This article presents a new criticisms of reductive approaches to knowledge-‘wh’ (i.e., those approaches on which whether one stands in the knowledge-‘wh’ relation to a question is determined by whether one stands in the knowledge-‘that’ relation to some answer(s) to the question). It argues in particular that the truth of a knowledge-‘wh’ attribution like ‘Janna knows where she can buy an Italian newspaper’ depends not only on what Janna knows about the availability of Italian newspapers, but on what she (...) believes about the matter. This dependence of Janna's knowledge-‘wh’ on her (possibly false) beliefs is incompatible with the reductive approach. (shrink)

_Wh_-questions with the modal verb _can_ admit both mention-some (MS) and mention-all (MA) answers. This paper argues that we should treat MS as a grammatical phenomenon, primarily determined by the grammar of the _wh_-interrogative. I assume that MS and MA answers can be modeled using the same definition of answerhood (Fox in Mention-some interpretations, MIT seminar, 2013 ) and attribute the MS/MA ambiguity to structural variations within the question nucleus. The variations are: (i) the scope (...) ambiguity of the higher-order _wh_-trace and (ii) the absence/presence of an anti-exhaustification operator. However, treating MS answers as complete answers in this way contradicts the widely adopted analysis of uniqueness effects in questions of Dayal (Locality in _wh_ quantification: Questions and relative clauses in Hindi, 1996 ), according to which the uniqueness effects of singular _which_-phrases arise from an exhaustivity presupposition, namely that a question must have a unique exhaustive true answer. To solve this dilemma, I propose that question interpretations presuppose Relativized Exhaustivity: roughly, the exhaustivity in questions is evaluated relative to the accessible worlds as opposed to the anchor/utterance world. Relativized Exhaustivity preserves the merits of Dayal’s exhaustivity presupposition while permitting MS; moreover, it explains the local-uniqueness effects in modalized singular _wh_-questions. (shrink)

Some characteristics of two species of singular reference are described and a complexity of mention vis-a-vis designation illustrated by means of special quotation devices. It is pointed out that the use/mention distinction is more complex and less absolute than sometimes realized.

. Is R.S. Peters' way of mentioning women in his texts detrimental to philosophy of education? Some considerations and questions. Ethics and Education: Vol. 7, Creating spaces, pp. 291-302. doi: 10.1080/17449642.2013.767002.

According to the sensitivity account of knowledge, S knows that p only if S’s belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. The sensitivity condition is usually relativized to belief-formation methods to avoid putative counterexamples. A remaining issue for the account is where methods should be mentioned in sensitivity subjunctives. In this paper, I argue that if methods are mentioned in the antecedent, then the account is too strong to (...) accommodate inductive knowledge; if methods are mentioned in the consequent, then the account is too weak to eliminate some luckily true beliefs from the realm of knowledge. Therefore, the strategy to relativize the sensitivity condition is undermined by inductive knowledge and some luckily true beliefs. (shrink)

One of the goals of a certain brand of philosopher has been to give an account of language and linguistic phenomena by means of showing how sentences are to be translated into a "logically perspicuous notation" (or an "ideal language"—to use passe terminology). The usual reason given by such philosophers for this activity is that such a notational system will somehow illustrate the "logical form" of these sentences. There are many candidates for this notational system: (almost) ordinary first-order predicate logic (...) (see Quine [1960]), higher-order predicate logic (see Parsons [1968, 1970]), intensional logic (see Montague [1969, 1970a, 1970b, 1971]), and transformational grammar (see Harrnan [1971]), to mention some of the more popular ones. I do not propose to discuss the general question of the correctness of this approach to the philosophy of language, nor do I wish to adjudicate among the notational systems mentioned here. Rather, I want to focus on one problem which must be faced by all such systems—a problem that must be discussed before one decides upon a notational system and tries to demontrate that it in fact can account for all linguistic phenomena. The general problem is to determine what we shall allow as linguistic data; in this paper I shall restrict my attention to this general problem as it appears when we try to account for certain words with non-singular reference, in particular, the words that are classified by the count/ mass and sortal/non-sortal distinctions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Brief Mention The Classicist’s ThirstP. A. S.( Od.11.582–92)These are some of the first lines I read of Greek poetry, thanks to Schoder’s Homeric Greek,and they are part of the reason I became a classicist. Their simplicity, directness, and clear statement of a man’s desperate longing for what is necessary and beautiful stirred my unformed youth and incited me to master as best I could this delightful impossible (...) language. Forever eager, forever denied, Tantalus now strikes me as the image of the scholar always hoping to reach and make his own the truth, always finding it receding from his lips, or scribbling pen.In each century, ever since Petrarch rediscovered Cicero’s letters and Livy’s decades and thought he had found kindred spirits, with whom he could converse directly over the ages, scholars have sought for methods of establishing a closer tie to the classical past and modes of relating it to their own world. Every century has built on what has gone before, while criticizing previous work as inadequate or wrongheaded. Petrarch began the search for manuscripts, reassembling the decades of Livy, and inspiring Boccaccio and later humanists in a chase for treasures that continued into the sixteenth century. But bare manuscripts were not enough: soon the need for a renewed study of grammar and diction became apparent, for the collation and emendation of texts, for translation into the vernacular.Let Poliziano stand for many: he brought to the work of emendation and interpretation of classical Latin texts a knowledge of Greek remarkable in his day, a precise familiarity with a wide range of authors and their commentators, and the technique of evaluating manuscripts by [End Page 143]their age. He would hunt out and note the readings of the earliest codices available—he found many in Florence, assembled by previous scholars—and emend the vulgate tradition, often using Greek texts to correct the Latin. With these tools he was able to make an outstanding contribution to the text and interpretation of authors. Each short essay of the Miscellaneorum centuria primaand the unfinished Centuria secundais cut like a small jewel, the ingenuity and insight of each facet flashing the brilliance of his method. How often he seems to have escaped Tantalus’ fate, and sipped the water, tasted that delicious fruit.Yet important as his work was, at a distance of time the elusive truth recedes, and must be sought all over again. The oldest manuscripts are not necessarily the best, stemmata can play strange tricks, contamination can confuse traditions, anonymous correctors are revealed as identifiable scholars. Methods are refined, new techniques tried, terminology clarified. Now Poliziano’s marvelous command of the Latin vocabulary is available to the undergraduate who troubles to do a word search on the PHI CD-ROM, though not with the linguistic skill or knowledge of context to use it well. Microfilm, copying machines, and air travel allow inspection of manuscripts scattered throughout the world. Students use texts annotated with the learning of five hundred years, and have at their fingertips information even a Poliziano could not know. Yet somehow our thirst is still there, our hunger not satisfied. The sense of the texts, the events and emotions of history, the culture of which they are a part, their meaning to our own lives, are still elusive.Poliziano’s methods have not relieved our thirst, nor have those of Bentley or Mommsen, of Wilamowitz or Gildersleeve, though they have brought us closer to understanding the ancient texts and the world that created them, and have given us a taste of that world, those people. Their work has brought us where we are today. The Estienne motto, found on the cover of the summer issues of the Journal,is apposite: Noli altum sapere. 1Some of the old limbs that did not bear fruit are pruned away and new ones grafted on, but the new depend on the vigor of the old trunk.Each scholar, each generation of scholars, is condemned—or privileged—to repeat the experience of searching for a better method of understanding, of stretching once more toward the receding water.This Journalhas... (shrink)

Excerpt from Some Principles of Moral Theology: And Their Application The present book is an attempt to bring together, from the Bible and from Christian experience, the principles which have guided the Church in dealing with individual souls; to test those principles by the light of modern knowledge; and to apply them to present-day conditions and needs. Some of the traditional terminology of moral theology has been discarded; much has been retained, either because it seemed the best medium (...) for expressing what had to be expressed, or because it would have been impossible otherwise to indicate the development and formulation of Christian thought on the subject. Thus the book may prove of interest not merely to the clergy and others who are confronted by the practical problems of conduct and morality, but also to students entering upon the study of moral theology for its own sake. The Church of England affords her clergy singularly little expert guidance in this matter of the direction of souls. Two branches of the subject - those which go by the names of Christian ethics and the theory and practice of the confessional respectively - have indeed been systematically and fully treated by recent writers and there is a wealth of practical experience to be drawn both from manuals of pastoral theology and from biographies. Moral theology, however, as will appear, com prises much more than the two topics just mentioned. Yet within the last fifty years, apparently, only three books have attempted to present the whole content of moral theology in such a form as should guide the theory and practice of the Church of England, and all three are out of print and consequently difficult of access. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

‘And if I must make some mention of the virtue of those wives who will now bein widowhood, I will indicate all with a brief word of advice. To be no worse thanyour proper nature, is a great honour for you; andgreat honour is hers, whose reputation among males is least, whether for praise or for blame.’.

