In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minutes of the Annual General Meeting 2023Cornelis de Waal, Editor-in-Chief, Richard Kenneth Atkins, André De Tienne, Director and General Editor, and Elizabeth Cooke[as approved on January 17, 2024]The Annual General Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society was held in conjunction with the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA on January 5, 2023, at the Sheraton Le Centre, Montréal, Quebec. Rosa Maria Mayorga chaired the meeting and called (...) it to order at 12:38 p.m.1. Moment of SilenceThe annual meeting began with a moment of silence in memory of Peirce scholars who passed away in the last year.2. Approval of Minutes of the 2022 MeetingMinutes of the 2022 Annual General Meeting had been posted online. Copies were also distributed at the annual meeting. Rosa Maria Mayorga asked for a motion to approve the minutes. James Liszka so moved and Fabienne Forster seconded. The minutes were approved unanimously.3. Report from the Executive CommitteeRichard Kenneth Atkins submitted the following report.The Executive Committee Meeting was held virtually via email. All members of the Executive Committee were contacted and responded regarding the agenda and items.Agenda Items(A) Non-profit Status Update:On December 5, 2022, we received notification from the IRS that we have been legally approved as a public non-profit foundation.(B) Funding for Scholarship:Every year, we set aside a certain amount of funding for scholarship, usually 2/3rds of the year's income. This includes the $1,000 set aside for the Peirce Essay prize. Atkins reported that the income this past year was $6,597.06. 2/3rds of that is $4,400. Atkins requested that that amount of money be set aside for funding for scholarship, with which the committee unanimously agreed.(C) Next Year's AGM:Atkins proposed that we continue to hold our annual conference in conjunction with the E-APA in New York, NY, especially as this keeps us in line with the calendar year which is also our fiscal year as a nonprofit. The committee unanimously agreed. [End Page 118](D) Any Other Business:Cornelis de Waal suggested that we add to the agenda for the annual business meeting a moment of silence to commemorate Peirce scholars who passed this year. The Executive Committee unanimously agreed.4. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce SocietyCornelis de Waal submitted the following report on behalf of the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Richard Kenneth Atkins read the report on his behalf.During the 2022 calendar year we produced four issues of the Transactions. We encountered some problems with the first issue, because the printer suffered a ransomware attack. This apparently wreaked havoc with their system and caused significant delay in the completion of the issue.Likely due to the (after) effects of the pandemic, quality submissions to the journal were down significantly, both in the Peirce segment and in the non-Peirce segment of the journal. In addition, there was a significant drop in book reviews. The latter led to the resignation of our long-term book review editor, Henrik Rydenfelt. For the last two months I have been taking over for him, and I'm first-hand experiencing some of the challenges, even including publishers simply not following through on requests for books. We did, though, publish a book symposium on James Liszka's Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences, and we have another book symposium forthcoming on Chris Voparil's Reconstructing Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Classical Pragmatists. Besides a number of excellent papers on Peirce, we published some very nice papers in American philosophy. The latter include an extensive portrait of Edwin Bissell Holt, a discussion of the use of the term pragmatism in 18th century Germany, the first English translation of two texts by Wilhelm Jerusalem, as well as work on George Santayana, Jonathan Edwards, and Emily Dickinson.With Henrik gone, the editorial team is now down to Robert Lane and me (hopefully briefly returning to the traditional Robin-Hare setup). I'll be attending the upcoming SAAP meeting in Denver, and Bob is planning to attend as well... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Transformation of Hearts and Minds:Chan Zen-Catholic Approaches to PreceptsHarry L. WellsCatholic and Buddhist priests, monastics, teachers, and community leaders participated in the second of an anticipated four annual dialogues. The series is sponsored by the Dharma Realm Buddhist Association, the San Francisco Zen Center, and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). The conference took place 4–7 March 2004 at Mercy Center in Burlingame, CA, whose own East-West (...) meditation program, led by Fr. Thomas Hand, celebrated its twentieth anniversary that year. A popular retreat center and home to the Sisters of Mercy of Burlingame, the Center offered participants tree-dotted, spacious grounds and strolling paths, as well as a labyrinth for contemplative walking.Each day began with both Catholics and Buddhists in Mercy Center's Rose Room, a Zen-style meditation space, for an hour of silent meditation in the morning. Catholic liturgy was celebrated in the afternoon in the main chapel, with all participants invited to attend and share prayer and blessings. On the two full days, Friday and Saturday, two sessions of presentations were held each morning, with one session following in the afternoon. Each of the six sessions focused on a position paper, with three papers given from a Buddhist and three from a Christian perspective. Each paper was presented by its authors, followed by two formal responses, one by a Buddhist and one by a Catholic participant. This was in turn followed by an open discussion within the whole group. A minute of silent meditation began and ended each session.The presentations focused on various meanings embraced by the term "precepts" in each tradition. One paper introduced perspectives on Buddhist precepts in three different Buddhist lineages. Another presented six guidelines as "Precepts on the [End Page 155] Mind-Ground" that connect ethical commitments with social engagement. A third paper focused on Bodhisattva practice, which embraces and unifies all sentient beings. On the Christian side, presentations discussed the precepts as signposts on the path that leads away from suffering, as motivations that move us, and as the practice of the presence of God, exemplified by the writings of Brother Lawrence.A glossary prepared by Fr. Francis Tiso helped define Catholic Christian terms for the Buddhist participants in the dialogue. Similarly, a book distributed to all participants by the Dharma Realm Buddhist Association provided background on "Buddhism A–Z." Formal discussion sessions in the evenings, as well as informal talks by the participants while walking outside or in the form of impromptu hallway meetings added to the depth and richness of the dialogue. Some recurring themes were the importance and meaning of a personal teacher in both traditions; another was the "embodiment" of the teachings, the value of teaching through presence. Personal stories and practical experiences offered by individual participants were much appreciated and added poetry and emotion to the headiness of theological discussion.Members of both the Buddhist and the Catholic traditions reported that the encounter with the spiritual practices and beliefs of the other faith provides both affirmation of the familiar and welcome discovery of unexpected riches of the spirit. The next meeting will be held 20–23 January 2005 at the San Francisco Zen Center. The theme will be "Practice: Method and Experience Toward Transformation."Participating in the 2004 dialogue were Rev. Heng Sure (Berkeley Buddhist Monastery), Bishop John C. Wester (Auxiliary Bishop, Archdiocese of San Francisco), Rev. Taigen Dan Leighton (Mountain Source Sangha), Fr. Arthur Kennedy (Secretariat for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, USCCB), Bhikshuni Heng Liang (Dharma Realm Buddhist Association), Dr. Martin Verhoeven (Institute for World Religions), Dr. Ron Epstein (Institute for World Religions), Dr. Snjezana Akpinar (Dharma Realm Buddhist University), Rev. Shosan Victoria Austin (San Francisco Zen Center), Rev. Alan Senauke (Berkeley Zen Center), Jan Chozen Bays (Zen Community of Oregon), Sr. Phyllis D'Anna, SND (Center for the Practice of Applied Spirituality), Fr. Thomas W. Devereaux (Diocese of Santa Rosa), Robert Hale, OSB Cam. (Incarnation Monastery, Berkeley, CA), Thomas Hand, S.J. (Mercy Center, Burlingame, CA), Fr. Rafael Luévano (Diocese of Orange), Deacon Thomas McGowan (Diocese of Oakland), Lorraine Moriarity (St. Vincent de Paul Society of San Mateo County), Fr. Gerry O'Rourke (Archdiocese... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42.3 (2006) 459-461 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Minutes of the Business Meeting Charles Sanders Peirce Society 28 December 2006Following the annual scholarly meeting, with papers by President Vincent Colapietro, "Reflective Acknowledgment and Practical Identity: Kant and Peirce on the Reflexive Stance" and Essay Contest winner Shannon Dea, "'Merely a Veil over the Living Thought': Math and Logic in Peirce's Forgotten Spinoza (...) Review," President Colapietro called the meeting to order shortly after 7 o'clock in Concourse B of the New York Hilton.The minutes of the 2003 and 2004 meetings, published in the Fall, 2004, and Summer 2005 Transactions respectively, were approved.Vincent Colapietro delivered the following report from the President and Executive Committee:André De Tienne's proposal to adopt the address of the Institute for American Thought at IUPUI as the official address of the Peirce Society was accepted.It was agreed that announcements for the Peirce Essay Contest should be placed in the Transactions and in other appropriate publications (e.g. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy and the S.A.A.P. newsletter) by mid-year if possible. It was also agreed that some length limits should be set for submitted essays and that there should be a requirement that essays meet the general standard of a submission for publication in a journal.There was discussion of the desirability of separating the collection of membership dues from subscription to the Transactions. The chief reasons for thinking that this separation might be called for are 1) the increasing availability of the Transactions through university library electronic subscriptions and 2) the higher cost of foreign subscriptions (making membership in the Society far most costly for foreign members). It was decided to revisit this issue in a year or two (after the new arrangement with IU Press has become more settled).Vincent Colapietro, Mark Migotti, and Nathan Houser were appointed to serve as a "meta" committee to form, with the approval of the Executive Committee, a "regular" committee to organize the 2014 Peirce World Congress. They will also recommend a chair for the committee and a location for the congress. Indianapolis was favored by members present.It was agreed that a list of rules and procedures for conducting Society business should be drawn up for the guidance of new Society office holders. These lists will include the rules and procedures for fulfilling the functions of the various offices, for running meetings, time-tables for making decisions, and so on. N. Houser will work on this with André Tienne and Mark Migotti to draft these lists. [End Page 459]It was agreed that the outgoing Chair of the Nominating Committee should communicate with the incoming Chair a list of the candidates who were considered but not nominated, along with the basis for consideration.Peter Hare delivered the following report on the Transactions:Starting with the fall issue, the Transactions is being published by Indiana University Press. Editorial arrangements are unchanged. Although the transition has been time-consuming in the short run, the new publishing arrangements promise in the long run to increase greatly the journal's impact on the world of scholarship. This year has also been difficult because a key staff member in our previous publishing arrangements failed us. In 2005 we had 499 member/subscribers (406 domestic and 93 foreign). The bank balance is $4008.Vincent Colapietro delivered for Mark Migotti a preliminary version of the following financial report :2005 income was $1,713.05 ($1,497 in membership dues and $216.05 in interest). 2005 expenditures were c. $1,987.40: ($500 for the essay contest prize, $550 for travel subvention and dinner for the contest winner; 674.40 for mailings; $128.40 for web-site fees; $75 dues to the Logic and Methodology section of the International Society for the Philosophy of Science, and $60.00 for a subsidized membership for CISPEC).As of December 31, 2005, the Society's assets were: $10,625.92, a decrease of $.274... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Balancing Depth and Breadth in Our Conversations:Denver 2022 SBCS Annual MeetingSandra Costen KunzIn 2020 and 2021, due to the corona virus pandemic, the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (SBCS) held its annual board meeting, members meeting, and paper sessions online. This year, in 2022, we were delighted to meet face-to-face again on November 18–19 in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR). Because we are (...) an AAR "related scholarly organization," all of our events were scheduled through, and publicized by, AAR's staff. President Mark Unno not only presided at the board's table but also graciously ran a video conference, primarily to accommodate board and committee members who were outside the United States or dealing with travel-prohibiting health issues.The 2020 and 2021 fully online governance meetings, led by then-president Leo Lefebure, had been well organized, well run, highly effective, and a lot of fun. But as I watched the attentive eyes around the table this year and listened to the laughter, empathetic sighs, and plans for follow-up conversations, it seemed to me that meeting in person, in some ways, more powerfully supports the society's aim to foster in-depth Buddhist-Christian dialogue and comparative studies. Mark, then vice president, had organized the 2020 and 2021 online paper sessions carefully for online audiences. We were thrilled that these beautifully crafted and moderated presentations drew audiences that were amazingly broad in terms of both size and diversity. Planned as emergency extensions of the society's efforts to create, through our blog and Facebook page, safe online spaces for Buddhist-Christian dialogue and comparative studies, these sessions drew an international audience whose breadth astounded us! Conversations that had begun in these sessions could not, however, be quickly continued over a meal or coffee. In some ways, they did not appear to me to spark the same depth of ongoing conversation that the SBCS has prompted in our four decades of face-to-face meetings.As the board continues to discuss how to balance our desires for both depth and breadth of conversation among our board, our members, and nonmembers who attend our events, we sincerely welcome the wisdom of members and other readers. You can submit suggestions to: https://www.society-buddhist-christian-studies.org/contact. [End Page 263]board of governors meetingPresident's Opening RemarksCalling this year's board meeting to order a little past 9 a.m., Mark Unno said that he sensed that his father, Taitetsu Unno, "is with us, encouraging and congratulating the society on how far we've come in the past forty years." He recalled his father's participation in the Cobb–Abe dialogues and the network that evolved into the SBCS, and that these initial conversations were often highly theological—and testy—and often involved a translator. Mark is convinced, however, that this early debate was a necessary foundation for developing a more robust mutual learning community. Describing two significant ways the society is modeling collaborative learning, he said:1. We're providing a model of interreligious engagement for other people in our various traditions.2. Although we do have impacts on scholars and general audiences through our AAR sessions, journal, and online resources, our greatest impacts as board members have been on each other! Furthermore, any impact of lasting value will come through our embodiment of deep dialogue and mutual learning.Mark explained that we'd begin with the online European Network report, move to the Japan Society's report, and then to the treasurer's and secretary's reports, both of which would be presented online.International Advisor Report from EuropeElizabeth Harris, representing the European Network of Buddhist Christian Studies, explained that since its formation in the 1990s, its main work has been to hold a conference every other year and publish the papers. EOS Verlag has now published the papers that she and Perry Schmidt-Leukel edited from the 2020 conference titled "A Visionary Approach: Lynn A. de Silva and the Prospects for Buddhist-Christian Encounter." The 2022 conference titled "Euro-Buddhism and the Role of Christianity," whose papers are now being edited... (shrink)

