This article critically evaluates the possible impact of the Charter on the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and national constitutional courts. While it is premature to provide a definitive assessment of the kind of collaboration that these courts will develop, it is crucial to identify a number of features of the new landscape that will influence the direction in which the relationship between the CJEU and constitutional courts will evolve. (...) This article discusses several reasons that may result in better or a higher number of judicial interactions, as well as factors that may create tension or cause problems in the relationship between the CJEU and national constitutional courts. As such, it offers a framework that may help us to understand future post-Charter judgments by these courts setting out how they conceive their engagement with their counterpart on fundamental rights issues. (shrink)

This research examines the legal recognition of customary land in Indonesia, reflecting the complexity of the relationship between indigenous communities and the state in managing natural resources within the framework of agrarian legal politics. Legal uncertainty and weak implementation mechanisms affect the recognition of customary land, despite the Constitutional Court Decision No. 35 of 2012 providing a strong legal foundation. Using a qualitative approach, this study analyzes primary and secondary data and conducts in-depth interviews with indigenous communities and legal (...) experts. The findings reveal that despite legal recognition, its implementation on the ground still faces challenges, such as the confiscation of customary land without fair compensation and limited access of indigenous communities to natural resources. Moreover, the involvement of indigenous communities in participatory mapping has proven effective in strengthening customary land claims. This research implies the need to strengthen legal protection mechanisms and increase the involvement of indigenous communities in the recognition and decision-making processes concerning customary land within the broader context of agrarian legal politics in Indonesia. (shrink)

Constitutional review was the most original idea stemming from the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. It is argued that the politician Karl Renner gave birth to the idea of a constitutional court. Hans Kelsen played the predominant role in the drafting of constitutional provisions. The new Constitutional Court provided for a centralized system of review, with an eye to a number of politically important issues. Owing to the pressure that stemmed from various discussions between and among (...) the politicians of the national state and the Länder, Kelsen was obliged to depart from the German model of the federal state and to develop in its place a new theory. (shrink)

This two-volume book, published open access, brings together leading scholars of constitutional law from twenty-nine European countries to revisit the role of national constitutions at a time when decision-making has increasingly shifted to the European and transnational level. It offers important insights into three areas. First, it explores how constitutions reflect the transfer of powers from domestic to European and global institutions. Secondly, it revisits substantive constitutional values, such as the protection of constitutional rights, the rule (...) of law, democratic participation and constitutional review, along with constitutional court judgments that tackle the protection of these rights and values in the transnational context, e.g. with regard to the Data Retention Directive, the European Arrest Warrant, the ESM Treaty, and EU and IMF austerity measures. The responsiveness of the ECJ regarding the above rights and values, along with the standard of protection, is also assessed. Thirdly, challenges in the context of global governance in relation to judicial review, democratic control and accountability are examined. On a broader level, the contributors were also invited to reflect on what has increasingly been described as the erosion or 'twilight' of constitutionalism, or a shift to a thin version of the rule of law, democracy and judicial review in the context of Europeanisation and globalisation processes. The national reports are complemented by a separately published comparative study, which identifies a number of broader trends and challenges that are shared across several Member States and warrant wider discussion. The research for this publication and the comparative study were carried out within the framework of the ERC-funded project 'The Role and Future of National Constitutions in European and Global Governance'. The book is aimed at scholars, researchers, judges and legal advisors working on the interface between national constitutional law and EU and transnational law. The extradition cases are also of interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of criminal law. Anneli Albi is Professor of European Law at the University of Kent, United Kingdom. Samo Bardutzky is Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. (shrink)

The article analyses the problem of using European constitutional heritage in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia when interpreting the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. The author analyses several judgments of the Constitutional Court of Latvia, wherein the Court refers to European legal heritage, when interpreting separate norms of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Such practice is particularly evident in two categories of cases. The influence of European legal heritage (...) is most clearly expressed in cases where the Court ascertains the essence of the continuity doctrine and when interpreting human rights enshrined in the Constitution (the Satversme). The author notes that constitutional courts reveal two tendencies. On the one hand, a constitutional court cannot ignore the international context. European courts are influenced by European Union law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. On the other hand, constitutional court judges in every country have sworn to be loyal to the national constitution and thus have a duty to exercise constitutional control. These tendencies are not necessarily objectionable. On the contrary–knowledge of the international legal context helps the Constitutional Court exercise its mission. (shrink)

In 2017, Italy passed a law that provides for a systematic discipline on informed consent, advance directives, and advance care planning. It ranges from decisions contextual to clinical necessity through the tool of consent/refusal to decisions anticipating future events through the tools of shared care planning and advance directives. Nothing is said in the law regarding the issue of physician assisted suicide. Following the DJ Fabo case, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of article 580 of (...) the criminal code in the part in which it does not exclude the punishment of those who facilitate the suicide when the decision has been freely and autonomously made by a person kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, the source of physical or psychological suffering that he/she considers intolerable, but fully capable of making free and conscious decisions. Such conditions and methods of execution must be verified by a public structure of the national health service, after consulting the territorially competent ethics committee. This statement admits, within strict and regulated bounds, physician assisted suicide, so widening the range of end-of-life decisions for Italian patients. Future application and critical topics will be called into question by the Italian legislator. (shrink)

This book explores the constitutional, legally binding dimension to legisprudence in the light of the German Federal Constitutional Court's approach to rational lawmaking. Over the last decades this court has been remarkably active in applying legisprudential criteria and standards when reviewing parliamentary laws. It has thus supplied observers with a unique material to analyse the lawmakers' duty to legislate rationally, and to assess the virtues and drawbacks of this strand of judicial control in a constitutional democracy. By (...) bringing together legislation experts and public law scholars to elaborate on 'legisprudence under review', this contributed volume aspires to shed light on the constitutionalisation of rational lawmaking as a controversial trend gaining ground in both national and international jurisdictions. The book is divided into five parts. Part I frames the two key issues pervading the whole collection: the intricate relationship between judicial review and democracy, on the one hand, and the possibility of improving and rationalizing the task of legislation under the current circumstances of politics, on the other. Part II provides an overview of the judicial review of rational lawmaking, laying special emphasis on the duty of legislative justification imposed on lawmakers by the German Constitutional Court. Part III is devoted to the review of the systemic rationality of legislation, in particular to the requirements of legislative consistence and coherence as developed by this court. Contributions in Part IV revolve around the judicial scrutiny of the socio-empirical elements of rational lawmaking, with the control of legislative facts and impacts and the problem of symbolic laws being the central topics. Finally, Part V draws on the German case law to discuss the links between rational lawmaking, balancing and proportionality, and the interdependence between process review and substantive review of legislation. (shrink)

In this paper I take up aspects of the origins of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany, with special attention to the reasons for the aggregation of power and to the question of how far constitutional court models from abroad played a role in the development of the Court. Where the beginnings of the Federal Constitutional Court are concerned, the German tradition and the experience with the lawless regime of the national socialists played (...) a fundamental role. To a certain degree the Austrian model and to a lesser degree that of the United States figured in the deliberations of Germany's post‐War constitutional framers, too. (shrink)