We study some operations that may be defined using the minimum operator in the context of a Heyting algebra. Our motivation comes from the fact that 1) already known compatible operations, such as the successor by Kuznetsov, the minimum dense by Smetanich and the operation G by Gabbay may be defined in this way, though almost never explicitly noted in the literature; 2) defining operations in this way is equivalent, from a logical point of view, to two clauses, one (...) corresponding to an introduction rule and the other to an elimination rule, thus providing a manageable way to deal with these operations. Our main result is negative: all operations that arise turn out to be Heyting terms or the mentioned already known operations or operations interdefinable with them. However, it should be noted that some of the operations that arise may exist even if the known operations do not. We also study the extension of Priestley duality to Heyting algebras enriched with the new operations. (shrink)

In this paper we contend that the ability to engage in meta-dialog is necessary for free and exible conversation. Central to the possibility of meta-dialog is the ability to recognize and negotiate the distinction between the use and mention of a word. The paper surveys existing theoretical approaches to the use-mention distinction, and brie y describes some of our ongoing e orts to implement a system which represents the use-mention distinction in the service of simple meta-dialog.

We study some operations that may be defined using the minimum operator in the context of a Heyting algebra. Our motivation comes from the fact that 1) already known compatible operations, such as the successor by Kuznetsov, the minimum dense by Smetanich and the operation G by Gabbay may be defined in this way, though almost never explicitly noted in the literature; 2) defining operations in this way is equivalent, from a logical point of view, to two clauses, one (...) corresponding to an introduction rule and the other to an elimination rule, thus providing a manageable way to deal with these operations. Our main result is negative: all operations that arise turn out to be Heyting terms or the mentioned already known operations or operations interdefinable with them. However, it should be noted that some of the operations that arise may exist even if the known operations do not. We also study the extension of Priestley duality to Heyting algebras enriched with the new operations. (shrink)

I venture to call the attention of classical scholars to two legends about Roman Emperors gleaned amid the arid waste of theological nonsense which passed for literature among the Copts, in the hope that they may have better luck than I have had in tracing them to some classical source. The first is taken from MS. Par. Copte 131, fol. 40, a single leaf of what seems to be a geographical and historical encyclopaedia.1 The writer who is treating in (...) a very discursive way of Ethiopia, states that Nero or Domitian—a strange pair to run in double harness—caused an island in the Red Sea to be watered with oil. The description of that island is mixed up with a mention of the original divisions of the Indians—a term which as usual in early days embraces both Indians and Ethiopians,—and their subsequent changes; and as that too may be of interest to students of ancient geography, I will translate the passage in full. (shrink)

We analyse Reach's puzzle, according to which it is impossible to be told anyone's name, because the statement conveying it can be understood only by someone who already knows what it says. We argue that the puzzle can be solved by adverting to the systematic nature of mention when it involves the use of standard quotation marks or similar devices. We then discuss mention more generally and outline an account according to which any mentioning expressions that are competent (...) to solve Reach's puzzle – and in particular those consisting of standard quotation marks and their fillings – have a descriptive analysis: we rebut the usual objections to this account, and show how it is superior to some of the alternatives in the literature. We conclude by briefly connecting the foregoing discussions with semantic theory. (shrink)

This article serves as an introduction to the text of Otto F. Kernberg which follows. It sets out to introduce some of the principal questions concerning leadership and leaders which are addressed in psychological research and writing. A brief critical summary follows of some of the main approaches adopted: leadership and traits, leadership and situation, contingency models, systems approaches. Finally the contribution of Kernberg to the discussion of leadership is introduced, with particular attention to how what this contribution (...) may have to add to the other approaches which were mentioned. The reader is then encouraged to read Kernberg's text which follows. (shrink)

