Results for 'normative realism'

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  1. Meta‐normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive.Jeff Behrends - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.
    In this article, I articulate and respond to an epistemological challenge to meta-normative realism. The challenge has it that, if realism about the normative is correct, and if evolutionary forces have significantly influenced our normative judgments, then it would be a remarkable coincidence if the content of the normative facts and our normative judgments were aligned. I criticize David Enoch's recent attempt to meet this challenge, but provide an alternative response that is structurally (...)
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  2.  92
    Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - 2018 - Philosophia 51 (1):349–366.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
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  3. Normative realism: co-reference without convergence?Laura Schroeter - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    This paper examines whether realists can explain co-reference without appealing to subjects’ ideal convergence in judgment. This question is particularly pressing in the normative domain, since deep disagreement about the applicability of normative predicates suggests that different speakers may not pick out the same property when they use normative terms. Normative realists, we believe, have not been sufficiently aware of the difficulties involved in providing a theory of reference-determination. Our aim in this paper is to clarify (...)
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  4. Dehorning the Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism.Michael J. Deem - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (5):727-746.
    Normative realists tend to consider evolutionary debunking arguments as posing epistemological challenges to their view. By understanding Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian dilemma’ argument in this way, they have overlooked and left unanswered her unique scientific challenge to normative realism. This paper counters Street’s scientific challenge and shows that normative realism is compatible with an evolutionary view of human evaluative judgment. After presenting several problems that her adaptive link account of evaluative judgments faces, I outline and defend (...)
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  5. Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane, Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson.T. M. Scanlon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):877-897.
    In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.
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  6. Normative realism and Brentanian accounts of fittingness.Reuben Sass - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-25.
    Brentano is often considered the originator of the fitting-attitudes analysis of value, on which to be valuable is to be that which it’s fitting to value. But there has been comparatively little attention paid to Brentano’s argument for this analysis. That argument advances the stronger claim that fittingness is part of the analysis of normativity. Since the argument rests on an analogy between truth and fittingness, its impact may seem limited by the idiosyncratic features of Brentano’s later notion of truth. (...)
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  7. Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
    Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that (...)
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  8. Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.Erik Joseph Wielenberg - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Erik J. Wielenberg draws on recent work in analytic philosophy and empirical moral psychology to defend non-theistic robust normative realism, according to which there are objective ethical features of the universe that do not depend on God for their existence. He goes on to develop an empirically-grounded account of human moral knowledge.
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  9.  72
    Normative realism, or Bernard Williams and ethics at the limit.Joseph Mendola - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):306 – 318.
    Recent arguments for normative realism have centered on attempts to meet a demand on normative facts articulated by harman, That they be required for explanations of uncontroversial phenomena. This paper argues that another argument for normative realism should take precedence, An argument suggested by williams's skeptical discussion of moral objectivity in "ethics and the limits of philosophy".
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  10. Normative Realism.Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.) - forthcoming
    Normativity is both one of the most important and ubiquitous of phenomena and, despite its historical centrality to philosophy, one of the least understood. The idea that there might be objective, attitude-independent, truths about what we ought to do (morality), what we ought to believe (rationality) or what we ought to appreciate (aesthetics), has always seemed very puzzling to philosophers, even though ordinary thought seems steeped in such judgments. -/- Up until quite recently, the received view was that there was (...)
     
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  11. Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism.Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):126-136.
    Normative realists might be assumed to have few worries about semantics. After all, a realist might initially hope to simply adopt the best semantic theory about ordinary descriptive language. However, beginning with the non-cognitivist appropriation of the open question argument, a number of philosophers have posed serious objections to the realist’s ability to offer a plausible semantic theory. This paper introduces the two most influential semantic challenges to normative realism: the open question argument, and the Moral Twin (...)
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  12.  37
    Normative Institutionalism and Normative Realism. A Comparison.Carla Faralli - 1993 - Ratio Juris 6 (2):181-189.
    MacCormick and Weinberger's normative institutionalism, or neo‐institutionalist theory, is propounded as “a socially realistic development of normativism.” This theory blends normativism and realism and represents the coherent outcome of two components of each author's thought: normativism from the standpoint of legal theory; neo‐empiricism from the standpoint of philosophy generally. Scandinavian legal realism, or normative realism, is the only school of jurisprudence that can be understood as a direct offspring of one of the philosophical currents (i.e., (...)
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    Abductive Moral Arguments and Godless Normative Realism: An Evaluation of Explanations for Moral Facts and Motivations for Moral Behavior.Jonathan Smith - 2020 - Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1).
