This paper first investigates logical characterizations of different structures of opposition that extend the square of opposition in a way or in another. Blanché’s hexagon of opposition is based on three disjoint sets. There are at least two meaningful cubes of opposition, proposed respectively by two of the authors and by Moretti, and pioneered by philosophers such as J. N. Keynes, W. E. Johnson, for the former, and H. Reichenbach for the latter. These cubes exhibit four and six squares of (...) opposition respectively. We clarify the differences between these two cubes, and discuss their gradual extensions, as well as the one of the hexagon when vertices are no longer two-valued. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the use of these structures of opposition for discussing the comparison of two items. Comparing two items usually involves a set of relevant attributes whose values are compared, and may be expressed in terms of different modalities such as identity, similarity, difference, opposition, analogy. Recently, J.-Y. Béziau has proposed an “analogical hexagon” that organizes the relations linking these modalities. Elementary comparisons may be a matter of degree, attributes may not have the same importance. The paper studies in which ways the structure of the hexagon may be preserved in such gradual extensions. As another illustration of the graded hexagon, we start with the hexagon of equality and inequality due to R. Blanché and extend it with fuzzy equality and fuzzy inequality. Besides, the cube induced by a tetra-partition can account for the comparison of two items in terms of preference, reversed preference, indifference and non-comparability even if these notions are a matter of degree. The other cube, which organizes the relations between the different weighted qualitative aggregation modes, is more relevant for the attribute-based comparison of items in terms of similarity. (shrink)

Many people think that if you're uncertain about which moral theory is correct, you ought to maximize the expected choice-worthiness of your actions. This idea presupposes that the strengths of our moral reasons are comparable across theories – for instance, that our reasons to create new people, according to total utilitarianism, can be stronger than our reasons to benefit an existing person, according to a person-affecting view. But how can we make sense of such comparisons? In this article, I (...) introduce a constructivist account of intertheoretic comparisons. On this account, such comparisons don't hold independently of facts about morally uncertain agents. They're simply the result of an ideal deliberation in terms of certain epistemic norms about what you ought to do in light of your uncertainty. If I'm right, this account is metaphysically more parsimonious than some existing proposals, and yet has plausible and strong implications. (shrink)

The hypothesis that humans are superior to non-humans by virtue of higher cognitive powers is often supported by two recurrent fallacies: that any competence shown by humans but not by our closest living relatives must be unique to humans; and that grades of intelligence can be inferred from behavior without regard to motivational structures.

Research in diverse populations has often found that thin media images negatively affect women’s state body image, with many women reporting lower body satisfaction after exposure to pictures of thin models than before exposure. However, there is evidence that theistic affirmations might buffer against the negative effect of media on body image. Furthermore, based on cross-sectional and correlation analyses, religiosity and the Islamic body covering are discussed as protective factors against a negative trait body image. However, there is no experimental (...) research on veiled Muslim women’s state body image. Therefore, the current study experimentally investigated whether the body satisfaction of veiled Muslim women (n = 66) decreased after exposure to thin media images compared to pictures of furniture as a control condition. Christian women (n = 90) and atheist women (n = 74) were included as control groups, and participants were randomly assigned to the two conditions. Prior to the experimental session, participants’ trait body image was assessed using an online questionnaire comprising questions about body satisfaction, thin-ideal internalization, pressure to be thin, and physical appearance comparisons. The results showed that body satisfaction decreased in the experimental condition and not in the control condition, but no significant differences in pre-post changes were found between the three groups. However, in the experimental condition, veiled Muslim women reported a more positive state body image than did Christian women. Moreover, veiled Muslim women had a more positive trait body image than did Christian women and atheist women. Thus, veiled Muslim women reported lower levels of thin-ideal internalization, pressure to be thin, and physical appearance comparisons than did Christian women and atheist women. As the pre-post changes in body satisfaction did not differ between the three groups, veiling might not buffer against the negative effect of thin media images on state body image. Nevertheless, given the more positive trait body image of veiled Muslim women compared to Christian and atheist women, veiling might positively influence body image in the longer term. (shrink)

Consider the regularity thesis that each possible event has non-zero probability. Hájek challenges this in two ways: there can be nonmeasurable events that have no probability at all and on a large enough sample space, some probabilities will have to be zero. But arguments for the existence of nonmeasurable events depend on the axiom of choice. We shall show that the existence of anything like regular probabilities is by itself enough to imply a weak version of AC sufficient to prove (...) the Banach–Tarski Paradox on the decomposition of a ball into two equally sized balls, and hence to show the existence of nonmeasurable events. This provides a powerful argument against unrestricted orthodox Bayesianism that works even without AC. A corollary of our formal result is that if every partial order extends to a total preorder while maintaining strict comparisons, then the Banach–Tarski Paradox holds. This yields an argument that incommensurability cannot be avoided in ambitious versions of decision theory. (shrink)

The issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility is about the possibility (or not) of comparing the utility or welfare or the mental states in general, of different individuals. Embedded in the conceptual framework of utilitarianism, interpersonal comparisons were admissible in economics as part of the theoretical justification of welfare policies until the first decades of the twentieth century. Under the strong influence of the scientific philosophy of positivism as reflected in the works of early neoclassical economists and as (...) epitomized by Lionel Robbins, utility comparisons were subsequently rejected as a value judgement. Robbins’ methodological stance is still prevalent among mainstream economists. Despite the explicit rejection of comparability by the majority of economists, interpersonal comparisons are necessary for many key policy issues, such as progressive taxation, social welfare policies, GDP-based welfare comparisons, cost–benefit analysis, and public goods provision. In this paper, the case of interpersonal utility comparisons is discussed as an illustrative example of the usefulness of the study of the role of value judgements, and generally of the interrelationship between ethics and economics. It is argued that the current tension between theory and policy practice might be resolved through the efforts of prominent economists and philosophers to challenge positivism, and especially its problematic treatment of value judgements and of ethical assumptions in general. The discussion also provides more strength to the view that policy makers and their economic advisers cannot avoid ethical questions in their analysis of the workings of the economic system. (shrink)

This book is the first to bring together an interdisciplinary collection of essays on surrogacy and egg donation from three socially, legally and culturally distinct countries - India, Israel and Germany. It presents contributions from experts in the field of social and cultural sciences, bioethics, law as well as psychology and provides critical-reflective comparative analysis of the socio-ethical factors shaping surrogacy and egg donation practices across these three countries. This book highlights the importance of a comparative perspective to ‘make sense’ (...) of controversies and transitions in this highly contested area of artificial reproductive technologies. It demonstrates how local developments cannot be isolated from global events and vice versa. Therefore, this volume can be used as a standard reference for anyone seeking to understand surrogacy and egg donation from a macro-perspective in the next decade. (shrink)

When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social sciences, chiefly (...) because strategy replication often cannot be sensibly interpreted as strategy bearer reproduction in this domain. Second, I show that alternative replication mechanisms imply interpersonal comparability of strategy payoffs. Giving a meaningful interpretation to such comparisons is not an easy task for many social situations, and thus limits the applicability of EGT in this domain. Third, I argue that giving a new interpretation both to strategy replication and selection solves the issue of interpersonal comparability, but at the costs of making the new interpretation incompatible with natural selection interpretations of EGT. To the extent that social scientists seek such a natural selection interpretation, they face a dilemma: either face the challenge that interpersonal comparisons pose, or give up on the natural selection interpretation. By identifying these tensions, my analysis pleas for greater awareness of the specific purposes of EGT modelling in the social sciences, and for greater sensitivity to the underlying microstructure on which the evolutionary dynamics and other EGT solution concepts supervene. (shrink)

Metanormativists hold that moral uncertainty can affect how we ought, in some morally authoritative sense, to act. Many metanormativists aim to generalize expected utility theory for normative uncertainty. Such accounts face the “easy problem of intertheoretic comparisons”: the worry that distinct theories’ assessments of choiceworthiness are incomparable. The easy problem may well be resolvable, but another problem looms: while some moral theories assign cardinal degrees of choiceworthiness, other theories’ choiceworthiness assignments are merely ordinal. Expected choiceworthiness over such theories is (...) undefined. Call this the “hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons.” This paper argues that to solve the hard problem, we should model moral theories with imprecise choiceworthiness. Imprecise choiceworthiness assignments can model incomplete cardinal information about choiceworthiness, with precise cardinal choiceworthiness and merely ordinal choiceworthiness as limiting cases. Generalizing familiar decision theories for imprecise choiceworthiness to the case of moral uncertainty generates puzzles, however: natural generalizations seem to require reifying parts of the model that don’t correspond to anything in normative reality. I discuss three ways of addressing this problem: by demystifying the reified elements by using them as promiscuously as possible; by constructing alternative decision theories that don’t require the troublesome elements; and by employing an alternative model of metanormative decision problems, and of moral uncertainty generally. (shrink)