The Eurozone Crisis is not just a monetary and economic challenge. It is as well the first tremendous challenge of the European Community and as well the national institutions and constitutions of the member states not only within the Eurozone. On one side the European Commission, the European Parliament and the ECB with its endeavours to safeguard and stabilize the single currency EURO within the Eurozone, to support the suffering countries in the south with its struggle against speculative hedge (...) funds, to render financial relief measures to those countries and its financial industry. Irrespective the fact governments and citizens within that countries, less appear to appreciate or honor that measures as efficient help to stabilize but condemn as form of European paternalism and patronage. On the other hand the countries and its citizenship especially in the north of the Eurozone to set a stop sign to the EU and the ECB. Therefore they stress the Maastricht criteria and cite the Art 125 of the TEU, which prohibits one nation to stand for or to be liable for the Government debts of another nation. Especially in the German perspective the demarcation line appears to run along between the European Commission, European Central Bank and European Court on the European side and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Bundesbank on the national German side. Each of the institutions feels to be bound to its origin functions and principles and save the respective constitution and the task rendered by that constitution. For a better understanding it is essential to get aware of and to reinforce the constitutional role which the Grundgesetz awarded to the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesbank and the German citizenship placing their confidence in these institutions. Es soll konkret das Verhältnis zur Nichtbeistandsklausel No-Bail-out Klausel Art 125 AEUVertrag, den Europäischen Fiskalpakt / dem ESFS, ESM / dem OMT-Programm der EZB, möglichen Entwicklung des EU zur Haftungs- und Transferunion mit einem zukünftigen Haftungsautomatismus der Mitglieder, der Unterscheidung von gemeinsamer Währungspolitik und nationaler Wirtschaftspolitik, der drohenden Vergemeinschaftung von Staatsschulden einzelner EU-Länder, die Budgethoheit des nationalen Parlaments als freie Entscheidung über die Verwendung des nationalen Haushaltes untersucht werden. Mit allen diesen Fragen mussten sich das höchste Deutsche und Europäische Gericht in jüngster Vergangenheit intensiv beschäftigen. (shrink)

The very idea of the draft European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty was reexamined after the failed French and Dutch referendums and the Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Reform Treaty) was drafted and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after it’s ratification by all 27 member states. The traditional notion of a Constitution as a national legal document establishing the social contract and a moral minimum for a particular socially unified group still prevails in legal and (...) political thinking. Indeed, the European Union has some constitutional elements, but absence of the so called ‘European demos’ prevents us from recognizing the founding treaties as a real ‘European constitution’ in the proper sense of the word. The author agrees with the decision to exclude the term ‘Constitution’ from the title and contents of the new Reform Treaty. The author also suggests that softer terms, like ‘European constitutional order’ and ‘European Constitutionalism’ might better reflect the scope of contemporary European integration than the term of ‘a Constitution for Europe’. A rethinking of the ‘constitutional core’ of the Lisbon Treaty was inspired following the so-called Lisbon judgments of Czech, Latvian and German constitutional courts. (shrink)

Shifts in the national cultural identity of the US have been reflected in shifts in the US’ dominant constitutional narratives. For the United States, “inter-legality” has been less a matter of dealing with alternative non-state legal narratives than of contending with constantly arising and competing narratives about the “correct” nature of the “official” legal order of the state. The US Supreme Court has claimed to have the “last word” in resolving these arguments but because that Court is so (...) often sharply divided and because the Court membership and the nature of its “last words” changes so often, where a significant element of the society seeks to advance its ideas and interests, it will often do so in legal and constitutional terms. As the national culture undergoes changes, a competing constitutional narrative may gain ground and even ultimately prevail, at least for a time, and achieve Supreme Court “endorsement” for its claims. (shrink)

The article deals with the question whether a state might be held liable for the infringement of constitutional law if its national court of last instance violates the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union under the conditions laid down in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and developed in the case-law of the Court. Relying on the well-established practice of the (...) European Court of Human Rights, which accepts that in theory an arbitrary decision not to refer a question for a preliminary ruling could infringe the right to a fair trial established in the ECHR, the author analyses whether constitutional courts of Germany, Czech Republic, Spain and Lithuania have elaborated the equivalent practice and if so, whether they have established any specific criteria that national courts are required to bring into play in order to substantiate the decision not to refer. (shrink)

In recent decades, environmental rights have been increasingly developed at both the national and international level, along with increased adjudication of these rights in both national (constitutional) courts and international human rights courts. These parallel trends raise a question as to whether it is better to develop and adjudicate environmental rights at the national or international level. This article considers the case made by James May and Erin Daly in favor of developing environmental rights (...) at the national constitutional level and adjudicating these rights in domestic courts. I consider the limitations of this case by showing that international environmental human rights can play a role that systematically benefits environmental protection, with adjudication in international human rights courts a key part of that process. This involves drawing on an argument offered by Allen Buchanan to justify a system of international legal human rights, which appeals to a number of benefits that such a system can provide. The argument is developed and applied to adjudication of environmental human rights in international human rights courts. First, it is shown how these benefits are realized in the area of environmental human rights. Second, it is shown how adjudication can enhance these benefits, both by providing a mechanism for their realization and by facilitating a mutually supportive relationship among them. On the basis of these enhanced benefits and the value that they add, it is concluded that there is strong justification for developing and adjudicating environmental human rights at the international level. (shrink)