ʻAlī b. Abī Tālib (d. 40/661), who took over the caliphate duty in a troubled environment after the murder of ʻUthmān b. ʻAffān (d. 35/656), first faced with the demands that the murderers of his murdered predecessor be punished. Although Hazrat ʻAlī himself was of the same opinion, he wanted to ensure public order in the city first. However, the Companions of the Prophet (aṣ-ṣaḥābah) like Zubayr b. al-ʻAwwām (d. 36/656) and Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbaydallāh (d. 36/656), who were not convinced (...) about this issue, started an opposition movement under the leadership of ʻĀ’isha bt. Abī Bakr (d. 58/678), who went to Mecca. The attempts of this movement, which got out of control with the participation of Umayyads and ʻAbdallāh b. Saba’ supporters of different intentions, ended with The Battle of the Camel. Before the war took place, Hazrat ʻĀ’isha heard the barking of dogs when the army led by ʻĀ’isha came to Hawaab on the road to Basra. For this reason, she asked where they were. When she heard that this region was Hawaab, she wanted to go back. Because the Hazrat Prophet had said the following before: "Which of you the Haw's dogs will bark for." The following statement is used in the ḥadīth sources in several different variants, generally without specifying a name: "Thereupon, the people with her wanted her to continue her journey, hoping that the Muslims would recover.” At this point, there is a difference between ḥadīth sources and Islamic historical sources. Islamic historical sources state that the people who wanted her to continue her journey were Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbaydallāh, Zubayr b. al-ʻAwwām and ʻAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr (d. 73/692). The following statements are included in another narration reported from Ibn ʻAbbās (d. 68/688) regarding the issue: The Prophet said to his wives: “I wish I knew! Which of you owns the beautiful hairy camel!” She will set out and then Hawaab dogs will bark at her, many people will be killed, right and left. Then she will survive when she is almost dead. A fifth piece of news mentioned within this framework was narrated by Abū Rāfiʻ (d. 40/660). According to this rumor, the Prophet of Allah said to Hazrat ʻAlī: "Something will happen between you and ʻĀ’isha." Hazrat ʻAlī said: "O Prophet of God! Me?" Allah's Prophet said: "Yes." Hazrat ʻAlī said: "Is it me among my friends?" Allah's Prophet said: "Yes." Hazrat ʻAlī said: "Well, did I trouble them?" The Prophet of Allah said: "No," and then added: "If such a thing happens, take her to a safe place." The sixth narration on the subject is a statement made by Ḥudhayfa b. al-Yamān (d. 36/656). Accordingly, Ḥudhayfa said: "Would you believe me if I told you that one of your mothers will set out with a group of Muslims and will fight you?" Those who were there said: "Will this really happen?" Ḥudhayfa said: "Yes". The last narration mentioned in this context is the news of Abū Bakra (d. 52/671). According to this narration: "Abū Bakra said: Immediately after joining the people of Camel in order to fight with them in the days of Camel, Allah helped me with a word I heard from the Prophet. When the news that the Persians appointed the daughter of Kisrā as the ruler reached the Prophet, the Prophet said: ‘The people who entrust their works to women will not find peace’. " In such a situation, it becomes important to analyze the narrations. Because analyzing the reliability of the narrators and the contents of the narrations will help to understand the subject in a healthy way. Although ḥadīth scholars make some different statements about the reliability of the people who narrated the narrations, the view that gains weight is that they are reliable. Likewise, no problem was detected in the contents of the narrations. Some problems draw attention when Islamic historical sources are considered. For, these historians were not as sensitive as ḥadīth scholars regarding the evaluation of the narrations. At this point, two problems draw attention: The transponder understanding adopted in the early stages of historiography. The effort to protect some valued people. Early historians generally adopted the transponder understanding while writing their works. For this reason, some misinformation that was not analyzed began to be passed down from generation to generation. At this point, the science of history should benefit from the methods of ḥadīth and its sound narrations. In addition, the effort to protect a valuable person like Hazrat ʻĀ’isha has brought the understanding of holding the Companions like Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbaydallāh and Zubayr b. al-ʻAwwām responsible for a behavior that is thought to be wrong. However, it should not be ignored that people can make mistakes. Loving Hazrat ʻĀ’isha does not require defending her wrong decision. In addition, this has brought the accusation of other Companions of behavior unbecoming to them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 385-406 [Access article in PDF] Some Thoughts on What Spinoza Learned from Maimonides on the Prophetic Imagination Part Two:Spinoza's Maimonideanism Heidi M. Ravven 1. Spinoza's Maimonideanism Now it is precisely with the belief that the prophets were philosophers and the Bible offers veiled insights into the central doctrines of philosophy, so powerfully argued and deeply held by Maimonides that he (...) included it as one of his Thirteen Principles of Jewish Faith the acceptance of which is a necessary condition of a share in the World to Come, 1 that Spinoza took strong issue. 2 At the same time, however, Spinoza agreed with Maimonides' doctrine [End Page 385] of the a. imaginative (literary) character 3 and b. the political function 4 of the Bible and of its authors and of the major prophetic figures. The quite obvious influence of Maimonides' account of prophecy upon Spinoza's account in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) has been widely recognized and commented upon. That is to say (although no commentator up till now, as far as I know, has made this point explicit), Spinoza adopted Maimonides' conception of prophecy as mimetic or productive and not only—or chiefly—as receptive. 5 The Maimonidean account of the (prophetic) imagination clarifies why the atomic fact model of the receptive function of the imagination is inapplicable to the TTP. The imaginative character of prophecy is not about picking up information (in a dream or otherwise) delivered from God; rather, it concerns how one understands (and presents) certain truths (in the case of Spinoza's notion of prophecy, namely, those of ethics and in Maimonides' those of science as well as of ethics) imaginatively rather than rationally, i.e., within a web of (narrative and symbolic) associations instead of within the deductive order of rational causal explanation. "Now we see," Spinoza, in the first chapter [End Page 386] of the Tractatus, 6 writes, echoing Maimonides (esp. Guide II, 47), "why the teachings of the prophets were nearly all in the form of parables and allegories, and why all spiritual matters were expressed in corporeal form, for this is more appropriate to the imaginative faculty." Prophecy does not consist in the simple reception of pieces of information transmitted directly from God. This is not what it is for Maimonides nor for Spinoza.Thus we find that Spinoza formally defines the prophet in the beginning of TTP, chapter i, as "one who interprets (interpretatur) God's revelations to those who cannot attain to certain knowledge of the matters revealed... For the Hebrew word for prophet is nabi, that is, speaker and interpreter (orator et interpres)." 7 The prophet is interpreter in imaginative terms, whether he reformulates belief imaginatively or instead merely understands it in that way himself to begin with. Prophecy is an imaginative (narrative, symbolic) rather than a philosophical (logical and demonstrable) type of understanding and presentation. If one looks at Spinoza's account of prophecy in TTP i, one finds that immediately after Spinoza defines prophecy, he then goes on to tell us what revelation is scientifically: "the nature of [the human] mind... is the primary cause of divine revelation." That is to say, the mind itself, whether rationally in intellectual thought or in its imaginative capacity and in both cases as itself a product of divine (i.e., natural) causes, supplies the content of revelation. 8 Spinoza then goes on to say that now that we have understood the true explanation of prophecy, we must return from this scientific understanding to the biblical account of prophecy. At that point he tells us that "the Jews never make mention of intermediate or particular causes nor pay any heed to them, but to serve religion and piety... they refer everything to God." Now this is a crucial passage and must be used as an interpretive principle for all that follows. (Spinoza illustrates the point in some detail at the end of the chapter where he lists the various... (shrink)

The phrase ληκύθιον πώλεсεν, which Aeschylus in the contest of Aristophanes' Frogs mockingly introduces into six of the prologues of his rival Euripides , has recently attracted a great deal of attention. With a couple of exceptions those scholars who have discussed it during the last fifteen years agree that it contains a sexual innuendo. Where they differ is on the exact nature of its meaning. What vase shape does ληκύθιον or λήκυθοс denote and hence what part of the male (...) genitalia is envisaged? Or is it mistaken to press for anatomical detail? May not the phrase simply suggest ‘become detumescent’? These are the questions that have been posed regarding Ar. Ran. 1200–47. In what follows I shall try to show that the context, far from demanding that we give an underlying sexual meaning as well as its surface meaning to the phrase, could almost be said positively to exclude such a meaning. In an attempt to be as brief as possible I shall not deal with all of the suggestions made by the scholars mentioned in my second footnote and rarely indicate points of agreement, disagreement or indebtedness. When I confront the arguments of these scholars they are mostly those of two of the most recent contributors to the debate, Snell and Anderson. At first sight there is some plausibility in the suggestion that lekythion might denote a penis or a pair of testicles or both things. Several vase shapes have a suggestive appearance. If the object denoted is actually the vase we are accustomed to call the aryballos, the reference would be to an object whose name possibly derived from a word which had a genital reference. It has also been suggested that this object was once manufactured from animals' testicles. (shrink)

Introduction. This paper is a sequel to our paper [3]. In that paper we introduced the notion of a finite approximation to an infinitely long formula, in a language L with infinitely long expressions of the type considered by Henkin in [2]. The results of the paper [3] show relationships between the models of an infinitely long sentence and the models of its finite approximations. In the present paper we shall apply the main result of [3] to prove a number (...) of theorems about ordinary finitely long sentences; these theorems are of a type which one might call “preservation theorems”. The following two known results are typical preservation theorems: A sentence φ is preserved under substructures if and only if φ is equivalent to some universal sentence ; φ is preserved under homomorphic images if and only if φ is equivalent to some positive sentence. An expository account of preservation theorems may be found in Lyndon [9].We shall use freely all of the notation introduced in [3], and shall not attempt to make this paper selfcontained. However, the reader should have no difficulty following this paper after he has read [3]. In § 1 we cover some preliminary topics. In § 2 and § 3 we shall illustrate our method in familiar situations by proving anew the two preservation theorems mentioned above. We shall then obtain four new preservation theorems in §§ 4, 5, and 6, involving respectively direct powers and roots, strong homomorphisms and retracts, and direct factors. The result in § 6 was stated in the abstract [4], while the results in § 5 were stated in the abstract [5]. (shrink)

