The aim of the paper is to discuss the compatibility of Lacan’s propositions concerning myth posed in Séminaire XVII , as “knowledge of the truth” and as “enunciation of the impossible”, so as to show that they are connected in the sense that myth is the exposition of a process that links enunciation of the truth with a state of rejoice. Elements of Hegel philosophy play an important role in this intricate arrangement.

Resumen Este artículo expone la presencia de Hegel en la teoría psicoanalítica de Lacan: en primer lugar, el uso que este último hace de la dialéctica del amo y el esclavo para iluminar la dimensión imaginaria de la conciencia y el deseo, en segundo lugar, la recepción de la concepción hegeliana del lenguaje en conexión con la función simbólica y la constitución de la subjetividad, y finalmente la postura de ambos respecto de la relación entre saber y verdad. Los tres (...) aspectos contribuyen a iluminar la interpretación del concepto de sujeto en Lacan a la luz de la influencia hegeliana.This article exposes the presence of Hegel in the psychoanalytk theory of Lacan: first, the use that the latter makes of the dialectic of the master and the slave to illuminate the imaginary dimension of consciousness and desire, secondly, the reception of the Hegelian conception of language in connection with the symbolic function and the constitution of subjectivity, and finally the position of both with respect to the relationship between knowledge and truth. The three aspects contribute to illuminate the interpretation of the concept of subject in Lacan in light of the Hegelian influence. (shrink)

Chapter 1 reconstructs Gadamer's fundamental philosophical task. The task is the problem of certainty, which is the problem of responding in some way or another to reasons that seem to show that we need, but cannot complete, the justificationalist project. Justificationalism is the view that we need a special philosophical of all human knowledge all at once. Chapter 2 argues that Hegel and Heidegger both try to solve the problem of certainty by transforming the realist conception of truth on (...) which it depends. Chapters 3 and 4 argue that Gadamer provides the resources for a different response. By exploiting similarities between Gadamer's account of understanding and externalism in analytic epistemology, I argue that there is a possible position, hermeneutic externalism, which is based on Gadamer's concept of authority. Chapter 5 tries to show how hermeneutic externalism finally provides an answer to the problem of certainty. The conclusion that I would like to draw from the whole of this work is that Gadamer is a realist and an externalist, in the sense that those views represent what he should think. He should embrace externalism and realism because they best represent his genuine insights and they best address the philosophical task as he conceives it. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th Century. A major figure in the development of phenomenology, his work also profoundly influenced many of the intellectual movements that followed in his wake, from Sartre's Existentialism to Derrida's deconstructionism. Towards the Definition of Philosophy brings together two seminal lectures that mark a breakthrough moment in Heidegger's thought and introduces the major themes that he would develop in his opus Being and Time.

The text of Martin Heidegger's 1930-1931 lecture course on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit contains some of Heidegger's most crucial statements about temporality, ontological difference and dialectic, and being and time in Hegel.

This work is central to Heidegger's overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth.

"Fried and Polt's translation of Martin Heidegger's Being and Truth is a well-crafted and careful rendering of an important and demanding volume of the Complete Works."-Andrew Mitchell, Emory University In these lectures, delivered in 1933-1934 while he was Rector of the University of Freiburg and an active supporter of the National Socialist regime, Martin Heidegger addresses the history of metaphysics and the notion of truth from Heraclitus to Hegel. First published in German in 2001, these two lecture courses (...) offer a sustained encounter with Heidegger's thinking during a period when he attempted to give expression to his highest ambitions for a philosophy engaged with politics and the world. While the lectures are strongly nationalistic and celebrate the revolutionary spirit of the time, they also attack theories of racial supremacy in an attempt to stake out a distinctively Heideggerian understanding of what it means to be a people. This careful translation offers valuable insight into Heidegger's views on language, truth, animality, and life, as well as his political thought and activity. Gregory Fried is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Suffolk University. He is author of Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics and editor of A Companion to Hedegger's Introduction to Metaphysics. Richard Polt is Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Xavier University. He is author of The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy and Heidegger: An Introduction. (shrink)

This is a sweeping and provocative work of aesthetic theory: a trenchant critique of the philosophy of art as it developed from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, combined with a carefully reasoned plea for a new and more flexible approach to art.Jean-Marie Schaeffer, one of France's leading aestheticians, explores the writings of Kant, Schlegel, Novalis, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger to show that these diverse thinkers shared a common approach to art, which he calls the "speculative (...) theory." According to this theory, art offers a special kind of intuitive, quasi-mystical knowledge, radically different from the rational knowledge acquired by science. This view encouraged theorists to consider artistic geniuses the high-priests of humanity, creators of works that reveal the invisible essence of the world. Philosophers came to regard inexpressibility as the aim of art, refused to consider second-tier creations genuine art, and helped to create conditions in which the genius was expected to shock, puzzle, and mystify the public. Schaeffer shows that this speculative theory helped give birth to romanticism, modernism, and the avant-garde, and paved the way for an unfortunate divorce between art and enjoyment, between "high art" and popular art, and between artists and their public.Rejecting the speculative approach, Schaeffer concludes by defending a more tolerant theory of art that gives pleasure its due, includes popular art, tolerates less successful works, and accounts for personal tastes."[A] remarkable work.... [Schaeffer's] writing is governed by... the ideals of clarity and consequence, the ideas of logic, truth, and evidence.... Schaeffer is so precise and unrelenting a philosophical critic that one wonders how some of the philosophies he anatomizes here can possibly survive the operation."--From the foreword by Arthur C. Danto. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 25 This is a pre-print. Please cite only the revised published version. This paper presents an original, ambitious, truth-directed transcendental argument for the existence of an ‘external world’. It begins with a double-headed starting-point: Stroud’s own remarks on the necessary conditions of language in general, and Hegel’s critique of the “fear of error.” The paper argues that the sceptical challenge requires a particular critical concept of thought as that which may diverge from reality, and that this (...) concept is possible only through reflection on situations of error, in which how things are thought to be diverges from how things really are with independent items in an objective world. The existence of such a world is therefore a necessary condition of the possibility of scepticism: such scepticism is therefore false. I defend the argument against objections from Stroud’s sceptic and others. Drawing on Heidegger, the paper concludes by indicating that the chain of necessary conditions includes practical engagement with the world. (shrink)

