The concept of the unity of existence finds resonance in both Islamic philosophy, particularly in the Transcendental philosophy of Molla Sadra, and the Advaita Vedanta school of Indian philosophy, notably championed by the mystic philosopher Sankara. Molla Sadra's philosophical framework is rooted in the intertwining principles of Multiplicity within Unity and Unity within Multiplicity, (Kathrat fil Wahdat, Wahdat fil Kathrat) elucidated through two key theories: (I) Gradational unity of existence, (Al Wujud Al Tashkiki) and (...) (II) Individual unity of existence. (Wahadat al Shkaksi) Sankara, a mystic philosopher within the Vedanta tradition, expounds upon the unity of existence through non-dualism, positing that Atman (individual soul) is identical to Brahman (universal consciousness). His philosophical stance involves dismantling the perceived realm of multiplicity by invoking the concept of cosmic illusion, referred to as the doctrine of Maya. This paper delves into an exploration of the perspectives of Molla Sadra and Sankara regarding the unity of existence. While both thinkers share the notion that a singular reality is concealed by a metaphorical veil, they each draw inspiration from their respective sacred texts-the Quran for Molla Sadra and the Vedas for Sankara. Consequently, they have formulated comprehensive systems of thought grounded in principles and assertions that invite scrutiny. However, it is essential to note that some disparities exist in their ideas. This paper aims to elucidate the commonalities and divergences between Molla Sadra's and Sankara's philosophies, shedding light on the similarities and polarities inherent in their conceptualizations of the unity of existence. (shrink)

