This paper offers an account of the ship of Theseus paradox along the lines of the so-called nonstandard primitivism about vagueness. This account is inspired by a model of the ship of Theseus paradox offered by Dinis that considers near-equality, in the context of Nonstandard Analysis, as the proper way to model the `same as' relation. The output is a class of models which unifies the semantic account of vague gradable adjectives recently proposed by Dinis and Jacinto with (...) that of the `'same as' relation. It does so by taking both paradoxes to arise from a confusion between relations of marginal difference between vague degrees and ``"small'' precise relations between the things that have those degrees. (shrink)

In the context of nonstandard analysis, the somewhat vague equality relation of near-equality allows us to relate objects that are indistinguishable but not necessarily equal. This relation appears to enable us to better understand certain paradoxes, such as the paradox of Theseus’s ship, by identifying identity at a time with identity over a short period of time. With this view in mind, I propose and discuss two mathematical models for this paradox.

The author discusses several models of the relation of church and state with respect to their advantages and shortfalls to freedom of religion and equality of religions. The first model is the separation of church and state at a great distance, the second the model of equal religions and the third the rapprochement model of civil religion and constitutional ethics. None of these possible models is fully satisfying. Precisely because the minimum pre-requisites for legitimacy and liberality are preserved, or (...) should be preserved, in all three models, the advocates of all of these church-state models should learn to cherish their respective assets in order to ‘bear’ the accompanying losses. (shrink)

The proposal on offer is a radical form of egalitarianism. Under it, each citizen receives the same income, regardless of profession or indeed whether he or she works or not. This proposal is bad for two reasons. First, it is inefficient. It would eliminate nearly all incentive to work, thereby shrinking national income and leaving all citizens poorly off (albeit equally poorly off). I illustrate this inefficiency via an indifference curve analysis. Second, the proposal would be regarded as unjust by (...) almost everyone. The empirical work on justice makes this plain. Equal pay for equal work is desirable; equal pay no matter what is something else entirely. It is an idea not likely to find adherents. (shrink)

In the debate on the basis of moral equality, one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that (...) there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections. (shrink)

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status‐conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of (...) moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude‐based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status‐holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter. (shrink)

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are (...) not one but two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority. (shrink)

It is my intention in this paper to highlight the dangers which arise when people appeal to moral intuitions to settle questions in political, and in general in applied, philosophy. But first I want to ask why all or nearly all of us are in favour both of liberty and of equality – why all our intuitions are on their side. In the case of liberty it is easy to understand why. Although philosophers have held diverse theories about the (...) concept of liberty – theories which have been drawn together into two main groups in a famous lecture by Sir Isaiah Berlin – there cannot be much doubt that in the mind of the ordinary man to have liberty is to be under no constraint in doing what one wants to do. This, at any rate, is a main constituent of the concept of liberty as all of us understand it. Since, therefore, it seems self-evidently true that we want to be able to do what we want, we are bound to want liberty and, in general, to be in favour of it. We want it for ourselves; if we universalize our prescriptions, this constrains us to be in favour of it for others as well. That explains why, if any politician can claim that he is fighting for liberty, he is likely to win a large following. In the case of equality the matter is not so clear cut. (shrink)

[First paragraph of article] Many modern readers may be inclined to agree with ROBERTRECORDE, when in his Whetstone of Witte (1557) he gives as his reason for taking (( a paire of paralleles, or Gemowe lines of one lengthe, thus: == )) to be his sign of equality - (( bicause noe. 2. thynges, can be moare equalle )). To some readers this choice of the equality symbol may seem so evidently a foreordination, that they cannot readily understand (...) how any other symbol could have been proposed as a serious rival. They experience a very perceptible shock when informed that RECORDE'S symbol had several competitors and that it nearly perished in its fierce struggle for existence. (shrink)

Badiou's philosophy of the ‘event’ has itself become an event of sorts for contemporary social and political theory. It has broken radically with a set of propositions concerning the operation of power, the status of knowledge, and the possibility of action that were for some time considered nearly unquestionable, in many ways defining what Badiou might call ‘the state of the situation’. After briefly outlining the manner in which Badiou's reinvigoration of the concept of ‘truth’ constitutes a serious challenge for (...) the politics of difference and the ethics of alterity, this paper explores the significance for educational philosophy of what, borrowing from Jacques Rancière, Badiou calls the ‘axiom of equality’, or the notion that, in democratic politics, ‘equality must be postulated not willed’. I suggest that this axiom is best understood when read in relation to Rancière's The Ignorant Schoolmaster, and thus explore an intrinsic link between Badiou's more obscure philosophical claims and political assertions on the one hand, and the question of education on the other. I further propose that the limitations of Badiou's criticism of Rancière's work, which suggests that he stops short of locating an effective political subject who might oppose the parliamentary state, are revealed most explicitly when we reassess Rancière's approach to education in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, and in his more recent work on political aesthetics. Ultimately, however, I conclude that a truly democratic approach to education will have to learn from both Badiou and Rancière, and take seriously the ‘axiom of equality’. (shrink)

Patients with serious illnesses or injuries may decide to quit their medical treatment if they think paying the fees will put their families into destitution. Without treatment, it is likely that fatal outcomes will soon follow. We call this phenomenon “near-suicide”. This study attempted to explore this phenomenon by examining how the seriousness of the patient’s illness or injury and the subjective evaluation of the patient’s and family’s financial situation after paying treatment fees affect the final decision on the (...) treatment process. Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics were employed to analyze a dataset of 1042 Vietnamese patients. We found that the more serious the illnesses or injuries of patients were, the more likely they were to choose to quit treatment if they perceived that paying the treatment fees heavily affected their families’ financial status. Particularly, only one in four patients with the most serious health issues who thought that continuing the treatment would push themselves and their families into destitution would decide to continue the treatment. Considering the information-filtering mechanism using subjective cost–benefit judgments, these patients likely chose the financial well-being and future of their family members over their individual suffering and inevitable death. Our study also demonstrates that mindsponge-based reasoning and BMF analytics can be effective in designing and processing health data for studying extreme psychosocial phenomena. Moreover, we suggest that policymakers implement and adjust their policies (e.g., health insurance) following scientific evidence to mitigate patients’ likelihood of making “near-suicide” decisions and improve social equality in the healthcare system. (shrink)

Ronald Dworkin's work on equality has shaped debates in the field of distributive justice for nearly three decades. In this book Alexander Brown attempts to provide a critique but also a defence of that work, and to extend equality of resources globally.

