I address an argument in value theory which threatens to render nonsensical many debates in modern ethics. Almotahari and Hosein’s :1485–1508, 2015) argument against the property of goodness simpliciter is presented. I criticise the linguistic tests they use in their argument, suggesting they do not provide much support for their conclusion. I draw a weaker conclusion from their argument, and argue that defenders of goodness simpliciter have not responded adequately to this milder conclusion. I go on to argue that moral (...) philosophers ought to abandon the property of goodness simpliciter and focus their attention on the property of being a good state of affairs. I defend this property against Almotahari and Hosein’s criticism, and give reasons to think it is at the heart of moral theory. (shrink)

In the course of history, the doctrine of just war has proven to be susceptible to political misuse. Furthermore, it features a number of conceptual deficiencies. In the leading perspective of ‘just peace’, peace ethics primarily emphasises the task of violence prevention, for which the realisation and protection of human rights gain central importance. Even the traditional term ‘common good’ can be reformulated in this context. The concept of ‘just peace’ critically confronts the discussion (...) on the legitimacy of pre-emptive wars. With regard to ‘humanitarian interventions’, it calls for a sophisticated catalogue of criteria that helps to define the presuppositions under which such interventions can be deemed legitimate. (shrink)

This article revisits some of the main tenets and problems of the Just Peace concept as developed in the German Protestant Church, showing how it is beset by incoherences, ironical returns of expanded violence, as well as the problem of abstraction: once the Just Peace concept is applied to concrete problems, it runs dry. The article then examines some recent contributions made under the wider umbrella of ‘peace ethics’, showing that attempts to combine the (...) class='Hi'>Just Peace and bellum iustum are bound to fail. It then retraces the present shift to Just War thinking that reorders the basic terms, whilst also retaining some of the tenets of the Just Peace approach. Some refinements of these developments are indicated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Just Peace:A Buddhist-Christian Path to LiberationKyeongil JungThe primary goal of religion is liberation from suffering, and the state of liberation is peace. In that sense religion is a salvific and peace-seeking path. But just as many rivers flow into one great ocean, there are many paths to liberation, that is, to peace. Since the destination is the same, peace-seekers may walk on (...) one path, two paths, or more. I don't know whether it is due to good karma or divine grace, but I have been walking on two paths, Buddhist and Christian, since I began to pursue a spiritual-social transformation of the self and the world. This is possible, as my late friend Praveen Chaudhari said, not because the two paths are the same but precisely because they are different.The contrasting difference I have experienced is that while Buddhism is a path of peace to peace, Christianity is a path of justice to peace. This difference has become more apparent to me as I have studied and practiced both socially engaged Buddhism and liberation theology. Engaged Buddhists seek to achieve peace through "being peace," which is an impartial and nonadversarial way of proceeding, whereas liberative Christians seek to achieve peace through working for justice, which entails a preferential and confrontational attitude. But in these differences I believe that the two approaches can complement, not contradict, each other. They can do so because Buddhism and Christianity are differently but equally salvific paths on the common ground of human suffering.I walk on the two paths to peace at the same time. While this may not be possible intellectually and logically, in my experience it becomes possible through praxis. Liberation theologians are right that theological reflection is a "second act" that follows the first act: the praxis of liberation. In this essay I reflect on four major oppositions that have arisen in the course of my dual praxis: compassion language and justice language, peace and justice, nonviolence and violence, and meditation and action. In each case the opposition is resolved through mutual correction in view of the salvific purpose of both emphases.Compassion Language and Justice LanguageThere are two languages that inspire people to respond to human suffering, namely, the language of compassion and that of justice. Though the two languages are spoken [End Page 3] by Buddhists as well as Christians, compassion language is often attributed to Buddhism and justice language to Christianity. Buddhists draw mainly on compassion language to respond to human suffering. Such language is impartial: it does not discriminate between victims and victimizers, but encourages Buddhists to be compassionate toward both. Thich Nhat Hanh gives a striking illustration of the impartiality of Buddhist compassion: "I am the twelve-year-old girl, refugee on a small boat, who throws herself into the ocean after being raped by a sea pirate. And I am the pirate, my heart not yet capable of seeing and loving."1The two italicized "be" verbs challenge me. Though it is not always easy, I have no problem with the first "am" in the poem. I am compassionate toward the poor twelve-year-old girl. I feel her pain, shame, and despair. The compassion language does not allow me to distance myself here from her there. The girl's suffering is my suffering; I am the twelve-year-old girl. But, the second "am" takes my breath away. It is unthinkable and even immoral to identify myself with the sea pirate and to be compassionate toward him. I am not the pirate. Instead of compassion, I feel anger. The pirate should be punished for his heinous crime. I must take sides with the girl against the sea pirate. Why on earth is Nhat Hanh compassionate toward the evil sea pirate?Nhat Hanh was also angry when he heard of the girl's cruel fate. However, after meditating on the tragedy, he realized that he could not simply take sides: "If I had been born in his village and brought up under the same conditions, I would be exactly like him."2 He cannot take sides because he is aware of conditions in which a poor... (shrink)

