translations of the Qur’ān, that the translations have not been done in accordance with the qirāʾāt of ʿĀṣim, and that reflecting the qirāʾāt differences in the translations will enrich the translations. The claims that the word in question, which is read according to the Hafs narration of qirāʾāt of ʿĀṣim preferred in our country, has no basis in terms of Arabic language rules make this study valuable. (shrink)

In her article, “Melancholia, temporal disruption, and the torment of being both unable to live and unable to die,” Emily Hughes offers a provocative and powerful analysis of an experiential aspect of depression that is often overlooked in the psychiatric literature. Drawing on Heidegger’s account of ontological death, what he calls “dying” in Being and Time, Hughes illuminates how episodes of major depression can disrupt the synchronous unity of time that structures our experience and gives meaning to our lives. When (...) this happens, the sufferer enters a paradoxical liminal space, one in which we live through our own death, where death is understood ontologically as an inability-to-be. For Heidegger, “to... (shrink)

We are all problem-solvers of some sort. We solve problems to earn a living, get promoted, show that we are smart and deserve colleagues’ respect, and contribute to human progress. Yes, problem-solving is important; the better solution-maker we are, the brighter future we expect. But we are not such good problem solvers for simple reasons: it is hard to define a genuine problem.

I TRY TO SHOW THAT CONTRARY TO PRICHARD IN "DUTY AND\nIGNORANCE OF FACT" THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR MAINTAINING\nTHAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AT LEAST WE MAY BE UNAVOIDABLY\nIGNORANT OF OUR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS, AND OF WHAT IS\nRIGHT AND WRONG GENERALLY. WHY DID PRICHARD STAND SO FIRMLY\nAGAINST UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE OF OUR DUTY? I SUGGEST THAT\nHE IS REALLY THINKING ABOUT ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR BEING\nBLAMEWORTHY, FOR CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TO\nSPEAK OF SOMEONE'S BEING BLAMEWORTHY BY VIRTUE OF\nUNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE. I ALSO (...) RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE\nCONNECTION BETWEEN MORAL ACTION AND ABILITY, AND I TRY TO\nSHOW THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID AGAINST THE USUAL VIEW\nTHAT "DUTY TO," "WRONG NOT TO," ETC., ENTAIL "ABLE TO.". (shrink)

