Some Confucian scholars have recently claimed that Confucian political meritocracy is superior to Western democracy. I have great reservations about such a view. . . .

Lately it has become fashionable to speak of a ‘political meritocracy’ in Chinese political culture, which contrasts with the liberal ‘electoral democracy’ of the west. Here, however, I consider th...

ABSTRACT Meritocracy, in which success depends on ability and effort, is a desirable goal for sport, even if sport does not achieve this goal perfectly. However, even in a meritocracy whether athletes deserve praise is questionable, given that a determinant of success, genetic endowments, is beyond their control. From a hard determinist perspective, even the elements of athletes’ actions that appear to be within their control—their diligence in developing their skill and strategy and their good sportsmanship—are themselves a (...) function of other environmental and genetic factors for which they deserve no credit. However, a more plausible approach is the compatibilist view that enables us to combine moral evaluation of athletes’ actions with recognizing the causal influences on human behavior. In contrast with manipulation, which really does negate control over our actions, causation that operates via our rational agency is benign and perfectly consistent with our deserving praise for our achievements. (shrink)

Counter to ‘political meritocracy’, the goal of this article is to present a different approach to incorporating the Confucian political ideal into an ethical modification of liberal democracy, nam...

A crucial tenet of virtue-based or expertise-based theorizing about politics is that there are ways to identify and select morally and epistemically excellent people to hold office. This paper considers historical challenges to this task that come from within Greek and Confucian thought and political practice. Because of how difficult it is to assess character in ordinary settings, we argue that it is even more difficult to design institutions that select for virtue at the much wider political scale. Specifically, we (...) argue that the vast majority of proposals that purport to select for virtue are either (a) unlikely to be effective, (b) not implementable at the scale of most current nations, or (c) have already been incorporated into most democratic states. Thus defenders of meritocratic institutions should take more seriously the practical barriers that will almost certainly arise when trying to implement these proposals at scale. Historical proponents of meritocratic values were well aware of concerns about the feasibility of their political ideals, and we should be too. (shrink)

In the practice of education and educational reforms today ‘meritocracy’ is a prevalent mode of thinking and discourse. Behind political and economic debates over the just distribution of education benefits, other kinds of philosophical issues, concerning the question of democracy, await to be addressed. As a means of evoking a language more subtle than what is offered by political and economic solutions, I shall discuss Ralph Waldo Emerson's idea of perfectionism, particularly his ideas of the ‘gleam of light’ and (...) ‘genius’, as an alternative mode of thinking of human power. Through this Emersonian lens, a provocative shift will be made from meritocracy and ‘mediocracy’ to aristocracy. Emersonian aristocracy destabilizes balanced measures and prevailing discourse about fairness and justice, and makes us reconsider how to achieve a just society in democracy. As an educational implication, I shall propose the idea of citizenship without inclusion—a vision of education for a democratic society in which we learn to live as and with the Great Man. (shrink)

Confucian meritocrats argue that moral education should not aim to make people politically active because doing so is not only inconsistent with the underlying assumptions of Confucian virtue ethics, but it is likely to make people more adversary and uncivil. According to Confucian meritocrats, moral education should aim at inculcating a particular set of virtues that are directly conducive to political meritocracy such as deference, dependence and paternalistic gratitude, or what I call ‘passive virtues’. This paper argues that unless (...) public purposes are set clearly by the people themselves, it is impossible to know ex ante what sorts of character traits are to be considered good. The virtuous circle between active and virtuous citizenship and effective and virtuous political leadership is possible only when the regime is democratic, facilitating the extension of the self to the wider political world predicated on public purposes that bind all to one political community. (shrink)

Influenced by the example of China, a literature is emerging that advocates a modernized version of Confucian meritocracy, often as an alternative to liberal democracy and even democracy itself. We...