In his foreword to the Philosophical papers by Hans Hahn, Karl Menger mentions a controversy about the possibility or impossibility to speak about language within the Vienna Circle in the early 1930’s. He then adds: “Waismann proclaimed that one could not speak about language. Hahn took strong exception to this view. Why should one not – if perhaps in a higher-level language – speak about language? To which Waismann replied essentially that this would not fit into the texture (...) of Wittgenstein’s latest ideas.”1 Thanks to the publication of the protocols of the Vienna Circle by Friedrich Stadler in his book The Vienna Circle – Studies in the origins, development and influence of logical empiricism, we have access to some discussions within the circle in the years 1930 and 1931, that allow us a partial reconstruction of the controversy. In these minutes we attend a very lively discussion on the topic of ‘talking about language’. We would like to make more explicit the tenets of this controversy, starting from the discussions within the circle. We will then focus on the evolution of the positions of different members of the Circle, that reflect different attitudes towards this problem, that are expounded in articles published until 1936. Although its members strived to stay the closest, they could to the landmarks laid down by the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, some of its members broke with them in many respects. The need to admit the possibility of talking theoretically about language became more pressing as the works of Tarski and Godel began to exert an influence on the researches of its members. Two options emerged: talking about a language in another language (Hahn) or in the same language (Carnap). Hahn’s positions, despite their originality, stand close to those of Carnap, who presents in 1931 his meta-logical project. Disagreements with Waismann occured frequently. Neurath remained skeptical about such a development that could, according to him, lead back to metaphysical considerations. The protocols by Rosa Rand give us precious insights on the premises of this debate, symptomatic of the diversity of the positions and of the fruitfulness of the exchanges within the Vienna Circle at that time. However, this debate takes place in a broader setting, namely the discussion of the status of philosophical statements once the rejection of metaphysics is accomplished. The answers provided reflect strong dissenting currents within the circle. For Neurath, to conceive of philosophy as providing elucidations is mistaken. Science shall take the form of an encyclopedia, that contains heterogeneous discourses – exact formulated sentences, as well as piece of ordinary language – and is taken in a dynamic process. No discourse outside science can be accepted. For Schlick and Waismann, there is still room for philosophy as providing elucidations about language. For Carnap, the aim is to attain a logically suitable language for science; discussions in a natural language have only a provisional role, in order to attain an adequate language, in which the logic of science can be formulated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wittgenstein, Tolstoy, and ShakespearePeter B. LewisNear the middle of the first of his 1938 Lectures on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein talks about what he calls "the tremendous things in art"(LC, I 23 8, italics in original).1 Apart from a brief indication of the way in which our response to the tremendous differs from the non-tremendous, he does not refer again in this way to the tremendous things in art, (...) though he does refer elsewhere to what he calls "supreme art." But he does provide a couple of examples of the tremendous in art, the symphonies of Beethoven and Gothic Cathedrals. Suppose, now, like the student in the Investigations §185, we are asked to continue the series. I take it that, even given the lack of information, we could safely propose, say, Homer—the Iliad and the Odyssey—and Michelangelo—the Sistine Chapel—as further examples of the tremendous things in art. The idea is that the tremendous things in art are not works that are just very good or very fine, but rather they are great, supremely great; works of stature; special cases; instances of the highest kind of artistic achievement, occupying a distinctive place in the history of (Western) civilization.Another obvious candidate for the list of the tremendous things in art would be Shakespeare, where the name is shorthand for the great plays, the tragedies in particular, Lear, Hamlet, Othello,and so on. So it comes as something of a surprise to discover on reading that miscellaneous compendium of remarks known as Culture and Value that Wittgenstein himself had serious doubts about including Shakespeare in the pantheon of the tremendous things in art. There are seven passages in Culture and Value in which Wittgenstein reflects on Shakespeare.2 The earliest is dated 1939–40, though this passage does not appear to be critical of Shakespeare. The next two passages are [End Page 241] dated August 1946, the remainder coming in 1949 and 1950. The remarks critical of Shakespeare are, then, all very much late Wittgenstein.It is well-known that lots of people dislike Shakespeare's plays. Generations of school children have developed indifference or boredom or hatred that persists throughout their lives. And yet that does not count against Shakespeare's greatness; for, to borrow Hume's remark on those who would prefer Ogilby to Milton, "no one pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these [people] to be absurd and ridiculous."3 That rhetoric is, however, not available, at least not immediately, when the "pretended critic" (Hume's phrase) has the intellectual clout and aesthetic sensibility of a Wittgenstein; nor, for that matter, the artistic achievement of a Tolstoy.I have particular grounds for bringing Tolstoy into this discussion. In the first place, there is the importance of Tolstoy in the development of Wittgenstein's thinking about religious, moral and aesthetic issues. Secondly, it is by contrast with Tolstoy's criticism of Shakespeare that we can gain further understanding of Wittgenstein's remarks on Shakespeare. These two points are related. For it seems to me that it is partly through his reflections on Tolstoy's theories about art that Wittgenstein is led into commenting upon Shakespeare.Tolstoy famously attacks Shakespeare in his pamphlet, "Shakespeare and the Drama,"4 published in 1903 when Tolstoy was seventy-five years of age. Some have taken this essay as evidence that Tolstoy was in his dotage, his mind warped by religious-moralistic fervor. Not only does this fail to do justice to Tolstoy's reasons for criticizing Shakespeare—reasons that Howard Mounce has recently argued are by no means ridiculous5 —it also neglects the fact that the essay is the culmination of Tolstoy's life-long antagonism to Shakespeare. Nevertheless, that very slur on Tolstoy's sanity attests to Shakespeare's status in our culture as something tremendous. His achievement is a standard against which others are measured. And this, I think, is at least partly what Wittgenstein is hinting at in his remarks about the contrast between the tremendous and the non-tremendous in art when he says of the tremendous that "it plays an entirely different role... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 159-161 [Access article in PDF] Benedict's Dharma: Buddhist Reflections on the Rule of Saint Benedict. By Norman Fischer, et al. Edited by Patrick Hart, with an afterword by David Steindl-Rast and a translation of the Rule by Patrick Berry. New York: Riverhead Books, 2001. xvi + 222 pp. When Buddhist and Christian monastics meet, they recognize each other as brothers and sisters engaged in a (...) similar quest, despite their doctrinal differences. The nature of this quest is explored in Benedict's Dharma, in which four Buddhists (Norman Fischer, Joseph Goldstein, Judith Simmer-Brown, and Yifa, representing the Zen, Theravadin, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist traditions) ruminate on their fraternal and sororal feelings.Venerable Yifa, a nun of the prominent Taiwanese monastery Fo Guang Shan, is the only one of the four in monastic vows, and the reader may wonder what the three non-monastics could offer to a discussion on the monastic life. This is not a new problem. Patrick Henry and Donald Swearer's groundbreaking study, For the Sake of the World: The Spirit of Buddhist and Christian Monasticism (1989), spends a great deal of time on Zen monks, even though there are no Zen monks, theVinaya is kept by the Zen nuns or by the monastics of the parent and sibling lineages of Chan, Son, and Thien. (See my review article, "Why Are There Monks and Nuns?" in Buddhist-Christian Studies 12.) The monastic, it seems, is not confined to the habit.Brother David Steindl-Rast, a monk of Mount Saviour Monastery, grapples with this problem in his afterword, "Conclusions about a Beginning." It was at Mount Saviour that the phrase "the monastic dimension" was coined, to refer to those of monastic bent who for one reason or another did not or could not live in the cloister. One of Brother David's books was to be called, he told me, The Monk in Us, "us" meaning laypeople, but the title had an odd sound and was dropped. So, what is the monastic dimension? Brother David suggests that it is mindfulness, and he comes close to saying that wherever there is mindfulness, there is monasticism. "If mindfulness is all that matters, the monastery is merely a most convenient environment for this kind of life, but it can be lived anywhere, by anyone" (126). He goes on to discuss the phenomenon of monasteries shrinking in size at the same time as the number of long- and short-term visitors to monasteries grows, and proposes that we are moving toward a new understanding of the terms "contemplative," "monastic," and "lay."This insight may point to the most important contribution of this book. It is not about monasticism per se, and it is not a comparative study of the Rule and the Vinaya, with practical suggestions for their mutual reform; rather, it is a meditation on how anyone, monastic or lay, might live the contemplative or mindful life. Throughout the history of the Church and the sangha, laypeople have been in the majority, but attention has been focused on the priests and monastics. Pope Pius X [End Page 159] put it bluntly: the laypeople are the sheep who are to be led, and the clergy are the shepherds who lead. The Church, he added, is not a democracy. I do not know of a Buddhist who has been quite this straightforward, but many have come close, and the history of Buddhism is not that of a democracy. Occasionally, lay movements in both traditions have arisen, basing themselves on the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers or on the teaching of universal Buddha-nature, but they have quickly been co-opted by leaders who proclaimed themselves to be more equal than their fellows. The tragedy for both Buddhism and Christianity is that the contemplative or mindful life has become restricted to a group of professionals, with the attendant belief that such a life is unattainable by most Buddhists and Christians. Now that the dharma has come to the land of the red-faced people, where democracy is... (shrink)

The music of Christoph Willibald von Gluck was a revolution for Paris operagoers when his work premiered there in 1774. In a setting known for its restive and often rowdy spectators, Alceste, Iphigénie en Aulide, and Orpheé et Eurydice seized audiences with unprecedented force. They shed silent tears or sobbed openly, and some cried out in sympathy with the sufferers onstage. “Oh Mama! This is too painful!” three girls called out as Charon led Alcestis to the underworld, and a boy (...) pleaded with his father to take him home. A woman who watched the same performance described falling on her knees in her opera-box as the march of the priests of Apollo began, staying in this position “suppliant and with my hands clasped until the end of the piece.”Gluck's streamlined musical language was one reason for these emotional responses. He and his librettist Ranieri de’ Calzabigi simplified the conventions by eliminating extraneous subplots, abandoning the repetitive da capo form, and replacing trills and runs with simpler melodies meant to convey passion. Another reason was the widespread culture of sentimentalism, which equated virtue with sincerity and judged tears to be the natural sign of an open heart. Painters depicted tender and tumultuous family scenes, and friends pledged trembling vows of fidelity. Listeners were also readers, and many described similar tearful responses when they read the century's bestseller, Rousseau's novel Julie; or, The New Heloise.Everist, a musicologist, takes up the story of Gluck in France in the nineteenth century, when the German composer remained a presence in repertoires. No longer prone to tears, the public was often indifferent and sometimes hostile to his works. Conductors and composers nevertheless persisted in promoting Gluck's music. Between 1828 and 1870, operatic excerpts appeared roughly twice a year in performances of the prestigious Société des Concerts, and the charismatic conductor Jules Pasdeloup regularly programmed his music. Many listeners remained unconvinced. A writer in 1861 described the “sepulchral boredom that reigned the length of all five acts” of Alceste. The periodical Monde dramatique used the same language to characterize Gluck's music: it was “profoundly boring.” After a high point of performances in the middle of Napoleon III's reign, Gluck disappeared from the Paris opera and concert stage for some thirty years.Everist's aim in this slim book is to isolate the “agents” involved in the French reception of Gluck. Traditional reception histories might begin with Gluck and his aims, identifying musical features, particular responses of audiences, critics’ accounts, and perhaps the more elusive temper of the times. Everist focuses instead on less conspicuous networks of impresarios, theater directors, and publishers. In his telling, such agents also include journalists and writers of fiction. The avowed effort is to decenter the artist and his art to emphasize the limited role that composers and librettists play in the performance of an opera. A quoted passage in the book reminds us that without parking attendants, stagehands, and ticket sellers the show could not go on. True enough. Genealogies of Music and Memory therefore provides tables listing Gluck arias in anthologies, particular singers’ performances, works by composers other than Gluck who also drew themes from classical antiquity, and works by other foreign-born composers. A section on “material culture” lists paintings and sculptures of Gluck in Paris theaters and museums.As a “genealogy,” the book is a salutary reminder of the web of amateurs and professionals who discuss, promote, and perform works that others have created. Writers such as E. T. A. Hoffmann, Mme de Staël, and Hippolyte Taine held up Gluck as the embodiment of German music. Hector Berlioz wrote frequently and enthusiastically about Gluck, although he was less keen to program his music. The singers François Delsarte and Pauline Viardot aroused temporary interest in Gluck by regularly including his arias in their recitals. Musical anthologies for the bourgeois household included piano arrangements of his best-known arias. Some nineteenth-century adaptations of his works were scored for the military band.Genealogies of Music and Memory is musicology with very little music. Everist's reliance on networks of actors, agents, publishers, pedagogical practices, and archival environments leads him to assert that “multiple agency is endemic in the story told here.” Unfortunately, it is often unclear just what the story is. Carelessness in writing and editing throughout—including a subject-verb clash in the book's final sentence—has rendered key passages obscure. Everist describes Delsarte's voice as feeble, broken, veiled, and ready to be extinguished twice in the same paragraph, first as a paraphrase and again in a quotation (with a misplaced comma).Decentering artists and their work to elevate others responsible for its reception brings attention to the unseen and often unsung. In the absence of particular performance histories, musical analyses and description, or sustained accounts of shared tastes or critical responses, however, conclusions remain piecemeal. Everist claims to have revealed a “Geertzian web of culture” in his study. A more modest account would describe it as an enumeration of references, revivals, editions, excerpts, and arrangements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A New Look at Animal-to-Human Organ TransplantationCharles R. McCarthy (bio)The acute shortage of organs available for transplantation into human beings combined with a new scientific understanding of the immune systems of both humans and animals make it probable that animal-to-human solid organ transplants (xenografts) may soon be attempted at a frequency rate unknown in the past. 1 Optimism about successful animal-to-human organ transplantation is greater than at any (...) previous time. The creation of a reliable supply of animal organs appears to be technically feasible. At least five major transplant centers in the United States are currently considering plans to pursue xenotransplantation. Although, at the time of this writing, no federal guidelines prohibit animal-to-human organ transplantation, the institutions considering such programs are awaiting deliberations on the subject by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).The demand for organs suitable for transplantation into human beings greatly exceeds the supply. According to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS 1996a), approximately 44,000 patients in the United states awaited organ transplantation at the end of 1995. In 1994, more than 3,000 patients died while on the transplant waiting list, and the demand for transplantable organs increases annually (UNOS 1996b). The figures do not include the hundreds or perhaps thousands of patients who could profit from a transplant, but who do not meet the requirements of the UNOS waiting list. Even if efforts to persuade persons to donate organs are redoubled, and even if the consent to donate organs should become a legal presumption, there is little prospect of developing a sufficient supply of transplantable human organs to meet the growing demand.As technical and biological barriers to successful animal-to-human xenografts are lowered, the prospect of raising dedicated colonies of animals, genetically altered to reduce the chances that human hosts will reject organs derived from them, is being seriously discussed. 2 Such colonies do not exist at the present time. [End Page 183] However, if new techniques for animal-to-human transplantation prove successful, it is likely that animal colonies will be established to provide a ready and predictable supply of organs for transplantation to humans. Some believe that commercial investment in colonies of purpose-bred animals to serve as a source of transplantable organs is close at hand (Leventhal 1994).New drugs and new combinations of existing drugs have improved the chances of successful medical outcomes for patients who receive solid organ transplants. It is now recognized that serial application of immunosuppressive drugs can reduce the likelihood of both short- and long-term organ rejection (Makowka 1994). Improved understanding of both human and animal immune systems, insights into histocompatibility, new agents to control graft-versus-host disease, animal breeding programs for the production of transgenic animals, and improved surgical techniques have opened, as never before, the possibility of successful transfer of organs from animals to humans. Some rate the chances of good patient outcomes (usually measured in terms of time of patient survival) as high, others make more conservative predictions, but virtually all experts believe that the chances for successful human patient outcomes resulting from xenotransplantation are improved. Because many patients face immanent death unless their organs can be replaced, there can be little doubt that many humans will readily consent to xenotransplantation.History Suggests CautionDespite the advances in immunosuppression, the frequency of failure in past animal-to-human xenograft attempts should temper the optimism of the transplant community. To date, all efforts to prolong human life by implanting solid organs from animals into human recipients have failed. The first attempts at animal-to-human xenotransplantation early in the twentieth century resulted in the early death of all recipients (Neuhof 1923). More sophisticated efforts at xenotransplantation occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a period when anti-rejection drugs began to make allografts more feasible. Although one human recipient of a xenograft survived for nine months (with poor quality of life), most patients died within a matter of minutes, hours, or a few days following the transplantation of organs from chimpanzees or baboons (Starzl... (shrink)

Dicaearchus of Messana (fl. c. 320 b.c.) was a peripatetic philosopher. Like Theophrastus of Eresus, he was a pupil of Aristotle. Dicaearchus's life is not well documented. There is no biography by Diogenes Laertius, and what the Suda offers is meager. However, it can be ascertained that a close friendship existed between Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus as both are mentioned as personal students of Aristotle. Dicaearchus lived for a time in the Peleponnesus, and in his pursuit of geographical studies and (...) measuring mountains, he is said to have enjoyed the patronage of kings. Dicaearchus's interests were in certain respects narrower than Aristotle's. There is no evidence that Dicaearchus worked in logic, physics, or metaphysics. To the contrary, his work On the Soul recalls the Aristotelian treatise of the same title, but Dicaearchus's work was not an esoteric treatise. Instead, it was a dialogue in two parts. His interest in good and bad lifestyles also found expression in works such as On the Sacrifice at Ilium, and On the Destruction of Human Beings, in which he presented man himself as the greatest threat to mankind. In On Lives, a work of at least two books, he considered philosophers and others noted for their wisdom, with his main thesis being the superiority of the active life over that of quiet contemplation. Cicero speaks of controversy between Dicaearchus and Theophrastus the former championing the active life and the latter that of contemplation. Circuit of the Earth was a work of descriptive geography in which Dicaearchus said that the earth has the shape of a globe. This interest in earth's sphericity led him to make maps and discuss other phenomena like the cause of ebb- and flood-tides and the source of the Nile River. The largest number of texts in the collection deal with cultural history, most of which stem or appear to stem from his Life of Greece, while the smallest section deals with politics. This tenth volume in the series Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities includes a facing translation of the Greek and Latin texts, making the material accessible to readers who lack the ancient languages, and the accompanying essays introduce important issues beyond the scope of the text. "[Dicaerchus of Messana] is a beautifully produced book...highly recommended, not only as a very full and useful treatment, meeting the highest standards, of one of Aristotle's more important pupils, but also as a model of methodology in the attempt to reconstruct from few remains something of an achievement which has been largely lost." -Dominic O'Meara, The Classical Bulletin William W. Fortenbaugh is professor of classics at Rutgers University. In addition to the other books in this series and his many articles, he has written Aristotle on Emotion and Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts. Eckart Sch³trumpf is professor of classics at the University of Colorado at Boulder. His interests include ancient literary criticism, rhetoric and political theory. His extensive commentary on Aristotle's Politics now extends to three volumes. A fourth and final volume is forthcoming. (shrink)

