Philosophical Anthropology is one of the post-Husserlian splinters -- a dizzying mix and match of phenomeno-psycho-anthro-philosophical hyphenated schools of thought. It arose first in the 1920's out of the same intellectual promptings as existentialism, which it briefly rivaled. It differs from existentialism and other phenomenologies in fine ways which Landmann combs scrupulously, along with distinctions among the sub-specialties that have proliferated within the field itself. Fortunately, two more general premises distinguish it from other forms of anthropology. (...) First, taking anthropology in its broadest sense as man's search for a self-conception, it allows a signal, shaping importance to its own formulations: culturally speaking, and psychologically too, man tries, tends to fit his self-image. Second, embracing man and everything human as its focus, it assumes phenomenology's grandest claims: reconciliation of the inward and the outer, and, by inference at least, a proper holistic restoration of the essential human sphere. The impulse and the method are widely evident now and several disciplines seem to be quivering toward some such point of convergence. But it is a moot point whether Philosophical Anthropology will stake out the ground. Landmann traces it from its substantive origins with the Greeks down through its most niggling modern self-assertions in a strictly academic survey of high-philosophical or similarly accredited propositions, The argumentative appeals (Freud, Nietzsche) seem rather dated now; and there is a further difficulty in that the action and its object are one and the same, the medium, so to speak, is the message -- i.e., thought about man. While this is a necessary aspect of the method, it can be disorienting. Scholars, however, will know where they are, and this will admit admirably to conventional, general uses. (shrink)

In this article I reconsider Ricoeur’s early philosophical anthropology in Fallible Man by probing its force in a current discussion on anthropology in the ethics of care. This discussion shows similarities with the intentions behind Ricoeur’s project. They are both dissatisfied with existing philosophical conceptions of human beings, in particular with their objectifying and fixing character. However, the ethics of care is a practice oriented approach while Ricoeur’s is an abstract philosophical one. In this article (...) I will examine whether Ricoeur’s philosophical approach may be of value for such a practical approach. For this purpose I analyse three aspects of Ricoeur’s approach that seem to be akin to the ethics of care: his ‘passion for the possible’ that inspires a critique of objectification; his methodological reflections that highlight the relation between philosophy and the pre-philosophical; and fragility as central anthropological category. Taking into account these aspects will give rise to the critical question of whether the anthropology in the ‘weak’ sense in which it is present in the ethics of care is able to account for the risk of objectification. Discovering the importance of this criticism reveals the relevance and topical interest of Ricoeur’s approach also for current practice-oriented philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology is the philosophical study of the conditions of human existence and the issues that confront people in the conduct of their everyday lives. This book surveys, from a contemplative, philosophical point of view, a wide variety of human-interest issues, including happiness, luck, aging, the meaning of life, optimism and pessimism, morality, and faith and belief. The author's deliberations blend historical, theoretical, and personal perspectives into philosophical appreciation of the human condition. The philosophers of (...) Greek antiquity took philosophy to center around just this issue of intelligent living - of determining the nature of life under the guidance of reason. Such a perspective puts philosophical agenda - a position it contested with the philosophy of nature throughout classical antiquity. In more recent times, however, its prominence has declined - no doubt, the author suggests, because modern man's achievements have been more notable in the natural than in the human science. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The study aims to substantiate philosophical anthropology as a space for the development of biopolitics, which is a relatively new synthetic scientific knowledge of the political in the biological and the biological in the political, which, however, has its roots in the era of antiquity. The analysis of biopolitics in the context of contemporary global challenges, in particular the COVID-19 pandemic, is carried out, which allows to actualize a new direction of biopolitics – microbiopolitics. _Theoretical basis._ The (...) study is based on an understanding of the initial, in relation to biopolitics, the nature of philosophical anthropology. While philosophical anthropology seeks an answer to the question – who is _Homo sapiens_, given the biosocial nature of man, biopolitics specifies the question in the form – who is _homo politicus_ in modern socio-political space with a focus on the imperative of a human-centred approach in the social sciences. The study is based on scientific works by specialists in philosophical anthropology and biopolitics. _Originality._ The authors substantiate the expediency and relevance of considering philosophical anthropology as a contextual space for the evolution of biopolitical knowledge from the natural philosophy of Antiquity to modern microbiopolitics. _Conclusions._ Philosophical anthropology is seen as a specific epistemological landscape in which fields of scientific knowledge are formed and developed that are in one way or another involved in the philosophical problems of man: philosophical psychology, social anthropology, philosophy of medicine, humanology, philosophy of education, ethics, as well as biophilosophy, bioethics, and, in particular, biopolitics. (shrink)

Philosophic anthropology, Pursuing philosophy's traditional search for reflective self-Knowledge seeks to crystallize the ideas of man underpinning empirical research and moral ideals. Neither the claim that pure speculation can produce factual knowledge nor the contention that a higher synthesis of empirical findings can become philosophy is acceptable. Philosophic anthropology is, Therefore, Most usefully conceived as a critique which traces the necessary presuppositions of the study of man in its various forms of the more rules we apply.

Helmut Plessner was one of the founders of philosophical anthropology, and his book _The Stages of the Organic and Man_, first published in 1928, has inspired generations of philosophers, biologists, social scientists, and humanities scholars. This volume offers the first substantial introduction to Plessner’s philosophical anthropology in English, not only setting it in context with such familiar figures as Bergson, Cassirer, and Merleau-Ponty, but also showing Plessner’s relevance to contemporary discussions in a wide variety of fields (...) in the humanities and sciences. (shrink)

If we read Ludwig Wittgenstein's works and take his scientific formation in mathematical logic into account, it comes as a surprise that he ever developed a particular interest in anthropological questions. The following questions immediately arise: What role does anthropology play in Wittgenstein's work? How do problems concerning mankind as a whole relate to his philosophy? How does his approach relate to philosophical anthropology? How does he view classical issues about Man's affairs and actions? The aim of (...) this book is to investigate the anthropological questions that Wittgenstein raised in his works. The answers to the questions raised in this introduction may be found on the intersection between forms of life and radical translation from another culture into ours. The book presents an extensive analysis of anthropological issues with emphasis on language and social elements. (shrink)