Resumo O autor defende uma descrição normativa fraca do constitucionalismo internacional à luz de dois factos: a contínua relevância da soberania do Estado face à hegemonia de superpotências e a necessidade imperiosa de um regime supranacional eficaz de direitos humanos. Ao defender uma institucionalização constitucional de direitos humanos, que inclui aspectos de justiça processual e material, mostra-se que, como nos casos domésticos, tal institucionalização pode e, talvez deva, incorporar um procedimento de controlo judicial que ascende ao nível de controlo constitucional. (...) De facto, o parecer do Tribunal Europeu de Justiça no caso Kadi estabeleceu um possível precedente para o controlo do Conselho de Segurança no sentido do cumprimento dos direitos humanos e outras normas peremptórias. Dada a necessidade de perícia técnico legal para a elaboração de tal controlo, um caso prima facie pode ser feito para o estabelecimento de um Tribunal Constitucional especializado ao nível internacional. Contudo, dado o impacto desempenhado pelo poder político na resolução técnica da adjudicação de casos específicos e concretos, dentro de um sistema jurídico altamente fragmentado, e dado o facto de que o controlo constitucional também toca questões mais abstractas e menos técnicos de justiça social, o autor recomenda, que a função de controlo constitucional seja disseminada por várias instituições globais, incluindo a actual Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e na esfera pública global. O controlo constitucional pluricêntrico, bem como a institucionalização dos direitos humanos decorre do desacordo multicultural existente acerca do significado desses direitos e da ameaça da hegemonia de superpotências sobre as instituições globais. Assim antecipa-se também a realização de uma constitucionalização mais monista no Direito Internacional com o crescimento da solidariedade global entre os povos. Palavras-chave : Constitucionalização, Controlo Constitucional, Direitos Humanos, Habermas, Nações Unidades, Pluralismo LegalI defend a weakly normative description of international constitutionalism in light of two facts: the continued salience of state sovereignty in the face of superpower hegemony and the overriding need for an effective supranational human rights regime. In arguing for a constitutional institutionalization of human rights that includes aspects of procedural and substantive justice, I show that, as in the domestic case, such an institutionalization could and perhaps should incorporate a procedure for judicial review ascending to the level of constitutional review. In fact, the European Court of Justice’s review of the Kadi case establishes a possible precedent for reviewing Security Council compliance with human rights and other peremptory norms. Given the need for technical legal expertise in elaborating such review, a prima facie case can be made for establishing a specialized constitutional court at the international level. However, given the impact that political power plays in the technical resolution of concrete, case-specific adjudication within a highly fragmented legal system, and given the fact that constitutional review also touches on more abstract and less technical issues of social justice, I recommend that the function of constitutional review be dispersed in several global institutions, including the current United Nations General Assembly and a global public sphere. The pluralization of constitutional review and the accompanying interpretation and institutionalization of human rights recognizes existing multicultural disagreement on the meaning of human rights and the threat of superpower hegemony over global institutions while anticipating the realization of a more monistic constitutionalization of international law with the growth of global solidarity between peoples. Keywords : Constitutional Review, Constitutionalization, Habermas, Human Rights, Legal Pluralism, United Nations. (shrink)

This chapter continues the institutional design process started in the previous, turning to four different types of modification in the system of constitutional review. I consider, in turn, the establishment of self-review panels in the legislative and executive branches of national governments (A), various mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal concerning constitutional elaboration (B), easing constitutional amendability requirements in overly obdurate systems (C), and finally establishing civic constitutional fora as replacements of traditional amendment procedures (...) (D). In each case the proposals are motivated by the problems of judicial review I identified in the previous chapter, and their design is oriented to the fullest realization of the six assessment values I specified there. I assume throughout that some form of judicial review is extant in the political system, and for the most part I assume the concentrated system with specialized constitutional courts that I argued for there. Where something important hangs on the difference between a concentrated and diffuse system of constitutional courts for the design of these other mechanisms for constitutional elaboration, I take that up in the discussion. (shrink)

This article discusses a rare instance of the highest national courts explicitly addressing traffic signs in their judgments or decisions. It critically examines the standpoint expressed by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court, according to which the basic traffic sign categories in Poland—obligatory, prohibitory, informative and warning—are not separable [e.g. prima facie non-normative signs can also be normative ]. These courts formulated this idea when addressing the legal question concerning the applicability of legal provision (...) penalizing failure to comply with a traffic sign to parking a car without paying a fee in an area marked by an informative sign that indicates the need to charge a fee for parking. The article analyses and criticizes the relevant standpoint of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court. It shows how many negative consequences can result from frivolous treatment and neglect of traffic signs. It also reconstructs some possible practical recommendations concerning not only traffic signs but also visualizations of legal rules in general. (shrink)

The most significant moments of restoration of Lithuania’s statehood and its constitutional consolidation in the national legislation during the Atgimimas period (from the foundation of Sąjūdis on 3 June 1988) and the work of the Supreme Council of Lithuania (from February 1990 to October 1992) are discussed in this article. The author pays attention to the challenges of drafting the new Constitution – the main weapon in the political fight; the article declares the complexity of this process and (...) mentions the participating persons. The article analyses the process of adopting the fundamental legal acts, initiated by Sąjūdis, such as the Citizenship Law, the Political Parties Law, the Law on the Constitutional Court. The most important and relevant problems and aims of the Independent State’s first year legislation are discussed in the article. One of the first legal acts – the Regulation of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as considering about the functions of the officials and other staff of the Supreme Council, the functions of the Legal Department, the relations between the Supreme Council and its Legal Department are analysed. The article pays attention to the first steps of the Independent State, based on the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted on 25 October 1992 by referendum. The restoration of the Presidential institution and the formation of the Constitutional Court is also discussed. The significant role of Professor dr. Juozas Žilys in drafting the most important legal acts, acting as preconditions for the restoration of statehood of our country and its constitutional consolidation is noted in the article. (shrink)

Article 14 Chapter I ‘The State of Lithuania’ of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania of 1992 reads as follows: ‘Lithuanian shall be the State language’. This principle is not new in the Lithuanian history of constitutionalization, as Lithuanian was the official language of the State in the interwar period but lost this status during the Soviet occupation. After 1988, when many political, economic and social changes crucial for further development of the State took place in Lithuania, linguistic issues (...) re-emerged. It was recognized back then that language played a vital role in the life of the State and the society, and the Lithuanian language was given back its status of the official language by the Constitution. The principle that Lithuanian is the official language of the State, enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, was further elaborated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its rulings and judgments. According to its official constitutional doctrine, the Lithuanian language should be treated as a very specific constitutional value, as it forms the basis of the ethnic and cultural identity of the Lithuanian nation and is the guarantor of the national identity and survival. The status of Lithuanian as the official language means that the Lithuanian language must be used in all spheres of public life. The Court also holds that having this principle enshrined in Chapter I ‘The State of Lithuania’ of the Constitution implies that the Lithuanian language enjoys particular protection since the provisions of this Chapter may be amended only by a referendum. (shrink)

This short essay explores the importance of fear and violence in the genesis and life of constitutions, with a particular focus on the case of secession. Secession has been seen as a taboo and until recently constitutions tried to avoid mentioning it, considering such a phenomenon as an extra legal fact. A turning point has been represented by the famous Reference of the Canadian Supreme Court on Québec. Finally, in the last part of this work I shall try to present (...) some arguments in favour of the explicit constitutionalization of a secession clause in multi-national federalisms. (shrink)

In another tumultuous term of the United States Supreme Court in 2022-2023 a series of critical cases implicate instant and forthcoming changes in multiple fronts that collectively shift the national public health law and policy environment.