This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent., was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention. The editors recommend that to experience the drifiting (...) thought that attention be paid to the contributions as they entered into conversation one after another. This particular piece is from the BETWEEN SPACE & PLACE thread: April Vannini, Those Between the Common * Laura Dean & Jesse McClelland, Ballard: A Portrait of Placemaking * Amara Hark Weber, Crossroad * Isaac Linder & Berit Soli-Holt, The Call of the Wild: Terror Modulations * Ashley D. Hairston, Momma taught us to keep a clean house * Sean Smith, The Garage * * * * Instead of beginning with radical doubt, we start from naiveté. —Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object Deep in the forest a call was sounding, and as often as he heard this call, mysteriously thrilling and luring, he felt compelled to turn his back upon the fire and the beaten earth around it, and to plunge into the forest, and on and on, he knew not where or why; nor did he wonder where or why, the call sounding imperiously, deep in the forest. —Jack London, The Call of the Wild The figure of the feral remains a perpetual enigma, but the parameters remain relatively consistent. A person, usually a child, enters civilization after having been raised by wolves or kept in some kind of cruel captivity. The outsider perspective on domestication ensuing in an edge of a culture's self-recognition of its clumsier attributes, what has been taken for granted becomes apparent, is brought to the foreground with the stranger and made questionable. Amusement follows naïve questions or observations such as Kaspar Hauser in the Herzog film, The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser, when Kaspar notes that while in his room he is engulfed by it, but when he looks at the tower he can turn away and it disappears. Ergo, the room is larger than the tower. How entertaining. The aberrant one destabilizes the comforting cultural normative. Places become seen as mere impressions out of space, a patterning, a rut that not everyone lives in like us. This is one figure of the feral. The naiveté that begs all the questions. As a figure for a certain philosophical disposition, the rapidity of one’s saccade scans the environment, intuits it’s space, not from an initial thaumazein or a Critchlean sense of disappointment, but from a child-like naiveté bent on survival. To serve the naïve is merely one form of critique, and it is not nearly used enough in lieu of the critique that provides answers. How dull. It is not necessary to be an outsider to entrench a critique with naiveté. After having forced to suffer in the most parched and rocky terror, itself for so long rooted upwards of fifty feet into the ground upon which it grows, even a grapevine can spontaneously produce a white grape on a red vine. The curious feral can arise from within, and like pinot grigio, it adds variety without admonishing its roots. There is also the feral dog. Not raised by wolves, but humans. Founded in place the figure of this feral denies this place. The trajectory of this feral roves from the cultivated to uncultivated, or in speaking of plants from controlled to volunteer, finding the necessary nutrients and survival patterns on its own. Finding other places, reaching out into space testing its fertility. And when introduced into a foreign environment, it withers or flourishes. We would like to attempt a thesis at this juncture and to accept neither feral figure in its entirety, but to argue for the intimate conjunction between a cultivated place and its resonance with the space it procures for its nest and kin. I'm not a biter, I'm a writer for myself and others. —Jay-Z, What More Can I Say? I am writing for myself and strangers. This is the only way that I can do it. Everybody is a real one to me, everybody is like some one else too to me. No one of them that I know can want to know it and so I write for myself and strangers. —Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans There is no subjective disposition outlining an unambiguous individual of the para-academy. There is no para-academic. We all have day jobs. 'Para-academic' seeped through the cracks as an adjective in the call to frame publishing dedicated to the critical rigor expected by academic publishing, but to deny the limitations of guarded legitimation through capital means. Open-access holds hands with this parasitic descriptor. Para-academic publishing's refusal to adhere to the valuation of locked access of a site, the site “of a desperate initiation to the empty form of value,” 1 seeks to recognize not merely an inclusive interpretation of significance, but the significance of thinking practice. The practice inside the paywalls of academic 'education' is held in a deathgrip by its infatuation with value and information, both empty without the apprehension of human experience, the barbaric yawp. “I can't breathe in here.” It is not that a para-academic practice leads one to the childish wonder of Kaspar Hauser who wonders about the spatiality of his room. It is the academic legitimation that distorts that one can hold the understanding of both in a constellation of place and space. Led to believe there is only a place for things, we are led to disillusionment. It is also not that a para-academic practice relinquishes itself to the invasive growth outside of careful cultivation, an abandonment of pleasantries for the toothy growl of a predator. It is the academy's fear that thought does not require capital to signify value. Some of the most nutritious meals can be foraged. Defining a para-academic practice is not outlining a place of accreditation of the practice, it is the recognition that any place is subject to modulation by the space it inhabits as well as creates. The para-academic practice keeps an eye of the creation of spaces, follows those paths that eat themselves in the name of academia. This is not unlike Red Peter's report to the academy, only successful if we report in idle idiosyncratic banalities that we have once again become victorious in our acculturation and nullification within the confines of accredited mush and our trajectory of wild rigor is defeated in our desire for recognition as recognizable in this place. Weeds are integral to the functioning of a large ecosystem. The manicured garden is entirely reliant on its keeper. The pansy can also go wild once neglected, the daisy definitely does.... a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow from the original act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even if unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please. At this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it, and the world may seem like shifting sand beneath our feet. —George Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form Two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing edge, and another edge, mobile, blank, which is never anything but the site of its effect: the place where the death of language is glimpsed. These two edges, the compromise they bring about, are necessary. —Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text Between these two epigraphs, interminable questions of where and questions of happening, gesture, and interface. To stay buoyed between a site of visible happening and haptic perspicacity. Bounded by one or the other leads to a desiccation of potential knowledge. The tumbleweed tumbles until met with mud, a bare structure moving but not movement. A tumbleweed tumbleweeds, propagates only at a place. It becomes significant again, continues. Significance, the site where meaning is made known through kinesthetic apprehension. 2 The feral founds a gestural horizon; an outsider’s scrawl-becoming-law; Deleuze teaching Meno’s dog geometry. Place as marked, outlined, recognized, territorialized. The academies marked by their peculiar disciplines, outlined by their rigid boundaries, recognized as factories of value. This far from ensures complete purchase on the space of thought, but it has made an undeniably elaborate means of making work significant. The academy is a muddy spot, it is fertile, but its gates are high and its dogs are barking. The coordinates of concept and experience. Already claimed by a stabilizing suspension, the terms enter specificity of ‘this is this’. Another correlation: activity and the individual. The individual, a placeholder in the crosshairs of juridical identification. Activity, what expands and surrounds this location, but utterly indebted to the node of “one who”. What's happening in this oscillation of nature and nurture is practice. Practice, as Stengers tells us “is not the activity of an individual or the product of that activity. It is the ingredient without which neither that activity nor this product would exist as such.” 3 Moving outward from our own honing, we're curious about the ingredient creating the place for holding conceptual and experiential engagements in each hand. And we'd like to argue that this place is not a limiting specification, but a practice undulating daily, by the minute. And we call this practice the para-academic practice. I repeat: there was no attraction for me in imitating human beings; I imitated them because I needed a way out, and for no other reason. —Franz Kafka, A Report to an Academy In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion must respect the limit it discovers in itself—a limit where minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist. — Albert Camus, The Rebel Anyone is a para-academic or practicer of such means. The academic can, and we argue should, be active para-academically, to escape the bounds, recognizing no site specific place as a place to rest on or the place to grab the Kafka's top and wonder at its disobedience not to continue. Yet, the para-academic practice must maintain the desire for rigor in scholarship. Indeed desiring past itself to claim a more naïve rigor, one that does not take its form for granted. Without a para-academic practice, the scholar spends half the time merely working on behalf of a hierarchy, to maintain it, and the other measly amounts of time are in the name of thinking, but only in name. Not to mention the amount of debt it takes to attend the halls of higher education. Not to mention the snoring tenures. Not to mention the barely scraping by adjuncts. Not to mention the materials that shake the very force of producible theory. Not to mention when swimming in texts becomes slogging through data. Academia is a barbaric food chain and it is our claim that there is, as always, an imperative for thought to move, with Heidegger, beyond the logics of calculation and planning, to a time of its own. The path, into the panic of the dark wood of this space can be followed by any; any who let the silence and the rigor enter the play. Where the little theater is larger when inhabited ; where the data of the tutor asymptotically refutes; and where, as much as one wouldn’t expect it here, ballet may turn out to be the most feral of forms… NOTES Jean Baudrillard, “Value's Last Tango” Simulacra and Simulation trans. Sheila Faria Glaser,. “What is significance? It is meaning, insofar as it is sensually produced.” Roland Barthes in The Pleasure of the Text. Isabelle Stengers, “The Science Wars” Cosmopolitics I trans. Robert Bononno, 47. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:My Patient, TeacherMarissa BlumI remember meeting Beatriz about 12 years ago when security was called to her office visit room by the fellow doctor-in-training who was seeing her. She was yelling loudly about her pain medications, causing a terrific commotion. I stepped in to relieve the fellow and tried to calm her down and move the visit along without anyone getting hurt or further upset. And from then on, (...) Beatriz was moved to my schedule from the fellow's for her monthly visits for her knee pain and refills of fentanyl and oxycodone. She had terrible knees and walked with a cane, almost always accompanied by her son. At one point, she came to our clinic asking to be seen but couldn't, and then fell onto her knees and rolled onto her back in the wait-room, clutching and waiving her cane, expelling expletives and railing at anyone who wanted to help but denying them that privilege. It was as though she relished exposing her pain and a lifetime of hardship for all to confront. I came down from my office to talk with her and when I couldn't convince her to get up on her own, we called EMS to assist and they took her away in an ambulance.For the first few years, I recoiled seeing her name on my schedule each month. I knew I would have to endure a barrage of labile emotions and complaints not just about her constant pain and feelings of inadequacy of her pain medications, but also about her other doctors and how they don't respond to her, or about how the rest of her family shows no care for her. Initially, these visits were hard because they were unpredictable and Beatriz also had bipolar disorder and maybe borderline personality too. I never knew which type of Beatriz I would walk in to see: Angry, tearful, lamentful, and all of those faces were difficult for me. But we met every month for years. During those visits, which almost always were attended by her son, who quietly sat by to either gently rebuff or passively agree with her, I learned so much about her and her very hard life. She was left to raise two children alone, unskilled and ill with hepatitis C, which led to liver cancer, followed later by breast cancer. She chose not to pursue additional therapy for breast cancer, expressing a fatalistic view of her life and intimating she in some way deserved the ailments that she developed. She saw me for disabling knee and hip arthritis that took away her independence and ability to scale the outdoor steps to her second-floor apartment and required the assistance of her son to dress, bathe and care for her. Beatriz never knew this, and I didn't share [End Page 18] it with her, but on one of my early morning drives into North Philadelphia, I saw her on a sun-baked unfriendly street, struggling to move around with her walker. She had many reasons to be angry, and the 30 minutes I spent with her every month became a catharsis for her to unload all that she felt.During my medical training, I encountered hundreds of patients—mostly all in the hospital setting—who might be characterized as difficult and understandably; no one who is relegated to the hospital setting, acutely or chronically ill and requiring inpatient care, could possibly be in the best mood of their lives. Somehow, it was easier for me to care for patients in these snapshot encounters that I controlled. I dictated my time in the room and didn't necessarily have to encounter the same challenging patient longitudinally, which made certain encounters much easier to bear. I realize now I wasn't fully processing the burdens carried by these patients in a way that enabled me to be a compassionate and fully present physician to them. It was an adaptation to the fast-paced life of residency, where one just has to get the job done and move on to the next task without time to process or reflect on difficult patient interactions. This is a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.4 (2000) 629-635 [Access article in PDF] Brief Mention Gildersleeve and M. Carey Thomas Ward W. Briggs IN A RECENT COLUMN on the dismissal of Professor Mary Daly of Boston College, who for decades has not permitted men in her women's studies classes, Garry Wills recalled two stories about Basil L. Gildersleeve: When women were admitted to the graduate school at the Hopkins, much to (...) Gildersleeve's regret, he said that he could not teach his course on the obscene Greek dramatist Aristophanes--he would be too inhibited when it came to explaining the dirty jokes. He was told that not even he, the founder of Greek studies at the place, could refuse to admit women. He countered that by putting up a screen in his classroom and making the women sit behind it. That way they could hear him, but he could pretend they were not there. 1This is virtually the version that I heard at roughly the same time as Wills. The anecdote, though fictional, offers the opportunity to provide a more nuanced if still problematic account that shows Gildersleeve respectful of the ambitions and achievements of a determined and successful woman, while retaining strong reservations on the desirability of higher education for women.In 1877 M. Carey Thomas (1857-1935) was among the first women to graduate from Cornell (the only university in the East that admitted women full-time). 2 She had majored in classics, to which she was drawn by her love of literature, and taken other coursework in mathematics, [End Page 629] literature, and philosophy. She read Agamemnon 3 and Oedipus Tyrannos with Tracy Peck (1838-1921). 4 Her thesis examined Greek civilization to the disadvantage of Roman political hegemony. She earned a B.A. degree, but her program had lasted only two years.The founding board of Johns Hopkins included among its largely Quaker membership Thomas's father, James Carey Thomas (1833-97), a prominent Baltimore physician, who was very keen that the new university should admit women. His daughter, still animated by the advice of Jane Slocum that had led her to Cornell, "What we want in the cause of women are not doctors and lawyers (there are plenty of those), we want scholars," 5 applied on 22 September 1877 to Gildersleeve's second annual graduate seminar. She had as yet no realistic understanding of the requirements, though she was aware of the difficulties of coeducation at that time, which she compared to "living on a volcano or on a housetop." 6She wrote directly to Johns Hopkins president Daniel Coit Gilman (1831-1908), who took her application to the board of trustees. The board, despite the influence of Thomas's father, decided that a difficult compromise was necessary: she, the only woman student at the university, in this its second year of existence, should "have the direction of studies by University Professors, and the final examination for degrees without class attendance in the University." 7 On this basis she first encountered the university's professor of Greek.Gildersleeve's time was precious that year: he was establishing the first graduate seminar in the country, getting the American Journal of Philology under way, organizing his edition of Pindar, and serving as president of the American Philological Association. The trustees' rule imposed the extra burden of a private tutorial. 8 Nevertheless, he agreed that Thomas could sit in his grammar lectures and that he would meet [End Page 630] with her regularly to discuss the work of his seminar. Her preparation was not up to the standard of the five advanced male students already in the seminar 9 and Gildersleeve indicated that she "might be able to take [the degree] in three years" (Thomas's emphasis) and insisted that she learn German. 10 She plunged into her work ("a terrible undertaking") 11 with enthusiasm, teaching herself German and reading Thucydides and the Odyssey. 12 The fall of 1877 was agony. She attended Gildersleeve's biweekly lectures on "Practical Exercises in Greek," but lamented that there were "so many books... waiting to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents, 1911–1951Newton GarverBrian McGuinness, editor. Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents, 1911–1951. Malden, MA-Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Pp. vii + 498. Cloth, $134.95.This volume includes nearly everything contained in Cambridge Letters (Blackwell, 1995), supplemented by Wittgenstein’s exchanges with Sraffa (not available in 1995), by correspondence with many of his students, and by various documents pertaining to his status in the University (...) and to the Moral Sciences meetings. Throughout, there are notes by McGuinness that provide details about persons, places, and events mentioned in the texts. Altogether, the volume offers rich rewards for both students of Wittgenstein and those interested in the interplay of the times.Wittgenstein was Austrian to the core, as is evident in his admiration for such distinctly Viennese cultural icons as Nestroy, Grillparzer, Labor, Weininger, and Kraus—none of whom was familiar in the circles within which he moved in Cambridge. In his introduction, however, McGuinness makes clear that Cambridge, not Vienna, was the place where Wittgenstein could work. There were no roots in Cambridge, compared to those in Vienna, but growth, it seems, had to take place away from the roots. During his first stay in Cambridge (1912–14) Wittgenstein established connections with the giants of the time: Russell, Moore, and Keynes, all of whom had been active members of the Apostles, and who therefore put him in touch with the Bloomsbury-flavored younger elite of the University. Although none of these relationships was smooth, they all served in 1929 to ease Wittgenstein’s re-entry into Cambridge.Once back at Cambridge, and back at work in philosophy, Wittgenstein established his own circle, composed of younger scholars who attended his lectures. The only contact from the early period with whom he remained close through the 1930s and ’40s was Moore, although neither Russell nor Keynes disappeared entirely. Moore attended Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1930–33, and the two met regularly whenever Wittgenstein was in Cambridge. Among his peers, the big addition was Piero Sraffa, the Italian economist who was, as McGuinness puts it, first a protegé and then a successor of Keynes. It is difficult to reconstruct the content of the conversations between these two powerful intellects, but the letters and notes included here make it plain that the conversations were intense and had continuing themes. The Sraffa documents have been available elsewhere, but the chronological order of the documents in this volume means that we can now see them in the wider context of Wittgenstein’s ongoing activity.Wittgenstein and Sraffa were both equals and opposites—equal in genius, in honesty, in forthrightness, in stubbornness, and in commitment to dialogue, but opposite in opinions and convictions. Time and again, the letters and notes show evidence of tough, wrenching discussions, at times suspended because of exhaustion and weariness. Wittgenstein lists Sraffa last (chronologically, we presume) of ten people who influenced his thought. The letters and notes in this volume confirm a powerful influence, but offer scant clues as to the direction of the influence in Wittgenstein’s later thought.One of the younger scholars was the physicist W. H. Watson, who became Distinguished Professor at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario. His On Understanding Physics is, [End Page 115] McGuinness reports, a reliable guide of Wittgenstein’s thinking on these matters. In their correspondence we find many instances of what they both regarded as nonsense penned by the great scientists of the day (Jeans, Eddington, and Einstein). The nonsense appears to have presented grand pronouncements in everyday language, concerning mundane rather than distinctively philosophical matters. By providing new insight into how Wittgenstein relished nonsensical items, the correspondence with Watson helps us appreciate Wittgenstein’s nose for nonsense as part of his philosophical genius.For Wittgenstein, happiness depended on work. This is evident in his Notebooks 1914–1916 and again in these documents. For example, on June 17, 1941, he writes to Moore, “About six weeks ago I suddenly... began to be able to write again. Quite possibly this will last only for a very short time; but it feels good while it lasts and has made a great deal of difference to me... (shrink)