“Basic equality” is the thesis that all (or nearly all) human beings are equal in moral status. Widespread interpersonal differences among humans make the task of justifying basic equality notoriously difficult. One strategy for circumventing this difficulty is to identify some morally significant binary (“all-or-nothing”) property that all humans have. This strategy seems promising: if the basis of equality is binary, then those who have it have it equally. However, skeptics have argued against this strategy on the (...) grounds that a proper defense of basic equality requires that we identify a morally significant property that can vary among humans but does not in fact vary. This paper examines various ways in which this skeptical argument can be motivated and concludes that they all fail. (shrink)

The equality provision in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 was drafted with a vision of promoting substantive equality. Following challenges to this vision during the 1990s by a group of conservative Supreme Court judges, the recent judgment of Iacobucci J in Law v Canada (1999) has been welcomed for reasserting section 15's substantive ideal. But despite the effective manner in which the provision was drafted, and despite the recent guidelines set out in (...) Law, interpretations of section 15 must continue to explore the complexities of intersectional inequalities and clarify any reliance on the ambiguous call to ‘human dignity’ if they are to maintain Canada's position near the forefront of progressive approaches to equality law. (shrink)

Does V = L? Is the Axiom of Constructibility true? Most people with an opinion would answer no. But on what grounds? Despite the near unanimity with which V = L is declared false, the literature reveals no clear consensus on what counts as evidence against the hypothesis and no detailed analysis of why the facts of the sort cited constitute evidence one way or another. Unable to produce a well-developed argument one way or the other, some observers despair, (...) retreating to unattractive fall-back positions, e.g., that the decision on whether or not V = L is a matter of personal aesthetics. I would prefer to avoid such conclusions, if possible. If we are to believe that L is not V, as so many would urge, then there ought to be good reasons for this belief, reasons that can be stated clearly and subjected to rational evaluation. Though no complete argument has been presented, the literature does contain a number of varied argument fragments, and it is worth asking whether some of these might be developed into a persuasive case.One particularly simple approach would be to note that the existence of a measurable cardinal implies that V ≠ L,1and to argue that there is a measurable cardinal. The drawback to this approach is that its implying V ≠ L cannot then be counted as evidence in favor of MC, as it often is. Indeed, there seems to have been considerable sentiment against V = L even before the proof of its negation from MC,2and this sentiment must either be accounted for as reasonable or explained away as an aberration of some kind. (shrink)

The Netherlands is a small country with many people and much livestock. As a result, animals in nature reservations are often living near cattle farms. Therefore, people from the agricultural practices are afraid that wild animals will infect domestic livestock with diseases like Swine Fever and Foot and Mouth Disease. To protect agriculture (considered as an important economic practice), very strict regulations have been made for minimizing this risk. In this way, the practice of animal farming has been dominating (...) the practices of nature management completely. If, for instance, Foot and Mouth Disease strikes an agricultural area, all wild pigs and cattle living in the nearby nature reservations have to be killed, whether infected or not. This dominant position of one practice over the other has now become problematic. While the morality of the practice of nature management seems to be very different from the morality of agriculture and agriculture has become less important from an economic point of view, the public as well as those involved in nature management no longer seem to accept the dominant position of agriculture. Besides a literature study, we performed a field study with in-depth interviews with experts from both practices to analyze the dynamics of the internal moralities of both practices in the previous century, in order to clarify the contemporary situation. The conclusion was that the traditionally strong position of agriculture is not only weakening; it also appears that the internal values of agriculture are changing. The experts from both sides agreed that, in case of a disease outbreak, it is neither ethically justified nor necessary (because of the estimated low risk of disease transfer) to destroy the animals in nature reservations as a routine preventive measure. This is a major shift in morality. (shrink)

The near-miss has been considered an important factor of reinforcement in gambling behavior, and previous research has focused more on its industry-related causes and effects and less on the gaming phenomenon itself. The near-miss has usually been associated with the games of slots and scratch cards, due to the special characteristics of these games, which include the possibility of pre-manipulation of award symbols in order to increase the frequency of these “engineered” near-misses. In this paper, we argue (...) that starting from an elementary mathematical description of the classical (by pure chance) near-miss, generalizable to any game, and focusing equally on the epistemology of its constitutive concepts and their mathematical description, we can identify more precisely the fallacious elements of the near-miss cognitive effects and the inadequate perception and representation of the observational-intentional “I was that close.” This approach further suggests a strategy of using non-standard mathematical knowledge of an epistemological type in problem-gambling prevention and cognitive therapies. (shrink)

Ordinary equational logic is a connective-free fragment of first-order logic which is concerned with total functions under the relation of ordinary equality. In [AN] (see also [AN1]) and in [Cr] it has been extended in two equivalent ways into a near-equational system of logic for partial functions. The extension given in [Cr] deals with partial functions under two relationships: a relationship of existence-dependent existence and one of existence-dependent Kleene equality. For the language that involves both relationships a (...) set of rules was given that is complete. Those rules in the set that involve only existence-dependent existence turned out to be complete for the sublanguage that involves this relationship only. In the present paper we give a set of rules that is complete for the other sublanguage, namely the language of partial functions under existence-dependent Kleene equality.This language lacks a certain, often needed, power of expressing existence and fails, in particular, to be an extension of the language that underlies ordinary equational logic. That it possesses a fairly simple complete set of rules is therefore perhaps more of theoretical than of practical interest. The present paper is thus intended to serve as a supplement to [Cr] and, less directly, to [AN]. The subject is further rounded out, and some contrast is provided, by [Rob]. The systems of logic treated there are based on the weaker language in which partial functions are considered under the more basic relation of Kleene equality. (shrink)

Conceptions of desert and responsibility have had a powerful influence in justifying economic inequality. Currently, they are being reaffirmed in policies advocated by the centre left in Britain. In contrast, luck egalitarianism, one of the dominant theoretical positions in contemporary political philosophy, puts equality at the top of the agenda and notoriously undermines traditional notions of desert and rejects the conception of personal responsibility on which traditional ideas rely. Although luck egalitarians are sceptical about desert and redefine responsibility to (...) reduce its role in arguments for just distribution, they nevertheless retain a commitment to holding people responsible for the distributive consequences of what they freely choose to do. They attempt to demonstrate that equality can be reconciled with responsibility. I will argue that luck egalitarians have not gone far enough in eliminating desert and responsibility from the armoury of social justice, and that their own arguments should have led them to do so. My aim in this article is to push the ideas implicit in luck egalitarian's arguments to their logical conclusion. I argue that for practical and conceptual reasons, they should have formulated their theories as though hard determinism is true, or nearly true, even if it is not. Denying the pertinence of judgements of desert and responsibility to questions of distributive justice removes an obstacle to egalitarian aims by suggesting a more egalitarian distribution than one that is hostage to voluntary choice. It could be accepted that luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the concept of personal responsibility without accepting the conclusion that considerations of responsibility should be abandoned. However, any plausible account of responsibility would demonstrate that existing inequalities are undeserved, and that these inequalities make a mockery of politicans current emphasis on personal responsibility. (shrink)