The idea that our economic institutions should be designed meritocratically is back as a hot topic in western academic circles. At the same time political meritocracy is once again a subject of philosophical discussion, with some Western philosophers embracing epistocracy and Confucianism being revived among Eastern philosophers. This survey has the ambition, first, of putting differing strands of this literature into dialogue with each other: the economic with the political, and the Western with the Eastern. Second, we seek here (...) to impose order on the debates over meritocracy by carefully separating out the four steps that must be traversed on the journey to a meritocratic conclusion. Third we want to promote a more productive debate moving forward by cleanly pulling apart three kinds of purported merit base. (shrink)

Whether China should be more democratic has been a continuous debate among political theorists inside and outside of the country. Over the last decade or so, much scholarly discussion on the question surrounds the ideas of the political meritocrats, who hold that democratically elected officials should be constrained, if not replaced, by meritocratically selected officials, chosen by means of, for instance, examinations and peer recommendations. This institutional arrangement, most of them argue, is particularly suitable for the circumstances of China. The (...) political meritocrats construct the dichotomy between democracy and political meritocracy by showing that political meritocracy is intimately connected to Chinese culture, and that democracy is in many ways Western. I argue, however, that this dichotomy is artificial and misleading. First, the ‘Chineseness’ of political meritocracy as well as ‘Westernness’ of democracy are often exaggerated by the political meritocrats. Second, the cultural considerations underpinning the Chineseness of meritocracy and Westernness of democracy are not taken as seriously by the political meritocrats’ view on the superiority of ideal meritocratic politics to non-ideal democratic politics, which renders the political meritocrats’ argument about the democracy–meritocracy dichotomy inconsistent. (shrink)

There are two ways, broadly speaking, that one might conceive of meritocratic education. On a standard, ‘narrow’ conception, a meritocratic approach to education is one which distributes certain educational goods and opportunities according to merit. On a second, ‘broader’ conception, however, meritocratic education is an educational system suited to a commitment to meritocracy – where ‘meritocracy’ refers to a particular conception of distributive justice. In this article, I argue that these two conceptions are incompatible with each other, and (...) so the standard ‘narrow’ conception of meritocratic education is, in fact, incompatible with a commitment to meritocracy, at least given the typical way of understanding meritocracy. Of particular importance is that while meritocracy, as a view of distributive justice, requires a commitment to equality of opportunity principles, the narrowly meritocratic conception of education does not. The reason has to do with differences in the underlying justifications of the merit-based principles in each: Meritocracy appeals to moral desert, while the educational desert that is grounded by one’s merits is best thought of as a kind of institutional desert. Thus, I will argue, while meritocracy (and so the broad conception of meritocratic education) is constrained by a fair equality of opportunity requirement, narrowly meritocratic education is not. Recognizing the relationships between meritocracy, meritocratic education, and equality of opportunity, I argue, sheds considerable light on disagreements in the debate over equality of opportunity in education. (shrink)

The first full-length study of Francesco Patrizi, the greatest political philosopher of the Italian Renaissance prior to Machiavelli. Patrizi was a humanist whose virtue politics-a form of values-based political meritocracy-sought to reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and equality in service of good governance. He wrote two major works, On Founding Republics (1471) and On Kingship and the Education of Kings (1483/84), both of which were hugely influential when printed in the sixteenth century, but later forgotten.

Meritocracy claims to reward the meritorious with more resources, thereby achieving social efficiency and justice in a level playground. This article argues that the rise of meritocracy in a society is the institutional consequence of adopting progressive humanism, an ideal-type worldview that advocates the harmonious co-realization of individual achievement and social contribution. However, meritocracy is a self-defeating illusion because, even in a level playground, it only rewards conspicuous and wasteful display of ‘merit’ rather than genuine contributions to (...) society. Similar to the promise of an afterlife to Catholicism, the illusion of meritocracy constitutes an indispensable theodicy to progressive humanism. For societies holding such worldviews, meritocracy is a necessary illusion that cannot be dispelled by institutional reforms or political movements. (shrink)

Against Meritocracy is a meticulous and much needed critique of meritocracy tracing the genealogies of the concept before presenting case studies that demonstrate its continuing ideological power. This review looks at Littler’s analysis within the context of wider understandings of meritocracy and social mobility. It concludes that Littler’s compelling argument of the damage, both ideological and material, caused by the workings of meritocracy needs to be heeded.