In the paper ‘COVID-19 vaccine boosters for young adults: a risk–benefit assessment and ethical analysis of mandate policies at universities,’ Bardoshet alargued that college mandates of the COVID-19 booster vaccine are unethical. The authors came to this conclusion by performing three different sets of comparisons of benefits versus risks using referenced data and argued that the harm outweighs the risk in all three cases. In this response article, we argue that the authors frame their arguments by comparing values that (...) are not scientifically or reasonably comparable and that the authors used values that represent grossly different risk profiles and grouped them into a set of figures to create an illusion of fair comparisons. We argue that absent the falsely skewed portrayals of a higher level of risk over benefit in their misrepresented figures, the five ethical arguments they presented completely fall apart. (shrink)

The problem of inferring probability comparisons between events from an initial set of comparisons arises in several contexts, ranging from decision theory to artificial intelligence to formal semantics. In this paper, we treat the problem as follows: beginning with a binary relation ≥ on events that does not preclude a probabilistic interpretation, in the sense that ≥ has extensions that are probabilistically representable, we characterize the extension ≥+ of ≥ that is exactly the intersection of all probabilistically representable (...) extensions of ≥. This extension ≥+ gives us all the additional comparisons that we are entitled to infer from ≥, based on the assumption that there is some probability measure of which ≥ gives us partial qualitative information. We pay special attention to the problem of extending an order on states to an order on events. In addition to the probabilistic interpretation, this problem has a more general interpretation involving measurement of any additive quantity: e.g., given comparisons between the weights of individual objects, what comparisons between the weights of groups of objects can we infer? (shrink)

Animals, like humans, experience different levels of well-being depending on decisions made by others. As a result, the well-being of animals must be included in any full accounting of the well-being consequences of decisions. However, this is almost never done in large-scale policy and investment analyses, even though it is common to quantify the consequences for human welfare in these decision analyses. This is partly due to prejudice, but increasingly also because we do not currently have good methods for quantifying (...) animal well-being consequences and putting them on the same scale as quantified human well-being consequences. We might call this ‘the problem of interspecies comparisons.’ This important barrier to including animal well-being in decision-making is the result of an insufficiently developed theory and practice of animal well-being and its relation to human well-being. This chapter explains the problem of interspecies comparisons, explains recent research that develops methods to overcome this problem. (shrink)

There is a growing interest in comparison of international health care data with the hope that such studies will enable individual systems to learn from other systems. Such comparisons, however, presuppose that there exist common criteria for evaluating health care systems. The main thesis of this paper is that these comparative studies are misleading because they employ inappropriate operationalizations of these criteria because the operarionalizations are based upon mistaken global conceptualizations of the criteria in question. The essay provides a (...) methodological critique of what has been done and sets a new agenda for future research. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. (...) In this paper, I focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

Normative-based distributional comparisons across countries and over time build upon the assumption that individuals are selfish. However, there is a consolidated evidence that individuals also care about what others have. In this paper, we propose a framework for comparing and ranking distributions that includes non-individualistic possibilities. Specifically, we consider ranking criteria that account, in one case, for the feeling of compassion and, in the other case, for the feeling of envy. These feelings are generated respectively by those having lower (...) resources and those having higher resources. We illustrate our framework using CNEF data for Australia, Korea, Germany, Switzerland, and the US and show that accounting for the presence of compassion and envy might lead to different welfare rankings. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore the meaning of freedom from a comparative perspective, focusing on critical comparisons between the discourses of liberalism and Neo-Confucianism. In so doing, my specific purpose is to characterize one of the possible, and perhaps the most plausible, presentations of Confucian liberalism as a perfectionist form of Hegelian liberalism. The contents are organized into three major sections.To begin with, thanks largely to Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of Liberty” and Chang Fo-ch’üan’s Tzu-yu yü jen-ch’üan, an asymmetry (...) emerged in conceptualizing negative and positive freedom in the Chinese context; this development suggests that whereas negative.. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining (...) a realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcomes then leads to the judgment that strategic voting is beneficial. If it is, then Arrow's theorem does not have far-reaching consequences for democracy because one of its conditions is not normatively acceptable. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that interpersonal comparisons of utility are problematic or even impossible, and that this poses a problem for the thesis that pleasure is a legitimate, measurable quantity. This, in turn, is thought to pose a problem of some kind for a variety of normative ethical and axiological theories. Perhaps it is supposed to show that utilitarianism or hedonism is false, or is supposed to show that there is no genuine hedonic calculus, or that any view that (...) presupposes that pleasure and pain are morally relevant is false or untenable. Its proponents begin by noticing that interpersonal comparisons of pleasure and pain are impossible in some relevant sense. This impossibility has been exploited by different philosophers for different purposes. It is clear, however, that a great many ethical theories rely in some way on the thesis that pleasure is measurable, and that its incoherence therefore threatens a great many theories in ethics. The purpose of this paper is to survey several of the most interesting versions of this argument; then to explain several attempts to respond to the problem, and to explain why each attempt fails; then to present, explain, and defend the correct solution to the problem. (shrink)

