While major religions espouse moral values encouraging prosocial behavior, the empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of religious influence on such behavior, as proposed by the religious pro-sociality hypothesis, remains inconclusive. To explore this further, we conducted two studies to test this hypothesis in Pakistan, a Muslim-majority Asian nation, focusing on whistleblowing as a prosocial behavior. The first study gathered cross-sectional data from 323 undergraduate business students in Karachi, Pakistan, utilizing hypothetical scenarios of academic cheating and bank embezzlement. Participants completed a (...) scenario-based questionnaire assessing intrinsic religiosity, personality traits, and whistleblowing intentions. Measures were adapted for the Muslim context, with intrinsic religiosity assessed using the Age Universal Intrinsic-Extrinsic (AUIE) scale and personality traits measured using the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) scale. Regression analysis of these data revealed that while intrinsic religiosity significantly predicted whistleblowing intentions in the academic cheating scenario, it did not do so in the bank embezzlement scenario. Furthermore, multiple regression modeling to test moderating effects of personality traits did not yield significant results for either scenario. The second study employed an experimental design to observe actual whistleblowing behavior among 85 undergraduate business students in Karachi, Pakistan. Participants were randomly assigned to either a religious or a neutral condition, aiming to assess the impact of intrinsic religiosity on whistleblowing behavior. The experiment used a cover story which involved a confederate cheating during an intelligence quotient (IQ) test. The purpose of this design was to examine whether the participant, acting as the sole witness to wrongdoing, would intervene and blow the whistle. Data analysis using logistic regression indicated that intrinsic religiosity did not significantly predict whistleblowing behavior across both the experimental and control conditions. These contrasting results highlight the complexity of whistleblowing, emphasizing its subjective nature and the influence of social dynamics on behavior. (shrink)

The uplift of the individual or the community is not possible sans mind-control. Human’s well-being is inseparable from mind-control. All kinds of people need control of mind. Believers, atheists, agnostics, those who are indifferent to religion are in need of control of mind. There are many factors of uncontrolled mind. The greatest among them is the pleasure motive which eats away our will to control the mind. The pleasure-motive, being elemental aspect of human personality, cannot be obliterated completely by (...) the common people. Complete renunciation of pleasure is not possible for the laity. Therefore when we seek physical pleasure, we should do it in such a way that it does not spoil our physical or mental health, or obstruct our higher development. That is to say, seeking pleasure should not be to the extent of self-destruction. Holy company is the other positive factor of mind-control. Association of pious people makes our task of controlling the mind easier. Similarly, yogic practices of relaxation and concentration increase human’s ability of regulating the mind and its expression. (shrink)

Terror management theory and research can rectify shortcomings in Atran & Norenzayan's (A&N's) analysis of religion. (1) Religious and secular worldviews are much more similar than the target article supposes; (2) a propensity for embracing supernatural beliefs is likely to have conferred an adaptive advantage over the course of evolution; and (3) the claim that supernatural agent beliefs serve a terror management function independent of worldview bolstering is not empirically supported.

Analytic philosophers of religion typically take God to be ‘the personal omniGod’ – a person who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, and who creates and sustains all else that exists. Analytic philosophers also tend to assume that the personal omniGod is the God of ‘classical’ theism. Arguably, this is a mistake. To be consistent, a classical theist or her supporter must deny that God is literally a person. They need not, however, deny the aptness of using personal language, or (...) of thinking of God as a person or personal at the level of religious psychology. (shrink)

Divine Motivation theory is a major contribution both to the philosophy of religion, particularly the philosophy of religious ethics, and to general ethical theory. It is demanding reading, because it is long and complex and about difficult issues. It is also rewarding, because it is suggestive and highly original, written and argued with philosophical intelligence and disciplined care, and rich in systematic connections and explanations of them.