In the past two decades, Confucian meritocrats have justified the unequal distribution of political power by appeal to the ideal of Confucian virtue politics. In this article, I demonstrate that at the heart of Confucian virtue politics lies a political leader’s affective accountability and show that non-democratic Confucian meritocracy fails to embody this moral ideal. Then, I argue that the ideal of Confucian virtue politics can be better realized in democratic system. To this end, I first describe how ordinary (...) citizens’ moral demand for a political leader’s affective accountability in a consolidated democratic society can make theoretical space for a Confucian political leader. Next, I articulate the role of a Confucian political leader in contemporary democratic society from a normative standpoint and show that at the core of Confucian democratic meritocracy lies ‘mutual moral transformation’, formed by dialectical interactions between a virtuous Confucian political leader and empowered citizens. (shrink)

This article provides a framework for comparing meritocratic and affirmative action admissions policies. The context of the analysis is admissions to public universities; admission rules are evaluated as part of the public investment problem faced by a state government. Meritocratic and affirmative admissions policies are compared in terms of their effects on the level and distribution of human capital. I argue that (a) meritocratic admissions are not necessarily efficient and (b) affirmative action policies may be efficiency enhancing relative to meritocratic (...) ones. Both these claims, as well as their negations, depend on features of individual behavior for which there is little empirical evidence. The implications of this absence of evidence are then explored, with a focus on policy evaluation when equality and efficiency are both desiderata. I argue that standard statistical decision theoretic approaches do not apply to the affirmative action case, even if equality and efficiency are rendered commensurable based on a scalar payoff function. In this context, I suggest that a presumption for equality-enhancing policies leads to support for affirmative action, but I emphasize the contingent nature of this conclusion. Key Words: affirmative action • meritocracy • college admissions • efficiency. (shrink)

This article considers the role of meritocracy in the ruling ideology of Singapore. It argues that meritocracy, far from being a system for the management of scarce resources, is in fact the imposi...

Most critics of our contemporary meritocratic practices and institutions believe their arguments speak to the defects of the ideal of meritocracy itself. I argue that this is a misguided generalization because meritocracy can take many forms depending on the conception of the good and broader theory of justice to which the distributive principle of merit it is attached. To illustrate, I contrast two radically different forms of meritocracy – a telic or end-oriented model based on Plato’s Kallipolis (...) and a procedural model inherent in our free market of careers open to talents. Far from being a unified ideal, meritocracy is a spectrum of social and political arrangements, ranging between the telic and the procedural poles. Thus, identifying ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’ as the main sources of injustice in our contemporary societies further conceals the background conditions and underlying commitments that should be subject to our critical scrutiny. (shrink)

Unemployment is one of the greatest social problems all around the world including in modern capitalistic welfare states. Therefore its social critique is a necessary task for any critical social philosophy such as Axel Honneth's recognition approach, which understands social justice in terms of social conditions of recognition. This paper aims to develop an evaluation of unemployment and its moral weight from this perspective. I will lay out the recognition approach and present a moral evaluation of unemployment as socially unjust (...) based on the knowledge of its negative consequences for those affected. I will then discuss two objections to this conclusion, namely that a mere correlation of suffering and moral wrongness is not enough and that there are legitimate differences in the experience of recognition which could justify the existence of unemployment as deserved. In the next section, I will then refute both objections and first show that unemployment can be understood as socially unjust based on the knowledge that it is involuntary and that the unemployed are not responsible for their condition. Then I will discuss the relationship between the idea of meritocracy and unemployment to examine the assumption of unemployment as being deserved. I will finally conclude that unemployment is not a necessary side effect of meritocracy and that there are good reasons to argue for a moral and justified obligation to provide an actual access to paid work for all who want to work. However, such changes face serious obstacles and are not likely to happen under the current interpretation of meritocracy and social esteem which are one-sided and flawed. (shrink)

Confucian meritocratic rule has been recently advocated on the basis of the economic performance of Western democracies and the political ignorance of their average voters. These arguments are grou...