The thesis of the present volume is critical and dual. (1) Present day philosophy of man and sciences of man suffer from the Greek mis taken polarization of everything human into nature and convention which is (allegedly) good and evil, which is (allegedly) truth and fal sity, which is (allegedly) rationality and irrationality, to wit, the polar ization of all fields of inquiry, the natural and social sciences, as well as ethics and all technology, whether natural or social, into the (...) totally positive and the totally negative. (2) Almost all philosophy and sci ences of man share the erroneous work ethic which is the myth of man's evil nature - the myth of the beast in man, the doctrine of original sin. To mediate or to compromise between the first view of human nature as good with the second view of it as evil, sociologists have devised a modified utilitarianism with deferred gratification so called, and the theory of the evil of artificial competition (capitalist and socialist alike) and of keeping up with the Joneses. Now, the mediation is not necessary. For, the polarization makes for abstract errors which are simplistic views of rationality, such as reductionism and positivism of all sorts, as well as for concrete errors, such as the disposition to condemn repeatedly those human weaknesses which are inevitable, namely man's inability to be perfectly rational, avoid all error, etc. , thus setting man against himself as all too wicked. (shrink)

Martin (Mordechai) Buber was born in Vienna in 1878. He lived in Germany until 1933, then emigrated to Switzerland, and later to Palestine. After the Second World War, the philosopher condemned Arab-Jewish hostility and inhumane actions towards Palestinian Arabs. Buber died in 1965 in Jerusalem. The creative legacy of the philosopher is extremely popular in many countries. As a thinker, Buber combined many diverse interests and aspirations. He was a non-trivial sage-philosopher, a brilliant translator of the Tanakh, a researcher of (...) Hasidism, an outstanding educator and preacher, poet and writer. Buber's views are close to dialectical theology and existentialism. The central idea of Buber's philosophy is being as a dialogue between God and man, man and the world. Developing the concept of religious existentialism, the thinker significantly enriched philosophical anthropology. The insight expressed by him, rooted in the biblical tradition, is simple and majestic: a person's life is in dialogue with other people who are like him. This dialogue is creative and saving when it is carried out through the medium of God, his precepts about morality and love. It is in this dialogue that the vitality of God himself is revealed. Thus, Buber responded with all his creativity to the philosophical ideas of the XX century, to the ideas of "the death of God" and "the death of Man". (shrink)

Purpose. The research is aimed at understanding the philosophical and journalistic heritage of M. Scheler during 1914-1919. "The philosophy of war" is regarded as the middle link between the phenomenological and anthropological stages of its philosophical evolution. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is the philosophical legacy of Max Scheler, as well as the work of domestic and Western researchers devoted to this issue. Problems of Weltkriegsphilosophie become comprehensible based on the historical, logical and comparative (...) principles of historical and philosophical analysis, which allowed to theoretically reconstruct the cultural and historical context, philosophical sources and ideological intentions of the German philosopher. Originality. For the first time in domestic historical and philosophical thought, it proved that the works by Max Scheler of the First World War played an outstanding role in the formation of philosophical anthropology as a separate philosophical trend. Conclusions. The basis of the Weltkriegsphilosophie by Max Scheler is the philosophical comprehension of the war in which the thinker tries to see the high sacral meaning, where the sacrifices that the nation brings to the altar of victory are not in vain: the nation is rallying this sacrifice, its readiness for it. According to Scheler, war is the most effective means of forming the so-called "love communities", to which he refers combat brotherhood, family and nation as a "collective personality", which recognizes itself through war. The philosopher is disappointed to some part with militaristic enthusiasm in his later military journalistic works and calls for a spiritual and moral renewal of Europe, fed from Christian roots. At the heart of this renewal should be the principle of personal solidarity, based on the Christian idea of love. However, Catholic universalism is an insufficient means for the formation of a "love community" and a new man who is co-creator of God that constitutes the main core of the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler, which emerges in the 20s of the twentieth century. Based on this, the article affirms the existence in Sheler’s works of an intermediate stage between his phenomenology and philosophical anthropology – Weltkriegsphilosophie. (shrink)

"Philosophical anthropology" is a special and extremely comprehensive branch of the history of world science and modern philosophical thought in general. Philosophical anthropology is an important branch of Western philosophical and social thought. Philosophical anthropology, which took its historical roots from ancient Greek philosophy, existed in the later periods of the history of philosophy, acquired a new meaning in German classical philosophy, and became a special trend in the history of philosophy starting (...) from the beginning of the 20th century, is also, in general, a new philosophy of man. It is a philosophical teaching that includes the results of various systems of knowledge about the nature and existence of man in the 20th century Western Europe, mainly in German-language philosophy. In a broader sense, philosophical anthropology is a scientific system consisting of a set of philosophical ideas, concepts, and teachings that focus on man and aim to study him. Philosophical anthropology, which emerged in the late 1920s as a result of Max Scheler's philosophical teaching and was considered a new direction in the history of thought, developed as a branch of non-classical philosophy. (shrink)

The article is dedicated to the study of the relationship between the diversity of the world of knowledge and the world of man. The role of knowledge in human life is shown, the mechanism of its influence on the human world is revealed, the diversity of knowledge in the context of plurality of language images is revealed, the relationship of such philosophical disciplines as epistemology and philosophical anthropology, which deal with the problems of knowledge and man, respectively, (...) is clarified. It is shown that сurrently, scientists are concerned about knowledge that corresponds to all the canons of classical rationality and yet turns out to be deeply irrational in its moral indifference regarding its use. It is substantiated that the times of classical rationalist euphoria from the success of science are over and it is time to reject the enlightenment illusions about science as a ‘panacea’ for all social ills. The discrimination of pre- and out-scientific knowledge does not meet the modern requirements of the new epistemology. Some anthropological and humanistic parameters of cognition are highlighted, and an attempt is made to offer a certain anthropological view of the world as a whole. It is shown that the turn from epistemology to ontology, which took place in the philosophical thought of the twentieth century, does not mean that epistemology has exhausted the possibilities of its development and should withdraw from the historical arena or relegated to the periphery of philosophical research. Moreover, nowadays we are increasingly talking about a cognitive or epistemological turn in philosophy. Classical epistemology is being replaced by various variants of modern non-classical epistemology, such as the cognitive approach, various versions of modern philosophy and sociology of science and anthropology of cognition, evolutionary and social epistemology, etc. The leading feature that defines and unites these areas of non-classical epistemologies is their anthropologisation, which testifies to the inextricable connection of such philosophical disciplines as epistemology and philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