이 글은 4차 산업혁명과 민주주의의 관계에 대한 철학적 해명을 시도하는데 목적을 둔다. 특히 4차 산업혁명이라는 시대적 현상의 토대에 위치하는 인터넷, 인공지능 알고리즘, 빅데이터 등과 같은 과학기술이 시민의 삶과 민주주의에 미치는 영향들을 비판적으로 검토하는데 초점을 맞춘다. 4차 산업혁명은 산업 전반의 패러다임의 전환에 대한 근래의 시대적 규정이다. 그러나 이러한 규정이 과연 적절한 것인지의 문제는 여전히 열려있다. 역사적으로 볼 때 산업혁명이라는 개념은 증기기관, 전기, 컴퓨터 같은 새로운 기술이 생산과 소비의 변화를 단기간에 혁명적으로 불러오고 사회문화적 지형의 변화를 동반하는 시기에 적용되었다. 때문에 이미 컴퓨터와 인터넷을 (...) 통한 생산과 소비의 변화가 이루어진 3차 산업혁명의 시기를 고려하면 최근의 상황에 패러다임의 전환이라고 할 만한 것이 있는지에 대한 의문을 제기하는 것도 무리는 아니다. 하지만 단순히 컴퓨터에 의한 생산자동화 시스템 도입과 인터넷 통신기술의 발달로 인한 정보의 공유라는 현상만으로 포괄하기 어려운 사회적 사태들이 등장하고 있는 현실을 부정하기는 어렵다. 대표적으로 인터넷과 인공지능 알고리즘 그리고 빅데이터의 활용을 통한 산업의 성장과 사회문화적 지형의 변화가 그것이다. 인터넷과 인공지능은 사물과 사물, 사물과 사람, 사람과 사람을 연결시키면서 기존에 추구해 왔던 생산과 소비의 방식을 바꾸고 있으며 이것은 다시 우리의 삶과 사회의 변화로 연결되고 있는 것이다. 이렇게 볼 때 4차 산업혁명이라고 부르는 사태에 패러다임의 전환을 의미할 만한 혁명이 있는지의 문제에 대해서는 그 경계를 달리할 수 있겠지만 새로운 과학기술의 등장이 우리의 삶과 사회의 문화를 빠르게 변화시키고 있거나 변화시킬 것으로 보인다는 생각은 일견 타당해 보인다. 우리는 먼저 4차 산업혁명으로 규정되는 사회적 현상 내지는 일련의 사태들이 시민의 삶에 미치는 영향들을 다루는 것으로 논의를 시작할 것이다. 이어서 그러한 영향들이 어떻게 우리의 기대와 달리 사유의 무능을 겪는 시민들을 만들어낼 수 있는지를 살펴볼 것이다. 동시에 사유의 무능이 사회에 일으키는 일련의 현상들을 고립적 개인주의와 무비판적 집단주의로 규정하면서 그러한 주의들이 어떻게 민주주의의 토대를 침식하고 새로운 형태의 통제사회를 가져올 수 있는지 보여주고자 한다. 결론에서는 4차 산업혁명의 기대를 뒷받침하는 과학기술이 우리를 사유의 무능과 통제 사회로 이끌 수 있으며 이는 곧 시민적 역량의 훼손과 민주주의의 위기를 의미한다고 주장할 것이다. 더불어 사유의 무능으로부터 벗어난 시민들만이 4차 산업혁명과 인간의 삶이 맺어야 할 관계에 관한 비판적 논의를 민주적으로 통제할 수 있다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

Albert Camus’ views contributed to the rise of the philosophy known as Absurdism, he defines the Absurd “as the conflict between the human tendency to seek inherent value and meaning in life, and the human inability to find any meaning in a purposeless, meaningless, and irrational universe, with the ‘unreasonable silence’ of the universe in response.” However, this world in itself is not absurd, what is absurd is our relationship with the universe, which is irrational. Camus is considered to (...) be an existentialist, even though he firmly rejected the term throughout his lifetime. He is properly categorised as an atheist existentialist. However, he would also disagree with this label. In his notebooks, he presents the following contradictory statement: -/- “I do not believe in God and I am not an atheist.” -/- This reflects the notion of the Absurd. The search of the possibility of the existence of God is humanly impossible, but this also entails that the proof that God does not exist is impossible too. He writes in The Myth of Sisyphus: “In a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.” The Myth of Sisyphus is a fierce expression of the Absurd. It starts off with a powerful and thought-provoking statement: “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.” . (shrink)

Pessimists hold that human life is fundamentally a condition of suffering which cannot attain transcendent meaning. According to pessimistic nihilism, life’s lack of transcendent meaning gives us reason to regret our existence. Life-affirming nihilism insists that we can and should affirm life in the absence of transcendent meaning. Yet both of these strains struggle to articulate what practical reasons might compel us to regret or affirm our inability to transcend the immanent conditions of the human predicament in the first (...) place. I suggest that we catch sight of these practical reasons when we shift our attention from the value of transcendent meaning to the desire for temporal transcendence expressed by strong attachments such aslove and devotion. In short, we want the things we love to last forever, and they can’t. This makes human life tragic, but it does not settle the question of what sort of meaning it might have or lack. (shrink)

