Results for 'ontological permissivism'

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  1.  15
    Epistemic Permissivism and Symmetric Games.Brian Weatherson - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-13.
    Permissivism in epistemology is a family of theses, each of which says that rationality is compatible with a number of distinct attitudes. This paper argues that thinking about symmetric games gives us new reason to believe in permissivism. In some finite games, if permissivism is false then we have to think that a player is more likely to take one option rather than another, even though each option has the same expected return given that player’s credences. And (...)
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  2. Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism.Maegan Fairchild - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):619-638.
    Radically permissive ontologies like mereological universalism and material plenitude are typically motivated by concerns about arbitrariness or anthropocentrism: it would be objectionably arbitrary, the thought goes, to countenance only those objects that we ordinarily take there to be. Despite the prevalence of this idea, it isn't at all clear what it is for a theory to be “objectionably arbitrary,” or what follows from a commitment to avoiding arbitrariness in metaphysics. This paper aims to clarify both questions, and examines whether arguments (...)
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  3. Permissivism, Epistemic Utility, and Arbitrariness.André Eilertsen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    The paper addresses the issue of “epistemic permissivism”: does epistemic rationality ever permit more than one doxastic attitude to some proposition, given some body of evidence? One approach has taken up William James’s idea that there are different ways of weighing our two central cognitive goals as believers: Believe truth! Shun error! This motivates an affirmative answer to the question: agents with the same evidence can rationally come to different conclusions about some proposition because they weigh the importance of (...)
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  4. Paraphrase, categories, and ontology.Jonah Goldwater - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (1):39-56.
    Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView. The method of paraphrasing away apparent ontological commitments is a familiar tool for trimming one's ontology. Even so, I argue that aiming to avoid commitment via paraphrase is unjustified. The reason is the standard motivations for paraphrase rest on implicit yet faulty principles regarding ontological categories and categorization- or so I argue. These results also provide indirect support for a permissivist approach to ontology.
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  5.  96
    Schaffer, Sherlock and Shaddai.Hezki Symonds - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1244-1255.
    According to Schaffer, most of the controversial entities that ontologists debate exist. Schaffer calls this view permissivism and he defends it by appealing to easy arguments for the existence of the entities in question. Schaffer presents several easy arguments, but his easy argument for fictional characters and his easy argument for God play a crucial role in his defence of permissivism. In this paper, I argue that Schaffer doesn’t have the resources to defend his easy argument for fictional (...)
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  6. A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology.Simon Hewitt - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (2):159-166.
    Permissivist metaontology proposes answering customary existence questions in the affirmative. Many of the existence questions addressed by ontologists concern the existence of theoretical entities which admit precise formal specification. This causes trouble for the permissivist, since individually consistent formal theories can make pairwise inconsistent demands on the cardinality of the universe. We deploy a result of Gabriel Uzquiano’s to show that this possibility is realised in the case of two prominent existence debates and propose rejecting permissivism in favour of (...)
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  7. A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.
    Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that the evidence can rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. Pascal’s wager is the idea that one ought to believe in God for practical reasons, because of what one can gain if theism is true and what one has to lose if theism is false. In this paper, I argue that if epistemic permissivism is true, then the defender of Pascal’s wager has powerful responses to two prominent objections. First, I (...)
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  8. (1 other version)Against Conservatism in Metaphysics.Maegan Fairchild & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:45-75.
    In his recent book, Daniel Korman contrasts ontological conservatives with permissivists and eliminativists about ontology. Roughly speaking, conservatives admit the existence of ‘ordinary objects' like trees, dogs, and snowballs, but deny the existence of ‘extraordinary objects', like composites of trees and dogs. Eliminativists, on the other hand, deny many or all ordinary objects, while permissivists accept both ordinary and extraordinary objects. Our aim in this paper is to outline some of our reasons for being drawn to permissivism, as (...)
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  9. Chapter two autobiography, ontology and responsibility Roy Elveton.Ontology Autobiography - 2009 - In B. P. O'Donohoe & R. O. Elveton (eds.), Sartre's second century. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 17.
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  10.  19
    caracteristica-actividad. See part-whole relation/steps-activity causal relation certainty in. See certainty.Basic Formal Ontology - 2010 - In Alain Auger & Caroline Barrière (eds.), Probing Semantic Relations: Exploration and Identification in Specialized Texts. John Benjamins. pp. 149.
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  11. History in the Philosophy of Heidegger.".Ontology Phenomenology - 1958 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 12:117-32.
     
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  12.  59
    The controversy over res in philosophy of science and the mysteries of ontological neutrality.Ontological Neutrality - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (2):141.
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  13. Bantu philosophy.Bantu Ontology - forthcoming - African Philosophy: A Classical Approach.