Conceptions of desert and responsibility have had a powerful influence in justifying economic inequality. Currently, they are being reaffirmed in policies advocated by the centre left in Britain. In contrast, luck egalitarianism, one of the dominant theoretical positions in contemporary political philosophy, puts equality at the top of the agenda and notoriously undermines traditional notions of desert and rejects the conception of personal responsibility on which traditional ideas rely. Although luck egalitarians are sceptical about desert and redefine responsibility to (...) reduce its role in arguments for just distribution, they nevertheless retain a commitment to holding people responsible for the distributive consequences of what they freely choose to do. They attempt to demonstrate that equality can be reconciled with responsibility. I will argue that luck egalitarians have not gone far enough in eliminating desert and responsibility from the armoury of social justice, and that their own arguments should have led them to do so. My aim in this article is to push the ideas implicit in luck egalitarian's arguments to their logical conclusion. I argue that for practical and conceptual reasons, they should have formulated their theories as though hard determinism is true, or nearly true, even if it is not. Denying the pertinence of judgements of desert and responsibility to questions of distributive justice removes an obstacle to egalitarian aims by suggesting a more egalitarian distribution than one that is hostage to voluntary choice. It could be accepted that luck egalitarianism cannot accommodate the concept of personal responsibility without accepting the conclusion that considerations of responsibility should be abandoned. However, any plausible account of responsibility would demonstrate that existing inequalities are undeserved, and that these inequalities make a mockery of politicans current emphasis on personal responsibility. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay aims to bring two important lines of inquiry and criticism together. It first lays out an institutionally enriched account of what a just world economic order will look like. That account prescribes, via the requisites to that mechanism which most directly instantiates the account, “three realms of equal treatment and market completion”—the global products, services, and labor markets; the global investment/financial markets; and the global preparticipation opportunity allocation. The essay then suggests how, with minimal if any departure from (...) familiar canons of traditional international legal mandate interpretation, each of the Bretton Woods institutions—particularly the GATT/WTO and the IMF—can be viewed at least in part as charged with the task of fostering equal treatment and ultimate market completion within one of those three realms. The piece then argues that one of the institutions in particular—the World Bank—has, for reasons of at best negligent and at worst willful injustice on the part of influential state actors in the world community, fallen farthest short in pursuit of what should be viewed as its proper mandate. The article accordingly concludes that a fuller empowerment of the Bank to effect its ideal mission will press the Bretton Woods system more nearly into ethical balance, and with it the world into justice; and that full empowerment of the GATT/WTO and IMF should be partly conditioned upon the fuller empowerment of the Bank. (shrink)

Induced abortion is a worldwide practice and its legalisation is a persistent demand of the women’s movement. Although in the academic literature there are numerous studies that address the study of fertility, nowhere near as much attention has been given to the analysis of induced abortion and its determining factors, and even less to the consideration of gender equality as a variable through which to understand it. This article focuses on the influence of gender equality on the (...) rate of induced abortion in different European countries. To that end the authors have constructed an econometric panel data model with information from 26 European countries for the period 2006–2011. They have analysed comparative indicators of the gender gap in terms of education, employment and wages. In addition, they have taken into account sociodemographic covariables such as the average age of motherhood, the migration rate and the percentage of births to unmarried mothers in each country. Also, as contextual factors the authors used the Human Development Index and an indicator of the legislation on abortion in the countries studied, as well as the percentage of the population who identify as having religious beliefs. The results show that the induced abortion rate is conditioned not only by national legislation on abortion, but also by gender equalities, specifically that as gender inequality decreases, so too does the frequency of induced abortions. These findings have clear political implications, showing as they do how improvements in the status of women, particularly with respect to their social and economic rights, impact on women’s reproductive decisions. (shrink)

When it comes to liberalism, the usual story in postwar America is one of decline, accompanied by the subplot of conservatism’s ascendance. But take a longer view—look beyond and below politics—and it is the unchallenged triumph of liberalism and its philosophical assumptions that ought to command our attention. The triumph of liberalism means the tyranny of liberalism, explains James Kalb in this illuminating book, for liberalism is the extension into the sociopolitical realm of modern scientific thought and technological rationality. These (...) modes of thinking are regarded by nearly everyone today as uniquely authoritative; those institutions and beliefs which do not conform are regarded at best as annoyances, and at worst as evil. Furthermore, Kalb shows how liberalism is an expression of the interests and outlook of commercial and managerial elites, who are suspicious of less rationalized and controllable forms of social organization like the family. Kalb does not merely rehearse a tale of woe, nor is he content simply to analyze the current situation. With reference to concrete issues such as the debate surrounding same-sex marriage, he outlines the kind of traditionalist response to liberalism that is likely to be most effective. He argues that traditional, decentralized, and nonliberal forms of social organization are ultimately impossible to eradicate, and he shows how more human forms of association than those favored by liberalism might once again be brought into being. (shrink)

“What must be thought,” Jacques Derrida writes in the closing pages of Rogues, “is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive decision.”1 To certain readers of Derrida, this passage, coming near the end of Rogues, written some two years before he passed away, would mark the fundamental failure of his thought. “What must be thought …”: (...) an exhortation, an ethical injunction, but seemingly also a final plea at the end of a long career that, many…. (shrink)

Equational logic for total functions is a remarkable fragment of first-order logic. Rich enough to lend itself to many uses, it is also quite austere. The only predicate symbol is one for a notion of equality, and there are no logical connectives. Proof theory for equational logic therefore is different from proof theory for other logics and, in some respects, more transparent. The question therefore arises to what extent a logic with a similar proof theory can be constructed when (...) expressive power is increased.The increase mainly studied here allows one both to consider arbitrary partial functions and to express the condition that a function be total. A further increase taken into account is equivalent to a change to universal Horn sentences for partial and for total functions.Two ways of increasing expressive power will be considered. In both cases, the notion of equality is modified and nonlogical function symbols are interpreted as ranging over partial functions, instead of ranging only over total functions. In one case, the only further change is the addition of symbols that denote logical functions, such as the binary projection functionAethat maps each pair ‹a0,a1› of elements of a setAinto the elementa0. An addition of this kind results in a language, and also in a system of logic based on this language, which we callequationalIn the other case, instead of adding a symbol forAe, one admits those special universal Horn sentences in which the conditions expressed by the antecedent are, in a sense, pure conditions of existence. Languages and systems of logic that result from a change of this kind will be callednear-equational. According to whether the number of existence conditions that one may express in antecedents is finite or arbitrary, the resulting language and logic shall befiniteorinfinitary, respectively. Each of our finite near-equational languages turns out to be equivalent to one of our equational languages, and vice versa. (shrink)