Whilst there have been serious attempts to locate the practice of male circumcision for religious motives in the context of the (respective) religion's narrative and community, the debate, when referring to a clinical context, is often more nuanced. This article will contribute further to the debate by contextualising the Islamic practice of male circumcision within the clinical setting typical of a contemporary hospital. It specifically develops an additional complication; namely, the child has a pre-existing blood disorder. As an approach (...) to contributing to the circumcision debate further, the ethics of a conscientious objection for secular motives towards a religiously-motivated clinical intervention will be explored. Overall, the discussion will provide relevance for such debates within the value-systems of a multi-cultural society. This article replicates several approaches to deconstructing a request for conscientious refusal of non-therapeutic circumcision by a Clinical Ethics Committee (CEC), bringing to light certain contradictions that occur in normatively categorizing motives for performing the circumcision. (shrink)

Widely regarded as one of the foremost figures in contemporary philosophy of religion, this book by Linda Zagzebski is a major contribution to ethical theory and theological ethics. At the core of the book lies a form of virtue theory based on the emotions. Quite distinct from deontological, consequentialist and teleological virtue theories, this one has a particular theological, indeed Christian, foundation. The theory helps to resolve philosophical problems and puzzles of various kinds: the dispute between cognitivism and non-cognitivism (...) in moral psychology, the claims and counterclaims of realism and anti-realism in the metaphysics of value, and paradoxes of perfect goodness in natural theology, including the problem of evil. As with Zagzebski's previous Cambridge book Virtues of the Mind, this book will be sought out eagerly by a broad swathe of professionals and graduate students in philosophy and religious studies. (shrink)

This article aims to study the present-day disarray of radical social critique, as represented by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, which lacks reliable mainstays in contemporary societies and therefore resorts to religion in order to justify the universality of its revolutionary project. Emphasizing the opposition between particularity and universality, both Badiou and Žižek reject religion as a cultural particularity, attempting at the same time to discover in religion the symbolic codifications of the universal experience of a radical (...) social change. Precisely this is the task of Alain Badiou’s book on Saint Paul, which focuses on religious events such as the Resurrection and religious concepts such as grace. However, as the article tries to point out, this recourse to religion is certainly not innocuous, insofar as the desired radicality of social critique implies dogmatism, traditionalism and a hidden appeal to violence. (shrink)

I hypothesize that people engage in religious practices, in part, because such practices activate the frontal lobes. Activation of the frontal lobes is both intrinsically rewarding and necessary for acquisition of many of the behaviors that religions seek to foster, including self‐responsibility, impulse and emotion modulation, empathy, moral insight, hope, and optimism. Although direct tests of the hypothesis are as yet nonexistent, there is reasonably strong circumstantial evidence (reviewed herein) for it. Recent brain‐imaging studies indicate greater anterior activation values and (...) increased blood flow to frontal sites during prayer and meditation. Regular prayer is positively correlated with better overall mental health. Religiosity is correlated with higher levels of self‐monitoring, empathy, and moral insight and other positive behaviors and negatively correlated with depression and impulsive and risky behaviors. Independent data show that self‐monitoring, empathy, hope, and moral insight are all selectively associated with intact frontal function, whereas depression, impulsiveness, and drug and alcohol abuse are associated selectively with frontal dysfunction. If religious practices do indeed preferentially activate and stimulate development of the frontal lobes, (a) religious practices should be considered as possible adjuncts for some patients in treatment for mental health disorders, and (b) the frontal lobes (rather than the temporal lobes) should be considered the major brain site that supports the core components of religious experience. (shrink)