    Within this paper, I examine Godless normative realism, a naturalistic explanation of morality given by Erik Wielenberg and determine whether the theory poses a threat to abductive moral arguments for the existence of God. In particular, I argue that Wielenberg’s theory is a possible explanation for the existence of moral facts and that it offers a motivation for one to act morally, but that theism, as a whole, remains a better explanation for the moral aspects of the world. (...)
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  14. Deliberative Authority and Representational Determinacy: A Challenge for the Normative Realist.Tristram McPherson - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Controversy about the credibility of normative realism is endemic to contemporary metaethics. Some take realism to be “obviously, the default position,” while others, to put it mildly, do not., In the face of such persistent controversy, it can be valuable to step back from the myriad arguments for and against realism, and seek to understand the challenges that face this view in their deepest and most general form. This paper aims to achieve this deeper understanding with (...)
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  15. Realism and relativism about the normative.Paul Boghossian - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I defend normative realism—the claim that there are mind-independent, absolute normative facts—mostly by arguing against its rivals. Against mind-dependent theories of normativity, I argue that at least one highly influential version of such a view, Lewis's dispositional theory of value, is subject to at least three severe problems: the problem of the implausible contingency of value, the problem of ideal conditions, and the problem of lack of convergence. Against relativistic conceptions of normativity, I argue that either they (...)
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  16. Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4107-4124.
    In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.
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  17. What is at Stake in Debates among Normative Realists?Tristram McPherson - 2013 - Noûs 49 (1):123-146.
    One class of central debates between normative realists appears to concern whether we should be naturalists or reductionists about the normative. However, metaethical discussion of naturalism and reduction is often inconsistent, murky, or uninformative. This can make it hard to see why commitments relative to these metaphysical categories should matter to normative realists. This paper aims to clarify the nature of these categories, and their significance in debates between normative realists. I develop and defend what I (...)
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  18. Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity.David Plunkett - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):509-534.
    In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a “variance thesis” about our most fundamental (and seemingly most “authoritative”) normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with “ardent realism” about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of “referential normativity” in response to this challenge. I argue that, even if Eklund is right in his core (...)
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  19. Toothlessness Is Not a Problem for Normative Realism: A Reply to Barta.DiDomenico David - 2024 - Southwest Philosophy Review 40 (2):83-88.
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  20. A Plantingian Pickle for a Darwinian Dilemma: Evolutionary Arguments Against Atheism and Normative Realism.Daniel Crow - 2015 - Ratio 29 (2):130-148.
    Two of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments are Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma for Normative Realism and Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Atheism. In the former, Street appeals to evolutionary considerations to debunk normative realism. In the latter, Plantinga appeals to similar considerations to debunk atheism. By a careful comparison of these two arguments, I develop a new strategy to help normative realists resist Street's debunking attempt. In her Darwinian Dilemma, Street makes epistemological commitments that (...)
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  21. Finding by making : the mediating role of social constructions, commitments, and resonance in Hegelian normative realism.Arto Laitinen - 2020 - In James Gledhill & Sebastian Stein (eds.), Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy: Beyond Kantian Constructivism. New York: Routledge.
     
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  22.  13
    Naturalism, realism, and normativity.Hilary Putnam - 2016 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Edited by Mario De Caro.
    This collection of essays by Hilary Putnam, one of the very few contemporary grand masters of philosophy, presents the last development of Putnam's reflections regarding the core issue of his entire career: how to develop a form of philosophical realism able to account for both the scientific and the humanistic view of the world - that is, a conception in which the naturalistic view of the world can be reconciled with the acknowledgment that normative phenomena are a fundamental (...)
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  23.  7
    Moral Realism and Religious Beliefs: Analysing the Foundations of Ethical Normativity in Theistic Traditions.Eleanor Brighton - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2):255-269.
    The aim of research is to determine moral Realism and religious Beliefs. Regardless of whether moral truths correspond to moral facts or characterise moral qualities, Peripatetics and moral constructivists, on the other hand, believe that moral truths are discovered via an analysis of the circumstances of practical reasoning and human interests. Moral constructivism's perspective on the existence of moral characteristics is similar to Mullā Ṣadrā's on the Platonic Form of the Good. Because he believed that universal conceptions should be (...)
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  24.  64
    Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, by Erik J. Wielenberg.Angus Menuge - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):249-253.
  25. Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral (and Normative) Realism?Justin Morton - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (3):291-312.
    Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet (...)
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  26. Why realists must reject normative quietism.Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2795-2817.
    The last two decades have seen a surge of support for normative quietism: most notably, from Dworkin, Nagel, Parfit and Scanlon. Detractors like Enoch and McPherson object that quietism is incompatible with realism about normativity. The resulting debate has stagnated somewhat. In this paper I explore and defend a more promising way of developing that objection: I’ll argue that if normative quietism is true, we can create reasons out of thin air, so normative realists must reject (...)
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  27.  52
    Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, written by Erik J. Wielenberg.Matthew Carey Jordan - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):785-788.
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  28. Review of Erik Wielenberg's Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism[REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):541-545.
    This article is a short book review of Erik Wielenberg's book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.
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  29.  98
    Realism and Political Normativity.Matt Sleat - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):465-478.
    A prevailing understanding of realism, chiefly among its critics, casts realists as those who seek a ‘distinctively political normativity’, where this is interpreted as meaning nonmoral in kind. Moralists, on this account, are those who reject this and believe that political normativity remains moral. Critics have then focused much of their attention on demonstrating that the search for a nonmoral political normativity is doomed to fail which, if right, would then seem to fatally undermine the realist endeavour. This paper (...)
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  30.  87
    If You Cannot Help Being Committed to It, then It Exists: A Defence of Robust Normative Realism.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 32 (4):823-841.
    This review article examines David Enoch’s recent book Taking Morality Seriously and focuses on ‘the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative truths’ which is a central argument of the book. I will show that this important and original argument as it stands fails. I will also argue that if Enoch had embraced all the consequences of his argument, then he would have opened up a more promising line of argument via which to defend the robust realism of normative (...)
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  31. Realism in Normative Political Theory.Enzo Rossi & Matt Sleat - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):689-701.
    This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the (...)
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  32. (1 other version)Ardent realism without referential normativity.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper addresses a central positive claim in Matti Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts: that a certain kind of metaphysically ambitious realist about normativity – the ardent realist – is committed to the metasemantic idea that the distinctive inferential role of normative concepts suffices to fix the extension of those concepts. I argue first that commitment to this sort of inferential role metasemantic view does nothing to secure ardent realism. I then show how the ardent realist can address (...)
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  33. Connie Rosati, University of Arizona.Constitutional Realism - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  34.  38
    Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.William Lane Craig - 2017 - Philosophia Christi 19 (2):473-478.
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  35.  39
    Eric Wielenberg, Robust Ethics. The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 196 pp., £35 , ISBN 9780198714323. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):482-488.
  36. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity.Hilary Putnam - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):312--328.
    ABSTRACT:This essay describes three commitments that have become central to the author's philosophical outlook, namely, to liberal naturalism, to metaphysical realism, and to the epistemic and ontological objectivity of normative judgments.Liberal naturalismis contrasted with familiar scientistic versions of naturalism and their project of forcing explanations in every field into models derived from one or another particular science. The form ofmetaphysical realismthat the author endorses rejects every form of verificationism, including the author's one-time ‘internal realism’, and insists that (...)
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  37.  93
    Realist-expressivism and the fundamental role of normative belief.David Copp - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1333-1356.
    The goal of this paper is to show that a cognitivist–externalist view about moral judgment is compatible with a key intuition that motivates non-cognitivist expressivism. This is the intuition that normative judgments have a close connection to action that ordinary “descriptive factual beliefs” do not have, or, as James Dreier has suggested, that part of the fundamental role of normative judgment is to motivate. One might think that cognitivist–externalist positions about normative judgment are committed to viewing (...) judgments as having the same role in our psychology as ordinary descriptive factual beliefs. This paper argues to the contrary. It restricts attention to moral judgments. It develops an account of moral belief according to which, first, moral beliefs are representational cognitive states that have the same basic nature as ordinary descriptive factual beliefs. Yet, second, their fundamental role is such that, when all goes well, moral beliefs mesh with our moral policies to motivate action. The paper draws on a society-centered account of the grounding of morality, a distinction between “basic” and “internal” ways of thinking of the moral properties, and a hybrid account of the “meaning” of moral predicates, called “realist-expressivism.”. (shrink)
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  38.  62
    Robust Realism in Ethics: Normative Arbitrariness, Interpersonal Dialogue, and Moral Objectivity.Stephen Ingram - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides the first in-depth analysis. He argues that, in order to capture the normative non-arbitrariness of moral choice, we must commit to the existence of robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, non-natural moral facts. Specifically, he identifies five ways in which a metaethical theory might fail to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. The first involves claims about the bruteness of (...)