In this study, the rational criticism directed by Ibn Tayymiyya (d. 1338) to the philosophical evidence used to prove the unity of the necessary existent in the book Kitāb al-Is̲h̲ārāt wa al-tanbīhāt, which is accepted as a constitutive text in the history of Islamic philosophy, is examined. Author of the aforementioned book Avicenna (d. 1037) tries to prove the unity of the necessary existent from different ways in his books. Kitāb al-Is̲h̲ārāt wa al-tanbīhāt is a book that includes (...) one of these ways. The evidence that Avicenna uses in that book comprises of two preliminaries. The first preliminary is made up of specifying the relation between the thing that the different perceptible particular entities are common and are different. The second one is based on proving the existence not to be the cause of essence by centering the difference of existence and essence. Ibn Taymiyya, who criticizes philosophers in many ways, criticizes this evidence used by Avicenna in his work Mes’eletün fî tevḥîdi’l-felâsife. Rejecting the logic of Mashshaiyyun as science, Ibn Taymiyya also tried to refute the philosophical and logical rules that philosophers accept and use. In this context, Ibn Taymiyya argues that not only the preliminary presuppositions of the philosopher's argument to prove the unity of the necessary being, but also that the logical principles and rules previously accepted by the philosopher are false. One of the most important issues criticized by the thinker in relation to the subject is the reality of concepts, the existence of universals, how universals are moved to particulars, and the state of quiddity. According to him, concepts are mental and universals do not have a reality in the external world. Again, he thinks that universals like humanity are attributed to particulars as attributes, and therefore, in a way, he denies the universal being universal. Because, according to Ibn Taymiyya, a certain attribute of a being that is particular cannot be universal unlike itself. According to the thinker, the commonality in the concepts that logicians call universal consists only of a linguistic partnership. Undoubtedly, it can be said that Ibn Taymiyya's thought on the issue of concepts is close to nominalistic approach in a way. But he does not directly deny the reality of the concepts. For, according to him, the concepts that are universally formed in the minds are actually realized particularly. That is to say, the universal humanity has been realized particularly in individuals such as Ahmet and Mehmet. In other words, because the humanity in individuals is particular, Ahmet's humanity is different from Mehmet's humanity. For this reason, there can be no real partnership among the examples given. In this context, the unity distinction made by Ibn Taymiyya in understanding his thoughts is helpful. According to him, unity is of two types, real and qualitative. Real unity is the unity that exists in the essence of the individual. The qualitative unity is the unity that exists between the things under the concept of the universal. However, the qualitative unity is not considered as a unity since it does not occur in the external world. In fact, this is what distinguishes Ibn Taymiyya from nominalist thinkers. If we turn back to the evidence of Avicenna, based on the objections that Ibn Taymiyya made to the logic and philosophical principles of Mashshaiyyun in general, we can say that the thinker criticized the precedents of this argument by emphasizing the knowledge that universal concepts are intellectual entities. He emphasizes the examples that Avicenna uses to show the affiliation among the things are only made up of universal notions and alleges them not to have perceptible entity. Thus, he says that there is not a real affiliation among different particular entities that have perceptible existence. As to the second preliminary, Ibn Taymiyya says that this preliminary is also inaccurate for the reason that it is, like the first preliminary, based on the knowledge that the intellectual entities had come true in the physical world. According to him, the essence is made up of intellectual conceptualization. Therefore, it has not physical reality. After criticizing the preliminaries in this manner, Ibn Taymiyya says that the analogy that consists of these preliminaries is also erroneous. Because the analogy that is based on erroneous preliminaries does not give a correct result. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 275-291 [Access article in PDF] The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric 1 - [PDF] Alan G. Gross and Marcelo Dascal The standard view--that the Rhetoric lacks conceptual unity--has strong and prestigious support, stretching over most of the century. To David Ross in 1923 the unity of the Rhetoric was practical, not theoretical; to misunderstand this fact was to see this work, (...) mistakenly, as "a curious jumble of literary criticism with second-rate logic, ethics, and politics, and jurisprudence, mixed with the cunning of one who knows well how the weaknesses of the human heart are to be played upon" (285). So unaltered has been this view over the years that, in 1995, Jonathan Barnes could turn Ross's metaphor into an argument concerning the Rhetoric's lack of intellectual focus: it presents, not one art, but fragments of three arts, and of three arts that exist quite independently of rhetoric. The sections on logic have the closest connections with dialectic and in part overlap with what Aristotle says in the Topics; the sections on the emotions are linked to the ethical and psychological writings; Book III... shares its subject matter with the Poetics. Rhetoric... is a magpie, thieving a piece of one art and a piece of another, and then botching a nest of its own. (Companion 263-64) To Ross and Barnes, while logos, êthos, and pathos are essential to rhetorical invention, and style and arrangement are essential to rhetorical performance, they have nothing conceptually in common. Insofar as disciplinary identity depends on such conceptual unity, rhetorical studies lack such identity.William Grimaldi offers an alternate view; beneath Ross's jumble, he sees as the work's fundamental unifying principle, the enthymeme, which serves both as a form of argument and as a source for arguments about fact, character, and emotion. On this view, the factual content of a rhetorical argument is structured logically, a structure that is then molded linguistically [End Page 275] by means of êthos and pathos to suit the requirements of the particular case: "The content of... statements, the manner in which propositions will be expressed, the language, and images in casting the statements will be determined by the topical examination of the ethos and pathos of [a] particular speaker-auditor's situation" (Commentary I, 335n). Grimaldi convinced no one that this was the case; as Jakob Wisse has pointed out, Grimaldi's interpretation takes unacceptable hermeneutic liberties (27-28); nothing in the Rhetoric supports his view of the enthymeme as the central organizing principle of the work.Although we agree that Grimaldi was mistaken, we would like to argue that he was correct in seeing inferential processes as the key to the Rhetoric's conceptual unity. We would like to claim, however, that, contrary to Grimaldi's view, each of the three pisteis is inference-based, as is the canon of style. Moreover, the canon of arrangement, while not inference-based for Aristotle, plays a vital role in strengthening the patterns of inference that speakers prefer; in addition, it can be inference-based, as Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have shown. So much conceptual unity seems to us consistent with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric; if such unity exists, it would mean that Aristotle was correct in calling rhetoric a tekhnê, which was, like dialectic or medicine, a unified body of knowledge (1.1.2-1354a1-14)We are not going to argue that the text as we have it is conceptually unified; obviously, no text that contains inconsistent views and serious ambiguities can be unified and there is little doubt that the Rhetoric contains such inconsistencies and ambiguities. With the aid of current scholarship, however, we intend to construct from the text a consistent theory of persuasion with inference as its base. In our construction, we will add nothing to Aristotle. But we will omit some passages--especially, a crucial one in which he seems clearly to spurn emotional and ethical means of persuasion (1.1.3-1354a16-45). We will also prefer some interpretations--especially an... (shrink)