Beilin was a former chief negotiator for the Israeli government in the Oslo process at Camp David and Taba. He brings a valuable contribution to this volume as a practitioner and political scientist involved directly in conflict negotiations. After fulfilling his post as the Minister of Justice for the Israeli government, he became one of the lead Israeli representatives in the Geneva Accord negotiations. In this sceptical work, Beilin points to the possible dangers of speaking about the combined concepts of (...) justice and peace, believing that there cannot be one without the other. Peace treaties have often been signed and implemented by the victors of conflict, but have left the population on either side out of the determinations of justice. Beilin presents a history filled with examples in which political leaders have bypassed opportunities for peace because they did not deem the conditions just, and thus perpetuated conflict with untold costs. (shrink)

In the debate on peace ethics in Germany, it is constantly argued that the ‘doctrine of just war’ must be replaced by a ‘doctrine of just peace’. The criteriology of just war can at best be preserved within a doctrine of just peace. However, it is often overlooked that—although the word ‘peace’ may sound nicer than ‘war’—a doctrine of just peace is also fraught with great difficulties in terms of content. (...) The concept of peace can be interpreted in different ways; the concept of justice must even be differentiated if it is to have meaning at all. Ultimately, the two concepts point to a different understanding of tradition and historicity: while the doctrine of just war takes its criteria from the tradition, the idea of just peace attempts to draw conclusions for the present from drafts or blueprints of the future. However, since the drafts can turn out differently, new conflicts will arise precisely for this reason. Talk of ‘just peace’ might be more pleasing to the public, but does not necessarily have to be more restrictive in terms of violence. (shrink)

Including contributions from some of the world's leading scholars, this ground-breaking book provides a carefully considered analysis of what constitutes a just peace. A cross-section of conflicting viewpoints from political, historical, and legal perspectives are brought together in this book to demonstrate how just peace has to be a mediated peace.

This essay argues that contemporary warfare seems to be religious but is in fact secular in nature and as such calls forth religious alternatives. The violence unleashed by Islamic terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’ is secular in this sense that it is unmediated and removes any universal ethical limits from conflicts: unrestrained violence is either a divine injunction which is blindly and fideistically believed; or it is waged in the name of the supremely sovereign state which deploys war (...) to uphold the constitutional order guaranteeing an exclusive state monopoly on the use of arbitrary physical force. The first part compares and contrasts two false universalisms; that of global market democracy and a revivified pan-Islamic Ummah. The second part explores the classical and modern origins of Islamic terrorism. The third part examines the perverted theology at the heart of the neo-conservative ‘global war on terror’. The fourth part analyses the permanent ‘state of exception’ which underpins the modern state and licenses unrestricted violence by the sovereign who stands outside and above the constitutional order of legality and legitimacy. The fifth and final part outlines religious alternatives to secular warfare; with specific reference to Islam and Christianity. (shrink)

In this concluding chapter, Allan and Keller posit that Just Peace should be defined as a process resting on four necessary and sufficient conditions: thin recognition whereby the other is accepted as autonomous; thick recognition whereby identities need to be accounted for; renouncement, requiring significant sacrifices from all parties; and rule, the objectification of a Just Peace by a ‘text’ requiring a common language respecting the identities of each, and defining their rights and duties. This approach, (...) based on a language-oriented process amongst directly concerned parties, goes beyond liberal and culturalist perspectives. By moving beyond the idea of a peace founded on norms claiming universal scope, each side of a conflict has a place at the negotiating table to present their own perspective on what justice might entail. This inclusion into the decision-making process helps create the feeling of personal investment in the final negotiated product. In addition, negotiators need to work towards building a novel shared reality as well as a new common language to help foster an enduring harmony between previously clashing peoples. (shrink)