Artificial intelligent (AI) systems used in medicine are often very reliable and accurate, but at the price of their being increasingly opaque. This raises the question whether a system’s opacity undermines the ability of medical doctors to acquire knowledge on the basis of its outputs. We investigate this question by focusing on a case in which a patient’s risk of recurring breast cancer is predicted by an opaque AI system. We argue that, given the system’s opacity, as well as the (...) possibility of malfunctioning AI systems, practitioners’ inability to check the correctness of their outputs, and the high stakes of such cases, the knowledge of medical practitioners is indeed undermined. They are lucky to form true beliefs based on the AI systems’ outputs, and knowledge is incompatible with luck. We supplement this claim with a specific version of the safety condition on knowledge, Safety*. We argue that, relative to the perspective of the medical doctor in our example case, his relevant beliefs could easily be false, and this despite his evidence that the AI system functions reliably. Assuming that Safety* is necessary for knowledge, the practitioner therefore doesn’t know. We address three objections to our proposal before turning to practical suggestions for improving the epistemic situation of medical doctors. (shrink)

A few months after national vaccination campaigns were initiated around early 2021, the discussion regarding the mandatory vaccination of healthcare workers started gaining ground in most European states and also in the United States. The debate on whether healthcare workers should be required to be vaccinated has been fueled by three main reasons: the high transmissibility rate of the Delta variant, which posed a significant risk to national healthcare systems across Europe and the Americas, as well placing high pressure on (...) intensive care units even in the summer months (a); states’ inability to impose general lockdowns and social distancing measures during the 2022 winter due to financial hardship and fears of an ongoing recession (b); and governmental unwillingness to implement restrictive measures, having in mind their populations’ tiredness from previous lockdowns (c). This paper will explore the legal and managerial implications of mandatory vaccination among healthcare workers and will argue that it has the capacity to be a successful part of effective national healthcare systems in the search for responsible professionals to staff them. It will argue that national vaccination strategies are dependent on states’ national healthcare models. It will show how the major difference in healthcare models of the two states chosen as examples have affected their vaccination policies and their reception by healthcare personnel. Finally, it will prove that the advantages of mandatory vaccination for healthcare personnel outweigh prospected disadvantages, irrespective of ethical, or legal justification is applied. This research will go through the key points of the legislative provisions of the two states (a); it will delve into their legal (b) and managerial implications (c); and finally, it will go through the policy questions which arose (d). It will prove how selective mandatory vaccination policies may be applied to national healthcare systems with foundational differences in their conception. Thus, it will demonstrate that selective mandatory vaccination is a viable option both for models approaching health from a societal perspective, and from the liberal ones. (shrink)

Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...) example is normative practical reasoning of the form 'I ought to φ, so I'll φ', where 'I ought to φ' expresses a normative belief and 'I'll φ' an intention. This has at least some characteristics of reasoning, but there are also grounds for doubting that it is genuine reasoning. One objection is that it seems inappropriate to derive an intention to φ from a belief that you ought to φ, rather than a belief that you ought to intend to φ. Another is that you may not be able to go through this putative process of reasoning, and this inability might disqualify it from being reasoning. A third objection is that it violates the Humean doctrine that reason alone cannot motivate any action of the will. This paper investigates these objections. (shrink)

The decision to donate an organ is often the decision to save a loved one's life. Frequently recognized as an ultimate act of altruism, a person's choice to donate is embedded in their right to make decisions about their own body and well-being, free of coercion. To ensure donors are truly acting out of altruism, transplant professionals will not allow someone to donate if there are concerns of duress or inability to consent. Although the evaluation of potential donors is (...) well-intentioned and necessary, stigma and assumptions about young adults can sometimes lead to their being denied the opportunity to donate based on age rather than evidence, thus infringing upon their bodily autonomy. This case examines the narrative of a young man trying to save his sister through kidney donation, and the ramifications of denying him the opportunity to do so, and how the transplant community can re-envision their role in protecting young adult donors. (shrink)