This paper continues a dialogue that began with an article by Jeffrey Koperski entitled “Two Bad Ways to Attack Intelligent Design and Two Good Ones,” published in the June 2008 issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. In a response article, Christopher Pynes argues that ad hominem arguments are sometimes legitimate, especially when critiquing Intelligent Design (2012). We show that Pynes’s examples only apply to matters of testimony, not the kinds of arguments found in the best defenses of (...) ID. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES: THOMAS ON OBLIGATION AS RATIONAL PERSUASION THOMAS s. HIBBS Thomas Aquinas College Santa Paula, California 'TIHE PROMINENCE of moral obligation in modern hies is l'ooted in an early modern claim, which reached uition in Kant, concerning the primacy of the right ov;er the good.1 Although Kant was not the first to make such a claim, his texts have had the most palpable influence on modern (...) moral discourse.2 Many contemporary moral philosophers, however, have!attempted to discredit the Kantian p11oject.3 In so doing, they often advance wlternative views 1 In his highly influential work, John Rawls comments on the importance of the g-0od and the right in contemporary moral philosophy, "The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good.... The structure Df an ethical theory is... largely determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions," A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 24. 2 There are numerous precursors of Kant, both in the nascent rationalism of early modern science and -0£ late scholasticism and in the project of the "rationalization" of human life characteristic of classical Protestant moral thought. It was Nietzsche, of course, who saw Kant as a most heinous example of secularized Christianity. On the "rationalization" of the moral life in Protestantism, see Max Weber, Die protestantisohe Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, Volume l (TU.bingen: Mohr, 1920), pp. 17-206. Given the convergence of these discursive fields in early modern thought and society, one might be inclined to see Kant as providing the theoretical foundations for the common moral consciousness. a I am thinking -0f Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," and "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1-18, 157-173; Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and " Ought and Moral Obligation," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 293 ~94 THOMAS S. HIBBS characteristic of pre-modern moral philosophy, particularly of rthe 1 writings of Aristotle and Aquill!as. While consensus appears to have exnnerated Aristotle of the taint of Kantianism, the status of Tihomas's moral philosophy is still uncertain in the minds of many.4 Thomas's1 moral iphilosophy is, I believe, pre-modern. Throughout his writings he maintains the primaicy of the good ovier rthe right, the exact inverse of the Kantian position. By modern standards, Thomas's conception of obligation,seems impov;erished, almost naive. He devotes no independent treatise, or.for that matter no single quaestio, to the question of mom1l obligation. Francisco Suarez, one of Thomas's early modern oommenta.tors, found the latter's view to be muddled and unworkable. While Sua11ez criticizes Thomas's view, he fails to note that he 1and Thomas do not sha11e the same universe of discourse. What Suarez is after-a " theory of obligation "--is not extant in Thomas's texts. In fact, Suarez contributes to the deontological turn in the history of ethics. He pp. 114-123; Peter Geach, "Good and Evil," in Theories of Ethics, edited by Philippa Foot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 64-73; Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy" in her Oolleoted Philosophical Papers. Volume 3, l!Jthios, Religion and Politios (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 26-42; Alasdair Macintyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'," in Against the Self-Images of the Age (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 109·129. While all are critical of Kant, none of these writers advocates a straightforward return to Aristotle or Thomas. Williams, in fact, is sceptical about the viability of Aristotelianism. This litany, moreover, of Kantian critics is not intended to give the impression that there is a consensus on the failure of Kant's project. There are formidable contemporary representatives of the Kantian school. See, for instance, William Frankena, Thinking About Morality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980); Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1970); and Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: The University of Chicago... (shrink)

The study assessed the role of childhood religiosity in adult religiosity and learning motivation in university participants. Participants were 338 university students (mean age = 20.42, SD = 1.53, 47% men) selected from Islamic (50%) and general universities (50%). The findings showed that participants from Islamic university compared to those from general universities scored higher on religious altruism among religiosity outcomes and on self-efficacy and active learning strategies among learning motivation outcomes. The hypothesized associations between childhood religiosity, religious (...) altruism, religious practice, and specific learning motivation outcomes were significant. Childhood religiosity predicted two learning motivation outcomes, self-efficacy and active learning strategies, and only religious altruism in the presence of religious practice mediated these associations. In addition, university status moderated these mediated associations with stronger indirect effects for participants from Islamic universities compared to those from general universities. (shrink)

This work does not only talk of achieving a comprehensive philosophy of happiness & responsibility but actually develops one that can be represented as solid & ...