Life is fundamentally unequal, shaped by the arbitrary circumstances of birth and fate. The chapter critically explores the role of intellectual property (IP) law within the framework of meritocracy, arguing that meritocratic IP can provide effective incentives to fostering creativity, commerce, and innovation, to move up one’s position in society and change the culture in the process. However, meritocratic IP should not be used to justify or perpetuate inequality. IP rights, copyright, patents, trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), cultural heritage rights (...) (CHR), and trade secrets, are analyzed for their meritocratic value and their potential to either exacerbate or mitigate inequality. The digital transformation and the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) present new challenges, where creative destruction may widen income inequality while also lowering resource inequality by increasing access to goods and services. Additionally, the spatial and cultural dimensions of IP, particularly in the context of GIs and CHRs, are examined for how they can entrench existing disparities. The chapter advocates for a recalibration of IP law that better aligns with true meritocratic principles while ensuring that it does not reinforce inequality. It calls for a more flexible and inclusive IP system that respects both the heritage of the past and the innovation of the future, ultimately aiming to create a society where meritocracy drives inclusive progress and shared prosperity rather than entrenched inequities. (shrink)

The article will argue that neither what may be called ‘multiple legitimacies’ nor what Leigh Jenco refers to as the hybrid view of legitimacy provides substantial guidance in reconceiving legitima...

This study explores the principles of meritocracy and heredity as formulated in the three works of early Daoist philosophy, the Laozi, Zhuangzi and Wenzi. Because Daoist philosophy emerged in critical response to the Confucian worldview, this investigation is placed against the backdrop of pertinent Confucian propositions. To this end, the study begins with a review of Confucian positions on the issue of meritocracy and heredity as expressed in the main transmitted works, as well as newly excavated texts that (...) can be associated with this intellectual tradition. The paper concludes that, while indeed rejecting the Confucian understanding of meritocracy, Daoist texts operated with their own concepts on human excellency. Moreover, the opposition between meritocracy and heredity characteristic of some Confucian works appears less pronounced in early Daoist philosophy. (shrink)

It is my great pleasure to discuss Bell's latest book on political meritocracy. The China Model has received responses in both political theory and China studies, but unfortunately many of them still misunderstand his work. Therefore, before I articulate my critical comment, it would be helpful to clarify my own understanding of this book. As Bell points out in the preface to the paperback edition and in many responses to his critics, his aim is neither to denigrate democracy in (...) Western countries nor to defend the exact status quo of China. What he tries to do is to introduce political meritocracy as a legitimate political system for selecting leaders. Since China is typical of the kind of country in which... (shrink)

One of the most notable features in recent Confucian political theory is the advocacy of political meritocracy. Though Confucian meritocrats’ controversial institutional design has been subject to critical scrutiny, less attention has been paid to their underlying normative claims. This paper aims to investigate the two justificatory conditions of Confucian political meritocracy—the service condition and the reciprocity condition—in light of classical Confucianism and with special attention to moral disagreement. Finding the normative argument for Confucian political meritocracy both (...) incomplete (in light of classical Confucianism) and implausible (under the circumstances of moral disagreement), it proposes Confucian constitutional democracy as an alternative that can meet the three conditions of the good Confucian polity—service, reciprocity, and remedy—by reconceiving the people's well-being in terms of their basic rights, as well as by promoting constitutional dialogue among the three branches of the government. (shrink)