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  39.  43
    (1 other version)Normativity and the Realist Stance in Semantics.Giacomo Turbanti - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (21).
    Recent attempts to define and support realism in semantics seem to acknowledge, as the only defence from skeptical attacks to the notion of meaning, a flat acceptance of the existence of representational relations between language and things in the world. In this paper I reconsider part of the mistrust about the normative character of meaning, in order to show that some of the worries urging the realists to cling on representationalism actually rest on misconceptions. To the contrary, I (...)
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  40.  28
    A realistic view on normative conflicts.Daniela Glavaničová & Matteo Pascucci - 2020 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 29 (3):447-462.
    Kulicki and Trypuz (2016) introduced three systems of multivalued deontic action logic to handle normative conflicts. The first system suggests a pessimistic view on normative conflicts, according to which any conflicting option represents something forbidden; the second system suggests an optimistic view, according to which any conflicting option represents something obligatory; finally, the third system suggests a neutral view, according to which any conflicting option represents something that is neither obligatory nor forbidden. The aim of the present paper (...)
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  41. The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  42. Review of Erik J. Wielenberg’s “Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism”. [REVIEW]Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Ethical Perspectives 22 (3):509-513.
    Erik Wielenberg’s new book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism aims at defending a non-theistic of ‘robust normative realism’: the metaethical view that normative properties exist, and have four features: (1) objectivity, (2) non-naturalness, (3) irreducibility, and (4) causal inertness. In my review I criticize that Wielenberg does not address semantic issues which are crucial both to defending robust normative realism, and to assessing the empirical claims he makes. Moreover, (...)
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  43. Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversity.Machery Edouard, Kelly Daniel & P. Stich Stephen - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):830-830.
    We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.
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  44.  43
    : Robust Realism in Ethics: Normative Arbitrariness, Interpersonal Dialogue, and Moral Objectivity.Olle Risberg - 2024 - Ethics 135 (1):179-184.
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  45. Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism About Rational Norms.Emer O’Hagan - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):17-31.
    I defend constitutivism against two prominent objections and argue that agential constitutivism has the resources to take normative and ethical deliberation seriously. I first consider David Enoch’s shmagency challenge and argue that it does not form a coherent objection. I counter Enoch’s view that the phenomenology of first-person deliberation pragmatically justifies belief in irreducibly realist normative truths, claiming that constitutivism can respect the practice of moral deliberation without appeal to robustly realist truths. Secondly, I argue that the error (...)
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  46. Quasi-realism, acquaintance, and the normative claims of aesthetic judgement.Cain Samuel Todd - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
    My primary aim in this paper is to outline a quasi-realist theory of aesthetic judgement. Robert Hopkins has recently argued against the plausibility of this project because he claims that quasi-realism cannot explain a central component of any expressivist understanding of aesthetic judgements, namely their supposed ‘autonomy’. I argue against Hopkins’s claims by contending that Roger Scruton’s aesthetic attitude theory, centred on his account of the imagination, provides us with the means to develop a plausible quasi-realist account of aesthetic (...)
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  47. Aesthetic Normativity and Realism.Jan Hrkut - 2012 - Filozofia 67 (5):353-361.
  48. Normative ethics and the prospects of an empirical contribution to assessment of moral disagreement and moral realism.Andrew Sneddon - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):447-455.
    The familiar argument from disagreement has been an important focal point of discussion in contemporary meta-ethics. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion of interdisciplinary work between philosophers and psychologists about moral psychology. Working within this trend, John Doris and Alexandra Plakias have made a tentative version of the argument from disagreement on empirical grounds. Doris and Plakias present empirical evidence in support of premise 4, that ethics is beset by fundamental disagreement. They examine Richard Brandt on Hopi (...)
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  49. Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism.Nathan Nobis - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    In this work I defend moral realism, the thesis that there are objective moral truths, by defending “epistemic realism.” Epistemic realism is the thesis that epistemic judgments, e.g., judgments that some belief is epistemically reasonable, or justified, or known or should be held, are sometimes true and made true by stance-independent epistemic facts and properties. -/- One might think that epistemic realism needs no defense because it is obviously true and nearly universally accepted. But there are (...)
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  50.  42
    Normativity and Radical Disadvantage in Bernard Williams’ Realist Theory of Legitimacy.Ben Cross - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (3):379-393.
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