This paper argues that yu 欲 (desire), in Xunzi’s view, cannot by itself motivate action. Such a clarification will also bear on our understanding of the relation between xin 心 (the heart/mind) and yu in the Xunzi. This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section seeks to explicate the common assumption that yu can be an independent source of motivation. In the second section, I will conduct textual analysis that challenges such an assumption and argues that (...) only xin can by itself motivate action. In the third section, I explain that the issue of whether yu can conflict with xin is not applicable in Xunzi’s thought and extrapolate the implications that xin is always activated and that xin has natural inclination to pursue the objects of yu. For these reasons, the source of moral failure lies in xin being active in certain problematic ways. (shrink)

This essay is an introduction to systematic nonsectarian psychology of religion—its nature and scope, and its history. Among major issues, the study of motivation for being religious and stages of religious development are discussed, as well as counseling and psychotherapy. I summarize current trends.

Post-communist anti-Semitism in Romania and elsewhere in East Central Europe is not necessarily driven by the same motivations. Basically, each of the categories I employ in the taxonomy (updating earlier endeavors) acts out of a different motivation and has a different temporal orientation. What they all share, however, is precisely the attempt to respond to the need to produce what Benedict Anderson called an “imagined community,” in albeit significantly different positive terms of reference. A distinction is made between the (...) following taxonomic categories of “producers” of anti-Semitism: a) “Selfexculpatory nostalgic anti-Semitism;” b) “Self-propelling anti-Semitism”; c) “Neo-populist mercantile anti-Semitism”: d) “Utilitarian anti-Semitism”; e) “Reactive anti-Semitism; and, finally, f) “Vengeance anti-Semitism.&rdquo. (shrink)

IN THIS ESSAY I EXPLORE THE THEME OF MORAL MOTIVATION IN BONAventure's writings on evangelical poverty. By searching for an implied account of moral motivation in these more directly practical writings, I chart three trajectories of exemplification: meditation on the life of the exemplar as student and teacher, meditation on the exemplar as one who responds in a mediating way to social changes, and meditation on the exemplar with respect to future control of one's own environment. By examining (...) each of these trajectories in Bonaventure's thought with reference to the case of voluntary poverty, I offer an account of moral motivation that embraces individual and psychological, as well as historical and institutional, aspects of moral exemplarity. (shrink)

In the Natural history of religion, Hume attempts to understand the origin of our folk belief in gods and spirits. These investigations are not, however, purely descriptive. Hume demonstrates that ontological commitment to supernatural agents depends on motivated reasoning and illusions of control. These beliefs cannot, then, be reflectively endorsed. This proposal must be taken seriously because it receives support from recent work on our psychological responses to uncertainty. It also compares quite favorably with its main competitors in the (...) cognitive science of religion. (shrink)

In the final years of his life, the Belgian phenomenologist Marc Richir started to question if philosophical writing would become pointless when artists, great poets for example, have already achieved so well what philosophers have always aspired to achieve. There is no doubt that Richir considers himself in alliance with artists, since he basically believes that “phenomenology is trying to say the same thing as poets or musicians, or even possibly painters, but with philosophical language”. He seems thereby to imply (...) that phenomenology is destined to become self-aware as a sort of art. There is no surprise in this regard if we notice how frequently, throughout his entire career of philosophical production, he employs the Kantian term of the sublime to express what constitutes the phenomenon as nothing but phenomenon. This article goes through his phenomenological interpretation of Kantian aesthetics, his elaboration of the affinity between phenomenology and art, and then his genealogical conception of art, in order to introduce an original thought on what he calls “the moment of the sublime”. (shrink)

The debate on religious backgrounds of the attack of the 11th of September calls for a theological protest above all for two sides. On the one side, it is factually not tenable to challenge the religious motivation of a terrorist on the basis of an »enlightened« concept of religion, as predominantly politicians with transparent motivation did. On the other side, it should towards those theologically be advanced who - on the basis of a generalized critical concept of (...) religion- aim at attacking Christianity at the same time as Islam as a source of intolerance and terror readiness. (shrink)