Con este artículo se pretende simplificar la propuesta presentada en un trabajo anterior, prescindiendo como conectiva del símbolo barra de la probabilidad condicionada. Haciéndolo, se consigue reducir a la mitad el número de condiciones postuladas, percibiéndose con ello mejor el lugar central de la condición de superioridad por implicación. También se aborda qué información pueda proporcionar el grado de aproximación de los modelos teórico-económicos sobre lo que vaya a terminar sucediendo en las situaciones empíricas correspondientes, se indican dos formar de (...) ampliar el análisis para incrementarla, y se comenta la aplicabilidad práctica de las comparaciones estudiadas.The proposal about the approximation comparisons presented in an earlier essay may be simplified doing without the bar symbol of conditional probability. In this way, the number of the postulated conditions diminish in a half, and the key role of the superiority by implication property is better perceived. Attention is also paid to what information can be gathered from the approximation degree of economic theoretical models about what may finally happen in the corresponding empirical situations, and to the ways by which this information can be increased. Some comments about the applicability of approximation comparisons are added. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In two recent AJP papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose: specifically, we (...) should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity. (shrink)

The idea that morality and prudence are incommensurable normative domains—a central idea in normative pluralism—tends to be rejected because of the argument from nominal–notable comparisons. The argument relies on a premise that there are situations of moral–prudential conflict where we have a clear intuition that there are things we ought to do “all things considered”. It is usually concluded that this shows that morality and prudence must be comparable. I argue that normative pluralists, who defend this type of incommensurability, (...) can account for these intuitions by arguing that an “ought all things considered” need not presuppose inter-type comparability among the reasons it covers, and by endorsing more sophisticated theories of prudence; theories for which there are good, independent reasons to endorse, in any case. By following these steps, normative pluralism does not need to have the counterintuitive implications it is often thought to have. (shrink)

Loneliness—perceived social isolation—is defined as a discrepancy between existing social relationships and desired quality of relationships. Whereas most research has focused on existing relationships, we consider the standards against which people compare them. Participants who made downward social or temporal comparisons that depicted their contact with others as better reported less loneliness than participants who made upward comparisons that depicted their contact with others as worse. Extending these causal results, in a survey of British adults, upward social (...) class='Hi'>comparisons predicted current loneliness, even when controlling for loneliness at a previous point in time. Finally, content analyses of interviews with American adults who lived alone showed that social and temporal comparisons about contact with others were both prevalent and linked to expressed loneliness. These findings contribute to understanding the social cognition of loneliness, extend the effects of comparisons about social connection to the important public health problem of loneliness, and provide a novel tool for acutely manipulating loneliness. (shrink)

Recent societal changes, including a global pandemic, have exacerbated experiences of and attention to burnout related to work and parenting. In the present study, we investigated how several social forces can act as demands and resources to impact work-related and parental burnout. We tested two primary hypotheses in a sample of women who responded to an online survey. We found that social comparisons, social media use, negative emotions when comparing oneself to others on social media, and a high do (...) it all discrepancy were correlated with higher reports of work-related and parental burnout. Alternatively, positive emotions when comparing oneself to others and social support were related to lower reports of work-related and parental burnout. The influence of social media use on burnout was mediated by the emotions experienced when comparing oneself to others on social media. Tests of moderation indicated that social comparisons had stronger relationships with burnout for those with higher expectations that they should be able to do it all verses can do it all. Tests of social support as a moderator of the relationships between social demands and burnout were largely non-significant. Based on these findings, we make practical suggestions for interventions to increase positive emotions experienced from social media use, and to mediate the do it all discrepancy by redefining expectations around “doing it all.”. (shrink)

Many ethical theories, including in particular consequentialist moral the ories, require comparisons of the amount of good possessed or received by different people. In the case of some goods, such as monetary income, wealth, education, or health, such comparisons are relatively unproblematic. Even in the case of such goods there may be serious empirical measurement problems, but there appear to be no difficulties in principle. Thus Cooter and Rappoport maintained that there was no serious difficulty of making interpersonal (...) utility comparisons for an earlier generation of economists who regarded utility as an index of “material welfare.”. (shrink)

Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, 2011) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them.