The discipline of philosophy has been critiqued from both within and outside itself. One brand of external critique is associated with Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), the view that human cognition is partially structured by pervasive and automatic mappings between conceptual domains. Most notably, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) claimed that many central philosophical concepts and arguments rely on an unacknowledged metaphorical substructure, and that this structure has sometimes led philosophy astray. The purpose of this paper is to argue (...) that Lakoff and Johnson's critique is anticipated by the work of post‐Tractarian Wittgenstein and his student, Margaret MacDonald. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein outlines a method for identifying and resolving philosophical puzzles generated by misused grammatical analogies, although his discussion lacks a precise characterization of exactly how and why such analogies lead to trouble. In a 1938 paper, MacDonald offers such a characterization, which I outline and then connect back to Wittgenstein. In addition to this interpretive work, I supplement Wittgenstein and MacDonald's diagnosis using evidence from CMT which suggests that linguistic metaphors and analogies often originate in or are motivated by more fundamental analogical mappings in cognition. The supplemented account carries implications for how philosophical arguments ought to be formulated and critiqued. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Fulfilling Mitzvot through the Practice of Lovingkindness and WisdomDavid J. GilnerSince it has been more than forty years since I last wrote a paper in comparative religion, I have chosen not to attempt a scholarly paper. Rather, after a biographical sketch, I will discuss examples of Jewish texts that underpin my choice to pursue a path that includes practices drawn from the teachings of Tibetan Buddhism, and (...) explain how I plan to teach these practices within traditional Jewish settings.I grew up in Brooklyn, New York, in a Jewish family that identified with the Conservative movement. When I turned five, I was sent to a modern Orthodox yeshiva. For three and a half hours each morning, first five, then six days a week, I studied a comprehensive Jewish curriculum—taught in modern Hebrew—which included Bible, commentaries, Talmud, history, grammar, and the laws and customs of Ashkenazic Jewry. At fourteen, I left the yeshiva to attend a nondenominational Christian prep school. This seemingly radical change in schools and religious traditions occasioned no significant intellectual conflicts or spiritual anxieties. By fourteen, I sensed that religion was something people were born into; it was one of the cards life dealt you at birth.My sophomore year at Emory University saw the beginning of my interest in Buddhism. I began to practice Sōtō Zen sitting (zazen), and, in my readings, stumbled upon the koan Mu, which occupied my attention in and out of meditation for several years. I became a religion major and was particularly interested in modern Japanese religions. However, my advisor discouraged me from pursuing this interest in graduate school and suggested I build further on my strong traditional Jewish education, which is how I came to Hebrew Union College in 1972 to pursue a PhD in biblical and ancient Near Eastern studies.It was at that time that I began to practice Transcendental Meditation, and, subsequently, the TM Sidhis program, a practice that took, on average, three hours per day, and four and a half hours on days when I did group practice. Not finding a job teaching Bible led me to library school, after which I returned to Hebrew Union College in 1977 to work as a librarian. I became involved in interfaith community outreach, and lectured, led Bible study groups, and conducted Passover seders at local [End Page 27] churches, toward the goal of enhancing interfaith dialogue and understanding in the community. At this time I was fortunate to become friends with Paul Knitter, then a professor at Xavier University.In 1997, after twenty-five years of dedicated twice-daily practice, it became clear to me that I was "attached" to my TM meditation program and that this attachment was hindering my growth. I put my TM Sidhis practice aside and went back to zazen. Soon, I became associated with the Dzogchen organization led by Lama Surya Das, and trekchö became my basic practice. As a member of the online "three-year mandala program," I received a cassette-based education in various Tibetan meditation practices, which included my first experiences with visualization, as part of Tara and Machigma practices.In 2001, I learned of many unfilled requests sent to Hebrew Union College by small congregations asking for students to lead High Holidays services, so I volunteered. For the past ten years, I have served as the High Holidays rabbi at Congregation Tikkun Olam in Woodstock, Illinois. The phrase tikkun olam, often translated as "repairing the world," has become popularized in Jewish culture over the past two decades.In 2003, a friend sent me a teaching tape by Lama John Makransky on loving-kindness practice. My immediate gut reaction was that everything else I had done for thirty-five years was preparation for this teaching. I attended several courses in which Lama Makransky taught practices to cultivate innate lovingkindness and wisdom, and in 2007 I was privileged to attend the week-long course in which he taught his then forthcoming book Awakening through Love: Unveiling Your Deepest Goodness. Since then, I have attended other courses taught by Makransky under the aegis of the Foundation for Active Compassion. Within the realm of Ati Yoga, I think it... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Benedict XVI: A Life. Volume 2, Professor and Prefect to Pope and Pope Emeritus 1966–The Present by Peter SeewaldEmil AntonBenedict XVI: A Life. Volume 2, Professor and Prefect to Pope and Pope Emeritus 1966–The Present by Peter Seewald, translated by Dinah Livingstone (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2021), viii + 568 pp.What better way to spend Pope Benedict XVI's ninety-fifth birthday (which turned out to be his last) than by (...) visiting his birth house in Marktl am Inn at his birth minute—4.15 AM! In addition to five Finnish pilgrims, twenty or so local grandmas and grandpas attended the now-traditional early morning prayer, which this year fell on Holy Saturday, the very liturgical day on which Joseph Ratzinger was born and baptized. Other destinations on a do-it-yourself Ratzinger pilgrimage included Freising (studies and ordination), Regensburg (professorial years), Altötting (favorite Marian sanctuary), childhood villages and towns (Tittmoning, Aschau am Inn, Hufschlag, Traunstein), and of course Munich (seminary and episcopal years), with beer, good food, and Apfelstrudel at the Augustiner Klosterwirt.Such a trip is highly recommended, even though there were no Ratzinger books in the "Theology" section of University of Regensburg's bookshop, reflecting his persona non grata status in German academia. In Altötting, however, Peter Seewald's magnificent biography was on offer, as well as icon-like pictures of Pope Benedict and candles with his image on them—good for both admirers and critics!In English, Seewald's biography is divided into two volumes (for my review of volume 1, see Nova et Vetera [English] 20, no. 3), the second one comprising three parts: (1) professor, (2) prefect, and (3) Pope. The book was certainly worth the wait and does not disappoint: the research and analysis are excellent, the style is enjoyable, and interesting new details are revealed, such as the "endless outbursts of crying" and "violent quarrels with cardinals" of "popess" (as the housekeeper was called in the curia) Ingrid Stampa, who "kept Ratzinger's diary, edited official speeches and even decided who could meet the Holy Father" (351).As a journalist, Seewald is especially strong on the German press coverage [End Page 285] of Ratzinger. During his time as archbishop of Munich, "Ratzinger took part so frequently in the public debate that the Süddeutsche Zeitung feared that it would be a 'big shock' for millions of Upper Bavarian Catholics if his name did not appear in any edition of the four Munich daily papers" (109). Ratzinger's predominantly negative media image seems to stem to a great extent from the actions of Hans Küng. Asked about the cancellation of Küng's missio canonica at a youth event in 1979, Ratzinger said off the cuff that it was right, since Küng was actively disputing essential doctrines of the Catholic Church (128). The comments were published without authorization, which led to Küng accusing Ratzinger of "falling back on pre-conciliar customs of heresy-hunting, insinuation and defamation" (129). After the publication of Vittorio Messori's The Ratzinger Report in 1985, Küng "crashed in with a sweeping blow in the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit" (170), not failing to bring up his "litany of complaints: the 'case of Galileo,' the 'Chinese rites controversy,' 'putting all the most important European thinkers on the Index (Descartes, Kant, Sartre etc.),' '9 million victims of witch trials'" (171). According to Seewald, this momentous article, ending with the claim that Ratzinger was "afraid of the truth more than anything else," provided the endlessly reproduced media image of the prefect.Seewald singles out the Bild journalist Andreas Englisch as a striking example of the kind of deliberate manipulation typical of so-called expert reporters. After Benedict XVI's election, Englisch admitted with apparent remorse that, in previous reporting, in order to make John Paul II's "light shine more brightly," he had "needed an enemy to make the story more dramatic" (192). Seewald continues: "However, Englisch had no scruples about later applying his business model to books about Pope Francis, whom he raised almost to heaven, in order finally to shove the retired Benedict XVI down to hell" (192... (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the circumstances of Noël Coypel’s appointment as rector of the French Academy in Rome and to trace the route of his didactic journey from Paris to Rome with the Prix de Rome scholars entrusted to him. The paper is an attempt to answer the following questions: why a more difficult route through the Alps was chosen, in what way was the journey educational, and what role did the documents given to Coypel play (...) in securing the expedition. The article is based on an analysis of administrative records during the reign of Louis XIV, lists of superintendents and directors of the French Academy in Rome, accounts of royal buildings, and minutes of the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture in Paris. The paper uses the analytical method, the comparative method, the synthetic method, source criticism, argumentum ex silentio inference, and the geographical method when discussing the itinerary. Although the trip was purposeful and related to Coypel’s new position, he designed it in such a way as to not so much get to the destination quickly, but to show his students as much as possible. Coypel introduced the royal scholars to masterpieces of painting and sculpture at centers along a route through Dijon, Lyon, Chambéry, the Mont Cenis Pass, Turin, Milan, Bologna and Florence. The crossing of the Alps, though dangerous, was most often chosen because of the artistic reputation of the cities there. The trip was educational at the expense of comfort or safety. Coypel, as a guide and teacher led his charges by overseeing their learning during and through the journey. Wandering to the Eternal City was part of a painter’s education in the seventeenth century and was part of Coypel’s didactic work allowing young people to be inspired by direct exposure to masterpieces. The journey had an eminently didactic and artistic character, but also an initiatory one, as it gradually initiated and prepared the students for the experience of Rome, the center of artistic life at that time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 103-106 [Access article in PDF] The 2000 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies Edward L. Shirley St. Edward's University The annual meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies met in Nashville on Friday and Saturday, November 17 and 18, 2000. This year's papers addressed the theme "Beyond the Usual Alternatives in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," with usual alternatives being the categories of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.The (...) first session was held Friday afternoon. The first presenter, Terry Muck, spoke from a Christian perspective. He first addressed the adequacies of these three categories.Were these legitimate categories?Were they the only categories? Were there better ways to categorize theoretical positions involving the truth claims of the other? Terry suggested first that it seemed unnecessary to expand these three categories to include a fourth or fifth. Nor did he feel that it was necessary to do away with said categories altogether. He proposed, rather, that we make use of these three categories as helpful but that we be careful not to use them to label people. Indeed, he suggested, the same person might be inclusivist at one point in the dialogue but pluralist at another. It was especially important not to use these categories to dismiss another's position: "Oh, she's just an inclusivist." Terry pointed out that much of the discussion concerning the truth claims of the other were ultimately grounded in questions of soteriology: who will be saved (from a Christian perspective), or who can be liberated (from a Buddhist perspective)?The second presenter was Miriam Levering, speaking from a Buddhist perspective. In her paper, she used three medieval Chinese Buddhist teachers who seemed to represent these three categories: Kuei-feng Tsung-mi, Ch'eng-kuan, and Ta-hui Tsung-kao (with whom she also associated contemporary Buddhist teacher Thich Nhat Hanh). The three teachers were facing questions about the relationship of Buddhism to Confucianism and Taoism. Kuei-feng Tsung-mi taught that there were three types of teachings: those that were nonliberative, those that were partially liberative, and those that were fully liberative. Lao-Tzu and Confucius, he maintained, were liberated beings, but were not fully liberated. Their liberation was partial or shallow. Ta-hui Tsung-kao, on the other hand, taught that words and concepts were not as important as the experience of emptiness and non-self, which could take place outside a Buddhist context. This seems to be the position, Miriam suggested, ofThich [End Page 103] Nhat Hanh. Finally, Ch'eng-kuan taught that only Buddhism contained the truth and that the teachings of Taoism and Confucianism were poison and led one to hell.Virginia Straus responded from a Buddhist perspective. She appreciated Terry's suggestion that we shift from seeing the three categories as labeling and use them as instrumental categories: people tend to function in this way. She felt that Miriam's paper resonated with Terry's as she presented three types of teaching from within the Buddhist tradition.Virginia felt, however, that perhaps Terry had too quickly written off attempts to expand the number of categories to a set of four or five. Indeed, she pointed out, both presenters either ignored or dismissed this important work. Virginia also questioned why Terry seemed to let the positive and negative aspects of dialogue rise and fall on the question of salvation. What of David Chappell's suggestion that dialogue be based on responses to cultural and economic oppression rather than the search for truth? Global ethics, she suggested, would give a larger framework within which to dialogue.Afterwards, there was general group discussion. A question was raised as to whether there was a parallel between this discussion of dialogical positions and the debate in studies of mysticism between the perennialists and pluralists. Others questioned Thich Nhat Hanh's position that dialogue could only take place from the position of nonduality. Were these categories merely ways religious liberals had to label others? Can there be a Christian or Buddhist ethics without the experience of grace or non... (shrink)

Questions of ethics and the study of culture are tightly interwoven. Are we to see ethics as one thread in the fabric created by human culture or does ethics rather transcend culture? The discussions in this volume take place within this spectrum. Eleven Wittgenstein scholars explore how ethics is embedded in everyday activities and speech. The topics dealt with range from the ways we speak about human practices and nature, religious belief, gender, and moral understanding to questions about (...) Wittgensteinâ (TM)s views on ethics and what it means to understand and attend to a particular individual. Central points of departure are, firstly, that ethics cannot be reduced to any specific cultural form and, secondly, that how we conceive of language is crucially connected with how we perceive the relation between culture and ethics. The points of view put forth frequently pose radical questions to the mainstream of philosophy. The different uses to which Wittgensteinâ (TM)s thought is put also raise important questions about how one should understand the role of language, ethics and culture in his philosophy. (shrink)

Guilt and forgiveness, with their attendant philosophical and religious ramifications, permeate writing on the Holocaust and can also be related to South Africa’s recent history and present situation. Two controversial and provocative books (both possibly autobiographical) which tackle the question of guilt and forgiveness head on are Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower and Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader, both of which have led to much debate. The central event in both texts is the slaughter of innocents, burned to death in a building (...) during World War II, while the perpetrators (an SS officer who tells his story in The Sunflower and a concentration camp warder who refuses to tell hers in The Reader) either kill those trying to escape or totally ignore the screams of the victims. The reader has to decide whether it is plausible that years later these murderers feel genuine guilt and, if so, whether they should be forgiven – and by whom. The Reader can be seen as the obverse of The Sunflower. The two should be read in conjunction for an intriguing view of the human psyche, the dichotomy in the soul of a person preceding and succeeding his/her horrific deeds, and the questions arising of whether death can be faced by the wicked with a clear conscience, whether the fear of meeting one’s Maker engenders belated remorse, whether one changes if found out, and whether ignorance of mind betokens evil of soul which can be overcome with learning and insight. (shrink)