The article is a continuation of a series of works devoted to the methodological substantiation of the subject of philosophical anthropology. Using the example of specific searches for building the proper anthropological discourse, an attempt is made to analyze how different authors tried to build anthropology as a rigorous science. This makes it possible to analyze the problems associated with the methodology of science in its classical and non-classical versions. In this article, this work is done on (...) the material of E. Cassirer's searches, on building a connection between his classic work "Philosophy of Symbolic Forms" and his later work "Experience about Man", devoted to the anthropology as such. It is shown that Cassirer tried to overcome the substratum, naturalistic approach that dominated the essential paradigm in defining a person, by searching and describing the basic functional principle that singles out a person as a being. This is what Cassirer considers the principle of generating symbolic forms from which the entire space of culture is built. It is this that acts as the basic activity of a person, making him who he is and building his connection with culture. The symbolic form and the actual practice of form generation act as an intermediary between man and culture. This gives E. Cassirer the right to define man as a symbolic animal. The article also shows the difference between the classical discourse, which E. Cassirer continued to adhere to, and the non-classical one, which was proposed by M. Heidegger. This was shown in the famous discussion at Davos between two philosophers. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology is a broad-gauged study of man drawing on the findings of empirical sciences and the humanities. The paper is intended as a tribute to one of the pioneers in this field. The first part outlines central features of Plessner's conception, focusing on man's instinctual deficiency and his 'eccentric position' in the world; man from this perspective is an 'embodied' creature in the dual sense of experiencing the world through his bodily organs and of 'having' a body (...) and being able to reflect on his mundane situation. In social terms the perspective implies that man can find himself only through embodiment in institutional settings and role patterns - settings which, however, remain open to reinterpretation and revision. Subsequently Plessner's outlook is compared and contrasted with alternative views of the human condition. According to Gehlen, man's instinctual deficiency an openness need to be corrected through institutional stability and the standardization of role structures. Reviewing leading writings of the 'counter-culture', a final section explores contemporary anti-institutional trends which see man as a fugitive from social constraints and his search for self-fulfilment as antithetical to role patterns. (shrink)

Helmut Plessner (18921985) was one of the founders of philosophical anthropology, and his book 'The Stages of the Organic and Man', first published in 1928, has inspired generations of philosophers, biologists, social scientists, and humanities scholars. This volume offers the first substantial introduction to Plessners philosophical anthropology in English, not only setting it in context with such familiar figures as Bergson, Cassirer, and Merleau-Ponty, but also showing Plessners relevance to contemporary discussions in a wide variety of (...) fields in the humanities and sciences. (shrink)

The first part of the article (§§ 1-3) illustrates the critical relation the authors establish with the leading figures of philosophical anthropology in terms of their engagement with “world-openness” (Weltoffenheit). This notion cannot be reduced to the objectivity that confronts man as a spiritual being, as in Max Scheler, but rather makes it possible to grasp the limits of distancing objectification; in Arnold Gehlen, the coercion to action derived from the indeterminacy of man’s relation with the world is (...) not sufficient to comprehend the role of culture for the constitution of the human animal itself; and with the biological means utilized by Helmuth Plessner it is not possible to account entirely for the human capacity to establish relations by means of society. Historical anthropology, as the second part (§§ 4-5) of the article shows, aims to respond to such deficiencies by bringing to light the numerous historical and cultural forms of openness to a plurality of worlds. Freeing itself of any abstract and binding anthropological norm that claims to define the essence of man, historical anthropology investigates human structures and phenomena through a series of transdisciplinary studies centering on themes such as the body, ritual, mimesis and the performative dimension in its entirety, performance and performativity. (shrink)

Dissolution of tradition : the new affiliation -- Jefferson's communitarianism : in search of the affiliated man -- Consequences of communitarianism : the other side of love.