There is another sort of ‘defense’ of relativism that I mention in conclusion. Sometimes one finds the view that one is rightly punished for a crime only if they admit committing it, and that it was a crime — something wrongly done: ‘punishment conditional on confession’ is the rule proposed. It might seem that this would give impunity to a criminal hardy enough to deny the fact, or the evil, of her deed; so it would, unless it was also (...) understood that if a person was proved by accepted standards to be the perpetrator of an action agreed to be wrong, the opportunity to admit guilt would extend from open questioning through beating to exquisite torture until confession was extracted (cf. the Chinese customs reflected in the Judge Dee stories of Robert Van Gulik). More often, one finds the view that a person is not refuted unless he admits this, and a view is not refuted — and so is not properly dismissed — unless its proponents concede defeat. A similar view is that all really telling philosophical criticism must be internal or else non-neutral (a view we discussed above).If one can in principle produce a conceptual system from a list of all propositions by following the recipe: for any proposition P include P, or else include not-P, in S, then (providing one adds no constraints concerning consistency) there will be no proposition that will appear in all conceptual systems. If what it is for a proposition to be neutral is for it to appear in all conceptual systems, then no proposition is neutral. But of course, the same recipe that produces this result produces the result that the proposition (P) Some proposition is both true and false appears in some conceptual system which (since the denial of (P) appears in less than all systems and hence is not neutral) is (allegedly) none the worse for that. And the proposition (P1) Conceptual relativism is false appears in some conceptual systems which (since the denial of (P1) appears in less than all systems and hence is not neutral) is none the worse for that. But then what remains of the claim that conceptual relativism is true?Sometimes refuted is used in a person-independent manner: Proposition P is (and always was) refuted by the fact that F uses P is refuted in such a way that it does not entail There is someone who refuted P. Sometimes, of course, it is so used that P is refuted does have that entailment. Even in the latter case, refutation is an epistemological notion, and Person S is refuted does not entail S knows that S is refuted and is compatible with S believes that S is not refuted. The recommendation that we add a psychological component of ‘admits to’ to the epistemological notion ‘being refuted’ seems to have no other ground than the arbitrary one that if we do we shall then be able better to defend relativism.While the recipe for constructing conceptual systems suggested above may seem useful to a relativist — it gives one clear content to ‘neutral proposition’ — it has what must surely seem a defect to the relativist, namely that given it (even with consistency constraints added) there will be no translational incommensurability. For if P is contained in system S, then not-P is expressible in S, and conversely. And the recipe yields the result that for any proposition P, and any system S, S contains either P or else not-P.This, of course, brings out an ambiguity in ‘contains’. In one sense, a system ‘contains (1)’ whatever can be expressed in it. In another, it ‘contains (2)’ whatever, according to it, is true. If it is a complete system without suspense of judgment it contains (1) twice the propositions it contains (2). Further, a system contains (1) lots of propositions it (or its proponent) does not regard as true, and so the fact that a proposition P appears in system S does not mean that P favors S. One often at least can state the conditions of S's falsehood in S, and even prove in S that S is false, where “in” is used in the sense of “contains (1).”Sophisticated relativism, then, seems no more plausible, no more free from inconsistency, and no less open to devastating critique than are its less cultured relatives. Relativism, at least in the varieties discussed here, seems to live up to its unsavory reputation. Since not even translation incommensurability seems to entail lack of cognitive competitiveness, it seems that it will have to be admitted that, regarding apparent disagreement on basic matters — including fundamental religious disagreement — the appearance is also the reality. People do uneliminably disagree, and short of conversion or (what will seem from within the religious perspective in question) some other ‘failure in faith’ (e.g., coming to reject all religious views) will continue to do so. Whatever can be done in terms of common understanding and common humanitarian endeavors must be done without denying the many basic disagreements that there are. And whatever notion of inter-faith dialogue is other than espitemically defective will have to face that fact; for significant dialogue based on self-deception or on falsehood seems not a terribly promising enterprise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 95-102 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway Some Initial Reflections on NBAC Eric M. Meslin and Harold T. Shapiro On 3 October 2001, Executive Order 12975 expired, and with it so too did the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Established by President Bill Clinton in 1995, NBAC was the fifth national committee since 1974 created to advise the U.S. (...) government on bioethics policy. In the long political tradition in this country that national bioethics policy advice should use temporary rather than permanent bodies, NBAC followed in the footsteps of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974-78); the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1980-83); the Ethics Advisory Board (1978-80); and the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee (1988-89). Arguably, other distinguished panels could lay claim to recognition as a "national bioethics committee" including the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) (1994-95); the Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (1988); the Human Embryo Research Panel (1994); and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), which continues to function.These committees and commissions form a kind of a continuum, albeit occasionally interrupted by periods during which no such bodies existed. Each arose from a particular confluence of events and circumstances. NBAC was no different; its history can be traced both to a series of discussions within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy beginning in 1993 (NBAC 1998a, p. 3), and to a specific recommendation from ACHRE that called for a national committee to address ethical issues in human subjects research (ACHRE 1995, p. 817). Nbac's Impact In his useful comparison of the accomplishments of the National Commission and the President's Commission, Brad Gray concluded that seven lessons were learned, the sixth of which was that "nothing substitutes for having a perceptible impact on either policy or practice" (Gray 1995, p. 304). Assessing NBAC's [End Page 95] impact on "policy or practice" is difficult, particularly given the fact that it so recently completed its work. More time may be needed before a full assessment can be undertaken of the impact of its six reports (and their total of 120 recommendations). Instead, in this essay we offer some reflections on NBAC's initial impact, using some specific examples of how bioethics gets done Inside the Beltway. Eliciting Reaction If immediate reaction by the White House is any measure of impact, then Cloning Human Beings (NBAC 1997) had a significant one. The day after he received this report in a Rose Garden ceremony, President Clinton submitted a bill to Congress that would have extended the moratorium on federal funding to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer. This bill never passed, nor has any other bill emerged that has enjoyed the support of the House and the Senate. Five states have enacted legislation to date, but these vary in their permissibility from bans on all forms of cloning to bans similar to the one proposed by NBAC, which recommended a time-limited prohibition only on somatic cell transfer to create a child (reproductive cloning).If the Cloning report elicited speedy action from the White House, this paled in comparison to the reaction that led to and, in turn, was created by Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research (NBAC 1999a). Those who believe that government moves slowly need only be reminded of the events of 8-14 November 1998 (and, as we shall mention below, the further events of 14 July 1999). Some will recall that early in the second week of November 1998, James Thomson and his colleagues published in Nature and John Gearhart and his colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that they had isolated and cultured human primordial stem cells and germ cells respectively. Within days of these remarkable reports, Advanced Cell Technology (ACT) announced via an article written by Nicholas Wade in the... (shrink)

I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts (...) of compatibilism, and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will. (shrink)

One way to make the logical elements in Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery more interesting to children is to get them to enjoy working with sentences beforehand. I have found that puzzles which illustrate logical principles can be used to build initial interest in working with sentences that carries over into the chapters in Harry. Puzzles can also be used as a reward. After a particularily good class, instead of homework the fifth grade students I work with are given a puzzle - (...) something to think about for next time. There are some themes in Harry which can be supplemented with logical riddles; and I will mention one and describe how to do this below. But before I get into a description of the mechanics of using logic puzzles with Harry, some comments about the psychological benefits of puzzles might be useful. (shrink)

In Béziau a logic \ was defined with the help of the modal logic \. In it, the negation operator is understood as meaning ‘it is not necessary that’. The strong soundness–completeness result for \ with respect to a version of Kripke semantics was also given there. Following the formulation of \ we can talk about \-like logics or Beziau-style logics if we consider other modal logics instead of \—such a possibility has been mentioned in [1]. The correspondence result between (...) modal logics and respective Beziau-style logics has been generalised for the case of normal logics naturally leading to soundness–completeness results [see Marcos :279–300, 2005) and Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski :229–248, 2005)]. In Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Nasieniewski :185–196, 2008), :189–203, 2009) some partial results for non-normal cases are given. In the present paper we try to give similar but more general correspondence results for the non-normal-worlds case. To achieve this aim we have to enrich original Beziau’s language with an additional negation operator understood as ‘it is necessary that not’. (shrink)