The discussion between Searle and the Churchlands over whether or not symbolmanipulating computers generate semantics will be confronted both with the rulesceptical considerations of Kripke/wittgenstein and with Wittgenstein's privatelanguage argument in order to show that the discussion focuses on the wrong place: meaning does not emerge in the brain. That a symbol means something should rather be conceived as a social fact, depending on a mutual imputation of linguistic competence of the participants of a linguistic practice (...) to one another. The alternative picture will finally be applied to small children, animals, and computers as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Annual Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesSan Diego, California, USA November 21–23, 2014Sandra Costen Kunz, SBCS Secretary and Jonathan A. Seitz, Newsletter EditorThe annual meeting is an opportunity to meet, to reconnect, and to share our work. As a “Related Scholarly Organization” of the American Academy of Religion, the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies holds its meetings concurrently with the AAR’s national conference. The SBCS normally organizes (...) two panels and holds board and members meetings. This year’s panels were “Liberation Theology and Engaged Buddhism: Challenging Each Other, Learning from Each Other,” and “Old Buddhist Texts: New Womanist Thought.” The papers from panels are often published in this journal.board meetings (officer and committee reports)The society’s annual board meeting was held on Friday, November 21, and its members meeting Sunday, Nov. 23. The board approved officer reports submitted by the treasurer, Denise Yarbrough, the interim journal editors, Terry Muck and Rita Gross, and the newsletter editor, Jonathan Seitz and the minutes submitted by secretary Sandra Kunz. An extended discussion treated the history of the relationship between the society, the journal, and the University of Hawai’i Press. The board voted to continue publishing with UHP while working out a new memorandum of understanding.We reviewed reports from the Nominating Committee, Streng Book Award Committee, Graduate Student Award Committee, Membership Committee, Social Media and Website Committee, and Program Committee.Nominating CommitteeThe Nominating Committee reported that the governing board terms of Yifa and John Makransky end with this board meeting. John remains on the board as vice president. We discussed nominees for these two board positions.Streng Book Award CommitteeThe Streng Book Award Committee noted that it would be helpful to receive nominations. Thomas Hastings joined the committee and J. Abraham Vélez de Cea was elected to another term. [End Page 207]Graduate Student Award CommitteeKaren Enriquez reported for the Graduate Student Award Committee, noting that although a good paper was selected this year, the problem of paper quality remains. Rita Gross suggested that members with students working in Buddhist-Christian studies should encourage them to present papers at regional AAR meetings and submit these to the award committee. Judith Simmer-Brown suggested we start a subsidiary online journal that would publish, among other things, commentaries on BCS articles, including grad student commentaries. John Makransky suggested that we also post important articles from past issues we see as classics in the field. In light of the board’s enthusiasm about this idea for publishing grad student papers online, and in light of the difficulties of scheduling graduate student award papers within our sessions, John moved that we discontinue the oral presentation of graduate student award papers. Judith seconded the motion, which passed unanimously. John later moved, and Judith seconded the motion, that the board charge Karen, Glenn Willis, and Sarah Swenson to develop a proposal by March for a website that would host a subsidiary peer-reviewed online journal, being sure to articulate how this could promote the society among younger scholars. It passed unanimously.Membership CommitteeReminding us of Jonathan Seitz’s list of past members, John Makransky suggested we send out a membership mailing to them. Sarah Swenson and Alice Keefe were charged with creating a comprehensive distribution list and sending out a mailing asking everyone to join, rejoin, or renew their membership.Social Media and Website CommitteeIn light of our proposal to start a subsidiary online journal, Judith Simmer-Brown was gratefully charged with chairing a new committee with David Gardiner and Glenn Willis, who has been handling Facebook publicity. They will get bids for hiring a professional website designer who can configure it in such a way that we could maintain it ourselves.Program CommitteeJohn Makransky reported briefly on the potential session topics suggested at the lunch meeting. We discussed pros and cons of forming panels of known experts and using AAR’s blind submission process. The discussion ended with general exhortation to scout out scholars with pertinent work to enlarge our pool of presenters.We briefly discussed the pros and cons of organizing an international conference and reviving and regularizing the... (shrink)

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language (...) which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non-circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions. (shrink)

This paper presents a list of meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa during the period 1929-1951. It was compiled using Sraffa’s notes from his pocket diaries and including supplement appointments noted by Wittgenstein. The information - like addresses or names of other speakers - added by Sraffa to some appointments have been here explained in the footnotes. As it is shown, it emerges by the list that the meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa can be divided (...) in several different periods. (shrink)

In his review of Phillip Grier’s anthology, Dialectic and Contemporary Science, Darrel Christensen expresses his regret that I “did not find occasion… to give more attention… to the sorts of well-informed and pointed criticism that E. McMullin raised.. in ‘Is the Progress of Science Dialectical?’” In that book it would hardly have been possible or appropriate, for me to have done so, because I did not write it, and although the editor invited me to respond to the (...) authors who contributed, Ernan McMullin was not one of them. The paper to which Christensen refers was presented to the first meeting of the Hegel Society of America in 1970, at which I was present; but after so long an interval of time I cannot now remember if or how, I responded to it. So far as my recollection serves, my own paper, although distributed to those attending the meeting, was not read and was not fully discussed. So there may well be some need for taking up Christensen’s challenge, even at this late hour. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Annual Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies:San Francisco, California, USA, 19-22 November 2011Sandra Costen Kunz, SBCS SecretaryThe SBCS is one of thirty-two scholarly societies formally recognized by the American Academy of Religion as "Related Scholarly Organizations." The pattern for many years has been for the SBCS to hold its annual meeting in conjunction with the annual meeting of the AAR. On the Friday before the AAR's annual (...) meeting begins, the board meets in the morning and early afternoon, followed by an AAR-advertised session late that afternoon and then a field trip that evening. On Saturday, another paper session or panel is followed by the Society's annual members' meeting.Friday afternoon's 4:00-6:30 session, titled "Constructing Buddhist Identities in the West," was standing room only. The four papers presented at that panel are included in this volume.On Saturday morning, then SBCS president Miriam Levering presided at a well-attended session from 9:00 to 11:30. The topic was "Christian Readings of Buddhist Texts." Catherine Cornille (Boston College), editor of the Christian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts series, gave the first presentation, titled "Reading the Religious Other." She discussed the origin and nature of the series and gave examples of the methodologies used in various volumes they had published. Francis X. Clooney (Harvard University) presented "Reading Inter-religiously as a Theologically Necessary Act." Insisting that "reading well has a lot of common factors whether or not a text is from one's own or another tradition," he noted that "saying you read both the same doesn't mean you put them on same doctrinal level.... We defer the apologetics not just to be polite, but because there are many other things to do first." Leo Lefebure (Georgetown University) spoke about "Reading the Dhammapada" in light of his work with Peter Feldmeier in writing The Path of Wisdom: A Christian Commentary on the Dhammapada, published within the Christian Commentaries on Non-Christian Sacred Texts series. The volume was the winner of this year's Frederick J. Streng Book Award, which was presented by Amos Yong (Regent University). Lefebure pointed out that biblical wisdom literature and the Dhammapada both insist [End Page 129] that how we view the world largely shapes our happiness or unhappiness, and that both describe "decidedly unskillful and skillful ways to live."Between the Saturday morning session and the members' meeting that followed, Karen Enriquez presented the graduate student award to Kyeongil Jung, a student of Paul Knitter's at Columbia University-Union Theological Seminary. He gave a brief synopsis of his award-winning paper, "A Buddhist-Christian Story of Peace and Justice," also included in this volume. [End Page 130]Copyright © 2012 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

Background There is little dispute that the ideal moral standard for surgical informed consent calls for surgeons to carry out a disclosure dialogue with patients before they sign the informed consent form. This narrative study is the first to link patient experiences regarding the disclosure dialogue with patient-surgeon trust, central to effective recuperation and higher adherence. Methods Informants were 12 Israelis, aged 29–81, who underwent life-saving surgeries. A snowball sampling was used to locate participants in their initial recovery process (...) upon discharge. Results Our empirical evidence indicates an infringement of patients’ right to receive an adequate disclosure dialogue that respects their autonomy. More than half of the participants signed the informed consent form with no disclosure dialogue, and thus felt anxious, deceived and lost their trust in surgeons. Surgeons nullified the meaning of informed consent rather than promoted participants’ moral agency and dignity. Discussion Similarity among jarring experiences of participants led us to contend that the conduct of nullifying surgical informed consent does not stem solely from constraints of time and resources, but may reflect an underlying paradox preserving this conduct and leading to objectification of patients and persisting in paternalism. We propose a multi-phase data-driven model for informed consent that attends to patients needs and facilitates patient trust in surgeons. Conclusions Patient experiences attest to the infringement of a patient’s right to respect for autonomy. In order to meet the prima facie right of respect for autonomy, moral agency and dignity, physicians ought to respect patient’s needs. It is now time to renew efforts to avoid negligent disclosure and implement a patient-centered model of informed consent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Annual Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesSandra Costen Kunz and Jonathan A. SeitzThe Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (SBCS) is one of more than two dozen scholarly societies that have been formally recognized by the American Academy of Religion as Related Scholarly Organizations. The pattern for many years has been for the SBCS to hold its annual meeting in conjunction with the annual meeting of the AAR. (...) On the Friday before the AAR’s Annual Meeting begins, the Society’s board meets in the morning and early afternoon, followed by an AAR-advertised session late that afternoon. On Saturday, another paper session or panel is followed by the Society’s annual members’ meeting.A highlight of the 2012 SBCS annual meeting was the unanimous approval, first by the governing board and later by the membership in attendance, of a major revision of the society’s bylaws. This revision focused largely on updates necessitated by changes in the ways scholars communicate day-to-day and in scholarly publications, and in international banking practices, because of the expanding use of electronic media. This revision was well over a year in the making, with particularly generous input of time and thought by former board member Grace Burford and Treasurer Guy McCloskey, and with efficient guidance by President Terry Muck.Another highlight of this 2012 gathering was the announcement at the board meeting that the SBCS’s reapplication for formal status as a Related Scholarly Organization of the AAR was accepted for another five years. Among other privileges, this status makes it possible for us to communicate our calls for papers, session plans, and annual meeting schedule through AAR’s website and print publications.At the governing board meeting, Treasurer McCloskey noted an increase of more than 7 percent in paying members, but it was agreed that the society could carry [End Page 193] out its purposes more effectively if we were to welcome more new members. One especially notable new member is C. Denise Yarbrough (University of Rochester), who was unanimously approved at the members meeting as the Christian co-editor of this journal, along with Buddhist co-editor Wakoh Shannon Hickey (Notre Dame of Maryland University), who signed on in 2011.Rita Gross, who formerly co-edited the journal and was president of the Society, was elected to the board, replacing Amos Yong, whose term ended in 2012. We are extremely grateful for his leadership in many areas, including the Streng Book Award Committee. Abraham Vélez de Cea was unanimously approved to chair the Streng Book Award Committee, with Mary Jeanne Larabee continuing on the committee and David Gardiner being approved as the third member. Alice Keefe, in her vice presidential role as program chair, took note of the lively discussion about possible topics for next year’s panel sessions.The Friday afternoon seminar was titled “Contemplative Pedagogy: Pitfalls and Potentials.” Panelists included John D. Copenhaver (Shenandoah University), Kristine T. Utterback (University of Wyoming), Andrew O. Fort (Texas Christian University), and Judith Simmer-Brown (Naropa University). The respondent was William H. Green (Tougaloo College), and Wakoh Shannon Hickey (Notre Dame of Maryland University) presided. Versions of the four panelists’ papers are included in this volume of the journal, as well as additional papers on the topic by other authors.In lieu of its customary field trip, this year the SBCS encouraged participants to attend the new film Jesus & Buddha: Practicing across Traditions (Old Dog Documentaries, 2012), screened on Friday night before the AAR Annual Meeting. In the film, three leading figures in Buddhist-Christian dialogue were interviewed: Paul F. Knitter (Union Theological Seminary), Robert Kennedy, SJ (St. Peter’s College), and Chung Hyun Kyung (Union Theological Seminary). A discussion, over which Knitter presided, followed the film.The Saturday panel was “The Ethics of Wealth in a World of Economic Inequality: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives.” Panelists included Joerg Rieger (Southern Methodist University), Alan Jay Richard (Realistic Living, Inc.), and Carol S. Anderson (Kalamazoo College). The respondent was Mark Wood (Virginia Commonwealth University), and Alice A. Keefe (University of Wisconsin) presided. At the end of this session, before the member’s meeting, we enjoyed P. J. Johnston’s... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 43-49 [Access article in PDF] Double Religious Belonging:Aspects and Questions Catherine Cornille College of Holy Cross at Worcester, Massachusetts The idea of double or multiple religious belonging seems to have become an integral feature of the religious culture of our times. It is no longer surprising to hear people refer to themselves as partly or fully Christian and Buddhist, and the hybridizing of Jewish and (...) Buddhist religious identities has even led to a new terminology (Jubu). While this phenomenon has been part of Asian religious cultures for centuries, it is relatively new to the West, where a combination of political and religious forces have shaped religious identities around comparatively rigid and exclusive boundaries. With the gradual dissolution of traditional geographical and spiritual monopolies by particular religions, the religious field has become wide open and religious belonging increasingly a matter of choice and degree. The phenomenon of multiple religious belonging may be found in any combination of any number of religions. There are the Jews for Jesus; Christians who have become deeply involved in Muslim (mostly Sufi) religious practices; and Hindus who also consider themselves partly Christian or—more often—vice versa. But by far the most common phenomenon in the West is that of Christians or Jews who also profess to be Buddhist, hence the importance of discussing this phenomenon in this meeting on Buddhist-Christian dialogue.In this paper, I wish to outline the different contexts in which double or multiple religious belonging seems to manifest itself so as to reflect on the possibilities and limits of the very concept or category. While different religions may have various ways of defining or circumscribing the issue of religious identity and generally allow for different degrees of belonging, I will discuss the possibility of double religious belonging on the basis of a strong—and for most religions, ideal—understanding of religious belonging. Double Religious Belonging and New Age One of the contexts in which the phenomenon of double or multiple religious belonging may seem to present itself most readily is that of the late modern or postmodern form of religiosity called "New Age." Whereas New Age religion is essentially elusive, one of the most prominent scholars of New Age, Wouter Hanegraaf, defines it as a "popular Western culture criticism expressed in terms of a secularized [End Page 43] esotericism" and refers to general characteristics such as this-worldliness, holism, evolutionism, psychologizing of religion and spiritualizing of psychology, and, of course, the belief in the advent of a New Age. 1 In addition to these characteristics, one of the most noted features of New Age religiosity is its openness toward all religious traditions and the freedom with which it combines beliefs and practices from mainly the Asian religions, the mystical strands of the monotheistic traditions, and various forms of Shamanism. This has led to the image of New Age as a form of religious bricolage or a religion of the supermarket. Often underlying New Age religiosity is the belief that all religions derive from or meet in the same ultimate religious experience, and that one may thus belong to all religions at the same time.While New Age religion may therefore be regarded as a form of multiple religious belonging, it might be more appropriate to speak here of a complete absence of religious belonging. As scholars of religion such as Joachim Wach have pointed out, religious belonging is taken to involve a "total response of the total being (feeling, will and intellect) to Ultimate Reality." 2 It involves abandonment to a transcendent reality mediated through the concrete symbols and rituals of a particular religion. Surrender is thus not to the ultimate as such, but through—and in the end—to the teachings and practices embedded in a concrete religious tradition. Religious belonging in this strong sense of the term implies the acceptance, on faith, of a particular truth revealed and transmitted outside of the immediate experience of the individual and expressed in a particular body of teachings and practices. It also generally has a certain social dimension in which individuals celebrate... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Five More MinutesKristen Carey RockFive more minutes. How many times have you said the phrase, "I need just five more minutes"—perhaps to finish a note, clean up the kitchen, or read the kids a bedtime story? It is a seemingly insignificant amount of time. But what if you knew that these five minutes were the last five minutes you would spend conscious on this (...) earth? The last five minutes you would spend with your parents and your young children before you would receive a sedative and be transported down to the operating room, where you would be removed from life support and then donate your organs? In a hoarse rasp through his tracheostomy, he kept whispering, "Please. Just five more minutes."This is the reality that I walked into one Friday morning in 2021 as I took over the ICU service at my hospital. I am an ICU doctor at a busy academic center in the northeast and was on the frontlines of our COVID response, including the care of patients who required ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation)—the last resort for treating patients suffering from severe lung disease.I did not have the privilege of meeting this patient until the morning of his death, but I knew he had been in the hospital for close to three months due to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) due to COVID-19. On the spectrum of COVID symptoms, this problem is the worst of the worst, and it left his lungs in tatters—so much so that he had relied on an ECMO machine to perform the functions of his lungs for many weeks in hopes that he would either recover or become eligible for a lung transplant. During this time, many hundreds of doctors, nurses, nurse practitioners and respiratory therapists had gotten to know him quite well. They met his father, former wife, and his four school-aged children. They learned of his service to our country as a member of the Air Force and his subsequent devotion to his community as a religious leader and beacon in his community. As he recovered to the point where he was able to be awake and interactive with a tracheostomy, allowing him to mouth words, they also got to know him as a kind and gentle man with a fierce will to live and devotion to his family.Yet, after many weeks of ups and downs, progress and setbacks, it became clear that he could not survive without the help of his ECMO machine. Though it is possible for someone to survive for many months on ECMO, like most forms of life support, it is a bridge rather than a destination therapy. More complicated and invasive than other forms of life support, it is resource-intense and fraught with medical complications. And one day, came the heartbreaking news that due to too many blood transfusions during his illness, he would not be able to receive a lung transplant. He and his care team realized this meant there was no path forward. It came as little surprise to those who knew him that when he realized that he could not live independent of machines or outside the walls of an intensive care unit, his final act would be to help others. He would give others the opportunity for the organ transplant that he so cruelly could not receive.And so, the date and time were set. The transplant teams from other hospitals began to arrive. His final morning on earth would be spent with his family, except for a last trip outside to see the sunshine. With masterful coordination, his ICU room was recreated on the roof atop our helipad. As an army of caregivers attended to his tubes, pumps, and machines, he was able to feel the warmth of the spring wind as the Air Force sent an honor guard of fighter jets to pay their final respects. I watched him smile as the planes flew overhead, unsure if he could see or just hear them. Even though someone had the foresight to place a pair of sunglasses on his face, he still grimaced at the sunlight after months of artificial... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reclaiming the Integration of Body and MindDeborah SpragueThe week before New Year’s Day has often spurred me to evaluate my personal path. I courted my own permission to apply to graduate school, charting scenarios, figuring options, but still I held back. Browsing the Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School website, I found a unique course offering: Deepening the Heart of Wisdom: Buddhist Christian Contemplative Practice and Dialogue. I knew I (...) had to take it! Class was going to start in a week and as yet I hadn’t even applied to the school’s graduate program. In a flurry I requested transcripts, garnered recommendations, and considered childcare options. My desire to engage this particular dialogue grew through my Christian practice of Centering Prayer1 and my Episcopal parish’s contemplative interfaith Vital Conversations program.These vital conversations began with an intentional time of silence in which we prepared the “eye of the heart” to perceive the conversation at a deeper level. Our rector invited a guest from a different faith tradition each month.2 He engaged the guest in questions and dialogue regarding his or her spiritual practices and personal story. Then, the guest received questions from the group. After hearing a Buddhist guest and visiting the local Zen center, I knew my own spiritual formation would be broadened and deepened by taking the two-week, intensive format course. Because actual spiritual practice from both traditions comprised a significant portion of the class, I surmised this course would foster a more complete, integrated form of understanding the two traditions.This essay will explore the contemplative pedagogy of this course, wherein the instructors hoped “students [would] walk away with a visceral understanding of these traditions as full-body disciplines for transforming the mind and heart.”3 First, I will give a brief description of the class participants and discuss the types of spiritual practices we encountered from each tradition. Then, I will share my experiences related to those practices and how the structure of the course supported an integrated epistemology. Finally, I will consider the phenomenon of Christian interest in Buddhist practices and what that implies about popular Christianity and its potential to become a fuller version of itself. [End Page 101]The student population of this class was largely Christian, with some Unitarian Universalists, a pagan, and an agnostic as well. That said, the spectrum of Christians reflected mainline denominations as well as some persons with roots in Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. As might be expected from a varied group, the Christologies of participants varied from creedal to acreedal. This group came together to participate in a variety of Christian and Zen Buddhist spiritual practices.The class engaged the following practices according to Sōtō Zen: zazen, contemplative walking as a group, and, near the end of the course, Rev. Dr. Hickey led us in a portion of the Sōtō-shū morning service. Every class began with at least fifteen minutes of zazen, which gradually increased as the class progressed. Daily practice of the same meditation technique allowed us to enter that particular practice in a sustained way.In contrast to our Zen practice, we experienced a different type of Christian spiritual practice with each class session. This approach acquainted students with a variety of traditions but did not allow experiential depth in any one particular mode. The students and instructors took part in Taizé chanting,4 chanting of the Psalms from the Daily Office, lectio divina,5 praying with icons,6 the Jesus Prayer,7 the Rosary,8 and two guided reflections: an Ignatian9 meditation on a gospel text, and a meditation developed by Christian contemplative Anthony De Mello. I wondered how our experience of the class would have changed had the Christian practice focused on one or two types, in a sustained, daily manner. Perhaps the rationale for surveying a wide variety of practices reflected the need for Western Christians to gain familiarity with their own contemplative traditions.I consider Christianity’s analog to zazen to be Centering Prayer, because it is also based in no-thought. However, Centering Prayer was not included in our experience of spiritual practices. If we conceive of two... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The 1998 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesPeggy StarkeyThe annual meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies was held at the Walt Disney World Dolphin in Orlando, Florida, on Friday, November 20, and Saturday, November 21, 1998. The theme for this year’s sessions was “Ritual and Its Connection to Ethical Activity in the World.”The Friday afternoon panel, moderated by John Berthrong (Boston University), focused on Buddhist views. John (...) Makransky (Boston College) argued from a Mahayana Buddhist perspective that ritual/contemplative activity is a more effective paradigm for contemporary Buddhist ethics than that of Buddhist doctrine, which is now regarded by many as the source of Buddhist ethics. Historically, ethics has been the outflow of ritual activity and as such is both available to many more Buddhists than doctrine and draws more fully upon the various resources of the tradition. Furthermore, rituals as communal/universal expressions of ultimate reality, when practiced within the horizon of the concerns of one’s culture, naturally take expression in forms of social engagement. Stephanie Kaza (University of Vermont) provided insight into the connection between ritual practice and ethics through her vivid explanation of specific Zen rituals. One such ceremony, adapted to address human suffering in a specific situation, took place at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site. The ceremony prepared people for the difficult decision of choosing or not choosing civil disobedience. Thus, Zen rituals not only provide the invitation for mindful awareness in daily life, but also the possibility, though not the guarantee, for transformation everywhere. Yukio Matsuda (University of Heidelberg) discussed the relation between ritual and social activities in the areas of peace, culture, and education in Nichiren Buddhism as practiced by the Soka Gakkai movement. Chanting the diamoku in front of the gohonzon, for example, enables one to directly touch one’s own enlightened life and encourages not only a responsibility for changing one’s own destiny, but also a commitment to social engagement that works toward the creation of a peaceful society. Don Mitchell (Purdue University), responding from a Roman Catholic perspective, stressed those aspects of the three papers that led him to a better understanding of his own tradition. As in Buddhism, he sees the ritual sacraments in Christianity as providing models for moral behavior, reinforcing faith, and [End Page 175] empowering ethical behavior. He also raised several issues pertaining to the reinterpretation of Buddhist rituals or even the creation of new ones by Western Buddhists.John Berthrong introduced the Saturday morning panel, which focused on Christian views. Nicholas Groves (Chicago Public Library) drew on the history of the Oxford Movement, which he traced from its inception in 1833, for his example of the influence of Christian ritual upon ethics. For this movement, ritual was both an expression of the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity and the basis of an imperative for social justice. For the discussion to follow, he asked, “What is the function of a prophetic and radical reading of a spiritual tradition, either Christian or Buddhist, within the larger community of the Sangha or the Church?” Speaking from a Protestant point of view, Jay Rock (codirector, Interfaith Relations, National Council of Churches of Christ, USA) discussed Christian ritual in terms of the reactualization of the past and of the transformation of the present. Baptism and the Eucharist commemorate past historical events that are made present in the liturgy in such a way that the participating Christians not only receive God’s gift of unlimited love, but also are sent out into the world to live out this love in ethical behavior. Christian ritual confronts the participants with the question, What is now required? Responding from a history of religions perspective, Jan Nattier (Indiana University) raised several questions for discussion: How does ritual—not the theological ideas behind it—empower social action? Would there be Christian social activists without the ritual of the Eucharist? What are the political factors, past and present, that have created a shared sense of the necessity of social action across the boundaries of such radically different traditions as Buddhism and Christianity? The session then ended with a lively discussion.President Paul Ingram presided over... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Not the End We Planned ForAnonymous FourIn 1997, my four–year–old daughter was diagnosed with a high–risk medulablastoma. She underwent the current treatment program at that time. She suffered multiple complications from the treatment and developed seizures, which caused her to lose her sight and 80% of her hearing. These all contributed to her manifesting many behavioral issues, making her a danger to herself and others. Also during this (...) time, she developed large amounts of brain atrophy from the maximum radiation dose she had been given. In August of 2010, Emily was still deteriorating, her seizures were uncontrollable, and her quality of life was extremely poor. A meeting to discuss how to care for my child if an acute crisis presented was held. The meeting included her parents, oncologist, endocrinologist, pediatric neurologist, social worker and the head of medical ethics. We discussed what course of action would be best for her nothing could be done to reverse her condition or prevent further deterioration. A POLST is a physician order for life sustaining treatment and is appropriate if the doctor feel that the patient has a good chance of death in the next year. The purpose of this document is to have a plan in place in case the patient has a life threatening crises. We chose to put a POLST in place with specific instructions not to intubate. This was a hard decision to make for a parent, but we all felt it was the best choice for her.A few months after the POLST was entered, in November, 2010, I came home from the store and my daughter’s caregivers told me she had complained of a headache different from her usual headaches. They gave her Tylenol with codeine and she went to bed about 4 p.m. When I checked her later she seemed fi ne, merely sleeping her headache off. We [End Page 30] decided to let her sleep some more. Around 8 p.m the caregivers came and got me because they could not wake her up to go to the bathroom, which was her normal routine. I immediately went to try and wake her up but could not. I ran my thumb up the bottom of her foot and there was no reflex response. I yelled for her father that we needed to immediately go to the hospital.We took her to the ER at the local hospital that treated her close to the house. We told them we did know what was happening with her but that there was a POLST in place in her chart. They started lines, a nasogastric tube, and sent her for a CT, which showed massive amounts of blood in her brain. I repeated again to the ER staff and physician that there was a POLST in place but no one acknowledged my statement. I asked for a different physician, one that would respect the POLST, and was told there was no one else nor was there a neurosurgeon available. The attending physician insisted she be intubated in order to be transferred to a partner hospital (more than 20 minutes away) where there was a neurosurgeon on duty. I asked him to please call her oncologist at which point he yelled at me that, “he was not calling anyone else and that she needed to be intubated and transferred to the other hospital.” By this time, four hours had passed and I knew she had not gotten any medication for pain, so I told the physician to go ahead and transfer her since I knew the hospital we were at would not admit her for palliative care. She was then intubated, in violation of the POLST, and transferred to the other hospital where the neurosurgeon there told us what we already feared: That she had experienced a massive bleed in her brain. We requested she be extubated and be given palliative care to make her comfortable until she passed away.It is tragic that our daughter’s last hours involved aggressive medical treatment. As parents we hoped to avoid any additional suffering for our child, we did everything we knew to do to insure aggressive... (shrink)