Following the publication of the seminal Fear of Freedom, Erich Fromm applied his unique vision to a critique of contemporary capitalism in The Sane Society. Where the former dealt with man's historic inability to come to terms with his sense of isolation, and the dangers to which this can lead, The Sane Society took his theories one step further. In doing so it established Fromm as one of the most controversial political thinkers of his generation. Anaylsing how individuals conform (...) to contemporary capitalist and patriarchal societies, the book was published to wide acclaim and even wider disapproval. It was a scathing indictment of modern capitalism and as such proved unwelcome to many. Unwelcome because much of what Fromm had to say was true. Today, as we settle into the challenges of the 21st century, Fromm's writings are just as relevant as when they were first written. Read it and decide for yourself - are you living in a sane society? (shrink)

This paper argues that there is no genuine puzzle of ‘imaginative resistance’. In part 1 of the paper I argue that the imaginability of fictional propositions is relative to a range of different factors including the ‘thickness’ of certain concepts, and certain pre-theoretical and theoretical commitments. I suggest that those holding realist moral commitments may be more susceptible to resistance and inability than those holding non-realist commitments, and that it is such realist commitments that ultimately motivate the problem. However, (...) I argue that the relativity of imaginability is not a particularly puzzling feature of imagination. In part 2, I claim that it is the so-called ‘alethic’ puzzle, concerning fictional truth, which generates a real puzzle about imaginative resistance. However, I argue that the alethic puzzle itself depends on certain realist assumptions about the nature of fictional truth which are implausible and should be rejected in favour of an interpretive view of fictional truth. Once this is done, I contend, it becomes evident that the supposed problem of imaginative resistance as it has hitherto been discussed in the literature is not puzzling at all. (shrink)

Anselmian theists, for whom God is the being than which no greater can be thought, usually infer that he is an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Critics have attacked these claims by numerous distinct arguments, such as the paradox of the stone, the argument from God's inability to sin, and the argument from evil. Anselmian theists have responded to these arguments by constructing an independent response to each. This way of defending Anselmian theism is uneconomical. I seek to establish (...) a new defence which undercuts almost all the existing arguments against Anselmian theism at once. In developing this defence, I consider the possibility that the Anselmian God is not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. (shrink)

Teodor Adorno's work Philosophy and Teachers was first read as a report at the Frankfurt Studenthome in November 1961. In this report Adorno continued the topic of criticism of those factors of the then formation of West Germany, which made impossible a personal fight intellectual to with the cultural remnants of a totalitarian society. Adorno drew attention an exam in philosophy, important element of the educational process. This exam should pass composed of future teachers, candidates for the work of the (...) teacher of gymnasium. This exam should be composed by future teachers, candidates for the work of the teacher of gymnasium. Adorno noticed the tendency of formalistic adherence to the Rules of Examination by some future teachers who are unable to understand the humanistic, emancipatory and spiritual essence of philosophy, and therefore do not understand the purpose of conducting this exam. Adorno honored the long tradition of academic freedom of the German University and noticed the figure of the German philosopher, describing him as the man whose intellectual activity influenced the humanization of the German University, which directly influenced to the corresponding cultural transformations. But in post-war universities in the Federal Republic of Germany there is a trend to the principles of scientific knowledge. This tendency is coupled with the attitude of some future teachers to knowledge as appropriation to the consumer way, was due to the absence of personal love for their own specialty and to their students. Adorno was convinced that such teachers are indifferent to their specialty and do not have a calling to him. Adorno defined as a sign to the absence of calling in these people is intellectual negligence, provincial speech and provincial inability to understand human freedom as a spiritual value. Such teachers are incapable of offering new knowledge to their students by way of perfekt speech and by way of perfekt written presentation. As completely different Adorno offered to see a person who is capable to appropriation of the knowledge that is needed to understand hemseif and his professional obligation. This person can will use self-understand and self-reflection, and therefore she can will independently to understand of the sense of their pedagogical work. This person will be faithful and patient in carrying out his work for the practical introduction of humanistic ideals of prior philosophical knowledge into society. (shrink)