The relation between critical theory of society and philosophical anthropology is a very interesting and exciting but also problematic one. On the one hand, since Hork- heimer’s seminal essay Remarks on Philosophical Anthropology critical theorists have always expressed a clear distaste for anthropological speculation. On the other hand, notwithstanding Adorno’s aim in Negative Dialectics to “vetoe any anthropol- ogy” and criticize “the question of man [as] ideological”, he frequently mentioned the project of a “negative anthropology” (...) or “dialectical anthropology” as an important one. In this context, it is especially noteworthy that Adorno developed a significant philosophical and also human relation during the 1960s with Arnold Gehlen, one of the founders of 20th-century philosophical anthropology. In my contribution I will fo- cus on some aspects of the Adorno/Gehlen relation, mostly approaching this topic at a historical-philosophical level rather than at a strictly theoretical level, and offering some remarks on certain affinities between their aesthetic theories and also on cer- tain philosophical elements that emerge in a powerful and significant way from the public debates between Adorno and Gehlen that took place in the 1960s on radio and TV. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toward a Philosophical Anthropology of Nonhuman AnimalsKalpana SeshadriIn medieval iconography, the ape holds a mirror in which the man who sins must recognize himself as simian dei [ape of God]. In Linnaeus’s optical machine, whoever refuses to recognize himself in the ape, becomes one: to paraphrase Pascal, qui fait l’homme, fait le singe [he who acts the man, acts the ape].—Giorgio Agamben, Man and Animal[It is] then, (...) not just about animals. It concerns whether or not we can conceive of ethical relationships beyond either continuism or separatism, beyond identity politics or abyssal alterity.—Kelly Oliver, Animal LessonsI owe a deep debt of gratitude to the authors of the four provocative and challenging papers on HumAnimal: Race, Law, Language, not only for their thoughtful consideration of my work, but for pinpointing and interrogating an uncertain “failure” in my text, namely the absence of the animal as such. David Wood asks if it would be unfair to characterize HumAnimal as a work of “anthropocentric posthumanism.” Ellen Armour, too, wonders about animals and where they figure in my project. She suggests that HumAnimal doesn’t “quite cross the putative line between humans and animals as such,” but [End Page 197] she immediately and generously qualifies the observation as a “good thing, a productive thing.” Rebecca Tuvel, on the other hand, worries that in following Agamben, I appear to uphold “the binary logic that posits animals in opposition to humans because they lack language.” Animals, she suggests, “do seem to communicate with us in important ways, ways that are worth hearing.” These astute comments undoubtedly hit the mark; HumAnimal has nothing to say about animals as such, and despite the lure of the title, there is nary a squeak nor a snout that scuttles between the covers.Rather than explain or defend this absence, let me turn to the title of this response: Why a philosophical anthropology rather than a zoology of animals? Obviously, there is a paradox inherent in calling for an anthropology of autozoōn, instead of a philosophical zoology. The latter would perhaps entail theories of evolution and animal behavior, research areas better left to natural scientists than to philosophers and critical thinkers. The problem with zoology is the way in which the philosophical question is supplanted by biological fact. An anthropology of animals on the other hand, would mean that we focus on the question of what it means to be something. In other words, my sense is that the question of the animal in philosophy can only be raised as a question of human propriety. To lose sight of the fraught co-implication of human propriety and animal alterity is to lose sight of the contribution that philosophy can make to hum(an)animal studies. Thus, where the animal is concerned what we must think is not merely whether the animal has language, whether we are in some kind of biological or social continuity with it, or whether between the animal and human is a condition of implacable alterity, a gulf that cannot be breached. We must also think the kind of necessity charged by the animal as such for thought or for any thinking to take place, and for any interrogation of (human) being. In other words, to follow Derrida in his deconstruction of the animal as such, the animal that is only a word, (l’animot) an abstraction that refers to nothing and everything, an idea of nonhuman life predicated on the ideal of man, must we not abandon, once and for all, the natural attitude toward animals? Must we not begin with the acknowledgment that the animal as such cannot be spoken of, that animals as such do not exist, but what exists is the signifier “animal” as the necessary correlative to any thought, construction or deconstruction of human-being? And that now in our current epoch of posthumanism, the strategic concept of “the natural animal” serves as an inconceivable ideal directing our ethics and our politics? Thus, I suggest that what we must contend with today, what must be encountered not once and for all but repeatedly, is the logical non sequitur that confronts us; that is... (shrink)

In the article I consider whether philosophical anthropology offers knowledge about man. I begin with a definition of knowledge, then I present philosophical anthropology against the background of other kinds of anthropology. Having explained what is proper to it, I show that its goal cannot be the attainment of knowledge. Knowledge has requirements that an unreduced philosophical anthropology cannot fulfill; reduction deprives it of what is proper to it. However, the fact that it (...) does not produce knowledge is not a defect. The goal of my article is to create a common arena for considering various different approaches to man; this requires that the various parties admit that man cannot be reduced to what can be known about him. In order to know something, it is necessary to use carefully selected methods; it is not the case that merely saying something about man implies the possession of knowledge about him. (shrink)

Purpose of this article is the historical reconstruction of the studies in philosophical anthropology in Soviet Ukraine. Theoretical basis. In the philosophical tradition of independent Ukraine, there is an opinion that at the intersection of the 1960s and 1970s, there was an anthropological turn in the national philosophical thought. The authors provide a holistic and comprehensive reconstruction of philosophical understanding of man in the works of Ukrainian thinkers of the Soviet era. Originality. It has been (...) proved that before the emergence of the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Ukraine Academy of Sciences and the restoration of the Philosophy Department at Kyiv State University, the writings of Ukrainian philosophers in the 1920s and 1930s emphasize specifically the "ideological" factor of human existence. Based on the materials of M. Maksymovych Academic Library and the library at H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, there have been revealed and traced the specific features and peculiarities of the transformation of main accents in philosophical and anthropological studies of Soviet Ukrainian researchers in the post-war period. Conclusions. The studied problems developed in Soviet Ukraine in two vectors. The focus was on man as a social phenomenon and a "product of ideology" on the one hand, and, on existential aspects of a human being with its internal contradictions, understanding of its nature and the sense of existence, on the other hand. It has been established that the anthropological problems were the focus of not only scientists of the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Ukraine Academy of Sciences, but also of teachers of Kyiv State University. The authors grounded the thesis that, unlike the 1940-1950s, when the focus was on philosophical problems of natural science and philosophical personology, the 1960s bring forward not only philosophical and anthropological studies but also ethical and aesthetic issues, logic and scientific atheism. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is aimed at finding out the grounds, forms and essence of the correlation between the projects of information philosophy and transhumanism from the point of view of the problematics of philosophical anthropology. Attention is focused on the status of the knowing subject and the transformations of the forms of its activity within the specified correlation. Theoretical basis. Insufficient thinking on the issue of the functioning of traditional cognitive models, in particular Kant’s transcendental questioning, which formed (...) the basis of modern rationality and classical science, in the new sociocultural reality led the authors to problematize the forms and essence of interaction and operating with knowledge and communication in the information sphere of human existence and communication. A comparative consideration of the worldviews in the information philosophy and transhumanism projects, made on the basis of a study of current scientific literature, provided an opportunity to assume the probability of implicit elimination of the problems of philosophical anthropology from the horizon of meanings of modern science through the blurring of essentially anthropological analytics. Originality. The article proves the ambivalent nature of the correlation between the projects of philosophy and transhumanism information that are externally close on the subject and problematics, and for the first time in the domestic literature, they have been compared. The content of the powerful potential of information philosophy for the development of philosophical anthropology approaches to the phenomena of the human world determined by the technological nature of civilization and the powerful sociocultural issues of modernity have been clarified. The threats of the dehumanization of the problem field in the modern science and spheres of applied digital technologies associated with transhumanism, interpreted as an ideology, are underlined. Conclusions. The analysis of theoretical positions relevant for the philosophy of information and transhumanism resulted in a number of conclusions, central among which is the statement of the "blurring" situation, the hidden elimination in the content of problematics of philosophical anthropology and its humanistic pathos within the limits of modern forms of correlation and existence in the scientific discourse of the philosophemes and ideologemes in the information philosophy and transhumanism. Epistemological phenomena of "cognitive closure" and a man as a "blind spot" in the thinking on the science and technology development, primarily communication, indicate the relevance of a full comprehensive consideration of the problems of philosophical anthropology in projects of the information philosophy and transhumanism. (shrink)