Pope Francis both grants the right to use armed force in self-defense and regards all war as ‘a defeat for humanity’. This seeming paradox can be explained by the fact that what is a theoretically just use of force (according to the criteria of just war theory) inevitably results in unjust violence when carried out in practice. The undertaking, processes and practices of war are highly susceptible to what Augustine called the libido dominandi. The theory of just (...) war is carried forward in institutions of actual war-making that foster escalation, discourage restraint, and adapt the theory itself to accommodate increasing violence. ‘Just war’ fails to embody the social and institutional virtue of justice. Thus, as Pope Francis exhorts, the Christian ethics of war and peace should prioritize the theory of just peace and the cultivation of peacebuilding dispositions, practices, and institutions. These strategies favor justice, but success is not guaranteed. (shrink)

In this chapter, I approach the subject of peace by way of Andrew Fiala’s pioneering, synthetic work on “practical pacifism.” One of Fiala’s articles on the subject of peace is entitled “Radical Forgiveness and Human Justice”—and if one were to replace “Radical Forgiveness” with “Peace,” this would be a fair title for my chapter. In fact, Fiala himself explicitly makes a connection in the article between radical forgiveness and peace. Also in support of my project, Fiala’s (...) article names four of the six historical figures who are central to my chapter, namely Marcus Aurelius, King, Arendt, and Nietzsche. Moreover, Fiala also insists there “forgiveness must be held in creative tension with justice,” and it is this very tension that forms the basis of my new conception of socially-just peace. To wit, I propose that socially-just peace is lovingly generous reimagining (peace) through intuitively self-overcoming tension (social justice). (shrink)

The article’s reasoning is based on the definition of the nature of the war in Ukraine, which, following the Russian aggression on February 24, 2022, escalated into a full-scale conflict: this war has gradually acquired features of the total wars of the 20th century and transformed into a war of attrition, which could last for a considerable period of time. If such a war does not end with the capitulation of one of the parties, the most likely outcome would be (...) a peace agreement involving third parties, which would take the form of a compromise and involve a renunciation by the participating parties of complete victory in the war. Given the just nature of Ukraine's war against Russian aggression, the author raises the question of whether a peace can be considered just without a complete victory over the aggressor and without the full restoration of justice disrupted by the aggression. Drawing on the classical work of M. Walzer, the author concludes that renouncing complete victory and halting hostilities at a point when the conflict can be resolved through political means fully aligns with the concept of a just war as a limited war. To establish the moral principles and possible limits of compromises in wartime, the author turns to A. Margalit’s concept, which, in his view, continues Walzer’s reasoning by outlining the possibility of compromises for the sake of peace. Drawing on contemporary research on political compromises, the author analyzes possible configurations of compromises in wartimes, their differences from political compromises in peacetime, and other potential outcomes of a war of attrition, including scenarios such as the capitulation of one of the parties or a modus vivendi. The article develops on the ideas of M. Walzer and A. Margalit, emphasizing that limiting the war and reaching a compromise for peace make necessary to clarify the requirements of justice. This, in turn, necessitates that the party engaged in a just war be guided by the ethics of responsibility when determining war aims, while also adhering to the fundamental distinction between good and evil in order to avoid "rotten" compromises. (shrink)

In this essay, the author describes the trajectory toward a just peace framework in contemporary Catholic social teaching, as well as similar trends in the broader Christian community. He articulates a refined just peace framework or process that has arisen from and within a pastoral approach that listens to the experiences and voices of people in conflict situations across various cultural spaces. He then turns to the recent and challenging case of the war in Ukraine to (...) explore and argue for a just peace approach rooted in the praxis of accompaniment. The author also reflects on the distinction between and implications of an accompaniment approach and a justification-of-war approach to initiate more inquiry on this topic. (shrink)

The concept of jus post bellum deals with moral considerations in the aftermath of conflict and is concerned with how a just peace should look like. This paper analyses the concept of jus post bellum as developed by contemporary Just War theorists. Its aim is to provide a critical perspective on the proposed substantial scope of this concept. In other words, it will consider the question: in restoring peace after war, is it justified for just (...) combatants to change the political structure of a defeated aggressor? The piece will be divided into two main parts. First, through a review of the literature, I define the current state of the art on jus post bellum thinking in relation to a number of key aspects of this concept. What does241 it entail? Which principles is it made of? What sort of activities do just war theorists speak about when they speak of creating a just peace? Second, I focus on the principle of ?political rehabilitation? of the defeated state: is it permissible? Under what circumstances? While considering these questions and authors' views on this matter, the paper will provide a critical reappraisal of the current debate on the justifiability of political reconstruction in post-conflict states. (shrink)