이 글은 한국의 유교적 근대성이라는 맥락에 초점을 두고 메리토크라시와 민주주의의 관계를 규명해 보려는 한 시도다. 서구에서는 이 메리토크라시 이념이 ‘민주주의의 토대’라고까지 평가되는데, 이 글은 강하게 메리토크라시 이념을 쫓았던 유교적 문화 전통의 영향으로 우리 사회에서도 어느 정도 그런 연관이 확인될 수 있다는 데서 출발한다. 오늘날 한국의 민주주의는 유교 전통의 긍정적 영향사 위에 서 있다. 그러나 메리토크라시는 민주주의에 대해 반드시 긍정적인 함축만을 갖지는 않는다. 이 글은 그것이 심각한 사회경제적 불평등을 생산하고 정당화하면서 민주주의의 토대를 스스로 잠식해가는 ‘배반의 이데올로기’이기도 함을 보여준다. 그렇지만 강한 유교적 (...) 전통을 갖고 있는 동아시아 사회들에서는 메리토크라시 이데올로기를 단순하게 무시하기 쉽지 않은데, 여기서는 유교 전통의 계승이라는 차원에서 ‘정치적 메리토크라시’(현능정치)에 대한 유혹도 결코 가볍지 않다. 이 글은 또한 이 정치적 메리토크라시가 결코 민주주의의 대안이 될 수 없음을 논증하며, 메리토크라시와는 다른 방식으로 오늘날 민주주의의 위기를 극복할 수 있는 길을 모색한다. 마지막으로 이런 식의 인식이 한국 민주주의의 미래에 대해 가질 수 있는 함축에 대해서도 짧게 논의한다. (shrink)

본 논문은 니체의 자유의지 개념과 실천 교설 사이의 비일관성과 관련하여, 기존의 ‘양립론’과 ‘비양립론’의 주요 논증을 비판적으로 검토하고, 새로운 대안을 제시하기 위한 목적으로 작성되었다. 비양립론에 의하면, 니체는 자유의지를 인과적으로 무력한 ‘부대현상’으로 이해하기에, 그의 실천 교설은 보편성을 확보하는 데에 실패했다고 본다. 반면, 양립론에 의하면, 니체는 새로운 형태의 자유 개념을 제시하였기 때문에 실천 교설과의 비일관성은 존재하지 않는다고 주장한다. 그러나 기존의 비양립론은 니체의 자유의지 개념이 20세기 형이상학의 논쟁보다 더 복잡한 맥락에서 탐구된 결과물이며, 따라서 더 신중한 접근을 할 필요가 있다는 점을 간과하고 있다. 반면, 기존의 (...) 양립론은 니체가 제시했다는 새로운 형태의 자유 개념이 형이상학적 논쟁의 성과에 비추어 보아 정확히 어떤 형태인지에 관해 지적하고 있지 못하다. 본 논문은 ‘욕구들의 생성과 충돌’로 보는 니체의 자유의지 개념을 ‘사건-인과 자유론(event-causation libertarianism)’으로 독해할 만한 근거가 있으며, 이러한 독해가 실천 교설과의 비일관성 문제를 해결할 수 있는 가장 설득력 있는 견해임을 보여주고자 한다. (shrink)

"Meritocracy" has historically been understood in two ways. The first is as an approach to governance. On this understanding, we seek to put meritorious (somehow defined) people into public office to the benefit of society. This understanding has its roots in Confucius, its scope is political offices, and its justification is consequentialist. The second understanding of "meritocracy" is as a theory of justice. We distribute in accordance with merit in order to give people the things that they deserve, (...) as justice demands. This understanding has its roots in Aristotle, its scope is social goods broadly, and its justification is deontological. In this article, I discuss the differences--especially the conceptual differences--between these two, prima facie distinct, meritocratic traditions. I also argue that despite their differences Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are harmonious. In Section I of the article I introduce the two meritocratic traditions through, in part, a highly abbreviated history of talk about "merit" and "meritocracy" in Chinese and Western philosophy. In Section II, I discuss a number of conceptual issues and partition meritocratic theories in accordance with their scopes and normative justifications. I also discuss two scenarios. In one scenario, Eastern Meritocracy appears to deliver the right result and Western Meritocracy, the wrong result. In the other scenario, vice versa. Finally, in Section III, I argue that Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are each special cases of a single, compelling notion of "meritocracy.". (shrink)