Irish Travellers constitute a pre-demographic-shift population living among a post-demographic-shift one. Their socio-medico profile identifies them as largely on fast life-history trajectories. In addition, they are strongly religious, highly sexually behaviorally dimorphic, with strong traditions of male-male competition and quasi-symbolic bride capture. Their male-male competitions thus allow for the comparative testing of a number of interesting theories pertaining to the nature and function of types of violence in society. As a pilot study, we used expert raters to analyze a number (...) of real-life bare-knuckle competitions in terms of the support said spectacles offered to theories of this sort of violence as reinforcing ideas of antisociality, hierarchical promotion, intersexual signaling, or maintenance of within-group equality. We found good evidence to support theories of within-group, prosocial hierarchical functions for these contests. Limitations and implications for future research, such as direct measurement of fitness, are discussed. (shrink)

Professor Harry Brighouse has written extensively against ‘educational choice’ reforms in England and Wales and in the USA, and has challenged the status quo of private school provision in England and Wales. This paper explores the extent to which his arguments are applicable to the more radical, but prima facie linked, concept of the ‘privatisation of education’, that is, where funding, provision or regulation of education are progressively moved away from the state to the private sector. The arguments address in (...) particular the issues of autonomy-facilitating education and educational equality, suggesting that Brighouse's arguments that use these concepts are not powerful objections to the case for choice or privatisation. Indeed, it is suggested that there are several arguments in Brighouse's writings, concerning the virtues of efficiency, diversity and innovation, and the power of the ‘mimicking effect’ of parents who are not skilled choosers, that contain the kernel for an argument advanced elsewhere that defends, rather than opposes, the privatisation of education. (shrink)

There is growing interest for implementing tools to monitor cognitive performance in naturalistic work and everyday life settings. The emerging field of research, known as neuroergonomics, promotes the use of wearable and portable brain monitoring sensors such as functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to investigate cortical activity in a variety of human tasks out of the laboratory. The objective of this study was to implement an on-line passive fNIRS-based brain computer interface to discriminate two levels of working memory load (...) during highly ecological aircraft piloting tasks. Twenty eight recruited pilots were equally split into two groups (flight simulator vs. real aircraft). In both cases, identical approaches and experimental stimuli were used (serial memorization task, consisting in repeating series of pre-recorded air traffic control instructions, easy vs. hard). The results show pilots in the real flight condition committed more errors and had higher anterior prefrontal cortex activation than pilots in the simulator, when completing cognitively demanding tasks. Nevertheless, evaluation of single trial working memory load classification showed high accuracy (>76%) across both experimental conditions. The contributions here are two-fold. First, we demonstrate the feasibility of passively monitoring cognitive load in a realistic and complex situation (live piloting of an aircraft). In addition, the differences in performance and brain activity between the two experimental conditions underscore the need for ecologically-valid investigations. (shrink)

One potentially morally justified use of torture is found in philanthropic torture of a perpetrator (PTP): scenarios in which a perpetrator has instigated significant pending suffering against innocents and in which the suffering can be prevented by means of the perpetrator’s cooperation. These situations involve a clash of two intuitions: that torture is in some strong and obvious sense absolutely morally wrong, and that torture or harm of an immoral perpetrator may be permissible to prevent equally abhorrent, if not greater, (...) moral wrongs. My view is that a dually grounded view—permissible on theoretical grounds but wrong on practical grounds—can do justice to the conflicting intuitions we have about torture in cases of PTP. Further, I hold that practical “absolutism” will only be “mostly” or “likely” absolute, but that we should accept as adequate this “near absolutism”—it will give us the practical result we seek while also satisfying the intuition that we may act in otherwise untoward ways to prevent horrific moral harms. (shrink)

Reflectance spectroscopy is a standard tool for studying the mineral composition of rock and soil samples and for remote sensing of terrestrial and extraterrestrial surfaces. We describe research on automated methods of mineral identification from reflectance spectra and give evidence that a simple algorithm, adapted from a well-known search procedure for Bayes nets, identifies the most frequently occurring classes of carbonates with reliability equal to or greater than that of human experts. We compare the reliability of the procedure to the (...) reliability of several other automated methods adapted to the same purpose. Evidence is given that the procedure can be applied to some other mineral classes as well. Since the procedure is fast with low memory requirements, it is suitable for on-board scientific analysis by orbiters or surface rovers. (shrink)

Esports have transformed playing video games into a competitive activity that bears similarities to sports and the processes of sportization. Taking as a starting point the concept of sports as competitive games, the objective of this work is to analyse the sportization of esports, as well as the impact of esports on the concept of sports and their implications on sports in the immediate future. Sports and esports are two different realities that interact with each other. This is a conceptual (...) problem for sports, and it also defines a practical challenge in the immediate future of sports. The virtual environment offers new possibilities in sports, such as broadening the possibilities of confrontation and competition development, contributing to reducing the environmental impact of certain sports, improving safety and maintaining the physical integrity of athletes, and increasing social justice and equality of chances in sports competitions. The challenge, therefore, is to try to bring esports and sports closer together, even moving toward hybrid sports, as addressed throughout this article. (shrink)

Esports have transformed playing video games into a competitive activity that bears similarities to sports and the processes of sportization. Taking as a starting point the concept of sports as competitive games, the objective of this work is to analyse the sportization of esports, as well as the impact of esports on the concept of sports and their implications on sports in the immediate future. Sports and esports are two different realities that interact with each other. This is a conceptual (...) problem for sports, and it also defines a practical challenge in the immediate future of sports. The virtual environment offers new possibilities in sports, such as broadening the possibilities of confrontation and competition development, contributing to reducing the environmental impact of certain sports, improving safety and maintaining the physical integrity of athletes, and increasing social justice and equality of chances in sports competitions. The challenge, therefore, is to try to bring esports and sports closer together, even moving toward hybrid sports, as addressed throughout this article. (shrink)