The article underlines the significance of social rights as important constitutional rights of a human being and emphasises the peculiarities of their nature from the point of view of not only national, but also international law. The article presents an analysis of the constitutional doctrine of the protection of guarantees of social rights, which has been formulated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in the course of considering the issues of reduction of social (...) guarantees—pensions and remuneration, which were determined by the economic crisis. In the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence the personal right to social security has been construed in the most broad and comprehensive terms. The human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution have been treated as constituting an integrated and harmonious system, and social rights have been interpreted not only as certain obligations of the state to the public, which inter alia are determined by the social purpose of the state, but also as a person’s individual rights, for which judicial defence is guaranteed. Such concept of the said rights has also been influenced by international law, inter alia the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Social rights, while being an object of regulation of international law, have been forming the European doctrine of guarantees of these rights and have influenced the concept of these rights in national law. The main attention in the article is devoted to the analysis of the doctrine formulated in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in relation to the correction (limitation) of social rights (payment of pensions and remuneration) under the conditions of economic crisis. In the article the period of formation of this doctrine is divided into two stages: the period of 2002–2006, when the Constitutional Court had to decide regarding the compliance of the legal acts whereby social guarantees had been constricted with the Constitution, and which was caused by the consequences of the so-called Russian economic crisis for the economic development of the state of Lithuania; and the period from 2009 to date, during which the Constitutional Court has been forming the constitutional doctrine of limitation of social rights, which was conditioned by the outcomes of the global economic crisis for the economy of the state of Lithuania. The article raises a question as to whether the constitutional doctrine being formed by the Constitutional Court in relation to the limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis may be assessed as an independent one or whether it still remains to be a separate case of limitation of rights within the general doctrine of limitation of human rights. On the basis of the analysis of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, a conclusion is drawn that the criteria established in the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis are even stricter than the universally recognised criteria for the limitation of human rights in the law of human rights, therefore, it is possible to assess the doctrine of limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis, as formulated by the Constitutional Court during 2009–2012, which is the continuation of the previous doctrine, as an independent doctrine, the basis of which, undoubtedly, remains to be formed by the general principles of limitation of human rights recognised in the law of human rights. The article is not only confined to the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, it also provides examples of construction of the doctrine of social rights (inter alia those influenced by the economic crisis) by certain other constitutional courts. (shrink)

Is there an independent legal method separate from the political process for handling a constitutional amendment that may be inconsistent with, or contrary to, the basic structure and rights the Federal Constitution currently inaugurates, or are courts stuck with having to accept the amendment on its face? This problem is not unique to the United States. Nor is it the same problem as whether a state constitutional amendment may violate the Federal Constitution. While I initially focus on (...) the U.S. Constitution, I plan, before the end of this piece, to broaden out to other national constitutions as well, and certainly some of the arguments might also apply to state constitutional amendments, as we see with the controversy over the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8. In this vein, it will make sense to consider cases from other nations, like Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, in which the Supreme Court of India held that the judiciary could strike down amendments to the constitution passed by Parliament that conflict with the constitution’s “basic structure.” The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed what constitutes the basic structure of the U.S. Constitution. This is the question addressed in this article. (shrink)

Whilst the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which became part of binding primary EU law on 1 December 2009, constitutes an important codification and clarification of fundamental rights as they exist in the European Union, the field of application of the Charter is limited in a significant way: the Charter only applies when EU law is at stake. When national courts and authorities in the EU Member States are confronted with problems of purely national (...) law, they are not obliged to apply the Charter but should instead rely on the national constitutional Bill of Rights as well as the international human rights instruments which are binding on the Member State in question. The borderline between EU law and national law is not always easy to establish in a concrete case. This article discusses theoretical and practical problems arising out of the application and interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter, according to which the Charter is addressed to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. It is suggested to adopt a pragmatic case-by-case approach, asking oneself if there is another norm of Union law than a Charter provision which is directly relevant to a case in concreto. If the answer is yes, also the Charter should be applied, supposing that there is a Charter provision which could influence the outcome of the case. If the answer is in the negative, national courts and authorities are only obliged to apply national law, including the constitutional Bill of Rights and the international human rights obligations of the Member State concerned. (shrink)

The European Stability Mechanism is the rescue fund that may grant loans to struggling euro zone governments by issuing bonds, collectively by the euro zone members. The implementation of the ESM spawned a lot of legal challenges brought to higher judicial authority in Ireland, Austria, Estonia, Germany and Poland. In the fall of 2012 the ESM was subject to legal analysis in the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in the European Court of Justice. Delivering much (...) anticipated rulings in legal challenges to the legal provisions establishing the ESM, courts avoided upsetting the complex arrangements in question by producing legal decision of direct political import and letting EU bailout measures go forward. In looking over different critical responses, we have seen an argument raised by media and legal scholars, according to which courts’ capitulation before the power of financial markets in the EMS rulings represents “a sign of judicial crisis” that marks the weakness of modern European jurisprudence. In light of their importance, we undertake a preliminary semiotic analysis of the ESM rulings of the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in the European Court of Justice. Our analysis aims at discerning the crucial aspects of those rulings is performed on the basis of different semiotic methodologies combined with the refined ideas of the Scandinavian analytical school of the doctrinal study of law. In traditional legal studies there seems to be a taken for granted assumption that there is one analytical way to dissect judicial reasoning of the supreme courts. This paper argues that the manner of analyzing the constitutional reasoning needs to be congruent with the particular research methodology. (shrink)

Despite historic efforts to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, national health reform is threatened by multiple legal challenges grounded in constitutional law. Premier among these claims is the premise that PPACA’s “individual mandate” is constitutionally infirm. Attorneys General in Virginia and Florida allege that Congress’ interstate commerce powers do not authorize federal imposition of the individual mandate because Congress lacks the power to regulate commercial “inactivity.” Stated simply, Congress cannot regulate individuals who choose (...) not to obtain health insurance because they are not engaged in a commercial venture. Several courts initially considering this argument have rejected it, but two federal district courts in Virginia and Florida have concurred, leading to numerous appeals and the near promise of United States Supreme Court review. (shrink)

Suppose that it can be right to grant amnesty from criminal and civil liability to those guilty of political crimes in exchange for full disclosure about them. There remains this important question to ask about the proper form that amnesty should take: Which additional burdens, if any, should the state lift from wrongdoers in the wake of according them freedom from judicial liability? I answer this question in the context of a recent South African Constitutional Court case that considered (...) whether an officer having been granted amnesty for apartheid-era killings should be held to mean that the police force may not discharge him on the ground of having been convicted of a serious offence. The Court ruled that, despite amnesty having been granted to the guilty officer, the police force was permitted to discharge him. I distinguish the major ethical reasons the Court gives for its conclusion, which ultimately appeal to the value of national reconciliation, and I argue not only that the reconciliation-based rationales rest on empirical contingencies for which there is little evidence, but also that their logic in fact provides some reason to reject the Court’s conclusion. Then, I sketch an attractive new theory of right action, grounded on salient sub-Saharan values often associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’, that I maintain provides a stronger, unitary foundation for the Court’s key pronouncements. I conclude by discussing some of the broader implications of the moral theory for related matters, such as the rights of victims in the processes leading up to presidential pardons of those who have committed atrocities and the duties of newspapers with regard to the reputations of the latter. (shrink)

The principle of sustainability is generally taken as a good, but what does sustainability really mean? The notion of sustainability has been at the center of global governance debates for more than a decade and many countries across the world include sustainability in their constitutions. This paper argues that in order to understand the concept of sustainability in a constitutional context, we need to turn to the notion of dignity. The paper explores the concepts of sustainability and dignity and (...) their meanings in the framework of climate justice and related questions and by discussing them in the context of Kantian and republican theory. In addition, the paper looks at intriguing court cases on the importance of nation states meeting their climate law duties. The paper concludes by exploring new uses of the sustainability concept. EU constitutional law will serve as a laboratory in testing these questions. (shrink)