The question of knowledge - that is the question of truth - has moved Western philosophy from the very beginning, and this question must also show where Nietzsche stands in Western metaphysics: whether he is the perfector of it or whether he overthrows it This end opens up a new beginning. Heidegger's lecture thinks about this decision from the first sentence to the last. Seeing knowledge as a form of the will to power also means demarcating Nietzsche's philosophy from (...) misunderstandings and misinterpretations: Nietzsche's biologism and the relationship between science and philosophy are topics that are fundamentally discussed.The volume is based on the manuscript for the lecture from the summer semester of 1939. It also contains the "repetitions" that are missing from the individual volumes published by Neske in 1961. The version of the last lecture hour, revised in autumn 1940, was included in the appendix, as was a bundle of texts entitled "Notes on Nietzsche". [Publisher's synopsis]. (shrink)

In the “Postscript” to his Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger suggests that one important aim of his investigation into the relation between truth and art is to subject to scrutiny Hegel’s famous thesis on the end of art. The purpose of my essay is to contribute to this project by reexamining aspects of Hegel’s discussion of art in the Phenomenology of Spirit that appear to subvert his own thesis. Hegel’s treatment of ancient Greek drama and, specifically, some (...) of his remarks on comedy, not only bring Hegel’s claim about the end of art into question, but also lend new insights into the possibilities for the relationship between truth and art in our age. (shrink)

The paper examines Heidegger's notions of truth and knowledge in the context of Locke's theory of same. It argues that when Heidegger's expositions of "primordial truth" and knowledge as a "retainment of assertion" are analyzed in their Beings, new and improved definitions emerge which support Locke's ideas of truth and knowledge. It shows that Heidegger's primordial truth is the process which uncovers Locke's propositional truth and on which any knowledge must be based. Wherefrom, to solve the problem (...) of what knowledge is and how one defines it, one must start with Heidegger's conceptions of truth and knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel’s Hermeneutics by Paul ReddingTerry PinkardPaul Redding. Hegel’s Hermeneutics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi + 262. Cloth, $39.95. Paper, $16.95.Following on the heels of fruitful reception of Kant at work in the last several decades in English-speaking philosophy, one of the most productive lines of interpretation of [End Page 327] Hegel has tried to reconstruct Hegel’s thought in light of its relation to Kantianism. Paul Redding’s (...) new work carries this line further. As Redding sets matters up, Hegel builds explicitly on the unfinished “Copernican” move in Kant’s work, which, as the “Copernican” metaphor suggests, stresses the way in which our particular perspectives on the world must be understood as located within a set of conditions that, although not themselves experienced, are conditions of that experience. It calls, that is, for an investigation of how and whether “subjective” and “objective” points of view relate to each other. The “communicative” interpretation of Kant’s “Copernican” move sets up the Hegelian development of it: For one agent to be able to understand the claims of another’s experience, he must be able to conceive the other as an object-agent in the world and a subjective-agent that has a point of view on the world, and the other must likewise see him in the same way. Redding’s thesis is that Hegel appropriated the way that Kant, Fichte, and Schelling tried to provide such an account, and without falling into the pitfalls they did, developed a recognitive, “intersubjective,” theory of consciousness that successfully gives the proper account of how these two points of view are both necessary and relate to each other.Redding’s interpretation thus lays great weight on the short section of “master and servitude” in the Phenomenology as the key to the structure of all of Hegel’s thought. Each agent can recognize his own point of view only by virtue of recognizing the points of view of other agents, and this kind of recognition can arise when “an intention is common to subjects facing each other from opposed points of view” (111). The structure of recognition that emerges is, of course, quite complex and full of self-reflexive moments, but what emerges is Geist, spirit, the “I that is a We and the We that is an I,” which is not itself an entity having a point of view but a structure of self-conscious, mutually recognizing beings. Thus, at the basis of Hegel’s philosophy is a hermeneutical theory of how agents address and understand each other—that is, how they interpret each other’s acts, intentions, and expressions. Redding puts this interpretation to work in a short account of the progression of the Phenomenology, which he takes to be an account of the way in which the European community has historically failed to realize the kind of institutional and social structures of mutual recognition that would create the “conditions adequate for rational and free intentionality” (141) until modern times. The end of the Phenomenology—“absolute knowing”—is thus not the achieving of a “body of complete or final knowledge” but of the “(tragic) insight that particular and determinate bodies of knowledge are always conditioned and so perspectival” and thus calling for hermeneutical activities of interpretation (140).To make good on his account of the central status of “recognition” (and therefore of “hermeneutics”) to Hegel’s enterprise, Redding gives a short but quite insightful sketch of how Hegel’s notorious Science of Logic might be understood as a formalization of the logic of such recognitive practice, an account of how it is that agents can adopt these complex patterns of recognizing their own points of view as being recognized by others. Hegel’s Logic depends on the rejection of there being any “immediate” truths that can serve as absolute starting points or premises and from which we can then derive “mediated” true conclusions. There are no such “truths” outside of the circle of thought; this is, Redding argues, “characteristic of that ‘hermeneutic circle’ within [End Page 328] which, according to Heidegger and Gadamer, thought always moves,” namely, “a structure of reciprocal recognition... [as... (shrink)

The question of the ground of history, according to Gillespie, is the question of what history is. German Idealism’s attempt to construe history as a source of value was the “fullest and perhaps the most profound” attempt to answer this question, and culminated in Hegel’s vindication of history as a rational process. The twentieth century, with its wars and holocausts, has made it impossible to affirm history as a rational process or a source of value, and Heidegger’s account of (...) history as an increasing oblivion of the “truth of Being” recognizes this; in Gillespie’s view it prepares the way for a transcendence of history altogether. If we are either to affirm or transcend history, however, we must get clear on what it is — on its ground. Gillespie treats Hegel and Heidegger as offering contrasting approaches to such clarification. (shrink)