La parution récente en français du livre de M. Denton : “Evolution. Une théorie en crise” , qui traite des theories explicatives actuelles de l'évolution, nous amine à rappeler les caracteres généraux des grandes theories biologiques et à présenter une critique sommaire du livre en question.La science West pas une simple accumulation de connaissances. Le scientifique ne doit pas se contenter de decrire et de mesurer des faits. Son but eat d'essayer de les relier et de construire des théories qui (...) tentent de nous faire comprendre le “reel”, objet de ses recherches.Cependant, la nature du matériel biologique — c'est-à-dire les espèces vivantes et les catégories qu'on y a reconnues, classe ou ordre par exemple — est si complexe qua la biologie actuelle est fort loin encore Wavoir réalisé une synthèse qui ressemble, méme très approximativement, à la classification de Mendéleiev pour les éléments chimiques.Malgré cette complexité, les biologques ont réussi à construire la th6orie du fait de l'evolution et ils proposent aujourd'hui une théorie explicative de cette évolution qui, bien qua critiquée, est incontestablement bien étayee. Nous allons essayer de définir la structure des grandes théories biologiques; ensuite nous analyserons sommairement quelques-unes des critiques qui sont adressees aux theories de l'évolution.Considering the publication in French version of Michael Denton's book, Evolution : A Theory in crisis , in which he critizes the synthetical theory of the biological evolution, we thought it useful to point out the main errors of argumentation contained in that book by first referring to the characteristics of general biological theories.In biology, there exist elementary theories - such as that dealing with the extinction of giant Reptiles - and general theories - such as the chromosomic theory of heredity and the explanatory theory of evolution. The latter generally consist of a group of elementary theories imbricated so that they form a whole like a jig-saw puzzle. An example is provided by the synthetic theory of evolution that can be defined in 20 propositions divided into two categories : the propositions relating to the naturalists' observations - which correspond to descriptive concepts - and those relating to the data of the population genetics - which correspond to explanatory concepts . The general scheme of the theory is formed by a network of relations between the descriptive concepts and the explanatory concepts. There also exist other theories in general biology supported by thousands of minor facts which only together can be of proof of validity. These theories are quite reliable and cannot be questioned by facts still to be explained. Questioning can only happen if they are confronted to well-established data in nearly equal numbers.In his work, Denton does not deny the phenomenon of biological evolution, but he criticizes the syntheticians' ideas by emphasizing that no great evolutive changes can be accounted for by the complex mechanism of random mutations and selection. He goes back to a typological concept of the zoological classification in some way similar to that of Vialleton's. However, Denton agrees with the phenomenon of the biological evolution and accepts the existence of "saltations" among the great zoological groups. The arguments used by Denton merely show that he is not conversant with the complexity of sciences particularly in comparative anatomy and zoology, the teaching of which is being somehow neglected today.By giving as an example the structure of the aortic arches in Amphibians and by a summary of the variations of those structures and the evolution of the blood-circulation in Vertebrates, we proved that the typological argument is of no value. As a matter of fact, a study of the now living beings clearly shows the gradual transition - e.g. a transition by a very large number of feasible stages - from the Lower Vertebrates to the Higher Vertebrates. In particular, there have been several attempts at double circulation and there still exist many species in which the blood of the double circulation is mixed. It seems therefore obvious that the double circulation has been achieved, stage by stage, with many intermediate schemes; we are inclined, therefore, to conclude that this succession of small transformations was produced by a huge mechanism of selected small mutations.Our present-day biological knowledge includes a number of examples large enough to consider the “argument of the impossible” used by Denton is due to inadequate fossil data and not to any mysterious mechanism such as macromutations. Let us say again that the typological structures seem to occur only when the data of comparative anatomy and zoology are over-simplified. (shrink)

In 1980, Amartya Sen’s essay ‘Equality of What?’ stimulated a still ongoing discussion on the question: ‘Insofar as one holds that social justice demands rendering people’s condition more nearly equal, what aspects of people’s condition should be equalized?’ (Sen, 1982). In what respects should people be rendered more nearly the same? Prominent responses include resources, fundamental liberties, capabilities, advantages, welfare, and opportunities for welfare.1 There is a more general question in this neighbourhood that should be of interest. We might (...) conceive of social justice as requiring us to maximize some function of some aspect of people’s condition. The relevant aspect might be any of the candidates just listed or some hitherto unnoticed alternative. But it is not obvious in advance of argument that social justice requires equality of any sort. Perhaps the function we should be maximizing requires us to equalize, but it might be ‘maximize the average!’, ‘maximize the aggregate!’, ‘maximin!’, ‘equalize at the highest feasible level!’, ‘maximax!’, ‘prioritize!’, ‘maximize the number above sufficiency!’, or yet another alternative. The more general question about the nature of social justice requirements is ‘Whatever of what?’ There are two issues to resolve, not just one. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Plea for PityRobert H. KimballIntroductionDoes the ability to feel pity toward the unfortunate represent one of humanity's better instincts, on par with the capacity for love, compassion, and forgiveness? Or is pity actually one of our morally baser emotions, like jealousy, envy, or hatred, because pity can include contempt for its object and an attitude of morally reprehensible superiority on the part of the pitier? Surprisingly, there is (...) little philosophical consensus on this issue, with informed opinion nearly equally divided. That the same emotion can elicit such contrary evaluations shows how elusive a clear understanding of pity can be.Furthermore, is there something wrong—either logically or morally—with attempting to arouse the emotion of pity in others when they do not already feel it themselves (or do not feel it as intensely as we want them to)? Should appeals to pity be rejected because any emotion is inimical to clear thinking or simply irrelevant to the justification of action? Or is there something particularly morally reprehensible about trying to manipulate another's emotions and actions specifically on the basis of pity? Alternatively, at least in some cases could an exhortation to pity be an acceptable, even desirable, aspect of moral education or an often-necessary reminder to care about the misfortunes of others and not just to pursue our own self-interests? Surprisingly, opinion (at least in the informal fallacy tradition) is remarkably unanimous about the undesirability of appealing to pity. But I think their reasons can be improved upon.Traditional analyses of appeal to pity do not seriously analyze the emotion being appealed to, and most treatments of pity as an emotion do not address its use in rhetorical manipulation. I claim that what is wrong with appeal to pity can be satisfactorily understood only if pity itself is adequately understood. I propose to proceed by combining these two questions: what is wrong with pity? and what is wrong with appeal to pity? [End Page 301]In answering the second question, the textbook tradition of informal fallacy analysis holds that when a speaker attempts to arouse pity in an audience in order to induce an action, this situation should be interpreted not under the rubric of nonlogical causal influence, manipulation, or rhetorical persuasion but rather as belonging to the domain of (informal) logic, and in particular as a failed attempt at argument in which a descriptive premise that A pities B does not entail the normative conclusion that B deserves A's help (or that A should help B). Thus in the informal fallacy tradition, experiencing the emotion of pity is never a valid justification for action.2 I believe this rigid reason/emotion distinction has little basis in our actual belief-forming and decision-making practices. Nor do I believe that emotion should be excluded from reasoning, since our emotions are often informative and are sometimes more reliable guides to action than argument.In Appeal to Pity, Douglas Walton (1997) presents a nuanced and considerably more subtle alternative to the textbook tradition, in which he evaluates epistemically the effect of the emotional state of pity on practical reasoning. Analyzing such cases as charitable appeals (e.g., for starving people and disaster victims, arguments for hardship exemptions from general rules, and alleged atrocities), he emphasizes especially the particularizing nature of pity and the way it overrides universal principles, especially of justice. Under Walton's epistemic evaluation of pity, it emerges as a reason-clouding emotion under certain conditions. Furthermore, he shows how the occurrence of pity is susceptible to manipulation; he emphasizes especially cases in which pity is not actually deserved or justified but is manipulatively made to seem so.But Walton looks at a very small slice of the landscape of pity and what might be problematic about it. So in order to evaluate pity fully—not just epistemically but also as a moral emotion and its role in a fully flourishing life—we need to expand our concept of pity. In fact, pity is a very difficult and complex emotion to analyze (Solomon 1993).Definition of "pity"In pitying someone, such as a homeless person, a starving child, or a mutilated... (shrink)