In this chapter, I defend a transparency account of substantial self-knowledge against the self-interpretation account. First, I question how such self-interpretation should proceed without taking up at least some of the perspectives of the attitudes at issue. I argue that the inability to assess our attitudes from a detached perspective is not just a matter of epistemic access but relates to the nature of substantial attitudes themselves. Because they are connected to a person’s conception of themselves but also their (...) conception of their values, substantial attitudes are synchronically and diachronically indeterminate. This means that they need to be translated to a particular context and person. Second, I argue that such a process of translation involves the person’s sense-making agency. Different from interpretation— and, as will be addressed, different from reflective endorsement and self-regulation—substantial attitudes can only be self-attributed if the agent determines what they mean for her, here and now. My contribution highlights aspects of substantial self- knowledge that, on the one hand, connect substantial self-knowledge to non-ideal approaches in epistemology, linking it to an emancipatory practice of self-inquiry. On the other hand, the chapter shifts our way of thinking about transparent self-knowledge, how it should not be dismissed too quickly with respect to substantial self-knowledge, and how important the agential, non-reductive, and first-personal perspective is in relation to our mental life. (shrink)

Assessing what counts as infertility has practical implications: access to (state-funded) fertility treatment is usually premised on meeting the criteria that constitute the chosen definition of infertility. In this paper, I argue that we should adopt the expression “involuntary childlessness” to discuss the normative dimensions of people’s inability to conceive. Once this conceptualization is adopted, it becomes clear that there exists a mismatch between those who experience involuntary childlessness and those that are currently able to access fertility treatment. My (...) concern in this article is explaining why such a mismatch deserves attention and what reasons can be advanced to justify addressing it. My case rests on a three-part argument: that there are good reasons to address the suffering associated with involuntary childlessness; that people would decide to insure against it; and that involuntary childlessness is characterized by a prima facie exceptional kind of desire. (shrink)

Philosophers have often posited a foundational calling voice, such that hearing its call constitutes subjects as responsive and responsible negotiators of normative claims. I give the name ldquo;transcendental conscience to that which speaks in this founding, constitutive voice. The role of transcendental conscience is not – or not merely – to normatively bind the subject, but to constitute the possibility of the subject's being bound by any particular, contentful normative claims in the first place. I explore the ontological and temporal (...) status of transcendental conscience, using Heidegger's account of conscience in Being and Time as my textual touchstone. I ask what performative structure the call of conscience might have that would enable it to constitute normative responsiveness, and I raise some temporal conundrums surrounding this structure. I argue that it is incoherent to attempt to give a literal, chronological account of the origin of normative grip and response. I suggest that we can best understand the founding calls of conscience, not as literal events occurring in regular time, but as events that can only show up retrospectively, as occurring in an ever-receding, unlocalizable past, and that these calls can only be figured mythically and metaphorically. Appropriating a Derridean term, I claim that the voice of transcendental conscience must be that of a lsquo;ghost, whose call binds us by haunting us – a haunting that is no less transcendentally necessary for its inability to be translated into a literal historical event. (shrink)

Many philosophers, both past and present, object to materialism not from any romantic anti-scientific bent, but from sheer inability to understand the thesis. It seems utterly inconceivable to some that qualia should exist in a world which is entirely material. This paper investigates the grain objection, a much neglected argument which purports to prove that sensations could not be brain events. Three versions are examined in great detail. The plausibility of the first version is shown to depend crucially on (...) whether one holds a direct or non-direct theory of perception. Only on the latter is this version plausible. An analysis of the second "semantic" version concludes that a materialist description and explanation of the world should not be expected to transparently convey all that would be of interest or importance to human beings. The final version explicitly makes use of Grover Maxwell's non-direct perceptual theory of structural realism. Although a confusion is charged to Maxwell between phenomenal and objective properties, the critical difficulty for the grain objection is its failure to characterize "structure" from a non-percipient point of view. As the grain objection is ultimately found wanting, the real difficulty for materialism crystallizes as its irreconciliability with the mere existence of sentience, which seems to force some sort of emergence upon us. (shrink)