Daniel A. Bell’s searching for the possible alternatives to liberal democracy in light of the political progresses in the Asian countries spans two decades, culminating in his proposal of the so-called Chinese political meritocracy or xianneng zhengzhi. This article indicates the conceptual asymmetry between xianneng zhengzhi and “meritocracy” in three aspects. Firstly, xianeng zhengzhi remains at the brighter end of the spectrum of political ideas while “meritocracy” is bogged down in a highly polarized reception. Secondly, “meritocracy” (...) lacks the quintessence of xianneng zhengzhi, namely, an explicit stress on priority of moral worthiness. Thirdly, “meritocracy” is built upon foundational individualism and focuses on the individual performance and achievement. Although Confucian political tradition and the Western conception of meritocracy share some functional similarities, using the synthesized term “Confucian meritocracy” to introduce the Confucian political tradition may commit a cross-cultural hermeneutic fallacy. (shrink)

Daniel Bell's The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy is a significant contribution to contemporary political theory. I am very much in sympathy with his ideal of political meritocracy, although I would disagree with him on the degree to which it is realized or practiced in China today; for me, the reality is as distant from Bell's ideal of political meritocracy, if I understand it correctly, as it is from democracy. However, in the present (...) comment, I will not exploit this disagreement. Instead, I will try to make two friendly amendments to his political meritocracy as an ideal, with which I have a lot of agreements. In the Introduction to the book, Bell discloses that "I developed an... (shrink)

The word ‘meritocracy’ was coined by Michael Young in 1958 in his book The Rise of the Meritocracy (Young [1958] 2017]), and philosophical discussions under tha.

Political Theologies of Justice: Meritocratic Values from a Global Perspective Michael Puett In fourth century BCE China, a religious revolutionary named Mozi emerged. In opposition to much of the religious practices and assumptions of the time, Mozi announced that Heaven, the highest god, was a just and non-capricious deity who had created the world for humanity. As a just deity, Heaven rewarded good humans and punished bad ones. And Heaven charged humans with creating a political order that did the same: (...) Moreover, there are ways that I (Mozi) know Heaven loves the people deeply. It shaped and made the sun, moon, stars, and constellations so as to illuminate and guide [the people]. It formed and made the four seasons, spring, autumn, winter, and summer, so as to weave them into order. It sent down thunder, snow, frost, rain, and dew so as to make the five grains, hemp, and silk grow and prosper, and sent the people to obtain materials and benefit from them. It arranged and made mountains, streams, gorges, and valleys, and distributed and bestowed the hundred affairs so as to oversee and supervise the goodness and badness of the people. It made kings, dukes, and lords and charged them with, first, rewarding the worthy and punishing the wicked, and, second, plundering the metals, wood, birds, and beasts and working the five grains, hemp, and silk so as to make the materials for people's clothing and food. (shrink)

In lieu of Abstract: With inequality of various sorts ballooning worldwide, a critique of democracy has come of age, and a change of political ethos is underway. Against this background, the critique of democracy becomes not only possible but also popular, and examples in China and many Western democracies abound. It is no exaggeration to say, in this context, that sufficient momentum has gathered to qualify the situation as "democratic recession," despite people may have different understandings as to the exact (...) nature of this recession and how long it will last. Accompanying this recession, Confucian political meritocracy, whose aim is to correct the wrongs of democracy, is constructed as an alternative to liberal democracy. Many argue that the end of history is not nigh but will continue in and by Confucian political meritocracy... (shrink)