Indirectness is often used in our daily communication as a major communicative skill to keep a harmonious interpersonal relationship. From an Asian perspective, this paper is to discuss the various motives of indirectness, such as: politeness, self-protection, humor, rejection or denial, etc.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Shopping for Meaningful Lives: The Religious Motive of Consumerism by Bruce P. RittenhouseIlsup AhnShopping for Meaningful Lives: The Religious Motive of Consumerism Bruce P. Rittenhouse eugene, or: cascade, 2013. 211 pp. $33.00Are there any theories of consumerism that characterize people’s lives on a global scale? What motivates them to choose a consumerist lifestyle? If possible, how can we overcome this lifestyle that entails destructive consequences? In this new (...) book, Shopping for Meaningful Lives, Bruce Rittenhouse answers these questions by critically appropriating Paul Tillich’s theological insights. He first diagnoses consumerism as “not only a pattern of behavior that characterizes an individual life, but a way in which an individual organizes his or her particular life to seek to give it meaning” (3). It is thus more insidious than the mere acquisition of goods and services in ever-increasing amounts because humans are not meant to be mere consuming animals. [End Page 196]In attempting to deconstruct consumerism, Rittenhouse first points out that it has been poorly understood despite its seeming ubiquity. He launches his own investigation to look for possible theories of consumerism, which he then evaluates according to a consistent set of empirical criteria. In chapter 3 he enumerates five main types that describe Western consumerism: “1, greed, i.e., consumers’ intemperate materialistic hedonism; 2, status signaling, i.e., consumers’ desire to communicate superior social status; 3, manipulation of consumer by the producers of economic goods through marketing and advertising; 4, imaginative hedonism, i.e., consumers’ seeking emotional pleasure through the imaginative identities; 5, parental concern, i.e., parents’ desire to maximize their children’s well-being” (47). According to Rittenhouse, these five theories of the motivations for consumerism provide anecdotal support to demonstrate their practical relevance, but they “fall short of demonstrating their theories’ empirical possibility, let alone their empirical superiority over the rival theories” (95).Rittenhouse’s alternative theory is then developed in chapter 5, after he provides empirical evidence (including economic charts and analyses) for his own critique in chapter 4. His years of experience as a professional economist aptly qualify him to develop his social-scientific argumentation. Rittenhouse’s constructive proposal is hinged upon his critical insight that consumerism’s motivation may best be understood as religious. By religious, he means that it “answers a question posed by the nature of human existence” (132). Consumerism is now newly understood both as existential and as religious matter, and here Rittenhouse critically appropriates Tillich’s ontotheological categories and concepts, such as the three pairs of ontological elements in the self-world structure of being (individuation and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny). Since consumerism’s motivation is existential and religious, Rittenhouse attempts to resolve the moral and religious failings of consumerism by demonstrating the “correlation between the existential question of meaning and the answer of existential Christian faith” (133).Rittenhouse concludes his book by calling for existential conversion through the means of grace—that is, “the means of conversion to existential Christian faith and of ongoing conversion within ambiguous existential Christian faith” (175). The strength of this book lies in his discovery that consumerism is a spurious form of religious life that only destroys those who are intoxicated by its lifestyle. Given that consumerism has taken root everywhere affected by ever rising globalization, Rittenhouse’s existential investigation and theological remedy are definitely a welcome voice in the field of Christian ethics. His expertise in social-scientific study and empirical analysis is also a rare strength in this important pursuit. This book is well suited for upper-level college students as well as seminarians and theological school students. It is also a wonderful text for adult Bible study groups in churches and religious communities. [End Page 197]Ilsup AhnNorth Park UniversityCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Migration is a key driver of economic and societal transformation, touching people’s lives worldwide. Understanding why people decide to migrate is crucial for fostering inclusive and diverse societies and informing effective policy-making. This paper focuses on economic migrants, a particular group of migrants whose study has primarily been confined to narrow areas of interest and characterized by inconsistent terminology, limiting cross-study comparability and the synthesis of findings. Viewed through the interdisciplinary lens and derived from theoretical, empirical, and analytical research outcomes, (...) the present paper concludes that economic migrants’ movements are influenced by the socio-demographic factors of ‘age’ and ‘education’ and are motivated by both the economic motives of ‘expected income’ and ‘employment’ and the economic-related motives of ‘corruption’, ‘amenities’, and ‘happiness’. These motives also reveal a typical profile of economic migrants: working-age, highly educated, predominantly male individuals who seek opportunities in developed countries to achieve a fulfilling life. The presented findings contribute to a better understanding of the dynamic decision-making process of economic migrants and offer valuable insights for policymakers to design more nuanced and targeted strategies for integrating migrants into societies. (shrink)