Derived from Heidegger's interpretation of attractive force with a high volume of inspired beauty care and a master not only the followers. And in order to maintain this special, he followed the great classical psychologists: Ferdinand learning. He also won in the traditional school psychology professor at the certificate, but his real motive is not subject to the ancient hope臘Heidegger was carried out by the interpretation of the full amount of impact force. Nevertheless, Heidegger's classic is still up (...) to the United States: "true management and methods" to maintain significant influence over. Up to the United States as a major interpreter of Heidegger's thinking, and faithful friend. In about two more people, I turned to introduce three other in Heidegger, Gadamer's major research on the influence of the philosopher: Park Latin chart, sub-km Aristotle and Hegel. First we look at the future Park Latin chart, I think the focus on conversation and dialogue up to the United States and the "dialectic dialogue" concept. The relative importance of making it true, so true that people with reasonable doubt and dialogue. Although there are many plans to pull up to the United States Park effect, but I make up as two points and a U.S. interlocutor's talent and try to prove. I have given up by the United States with three coming from Aristotle's concept of sub-km: wise , mimetic and tragedy. Wise is to predict the results of practical wisdom for the rational, he does not see a formula-based learning, as can be, but based on life experience. That mimic the Department of Aristotle in the sub-km only copy, and is reasonable in real life, the ultimate communicator. Finally, the tragedy is not the only sub-km Aristotle considers the six parts of the structure, but compassion and fear the experience of change in the audience angle of view, it is up to the United States in view of the viewer's experience of understanding and application, is a kind of tragedy action meaningful participation and experience. Beneficiary of up to U.S. history in Hegel's awareness of personal, Hegel's dialectic, as well as their knowledge to the arts is the current acceptance of the senses. He does not agree with Hegel referred to the "art of the past things," Hegel explains how this point. Shortly we will be able to see the remarkable work of art as a nervous balcony. Let me give you a visit in Heidelberg, Heidegger's experience in the United States up to the lecture, he objected to clarify and to hide his own dialectic and Hegel's dialectic with links, because at the end of Hegel's philosophy of total abstraction knowledge. In the second part of this lecture, I turned to the analysis of Gadamer's thesis on the art of "the relevance of the United States," and Heidegger in this direction is the famous "Art works of origin> thesis compared. In the late writings, Heidegger shows that there is not his main independent and self-study will be presented in the art of the earth and the world as a tension. In Gadamer's thesis in art, he follows Heidegger in the hope臘by establishing the art of human culture, learn the origin of works of art ontology analysis. He discussed all the cultural roots of the game , the difference between symbolic meaning and religious ceremonies. But he formed an art theory of the problem to analyze, it also clarifies the classical art and contemporary abstract art. In these three elements: the game, symbols and festivals, art up to the United States to find a structure is more deep cultural roots. As in the early hope臘ceremony, dance performances and tragedy. Gadamer's encounter with the magnetic force of Heidegger's interpretations made him cautious not to become simply a follower of the great master. To maintain his independence, he studied with Paul Friedländer, the great classical philologist. He attained certification in classical philology to teach in the secondary schools, but his true motive was to be able to resist the powerful interpretations of Greek philosophy put forward by Heidegger. Nevertheless, Heidegger remained a major leavening influence on Gadamer's classic, Truth and Method, and Gadamer became a major interpreter of Heidegger's thought, and a constant friend. After a few comparisons between them, I turn to three major philosophers other than Heidegger who contributed concepts to Gadamer's masterwork: Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. Regarding Plato, I point to the emphasis in Gadamer on dialogue and conversation and the concept of eumeneis elenchoi, the respect the opponent that recognizes that he could be right, so they join together in dialogue in quest of the truth. Although there are many other debts to Plato in Gadamer, I point to these two and testify to Gadamer's gifts as a conversationalist and debater. I single out three concepts of Aristotle that Gadamer used: phronesis, mimesis, and tragedy. Phronesis is the practical wisdom that goes beyond calculative reason. It is based not on formulas that can be learned but on experience of life . Mimesis in Aristotle is not just copying, but on a recognition that ultimately conveyed truth about life. Finally, tragedy for Aristotle is not just a structure with six parts but an experience of pity and terror that transformed the perspective of the viewer. This was important in the hermeneutics of Gadamer that looked at the viewer's experience of recognition and application, a participatory experience of the meaning of the action of the tragedy. Gadamer is indebted to Hegel for the historical character of consciousness, the Hegelian dialectic, and the recognition that that art is a sensuous representation of the real. He did not agree with Hegel that art was a thing of the past, and also explained what Hegel meant by this: we no longer saw art as a disclosure of the divine. I mention an experience I had of Heidegger's visit to Heidelberg, where he spoke after Gadamer's lecture rejecting his effort to connect his dialect of clearing and concealing with Hegelian dialectic, because Hegel's philosophy always ended in absolute knowledge. For the second major part of the lecture, I turn to an analysis of Gadamer's essay on art, The Relevance of the Beautiful , comparable in a way to Heidegger's famous lectures on The Origin of the Work of Art . In the latter work, Heidegger declares his independence of his masterwork and presents art in terms of the tension between earth and world. In Gadamer's essay on art, he goes beyond the Heideggerian emphasis on the ontology of the artwork by seeking to establish the anthropological roots of art in Greek culture. He discusses the roots of all culture in play, the significance of the symbol, and the meaning of religious festivals. But he begins with an analysis of the problem of formulating a theory of art that does justice both to classical art and contemporary nonrepresentational art. In all three elements, play, symbol, and festival, Gadamer finds a foundation for art in the deep roots of our culture as found in the ritual, dance, and tragic plays of ancient Greece. (shrink)

The suitability of a new philosophical paradigm for geography needs to be assessed in the context of the questions it was designed to address and on the basis of clearly articulated criteria. Postmodernism, the latest contender for the attention of geographers, is here assessed in relation to Collingwoodian idealism. As an intellectual movement postmodernism arose in the unique circumstances of academic life in post Second World War France. In this rigidly structured academic environment a new generation of French scholars, well (...) schooled in the philosophies of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger and the ideas of Marx and Freud, discovered the radical nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and drew upon his ethical and philosophical writings to address contemporary issues of power, knowledge, truth and modernity. All the central anti-humanist ideas of what was to become postmodernism are to be found in Nietzsche: a distrust of science and knowledge truth claims, the notion of multiple interpretations and the subordination of knowledge to power. This situated knowledge, set in the traditions of Continental thought, is not easily incorporated into the empiricist philosophies that have hitherto defined the mainstream of Anglo-American science and humanist scholarship including geography. Geographers need to retain a commitment to the foundational value of science, recognize human agency in the form of the conscious, thinking individual, and continue to affirm the empirical nature of human geographical research. (shrink)