The article is devoted to philosophical anthropology in the works of Russian religious thinkers of the 20 th century during their period of emigration. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the main approaches to understanding human nature and its image in the philosophy of Russia abroad. The article identifies a common direction in the development of anthropological concepts, despite individual differences in the views of Russian religious philosophers. The review and analysis begin with the personalism of N.A. (...) Berdyaev, who considered the problem of man to be central to philosophy. In his work The Fate of Man in the Modern World, Berdyaev offered a personal understanding of the new epoch of the 20 th century and proposed his own project of Christian anthropology. His intellectual ally, B.P. Vysheslavtsev, in the book The Ethics of Transfigured Eros, developed an interpretation of anthropological ideas based on an original understanding of the conscious and unconscious in man. Vysheslavtsev extended his ethical framework by introducing the concept of self-knowledge, which he considers the essence of a creative personality. The article further examines the book Reality and Man by S.L. Frank, which provides a comprehensive view of this philosopher’s anthropological beliefs. The foundation for Frank’s anthropology is the idea of personal being, which has been substantiated and developed in Christian thought. L.P. Karsavin developed anthropology from the perspective of the philosophy of all-unity, understanding individual personality as dependent on higher (“symphonic”) personalities. He fully incorporated the doctrine of personality into the metaphysics of all-unity, in which the Trinity serves as the main principle in the development of the entire created world. The last section of the article delves into an analysis of anthropological ideas as presented in the works of V.V. Zenkovsky. In his work Principles of Orthodox Anthropology, Zenkovsky built his argument on the image of God found in human consciousness and justified an anthropological ideal grounded in church doctrine and Orthodox theology. According to the author of the article, all the considered thinkers of Russia abroad recognized the significance of philosophical anthropology and the need for its further substantiation in the context of the Christian worldview. (shrink)

‘What is Man?’ That was the half-secret question motivating political theory in the nineties and the aughts.1 Sometimes, critics glossed the question as one of ‘subjectivity’, ‘the theory of the su...

The question on the essence of man and his relationship to nature is certainly one of the most important themes in the philosophy of Hans Jonas. One of the ways by which Jonas approaches the issue consists in a comparison between the contemporary interpretation of man and forms of wisdom such as those conveyed by ancient Greek philosophy and the Jewish tradition. The reconstruction and discussion of these frameworks play a fundamental role in Jonas’s critique of the modern mind. In (...) the first section I introduce the anthropological problem in Hans Jonas’s oeuvre. Moreover, I clarify why it becomes essential for Jonas to resort to different forms of traditional wisdom. In the second and third sections I try to give an account (as complete as possible) of the two generalisations which Jonas shapes in order to criticise the modern concepts of man and nature. In the last section I show how Jonas links these generalisations to his own philosophical assessment of modernity. Finally, I focus on his methodology, which exemplifies how critical thinking may arise from a reconsideration of traditional contents. (shrink)

By examining the themes man and God, man and animal, and man as a rational being, Landmann provides a perspective that must be considered in understanding man’s life in culture and society. His view is that man is social and this aspect is the precondition of his cultural life. Man, as Landmann indicates, "produces cultures" and is more "strongly determined by cultural factors" than genetic factors. Whatever a man may believe about the static features in society, it is nevertheless pervaded (...) by an evolving process that may not be easily perceptible. This process is the change that can be measured by past records. Change, far from bringing destruction, somehow fosters man’s creativity. As Landmann states, "The most favorable times are the transition periods when an old world-structure is collapsing but individualism has not yet reached its peak." Through his discussion of various philosophers, notably Nietzsche, Marx, and Scheler, Landmann establishes an interesting tension according to which he evaluates man and his relation to self, others, creatures, and God. In the final analysis, man is portrayed in Landmann’s critical account as fundamentally a creator.—G.D.D. (shrink)

Helmuth Plessner’s Levels of Organic Life and the Human [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] is one of the founding texts of twentieth century philosophical anthropology. It is argued that Plessner’s work demonstrates the fundamental indispensability of the qualitative humanities vis-à-vis the natural-scientific study of man. Plessner’s non-reductionist, emergentist naturalism allots complementary roles to the causal and functional investigations of the life sciences and the phenomenological and hermeneutic interpretation of the phenomenon of life in its successive (...) levels and stages. Within this context, human agency can be understood as a higher-order property of organic life, which act by the selective activation of lower-level psychophysical powers. Plessner’s three ‘anthropological laws’ are used to situate the notion of practical self-understanding in between two extremes: deterministic views that deny human freedom and responsibility and views that ascribe an unrealistic amount of autonomy to human beings. (shrink)

Helmuth Plessner’s Levels of Organic Life and the Human [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] is one of the founding texts of twentieth century philosophical anthropology (understood as philosophical reflection on the fundamental characteristics of the human lifeform). It is argued that Plessner’s work demonstrates the fundamental indispensability of the qualitative humanities vis-à-vis the natural-scientific study of man. Plessner’s non-reductionist, emergentist naturalism allots complementary roles to the causal and functional investigations of the life sciences and (...) the phenomenological and hermeneutic interpretation of the phenomenon of life in its successive levels and stages. Within this context, human agency can be understood as a higher-order property of organic life, which act by the selective activation of lower-level psychophysical powers. Plessner’s three ‘anthropological laws’ are used to situate the notion of practical self-understanding in between two extremes: deterministic views that deny human freedom and responsibility and views that ascribe an unrealistic amount of autonomy to human beings. (shrink)