Die Frage, warum man moralisch sein soll, ist eine der ältesten und schwierigsten Fragen der Moraltheorie: Wie kann der Mensch dem moralischen Anspruch, dem er untersteht, gerecht werden? In welchem Verhältnis stehen moralische Urteile und Überzeugungen zu den Wünschen, Neigungen und Gefühlen des Menschen? Welche Rolle kommt der Vernunft in der Handlungsmotivation zu? Welche Bedeutung hat der religiöse Glaube für die menschliche Praxis? In der zeitgenössischen Moraltheologie werden diese grundlegenden Fragen weitgehend vernachlässigt. Die vorliegende Untersuchung leistet einen Beitrag, die Motivationsproblematik (...) wieder ins Zentrum der moraltheologischen Reflexion zu rücken. Ausgehend von einem Überblick über die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion um das Problem der moralischen Motivation wird die Motivationstheorie der Stoa rekonstruiert und ihre Rezeption durch Augustinus herausgearbeitet. Dabei erweisen sich die klassischen Motivationstheorien nicht nur als anschlussfähig an die gegenwärtige Diskussion, sondern sie bieten darüber hinaus auch wichtige Impulse für die Beschäftigung mit dem Motivationsproblem. (shrink)

Religion is not an evolutionary adaptation per se, but a recurring by-product of the complex evolutionary landscape that sets cognitive, emotional and material conditions for ordinary human interactions. Religion involves extraordinary use of ordinary cognitive processes to passionately display costly devotion to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents. The conceptual foundations of religion are intuitively given by task-specific panhuman cognitive domains, including folkmechanics, folkbiology, folkpsychology. Core religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary notions about how the world is, with (...) all of its inescapable problems, thus enabling people to imagine minimally impossible supernatural worlds that solve existential problems, including death and deception. Here the focus is on folkpsychology and agency. A key feature of the supernatural agent concepts common to all religions is the triggering of an "Innate Releasing Mechanism," or “agency detector,” whose proper domain encompasses animate objects relevant to hominid survival - such as predators, protectors and prey - but which actually extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices in wind, faces on clouds. Folkpsychology also crucially involves metarepresentation, which makes deception possible and threatens any social order; however, these same metacognitive capacities provide the hope and promise of open-ended solutions through representations of counterfactual supernatural worlds that cannot be logically or empirically verified or falsified. Because religious beliefs cannot be deductively or inductively validated, validation occurs only by ritually addressing the very emotions motivating religion. Cross-cultural experimental evidence encourages these claims. (shrink)

Crowdfunding is an effective method for raising funds, with donation-based crowdfunding standing apart from other models due to the absence of rewards or financial returns for donors. This research focuses on understanding the motivating factors behind Saudi society's partici-pation in donation-based crowdfunding, specifically on the Ehsan platform. Through analyzing 30 successful campaigns, conducting surveys, and interviewing a social media influencer, we explore intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, campaign features that attract support, and the impact of influencers. Our findings highlight the significant (...) positive influence exerted by in-fluencers, emphasizing the critical role of clear campaign descriptions and compelling story-telling. Additionally, we identify the preferred campaign types, such as debt, orphan spon-sorship, disaster relief, and the optimal timing for donor contributions. The study reveals that Saudi participants engage in donation-based crowdfunding campaigns on the Ehsan platform primarily driven by sympathy, personal satisfaction, and a sense of community. The trustwor-thiness of campaigns and the platform's user-friendly interface emerge as crucial factors in fostering donor engagement. Notably, our research underscores the higher success rate of se-curing sponsorships for younger orphans and the increased donor engagement during religious events. Moreover, this research recognizes the importance of sustainability in donation-based crowdfunding campaigns on the Ehsan platform. Future investigations will encompass an ex-tensive analysis of crowdfunding platforms in Saudi Arabia, contributing to further ad-vancements in this field. (shrink)