Modern generally accepted models of the growth of knowledge are scrutinized. It is maintained that Thomas Kuhn’s growth of knowledge model is grounded preeminently on Heidegger’s epistemology. To justify the tenet the corresponding works of both thinkers are considered. As a result, the one-to-one correspondence between the key propositions of Heideggerian epistemology and the basic tenets of Kuhn’s growth of knowledge model is elicited. The tenets under consideration include the holistic nature of a paradigm, the incommensurability thesis, conventional status (...) of a paradigm caused by pragmatist way of its vocabulary justification and even the basic instance – connection between Aristotelean and Newtonian mechanics. It is conjectured that an indirect influence of Heidegger upon Kuhn should be taken into account to explain the isomorphism. For instance, through the works of Alexandre Koyré admired by Kuhn. As is well-known, Koyré had close professional links with another Russian émigré – Alexandre Kojev – who presented in his 1933-1939 Paris lectures Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” seen through the cognitive lens of Heideggerian phenomenology. Key words: Martin Heidegger, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, growth of knowledge, paradigm, incommensurability thesis, holism, pragmatism. (shrink)

Since the mid-nineteenth century, many philosophers in the "continental" tradition have maintained that philosophy stands in a special relation to its history. Philosophy, they argue, is an inherently historical discipline, and it is impossible to do philosophy well without studying its past. Charles Taylor calls this view "the historical thesis about philosophy." But while the historical thesis is often taken for granted in recent European philosophy, it is notoriously difficult to pin down exactly what it means, or why one might (...) think it is true. This unreflective attitude towards history could be called a crisis, in Edmund Husserl's sense: a certain view of the history of philosophy has been handed down through the continental tradition, but without being adequately argued for, or even understood. ;This dissertation is a diagnosis and critique of the crisis. Its goals are to explain why continental thinking about the history of philosophy has become mired in confusion, and to determine what the tradition must do to come to terms with the crisis. My thesis is that since Hegel, continental thought has understood its relation to the past according to a single model---the model that Hegel himself proposed. But this model is flawed, because it is based on implausible assumptions about the nature of historical knowledge. To respond to the crisis, I argue, we must recognize the ways in which Hegelian assumptions dominate our understanding of history, and rethink them. And I propose an alternative view of historical inquiry, one that I believe avoids the difficulties raised by Hegel's account. ;The dissertation takes the form of a regressive historical narrative. Chapter One examines the arguments advanced for the historical thesis by three prominent contemporary schools: Derridean deconstruction, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and Levinasian ethical thought. I argue that each of these schools is deeply confused about the relation between philosophy and its past. Chapter Two explains how this confused approach to history first arose in Hegel's work on the history of philosophy. Chapters Three and Four describe how a Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy was unwittingly transmitted to contemporary thought via Heidegger and twentieth century hermeneutics. Finally, Chapter Five sketches an alternative to Hegel's view. Hegel believes that knowledge of history is unphilosophical because it is mimetic---that is, it merely imitates a pre-given past. I argue that Hegel is wrong about this. I claim that historical knowledge is in important respects active and productive, and that recognizing this is the first step towards understanding how truth can be genuinely in history. (shrink)

First collected in Italy in 1985, _Art's Claim to Truth_ is considered by many philosophers to be one of Gianni Vattimo's most important works. Newly revised for English readers, the book begins with a challenge to Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, who viewed art as a metaphysical aspect of reality rather than a futuristic anticipation of it. Following Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the history of philosophy, Vattimo outlines the existential ontological conditions of aesthetics, paying particular attention to the works (...) of Kandinsky, which reaffirm the ontological implications of art. Vattimo then builds on Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of aesthetics and provides an alternative to a rationalistic-positivistic criticism of art. This is the heart of Vattimo's argument, and with it he demonstrates how hermeneutical philosophy reaffirms art's ontological status and makes clear the importance of hermeneutics for aesthetic studies. In the book's final section, Vattimo articulates the consequences of reclaiming the ontological status of aesthetics without its metaphysical implications, holding Aristotle's concept of beauty responsible for the dissolution of metaphysics itself. In its direct engagement with the works of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Luigi Pareyson, _Art's Claim to Truth_ offers a better understanding of the work of Vattimo and a deeper knowledge of ontology, hermeneutics, and the philosophical examination of truth. (shrink)

Heidegger’s thinking has an underlying unity, this book argues, and has cogency for seemingly diverse domains of modern culture: philosophy and religion, aesthetics and literary criticism, intellectual history and social theory. “The theme of mortality—finite human existence—pervades Heidegger’s thought,” in the author’s words, “before, during, and after his magnum opus, _Being and Times_, published in 1927.” This theme is manifested in Heidegger’s work not “as funereal melodramatics or as despair and destructive nihilism” but rather “_as a thinking (...) within anxiety_.” Four major subthemes in Heidegger’s thinking are explored in the book’s four parts: the fundamental ontology developed in _Being and Time_; the “lighting and clearing” of Being, understood as “unconcealment”; the history of philosophy—with emphasis on Heraclitus, Hegel, and Nietzsche—interpreted as the “destiny” of Being; and the poetics of Being, explicated as the “fundamental experience” of mortality. Neither an introduction nor a survey, this book is a close reading of a wide range of Heidegger’s books, lectures, and articles—including extensive material not yet translated into English—informed by the author’s conversations with Heidegger in 1974_–_76. Each of the four subthemes is treated critically. The aim of the book is to push its interrogations of Heidegger’s thought as far as possible, in order to help the reader toward an independent assessment of his work and to encourage novel, radically conceived approaches to traditional philosophical problems. (shrink)

In Seminar XVII, entitled The reverse side of psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan presents his famous theorem of the four discourses. In this rereading I propose to demonstrate that Lacan’s theorem entails a transferable dialectical method for studying processes of knowledge production, enabling contemporary scholars to develop a diagnostic of the present, notably scholars interested in issues such as the vicissitudes of knowledge production under capitalism, the crisis of the university and the proliferation of electronic gadgets. In short, I will argue that (...) Lacan’s theorem of the four discourses entails a dialectical diagnostic of technoscientific knowledge during late capitalism. First, the four discourses will be briefly outlined, emphasising the extent to which they entail, albeit in an ambivalent manner, a return or detour to the logic of Hegel. Subsequently, each discourse will be presented in more detail, emphasising how they allow us to come to terms with the current status of technoscientific knowledge. Special attention will be given to the political backdrop of the seminar: the crisis of the university. Finally, I will discuss the historical dimension, outlining both the predecessor of the four discourses and their current predicament under neoliberal/capitalist conditions. (shrink)

Against the widespread antiplatonism of our century, noted philosopher, Hegel, and two great postmodern thinkers, Heidegger and Levinas, transform Plato's thoughts about reality, truth, and the Good into elements of their own reflection. He then presents his own retrieval of Platonic themes and arguments, showing how fruitful a critical reexamination of Plato's work can be, even today. Anyone interested in continental philosophy, phenomenology, ethics, or the history of philosophy should read this book.