This paper reviews briefly the main approaches in the literature on ethics of war and suggests the need to move beyond an _ethic of justice_ towards an _ethic of care_. The analysis problematizes dominant understandings of “just war” and “just peace” in the literature and highlights that incorporating elements of an ethic of care, our understanding of ethics of war and peace can be redefined, sharpened, and redeployed through an enlarged ethical lens. The author suggests that (...) scholars and practitioners in different fields of study and domains of social and political life can make important contributions by defining, elucidating, and advocating why both perspectives, those of ethic of justice and care, _together_ allow us to capture the prospects of a broader understanding and the practice of peace. (shrink)

In this chapter, Said argues that in the case of the Palestinians and Israelis, histories and cultures are inextricably linked ‘contrapuntally’ in symbiotic rather than mutually exclusive terms. When this understanding of circumstances occurs, it no longer seems viable to eliminate the opposition because there will always be a tomorrow in which retribution will be demanded by those who feel that an injustice had been forced upon family members or previous generations. Said emphasizes the need to think about and resolve (...) two histories that have become interwoven, despite the fact that many have tried to define the other in contradictory terms. Part of arriving at a Just Peace entails recognizing a shared identity and common history even if this approach highlights differences. This might be a monumental task considering the trials and tribulations that have often come to pass in a conflict, but for Said, an ‘abridged memory’ is not an option that will lead to Just Peace. (shrink)

In this article, the author aims to demonstrate how Agamben’s concept of Homo Sacer is ideally epitomized by a soldier in war. A soldier in war holds a peculiar position, as killing of soldiers is considered neither illegal by laws nor immoral by ethics, and so a soldier is not considered to be legally or morally “guilty” in the usual sense of the word if he or she kills another soldier in war. The author analyzes the notion of Homo Sacer (...) – a figure representing a human that can be killed without the killer being punished, but at the same time someone who cannot be sacrificed – and further demonstrates that a soldier in war can be said to hold precisely such a status. The reason why a soldier cannot be sacrificed resides in the fact that he has already been “sacrificed to war” by his own society, in exchange for the safety of all other members of society. Perceiving a soldier as Homo Sacer provides a novel explanation and an additional argument for the moral symmetry of combatants, one of the pillars of non-revisionist Just War Theory, as all soldiers can be understood as persons sacrificed by their own societies. (shrink)

In recent times, ‘just war’ discourse has become unfortunately associated, in the minds of some, with the idea of the forcible promotion or imposition of democracy as a legitimate just cause. It would thus be understandable if supporters of just war theory were to disavow any particular linkage of its tenets with the democratic ideal. However, while certainly not endorsing the stated cause, this article contends that the theory in its most plausible and attractive form does exhibit (...) certain biases towards the ideal, in both jus ad bellum and jus post bellum. If these biases fall short of shackling the theory to claims such as ‘only democracies can fight just wars’, they may nevertheless place taxing justificatory burdens on a non-democracy's claim to have a war-waging right and on non-democratic conceptions of the just peace that should ideally follow a just war. (shrink)

Through an historical-conceptual analysis of Utopia, the essay examines several features of More’s international political thought, drawing attention to the analogies that permit to compare his work to contemporary theories and practices of justifying war. From this perspective, More’s conceptualisation of just war constitutes an early modern attempt to legitimise states’ policies aimed at exporting specific political and cultural models to other states, relying on the assumption that such models are intrinsically valuable or constitute optimal solutions for the life (...) of any political community. (shrink)

In the wake of political evil on a large scale, what does justice consist of? Daniel Philpott takes up this question in Just and Unjust Peace. While scholars have written about many aspects of dealing with past injustice, no general ethic has emerged. Philpott seeks to provide a holistic model that delivers concrete ethical guidelines for societies striving to build peace.

In this paper, we draw attention to an unintended but severe side effect of just war thinking: the fact that it can impose barriers to making peace. Investigating historical material concerning a series of conflicts in China during the early twentieth century, we suggest that operating in a just war framework might change actors' identities and interests in a way that makes peacemaking an unavailable action. But since just war theory places significant normative constraints on how (...) long wars can be continued, it might thus be self-defeating, in the sense that those who adopt it may undermine the very goals which it is supposed to serve. Whether this finding calls for a revision of existing ethical frameworks governing warfare will depend on whether there are possible alternatives to just war theory that perform better at reining in unjust violence. (shrink)

'Glocal Public Philosophy' means a practical philosophy that deals with universal public issues from the particular public world or place where each individual lives and acts. Taking historical changes of the nature of public philosophy, as well as of academic situations from the 19th century onwards into consideration, the author tries to develop this idea in view of contemporary philosophies both in Western countries and in Japan. This book provides, not only new knowledge about modern Japanese public philosophies, but also (...) inspiration for a new role of philosophy for the realization of a more peaceful and just societies. (Series: Philosophy in International Context / Philosophie im internationalen Kontext. Studies / Abhandlungen, Vol. 9) [Subject: Philosophy]. (shrink)