This study examined cancer patients’ perceived emotional and informational support from a variety of interpersonal and media sources. We recruited patients from cancer patient association websites and online cancer forums and asked them to report to what extent they received support from interpersonal and media sources. Patients rated professional sources and personal sources as nearly equal sources of emotional support; however, professional sources were rated as significantly greater sources of informational support. Although family and oncologists were the most mentioned interpersonal (...) sources of support, they were also the most mentioned disappointing sources. Of the media sources, online interaction sources were rated as nearly equivalent sources of emotional support as interpersonal sources. That patients perceived emotional support, not only informational support, from various media sources is promising since interpersonal sources can be disappointing to some patients. (shrink)

Nietzsche talks about shame [scham*, schmach*, schand*] in all of his published and authorized works, from The Birth of Tragedy to Ecce Homo. He refers to shame in over one hundred passages – at least five times as often as he refers to resentment/ressentiment. Yet the scholarly literature on Nietzsche and shame includes just a handful of publications, while the literature on Nietzsche and resentment includes over a thousand. Arguably, this disproportionate engagement has been driven by the fact that English (...) translations of Nietzsche’s writings systematically italicize and transliterate ‘ressentiment’ rather than treating it as the normal word it is. In any case, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the secondary literature by using digital humanities methods to systematically investigate the functions of shame in Nietzsche’s writings. I argue that Nietzsche is ambivalent about shame, depending on the function that it serves. There are four main functions. First, in a society of near-equals, it regulates interactions and incentives in ways that preserve game-theoretic equilibria. Second and relatedly, Nietzsche associates the capacity to experience nuanced and appropriate feelings of shame – and to anticipate them in others – with the pathos of distance, a virtue that he associates with nobility. Third, when shame is directed towards fixed aspects of human nature, it transforms those aspects into vices; by contrast, when it is directed towards malleable aspects of human nature, it may foster self-improvement and virtue. Nietzsche frequently laments the way that shame targets immutable aspects of ourselves. Finally and relatedly, Nietzsche casts counter-shame on those who would direct first-order shame on fixed aspects of human nature, as well as a paradoxical form of uplifting shame on their victims. If this is right, then Nietzsche does not offer a univocal verdict on shame. Instead, like many other emotions and emotional capacities, shame is inescapable, complex, and function-relative. (shrink)

The general attributes of ecosystems are examined and a naturally occurring reference ecosystem is established, comparable with the isolated system of classical thermodynamics. Such an autonomous system with a stable, periodic input of energy is shown to assume certain structural characteristics that have an identifiable thermodynamic basis. Individual species tend to assume a state of least dissipation; this is most clearly evident in the dominant species (the species with the best integration of energy acquisition and conservation). It is concluded that (...) ecosystem structure results from the antagonistic interaction of two nearly equal forces. These forces have their origin in the Principle of Most Action (least dissipation or least entropy production) and the universal Principle of Least Action. Most action is contingent on the equipartitioning of the energy available, through uniform interaction of similar individuals. The trend to Least action is contingent on increased dissipation attained through increasing diversity and increasing complexity. These principles exhibit a basic asymmetry. Given the operation of these opposing principles over evolutionary time, it is argued that ecosystems originated in the vicinity of thermodynamic equilibrium through the resonant amplification of reversible fluctuations. On account of the basic asymmetry the system was able to evolve away from thermodynamic equilibrium provided that it remained within the vicinity of ergodynamic equilibrium (equilibrium maintained by internal work, where the opposing forces are equal and opposite).At the highest level of generalization there appear to be three principles operating: i) maximum association of free-energy and materials; ii) energy conservation (deceleration of the energy flow) through symmetric interaction and increased homogeneity; and iii) the principle of least action which induces acceleration of the energy flow through asymmetrical interaction. The opposition and asymmetry of the two forces give rise to natural selection and evolution. (shrink)

Property dualism [PD], when adopted by physicalists, is the view that mental properties are irreducible and joined to the physical. Many property dualists who subscribe to physicalism hold epiphenomenalism—the view that the mind does not have a causal role in affecting physical events (e.g., bodily movements).1 In this paper, I examine two possible origins of mental properties and the entailments of those origins if one is committed to physicalism. First, mental properties have a generative origin (e.g., emergence, neurophysiological, etc.). Second, (...) mental properties are fundamental. If mental properties have generative origins, then physicalism has an epistemological problem. Namely, if physical facts determine all mental facts, then we have exceedingly little evidence to favor the widespread existence of epiphenomenal minds over philosophers’ zombies.2 Briefly, the self has mental properties, but the irreducibility of mental properties and their causal inefficacy means that we cannot know the mental status of others. Whereas to claim mental properties as fundamental could entail panpsychism (or proto-panpsychism) and no physicalist method to determine what possesses mental properties. Fundamental mental properties entail the possibility of widespread epiphenomenal minds and the possession of mental properties by unexpected entities so that all biological material and some inanimate objects may have a near equal claim to possessing mental properties. (shrink)