Much recent attention has been paid to Kant’s account of the unity of space in the Critique of Pure Reason, not least because of the significant implications of that view for other key critical-period doctrines. But far less attention has been paid to the development of Kant’s account of the unity of space. This paper aims to offer a systematic account of Kant’s pre-critical account of the unity of space. On the view presented herein, Kant’s early account (...) of the unity of space is deeply rooted in his pre-critical cosmological views. In particular, I argue that Kant sees the unity of space as grounded in the cosmological unity of the world of substances, which is itself rooted in the divine conservation of all substances in relations of mutual causal dependence. I contend that the seeds of this view are present in the late 1740s and 1750s, but that this view receives its fullest and most complete expression in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation. The final section of the paper considers the fate of Kant’s pre-critical account of the unity of space. I contend that the theory is excluded from the Critique of Pure Reason in light of the strict epistemological strictures adopted in that text. But considerable textual evidence shows that Kant continues to aver the theory throughout the 1770s and 1780s in the looser epistemic context of his lectures. I contend, then, that this theory is not abandoned at all. Rather, like Kant’s 1763 proof of the existence of God, it is epistemically demoted: it is Kant’s preferred view, but one that falls short of the demanding epistemic standards of the critical philosophy. (shrink)

It is certainly simplifying to attribute a common way of thinking to vast human groups. This evident observation is particularly applicable when examining the ethnolinguistic ensemble traditionally designated as “Turkish-Mongolian”. The definition that can be given to this ensemble is based above all on linguistic facts. Two language families exist in Eurasia, Turkish and Mongolian respectively, scientifically well-defined and attested to, not only by living speakers but also by documents that go back, for the former, to the 8th century, and (...) to the 13th century for the latter. Moreover, there are considerable affinities between these two families, both in structure and in vocabulary; these affinities can be explained either through an original relationship between them or through many centuries of reciprocal influences, consequences of a long symbiosis. In addition, at a very early date there can be observed a very profound community of social structures and cultural traditions between the two groups (ranging from beliefs to material organization), the vestiges of which subsist even in our own times. (shrink)

Despite their distinct objects of study, the human behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. Unity in the behavioral sciences requires that there be a common underlying model of individual human behavior, specialized and enriched to meet the particular needs of each discipline. Such unity does not exist, and cannot be easily attained, since the various disciplines have incompatible models and disparate research methodologies. Yet recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for (...) class='Hi'>unity in the behavioral sciences, incorporating core principles from all fields, and based upon theoretical tools (game theory and the rational actor model) and data gathering techniques (experimental games in the laboratory and field) that transcend disciplinary boundaries. This article sketches a set of principles aimed at fostering such a unity. Key Words: behavioral science • game theory • experimental economics • rational actor model. (shrink)