Contemporary debate on humanitarian intervention has prompted a revival of interest in the Just War ( justum bellum ) tradition of moral reflection. This tradition can be seen to provide an ethical vocabulary for assessing and possibly justifying these interventions. Just War is typically viewed as a middle way between Pacifism, on the one hand, and Realism, on the other; hence an ample literature exists comparing these traditions. Considerably less has been written, however, contrasting Just War with (...) Perpetual Peace. This article seeks to remedy that lacuna, with particular application to the question of humanitarian intervention. Taking the political controversy over NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention as its point of departure, the article shows how support or opposition to this intervention often hinged upon the differing presuppositions of the Just War and Perpetual Peace traditions. It then proceeds to map out these different presuppositions by historical reference to exponents of each tradition, Aquinas and Vitoria for the former, Dante and Kant for the latter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation by Daniel PhilpottGlen StassenJust and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation Daniel Philpott New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 365pp. $29.95Just and Unjust Peace deals with an important question: What does a holistic framework of justice consist of in the wake of its massive despoliation? The wounds of political injustice include the following: violation (...) of the victim’s human rights, harms to the victim’s person, the victim’s ignorance of the source and circumstances of political injustices, the lack of acknowledgment of the suffering, the standing victory of the wrongdoer’s political injustice, and harm to the person of the wrongdoer. In such situations, Philpott argues, “what the government and community withhold is... an acknowledgment not only that a victim has rights but also that his rights were violated and that he suffered because of this violation” (37).The definition of justice in this context of wounds is reconciliation. It “encompasses peace settlements, human rights, democracy, and other key goals of negative and positive peace [as well as]... a broad restoration of right relationship involving a multiplicity of practices that each redress wounds of injustice in a particular way” (48–49).Daniel Philpott affirms peace as human rights, equality, and the rule of law, plus actors and institutions like the United Nations that spread this justice. He presents a fair summary of contending positions on human rights and works to develop overlapping agreement. “What is most essential to right relationship in the political order is human rights, their popular legitimacy, and their corresponding virtues” (55). But also, “It is in redressing wrong conduct—the other dimension of justice—that political reconciliation becomes far more distinctive” (55). This requires a deeper understanding of just peacemaking with restorative justice based in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and in insightful assessment of the burgeoning practices of truth commissions and restorative justice in the transitions from dictatorship to democracy.Philpott’s “rooted reason” invites different religions to speak from their depths but also encourages them to speak with reasons that can convince in public discourse (18, 20). Envisioning the incorporation of reconciliation into the modern state “is the life’s work of Rabbi Marc Gopin. In today’s Middle East, [End Page 211] Gopin argues, Jews as well as Christians and Muslims cannot afford to ignore the peacebuilding potential of traditional religious concepts” (132). Philpott also exhibits sensitive understanding of Islam, asking, “Do Islamic texts and traditions contain the materials for the construction of the ethic of political reconciliation that I am proposing? Can Muslims, on the basis of their religious convictions, join in an overlapping consensus on such an ethic?” His answer is a clear yes (153).He identifies and assesses six practices of a politics of reconciliation. The first involves building socially just institutions and relations between states: “Since 1974, some ninety societies... have sought to replace dictatorships with democracies.... A similarly intense global wave of peace operations sponsored by the United Nations... has sought to foster human rights and democratic institutions in states that have seen civil war” (175–76). The second has to do with the practices of political acknowledgment of wrongs: “Human rights are the standard that gives truth commissions and other public forms of acknowledgment form and direction” (188). The third pertains to reparations, with attention to the ongoing effects of historical injustices for descendants (195 and 201). The fourth addresses judicial punishment: “In practicing judicial punishment, a state redresses the violation of the victim’s rights insofar as it expresses, reaffirms, and thereby strengthens human rights as the legally valid values of its realm or of relations between it and another state” (237). The fifth is apology: “Like all of the other practices, apologies performed in political contexts have grown in frequency” (198). Finally, there is forgiveness. “Political injustices harm victims by robbing them of their agency and of their ability to pursue their own and others’ flourishing.... Forgiveness... re-empowers the victim as agent... [and liberates] from anger and resentment” and can also lead to recognition of the victim’s suffering, and to mutual respect for human rights (266–68... (shrink)