Summary This article presents and compares aspects of Charles Taylor's and Hans Blumenberg's seemingly opposing views about agency and epistemology, setting them in the context of the tradition in German ideas called ?philosophical anthropology?, with which both align their thinking. It presents key strands of this tradition, from their inception in the late eighteenth century in the writings of Herder, Schiller and others associated with anthropology to their articulation by thinkers such as Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen and (...) Karl Löwith in the early twentieth century. The main issues here are: man's status as part of nature or as ?radically divorced? from nature; the possibility of objective knowledge of man versus the epistemological status of human ?meaning?; the view of knowledge as abstraction versus ?concrete? or ?lived? experience. Within these parameters the article contrasts Taylor's emphasis on ?engaged? agency, embedded in discourses, bodies and predispositions, with Blumenberg's sense of our ?indirect? relation to reality: ?delayed, selective, and above all ?metaphorical??. It concludes that each position may be traced back to a key strand in philosophical anthropology: the one emphasising man's unique freedom, the other that sees man's grasp of reality as uniquely interwoven with a background of meanings. (shrink)

The archive of Gustav Shpet contains scattered preparatory materials for his works. Some of these handwritten rough drafts are devoted to Immanuel Kant. These jottings enable us to take a new look at possible trajectories of philosophical anthropology. The main goal of this article is to show, on the one hand, the modern relevance of Kant’s reflections on the essence of the human being and, on the other hand, the productiveness of their critical reinterpretation by Shpet. In effect, (...) Kant’s reflections give us an insight into the sources of the current anthropological crisis when “the free man”, capable of creating himself, has finally detached himself from his nature (i.e. accomplished what Kant believed to be the foundation of anthropology). Shpet’s critique enables us to outline the contours of a positive way out of today’s critical situation. To implement this task, the authors carry out a historical-philosophical analysis of Shpet’s treatment of the question of philosophical anthropology. This is a new approach both for Shpet scholarship and for the Russian philosophical tradition, an approach that opens up a new path to overcome the crisis and, what is more, a path that is ecologically significant. This gives us all the more reason to try to find the critical points of anthropologism (easy enough if we turn to Shpet’s article “The Anthropologism of Lavrov in Light of the History of Philosophy”). It also encourages us to reinterpret in an anthropological context Shpet’s reflections on the human being and humanness (see the article “Wisdom or Reason?”). The Supplement contains the first ever publication of a historical document, a letter Shpet received from the German embassy in 1924, inviting him to Königsberg for the celebration of the 200th anniversary of Kant’s birth and a programm of the event with the names of speakers and the topics of their presentations. (shrink)

We need a metaphysics of respect for nature in order to establish the foundation for a humanistic philosophical anthropology. A metaphysics of respect for human beings will assist us in overcoming the human crisis. Genuine metaphysical respect for nature and for humans needs no supernatural substance. Matter is realized as causa sui and can be also defined as Natura sapiens. Humans are not the only intelligent life forms in the universe. Man is primordial a creative being: Homo creans. (...) The predestination of philosophical anthropology consists in clearing and co‐creating the essence (logos) of human being. (shrink)

The article argues for the existence of an elective affinity between the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and German philosophical anthropology, affinity that would bring to light a 'blind spot' of the functionalism of the equivalence that is placed in the antithesis of the so called anti humanism in Luhmann. The question asked by the German sociologist: which self-projection of man is behind the assumptions of functionalist thinking? He responded: the man as problem solver in a transcendental sense. (...) As well as in Goethe elective affinity of a 'new' theoretical content with pre-existing materials, in the case that concerns us, such pre-existing materials would have had a known address, so that the originality of Luhmann would be in a new composition of categories. The new luhmannian composition takes shape, at least in the following arguments: the distinction from man/environment to the distinction system/environment; the turn from contingency to double contingency; complexity and its reduction in German philosophy to complexity and its reduction in systems theory; from categories of self-reference and self-observation to the theory of the observer; the offset of the human and the world to the offset of society; the functionalism of the German philosophy to the functionalism of the equivalence. El artículo postula la existencia de una afinidad electiva entre la Teoría de Sistemas de Niklas Luhmann y la Antropología Filosófica Alemana , afinidad que traería a la luz un ‘punto ciego’ del funcionalismo de la equivalencia que se coloca en la antítesis del mentado antihumanismo luhmanniano. A la pregunta que el mismo sociólogo alemán se planteaba: ¿qué autoproyección del hombre está detrás de las suposiciones del pensamiento funcionalista?, se respondía: el hombre como solucionador de problemas en un sentido trascendental. Tesis antropológica central de la AFA. Así como en Goethe afinidad electiva dice de una ‘nueva composición’ teórica con materiales prexistentes, en el caso que nos ocupa, tales materiales preexistentes tendrían domicilio conocido, de modo que la originalidad de Luhmann estaría en una nueva composición de categorías de una tradición antropológica muy desarrollada en su época y país. La nueva composición luhmanniana toma forma, al menos, en los siguientes desplazamientos argumentales: de la distinción hombre/entorno a la distinción sistema/entorno; del giro a la contingencia al giro a la doble contingencia; de la complejidad y su reducción en la AFA a la complejidad y su reducción en la teoría de sistemas; de las categorías de autorreferencia y de autoobservación a la teoría del observador; del descentramiento de lo humano y del mundo al descentramiento de la sociedad; del funcionalismo de la AFA al funcionalismo de la equivalencia. (shrink)

This book evaluates the Western conception of man. After having examined primitive thought in which Nature comprises everything that exists, including man, the author explains why in Western thought man is usually not only different from Nature, but opposed to it, which may have grave consequences to Nature’s fate.