The Swiss Confederation is characterised by a long constitutional evolution that can be divided into several important periods: the Old Swiss Confederacy (13–14 C.), Helvetica (1798–1848), Mediation (1803–1814), Restoration (1815–1830), Regeneration (1830–1848) and development since 1874. It can be stated that Switzerland adopted a modern, democratic constitution early; this state is the oldest democratic republic in Europe. In 1874, many amendments to the effective Constitution were made and a lot of gaps in legal regulation came to light, which led (...) to the opinion that in order to remove those shortcomings, a few specific amendments were no longer sufficient; therefore, it was decided to make substantial changes to the Constitution. The new Constitution was approved by the people and the cantons in the referendum of 18 April 1999 and came into effect on 1 January 2000. The most significant features of this Constitution include the entrenchment of the principles of democracy, federalism, and of the state of law and social welfare. Pursuant to the principle of division of governmental powers, the governing of the state is carried out by the following federal institutions: the Federal Assembly, the Bundesrat and the Federal Court. (shrink)

The US Supreme Court’s abortion decisions over the past forty years have helped to shape cultural beliefs and practices concerning heterosexual relationships, marriage, and parenting. This is true both in the practical and in the legal senses. Practically speaking, definitively separating sex from childbearing, as only abortion can do (given how often contraception fails), inevitably changes the meaning of sex, and therefore of heterosexual relationships. Legally speaking, the Court’s influence was mediated significantly by its decision to locate the right of (...) abortion in an area of constitutional law—substantive due process—which claims to contain only those rights that are indispensable to our national understanding of freedom, both at the level of the individual and respecting our overarching democratic order. In particular, over the course of forty years of abortion opinions, the Court’s reflections on a claimed link between abortion and freedom have led it to conclusions broadly reflected in modern American beliefs and practices insofar as sex, marriage, and parenting are concerned. These include, inter alia, a suspicion of motherhood on the grounds of its risks and harms, the dispensable roles and violent characters of men, the great importance of adults’ wishes, and the importance of sexual expression for individual identity, divorced from consequences for partners or children. (shrink)

My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is (...) the theory of “Constitutional Textualism”—or just plain “Textualism”—which says that the meaning of the Constitution lies entirely within the “four corners” of the document. Second is the theory of “Originalism,” which says that this meaning was fixed at the time of ratification. (Likewise, the meanings of the amendments were fixed at the time of their ratification.) -/- While Justice Scalia helped to inspire a Textualist/Originalist (and anti-substantive-due-process) movement, his Originalism has received far more attention than his Textualism. Since Judge Robert Bork first introduced Originalism to the general public during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987, this theory has ignited passions on all sides and effectively re-framed the entire debate about how to interpret the Constitution. Constitutional scholars, left and right, now define themselves as either for or against Originalism. Meanwhile, Textualism has merely retreated into the background. -/- Part of the reason for this disparate treatment is that many who reject Originalism still consider themselves to be Textualists. They agree with Justice Scalia (and Judge Bork) that the text is all-important. They disagree, however, that its meaning was fixed for eternity at ratification. Instead, they maintain that either the meaning of the text or applications of this meaning to new cases can change as society changes. -/- In this Article, I bring Textualism out of Originalism’s shadow and into broad daylight. I argue that once we dig just a little deeper into the proposition that all of the meaning in the Constitution inheres in its words, we find that this theory simply cannot work. In order to interpret the nation’s foundational document, we must resort to assumptions that it does not explicitly state. (Indeed, even Textualism itself is a theory that the Constitution does not explicitly endorse.) And the notion that “extra-textual” assumptions necessarily inform our interpretations of the Constitution poses a direct and insurmountable threat to Textualism. -/- The Constitution actually requires each judge, when faced with a case concerning the right to privacy, not merely to consider the text but also to anticipate and evaluate the moral, social, and political consequences of both possible decisions before choosing between them. While this position may initially sound counterintuitive, it turns out to be a much more realistic theory of constitutional interpretation than Textualism (and Originalism). -/- I ultimately conclude that, contrary to Justice Scalia, the Constitution most certainly does protect a right to privacy. For what it’s worth, the Obergefell majority agree with me (and oppose Justice Scalia). I aim to show exactly why they are correct. (shrink)

BY EXPLORING THE ONGOING CONTROVERSY WHETHER TEACHER-LED recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools is constitutional, this paper demonstrates how and why Christians have much to gain from reverting the pledge to its pre-1954 text. I expose critical weaknesses in recent strategies to retain the contested words "under God" in the pledge employed by litigants, amici curiae, several Supreme Court justices, and other interested parties. I additionally interrogate the prominent place the American flag holds in public life (...) and question whether such preoccupation rises to the level of fetishism or even idolatry. Finally, I conclude that pacifists and others who are critical of America's expanding military empire have good reason to reject the Pledge of Allegiance entirely, whether or not the nation is described as being "under God.". (shrink)

Does the establishment of a permanent InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal (International Criminal Court - ICC) constitute a challenge to national sovereignty? According to previous US governments and several American observers, the answer is yes. Establishing a world court that acts independently of the states that gave birth to it renders the idea of sovereignty meaningless. This article analyzes the American objections to the ICC and the conception of sovereignty and international law underlying these objections. It first considers the structure and (...) intent behind the criminal court and attempts to unveil the logic hiding behind the idea of ‘America’s historical uniqueness.’ It touches on the diverging US and European conceptions of sovereignty and ends up arguing that governments that stick to traditional conceptions of sovereignty and international law in the employment of their foreign policy may lose the moral legitimacy that has proven increasingly important for winning the sympathy of allies and regaining world leadership. Keywords: The ICC; US opposition to the court; sovereignty; international law; exceptionalism (Published: 19 May 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2009, pp. 83-108. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i2.1973. (shrink)

To explain how constitutions shape and are shaped by women's lives, the contributors to this volume examine constitutional cases pertaining to women in twelve countries. Analyzing jurisprudence about reproductive, sexual, familial, socio-economic, and democratic rights, they focus constructively on women's claims to equality, asking who makes these claims, what constitutional rights inform them, how they have evolved, what arguments work in defending them, and how they relate to other national issues. Their findings reveal significant similarities in outcomes (...) and in reasoning about women's constitutional rights in these twelve countries, challenging the tradition of distinguishing constitutional jurisprudence depending on whether the country has a written or unwritten constitution, subscribes to civil or common law, is a federal or unitary state, limits constitutional adjudication to the public domain, accords international norms binding or subject to incorporation force, or relies on a specialized or general court to adjudicate constitutional matters. (shrink)