This paper compares criticisms of Singapore’s meritocracy, especially against its impact on income disparities and class divisions, with Michael Sandel’s critique of the meritocratic ethic in the United States. Despite significant differences in their history and politics, meritocracy has similar dysfunctions in both societies, allowing us to draw theoretical conclusions about meritocracy as an ideal of governance. It then contrasts Sandel’s communitarian critique of meritocracy with recent Confucian promotion of political meritocracy and meritocratic justice and (...) argues that the Confucian principle of “promoting the virtuous and talented” is different from the contemporary conception of meritocracy. Textual evidence indicates that a Confucian understanding of “merit” is contrary to the technocratic expertise of contemporary meritocracies. Furthermore, pre-Qin Confucian texts do not support a conception of justice that emphasizes individual desert; they address distributive problems from the perspective of needs and sustaining social relations. The texts also support limiting the reign of merit when it results in inequalities that cause suffering, inhibit personal cultivation of some groups, or undermine social relations. The paper concludes with an assessment of Singapore’s on-going attempts to improve its meritocracy from a Confucian perspective. (shrink)

Regarding the selection of the legislative representatives, the elective system is the system that most democratic organizations have adopted. It has become so present nowadays that we take for granted the identification between elective system and representative democracy. But is this identification a correct one? I argue that it is not, since the meaning of 'representative democracy' has no reference to specific mode of selection of the representatives. And, since democracy and other methods of selection are compatible, it should adopted (...) the best one. The criteria of competence for the exercise of the political power ought to be the adopted method of selection, for it is the best one. I too argue that, in the context of division of labor into public and private labor, this is precisely what public representation aims: to leave to the experts the exercise of public labor. (shrink)

Several contemporary Confucian philosophers have posited differing hybrid views fusing meritocracy to democracy. There is a good deal of interest in a meritocracy in contemporary Confucian thought, and such a view perhaps should receive more serious consideration in liberal democratic thought since it may make for a stronger form of government when appended to democracy. In this paper, four contemporary hybrid theorists who combine elements of a meritocracy with a democracy are critically analyzed concerning an ability for (...) their views to be instantiated in liberal democracies for the legislative branch only. Finally, I provide a modified hybrid view for the legislature that I believe is the best fit for current liberal democracies. (shrink)

The meritocratic principle of educational justice maintains that it is unfair that individuals with similar ability who invest equal effort, have unequal educational prospects. In this paper I argue that the conception of ability that meritocracy assumes, namely as an innate trait, is critically flawed. Absent a coherent conception of ability, meritocracy loses its ability to morally evaluate educational practices and policies, rendering it an unworkable principle of educational justice. Replacing innate ability with an alternative conception of ability (...) is, therefore, crucial for meritocratic educational justice. I propose incorporating an alternative conception of ability into meritocracy—as the ″current limits of student ability″. The account of meritocracy that follows entails that unequal educational prospects are fair only when they result from the constraints of individual potential (or from differential effort). I argue that this potential-based account of meritocracy, though demanding, is a plausible and attractive account of educational justice. (shrink)

Let me first express my gratitude for the three detailed and informative critiques of my book The China Model. These critiques are themselves models of Confucian civility, even as they express sharp areas of disagreement. There does seem to be agreement that the ideal of a Confucian-inspired democratic meritocracy is a worthwhile political project, particularly in the Chinese political context, but Huang, Li, and Wang question my book's arguments in defense of this ideal. There are three kinds of critiques: (...) the need to take Confucianism more seriously, the need to take democracy more seriously, and the need to take political meritocracy more seriously. Let me try to respond to each critique in turn.Yong... (shrink)

During the Warring States period of Chinese history, both Confucian and Legalist (as well as Mohist) thinkers proposed meritocracy as an ideal way of governance. Despite this apparent agreement, they differed from each other on what should be counted as merits. In this paper, I will reconstruct Han Fei Zi (a so-called Legalist thinker)’s critique of Confucian virtue-based meritocracy. In this reconstruction, we can imagine a dialogue between Han Fei Zi and a Confucian, and there are actually a (...) few rounds of ever-deepening debates in which Han Fei Zi eventually won. Although, as it will be revealed, the Confucian that is under serious attack is of a Mencian kind (whose ideas are akin to Mencius’s), Han Fei Zi’s critique can be applied to virtue-based meritocracy in general. An adequate defence of this kind of meritocracy, then, will need to address challenges from Han Fei Zi. (shrink)