Because the goal of reducing violence is nearly universally accepted, the uniquely prescriptive character of peace and conflict studies is rarely scrutinized. However, prescriptive pacifism in social psychological peace research (SPPR) masks a diversity of opinion on whether nonintervention is more effective in promoting peace than intervention to punish aggression, restore stability, and/or prevent atrocity. SPPR’s skepticism is sharper in the post–9/11 era when states use public fear of terrorist threat to promote sometimes-unrelated domestic and geostrategic interests. (...) The most frequently proposed remedy for this kind of abuse is some form of international legal positivism that permits the use of force only in self-defense, per strict interpretation of the United Nations Charter, or not at all—a position the author calls ‘prescriptive pacifism." This project critically examines the metaethical premises of prescriptive pacifism, positivism, and realism, how these animate the moral and political skepticism of peace studies, psychology, and international relations, respectively, and meet in SPPR. After comparing the intellectual development of these fields and just war theory, I present influential psychologist Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory (SCT) of moral judgment and aggression as a case study. I present evidence of the problematic nature of Bandura and others’ formulation of moral engagement and disengagement, tracing their contradictions to the named premises. In brief, I argue that SCT’s underlying skepticism of individual moral judgment implies elite or consensus-driven models of social and political change whose institutional gradualism contradicts these authors’ and SPPR’s stated progressive aims, and whose utilitarian ethos undermines the egalitarian individualism that underpins both the liberal conception of the rule of law and the international human rights regime. Finally, I present an alternative model of moral reasoning and engagement based on a Kantian constructivist understanding of international ethics, and the theory of the just war. I outline two instruments inspired by these related normative frameworks that in addition to being more internally coherent, operationalize moral engagement and disengagement in a manner more consonant with political liberalism, existing international humanitarian law, and the emergent norm known as Responsibility to Protect. Intended for use in the collection and coding of qualitative responses to survey research of public opinion on morally ambiguous issues in international politics such as intervention and territorial integrity, these instruments avoid the tendency of existing SPPR frameworks toward false positives of militarism and pacifism. Their presentation also makes mutually comprehensible the often-confusing professional idioms of international relations, political theory, moral philosophy, and social psychology, standing to make a contribution to each. (shrink)

How can a just peace be built in sites of genocide, massive civil war, dictatorship, terrorism, and poverty? In Strategies of Peace, the first volume in the Studies in Strategic Peacebuilding series, fifteen leading scholars propose an imaginative and provocative approach to peacebuilding. Today the dominant thinking is the "liberal peace," which stresses cease fires, elections, and short run peace operations carried out by international institutions, western states, and local political elites. But the liberal (...) class='Hi'>peace is not enough, the authors argue. A just and sustainable peace requires a far more holistic vision that links together activities, actors, and institutions at all levels. By exploring innovative models for building lasting peace-a United Nations counter-terrorism policy that also promotes good governance; coordination of the international prosecution of war criminals with local efforts to settle civil wars; increasing the involvement of religious leaders, who have a unique ability to elicit peace settlements; and many others--the authors advance a bold new vision for peacebuilding. (shrink)

Lively political and public debates on war and morality have been a feature of the post-Cold War world. The Price of Peace argues that a re-examination of the just war tradition is therefore required. The authors suggest that despite fluctuations and transformations in international politics, the just war tradition continues to be relevant. However they argue that it needs to be reworked to respond to the new challenges to international security represented by the end of the Cold (...) War and the impact of terrorism. With an interdisciplinary and transatlantic approach, this volume provides a dialogue between theological, political, military and public actors. By articulating what a reconstituted just war tradition might mean in practice, it also aims to assist policy-makers and citizens in dealing with the ethical dilemmas of war. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 179-195.

In 1983 the US bishops issued a deeply influential pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, which addressed moral questions of warfare, particularly in the context of the Cold War. Four decades later, it is clear that the challenge to build just and peaceful societies is still with us in the US and throughout the world. This article supports the development of new documents—whether episcopal or papal—to center nonviolence in Catholic teaching, to demonstrate the (...) value and efficacy of active nonviolence in working toward a just peace, and to clarify the relationship between nonviolence and the just war tradition. It makes suggestions as to how such a document might be rooted in the Christian tradition and discipleship, and what issues must urgently be addressed. (shrink)

Peace is not just the work of governments or armies or diplomats, he argues, but the task of each one of us. We can all become makers of peace. We can do our part.