The first mention of the concept of an inconsistency measure for sets of formulas in first-order logic was given in 1978, but that paper presented only classifications for them. The first actual inconsistency measure with a numerical value was given in 2002 for sets of formulas in propositional logic. Since that time, researchers in logic and AI have developed a substantial theory of inconsistency measures. While this is an interesting topic from the point of view of logic, an important (...) motivation for this work is also that some intelligent systems may encounter inconsistencies in their operation. This research deals primarily with propositional knowledge bases, that is, finite sets of propositional logic formulas. The goal of this paper is to extend the concept of inconsistency measure in a formal way to sets of formulas with the modal operators “necessarily” and “possibly” applied to propositional logic formulas. We use frames for the semantics, but in a way that is different from the way that frames are commonly used in modal logics, in order to facilitate measuring inconsistency. As a set of formulas may have different inconsistency measures for different frames, we define the concept of a standard frame that can be used for all finite sets of formulas in the language. We do this for two languages. The first language, AMPL, contains formulas where a prefix of operators is applied to a propositional logic formula. The second language, CMPL, adds connectives that can be applied to AMPL formulas in a limited way. We show how to extend propositional logic inconsistency measures to such sets of formulas. Finally, we define a new concept, weak inconsistency measure, and show how to compute it. (shrink)

Atheism, which does not accept belief in God, criticizes all religions that include this belief. Especially modern period atheism tries to make many of its criticisms in the name of scientific and tries to spread its ideas with this method. The same method is followed in our country. Atheism is tried to be spread through publications such as many websites, social media accounts, articles, journals and books. The religion on which atheists focus their activi-ties in our country and make various (...) criticisms is naturally Islam. Atheists try to use science and highlight freedom of thought while voicing their claims against Islam, which the majority of the society believes in, since atheism does not have a serious equivalent in Turkish society. Criticisms of atheism regarding religion in our country are gathered in the center of Islam, Hz. Muhammad and Quran. Especially It is claimed that Hz. Muhammad never lived, therefore it is impossible to talk about an Islam and the Quran that he preached, and that the Umayyads, who became a great empire, invented Islam and Quran in their current sense in order to ensure the continuity of the state. Atheists relate these and similar claims to some parts of the Prophet's life. Therefore, there are many claims about Sîrah and they need to be examined. Until today, no Turkish study in the field of Sîrah has been determined regarding these claims made about the life of the Prophet. In this study, in order to fill the mentioned gap in the field, firstly, some claims of atheists regarding Mecca period were determined; These claims were classified according to their subjects and evaluated in terms of sîrah. Atheists, who attach importance to freedom of belief and thought and express these frequently, when turn into their ideas about Islam and Muslims from thought to action, writing, etc.; It has been observed that these sensitivities have disappeared. Specific to the period examined, it has been determined that atheists aimed to reject the Prophet and Islam completely and shaped his writings accordingly, and often did not include important details about the subjects on which they made claims. In addition, there is a lack of scientific literature and information; It is seen that many topics are distorted from their main media. (shrink)

Philosophers of language have paid some attention in recent years to the nature of direct quotation, especially in discussions warning against confusion between use and mention, and perhaps even more attention to the proper interpretation of indirect quotation. Virtually all work on quotation has been confined exclusively to linguistic or verbal quotation. What about quotation of other sorts? If a string of words can quote another string of words, can a picture quote a picture, or a symphony quote (...) another symphony? And if I can quote your words can I also quote, or only imitate or describe, your gestures? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 127.2 (2006) 293-303 [Access article in PDF] Some Late Sonnets of Gildersleeve Found at Sewanee Christopher M. McDonough University of the South e-mail: [email protected] Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve, the eminent classicist who founded this journal, is remembered primarily as an authority on matters of grammar and philology; he was in addition something of a poet, although of limited ability, who specialized in sonnets.1 In the (...) archives of the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, I recently found a number of sonnets written by Gildersleeve, all of them apparently from late in his long life.2 As these may be of interest to the readership of this journal, AJP's current editor has graciously allowed these nugae of her distinguished predecessor to be reprinted here.What follows below are seven sonnets written when Gildersleeve was evidently in or nearly in his nineties,3 all of which were copied in longhand by his niece, Mrs. Leon D. (Eleanor) Kirby, a longtime Sewanee resident.4 When and why Mrs. Kirby made these transcriptions is uncertain, [End Page 293] although her reasons appear to have been personal.5 She was not a practiced amanuensis (see below n. 14), and the text of the sonnets is largely as she copied them out, with only minor corrections.6 Because these require in places a little explication, I have supplied a brief commentary as well. From the appearance of his name fairly littering the footnotes, readers will ascertain that Professor Ward Briggs has been tremendously helpful to me in putting together this "Brief Mention."It was in one of his own late "Brief Mentions," in fact, that Gildersleeve outlined his theory that "the modern sonnet [is] an analogon on a large scale" to the elegiac distich (AJP 41.2 [1920]: 200 = Miller 1930, 402). As he continues, "The octave... represents the hexameter, the sextet, the pentameter, and the likeness to the latter is heightened by the use of terza rima."7 He ends his remarks on the matter thus: The Greeks kept prose and poetry steadily apart... but the elegiac distich was open to all; and I may claim Hellenic authority for introducing my sonnets into the company of grave grammarians. If that chiffonier Diogenes Laertius might try his hand on epigram, why not I try mine at sonnets? [End Page 294]In a letter to Paul Shorey, Gildersleeve had assessed his own poetic endeavors as "mere embroideries of more or less familiar texts" that are "at best... bits of versified rhetoric" (Briggs 1987, 346). On the other hand, as Shorey himself had maintained in a long New York Times tribute, "Everything that Gildersleeve did counted" (January 27, 1924, 14). No doubt the sonnets are of greater historical than literary value, although this is a judgment better perhaps left to the individual tastes of AJP's current company of grave grammarians. 1. Callimachus to Heraclitus (The Old Greek Page) They told me Heraclitus, thou wast dead. Death is the common lot, too well I know, Of every thing that lives and moves below The brazen heavens. But Ah! what tears I shed When I recalled how oft the hours sped. Unheeded they would come unheeded go While our discourse kept up its happy flow Until the sun sank to his ocean bed Long since, long since, my Halicarnassian friend [... thou hast returned to dust.] Thy play is over, and thy work is done. The angel Azrael who makes an end Of mortal men, thy tuneful voice hath hushed And yet thy Nightingales live on, sing on. 2. To Joseph Packard They told me Joseph Packard, thou wast dead Death is the common lot, too well I know, Of every thing that lives and moves below The brazen heavens. But Ah! what tears I shed, When I recalled how oft the hours sped. Unheeded they would come, unheeded go While our discourse kept up its happy flow. [Until the sun sank to his ocean bed] And now dear comrade, old Confederate friend Ashes to ashes art thou, dust to dust. The... (shrink)

The current paper discusses the peer review process in journals that publish research papers purveying new science and understandings. Different aspects of peer review including the selection of reviewers, the review process and the decision policy of editor are discussed in details. Here, the pros and cons of different conventional methods of review processes are mentioned. Finally, a suggestion is presented for the review process of scientific papers.

It is argued that the use/mention distinction, if it is to be a clear-cut one, cannot have the significance that it is usually thought to have. For that significance attaches to the distinction between employing an expression in order to draw attention to, or to talk about, some aspect of the world, as determined by the expression’s meaning, and employing it in order to draw attention to, or to talk about, the expression itself—and this distinction is not a (...) clear-cut one. In the final section of the essay this argument is extended to cast doubt on a rather glib appeal to the use/mention distinction that is frequently made in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Concise replies to remarks and queries by Paolo Parrini, and by students andmembers of the audience regarding the topics indicated by the above mentioned keywords.