As a powerful tool in the production of knowledge, comparing plays a crucial part in the sciences and the humanities. This volume explores the relationship between comparing and narrating in epistemic practices and clarifies the ways in which narratives enable or impede practices of comparing. It takes into account related activities, such as measuring and classifying, modeling, establishing norms and categories, as well as organizing and popularizing knowledge, to analyze the ambivalent relationship between narratives, scientific explanation, and understanding. The contributions (...) bring out the epistemic role of narratives, and elucidate how narratives are connected to comparisons and scientific explanations."--Publisher description. (shrink)

Boxers and healthcare workers alike should be able to exercise their rightsAlthough there are calls elsewhere to ban boxing, the Australian Medical Association advocates a less restrictive rule. Professional boxers would submit to brain scans and MRIs—but what to do with the results of such tests? Critics say that boxers should decide which risks they take, but boxers are not the only ones in the debate. Healthcare workers understandably want some say in which risks people take, because the hospital is (...) where boxers go when injuries occur . These issues of ethics and obligation are not made easier to resolve by the many disputed comparisons in this debate. Is boxing like other risk taking behaviour? Are physicians like other public employees? Until such questions are answered, a compromise would have check ups made mandatory, without forcing boxers to act on any knowledge gained.There is no shortage of comparisons in the debate over boxing. Boxing, we hear, is like fast food: dangerous yes, but it does offer some benefits. No, the opposing side contends, boxing is like a pistol duel: once considered sophisticated, it is now just a ritualistic violence. Perhaps boxing is like smoking: inform boxers of the risks and let them at it. Then again, if boxing is like smoking, people who do not realise how dangerous it is need protection from it. Depending on who you listen to, boxing is an expression of individualism and personal sacrifice—the next best thing to running your own country—or it illustrates the danger in letting concern for autonomy overstretch the social fabric. And so the comparisons continue, without really convincing anyone. Not surprisingly, reformist proposals that could include mandatory brain scans for boxers are viewed as intrusive …. (shrink)

The degree of justification for a judgment of artistic value is normally directly proportional to the size of the comparison class that is brought to bear in making that judgment. If that comparison class is very small or nonexistent, justified judgments are unlikely or impossible. So which artworks, if any, are comparable? The claim that evaluative comparisons can be made among artworks within a fine-grained category—abstract expressionist paintings, for example—is relatively uncontroversial. But is there any way that we can (...) compare artworks that have only a very coarse-grained category in common (such as two works of visual art), or that are in completely different coarse-grained categories (such as a symphony and a sculpture)? I argue that both very similar and very different artworks can be compared evaluatively. Comparisons within fine-grained categories are common, and reflection on critical practices shows us that they depend crucially on qualitative assessments of artistically valuable properties. Once qualitative assessment is recognized as underwriting artistic criticism, it follows that even rough-grained categorization provides no essential barrier to comparison, securing the possibility of well-justified evaluations of disparate artworks. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two sections. The first aims at showing in a general way that the programme and methods of Berkeley and Professor Ryle are to a large extent similar. The second deals with one problem only. It is an attempt to provide interpretation and commentary on Berkeley's attack on “absolute existence” and on Ryle's attack on the view that there can be different “kinds of existence,” “kinds of status,” or a number of different “worlds.”.

It is a truism that the relationships between literature and visual entertainment are multiple, complex and variable, especially if we consider literature in the broad sense and keep in mind the enormous variety in the forms of spectacle. Actually, several dangers lie in wait for the one who, on the comparative level, deals with the problem of the relationships between a literary work and a work intended to be viewed as visual entertainment.

A major problem for interpersonal aggregation is how to compare utility across individuals; a major problem for decision-making under normative uncertainty is the formally analogous problem of how to compare choice-worthiness across theories. We introduce and study a class of methods, which we call statistical normalization methods, for making interpersonal comparisons of utility and intertheoretic comparisons of choice-worthiness. We argue against the statistical normalization methods that have been proposed in the literature. We argue, instead, in favor of normalization (...) of variance: we claim that this is the account that most plausibly gives all individuals or theories ‘equal say’. To this end, we provide two proofs that variance normalization has desirable properties that all other normalization methods lack, though we also show how different assumptions could lead one to axiomatize alternative statistical normalization methods. (shrink)

This note demonstrates that the property of Replication Invariance, generally considered to be an innocuous requirement for the extension of fixed-population poverty comparisons to variable- population contexts, is incompatible with other plausible variable-population axioms in the presence of specific canonical fixed-population axioms.