Why has peace been often unjust, and why has justice been more belligerent than peaceful? Frequently, peace or armistice has served only to put a temporary end to violence, and has left some or all sides feeling dissatisfied. Peace has also been an imposition on the part of the victors of conflict to the end of some notion of order, thus leaving the affected common people to draw their own conclusions without ever being consulted. It is for (...) this reason that justice is often more properly envisioned as the image of a fighter with his sword rather than a balancing scale. In this chapter, Hoffman explores the complexity of how peace and justice might be wedded in international relations, and gives the reader sound starting points for thinking about this conceptual approach. (shrink)

According to Keller, we have no hope of explaining what is or is not a Just Peace in global relations unless we pay more attention to the intellectual context in which international law was formed. From its birth in the 16th century, there was a progressive retreat by Europeans from conceding sovereign rights to specific non-European peoples, to then only recognizing a conditional sovereignty, and eventually to denying any right to self-determination of non-white peoples. However, there was a (...) tradition of thought that recognized and accommodated cultural diversity that can be found in the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau, among others. This chapter argues that these writers proposed one of the cornerstones of the concept of a Just Peace, the principle of recognition. This notion was developed from an effort to understand another’s point of view and an appreciation of otherness. (shrink)

Humankind is currently witnessing, and shaping, the most significant and rapid paradigm shift in human history - a paradigm shift of major demographic, economic, ecological, and geo-political dimensions. For the first time in human history - we are faced not with just one crisis - but a confluence of several crises; crises that are not related to a single tribe or community - a single nation -or a single region of the world - but are each global in scale. (...) To meet the challenges of these global crises will require an equally historic paradigm shift; a paradigm shift with a strong environmental ethic that restores ecological balance and integrity to our failing ecosystems, and that addresses the critical issue of climate change; a paradigm shift toward an economic system that brings about an end to poverty — and a paradigm that brings an end to war as a means to solving conflict, as it is only through a global family in harmony and peace with itself, that we can solve the unprecedented global issues facing our one common home, planet earth - and our one common future as a global family. The travel and tourism industry has, and will continue to play a vital and leading role toward this paradigm shift, and as the world's largest industry involving virtually every nation in the world — will be the central pillar of a Peace through Commerce movement. The dramatic growth of tourism in the past 60 years is one of the most remarkable economic and social phenomena of our time. The industry has grown from a total of 25 million international arrivals in 1950 to a projected 1 billion international arrivals in 2010, and a further projection to 1.6 billion by 2020. Beginning with the emergence of "Ecotourism" in the late 1980' s, there are an increasing number of tourism market segments which fall within a broad category that can be called "Peace Tourism," and classified within a framework that includes peace within ourselves, peace with others, peace with nature, peace with past generations, peace with future generations, and peace with our Creator. Since its birth in 1986, the International Institute for Peace through Tourism (IIPT) has been promoting these values of tourism together with its vision of Travel and Tourism as the world's first "Global Peace Industry" - an industry that promotes and supports the belief that every traveler is potentially an "Ambassador for Peace." This "higher purpose of tourism" includes the key role of tourism in promoting international understanding and collaboration among nations; environmental protection and preservation of biodiversity; enhancing cultures and valuing heritage; contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction; and healing wounds of conflict. (shrink)

Little raises many questions of international legality in addressing the finer concepts of peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. He accentuates the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as foundations for each of these stages towards a Just Peace. Looking towards collectively accepted international treaties for a concept of justice, Little taps into a notion of legal validity that is at least partially composed of a legitimacy that emanates from the people themselves. Although there (...) are valid reasons for questioning who has been allowed to participate in the process developing international law, protecting the human rights of all, and labelling it justice certainly does not seem to create an untenable starting point. In fact, this approach that looks to protect the rights of all can be quite constructive because, ultimately, it is the people involved in a conflict who will determine whether a peace is just, and therefore lasting. (shrink)

Revolutions and aborted revolutions and bitter civil and "local" wars in the 1980s and since have raised new questions about national security, its definition, and its implementation. Nevertheless, a number of basic philosophical and political issues remain constant at a level deeper than tactical considerations. These are what eight accomplished philosophers, political scientists, Christian ethicists, and policymakers came together to discuss. They ask the fundamental and perduring questions of pacifism, war, intervention, and political negotiation. They focus on such problems as (...) ascertaining the role of the churches in the quest for peace, defining "national interest" and "national purpose," and construing intervention in other that strictly unilateral terms. (shrink)