This paper reports on part of an evaluation of teacher support teams as a special education needs support strategy in primary schools. Using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods, it focuses on areas derived from a theoretical framework for understanding schools’ approaches to SENs. TSTs were set up and run in six of the eight schools, with meetings of between 30 and 45 minutes, usually during lunchtime or after school. Most of the referrals were about behaviour (...) problems, though many were about learning difficulties. The support included providing emotional encouragement, specific approaches to managing behaviour, teaching strategies and consulting others. Referring teachers reported that their TST experience led to increased confidence and some improvements in the children, while TST members themselves believed that they had gained much from the TST experience. Overall the study showed the feasibility and benefits of setting up TSTs in primary schools. The findings are discussed in terms of the wider benefits of TSTs and their relevance to special needs policies and the implementation of the SENs code of practice. (shrink)

Drawing mainly from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and his middle period writings, strategic issues and problems arising from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Topics have been so chosen as to assist mediation between the perspective of philosophers and that of mathematicians on their developing discipline. There is consideration of rules within arithmetic and geometry and Wittgenstein’s distinctive approach to number systems whether elementary or transfinite. Examples are presented to illuminate the relation between the meaning of an arithmetical (...) generalisation or theorem and its proof. An attempt is made to meet directly some of Wittgenstein’s critical comments on the mathematical treatment of infinity and irrational numbers. (shrink)

Typically our perceptions occur in the setting of an active perceptual process. This chapter attempts to analyse active attending, and in particular, active perceptual attending. The exemplar phenomenon discussed is listening, which is a mental activity. Now mental actions fall into three different structural kinds, exemplified in soliloquy/recollecting/active attending, and the aim is the structural analysis of the latter. Theories as to the relation between listening and hearing are examined, and the conclusion reached is that listening encompasses that (...) part of the co‐present hearing that owes its existence to the will, a sector that inevitably has no more than a probabilistic measure. But how could hearing immediately derive from willing? This puzzle finds its resolution in the character of the special causal situation realized in listening. While will and sound are distinct existents with non‐identical causal powers, they are token‐identical causal agencies in the generation of the hearing sector of listening. This strange analysis vindicates the concept of active attending. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 165 of the church regularly gives renewed expression to inspiration in constantly new existential contexts. There the Christian churches have sometimes done well, and sometimes less well, leading to disillusionment. We can regard all this as a generally accepted consensus among contemporary theologians, though the instruments of the church's teaching authority often have a tendency to dwell on ' the letter ' of earlier statements and to (...) underestimate their historieal and hermeneutical dimensions" (208). Those in the Magisterium who dwell on 'the letter ' believe, erroneously in Schillebeeckx's judgment, that history can and does give rise to nonnative, enduring facts and forms. Theologians who attend to historical relativizing and hermeneutical theorizing, correctly in Schillebeeckx's judgment, know better. His book is clearly designed to demonstrate this point. There is one sense in which his hook docs not, and indeed cannot, fail, given how the facts which he presents for the reader's judgment arise out of the theory with which he begins and necessarily point to the conclusion which his theory already presupposes. This is a fail-safe method for getting to where one wants to go. Unfortunately, it gets there by way of an enormous detour around the facticity of the Catholic faith and practice, a facticity which, despite the efforts of some of our best known (if not finest) theologians over a two thousand year history, has consistently refused to submit to the hypothetical and the theoretical reason of rationalist theologians. Our faith is centered on the Christ, the incarnate, historical Logos of tradition and Scripture, not on the disincarnate, unhistorical logos of theoretical theology. Schillebeeckx is not the first, nor will he be the last, theologian intent upon reducing the Catholic faith to some hypothetical methodology. Happily, however, and perhaps even miraculously, the Church always manages to survive her theologians, a fact which cannot but offer solace to many of the readers of this book. University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas JOYCE A. Ll'J'TLE The.Argument of the "Tractatus :" Its Relevance to Contempora~·y Theories of Logic, Language. Mind, and Philosophical Trust. By RroHARD M. McDoNOUGH. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. Pp. xii + 311. This book attempts an analysis of the Tractatits Logico-Philosophicus based on taking Wittgenstein's professed "fundamental idea' as the hermeneutic key. Tractatus 4.0312 states, in part: "My fundamental idea is 166 BOOK REVIEWS that the 'log·ical constants' are not representatives." McDonough believes that previous interpreters of the Tractatus have either ignored or downplayed the importance of this statement, and he writes in the conviction that taking it seriously produc&s a reading of the Tractatits that is friendlier toward philosophical language and argumentation than " the strong nagativ& views... which have been hastily claimed " as the import of the book (p. 11). In order to establish this "fundamental idea" as an interpretative device McDonough reminds the reader of links among three ideas. The first is the idea that the logical constants are not representatives. The second is the idea that the sole (real) logical constant is the general propositional form (T 5.47). The third is the fact that the status of the propositions of logic as tautologies exhibits the logic of their constituents, and hence, the logical properties of language and the world (T 6.12). By developing the relations among these ideas, and extending them to the interpretation of the Tractatiis as a whole, McDonough aims to show that Wittgenstein is committed to an explicit, only "technically nonsensical," philosophical doctrin& concerning the derivation of general metaphysical facts about ontology from general facts about the philosophy of logic. This doctrine he characterizes as "the argument of th& Tractatus." By attributing to the book an argmnent or doctrine (in the sense just mention &d) he contradicts those commentators who have understood Wittg·enstein to be earnestly requiring real silence about philosophy and to b& asserting seriously that the Tractatu,s is a self-refuting treatise, to be kicked aside. once its lessons are learned. J\1foDonoug·h begins with vVittgenstein's understanding of negation and th& problem wheth&r there are negative facts. McDonough discusses Russell 's attempt to sort this out, and claims that Wittgenstein diagnoses Russell's mistake in this remark; "For it is difficult... (shrink)

The following brief memoir of Wittgenstein needs a few preliminary words of explanation. Among those who attended his lectures and discussions in the years it covers was D. G. James, who later became Professor of English at Bristol University and then Vice-Chancellor of Southampton University. I met him both in Bristol and Southampton, and on one occasion suggested to him that some of us who had known Wittgenstein, but who had not become professional philosophers, might (...) write down our recollections of him, and that he and I should start. What prompted the suggestion was, I think, the publication of Norman Malcolm's book, and a feeling that the non-professionals might have something to contribute to the assessment of Wittgenstein, particularly as a person. I wrote a preliminary draft and sent it to James; but he never responded, there was much else to do, I let the matter rest, and now James is dead. I wrote in about the year 1960 on holiday and away from any books of reference and from my own notes of Wittgenstein's lectures and conversations. I have shown the typescript to a few interested people, but because of its preliminary and unfinished nature have not previously thought of publication. It has recently been suggested to me that it might be of more general interest, and I publish it now as it was written, with one or two trifling alterations. I am well aware of its limitations. It was intended to give an impression of Wittgenstein as a person rather than as a philosopher, and the rather miscellaneous collection of remarks in section 3 have that in view rather than any more strictly ‘philosophical’ intention. Others may well question some of the detail and disagree with some of the opinions expressed. And there are some things which I might put rather differently today. But if the memoir has any interest it is best left as it was written. (shrink)