Virtue ethics treats aretaic, as opposed to deontic, concepts as fundamental and focuses in the first instance on character traits or motives rather than actions. Virtue ethics also contrasts with utilitarianism because although both these approaches are self‐other symmetric, they embrace different forms of symmetry. Utilitarianism holds that one's concern for oneself should be no different, fundamentally, from the concern one has for each and every other individual. But such ”in sensu diviso” symmetry differs from an ”in sensu composito” symmetry (...) that would have us be equally concerned with ourselves and with others considered as a class. Commonsense virtue ethics subscribes to the latter kind of symmetry because of the way in which it gives equal or nearly equal weight to both self‐benefiting and other‐benefiting virtues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.4 (2003) 114-121 [Access article in PDF] Art as Part of Daily Life - A Cross-cultural Dialogue between Art and People If encounters with art and artists become part of daily life in a small rural community, and if aesthetic experiences are perceived by its local residents as part of their daily lives, what kinds of humanistic, cultural, and social change take place in (...) the community and in the people involved? By living together in a residential community, and by showing and sharing the process of art making, to what extent can aesthetic, cultural, and social issues and concerns expressed by artists be interpreted by local residents? These are the main issues addressed in this essay. 1 The artistic and aesthetic education provided in the community gradually opened up a dialogue not only between foreign artists as guests and Japanese spectators as hosts, but also between art and people, culture and culture, and people and people within the local community. Outline of the Project The Cultural Exchange House, situated in Yamaguchi prefecture, has accommodated about forty artists-in-residence from abroad for over ten years. The forty artists who have stayed there include painters, potters, sculptors, photographers, pianists, musicians, composers, poets, and writers. Artists are responsible for their travel and living expenses. The use of the house is provided without charge and the needs of the artists are met by volunteers. About half of the artists have been German and the rest from Britain, Belgium, United States, Holland, and Australia. Male and female artists have been nearly equally represented.Beginning with three, there are now sixteen volunteers who felt that the creation of a cultural environment, or more specifically the creation of access to the world of art was important for the community. They saw the need for the local community to provide children and adults with aesthetic experiences that could enrich their internal and external worlds. Increasing numbers of children were leaving the community to attend schools and get jobs, with little possibility of returning. The volunteers felt that one of their roles was to educate children and their parents so that they could encounter values different from their own, develop self-confidence, and take pride in the local community which had such cultural opportunities. They assumed that art could open people's minds to the world outside their existing cultural framework, and that it would be valuable to have artists from the outside world as their neighbors and friends. [End Page 114] Benefits of the Project There are already extensive formal grants available to foreign artists in cities such as Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka. However, the people who came to Yamaguchi said that they were especially attracted to life in a rural community; they hoped to experience the "real life" of the Japanese. Since the projectcould offer no grants for travel and other daily expenses, the communitydecided that they had little hope of attracting well-known artists. Instead, they invited younger lesser-known artists with potential, who did not mind the limited conditions and who welcomed a new cultural experience which might stimulate or broaden their approach to art. The contract stated that the artists should participate in cultural exchange programs, such as visiting schools and community centers to hold art workshops, and also, at the end of their stay, to share their experiences of the residency in the form of an exhibition or a concert. The degree to which this contract was kept varied. In general, the artists fulfilled the local people's expectations by holding workshops with children and adults, and did not mind having concerts in the town gymnasium or exhibitions at the community center. Foreign artists had an opportunity to reflect in a quiet environment and further their art. They were also stimulated by the encounter with the culture and people, and felt at home in the Cultural Exchange House.The house is relatively large with more than ten rooms; a dining room,kitchen, toilet, an outside bathroom, a separate studio space, and a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
ources VICTORIA, LADY WELBY’S PAPERS AT YORK UNIVERSITY, TORONTO I. G-G Mathematics / Middlesex U.  St. Leonard’s Road, Bengeo, Herts.  ,  .-@.. ne of the fringe figures in British philosophical life during Russell’s early Ocareer was Victoria, Lady Welby (–). Coming in middle age to academic concerns, she was the most receptive person in Britain to the semiotics of C. S. Peirce (–), giving his work (...) some publicity especially in her books What Is Meaning? () and Significs and Language (). After her death much of her library went to the University of London Library; her heavily annotated copies of journals such as Mind and The Monist are worth consulting. Her papers remained with her family until they were purchased from Sir Oliver Welby in  by York University, Toronto. The large collection is stored in  large boxes, with the general reference number -; the archival staff has prepared an excellent catalogue. I sampled the collection in a short recent visit. It divides into two nearly equal halves. One half includes her own manuscripts and essays, sometimes including comments made by friends. Some manuscripts by others, or transcripts thereof (for example, H. G. Wells) were also stored. I looked at the manuscripts related to logic and language, and found that several were composed of transcriptions of her notes typed out on strips and then set in a chosen order by fixing to large sheets with pins. Logic as such did not feature strongly; more prominent were aspects of linguistics or speech practice. Lady Welby strove to popularize the work of fellow enthusiasts for linguistics. In particular, box  comprises her commissioned English translations of several articles published during the s by the logician and philosopher Giovanni Vailati (–), also the earliest follower of Russell’s hero Giuseppe Peano. Presumably Vailati’s and Welby’s deaths prevented the publication of the planned book. The other half of the collection comprises Lady Welby’s extensive correspondence, including copies or drafts of some of her own letters. Attached to many russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (summer ): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  -  . - letters are partial typewritten transcriptions, presumably prepared by or for her daughter Nina Cust (–) for a two-volume edition. As these transcriptions suggest, the originals were not only selected but also mauled quite a bit; the edition provides only extracts both locally within a letter and also globally across a file. They are organized chronologically in chapters each covering a short run of years, so that any extensive exchange is spread across several chapters. Further, the precise date of each letter is never given. This is a pity, for the full collection reveals an impressive range of serious contacts in the philosophical and other communities, and also with some figures related to her social status (from the aristocratic Stuart-Wortley family, Very Important in those days). Some letters relate to a discussion group which met at her home; first at Denton Manor, Grantham, Lincolnshire, and then during her widowhood in Harrow, London. To Lady Welby herself, one of the most important exchanges was that with C. S. Peirce (–), some of which appeared in the daughter’s edition and since has been published in full. For my interests two other files stood out. One is an intense exchange, especially in , with Mary Boole (–), in which her working relationship with her late husband and their religious stance were discussed. The other exchange was with Philip Jourdain (–); they used to lend each other books and recent issues of journals. When Lady Welby planned a visit in September , Jourdain assured her that a “tyred fly” would be hired to bring her to his home from the railway station, and that it had a large room which should be satisfactory to “you and your maid”. These two also exchanged opinions on recent philosophical literature, including that by Russell, whose work is mentioned in other files. There is a small exchange with Russell himself; both sides are available here, and of course also at the Russell Archives. Some or all of these files are printed in the Cust volumes, but the full collection needs to be consulted in order to do justice to the material. Researchers visiting the Russell... (shrink)

This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. The experimental (...) results are organized through a standard social reference model, modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money for bargainers. In our model bargaining is driven by relative standings comparisons between players, occurring in terms of real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) obtained in the game. The norm of equity behind the equalization of real earnings is called local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompass the wealth of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems to be relevantly endorsed by subjects. (shrink)