Constitutional and judicial law-making is increasingly beginning to find its reflection not only in the Anglo-Saxon, but also in the Romano-Germanic legal family. However, the prerequisites for the use of this legal instrument are different, which determines the relevance of conducting a comparative analysis regarding the provision of such a mechanism in the USA and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the research is to identify common and distinctive features in the process of implementation of constitutional and judicial law-making in (...) countries belonging to different legal systems. The article uses the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison, deduction and generalization. As a result, the specificity of ensuring the mechanism of constitutional law-making in the USA was expressed, taking into account various forms of law-making activity. It has been established that the development of constitutional provisions in the United States takes place with the help of the constitutional doctrines of the Supreme Court of the United States, which provide for the introduction of amendments to constitutional provisions without a formal procedure. As a result of the study of the experience of Kazakhstan, it was established that special priority was given to the role of precedent, in particular, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is explained by the integrative nature of the Romano-Germanic legal system, which allows effective development of national legislation as a whole and its provisions. The obtained results can be used during the professional training of judges in the Republic of Kazakhstan. (shrink)

This article analyses the decision of the US Supreme Court in Hurley and South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which the Court held that a lesbian, gay, and bisexual group could be prevented from marching in Boston's St Patrick's Day Parade. The author interprets the decision as a text through which the identities Irish, Irish-American, and American are constituted and reflected. The article begins with a consideration of the centrality of (...) the rights of speech and equality to the American national identity, and then proceeds to interrogate the role of parading as a performative spectacle in the acting out of national and group identities. An examination of the Hurley decision follows, which focuses on how the issue of who is allowed to march, and what that marching is thought to signify, serves as a metaphor for the ways in which an American national identity is itself conceived. The author argues that the dispute underscores deeper conflicts concerning how nations are conceived in sexualized terms, and whether American society today is better understood as a social group with a shared purpose, or as a series of diverse social groups which simply share space and a set of rules which govern coexistence. (shrink)

When David Souter was nominated by President Bush to the Supreme Court, he cited John Marshall Harlan as his model. It was an interesting choice. Admired by conservatives and deeply respected by his liberal brethren, Harlan was a man, as Justice William Brennan lamented, whose "massive scholarship" has never been fully recognized. In addition, he was the second Harlan to sit on the Court, following his grandfather--also named John Marshall Harlan. But while his grandfather was an outspoken supporter of reconstruction (...) on a conservative court, the younger Harlan emerged as a critic of the Warren Court's liberal expansion of civil liberties. Now, in the first biography of this important but neglected jurist, Tinsley Yarbrough provides a detailed account of Harlan's life, from his privileged childhood to his retirement and death. Yarbrough examines the forces and events which shaped the Justice's jurisprudence--his early life and often complex family relationships, education at Princeton and Oxford, his work as a prosecutor during Prohibition, Republican Party activities, wartime service in the Army Air Force, and years as one of the nation's preeminent corporate lawyers. The book focuses, however, on Harlan's years on the high bench. Yarbrough weaves together discussions of the Justice's relations with his brethren, clerks, and staff, an examination of Harlan's role in the decision-making process on the Court, and an analysis of his jurisprudence. The Justice's approach to constitutional interpretation exalted precedent, deference to governmental power, and narrow decisions closely tied to case facts; but he also accepted an evolving, creative model of constitutional construction which permitted expansive readings of constitutional rights. Yarbrough's details Harlan's close relationship with Justice Frankfurter, showing how--despite their friendship and alliance--Harlan strongly marked out his own position, both personally and judicially, on the Warren and Burger courts. And he examines the substance and significance of his dissents in such famous cases as Miranda and the Pentagon Papers. Intensively researched, smoothly written, and incisively argued, Yarbrough's biography offers an absorbing account of the life and career of a great dissenter, hailed by admirers as a "lawyer's lawyer" and a "judge's judge." Coming at a time when the high court has begun to adopt many of Harlan's principles, this account provides an essential perspective on the Court, civil liberties, and a pivotal figure in the history of both. (shrink)

Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. The War Powers Resolution, for example, prohibits any law from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes" them. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required laws to amend FISA or repeal its "exclusive means" provision before they could authorize warrantless electronic surveillance. But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce compliance. The Clinton Administration (...) inferred congressional "authorization" for the 1999 Kosovo War from an appropriations statute that failed to specifically authorize the conflict. And the Bush Administration inferred congressional "authorization" for the NSA surveillance program from ambiguous language in the post-September 11th Authorization to Use Military Force. In both situations, executive-branch lawyers employed expansive theories of implied repeal and constitutional avoidance to evade the codified clear-statement requirements, and Congress and the courts acquiesced to the President's actions. Recent proposals to strengthen the clear-statement requirements in Congress's national-security framework legislation are unlikely to be effective without institutional mechanisms, such as points of order, that can deter future legislators from enacting vague or ambiguous legislation from which the executive might claim implicit congressional "authorization," and that can induce Congress to confront Presidents that act without specific congressional authorization. Simply enacting more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements, or adding funding restrictions to Congress's framework legislation, fails to counter the aggressive interpretive doctrines that executives of both political parties have used to concoct congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language. (shrink)

This article examines the ways that state sexual regimes intersect with migration controls to re-make exclusionary nation-states and geopolitical hierarchies among women. I focus on two important Irish Supreme Court rulings: the X case (1992) and the O case (2002), respectively. X was a raped, pregnant, 14-year-old who sought an abortion in Britain. While the Supreme Court ultimately permitted her to procure an abortion, women's right to travel across international borders without government inquiry into their reproductive status came into question. (...) The O case concerned a Nigerian asylum seeker who invoked the fact that she was pregnant in an effort to avoid deportation. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed that she could be deported, despite the Irish Constitution's pledge to protect the ‘right to life of the unborn.’ Considered together, these cases reveal how overlapping sexual/migration control regimes both reinscribe hierarchies among women based on geopolitical location, and rebound the exclusionary nation-state despite growing transnationalism. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to expose the challenges facing the attempt by Jamaica to introduce a new digital ID system without adequate regard to public consultation and the rights of citizens. Design/methodology/approach The method used is critical text analysis and policy analysis, providing background and relevant factors leading up to the legislative changes under review. Extensive literature sources were consulted and the relevant sections of the Jamaican constitution referenced and analysed. Findings The case study may have national peculiarities not (...) applicable in other jurisdictions. Its introduction acknowledges that the Jamaican Government may amend and re-submit the legislation, absent the flawed clauses. The paper however will remain valid given its detailed analysis and exposure of risks associated with biometric data collection, face recognition technology and data storage flaws. Practical implications It will be a practical example of the risks associated with flawed biometric data collection and the role of Courts in reviewing such legislation. Referrals to the Courts can be used as a remedy, as occurred not only in Jamaica but also in many other jurisdictions, including India and Kenya. Social implications The paper foregrounds the rights of citizens to be consulted on the collection and storage of their sensitive biometric data. The social implications and risks of violating the constitutional rights of citizens were made evident, and can be an example to other jurisdictions. Originality/value The paper is the first of its kind to provide detailed data and analysis on an outright rejection by the Courts of a country's ID legislation on grounds that it violated the constitution and rights of citizens. It shows the ethical and social challenges in proposing and implementing legislation without adequate public consultation on such sensitive matters as biometric data. It also exposes some of the challenges of artificial intelligence and face recognition technologies in ID data collection, including flaws related to race, gender and coding. (shrink)