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  14. Argument's value1.Ontological Arguments & G. O. D. In - 1998 - In William L. Rowe & William J. Wainwright (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 2--54.
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  15. Goran Sundholm.Ontologic Versus Epistemologic - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 373.
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  16.  16
    Keith Campbell.Of Ontology - 2012 - In Leila Haaparanta & Heikki J. Koskinen (eds.), Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic. Oxford, England: OUP USA. pp. 420.
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  17. Mario Bunge.Semantics To Ontology - 1974 - In Edgar Morscher, Johannes Czermak & Paul Weingartner (eds.), Problems in logic and ontology. Graz: Akadem. Druck- u. Verlagsanst..
  18.  21
    Chislwlm, Internalism, and Knowing that One Knows, CHRISTOPHER H. CONN.Ontological Minimalism - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2).
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  19. Jonathan Edwards.Dispositional Ontology - 2009 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), Medieval Philosophy of Religion: The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, Volume 2. Routledge. pp. 3--223.
     
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  20.  27
    The Scope Argument, MICHAEL O'ROURKE.Against Musical Ontology & Aaron Ridley - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (3).
  21. Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.
    Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can (...)
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  22.  30
    Models back in the bunk. [REVIEW]Deriving Methodology From Ontology & A. Decade of Feminist Economics - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):599-621.
    A review of U. Mäki (ed.). Fact and Fiction in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. xvi 384. ISBN 0521 00957. As people interested mainly in theory, methodologists and philos...
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  23. Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.
    Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP (...)
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  24. Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.
    In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate (...)
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  25. Index of volume 79, 2001.Stephen Buckle, Miracles Marvels, Mundane Order, Temporal Solipsism, Robert Kirk, Nonreductive Physicalism, Strict Implication, Donald Mertz Individuation, Instance Ontology & Dale E. Miller - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):594-596.
     
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  26. Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.
    Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield’s prima facie promising attempt to answer (...)
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  27. Plausible Permissivism.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscript
    Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer (...)
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  28. Permissivism and the Truth Connection.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):641-656.
    Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called “truth-connection” enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy (...)
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  29. Permissivism About Religious Belief.Elizabeth Jackson - manuscript
    In this chapter, I argue that theistic belief is permissive belief. This is not a universal claim about persons or normative domains, but the claim that, for many common bodies of evidence, epistemic rationality is permissive about whether God exists. Marks of a permissive belief are rational disagreement over time, rational disagreement over persons, and powerful evidence on both sides. I argue that theistic belief fits all these criteria. I also show how considerations from divine hiddenness support permissivism about (...)
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  30. Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.
    There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called epistemic permissivism. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I present a taxonomy of forms of (...)
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  31. Permissivism and Intellectual Virtue.Troy Seagraves - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues for a permissivism of personal rationality, a rationality concerning the epistemic evaluation of persons. I work from the perspective of virtue epistemology where the standards of evaluation are the intellectual character virtues. On this picture, an agent is personally rational in having a doxastic attitude when having it is the result of some exemplification of an intellectual virtue. Permissive cases arise when the emotional components of intellectual virtues conflict, making some potential conclusions both enabled and disabled (...)
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  32. EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.
    Extreme Permissivism is the view that a body of evidence could rationally permit both the attitude of belief and disbelief towards a proposition. This paper puts forward a new argument against Extreme Permissivism, which improves on a similar style of argument due to Roger White (2005, 2014). White’s argument is built around the principle that the support relation between evidence and a hypothesis is objective: so that if evidence E makes it rational for an agent to believe a (...)
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  33. Comparative Dialectics: Nishida Kitaro's Logic of Place and Western Dialectical Thought By GS Axtell Philosophy East and West Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 1991). [REVIEW]I. I. Methodological & Ontological Materialism - 1991 - Philosophy East and West 41 (2):163-184.
  34. The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme (4):654-673.
    The debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism concerns whether a body of evidence sometimes allows multiple doxastic attitudes towards a proposition. An important motivation for Uniqueness is the so-called ‘arbitrariness argument,’ which says that Permissivism leads to some unacceptable arbitrariness with regard to one's beliefs. An influential response to the argument says that the arbitrariness in beliefs can be avoided by invoking epistemic standards. In this paper, I argue that such a response to the arbitrariness argument is unsuccessful. Then (...)
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  35. Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.
    In recent debates over permissivism and uniqueness—two theses concerning the relationship between evidence and epistemic rationality—some philosophers have claimed that permissivism has an intuitive advantage over uniqueness. I examine the cases alleged to intuitively motivate permissivism and suggest they do not provide prima facie support for permissivism. I conclude by explaining how my discussion bears on whether permissivism can defeat skeptical arguments based on recognized peer disagreement and the historical contingency of our beliefs.