On the basis of evidence obtained by unravelling enigmas in Philostratus and Eunapius’ Lives of the Sophists and lifting the veil of mystery surrounding some of the crucial, sophistic-related passages from Isocrates and Dio Chrysostom’s writings, we were able to arrive to a conclusion that, contrary to all expectations, the Second Sophistic is closely connected not so much with rhetoric as with philosophy itself, no matter what the so-called sophists say of the phenomenon in their attempts to disguise the (...) essence of things. Paradoxically enough, it turned out that the enigma in Eunapius and, above all, Philostratus’ work played almost the same role as did myth in Herodotus’ historical work in so far as only the skillful use of the mentioned stylistic device might confer an aura of magic to the scarce material being at the disposal of the authors. Keywords: Second Sophistic, Philostratus, Eunapius, legend of Socrates, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Isocrates, Platonism, enigma, symbolism. (shrink)

This paper discusses some of the modal involvements of analytical mechanics. I first review the elementary aspects of the Lagrangian, Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi approaches. I then discuss two modal involvements; both are related to David Lewis' work on modality, especially on counterfactuals. The first is the way Hamilton-Jacobi theory uses ensembles, i.e. sets of possible initial conditions. The structure of this set of ensembles remains to be explored by philosophers. The second is the way the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches' (...) variational principles state the law of motion by mentioning contralegal dynamical evolutions. This threatens to contravene the principle that any actual truth, in particular an actual law, is made true by actual facts. Though this threat can be avoided, at least for simple mechanical systems, it repays scrutiny; not least because it leads to some open questions. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the problem of interpretations of the Gettier problem. The author draws a distinction between counterexamples presented in Edmund Gettier’s article and Gettier-style cases, between the Gettier problem and general epistemological problem supposedly occurring in all or many Gettier-style cases. It is argued that in Gettier’s article there is a gap associated with an insufficiently defined concept of justification, which does not allow talking about Gettier problem without any explicit or implicit interpretation of his views on justification. Along (...) with this, it is indicated that the same concept of justification has strict features (deductive closure principle, non-factive justification and internalism), which do not allow arbitrary interpretations of the Gettier problem, and therefore we can say that some interpretations are closer to the text of a well-known article. (shrink)

In the target article the authors mention that at a recent conference “several leading scholars in bioethics expressed the view that there is nothing philosophically interesting left to be done in...

Purpose: The paper tries to explore the possibility of developing a theory of science that is compatible with the non-dualizing way of speaking. Problem: The difficulty of developing a non-dualism-compatible theory of science consists in the difference of the perspectives of the theory of science and the non-dualizing way of speaking. The non-dualizing way of speaking deals with descriptions as results of inquiries, whereas science theory thematizes the process of gaining descriptions in empirical research. If we want to reach compatibility (...) between these different perspectives, we are led to the question of what kind of relationship exists between inquiry and description and what is the source of attaining knowledge. In respect of social sciences, there is the additional problem that a great deal of their objects are text; therefore the relationship between text and interpretation is relevant for the empirical research process of social sciences. Findings: George Herbert Mead’s theory of action and communication allows a productive approach to the above-mentioned problem to be found. Mead conceives of speaking as potential acting, as action that is initiated but not carried out. In this way, describing and inquiring can be connected non-dualistically. The source of gaining knowledge and descriptions is, however, according to Mead’s action theory, practical activities. Objects are not presupposed, but are results from action. New experiences and descriptions come from inquiries that are stimulated by action problems and action inhibition and the endeavor to overcome the inhibition. Implications: The result of the argumentation is that Mead’s conception of action and language can serve to develop a theory of science that is compatible with non-dualizing thinking. The reason for this is that in Mead’s conception, acting and speaking, experiencing and describing are not conceived of as categorical differences but are related to each other as executed and initiated. (shrink)

Hadiths that have been discussed in this paper consist of narrations regarding divine attributes and having some problematic meanings between supporters of Bişr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī. These narrations were mostly accepted denounced (munkar) by Bişr al-Marīsī and his sopporters due to having an anthropormophist and corporealist content about God. They rejected divine attributes according to their understanding of God based on incomparability (tanzīh) which provided by Mutazilite approach towards divine attributes even though they conveyed some features of (...) Ahl al-Ra’y. They found contradicted of attributing human features to God based on their tanzīh understanding, therefore, they interpreted such this kind of narra-tions in terms of their approach or rejected at all. At the other hand, a hard Hadith scholar Uth-man al-Darimi believed that one should accept divine attributes as they are in the Qur’an and Sunna. According to his belief, he considered the explicit meanings of the narrations without interpretation of divine attributes, and based on his perpective he denied Bişr al-Marīsī and his supporters’ interpretations claiming they would cause divesting God of all attributes (ta‘tīl). He argues that these narrations should be taken into considerations based on their explicit mea-nings. The discussions on these hadiths are important due to showing different approaches of scholars from the schools of Ahl al-Ra’y and the ones from Ahl al-Hadith towards the hadith du-ring the period when the main Hadith works were collected. Discussions on the narrations stu-died in this paper reveal two schools’ understandings of divine issues, their approaches to divi-ne attributes, as well inform us their perspectives of hadith in general.Summary: The present paper examines the debates between ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (d. 280/894) and the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833) on the divine attributes mentioned in some hadiths in the period when the main hadith books were composed (i.e., III/IXth century). These debates that took place between the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra’y concern the un-derstanding and interpretation of the hadiths in a certain way.It could be stated that the debates focus on how the hadiths should be understood, or whether it is the explicit meaning of the words or the possible methaphorical meanings beyond them that should be considered.It is worth briefly introducing the parties who discussed the hadiths studied here. The aforementioned discussions about some hadith narrations are between the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, one of the important figures of the Ahl al-Hadith who wrote a separate work on these hadiths. This work was written as a rejection of the views of Bishr al-Marīsī and his two students on the attributes of God and some issues regarding hadith.Bishr al-Marīsī was regarded as an important scholar of Kalam who received fiqh education from Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798). He is a scholar of Ahl al-Ra’y who made scientific dis-cussions with many scholars including Imam al-Shafiʿī (d. 204/820). He was on the council of the Caliph Al-Mamūn (d. 218/833) and had a significant role in the adoption of the idea of the createdness of the Qurʾān (khalq al-Qurʾān).Uthmān al-Dārimī,on the other hand, was a scholar of Ahl al-Hadith who learned ha-dith from the authorities of his era such as Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn (d. 233/847), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848), Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 237/851), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Having visited all the important cities for the training of hadith, he learned the hadiths and conveyed them.With the understanding of proving the divine attributes and the opposition of the misin-terpretation of the narratives related to them, the groups advocating the appropriation of these lines in accordance with the understanding of incomparability (tanzīh) have complied the works since the first period. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the rejection of the divine attributes by Mu'tazila was influential in the emergence of the criticism literature of the Ahl al-Hadith and many authors wrote works in this direction.Regarding a narration by Abū Hurayra, an opponent reports that this narration gives the impression that God has the eyes and ears as we know. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī reports that this hadith proves sight and hearing not the eyes and ear organs. He indicates that God has no like by no means. Therefore, it is slanderous to refer the claim that Allah is made of organs to the Ahl al-Hadith. Abū Dāwūd states that with this hadith the attributes of sight and hearing for God are proved and Jahmiyya’s denial of the divine attributes are rejected.The opponent also considered Abū Hurayra's narration referring to the Prophet: "Faith is from Yemen, wisdom is from Yemen! I feel the breath of your Lord from Yemen!" as denounced (munkar). Because, according to Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions, breath can only come from those with an abdominal cavity, and Allah is free from it. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the opponent misunderstood. What is meant here is the wind that blows from Yemen and comforts people. In the context of this narration, we see that supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī evaluate the narrative literally, while ʿUthmān al-Dārimī interpret the narrative.Regarding the narration, "You can not approach Allah with something more virtuous than what comes out of it (the Qur'ān)" Ibn al-Saljī reports that Mushabbiha understands this as one with an abdominal cavity and from whom speech comes out. This understanding is in-valid since God is "samad" in the sense that He has no void. With this hadith, it is meant that the Qur'ān comes out of Allah’s presence rather than Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the real aim of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny God's attribute of speech. There is no doubt that the Qur'ān comes from Him, and those who do not accept it merely deny His attribute of speech.Attributed to Ibn Abbas; The meaning of "yamīn Allah" (the right hand of Allah) in narration "Black Stone (al-ḥajar al-aswad) is the right hand of Allah on earth, handshakes with the people" is not the right hand that we know according to Ibn al-Saljī, it is blessing and grace of Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who acknowledges that Black Stone is not meant to be a hand, the purpose of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny the two hands mentioned in the verses and ha-diths about Allah with invalid interpretations.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who criticized that Ibn al-Saljī quoted from another narration which Ibn Abbās heard from the Prophet, says that such poor narrations should not be spread. In addition, he points out that Ibn al-Saljī's interpretation is ugly and he criticizes it. Because Allah who is mentioned in the narrative is depicted as a young man with curly hair in a green suit. Such a narration is also an untrustworthy narration as it contradicts the authentic narrations of the Prophet. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who made this assessment of the narration, rejects the com-ments that the opponent made about the narration. According to the opponent, the phrase "I have come to Allah" means "to come into the presence of Allah in the Garden of Eden." Accor-ding to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī’s understanding, such complicated hadiths should not be only narra-ted.About the narration that are based on the Prophet and he does not know the answer to what he has come to know of himself, then he feels the coolness of his fingers as he puts his hand on his back and learns everything, the opponent evaluates the following: He was not Allah who came to the Prophet, but a well-behaved angel who was being directed by Allah and he was the angel who put his hand. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī rejects this interpretation of that oppo-nent. This comment is also contrary to other authentic hadiths. After he refused to the com-ment of the opponent about relevant narration, ʿUthmān al-Dārimī stated that he could not trust this comment on the basis of the authentic narrations he mentioned.Salaf scholars have preferred to be silent in this regard, as it is seen among the most difficult subjects to talk about divine attributes. However, subsequent generations have held dif-ferent paths in this regard. The basic approaches to understanding the divine attributes can be summarized in three main titles: tafwīd, tashbīh, and ta’wīl. Tafwīd is the path adopted by the early salaf scholars and means to leaving the knowledge about Allah’s entity and attributes to His knowledge. Tashbīh means to compare Allah to the created or the created to Allah. Ta'wīl is to interpret the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths that give the impression that Allah is like the crea-tures with semantics and rational deduction. The ones who deny the adjectives are called as Muʿattila and those who prove their attributes are called as Sifatiyya. According to Ahl al-Ra’y, it is necessary to appropriately make interpretation (ta'wīl) of the attributes giving the impression of anthropomorphism in terms of the dictionary. In the divine attributes, Muʿtazila advoca-ted the incomparability (tanzīh), whereas Ashʿariyya and Māturīdiyya adopted interpretation in accordance with incomparability. Mushabbiha and the Wahhābī-Salafī understanding has also taken the expressions regarding divine attributes with their explicit meanings.The debate between the scholars who lived in the ages II/VIII and III/IX, when the most important works are composed in the science of hadith, is important in that it is the first turn. In addition to this, the debate also contains important information on the approach to the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths, in that it shows two basic approaches, one of which represents the school of Ahl al-Ra’y, and the other represents the school of Ahl al-Hadith.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī generally advocates adhering to the explicit meaning of the narra-tion, while Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions criticize the narration labeling it as denied (mun-kar) or making an interpretation. On rare occasions, the places where ʿUthmān al-Dārimī re-jects the narration and makes interpretation, or where Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions de-fend the narrative can be seen.Interpretations made by Bishr al-Marīsī on the problematic narratives have influenced on the next scholars. Alongside Muʿtazilite scholars such as al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), his interpretations have been quoted by Sunni scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).The fact that the truth can be put forward in the science of hadith, which is based on the narration, does not favor one of the "narration" and "ra’y", it should be kept in mind that both of these depend on the proper and balanced use of both. To reveal the truth, the narration is in need of the opinion and the opinion (ra’y) is in need of the narration. Narration and opinion sho-uld be seen as complementary elements, not each other's opponents. (shrink)