In his "Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit," which includes his 1930-31 lectures on the "Phenomenology of Spirit," Heidegger states not only that Hegelian phenomenology “begins absolutely with the absolute,” but also that this phenomenological beginning is a necessary beginning of Hegel’s “system of science.” Although Heidegger acknowledges that the “proper” or “appropriate” beginning or “ground” of this system is the logical beginning (the beginning posited by Hegelian logic), he insists not only that there is also a second beginning of (...) the system, namely the one provided by the "Phenomenology of Spirit," but also that this beginning is necessary. Thus, Heidegger subscribes to the paradoxically-sounding thesis that Hegel’s system of science must have two beginnings. The present paper attempts, first, to flesh out this thesis (§§2-4), and, second, to uncover Heidegger’s argument for (or justification of) the claim that the phenomenological beginning is necessary to the Hegelian system of science (§§5-6). (shrink)

Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit is one of the most influential texts in the history of modern philosophy. In it, Hegel proposed an arresting and novel picture of the relation of mind to world and of people to each other. Like Kant before him, Hegel offered up a systematic account of the nature of knowledge, the influence of society and history on claims to knowledge, and the social character of human agency itself. A bold new understanding of what, after Hegel, (...) came to be called 'subjectivity' arose from this work, and it was instrumental in the formation of later philosophies, such as existentialism, Marxism, and American pragmatism, each of which reacted to Hegel's radical claims in different ways. This edition offers a new translation, an introduction, and glossaries to assist readers' understanding of this central text, and will be essential for scholars and students of Hegel. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse called the preface to Hegel's Phenomenology "one of the greatest philosophical undertakings of all times." This summary of Hegel's system of philosophy is now available in English translation with commentary on facing pages. While remaining faithful to the author's meaning, Walter Kaufmann has removed many encumbrances inherent in Hegel's style.

This article raises the thought of Heidegger as an alternative to the modern conceptualizations of learning that consider it as mere acquisition or construction of truth by knowledge or integration in truth through the Development of a higher level of consciousness. With Heidegger is going to be able to talk about learning how to inhabit the truth and to be inhabited by it, which implies the acquisition, the construction, the integration, but also "being-in-the-world" (Dasein) like a self before (...) the other. This implies a living idea of learning, because it is not a "representation" that is acquired or built, nor a simple "presentation" of a unitary whole in what one integrates with learning, but understands how living reality that is present and is represented Esenta, projecting itself creatively and shared in the "Being-with" (Mitsein) with tendency to the full unconcealment of the essence of Being with what to inhabit in the fullness of its meaning. (shrink)

Heidegger, in his Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, recognizes that the “image of the cave” is the central point of Plato's thought. According to Heidegger, this image is Plato's “doctrine” on truth, offered in order to “put in light the essence of the paideia“, for “an essential rapport unites the formation and the truth”. “The being of the ‘formation’”, he says, “is founded on the being of ‘truth’;”. But in the myth of the Cave, Plato passes, according to (...) Heidegger, from the alêtheia as not-veiling to an alêtheia as exactitude. The truth for Plato, according to Heidegger, is found not in things, but in ideas: “from the not-veiling of the essent, truth has become exactitude of the regard”; it is the “agreement” or “conformity” of essent and knowledge. Truth is thus ”under the yoke” of the idea. We note in Plato, according to Heidegger, ”a change in the essence of truth”, and “Plato treats and speaks of alêtheia, when he actually thinks of orthotês”. Here, claims Heidegger, lies Plato's “ambiguity”: “Is it not then alêtheia which forms the main object of the ‘myth of the Cave’? Certainly not. And nevertheless it remains certain that this myth contains Plato's ‘doctrine’ on truth. For it is founded on an event he does not mention, namely that the idea is above alêtheia.”. (shrink)

Everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.Hegel, Phenomenology of SpiritCritical Theory and Heideggerian thinking are the conflicted offspring of Husserlian phenomenology.1 Their lineage goes through Husserl to the phenomenology of Hegel. This mixed ancestry, whether acknowledged or suppressed, is especially evident in two pathbreaking essays from the 1930s on the topic of truth. One, by Martin Heidegger, carries the title “On the Essence of Truth” (1930). The other, by Max Horkheimer, (...) is titled “On the Problem of Truth” (1935). A single word sets the English titles apart: where Heidegger.. (shrink)

This article raises the thought of Heidegger as an alternative to the modern conceptualizations of learning that consider it as mere acquisition or construction of truth by knowledge or integration in truth through the Development of a higher level of consciousness. With Heidegger is going to be able to talk about learning how to inhabit the truth and to be inhabited by it, which implies the acquisition, the construction, the integration, but also "being-in-the-world" (Dasein) like a self before (...) the other. This implies a living idea of learning, because it is not a "representation" that is acquired or built, nor a simple "presentation" of a unitary whole in what one integrates with learning, but understands how living reality that is present and is represented Esenta, projecting itself creatively and shared in the "Being-with" (Mitsein) with tendency to the full unconcealment of the essence of Being with what to inhabit in the fullness of its meaning. (shrink)