Norman Daniels's new book, Just Health, brings together his decades of work on the problem of justice and health. It improves on earlier writings by discussing how we can meet health needs fairly when we cannot meet them all and by attending to the implications of the socioeconomic determinants of health. In this article I return to the core idea around which the entire theory is built: that the principle of equality of opportunity grounds a societal obligation to meet (...) health needs. I point, first, that nowhere does Daniels say just what version of that principle he accepts. I then proceed to construct a principle on his behalf, based on a faithful reading of Just Health. Once we actually nail down the principle, I argue, we will find that there are two problems: it is implausible in itself, and it fails to ground a societal obligation to meet health needs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 35-37 [Access article in PDF] Seeking Emancipation through Engagement:One Nichiren Buddhist's Approach to Practice Bill Aiken SGI-USA I was born and raised Roman Catholic, which meant attending Catholic schools, first in the local parish schools and later at a private academy in suburban Philadelphia. As a child I was serious about my religion. I served as an altar boy and had serious thoughts about becoming (...) a priest.That was until the mid-1960s, when my hormones took over, my voice changed, and I converted to hedonism. I hadn't so much turned against my Catholic upbringing as I was temporarily distracted from it.It was when I went away to college that the religious questions began to resurface. Friends and classmates wanted to know what I believed in, and I really didn't know. The old form of Catholicism, with its stern, patriarchal vision of God, didn't seem to fit anymore. But the mystery remained as a palpable presence, and it seemed to require an answer. Was I an atheist? That seemed so negative. How about an agnostic? Possibly. They seemed to believe in something, even if they didn't know what it was. That seemed about right for the moment.My first encounter with Buddhism came during that freshman year at Penn State University in the fall of 1968. While attending a rather psychedelic party, a friend asked me if I knew anything about Buddhism. Replying that I didn't, I asked what Buddhism had to say for itself. My friend said that it spoke of the oneness and interrelatedness of everything. All I can say is that at that particular moment this made sense to me and started me on what would at first be a pretty casual exploration of Buddhism.But it would be in the bedridden summer of 1970, while recovering from a lifestyle-inflicted illness, that I started to reflect on my life in earnest and began to read as though Buddhism had something to say directly to me. More books by Alan Watts led to D. T. Suzuki, which in turn led to collections of sutras and finally to Phillip Kapleau and the Three Pillars of Zen. This would be my guide for the next year as I struggled to bring focus to my mind and my life.Being the poor and struggling student that I was, I could not afford the cost of a [End Page 35] retreat or sesshin training. So I struggled as well as I could with a combination of self-instruction and whatever I could learn from those who did attend these sessions.I should say at this point that while I may have had a highly developed religious sense, I never wanted to become a religious virtuoso or a renunciate. From the depths of my adolescent angst and confusion, I longed for an awakening, but I had conditions. And chief among them was that I would not be pried apart from my life as I knew it. The quietude of the monastery and hours of prayer or meditation held absolutely no appeal for me. If I were going to attain enlightenment it would have to be in Times Square (before Disney took it over). And so, through my daily stumbling efforts at zazen, I began struggling to bring about this awakening.So this is where I was spiritually when on a late summer day in 1971, a pleasant though somewhat scattered young woman approached me on the streets of downtown Philadelphia, invited me to a Buddhist meeting, and introduced me to the chanting of Nam-myoho-renge-kyo. The first meeting I attended was a rather large one on the campus of Columbia University in NewYork. Everyone seemed pleasant enough, but the meeting seemed more like a pep rally than a serious discussion about the profound teachings of the Buddha. When the main speaker finally took the stage, I found it nearly impossible to understand his broken English. So I'm afraid that I don't remember a single word he... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 241-246 [Access article in PDF] News and Views The 1999 International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter Barbara BernsteinWilmette, IllinoisThe 1999 International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter (IBCTE), also known as the Abe-Cobb Group, met at the Westin Hotel in Indianapolis, Indiana from April 15 to April 18. There were four papers on the theme "Social Violence." This theme followed last year's, which was "Environmental Violence." Each paper was read (...) beforehand; and to guide the discussion, each session was begun by a respondent.It was reported at the first session that the 2000 IBCTE will take place August 3-6 at Tacoma, Washington just prior to the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies International Conference on "Buddhism, Christianity, and Global Healing." The theme for next year's encounter will be "The Economic Factors in Social and Environmental Violence." This theme will build on the dialogue generated by the topics of the previous two years, namely, environmental and social violence. Papers will be prepared by Sulak Sivaraksa, John B. Cobb, Jr., Judith Simmer-Brown, and Carol Johnston. Responses will be made by Stephanie Kaza, David Chappell, Valerie Karras, and Terry Muck.It was also announced at that session that six of our membership will present a panel on the IBCTE at the Parliament of the World's Religions in Cape Town, South Africa in December 1999. That panel will share the fruits of the 15-year history of the IBCTE. Those who will attend this Parliament are: David Lochhead, David Chappell, Schubert Ogden, the Ven. Yifa, Judith Simmer-Brown, and Rosemary Ruether.The following is a summary of each of the eight dialogue sessions at the 1999 meeting: First Paper (April 16 Morning Session) Discussion began with Taitetsu Unno's response to David Lochhead's paper entitled, "Monotheistic Violence." Unno began by examining the relationship between deep personal faith (vertical) and the social/ethical elements of religion (horizontal). This led to further discussion on violence and the construction of "the other." Unno raised the questions: Who decides what constitutes the other? Further, who ultimately [End Page 241] decides if the other is or is not enemy/neighbor? Unno pointed out that, following Matthew 5, if God does not discriminate good from evil, then who can determine who is just and unjust? This comment pointed to the great problem for minorities in North American society.Unno also made some comments on Lochhead's use of liberation theology: If all economic systems are prone to misuse, then does a critique of capitalism do us much good?Lochhead's reply to Unno began with the issue of dualism and non-dualism. Here, Lochhead talked about a "soft" dualism, in that our world is constituted by relationships such that God and neighbor are the names that appear in this discourse. Like Martin Buber's path in I and Thou, dualistic construction comes out of relationships. Lochhead clarified that this dualism is not the same as a hard dualism, which is what Unno referred to as subject/object dualism. This led to the relevant question: What kind of violence is involved in the construction of the other? If God is a name for something beyond me, then how can the construction of the self in relationship to God be a form of violence? And would not this nonviolent, soft dualistic construction hold for any other person or living being? Lochhead then suggested that it is when relationships somehow degenerate into I-it, in Buber's terms, that the construction can become violent.Much rich insight was brought to light when the dialogue opened for general discussion. José Cabezón asked if violence demands the construction of the other? He pointed out that for the human realm differentiation is necessary for human life. Stephanie Kaza contributed to the discussion by suggesting that biological necessity is very hard for people to understand. There can be different bases of knowing, and religious knowing is from a privileged point of view for understanding our relationship with the natural environment. Larry Cunningham reminded us that relationships in Christianity are crucial because... (shrink)

The inclusion of attendance and participation in course grade calculations is ubiquitous in postsecondary syllabi, but can penalize the silent or anxious student unfairly. I outline the obstacles posed by social anxiety, then describe an assignment developed with the twin goals of assisting students with obstacles to participating in spoken class discussions, and rewarding methods of participation other than oral interaction. When homework assignments habituating practices of writing well-justified questions regarding well-documented passages in reading assignments are the explicit project (...) of weekly class meetings, participation increases on the part of all students. My focus shifted away from concern that I must get students to talk more, and turned instead to ensuring their marks reflected their learning rather than their speaking. Students’ improved engagement as a result of the assignment bears out evidence in the literature for active learning and for alternatives to taking attendance and quantifying participation. (shrink)

What the Nazis called Aktion T4 was a euthanasia program, officially started on August 18th, 1939. The registration operations for individuals with physical or mental handicaps were followed by forced sterilization and transfer to clinics organized to kill. In this article, I try to explain the mechanisms that allowed the memory of Aktion T4 to be preserved and passed from one generation to the next; memories of the “merciful death” of approximately 70,000 “lives unworthy of life,” that find (...) themselves embedded in family records and family history. In the first section, I summarize the discussion that resulted from the theories of Charles Darwin and Francis Galton. Even if those theories do not in any way allude to the consequences that we have witnessed decades after their publication, they started a debate about the value of life and the legitimacy of human intervention in the selection of hereditary character traits, as well as the concept of race and the different methods and forms of theories and eugenics that were later adopted in Europe and in the United States. In the case of Germany, translated into Rassenhygiene, those concepts flowed into the Nazi project of purification of the German people. Through interviews with families who had a relative interned in one of the program's clinics spread across the Reich territory between 1939 and 1945, I investigate the evolution and passage of memories stored within the family sphere, paying attention to the generational steps and processes of trauma. These stories are born from a complicated process of reconstructing these memories via interviews. Their recollections were full of painful silences and negations, similar to the thought process which led the victims to live in a condition that they could not understand, and separated them from the world before they were each made to face a solitary death, far from any contact with their families. The trauma that I analyze concerns actions that had been carried out by previous generations; in the majority of cases, younger generations were not aware of the destiny of their murdered relatives and therefore tried to rebuild the stories of people who they never had the opportunity to meet. I examine the problematic relationship of those being interviewed with the end-of-life issue and also the sense of guilt which is generated by the awareness of crimes that were committed. Aktion T4 was not a crime committed outside the national borders, nor a crime that extended beyond the private sphere to the “others.” Instead, it existed within the most central and intimate place of Nazi culture: the family. (shrink)

Imāmiyya holds that the theory of imāmate must rely on scriptural evidence and designation and that the Imām, the successor to Muḥammad, is in charge of all political and religious issues. The authority of the Imām includes some religious and social duties such as executing the legal punishments, collecting almsgiving, sustaining social order and declaring holy war. The fulfillment of these duties requires actual leadership of the Imām or his deputy. With the beginning of the great occultation in (...) 329/941, there was an uncertainty among the Imāmiyya followers about who would uphold these responsibilities. In this period, Shīʿī ʿulamā began to undertake the duties of the Imām in order to overcome this uncertainty and to avoid the possible schism. In the beginning, this delegation of authority was limited to the religious sphere; but, later, its scope gradually became wider. This process of delegation of power, which covers a long process, needs to be examined in its various periods. In this study, this subject will be considered with special reference to the scholars of the fifth century of hijra (hijrī). An effort is made in this article to reveal how the issues of the Imām’s powers are discussed in the context of the problem of expanding or narrowing the authority of the scholars who played significant roles in systemization of Uṣūlī (rationalist) thought in the period after Shaykh al-Mufīd.Summary: In the issues of Imām/Caliphate which led to political division among Muslims after the Prophet Muḥammad, Imāmī Shīʿa opines that the Imāmate theory relies on scriptural evidence and designation. According to this theory, apart from scriptural evidence and designation, personal qualities such as immaculacy, knowledge, bravery, and vantage are found in Ali, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and nine people from the lineage of Ḥusayn. The Imām as a successor to the Prophet Muḥammad is a person who has both religious and political power which includes implementation of punishments, collecting alms, ensuring justice, declaring holy war. For the Imāmī Shīʿa, there is a need for imām or his deputy who has absolute power to fulfill these duties.Imāmī Shīʿa, who held that the disappeared twelfth Imām would return back to restore justice in the world, had to confront various problems in finding solutions to some issues related to the existence of Imām himself, as well as theological issues during the period of great occultation. Particularly, the period of great occultation (329/941), in which the link with the Imām was severed completely, the Shīʿī community were uncertain on how to fulfill the responsibilities of the Imām probably due to the lack of religious sources. Shaykh al-Mufīd draws attention to the issue of khums (a one-fifth share of the spoils of war and of other specified forms of income). In this period of uncertainty, the Shiite scholars came into prominence in order to fill the gap and to prevent the social disorder. Referring to a tawqī‘ (rescript) from the Twelfth Imām, they claimed that they would take responsibility for the Twelfth Imām on his behalf. In the beginning, the delegation of the power was limited to the religious sphere. It was gradually extended to other spheres by the contribution of some scholars. It reached the largest dimension with the implementation of “wilāyat al-faqīh” theory.From that period until our times, the era when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived can be considered as the beginning of this period. In the fifth century when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived the delegation of power was limited to the religious sphere. In this article, how the scholars who played a role in the systematization of Uṣūlī thought dealt with the issue of the limits of the authority of Imām and how they defined the role of the Imāmī jurists (faqīh) will be examined.Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples were sometimes cautious on the issue of the delegation of the power of Imām. They, however, pointed out the role of the faqīh in the occultation period in order to overcome the uncertainty. As a matter of fact, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Qādī Ibn al-Barrāj made significant contributions to the issues of collection and distribution of khums. However, Sallār al-Daylamī’s contribution to the subject is more crucial. He considered khums as the grace of God and believed that it can be allocated by taking into account the share of the Imām. They put forward the views that explained in details the role of the faqīh in the collection and distribution of alms. Even Ibn al-Barrāj opined that in the absence of Imām and his deputy alms are to be allocated to the Faqihs on the ground that they know better how to distribute it. Therefore, in the absence of Imām and his deputy, by suggesting that faqīh must be in charge of collecting and distributing alms, they proposed a remedy in an early period.On the issue of leading the Friday prayer (ṣalāt al-jum‘a), which is one of the social duties of Imām, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples considered the presence of the Imām or his deputy as a condition for a valid Friday prayer. In addition to this condition, Al-Ḥalabī, also added that a person who meets the necessary conditions can be also considered in leading Friday prayer. This addition by Ḥalabī was an important contribution to the solution of the problems encountered during the period of great occultation on both Friday prayer and delegation of Imām religious and political authorities to faqīh. On the other hand, Sallār, another disciple of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, opposed the idea of the faqīh leading the Friday prayer in the absence of the Imām even when the necessary conditions are met. It can be said that this approach of Sallār led to the opinion of some Imāmis which considered Friday prayer unlawful in the absence of Imām. In the occultation period, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples showed a cautious attitude about the implementation of the punishments. They argued that only Imām could implement the punishments. However, the major step was taken by Shaykh Ṭūsī on the issue of who implements the punishments in the occultation period. He argued that the Imām’s designated the faqihs to implement the punishments. In addition to this subject, Shiite scholars discussed the issue of whether a Shiite officer under the reigning rule in the occultation period implemented the punishments. On this issue, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā compiled a treaty untitled Mas’ala fi’l-‘amal ma‘a’al-sulṭan. For him, the main criteria are whether such person has necessary responsibilities and qualifications. Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples also continued their master’s conciliatory attitude. In the final analysis, the contribution of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples on the issue of who will undertake the duties and responsibilities of the Imām is crucial in the systematization of the idea of transferal of the power of the Imām to faqīh including political one. In fact, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s advice to take part in the existing administrations has been considered a way out for the scholars who want to establish relations with the authorities in the later periods. (shrink)