1. In the opening chapter of his arresting book on Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of international and cosmopolitan right, Kant and the Law of War,1 Arthur Ripstein presents Kant’s position as a respon...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:War, Peace, and Reconciliation: A Theological Inquiry by Theodore R. WeberDavid H. MessnerWar, Peace, and Reconciliation: A Theological Inquiry Theodore R. Weber EUGENE, OR: WIPF & STOCK, 2015. 182 pp. $23.00Weber's book makes a helpful contribution to enlivening more theologically grounded strategies for peacemaking through reconciliation. It is a careful, systematic work that takes as its foundation a distinctively Christian view of [End Page 214] God's (...) nature and relation to the world. As a scholar and a pastor for over fifty years, Weber brings a much-needed, wise, and re-centered view to the questions entangled in war, peace, and reconciliation. He advises us not to look first into the realities of war for God, but to look to understand God as the context for all human conflict. He forcefully calls the reader to be a reconciler despite the intractability of conflict. The book is structured in three main parts, beginning with the theological context, then the political context, and, last, to peace, justice, and the church.The "war" that Weber addresses is interstate conflict, representing the negation of the web of relationships constituting a healthy international system. War disrupts God's plan and ruptures the right relationship between humanity and God (43–44). Throughout, Weber embraces a kind of Christian Realism, one that takes seriously the loving nature of God, the sinfulness of humanity, and the limits and possibilities for peacemaking in a human world. Downplaying the pacifistic message of Jesus, Weber highlights the necessities within a fallen world. We cannot eliminate war as a category of existence under the conditions of sin (until the eschaton), but with right orientation and action we can eliminate some war.Noting inadequacies of the just war tradition (though not dispensing with it), Weber identifies the need to ground it more firmly in theology, including enhanced attention to "just intention" as a primary criterion in evaluating the prosecution of war, displacing cause as the first question with which we must interrogate ourselves. Discernment about war and peace must be an ongoing conversation that should include people of faith as well as policymakers. Weber's theological and pastoral sensibilities, alongside his political savvy throughout, make the book a pleasurable and provocative read.The definition of reconciliation deployed is broad and complex, and Weber marshals it for powerful work. Reconciliation "is God's work—the movement of Divine grace through history, engaging all aspects of brokenness and promise and reaching its climax of fulfillment and disclosure in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ" (3). Grace continually calls humanity to enter into the work of reconciliation. Here Weber introduces the idea of relational power; more nuanced than mere substantive power, it connects to the core idea of institution building and the critical emphasis on strengthening the social fabric in the interest of peace. It is the hallmark of the reconciling transformation from systems of dominance to relationships of consent.The book raises questions regarding how to put reconciliation as described into concrete practice, responding to real cases and controversies. Also, there could be added discussion, against this theological backdrop, of what opportunities exist amid current US and global regime change to enter this reconciling activity more fully.Ultimately, the Christian context is central to understanding the ethics that Weber advances. Weber recommends a biblical foundation, one in which [End Page 215] we take the benefit of reading scripture backward from the Christ event. Such an exegetical strategy reveals that God has a plan for all of humanity, a vision of inclusiveness and reconciliation. It is from this vantage point of God's culminating vision, Weber illuminates, that we can understand and embrace human action throughout history and the meaningful, if incomplete, work of reconciliation to which we must commit ourselves, both politically and spiritually. [End Page 216]David H. MessnerEmory UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Introduction By Charles Randall Paul Thank you very much. Thank you very much Reverend Kowalski. I will now introduce our panel. I'll make my own remarks I ...

In this book, the late Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process so far has been mainly the result of the inability of both sides to reach an agreed formula for linking justice to peace. The issues of justice and injustice are focused mainly on the outcomes of the 1947-1949 first Arab-Israeli War and specifically in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. The conflicting historical narratives of the two sides regarding the question (...) of responsibility for the injustice done to the Palestinians turn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a classic case of linking the issues of justice and peace. Given that the two sides often define the conflict in terms of injustice and unfairness, these issues have particular relevance for the peace process, and this is what makes dealing with them as barriers to the resolution of the conflict so problematic. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that the link between justice and peace is an important issue requiring both sides' attention, but, given the wide and currently unbridgeable gap separating the two sides, it should be postponed to the phase of reconciliation rather than being included in the process of conflict resolution. The two-state solution is endorsed as the best and practical solution and as a first step for a "just peace" in this conflict, to be followed by reconciliation. Highly topical, this book is essential reading for scholars and researchers of International Relations, Peace Studies and the Arab-Israeli conflict. (shrink)

Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this world expect that peaceful cooperation is (...) the most beneficial form of interaction for them in the long run. The theory specifies the restrictions on the behavior of autonomous individual and collective agents that are indispensable for peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. In particular, I argue for the need of (i) a globally valid rule of conflict resolution to settle all intra- and inter-group conflicts that cannot be resolved locally, (ii) a world court to apply this rule in cases where local group authorities are inadequate to do so, and to serve as a final court of appeal, and (iii) a world police to enforce the rule. (shrink)