Voters have many motivations. Some vote on the issues. They vote for a candidate because they share that candidate's policy positions. Some vote on performance. They vote for a candidate because they think that candidate will produce the best outcomes in office. Some vote on group identities. They vote for a candidate because that candidate is connected to their social group. This paper is about these motivations. I address three questions. First, which of these motivations, were it widespread, would be (...) best for intrinsic democratic values? Second, how do the motivations of actual American voters affect the value of American democracy? Third, what motivations should individual American voters have? I argue that widespread issue voting would be best, followed by performance voting, followed by group voting. I argue that American voters do not much contribute to the value of American democracy. Their behavior makes it hard to achieve many democratic values. Finally, I argue that, were America an ideal democracy, American voters would have reason to vote on the issues. But, in their non-ideal democracy, American voters merely have reason to avoid voting on privileged group identities. (shrink)

Brandom’s attempt to motivate inferentialism is found wanting on a number of grounds, including a skepticism about how much recommendation for inferentialism can be derived from the evident unsatisfactoriness of the representationalism Brandom contrasts it with, which seems to be a straw man. Brandom’s appeal to authorities falls flat; in particular, his reading of Frege’s early work as inferentialist in Brandom’s sense is a misinterpretation. Given the programmatic character of Brandom’s recommendation for inferentialism, the quality of the motivation he (...) offers for it matters more than he has acknowledged. (shrink)

Frames group choices into categories, thus modifying the incentives for them. This effect makes framing itself a motivated choice rather than a neutral cognition. In particular, framing an inferior choice with a high short-term payoff as part of a broad category of choices recruits incentive to reject it; but this must be motivated by its being a test case.

I present evidence in favor of an overarching motivational self: a mental function that regulates expression of multiple goals. Goals often conflict with each other, and the role of a motivational self is to consciously or unconsciously prioritize pursuit of these goals. When observing inconsistency in expression of goals, it is therefore useful to consider whether the motivational self is attempting to balance between conflicting goals or if such inconsistency results from temporary self-control weakness.

We question whether altruistic motivation links identity fusion and extreme self-sacrifice. We review two lines of research suggesting that the underlying motivation is plausibly egoistic.