Carol Pateman has said that the public/private distinction is what feminism is all about. I tend to be sceptical about categorical pronouncements of this sort, but this book is a work of feminist political philosophy and the public/private distinction is what it is all about. It is motivated by the belief that we lack a philosophical conception of privacy suitable for a democracy; that feminism has exposed this lack; and that by combining feminist analysis with recent (...) developments in political philosophy, we can meet the philosophical and political need for a distinctively democratic conception of privacy. This book then, is an effort to sketch and defend such a conception of privacy. It aims to show that while some conceptions of privacy are inconsistent with democracy, others are not. Indeed, the book asserts, the belief that privacy can be valuable and that it can justify basic legal rights, is implicit in a democratic conception of persons as free and equal beings, and a democratic conception of politics as the self-governing, or regulating, activity of such individuals. Just as we can and should reject undemocratic conceptions of the suffrage in favour of democratic ones, so the book maintains, we can and must reject undemocratic conceptions of privacy in favour of ones that reflect the moral equality of men and women, and a commitment to democratic forms of government. Democracy is often described as government by and for the people. On such a view, democracy is a political regime which can be contrasted with monarchies or aristocracies on the one hand, or with theocracies and despotisms on the other. By contrast with the former, it is a form of government that views individuals as citizens and as equal members of the agency which authorizes the use of political power. By contrast with the latter, it is a form of government whose purposes and aims are established by the common interests of individuals, conceived as free and equal citizens. It is my contention that there is a plausible and attractive conception of privacy implicit in this view of democracy. Hence, I show that individuals have fundamental interests in privacy because privacy enables them to participate in politics freely and as the equal of others and, beyond that, to lead lives that they can each affirm to be reasonable, valuable and right. As I think that the ideal of democratic government is properly associated with this latter and broader goal, as well as with the former one, I call my account of privacy a democratic conception of privacy to signal its connection to a particular ideal of politics, and to the conception of persons that makes this ideal a convincing and inspiring one. As this is a work of political philosophy, however, no effort is made to address the legal merits of competing accounts of the right to privacy, or to resolve legal dispute about the content and justification of particular constitutional rights in the United States. Thus, while I use Supreme Court decisions and works of legal theory to illustrate and support my arguments, my use of these materials is governed by philosophical concerns and my conclusions, therefore, are strictly of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. The book is divided into four chapters, moving from feminist criticisms of privacy to an engagement with the philosophical literature on privacy and an account of the right to privacy in a democratic society. It proceeds as follows. In Chapter 1, I examine feminist concerns about privacy, through a close reading of the work of Catherine MacKinnon. I argue that MacKinnon persuasively shows that protection for privacy has frequently licensed the coercion and subjection of women, and that her arguments are supported both by feminist scholarship, key Supreme Court decisions, and by familiar conceptions of privacy and equality. However, I argue, these criticisms do not imply that privacy, like slavery, can never be democratic, because wholly inconsistent with the equality of individuals. Rather, feminist criticisms of privacy suggest that privacy, like the suffrage, can be necessary to the equality of women and can have a legitimate and important place in a democratic society. In Chapter 2, I examine the philosophical literature on privacy in light of the need to distinguish democratic from undemocratic accounts of its nature and value. This literature, I show, can help us to provide an account of privacy that is sensitive both to its inegalitarian aspects and to its importance for a democratic commitment to the freedom and equality of women. However, I argue, we cannot embrace current philosophical accounts of privacy uncritically, because to a striking extent they are, themselves, indifferent to the ways that privacy has licensed sexual inequality. Thus, in Chapter 2, I set about interpreting privacy as a moral and political value, in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the philosophical literature on privacy. Their strength is that they show that there are many reasons for caring about privacy, or many ways in which we might define it as a democratic value. Their weakness is that they tend to assume that we must choose amongst these different conceptions of privacy, in order to provide a philosophically cogent account of privacy. This, I show, is a mistake and one that can be remedied by remembering that a commitment to the equality of individuals requires us to acknowledge the reasonable differences in value and interest that may characterize their relations in a democracy. When we do so, I show, it is possible to define privacy in terms of its protection for self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality, without having to choose between the three of them. For individuals may legitimately disagree about the differences between privacy and other values, even while holding that privacy is a distinctive and important democratic good; and they may also disagree about the importance of privacy compared to other goods, such as equality, without denying that self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality can be morally and politically desirable in a democracy. In Chapter 2, therefore, I show that we can provide a philosophically adequate account of what privacy is and why it is valuable without supposing that privacy is always sexually egalitarian, or denying that it has a distinctive place in a democratic conception of value. Chapter 3 then extends this account of privacy, by considering the justification for a legal right to privacy. Just as we cannot provide a democratic conception of privacy without attending to the different, though equally valid, concerns that individuals may have so, I show, we cannot provide a democratic account of privacy rights if we forget that individuals can, quite reasonably, differ in the importance that they attach to privacy. The result, I argue, is that we can distinguish two main reasons for protecting privacy by right in a democracy, the one personal and the other political. Whereas the former emphasizes the importance of self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality to the personal freedom and equality of individuals, the latter emphasizes their importance to their prospects for voluntary and equal participation in the processes of collective choice and deliberation that define a democratic government. These two justifications of privacy rights reflect the fact that in a democracy the personal can be political, as feminists have insisted, but need not be in order to merit protection by right. Indeed, I argue, we can distinguish democratic from undemocratic accounts of the right to privacy in this way: for whilst the former acknowledge the variety of individuals’ interests in personal and collective choice, the latter either collapse the political into the personal, or assume that the legitimate claims of individuals are merely a function of collective needs, interests and values. Neither of these is consistent with familiar assumptions about the nature and justification of democratic institutions and rights, nor can they be reconciled with a commitment to sexual equality. Thus, I conclude, though the fact that there are different justifications for privacy rights in a democracy means that individuals may legitimately disagree over the content and justification of basic rights, it is wrong to confuse democratic debate with moral or conceptual confusion and so, arbitrarily, to truncate our accounts of privacy, equality and democracy. Finally, in Chapter 4, I test and develop these claims by examining the justification for abortion rights in a democracy. I argue that women have legitimate interests in abortion, as well as in bearing children, because they have fundamental, and legitimate, interests in privacy and equality. Although safe and legal abortion is necessary to sexual equality, as feminists claim, I show that we can provide a convincing and democratic account of women’s claims to abortion only if we recognize women’s interests in self-definition, intimacy and confidentiality. This is because women have both personal and political interests in abortion and we will be unable adequately to identify these if we overlook their interests in privacy. Indeed, I show, the difference between democratic and undemocratic solutions to conflict over abortion lies precisely in this: that whereas the former acknowledge the importance of privacy to the personal and political equality of women, the latter overlook or deny this. As a result, the latter license both mandated abortions, although women have legitimate interests in bearing and raising children, and prohibitions on abortion that cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women. That is not to say that abortion is not a politically significant matter, or that we can resolve moral conflict over abortion simply by giving women a legal right to abortion. Neither is the case. However, the chapter shows, in a democracy individuals are entitled to make morally and politically controversial decisions for themselves not simply because this is expedient or useful, but because this is right. To overlook this feature of democracy, I argue, is to make moral and political conflict utterly intractable by democratic means. Thus, while controversy over abortion has been held to show that privacy is an incoherent and undemocratic right, this chapter argues that it shows the reverse: for controversy over abortion makes clear that privacy is essential to democracy, and why this should be so. This overview of the book, I hope, makes clear that its concerns are methodological as well as substantive, and moral as well as political. Thus, its central methodological claim is that we cannot reconcile privacy with the equality of individuals unless we make a deliberate effort to do so. Its central moral and political claims are that privacy is compatible with the equality of individuals, and sufficiently important to the latter that, in a democracy, the privacy of individuals merits legal protection by right. However, this summary of the book also exposes its limitations. Chief amongst these, I fear, is that it provides no sustained discussion of the place of property on a democratic conception of privacy, and that the latter, itself, is rather a broad preliminary sketch than a polished and detailed portrait. I regard these limits on the scope and arguments of the book as limitations, albeit ones that I hope to be able to remedy before too long.However, limited though the book clearly is, I believe that it lays out the essential components of a democratic conception of privacy and that, by analysing and synthesizing several diverse bodies of literature, it may help those who are interested in the relations between privacy, equality and democracy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The 2006 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesWashington, DC, November 17–18, 2006Frances S. Adeney, SecretaryThe theme of this year's meeting was "Religious Self-Fashioning and the Role of Community in Contemporary Buddhist and Christian Practice." The first session presented participants with three papers. The first compared Christian and Buddhist groups that fostered community and long-term commitment. A second paper developed the theme of community affiliation with a description (...) of the Buddhist practice of Hoza. And a third paper demonstrated how a dual practitioner could minister pastorally to both Buddhists and Christians. In the second session practical and philosophical foci met in the discussion of papers on individualized vs. Sangha Buddhism in the United States and co-origination and universal intersubjectivity in Buddhist and Christian philosophies. It was a rich feast indeed.Dr. Sandra Costen Kunz presented her paper "Christian and Buddhist Confession, Affiliation, and Countercultural Action" to start off the first session. In a study of Christian and Buddhist groups, she found interesting methodological parallels in the process that groups undertook to build commitment and community among followers of each tradition. Focused on specific congregations, her paper served to illustrate a trend toward community building that has broad implications for both Buddhist and Christian institutions in their work of fostering commitment and nurturing faith in participants.Dr. Gene Reeves continued along the same theme with a description of the Buddhist practice of Hoza in his particular Buddhist community in Japan. A weekly practice of meeting together to help one another demonstrates a deeper philosophical belief that all can become bodhisattvas for others. Within the hierarchical Buddhist institutional structure, the meetings around Hoza display an egalitarianism that empowers ordinary people to see the Buddha nature in others and to realize it in themselves. In addition to empowering individuals, that process of mutual aid also solidifies the group.According to both papers, individual practice of religion, be it Buddhist or [End Page 133] Christian, and a group process of social solidification work together to deepen faith and community.The third paper in this first session showed the results of that individual/ social dialectic in the life of Dr. Duane Bidwell, who presented his paper "Practicing the Religious Self: Buddhist-Christian Identity as Social Artifact." The main emphasis of this paper was that religion, as a socially constructed reality, depends on community even in its most individualistic forms. As Buddhism and Christianity develop their traditions, those socially constructed worlds can be penetrated by one who traverses between the two worlds. Two stories of pastoral care demonstrated his point. First, in a Buddhist setting, Bidwell, although perceived as a Christian, drew on his Buddhist practices to comfort the dying. In the second example, the situation was reversed. In a setting in which Christianity was the expected form, Bidwell drew on those resources to worship around the deathbed of a young man.In her response to those three papers, Dr. Sallie King brought a critical dimension into the discourse as she asked questions concerning authority and decision making in each context. "How is consensus decision making balanced with hierarchical power in the groups studied?" she asked Dr. Kunz. "Given the equalizing power of Hoza, why is Reeves's organization so hierarchical?" was her question to Dr. Reeves. "And how," she asked, "did choice enter into Bidwell's religious identity?" Responses to those queries led to an interesting discussion that provided food for thought for participants in this meeting.The second session opened with Dr. Kenneth Tanaka's study "The Individual in Relation to the Sangha in American Buddhism: An Examination of 'Individualized Religion.' " Dr. Tanaka spoke to both communal and individualized dimensions of American Buddhism by analyzing a sangha in Alameda County, California, and contrasted it with the Buddhist practices of converts who did not participate in a sangha. He showed that identity for sangha members in Alameda was primarily related to selective joining of group activities by members. In the case of converts, his research showed that their Buddhist identity was most strongly related to meditative practices. A high level of commitment to those practices, with a goal of spiritual development, marked the converts who were... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 350-353 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Ways of Naysaying: No, Not, Nothing, and Nonbeing, The Ways of Naysaying: No, Not, Nothing, and Nonbeing, by Eva T. H. Brann; xviii & 249 pp. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, $35.00. This, the third of Eva Brann's trilogy on imagination, time, and naysaying respectively, is described by one of her colleagues as her (...) "cradle-to-grave book" (p. xvi). The word "naysaying" plays felicitously on the sound of the English word "nay" and the cognate Indo-European root "ne," which gives Brann a convenient starting-point for discerning what various forms of naysaying have in common. Note that this is saying rather than thinking, being, or doing, although the relations among these acts are a recurring concern in her discussion. Unlike some "postmoderns," Brann does not regard language as a self-contained arena with no reference outside of itself. Rather, for her, language is a convenient medium for thinking about what is extralinguistic, whether in the mind or elsewhere.Nor does she think that a word must necessarily have some underlying unity beneath its various meanings. In fact, heeding Wittgenstein's warning, she admits that "it is a pathologically bad craving to want a word to have one ultimate meaning, worse to look for one meaning over many words, and worst to assume that such a meaning may apply to a something beyond the realm of language." Nevertheless, she suggests, "this craving to look for one truth behind many appearances may be simply irradicable, being nothing less than the philosophical impulse" (p. xiv).Where does her "philosophical impulse" focus, on texts or on things? She explicitly tells us that texts are indispensable (at least for her) to get very far with the things themselves (p. 2). And so, in the course of her investigation, she attends to Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Anselm, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Bergson, Frege, Meinong, Russell, Whitehead, Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, among others. Nonetheless, she begins by noticing a sort of willful denial that is pre-linguistic and "speechless" (the contrariness of an infant), and she ends with the nothingness that is void of all language and everything else. These two topics, expressed by the words "No" (Chapter One) and "Nothing" (Chapter Six) respectively, "frame" her inquiry (p. 42). Along the way she always has an eye to what lies behind or beyond language, in the world or in the mind, with a chapter each for "Not," "Nonexistence," "Nonbeing," and "Negativity." She [End Page 350] says that Chapter Four, concerning "Nonbeing," is the center and philosophic focus of her study. Brann's chapters thus represent the six big divisions for organizing her observations. Indeed, for Brann, the plurality of naysayings "seems to fall naturally" into her sixfold division (p. xiv).Thoughtfully pondering this structure takes the reader a long way toward understanding the work (in both senses of "work": the thought itself and the text which records that thought). The chapter divisions progress from the willful, through the logical, the imaginative, the philosophic, and the dialectical, to end, as we noted, in the absolute Nothing, the "antagonist of Being." For instance, the distinction between the first two--the willful and the logical--is the distinction between the personal (denial) and the impersonal (negation). In considering willful denial, Brann understands the will to be a "willingness, inclination, readiness"--usually "determinate," "focused and active" (p. 7). Likewise, negation also has a personal origin: "Negation arises from the human desire and ability to make distinctions; it is (most likely) grounded in the opposition and polarities that belong to beings (of which the first... is surely that of thinking itself to its object, be it ideal or real)" (p. 29f.). Thus, although logical negation seems to originate in the personal subject there is something quite detachable and impersonal about logical formulations, so that Heraclitus "bids people hear his truth 'not listening to me but to the logos,' the cosmic collecting and distinguishing power" (p. 128). So the logos that begins for us as "reason manifested in... (shrink)

Wittgenstein suggested that considering the context in which a word or sentence is used may help show the limitations of some ways of setting up a philosophical problem. In this article, I explore the role this suggestion may have in moral (philosophical) reflection, through a consideration of a literary example taken from Jeanette Winterson’s novel, Written on the Body (2001). Using the example to elucidate ways of speaking in love that seem to embody an important truth and (...) ways of acting and thinking that appear to be a denial of that truth, I discuss and attempt to show how different ways of attending to context may reveal the moral dimensions of this language use. I also consider one point at which attention to context seems to come to a halt and when acknowledging what is ethically significant seems to demand something different from us. (shrink)

Although different perspectives on the essence and qualities of the absolute existence have been put forward by the philosophers, theologians, and Sufī philosophers, in the context of this article, we will examine whether absolute existence has a causal efficacy in addition to special existence in the unity of the First Principle and the first effect. We will discuss the views of two Ottoman scholars, Baghdādīzāda (who lived in the second part of the 10th/16th century) and Arpacīzāda (d.1033/1623), who analyzed the (...) effect of absolute existence with its aforementioned qualities on the simplicity of the First Principle and its being a part of the complete cause as an incomplete cause. It is generally accepted by the philosophers that the First Principle is the simple complete cause of the first effect by virtue of its essence without the need for conditions, tools, or the removal of any obstacle. Therefore, the First Principle must be the cause of the first effect with its simple existence that does not consist of any sensory or intellectual parts. Therefore, the decisive issue in the discussions regarding the definition of the complete cause is the inclusion of both simple and compound entities. Because the definition of a complete cause that includes only simple or compound causes would be incomplete since it does not include all entities. The definition of complete cause preferred by philosophers such as al-Asīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d.675/1277), who made important contributions to the conceptualization of complete and incomplete causes, as the totality of the things on which the maʿlūl depends in its existence, can only include composite entities. As a matter of fact, al-Sayyīd Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), in his Sharh al-Mawāqif and Hāshiya al-Tajrīd, states that the aforementioned definition of complete cause, which was mentioned by his predecessors al-Abharī and al-Kātibī has the possibility of including only composite entities, but he expresses that this situation is not a necessity with the example that a simple substance can be formed from a simple complete cause. The Ottoman scholar al-Khatībzāda (d.901/1496), who supported al-Jurjānī's sentiment that the aforementioned definition of the complete cause could only include composite entities, emphasized in his commentary on Tajrīd al-iʿtikād the possibility of accepting absolute existence as a necessary element for the realization of the complete cause, which led to the writing of separate treatises following the traces of this problem. In the context of al-Jurjānī and al-Khatībzāda's explanations, al-Baghdādīzāda addressed the possibility of absolute existence being a part of the complete cause without damaging the simplicity of the First Principle and wrote a separate treatise emphasizing that absolute existence does not eliminate the First Principle”s being a simple complete cause. Arpacīzāda was another Ottoman scholar who wrote a critical text in response to this treatise, which analyzed the effect of absolute existence on the existence of the first effect as a part of the complete cause and its relation to the special existence of the First Principle. In this article, we will try to reveal the effect of absolute existence on the First Principle's being a simple complete cause and the possibility of accepting it as a part of the complete cause through these individuals and treatises. (shrink)