A standard view in legal and political theory is that, to a first approximation, (1) we should aim to bring about the most legitimate institutions possible to solve the problems that should be solved at the level of politics, and (2) individual people are required to follow the directives of legitimate institutions, at least insofar as those institutions have the authority to issue those directives, and insofar as other considerations are nearly equal.1 On this standard view, the philosophical analysis of (...) institutional legitimacy can appear to be of the utmost importance because it can seem to answer the most important questions about what we should actually do in the realm of law and politics, and because it may also seem to serve as the crucial bridge between ideal and nonideal theory, at least if institutional legitimacy is analyzed as it often is as a matter of doing well enough along dimensions that are familiar from ideal APA NEWSLETTER | PHILOSOPHY AND LAW theory (e.g., ideal justice, universal consent, respecting basic rights, social welfare maximization, and so on). In what follows I identify a number of possible counterexamples to this standard view, which suggest that there may be no straightforward connection between institutional legitimacy and facts about what reasons, rights, and duties we actually have, and what institutions we should actually try to bring about, contrary to what the standard view assumes. (shrink)

Marie-Noëlle Carré | : Les dépôts contrôlés de déchets posent un défi à la gestion durable des métropoles, comprises comme des « traductions spatiales du global ». En effet, même s’ils génèrent de réels problèmes sanitaires et environnementaux, ils sont aussi des points d’appui du développement métropolitain. Cet article demande donc si le cadre de la justice environnementale est suffisant pour penser les problèmes de leur gouvernance métropolitaine, à la fois locale et mondiale. La démonstration suggère d’abord que la construction (...) du problème public des déchets ouvre la voie à l’expression de multiples dilemmes environnementaux. En fonction des échelles auxquelles ils prennent les décisions, les actrices et acteurs métropolitain.es sont parfois conduit.es à choisir entre des valeurs difficiles à hiérarchiser. L’article souligne ensuite que la justice environnementale, sociale et spatiale propose un cadre normatif à première vue adéquat pour explorer cette question. Toutefois, ce cadre peut être affiné pour appréhender la complexité métropolitaine et déplacer l’analyse des espaces de l’action aux pratiques des actrices et acteurs. Dans une perspective transaméricaine, nous mobilisons les exemples de Montréal et de Buenos Aires. | : Existing sanitary waste landfills challenge urban sustainable development in metropolitan areas as “local translations of the global.” Even though they create real sanitary and environmental issues, infrastructures are also involved in territorial development projects. This paper argues that environmental justice is a useful framework for tackling problems of global and local metropolitan governance. I suggest that waste as a public problem opens up multiple environmental dilemmas. Depending on the context they are reasoning in, metropolitan decision-makers are led to make choices between values of nearly equal importance for urban life. Then, the paper explores how environmental justice, social justice, and spatial justice provides a helpful normative framework to answer the questions that those dilemmas open. However, this framework can be refined to capture metropolitan complexity and shift the scope from spaces of action to practices of actors. The paper is based on fieldwork in Montréal and Buenos Aires. (shrink)

Sweden features near the top of most gender-equality rankings. The World Economic Forum rates it as having one of the narrowest gender gaps in the world. But Sweden is not only a good place to be a woman: it also appears to be an idyll for new dads. Close to 90% of Swedish fathers take paternity leave. In 2013, some 340,000 dads took a total of 12 million days’ leave, equivalent to about seven weeks each. Women take even (...) more leave days to spend time with their children, but the gap is shrinking. Why do Swedish dads take so much time off work to raise their children? (shrink)

Near the end of Euripides' "Helen", Helen reportedly exhorts the Greek troops to rescue her Egyptian foes: "Where is the glory of Troy ? Show it to these barbarians" . Helen's rallying cry serves as a point of departure for investigating the nature and status of kleos in a play which invites reframing her question: Where, indeed, is the glory of Troy if the report of Helen's abduction by Paris is untrue? The drama deconstructs the notion of a unitary, (...) transcendent meaning of "kleos" by demonstrating the slippage between its two root-meanings in Homer as "immortal fame," legitimated by the gods, and as mere "report" or "rumor." A diminution of the status of the proper name runs in parallel with this slippage between the two senses of "kleos": the heroic name loses its privileged status as a stable, transparent sign of character and becomes instead a signifier vulnerable to dissemination . As a vehicle of deception, Helen's phantom-twin becomes a figure for the polysemy of the signifier, both visual and linguistic. The phantom's substitution for Helen also highlights her symbolic role as a marker of men's status in a competitive system of exchange. If the play presents Helen as a continual object of men's attempts to capture her in song as well as in war, it presents heroic kleos as an equally insecure possession, insofar as it is always contingent on the "report" of others. Indeed, Helen becomes a metaphor for the duplicity inherent in the mimetic process by which fame is transmitted. That "kleos" turns out to have been a dangerously deceptive signifier is a lesson of more than literary interest for the Athenians watching Euripides' "Helen" -the forces of the Sicilian expedition had been annihilated only a year earlier. (shrink)

The history and effects of British imperialism in Fiji created a model for analyzing the semiotics of cultural identity. Following the acquisition of land in Fiji, the British recruited impoverished people from India and relocated them as indentured servants to do work on sugar cane plantations that natives refused to do. When Fiji became independent nearly 100 years later, the island nation had nearly equal populations of native Fijians and people of Indian decent. Fiji experienced three military coupes between 1987 (...) and 2000 while the two ethnic and culturally distinct groups competed for jobs and political power. As a small, island nation, identity-based communication in Fiji represents a microcosm of other more complex multicultural societies. This study examines the semiotics of cultural identity among the people of Fiji. (shrink)

International borders concentrate opportunities in some societies while limiting them in others. Borders also prevent those in the less favored societies from gaining access to opportunities available in the more favored ones. Both distributive effects of borders are treated here within a comprehensive framework. I argue that each state should have broad discretion under international law to grant or deny entry to immigration seekers; but more favored countries that find themselves under immigration pressure should be legally obligated to fund development (...) assistance for countries that generate immigration pressure. Funding should be subject to conditions of fair and effective use in recipient countries, and should aim at a near-term target of immigration-pressure equilibrium. Equilibrium obtains between two countries when, given appropriate background circumstances, the same proportion of individuals in each manifests a preference to migrate to the other. If meeting the equilibrium target in the short term would be to the long-term disadvantage of the worst-off countries, then a Pareto-superior alternative target supersedes. It mandates development assistance at the level that yields the most favorable human development projections for the worstoff countries. An implementable set of institutions is described that can achieve the equilibrium goal in the long term without unduly sacrificing other important ends, including economic growth, political stability, cultural integrity, the political autonomy of distinct societies, and their proper accountability for policy choices. Key Words: global justice • immigration • borders • development • distributive justice • development assistance • equality • international law • cosmopolitanism. (shrink)