In 2016, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen officially apologised to the island’s indigenous peoples. This national apology not only plays a persuasive role in informing the general public about the historical wrongdoings inflicted on the Taiwanese aborigines, but also constitutes a therapeutic and restorative role in the process of reconciliation with the indigenous victims. This article provides a critical discourse analysis of President Tsai’s apology. In particular, it examines the power and ideology embedded in both the speech and the related (...) ceremony, and is supplemented with extracts from interviews with a cross-section of key stakeholders, such as a former Constitutional/supreme Court Justice, indigenous/tribal leaders and members/staff/advisers from the Presidential Office Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee. The analysis reveals that, despite President Tsai’s apology and reconciliation policies, instead of facilitating reconciliation, the apology appears to exacerbate the long-standing latent tension between indigenous and non-indigenous groups. While the apology opens a window for reconciliation, a higher level of commitment is required to promote structural and systemic changes, such as land restitution, before the apology can be deemed adequate. (shrink)

Background The Constitutional Court of South Korea declared that an abortion ban was unconstitutional on April 11, 2019. The National Health Care System will provide abortion care across the country as a formal medical service. Conscientious objection is an issue raised during the construction of legal reforms. Methods One hundred sixty-seven perioperative nurses responded to the survey questionnaire. Nurses’ perception about conscientious objection, support of legislation regarding conscientious objection, and intention to object were measured. Logistic regression was used (...) to explore the factors associated with support of the legislation and the intention to conscientiously object. Results Only 28.8% of the responding nurses were aware of health care professionals’ conscientious objection. The majority felt that patients’ rights should be prioritized over health care professionals’ conscientious objection. On the other hand, 45.8% supported the legislation on conscientious objection to abortion, and 42.5% indicated a willingness to refuse to participate in an abortion case if conscientious objection was permitted. Religion, awareness of conscientious objection, and prioritizing of nurses’ right to conscientious objection were significantly associated with supporting the legislation. Moreover, religion and prioritizing nurses' rights were significantly associated with the intention to conscientiously object. Conclusions This study provides information necessary for further discussion of nurses’ conscientious objection. Nursing leaders, researchers, and educators should appeal to nurses and involve them in making policies that balance a women's right to non-discrimination and to receiving appropriate care with nurses' rights to maintain their moral integrity without compromising their professional obligation. (shrink)

How to accommodate diverse religious practices and laws within a secular framework is one of the most pressing and controversial problems facing contemporary European public order. In this provocative contribution to the subject, Lorenzo Zucca argues that traditional models of secularism, focusing on the relationship of state and church, are out-dated and that only by embracing a new picture of what secularism means can Europe move forward in the public reconciliation of its religious diversity.The book develops a new model of (...) secularism suitable for Europe as a whole. The new model of secularism is concerned with the way in which modern secular states deal with the presence of diversity in the society. This new conception of secularism is more suited to the European Union whose overall aim is to promote a stable, peaceful and unified economic and political space starting from a wide range of different national experiences and perspectives. The new conception of secularism is also more suited for the Council of Europe at large, and in particular the European Court of Human Rights which faces growing demands for the recognition of freedom of religion in European states. The new model does not defend secularism as an ideological position, but aims to present secularism as our common constitutional tradition as well as the basis for our common constitutional future. (shrink)

On November 8, 1994, Oregon became the first state in the nation to legalize assisted suicide. Passage of Proposition 16 was a milestone in the campaign to make assisted suicide a legal option. The culmination of years of effort, the Oregon vote followed on the heels of failed referenda in California and Washington, and other unsuccessful attempts to enact state laws guaranteeing the right to suicide assistance. Indeed, in 1993, four states passed laws strengthening or clarifying their ban against assisted (...) suicide. No doubt, Proposition 16 is likely to renew the effort to legalize assisted suicide at the state level.The battle over assisted suicide is also unfolding in the courts. Litigation challenging Proposition 16 on the grounds that it violates the equal protection clause is ongoing in Oregon. More significantly, three cases, two in federal courts and one in Michigan state court, have been brought to establish assisted suicide as a constitutionally protected right. (shrink)

Then newly elected Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, made a historic statement of “Sorry” for past injustices to Australian Indigenous peoples at the opening of the 2008 federal parliament. In the long-standing absence of a constitutional ‘foundational principle’ to shape positive federal initiatives in this context, there has been speculation that the emphatic Sorry Statement may presage formal constitutional recognition. The debate is long overdue in a nation that only overturned the legal fiction of terra nullius and recognised (...) native title to lan with the High Court’s decision in Mabo in 1992. This article explores the implications of the Sorry Statement in the context of reparations for the generations removed from their families under assimilation policies (known since the Bringing Them Home Inquiry as the Stolen Generations). We draw out the utility of recent human rights statutes—such as the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)—as a mechanism for facilitating justice, including compensation for past wrongs. Our primary concern here is whether existing legal processes in Australia hold further capacity to provide reparation for Australian Indigenous peoples or whether their potential in that regard is already exhausted. We compare common law and statutory developments in other international jurisdictions, such as Canada, as an indication of what can be achieved by the law to facilitate better legal, economic and social outcomes for Indigenous peoples. The year 2008 also saw Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper express his apology to residential school victims in the Canadian Parliament, providing thematic and symbolic echoes across these two former colonies, which, despite remaining under the British monarchy, both forge their own path into the future, while confronting their own unique colonial past. We suggest that the momentum provided by the recent public apology and statement of “Sorry” by the newly elected Australian Prime Minister must not be lost. This symbolic utterance as a first act of the 2008 parliamentary year stood in stark contrast to the long-standing recalcitrance of the former Prime Minister John Howard on the matter of a formal apology. Rather than a return to a law enforcement-inspired “three strikes and you’re out” approach, Australia stands poised for an overdue constitutional and human rights-inspired “three ‘sorries’ and you’re in”. (shrink)

It is now commonplace in many jurisdictions for judges to refer to the decisions of the courts of foreign jurisdictions when interpreting domestic human rights guarantees. But there has also been a persistent undercurrent of scepticism about this trend, and the emergence of a growing debate about its appropriateness. This issue is of particular relevance in jurisdictions that have relatively recently incorporated human rights provisions that are significantly judicially enforced. In the UK, a reconsideration of the use of comparative (...) judicial decisions in human rights cases is therefore particularly timely. The interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998 will bring with it the issue of how far British courts will (and/or should) use jurisprudence from other countries in order to help in arriving at decisions on the interpretation of the Act. This article raises for debate, therefore, the meaning and significance of national judges» citation of judgments from other jurisdictions as part of their reasoning in cases with a significant human (or constitutional) rights aspect. Several questions are identified and explored in an attempt to consider various aspects of the general phenomenon. These include empirical questions (how far does it happen, and where?), jurisprudential questions (can we identify criteria that help explain why it does or does not happen?), and normative questions (is it legitimate?). A review of the existing literature is undertaken with a view to determining how far scholars have succeeded in answering these questions. The article concludes that significant gaps exist in our understanding of the phenomenon and raises for discussion the methodologies that may be appropriate for addressing the phenomenon in the future. (shrink)