This paper inquires into the conceptual nature of self-deception. I shall afford a theory which links SD to wishful thinking. First I present two rival models for the analysis of SD, and suggest reasons why the interpersonal model is flawed. It is necessary for supporters of this model to work out a strategy that avoids the ascription of inconsistency to the self-deceiver in order to fulfill the requirements of the charity principle. Some objections to the compartmentalization strategy are put forward, (...) and a motivational theory is advanced. This theory diverges from Mele 's account of SD in that it establishes as a necessary condition for SD the existence of a causal link between a desire and a belief unacknowledged by the self-deceived subject, who is unaware also of the counterevidential nature of his belief, allows only 'weak SD' cases and offers methodological reasons against the seemingly intentional and dissociative nature of SD and stresses the deception-SD asymmetry. /// El presente artículo intenta investigar la naturaleza conceptual del autoengaño. Presentaré dos modelos rivales de análisis y ofreceré razones contra la teoría interpersonal frente a la motivacional, alegando las dificultades que comporta seguir alguna de sus estrategias de compartimentación para evitar la atribución de inconsistencia simple al sujeto autoengañado. Defenderé una teoría que vincula el autoengaño con la creencia desiderativa. Se trata de una teoría motivacional que difiere de la de Mele en que establece como condición necesaria para el autoengaño que se dé una relación causal entre el deseo y la creencia pertinentes, relación cuya existencia desconoce el sujeto, que ignora también el grado en que su creencia es incompatible con los datos empíricamente disponibles, acepta sólo casos de autoengaño débil y ofrece razones metodológicas contra la supuesta naturaleza intencional y disociativa del autoengaño y subraya la asimetría autoengaño/engaño. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Streminger: "Religion a Threat to Morality" Joseph Ellin The question posed by Gerhard Streminger is, "What did Hume think of the effect of religion on morality?" Professor Streminger makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's views. Streminger demonstrates that, in addition tohis critique ofthe rational basis ofreligion, and his perhaps less well-known critique ofthe origins ofreligion in what we may call the dark side ofhuman (...) nature, Hume strongly objected to religion on moral grounds. Religion is a threat to morality, Hume thinks. There is no doubt that this is Hume's view; in fact, as I shall show, Hume's opposition to religion is even more far-reaching than Streminger acknowledges. Though Hume did not write systematically on the subject, Streminger has ingeniously brought some order to Hume's views by arranging them under three heads. I shall, in turn, continue this clarification by summarizing Streminger's report of Hume's criticisms into sixteen propositions, as follows: 1.Because "fear of the unknown is the origin of religion," clergy have an incentive to limit knowledge. 2.Religious devotion arises from sorrow and terror (terror is the primary principle ofreligion [D 225-6]), so clergy have an interest in increasing human misery. 3.Clergy are necessarily hypocrites, who sometimes feign more devotion than they possess, and guard against the natural, cheerful sentiments. 4.The God of common religion is no moral authority because, among His other faults, He is malevolent, vengeful and wicked. 5.Due to His omnipotence and omniscience, He is an object offear, from whom nothing can be hidden. 6.This dominating God evokes flattery and adulation. 7.Because He is the product of human prejudices, God embodies discordant elements. 8.He unjustly inflicts excessive punishments and contradicts our natural human generosity. 9.False religion leads to an unnatural life and threatens our natural moral sentiments, in that superstitious terror evokes the monkish virtues ofmortification and humility. 10.Monotheism especially leads to intolerance, Volume XV Number 2 295 JOSEPH ELLIN 11.and to the suppression of the love ofknowledge and liberty. 12.In order to produce amazement and wonder, and to give value to service to the deity by provoking opposition and ridicule, religion deliberately promulgates absurdities. 13.The product of this is an obstinate, dogmatic spirit, guided by the rule that the greater the absurdity, the more zealous the advocacy. 14.Absurdities are also promulgated to assure that religious acts are done, not for morality, which, since itis natural and rational cannot be done for God, nor be an object offavour in God's eyes, but for God's sake alone. 15.The consequence of this is that superstition, rites and ceremonies, and not morality, are made the essence ofreligious observance. 16.By encouraging attention to eternal salvation, religion is likely to extinguish the benevolent affections, rendering its devotees untrustworthy. These are the criticisms. They are rather an odd catalogue of horrors, reflecting, no doubt, Hume's deep dislike of conventional religion as well as his unsystematic treatment ofthe subject. But what exactly are they criticisms of? Streminger thinks that Hume's target is "common religion," "established churches," religion "found in the world," "corruption," "popular," "vulgar" beliefs and practices, etc. Hume's target is thus not religion itself, but a certain degenerate or false form of it, not "true" but "false" religion. Thus for Hume there is a form of religion, "true religion," which escapes the criticisms, Streminger seems to suggest. But this is a distortion of Hume's views, based on a misreading of Hume's text. There is no evidence that for Hume there is any form of religion which can be identified as "true religion." What is supposed to be the distinction between true and false religion? Streminger quotes Hume on the "proper office of religion," whichis toinculcate goodmoral order. He quotes a passage, ultimately excised from the History ofEngland, but appearing in the Dialogues: The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit oftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of mortality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded... (shrink)