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  36.  50
    Permissivism and Mismatched Granularity.A. Muralidharan - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Permissivism is the claim that more than one doxastic attitude towards a proposition can at least sometimes be justified by the same total body of evidence. Impermissivism, the negation of Permissivism, is commonly taken to involve evidentialist assumptions. The only versions of Permissivism consistent with evidentialist assumptions are those which combine coarse-grained accounts of doxastic attitudes with fine-grained accounts of evidential support, as with Blake Roeber’s equipollent cases or vice-versa with fine-grained accounts of doxastic attitudes combined with (...)
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  37. Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  38. (1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.
    In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes (...)
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  39. Epistemic Permissivism and Reasonable Pluralism.Rach Cosker-Rowland & Robert Mark Simpson - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 112-122.
    There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...)
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  40. A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.
    Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. I give two positive arguments for IaBP; the first involves epistemic supererogation and the second involves doubt. Then, I should how these arguments give intrapersonal permissivists a distinct response to (...)
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  41. Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):515-532.
    Ginger Schultheis offers a novel and interesting argument against epistemic permissivism. While we think that her argument is ultimately uncompelling, we think its faults are instructive. We explore the relationship between epistemic permissivism, Margin-for-Error principles, and an epistemological version of Dominance reasoning.
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  42.  21
    Jacek Pasnic/ck.Complex Properties Do We Need & Inour Ontology - 2006 - In J. Jadacki & J. Pasniczek (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation. Reidel. pp. 113.
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  43. Permissivism, underdetermination, and evidence.Elisabeth Jackson & Greta LaFore - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
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  44. Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.
    A number of authors have defended permissivism by appealing to rational supererogation, the thought that some doxastic states might be rationally permissible even though there are other, more rational beliefs available. If this is correct, then there are situations that allow for multiple rational doxastic responses, even if some of those responses are rationally suboptimal. In this paper, I will argue that this is the wrong approach to defending permissivism—there are no doxastic states that are rationally supererogatory. By (...)
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  45. Permissivism.Julia Smith - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Epistemic permissivists believe that sometimes, incompatible doxastic attitudes—such as belief and suspension of judgment—can both be rational responses to a proposition given a single body of evidence. Epistemic impermissivists believe that a body of evidence always determines a unique rational doxastic attitude toward a proposition. This entry provides an overview of the current state of the debate between epistemic permissivists and impermissivists. Three important choice points for the permissivist are identified, and implications are discussed for the plausibility of the resulting (...)
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  46. Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & LIttlefield. pp. 201-215.
    Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
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  47.  72
    Permissivism and self-fulfilling propositions.Anantharaman Muralidharan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):217-226.
    Recently, self-fulfilling cases, that is, ones in which an agent's believing a proposition guarantees its truth, have been offered as counterexamples to uniqueness. According to uniqueness, at most one doxastic attitude is epistemically rational given the evidence. I argue that self-fulfilling cases are not counterexamples to uniqueness because belief-formation is not governed by epistemic rationality in such cases. Specifically, this is because epistemic rationality is not just about forming true beliefs, but about tracking mind-independent truths. In support of the latter (...)
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  48.  20
    Ontology development by domain experts (without using the “O” word).Andrea Westerinen & Rebecca Tauber - 2017 - Applied ontology 12 (3-4):299-311.
    Ontologies are created to describe and reason over the knowledge of a domain of interest. This requires deep understanding of the domain, and therefore, the input and collaboration of the domain’s...
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  49. A Partial Defense of Permissivism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Ratio 30 (1):57-71.
    Permissivism is the view that sometimes an agent's total evidential state entails both that she is epistemically permitted to believe that P and that she is epistemically permitted to believe that Q, where P and Q are contradictories. Uniqueness is the denial of Permissivism. Permissivism has recently come under attack on several fronts. If these attacks are successful, then we may be forced to accept an unwelcome asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. In this essay I clarify (...)
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  50. The Truth Problem for Permissivism.Sophie Horowitz - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262.
    Epistemologists often assume that rationality bears an important connection to the truth. In this paper I examine the implications of this commitment for permissivism: if rationality is a guide to the truth, can it also allow some leeway in how we should respond to our evidence? I first discuss a particular strategy for connecting permissive rationality and the truth, developed in a recent paper by Miriam Schoenfield. I argue that this limited truth-connection is unsatisfying, and the version of (...) that supports it faces serious challenges; so, for mainstream permissivism, the truth problem is still unsolved. I then discuss a strategy available to impermissivists, according to which rationality bears a quite strong connection to truth. I argue that this second strategy is successful. (shrink)
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