An innovative, ambitious, tradition-crossing study drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas to propose a new and transformative concept of truth. The idea of truth is a guiding theme for German continental philosophers from Husserl through Habermas. In this book, Lambert Zuidervaart examines debates surrounding the idea of truth in twentieth-century German continental philosophy. He argues that the Heideggerian and critical theory traditions have much in common—despite the miscommunication, opposition, and even outright hostility that have (...) prevailed between them—including significant roots in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Zuidervaart sees the tensions between Heideggerian thought and critical theory as potentially generative sources for a new approach to the idea of truth. He argues further that the “critical retrieval” of insights from German continental philosophy can shed light on current debates in analytic truth theory. Zuidervaart structures his account around three issues: the distinction between propositional truth and truth that is more than propositional (which he calls existential truth); the relationship between propositional truth and the discursive justification of propositional truth claims, framed in analytic philosophy by debates between epistemic and nonepistemic conceptions of truth; and the relationship between propositional truth and the objectivity of knowledge, often presented in analytic philosophy as a conflict between realists and antirealists over the relation between “truth bearers” and “truth makers.” In an innovative and ambitious argument, drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas, Zuidervaart proposes a new and transformative conception of truth. (shrink)

Heidegger’s discussions of beauty in the 1930s and ’40s arguably have more to do with a confrontation with Hegel than with a revisiting of the question of how best to analyse our experience of the beautiful. Beauty, for Heidegger as for Hegel, takes its definition from truth. At issue is a forcible rewriting of the harmony of the faculties to which Kant appeals in his defence of pure aesthetic judgements. The highest truth, and the truth of beauty, lies (...) in a proper understanding of harmony, whether as the comprehensive reconciliation of the absolute Idea or as the non-closure in which truth as unconcealment remains contested by concealment. While neither Hegel nor Heidegger abides by the subjectivism of Kant’s aesthetics, insisting instead that beauty is more than a mere feeling, Hegel’s beauty as reconciliation and Heidegger’s beauty as strife both attest to the ongoing sway of Kant’s harmony of the faculties. (shrink)

The article reflects on Heidegger’s “metaphysical” interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation is driven by two theses Heidegger holds: (1) that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s “system of science” and (2) that the Phenomenology is metaphysics. These two theses contrast with Houlgate’s “epistemological” interpretation, which claims that the Phenomenology is not a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science and that it is not metaphysics. The article shows that while Heidegger has an (...) argument that establishes, contra Houlgate, that the Phenomenology is metaphysics, this very argument has consequences that undermine Heidegger’s thesis that the Phenomenology is a necessary part of Hegel’s system of science. (shrink)

This essay will attempt a line-by-line reading of Lacan’s famous “The Mirror Image as Formative I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (1949) published in the collected volume of essays, Ecrits (1966). The article attempts to show that Lacan’s essay opens a space of primordiality, whereby we can revisit Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity and the Cogito, terms that originate with Descartes and evolves to Kant’s Critiques of dogmatic metaphysics, particularly in Heidegger’s Being and Time. These are steps (...) class='Hi'>Heidegger takes to set up his attempted critique of Hegel, who in turn tries to surpass the history of philosophy rooted in modern subjectivity, particularly in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). However, missing in Lacan’s essay and what remains unarticulated in Heidegger’s Being and Time is the following: relation between time, movement, and the space of primordiality where all notions of factical existence dissolve. Being born in time, developing in time, being in or at time, and being-towards-death, as Heidegger struggles to deconstruct – by way of his unique appropriation of phenomenology in Being and Time – can be questioned. Indeed, what Heidegger fails to develop, and he admits it explicitly, is the other side of his ‘one-sided’ treatment in the investigation: he only analyzed death as a possibility of Dasein’s greatest possibility to ‘be-Whole’ authentically (1962, 277) and completely neglected ‘being-towards-birth’ as the ‘other end’ of Dasein’s movement (1962, 425). We will argue that one is never born as a biological fact of existence, a social construction assigned at physical birth, like a gender or sex, or any religious notions of a created being from God the Creator, or any notions of rebirth, reincarnation, or resurrection, namely from religions in the West, like Roman Catholic Christianity, and the East, like Hinduism. Rather, ‘being-towards-birth’ in relation to the linear time of flowing now-points (past as no longer now, present as now, future as yet to be now), or ‘being-within-time,’ (Heidegger 1962, 457) is temporalized other than a dateable origin in spatialized time or history. (shrink)

The claim to truth has been common to both positive science and philosophy. But at present there is no consensus concerning what this claim to truth can mean for philosophical inquiry. Can a given philosophical position be regarded as true or false? Is it still possible to say that philosophical inquiry aims at truth at all? I argue that philosophy must be seen as oriented toward the disclosure of truth if it is to retain that critical dimension in which alone (...) constructive disagreement is possible. At the same time, I argue that the concept of truth which regulates philosophical inquiry is not that of the traditional correspondence theory. Rightly interpreted, the correspondence theory describes the meaning of truth for the positive sciences, which are concerned with facts; but it is adequate for an understanding of philosophy, which as a reflective enterprise is concerned with the meaning of facts. The aim of the dissertation, then, is to demonstrate the reflective connection between truth and meaning by exploring the concept of truth as developed in transcendental logic--the enterprise which thematizes the conditions which make knowledge of objects possible. ;In light of this problem, it is possible to see Heidegger's concept of truth in Being and Time as an important contribution to our understanding of the meaning of truth for reflection. Heidegger's theory of truth is often misinterpreted as an attempt to subvert the critical theory of truth as correspondence. However, it is in fact an attempt to situate the concept of propositional truth within a wider notion of truth as the disclosure of meaning as such, a notion which is necessary in order to understand the possibility of propositional truth. ;To show this, the dissertation traces the origin of Heidegger's concept of truth to its source in problems arising from the tradition of transcendental logic. This involves an examination of Heidegger's works prior to Being and Time, as well as a discussion of those philosophers from whom these works derive their inspiration. Most important among them are Emil Lask, whose revision of Kant's doctrine of categories led to a reflective identification of the object as such with meaning; and Edmund Husserl, whose concept of intuition and evidence allows us to see how such "original" meaning is given. But both Lask and Husserl remain tied to a correspondence theory in their attempts to explicate the relation between meaning and truth. Having subscribed to this position in his early works, Heidegger's reflection on the origin of meaning leads finally to the recognition that truth is first of all the historical disclosure of an horizon of meaning or intelligibility, within which alone it is possible to understand how a statement can "correspond" to the entity as it is in itself. ;The dissertation thus aims at establishing two points: that Heidegger's theory of truth is meant to describe a concept of truth adequate to the claims of philosophical reflection; and that this concept of truth must be seen as an answer to specific problems which arise from the theory of truth developed in the tradition of transcendental logic. (shrink)