The paper aims to examine the construction, circulation, and transformation of knowledge about man (anthropological knowledge) in human-technology interaction in the 20th century. The analysis focuses on the prerequisites of the industrial working world and its implicit knowledge about human beings. However, the basis and starting point of technical adaptation is usually ignored: The concepts of “man” and the anthropological knowledge gained experimentally from a anthropocentric designed interface. Based on the concept of an intuitive interface design this problem will be (...) investigated. The questions posed by this article as well as the objectives associated with them open up an interdisciplinary framework between philosophy of technology, philosophical anthropology and history of science given that they not only focus – by means of historical reconstruction – on historical changes in technological developments. They also address the issue of generation and transformation of anthropological knowledge in the definitions and interactions of “man” and “technology”. (shrink)

This publication is an article 2, expanding on the topic, outlined in article 1, published earlier in “Philosophical thoughts” (1019, No. 1). The author considers the constitutional prerequisites of the anthropological anti-Utopia of the Third Reich, the main principles of which were deduced from the folk-political and folk-cultural versions of the German philosophical anthropology completed with ideological statements of the industrialism. The functional potential of the human ideals is regarded. These ideals are canonized in the ideology of (...) the national-socialism with the symbolic representation as Leader, Worker and Soldier as practical persons are conceptualized as antipodes, which in the further myth creations of the national-socialism are concretized and became the features of heroes. The idea and realities of the folk educational state are analyzed including the chronological and topological characteristics of this anti-utopia with the practically unrestricted life-time and the dialectic of the European idea with paradox prescribing to it the Nordic origin. The significance of sacral meaning of the Third Reich is clarified in the categorical schemes of the political romantic. The consequences of intentional primitivism of the world view culture of the youth are detected in the landscapes of the anthropological anti-utopia with the transforming of the normal student into “the political soldier” and recognition of the masculine community as a structuring model of society. The anti-human intentionality of biological reduction of the new world view, which is founded on the myth of the origin and the race theory, is unveiled as a distinction between a “worse” and “non- worse” life what makes this anti-utopia a repressive one and legitimates the crime practices of the re-education and liquidation. (shrink)

The study began with an introduction to Philosophy of Man. This Philosophical-Christological approach started with sense of self-awareness on this seemingly vain technological modern world. In the history of philosophy, there were three objects of study evolving by themselves, world, man and God in orderly fashion and repeating in interval phases. Self-experience shows three objects: first, existential unity (past), second, experiential unity (present) and third, transcendental unity (future). Western Philosophy banked on Aristotle’s notion of man as rational animal that (...) led to Dualism turned into Monism and finally into Pluralism making it harder to capsulate man’s unity. Thus, the universal question “what is man?” including his end remains unanswered. The problem with Western-Aristotelian Thought was its dependence on rationality as ultimate and highest faculty of man. The Greeks believed in immortality of soul but contradicted reality that human mind has no power over death (mortality). Faith transcends mortal-natural state of man however not in proud and arrogant manner but in utter surrender and subjection (Paschal). Faith turns truth from objective to personal. God’s and man’s identity was both revealed. Man as God’s image becomes definite in the revelation about Christ, the Son of God - the Perfect Man Eph. 4.13. KEYWORDS: Philosophy, Christ, Perfect Man, Philosophical-Christological approach,Christian anthropology, Qualitative Research Design, Philippines. (shrink)

This philosophical anthropology tries to explore the basic categories of man’s being in the worlds using a special quantum meta-ontology that is introduced in the book. Quantum understanding of space and time, consciousness, or empirical/nonempirical reality elicits new questions relating to philosophical concerns such as subjectivity, free will, mind, perception, experience, dialectic, or agency. The authors have developed an inspiring theoretical framework transcending the boundaries of particular disciplines, e.g. quantum philosophy, metaphysics of consciousness, philosophy of mind, phenomenology (...) of space and time, and ontological relativity. (shrink)

Philosophical personalism has generated a very powerful field of study in the twentieth and twenty first centuries but has not produced a systematic exposition. This book fills this big gap by offering for the first time a full systematic personalistic vision of the human person. This ambitious volume offers a pedagogical and integrated exposition of philosophical personalism, answering vital questions about human identity and existence in a way that the reader can achieve an integrated view of the person. (...) The book points to the real life of each person so that, by partially unraveling the mystery of the personal being, it becomes a philosophical guide for life. For these reasons, the book can be used both for academic purposes, as a manual of philosophy of man or for personal enlightenment. Divided in five parts, the first part of the book works as an introduction, offering an overview of the human person and of the notion of person. The second part describes the internal structure of the human being addressing topics as corporeity as a personal fact; sensibility and the senses; affectivity; intelligence; freedom understood as choice and self-determination and, finally, the personal self. The third part analyses the person in action and some special types of action such as work and language. The fourth part deals with interpersonal relationships beginning with I-You relationship and following with the family and the social structure. Finally, part five deals with the so-called ultimate questions, that is, those that decide the final meaning of each person's life, namely, time, death, immortality, and religion. (shrink)