Blair makes a strong case that fluid cognition and psychometric g are not identical constructs. However, he fails to mention the development of the prefrontal cortex, which likely makes the Gf–g distinction different in children than in adults.1 He also incorrectly states that current IQ tests do not measure Gf; we discuss several recent instruments that measure Gf quite well. (Published Online April 5 2006).

The text of Martial is fairly good, though not as good as many editors seem to think. We have three separate sources from which our manuscripts are derived, which are called by Lindsay in the O.C.T. AA, BA and O.1 All three sources seem to have suffered from editing, AA less than the others. In A.D. 401 one Torquatus Gennadius seems to have emended the text . We do not know whether all three sources were affected by this recension: all (...) we know is that the BA family are the only manuscripts that mention it. But there are many signs of recension discernible in the readings of the other families too, e.g. pas-sages which have evidently had grammar or syntax thrust upon them—and in these I do not include the now obscure allusions and the dead jokes past recall. (shrink)

This article deals with the subject and semantic analysis of human organs mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān. After the relevant verses were researched and identified in accordance with thematic commentary methodology, their scientific and semantic analysis was carried out objectively. The comments of commentators in this context were also examined in the study. After the verses in which the organs are found are researched, their definitions, then an objective and brief interpretation are made, and the semantic usage of each is (...) shown. The subject consists of the organs in the head, the organs in the trunk, the organs in the body and limbs. As is known, human organs are attributed to Allah in the Qur’ān. While the predecessor avoided interpreting the organs attributed to Allah as they are, their successors interpreted them in accordance with the glory of Allah, based on the use of the Arabic language. However, some contemporary scholars say that such verses are representative narratives. In reality, there is nothing like Allah. However, God explains Himself with people's organs and actions so that they can understand His truth. These verses aim to explain the unknown world and its metaphors by comparing them to known events and phenomena in the world, and in this way to bring religious truths closer to the human mind. In the Qur’ān, expressions such as sealing or veiling the senses, as in the verse "Allah has sealed their hearts and ears, and there is a veil over their eyes, and there is a great torment for them" (al-Baqarah 2/7), also indicate the senses' deprivation of true perception expresses. The Holy Qur’ān takes care to mention the organs in the human body and uses them in many senses, both literal and figurative, in man's relationships in this world and the afterlife. He gives him examples of organs so that he can take lessons and advice, and reminds him of his beautiful creation and the blessings he gives because of these organs. The semantic uses of body organs in the Holy Qur’ān vary, as they contain literal connotations of the physiological meaning of the organ. This is a condition characterized by most of the organs mentioned once in the Holy Qur’ān. However, the connotations of the organs mentioned many times have varied and gone beyond their literal meanings, they have been used in figurative meanings and contain secondary connotations. It included many topics related to the existence, role and performance of humans in world life. For example, the hand is used for power, giving, blessing, dominance and specialization. Linguists did not distinguish between similar organs such as body, object and body, but on the contrary, they compared them to each other to the point of creating confusion. However, while interpreting them, many commentators have tried to separate them according to the context of the verse and take into account the differences in meaning between them. The organs are mentioned in general terms in the Holy Qur’ān, but the details they contain are not touched upon. For example: It talks about the head, but does not touch the hair, eyelashes and brain. It is talking about bones and does not touch parts such as the skull, ribcage, pelvis, and thighs. It mentions the abdomen but does not mention its parts such as the belly button, esophagus, stomach, liver, kidney, bile and bladder. In addition, in the Holy Quran, there are organ names in the human body that are used metaphorically in different meanings rather than expressing the reality of the organs. Esophagus (المريء) is one such expression. This expression is used in the sense of blessing for eating and drinking. For example, it is used in this sense in the verse, "Give women their dowry as a matter of right (with good will), and if they voluntarily donate some of that dowry to you, enjoy it with pleasure" (an-Nisa: 4/4). For example, Liver (الكبد) in the verse "We created man among difficulties" (el-Beled: 9/4), it expresses difficulties and constant troubles. The study deals with the sixty-two organs mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān and includes all the organs in the internal and external parts of the body mentioned in six hundred and forty-five verses. These are six hundred organs in total in the Qur’ān, in accordance with the statistics we made during our research. It is used ninety-one times. (shrink)