LA PHILOSOPHIE A L'ECOLE NATIONALE AVANT 1960 : LOUIS ALTHUSSER. Louis Althusser (1918-1990) : psychologie. Louis Althusser (1918-1990) : philosophie politique. LA PHILOSOPHIE A L'ECOLE NATIONALE AVANT 1960 : JEAN HYPPOLITE. Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968) : Aristote, Spinoza, Hume. Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968) : Aristote, Spinoza, Hume, Comte. Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968) : Descartes, Hume, Hegel, Comte, Marx, Husserl, Heidegger, psychanalyse. AUTRES REPERES DE L'EPOQUE 1960-2000. Le dossier Althusser cinquante ans après. L'aventure de la philosophie française depuis les années 1960. EXPLORATION DE (...) DIVERS TYPES DIALECTIQUES. Alain lecteur et admirateur de Hegel et de Marx. L'encyclopédisme dialectique dans la psychologie d'Henri Wallon. Le style dialectique dans les travaux de Germaine Wallon. (shrink)

Jacques Lacan comments repeatedly on anamorphic art as it exemplifies for him how the mind from a certain angle perceives through law-like patterns the world that would otherwise be nothing but a chaos of arbitrary multiplicities. The angle, though, has a certain effect on what is perceived; an effect that, as such, cannot be perceived within the realm of experience. The article tries to make the link between diffraction laws of perception more explicit in the subject-object dichotomy and refers for (...) that purpose to the work of both Hegel and Lacan. A reference to Hegel is necessary, as Hegel was not only one of Lacan’s own most important sources of insights, but the author who first focused on justified true belief through a theory of a missed encounter between truth and knowledge. (shrink)

The article examines Randall Collins's magnum opus, The Sociology of Philosphies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change in relation to a number of discourses bearing on the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of philosophies, from Hegel and 19th-century historicism to Mannheim, Foucault, Bourdieu and Gillian Rose's Hegel Contra Sociology. The article explicates Collins's dual theory of intellectual networks and institutional conflict as factors in the explanation of intellectual change. The article interprets Collins's work as a classic application of Durkheimian (...) sociological principles to the analysis of knowledge. However, the article argues that Collins is less successful in accounting for the internal normative motives of inquiry and the problem of what Hegel saw as the claims of reason in history based on the orientation to truth. (shrink)

"Why, in present-day French writing, are we most likely to encounter the word "humanist" only as a term of glib dismissal? In this introduction to the controversy over "humanism", Kate Soper explains how the argument (developed by existentialists and Marxist humanists), that human experience and action play a fundamental role in "making history", has fallen into disrepute. 'Humanism and anti-humanism' shows how the "humanist" standpoint emerged in the post-war period, out of a convergence of arguments derived from Hegel, Marx, Husserl, (...) and Heidegger, then traces its elaboration within existentialism and Marxism, and finally examines the "anti-humanist" reaction in the works of Lèvi-Strauss, Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, and Derrida. Soper clearly explains what is at stake in the debate between "humanists" and "anti-humanists", and contends that this can be understood only in the context of Cold War politics and the crisis for Marxism presented by Stalinism. 'Humanism and anti-humanism' is written from a position of critical sympathy with "humanism" and is aimed chiefly at readers with no previous knowledge of Continental philosophy." -- book cover. (shrink)

At a time when the analytic/continental split dominates contemporary philosophy, this ambitious work offers a careful and clear-minded way to bridge that divide. Combining conceptual rigor and clarity of prose with historical erudition, A Thing of This World shows how one of the standard issues of analytic philosophy—realism and anti-realism—has also been at the heart of continental philosophy. Using a framework derived from prominent analytic thinkers, Lee Braver traces the roots of anti-realism to Kant's idea that the mind actively organizes (...) experience. He then shows in depth and in detail how this idea evolves through the works of Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida. This narrative presents an illuminating account of the history of continental philosophy by explaining how these thinkers build on each other's attempts to develop new concepts of reality and truth in the wake of the rejection of realism. Braver demonstrates that the analytic and continental traditions have been discussing the same issues, albeit with different vocabularies, interests, and approaches. By developing a commensurate vocabulary, his book promotes a dialogue between the two branches of philosophy in which each can begin to learn from the other. (shrink)

The thirteen essays in this volume represent the most sustained investigation, in any language, of the connections between Heidegger's thought and the tradition of transcendental philosophy inaugurated by Kant. This collection examines Heidegger's stand on central themes of transcendental philosophy: subjectivity, judgment, intentionality, truth, practice, and idealism. Several essays in the volume also explore hitherto hidden connections between Heidegger's later "post-metaphysical" thinking—where he develops a "topological" approach that draws as much upon poetry as upon the philosophical tradition—and (...) the transcendental project of grasping the conditions that make experience of a meaningful world possible. This volume will interest philosophers in the continental tradition, where Heidegger's thought has long had a central role, as well as those many philosophers in the analytic tradition whose own approach to knowledge, semantics, and philosophy of mind traces its roots to Kant. (shrink)

This paper scrutinizes the dialogical character of knowledge from the perspectives of Hegel’s and Davidson’s philosophies. First, it outlines their analogous trains of thought, particularly their “anti-representational” and “intersubjective” accounts of knowledge. Second, it draws a parallel between the two by discussing their contrasting views of the structure and goal of knowledge, showing that while Davidson advocates an open-ended, scheme-less empirical knowledge, Hegel maintains the notion of a (universal-rational) scheme and a goal-oriented dialectical process in which “the true is the (...) whole.” This section then critically traces their underlying disagreement to their divergent views on the nature of meaning, language, and thought. Finally, it argues that their views can be seen as complementary to two versions of dialectic, showing that while Hegel’s approach, akin to Platonic dialectic, focuses on the self-contained and “Truth”-oriented “negotiational” movement of ideas, Davidson’s, reminiscent of Socratic elenchus, emphasizes the truth-oriented ‘conversational’ interaction of subjects exchanging concepts. (shrink)