In the beginning of the 20 th century, the discussion of the anthropological theme across the field of French philosophical debate. It also implies a redefinition of philosophy and politics at different levels. This is about the second episode of great anthropological questioning that took place in the 20th century, since the first had to do with the great German philosophical works which draws on the writings of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, and Ernst Cassirer, (...) among others. In the early 1960, the issues of the debate are of a different order. What is at the heart of this reflection is both a radical discussion issue of anthropology as an attempt to define the role and status of criticism in contemporary thought. Foucault makes the anthropological critique the point of departure, at the same time, in his review of the role and function of the Humanities on the device knowledge-power of modern and contemporary societies and the whole philosophical trajectory in which he will involve his searches during the duration of his life. He tries to understand what the meaning of the field of empirical knowledge that comes to emerge at this time with the claim to be a science, anthropology. Anthropology ends up wanting to resume human experience and philosophy in a move where the man gives his truth as the soul of truth. It is at this movement that Nietzsche put an end, when he showed that the death of God accompanies the death of man; that death of God is the end of metaphysics, and the place left free isn't absolutely the man who takes. The critique of the anthropological question is the starting point of an analysis with larger theme the problem of subject’s deconstruction and reconstruction, namely, the deconstruction of the subject as a cause and reconstruction of subjectivity as effect.Au début des années 1960 la mise en discussion du thème anthropologique traverse le champ du débat philosophique français. Elle implique aussi une redéfinition de la philosophie et du politique à différents niveaux. Il s’agit du deuxième épisode du grand questionnement anthropologique qui a eu lieu dans la philosophie du 20 e siècle ; le premier ayant affaire à la grande entreprise philosophique allemande qui se dessine dans les œuvres de Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, et Ernst Cassirer, entre autres. Au début des années 1960 les enjeux du débat sont d’une autre nature. Ce qui est au centre de cette réflexion est aussi bien une mise en discussion radicale de la question de l’anthropologie qu’une tentative de redéfinir la fonction et le statut de la critique dans la réflexion contemporaine. Foucault fait de la critique de l’anthropologie le point de départ à la fois de sa critique du rôle et de la fonction des sciences humaines dans le dispositif du savoir/pouvoir des sociétés modernes et contemporaines, et de toute la trajectoire philosophique dans laquelle il va impliquer ses recherches sa vie durant. Il essaie de comprendre quelle est la signification de ce champ de la connaissance empirique qui vient d'émerger à cette époque avec la prétention de constituer une science, l'anthropologie. L'anthropologie finit par vouloir relier l'expérience de l'homme et la philosophie dans un mouvement où l'homme donne sa vérité comme âme de la vérité. C'est à ce mouvement que Nietzsche a mis un terme lorsqu'il a montré que la mort de Dieu s'accompagne de la mort de l'homme; que la mort de Dieu est la fin de la métaphysique, et la place restée vide ce n'est absolument pas l'homme qui la prend. La critique de la question anthropologique est le point de départ d’une analyse ayant pour thème majeur le problème de la déconstruction et de la reconstruction du sujet, à savoir de la déconstruction du sujet comme arché et de la reconstruction de la subjectivité comme effet.No início dos anos 1960, a discussão do tema antropológico atravessa o campo do debate filosófico francês. Ela implica também em uma redefinição da filsofia e da política em diferentes níveis. Trata-se do segundo episódio do grande questionamento antropológico que teve lugar no século XX , uma vez que o primeiro teve a ver com a grande empreitada filosófica alemã que se desenha nas obras de Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, e Ernst Cassirer, entre outros. No início dos anos 1960, as questões do debate são de uma outra ordem. O que está no centro desta reflexão é tanto uma discussão radical da questão da antropologia como de uma tentativa de definir a função e o estatuto da crítica na reflexão contemporânea. Foucault faz da crítica da antropologia o ponto de partida, ao mesmo tempo, de sua crítica do papel e da função das ciências humanas no dispositivo do saber/poder das sociedades modernas e contemporâneas e de toda a trajetória filosófica na qual ele vai envolver suas pesquisas durante na duração de sua vida. Ele tenta compreender qual a significação do campo do conhecimento empírico que vem de emergir nesta época com a pretensão de constituir uma ciência, a antropologia. A antropologia termina por querer reatar a experiência do homem e a filosofia em um movimento onde o homem dá sua verdade como alma da verdade. É a este movimento que Nietzsche colocou um fim, quando mostrou que a morte de Deus se acompanha da morte do homem; que a morte de Deus é o fim da metafísica, e o lugar deixado livre não é absolutamente o homem que o toma. A crítica da questão antropológica é o ponto de partida de uma análise tendo por tema maior o problema da desconstrução e da reconstrução do sujeito, a saber, da desconstrução do sujeito como causa e da reconstrução da subjetividade como efeito. (shrink)

This article will address Edith Stein's interests in relation to the microcosm of man, whether as a material, living, animated or spiritual body, as well as in his social, historical, community and cultural position. For Edith Stein, only through this set of interrelated and exclusive instances, each with its own particularities and yet dependent on the others. The phenomenological study of the SELF presented by the author, in the search for the Divine, for awareness of “character”, in the experience of (...) each part of one's own being, in experience, in empathy, where through philosophical anthropology Edith Stein conceives everyone as living beings, with man as a microcosm. For this reason, in the first part it will be discussed regarding The Centrality of the Body in Stein's Philosophical Anthropology. It has become a necessity within anthropology to refer to the body/empathy element. These two realities are established as essential in Stein's considerations and they are what will determine the scope of what refers to the empathic process and the Constitution of the self, elements so necessary for the recovery of the affirming reality of the human in its specification’s man/woman. In the second stage will address about the Soul and Spirit in Stein's Philosophical Anthropology. The living body is established in the fact that in addition to possessing external sensory characteristics, which can be grasped by consciousnesses, they themselves are holders of the ability to feel. Stein postulates as the first characteristic of the experienced body The Binding of the latter to an individual consciousness, to a subject. In his doctoral work, Stein turns to the characterization of an individual who has an essence that is established not only in the corporeal-psychic dimension, but also in that of spiritual appreciation. Finally, and will be closed with conclusions. (shrink)

The article is a continuation of the series of works devoted to the construction of philosophical anthropology as a scientific discipline. This article is devoted to the search for W. Dilthey, who built his sciences about the spirit from the point of view of the so-called “anthropological reflection”. In the article, the author analyzes W.Dilthey’s search for a method and system of categories, with the help of which he actually tried to develop a new scientific paradigm for European (...) philosophy. As the main conceptual accents in this search, the author identifies three. First. Dilthey’s replacement of the concept of being by the concept of life. Second. The place of the cognizing subject, to which the classical sciences are accustomed, is occupied by the “whole man”, “the totality of human nature”. Third. The search for the place of the specifics of the sciences of the spirit was carried out on the basis of the so-called anthropological setting, on the basis of determining the place of man in the world and, accordingly, the word and method of understanding man adequate to this place, trying to overcome the boundaries of the mind set before by I.Kant. The author concludes that despite the influence of Dilthey’s works on many authors of the 20th century, we have to talk more about Dilthey’s project, about the idea, the ideal that he proposed for the humanities, than about the developed concept. The basis of this ideal is the idea of an understanding and experiencing person. But this project did not become a developed concept. (shrink)