Interventionism is an approach to the foundations of statistical mechanics which says that to explain and predict some of the thermodynamic phenomena we need to take into account the inescapable effect of environmental perturbations on the system of interest, in addition to the system's internal dynamics. The literature on interventionism suffers from a curious dual attitude: the approach is often mentioned as a possible framework for understanding statistical mechanics, only to be quickly and decidedly dismissed. The present paper is (...) an attempt to understand this attraction-repulsion story. It offers a version of interventionism that appears to be defensible, and shows that this version can meet the main objections raised against it. It then investigates some of the philosophical ideas underlying interventionism, and proposes that these may be the source of the resentment interventionism encounters. This paves the way to see some features and consequences of interventionism, often taken to be shortcomings, as philosophically advantageous. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Some Pornography May Be ArtMimi VasilakiIn "Why Pornography Can't Be Art,"1 Christy Mag Uidhir argues, as the title declares, that pornography cannot be art and thus that pornography is not art. According to Uidhir, this is because of the different ways in which pornography and art relate to contents and purposes. His argument for the impossibility of something being both art and pornography at the same time (...) runs roughly as follows. If something is pornography, then it has the purpose of sexually arousing (some audience) and that purpose is manner-inspecific. If something is art, then if it has a purpose, then that purpose is manner-specific. So when the purpose is sexual arousal, then it is manner-specific. Thus sexual arousal by art is manner-specific and sexual arousal by pornography is manner-inspecific. Therefore, Uidhir concludes, something cannot be both art and pornography.Here I argue that although this conclusion seems plausible, Uidhir fails to make a strong case for it because he does not establish that the purposes of art are necessarily "manner-specific" as opposed to the purpose of pornography, which is necessarily "manner-inspecific." That is, the paper does not make it plausible either that pornography has manner-inspecific purposes or that art has a manner-specific purpose.IUidhir's exclusivity doctrine is intrinsically implausible. Let us take for example a work mentioned in the article, Red Butt from Jeff Koons's [End Page 228] kitsch photo series of "Made in Heaven." Uidhir writes, "part and parcel of understanding Red Butt is recognizing that it depicts a sexual act involving Jeff Koons and Cicciolina.... Failure to do so precludes satisfaction of the purpose of the work" (p. 198). Here he rightly says that the audience cannot interpret the work without the prior knowledge of who is depicted in Red Butt: the audience must recognize the sexual act and the subjects of the photo as the artist and his wife. In other words, the role of knowledge of context in understanding art is connected with the claim that manner-specificity is essential to the purpose of art. In the case of Red Butt, the appeal to extra-visual and contextual information enables fuller understanding of the artwork. However, in fact, the wider audience (rather than the art critics) perceives the trash aesthetics of Red Butt while being ignorant of Koons's biography and this aesthetic irony might precisely be one of the purposes of the work. Even if it is true that the audience's recognition of the artist's intentional self-parody requires knowledge of who is depicted in the photos, we don't know if Koons intends his work to be understood (solely) in reference to or through this knowledge. It is plausible that Koons intended to blur the distinction between art and pornography by attempting to create art that is pornography. If we accept that pornography can never be art then if Koons intends to create art that is also pornography then he attempts the impossible; if we, on the other hand, allow for the possibility for an artwork to be both art and pornography and if we accept that Koons has succeeded in creating art that is pornography, then we can interpret Red Butt in the most natural way and say he has succeeded in creating both art and pornography. It seems therefore that regardless of the context, it is left to the audience to negotiate and finally decide, if they wish to, whether to appreciate Koons as pornography or as art (or both) despite the lines between these being unclear. This very ambiguity is part of the purpose of the work, which is lost on Uidhir's account.His exclusive model cannot account for artists whose explicit intention is to defy dichotomies by doing art and pornography at the same time. For example Annie Sprinkle, in reply to the question of whether she is doing art or pornography, insists against critics and defenders alike that she is "both an artist and a whore."2 Uidhir's position must be that, in effect, contrary to what she intends and believes, Sprinkle by definition cannot do both... (shrink)

In 1954 Hempel wrote “Once the idea of a partial specification of meaning is granted, it appears unnecessarily restrictive, however, to limit the sentences effecting such partial interpretation to reduction sentences in Carnap's sense. … Generally, then, a set of one or more theoretical terms, t1, t2 ⃛, tn, might be introduced by any set M of sentences such that M contains no extralogical terms other than t1, t2 ⃛, tn, and observation terms, M is logically consistent, and M is (...) not equivalent to a truth of formal logic. The last two of these conditions serve merely to exclude trivial extreme cases. A set M of this kind will be referred to briefly as an interpretative system, its elements as interpretative sentences.” This is the last move in a process in which the idea of definition has been widened beyond the explicit or equivalence definition which was the basis of earlier thought on the subject of introducing new words into a language. It would seem that the scheme proposed by Hempel must represent the final move, for it would seem difficult to conceive any more liberal description of a purely direct and verbal scheme. Among the predecessors of Hempel in this liberalising movement I will mention Ramsey and Braithwaite whose views stem ultimately from Campbell, and are based on the idea that the “interpretative system” is essentially a scientific theory, and Carnap who introduced the particular notion of a “reduction sentence”, and who was more directly the source of Hempel's own ideas. (shrink)

In the strategic document of the African Union approved in 2013 and spanning over 50 years, known as Agenda 2063, we find a blueprint for transforming Africa into a global powerhouse of the future. Many of the themes mentioned in Agenda 2063 are also mentioned in the New Testament, such as slavery, unity, poverty, women, children, discrimination and diversity. It is therefore clear that Christianity has something to contribute to Agenda 2063. Another word used throughout the Agenda 2063 document is (...) ‘transformation’. Concepts such as ‘transformative leadership’ and ‘radical transformation at all levels and in all spheres’ are mentioned. This contribution draws on the Agenda 2063 document to engage the missiological themes of unity, reconciliation and justice through the lens of the Belhar Confession. Deeply aware of the pain and disruption colonial Christianity has caused in many instances in Africa, the author contends that the Good News, particularly the New Testament themes of unity, reconciliation and justice, present a potentially transformative approach towards developing Africa. The research question that this article attends to is: how can the churches in Africa contribute to the aspirations of Agenda 2063 from the themes of unity, justice and reconciliation as declared in the Belhar Confession? By interrogating these key concepts of Agenda 2063 through the Confession of Belhar, the author concludes that the Belhar Confession can be regarded as a key African document, which could be explored further to facilitate unity, reconciliation and justice on the continent.Contribution: This article indicates the important relationship between church and state and the need for a partnership for the benefit of both. The need for a transforming state and a transforming church to participate in a transformed Africa is argued. The article promotes multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary aspects of studies as part of a mission praxis and application. (shrink)

In this article a humble attempt is made to bridge the gap between the history of education and the philosophy of education with reference to what has been called Disability Studies since the 1980s. After outlining some of the internal tensions within New Disability History concerning ‘critique’, ‘power’ and ‘history’ the suggestion is made to consider the possibilities of the word ‘experience’ in order to construct a ‘new’ way of approaching the past. Our reading of history will draw heavily (...) on some texts of Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault and some contemporary authors who—inspired by the work of the above‐mentioned—attempt to reconsider our modern subjectivity and reinterpret our agency. (shrink)