From the author: This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of one central problem in Hegelian philosophy: viz., whether the final realization of “absolute knowledge” is logically consistent with significant epistemic progress in the system’s continuing development. Serious consideration of the concept of systematic completeness, as interpreted on Hegel’s terms, uncovers the existence of a profound paradox. On the one hand, if the Truth is the Whole, then the truth of any finite part or aspect of that Whole depends upon its (...) place within the system as a totality. In order to grasp the part and comprehend it correctly, one must already have a systematically ordered knowledge of the universe in its entirety. Yet the methodological open-endedness of dialectical thinking precludes the acceptance of any particular theoretical formulation as final or complete in itself. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as a progression of successive formulations of the Truth, each of which improves on its predecessors by reconciling their internal contradictions, but no one of which is adequate in itself. Hence, no theoretical world view, including Hegel’s own, can rest content within its limits, for the inevitable advance of thought must in the end throw it down. (shrink)

This book gives a systematic account of Martin Heidegger’s methodology. Contrary to the widespread conception that Heidegger’s (late) philosophy is lacking any kind of verifiable, provable insights, the author shows that a rejection of the scientific method does not imply a rejection of methodological, rigorous thinking. In fact, it can be shown that the method of Heidegger’s philosophy is more rigorous, more strict and more radical than the scientific method. But because the scientific method is conceived of (...) as the non-plus-ultra even within philosophy, in order to outline Heidegger’s methodology we have to give an account of his criticism of the scientific method. By showing the limitations of modern science, we can unfold the possibilities of philosophy. -/- The book consists of four parts: The first part is about Heidegger’s concept of subjectivity and his criticism of the Cartesian subject-object-dichotomy. The main argument of the first part is that the ‘subject’, inasmuch as it is understood ontologically, is essential for philosophy. We outline this – following Steven G. Crowell – as the philosophical significance of the first-person-perspective (Heidegger’s early philosophy between 1919 and 1927). -/- The second part is about what we call an ontological theory of constitution: A radicalization of the Kantian transcendental philosophy which does not orbit around transcendental subjectivity, but rather around concrete subjectivity (Dasein vs. the transcendental ego). We take a closer look on what Heidegger has written between 1927 and 1930. -/- The third part is about Heidegger’s late philosophy. The main topic of this third part is Heidegger’s “seynsgeschichtliche Besinnung auf das machenschaftliche Wesen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft“ – which is in essence a closer look on what modern science is, on its relation to technology, and on its very own historicality. We discuss the most famous published texts and lectures between 1930 and 1976, but focus on Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures and his second magnus opus: the Contributions to Philosophy. -/- This criticism of modern science is the stepping stone for the fourth and final part, in which we take all the pieces and put them together by giving a systematic account of Heidegger’s methodology. In this final part we take a step back from Heidegger’s texts (and from his language) and confront Heidegger with the most famous criticism by Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Jürgen Habermas. -/- This allows us to give an account of the central concepts of Heidegger’s methodology: truth, knowledge and validity. We also talk about the status of philosophical concepts and in general: philosophical language, about Heidegger’s theory of philosophical conceptualization, which is known as the method of formal indication and about the possibility of an ontological foundation of modern science and epistemology. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GERMAN------------------------------------------------- -/- Der methodische Status insbesondere der Spätphilosophie Heideggers ist ein Problem: Mit den Mitteln der traditionellen Methodenlehre können die Aussagen dieser Philosophie nicht ausgewiesen und auch nicht begründet werden. Mit der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und ihrer Methode hat sie nichts mehr gemein. Aber muss dies heißen, dass diese Philosophie ihre Erkenntnisse überhaupt nicht mehr ausweisen kann? -/- Ich habe in dieser Arbeit versucht zu zeigen, dass auch die späte Philosophie Heideggers Methode hat. Auch wenn Heidegger in fast an den Mythos erinnernder Art und Weise über die Verbergung und das Sich-entziehen des Seyns spricht, handelt es sich um methodisch überprüfbare, ausweisbare Aussagen. Nur wird in Heideggers Methodologie Ernst gemacht mit dem Gedanken, dass die Philosophie eine eigene Methode braucht und sich nicht wie blind an der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft orientieren dürfe. Eine Methode, die sie zum Teil für sich erst entwickeln muss. -/- Die Grundbegriffe dieser ‚neuen Methodologie‘ zu klären, war das Hauptanliegen dieser Arbeit. Es ging um den Wahrheits-, Erkenntnis- und Geltungsanspruch dieser Philosophie. -/- Dafür habe ich einen Blick geworfen insb. auf die frühe Philosophie Heideggers (1. Teil: 1919-1927), auf die wichtigen Texte und Vorträge im Kontext von Sein und Zeit (2. Teil: 1927-1930) und auf die Texte zu Nietzsche, zu den Beiträgen und zu Wissenschaft und Technik (3. Teil: 1930-1976). In einem vierten Teil habe ich die Grundzüge dieser Methodologie skizziert. Ich habe mich dabei an der Kritik von Jürgen Habermas orientiert, der am bekanntesten und am stärksten die These vertreten hat, dass die Spätphilosophie Heideggers irrational sei. Auch hier kam ich zu dem Schluss, dass Heideggers Kritik an dem okzidentalen Rationalismus nicht in die Irrationalität führen muss, wie Habermas nahelegt, sondern dass dadurch ein kritisches Verständnis von Rationalität möglich wird. (shrink)

From its Presocratic beginnings, Western philosophy concerned itself with a quest for unity both in terms of the systematization of knowledge and as a metaphysical search for a unity of being—two trends that can be regarded as converging and culminating in Hegel’s system of absolute idealism. Since Hegel, however, the philosophical quest for unity has become increasingly problematic. Jussi Backman returns to that question in this book, examining the place of the unity of being in the work of Heidegger. (...) Backman sketches a consistent picture of Heidegger as a thinker of unity who throughout his career in different ways attempted to come to terms with both Parmenides’s and Aristotle’s fundamental questions concerning the singularity or multiplicity of being—attempting to do so, however, in a “postmetaphysical” manner rooted in rather than above and beyond particular, situated beings. Through his analysis, Backman offers a new way of understanding the basic continuity of Heidegger’s philosophical project and the interconnectedness of such key Heideggerian concepts as ecstatic temporality, the ontological difference, the turn (Kehre), the event (Ereignis), the fourfold (Geviert), and the analysis of modern technology. (shrink)