Pascal famously wrote that Plato and Aristotle “ont écrit de politique c'était comme pour régler un hôpital de fous.” I argue that the best way of understanding Aristotle’s political thought is to see that although Pascal may be right about Plato, he is completely wrong about Aristotle—and that that difference in their political philosophies may provide resources for challenges we face today. The first five chapters of the book argue that Aristotle envisions the paradigmatic case in which the ethical virtue (...) of justice operates as that between citizens within one and the same political community. Just like the virtue of courage is one that paradigmatically applies to a citizen-solider defending his polis, the virtue of justice applies to the citizen-jurist and the citizen-assemblyman, exercising the virtue within the domains of the assembly and the law-courts. The last three chapters argue that Aristotle conceives of justice as an institutional characteristic paradigmatically in the case of politeiai, both in how they are governed and which citizens they incorporate into the governing of the political community. The final chapter maps out how Aristotle understands justice in three domains that are significantly different than paradigmatic citizen roles. I look at what place, if any, Aristotle has for justice between human and non-human animals, within the household (specifically, towards slaves, children, and female spouses), and between poleis (or “inter-nationally”). (shrink)

Since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, over 165 countries have incorporated human rights standards into their legal systems: the resulting jurisprudence from diverse cultural traditions creates new dimensions to concepts first articulated in 1948. In this revised second edition, Nihal Jayawickrama draws on extensive sources to encapsulate the judicial interpretation of human rights law in one comprehensive volume. Jayawickrama covers the case law of the superior courts of 103 countries in America, Europe, Africa, Asia, the (...) Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as jurisprudence of human rights monitoring bodies. He analyses the judicial application of human rights law to demonstrate empirically the universality of contemporary human rights norms. This definitive volume is essential for legal practitioners, and government and non-governmental officials, as well as academics and students of both constitutional law and the international law of human rights. (shrink)

Lithuania had a different experience in legal regulation of private property. There were periods when right to private ownership was denied and on the other hand – the periods when right to private ownership was respected and protected. Authors wanted to review today’s status of rights to private property in retrospective. The main purpose of the article is to reveal functions of private property in Lithuania. The article analyzes peculiarities of legal regulation of private property in Lithuania during different stages (...) of the state’s development. The authors have analyzed the social significance of the right to private property, how it changed and how it has been reflected in Lithuanian legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, paying a particular attention to entrenchment of the right to private property in the Constitution of Lithuania. The authors evaluate the compliance of the national legal regulation and Article 1 of the First Protocol with the European Convention on Human Rights, and the case law of the European Court of Justice. (shrink)

How is legitimacy to be secured for constitution-like legal orders operating beyond the state? Some scholars recommend connecting aspects of global law to human rights adjudication and enforcement by adopting their preferred method for resolving conflicts, namely, proportionality analysis. Adopting a frame of analysis widely embraced by apex courts might generate the requisite regime legitimacy, it is argued. This turns out to be a strategy that is difficult to pursue in the realm of international investment law, a global legal (...) order made up of over 3,300 investment and regional treaties, enforced by private systems of dispute resolution, that incorporates standards of treatment familiar to national constitutional law. By undertaking an analysis of statements made by relevant actors in the field, principally investment lawyers and arbitrators, we learn that there is not that much interest in taking up proportionality analysis, despite the legitimacy problems that continue to dog the system. Whatever the purported advantages of turning to proportionality, it turns out that investment lawyers and arbitrators are not so interested in embracing logics other than one preoccupied with owing solicitude to foreign investors. This reluctance renders investment law a less legitimate, and therefore less sustainable, form of constitution-like global law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC PRIDE AND LIBERAL VICE 1 PAUL J. WEITHMAN University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana L IBERALISM IS often portrayed, and sometimes portrays itself, as a moral and political view that rejects the claims of tradition. Thus liberals characteristically claim that the traditional standing of a social arrangement contributes little or nothing to its political legitimacy. Whether an arrangement is legitimate depends upon whether or not those who (...) currently live under it can understand and accept its rationale. Members of each generation must be able to examine arrangements as if they themselves were signatories of the social contract; the justification of regimes must, as it were, be susceptible of renewal in every age and to every citizen. Jefferson gave this view its most extreme expression when he claimed that each generation has the right to begin its nation's political life anew, and that national constitutions should be rewritten every two decades.2 Liberals often seem no kinder to intellectual than to political traditions. As they think political life can periodically begin anew, so they sometimes seem to think that political and moral philosophy can begin anew. Hobbes famously castigated the obscurities of scholasticism and argued that political philosophy could achieve firm footing only if the rubble of the past were swept away.3 Liberal contract theorists have followed Hobbes's lead, developing political theories that rely not at all upon classi1 Thanks to Alasdair Macintyre, David O'Connor, Michael Pakaluk, David Solomon, Eleonore Stump, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my teacher and friend, Prof. Judith Shklar. 2 See Jefferson's famous letter to Madison of September 6, 1789 (The Portable Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson [New York: Viking, 1977], 444ff.), as well as his lesser known missive to Samuel Kercheval of July 12, 1816 (ibid., SS2ff.). 3 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 727, for an especially pungent expression of a view that runs throughout the Leviathan. 241 242 PAUL J. WEITHMAN cal and medieval moral philosophy. To take but one example of this neglect of the past, the ethical writings of scholasticism are dominated by richly detailed analyses of the virtues and vices, yet liberal writers roundly ignore these discussions. Liberals have been quick to defend their suspicions of the thought and politics of the past, but critics of liberalism have been equally quick to seize upon them. Champions of virtue ethics have been among the most vocal critics of liberalism in recent years, arguing that liberals court philosophical peril by neglecting the insights of earlier moral theories. Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century opponent of liberalism, had an additional complaint. Burke discerned an arrogance in the liberal rejection of intellectual and political tradition. It was mere pride, Burke thought, to suppose that politics and political theory could be made transparent to the reason of every individual in the way that liberals sometimes claim.4 Burke's allegation that the liberal rejection of tradition reflects pride is ironic, for pride is a central element of one of the traditions of moral thought that liberals seem determined to reject. During a lengthy period of philosophy's history, pride was thought to be a motive of all wrong action. The biblical book of Sirach says that pride is the beginning of all evil5 and a long line of medieval moralists labored to explain how this might be so. Yet the tradition of moral thought that accorded pride so central a role now suffers from neglect at the hands of many philosophers. And pride itself is a vice that many philosophers now consider unworthy of attention. Most fail to consider it seriously as a motive for any wrong action at all. I have three aims in this paper. One is to examine pride's neglect more closely. I shall argue that pride suffers this neglect because of its centrality to a religiously based tradition of moral thought that many philosophers no longer accept. The alleged connection between pride and religion is, I shall argue, suggestive. It suggests what an account of pride would have to include 4 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on... (shrink)