In The Impossibility of Perfection, Michael Slote tries to show that the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of the virtues is mistaken. His argumentative strategy is to provide counterexamples to this doctrine, by showing that there are what he calls “partial virtues”—pairs of virtues that conflict with one another but both of which are ethically indispensible. Slote offers two lines of argument for the existence of partial virtues. The first is an argument for the partiality of a (...) particular pair of virtues: frankness and tact. The second is a kind of feminist critique. I argue that both of these lines of argument fail. In both cases, Slote fails to ask whether the apparent conflict between putatively partial virtues has arisen from a misunderstanding of the demands of those virtues. From this error I suggest we can learn an important lesson: whether in our studies thinking about the virtues or in our everyday lives trying to practice them, it is a serious mistake to focus on the relationships among virtues without considering precisely what each of these virtues demands. (shrink)

If the octopus were conscious, what would its consciousness be like? This paper investigates the structure octopus consciousness, if existent, is likely to exhibit. Presupposing that the configuration of an organism’s consciousness is correlated with that of its nervous system, it is unlikely that the structure of the sort of conscious experience that would arise from the highly decentralized octopus nervous system would bear much resemblance to those of vertebrates. In particular, octopus consciousness may not exhibit unity, which (...) has long been assumed to be the normal or default structure of consciousness. The octopus nervous system is characterized by the following features: its three anatomically distinct components have extensive functional autonomy and little intercommunication; much of the sensory processing and motor control routines—that in vertebrates are localized in the brain—take place within the peripheral arm nervous system; and proprioception and somatotopic representation are significantly downplayed. In this paper, I present the octopus as a highly successful biological organism in which it is plausible that the unified model of consciousness does not hold. (shrink)

Both Kant and Davidson view the existence of mental states, and so the possibility of mental content, as dependent on the obtaining of a certain unity among such states. And the unity at issue seems also to be tied, in the case of both thinkers, to a form of self-reflexivity. No appeal to self-reflexivity, however, can be adequate to explain the unity of consciousness that is necessary for the possibility of content- it merely shifts the focus (...) of the question from the unity of consciousness in general to the unity of self-reflexivity in particular. Through a comparison of the views of Kant and Davidson on these matters, the nature of the unity of consciousness is explored, in relation to both the idea of the unity of the self and the unity that would seem to be required for the possibility of content. These forms of unity are seen to be indeed connected, and to be grounded, in Davidson and perhaps also in Kant, in organized, oriented, embodied activity. (shrink)

The view that special science properties are multiply realizable has been attacked in recent years by Shapiro, Bechtel and Mundale, Polger, and others. Focusing on psychological and neuroscientific properties, I argue that these attacks are unsuccessful. By drawing on interspecies physiological comparisons I show that diverse physical mechanisms can converge on common functional properties at multiple levels. This is illustrated with examples from the psychophysics and neuroscience of early vision. This convergence is compatible with the existence of general constraints (...) on the evolution of cognitive systems, and does not involve any ad hoc typing of coarse-grained higher level properties. The mechanisms that realize these common higher level properties are really distinct by the criteria laid down by critics of multiple readability. Finally, I present an account of how such functional properties might constitute special science kinds by playing a central explanatory role in a range of cognitive models. Behavioral science kinds in particular are the functionally defined constituents picked out by our most successful models of the multilevel systems and mechanisms that explain cognitive capacities. (shrink)

The text considers the possibility of studying the Freudian psychoanalysis as a certain form of transcendentalism. In particular, it analyses the relation of Freud’sproposition concerning the strangeness within the subject—a strangeness called unconsciousness—to Kant’s claim about the necessity of the synthetic unity ofapperception. The study commences with Ricoeur’s reading of Freud’s teachings in order to demonstrate how, by introducing the language of transcendental philosophy into the reading of Freud’s works, Ricoeur omits the issue of the subjective conditions for (...) the constitution of any possible meaning. Next, searching for the possibility to formulate these conditions on the grounds of Freudian psychoanalysis, the text investigates relevant Heidegger’s reading of Kant. It finds in it the model justification for such understanding of the unity of “I think” which makes it, already at its core, conditioned by diversity identified with temporality. By attempting to grasp the contradiction between such a temporal condition for subjectivity and Freud’s postulate on the timeless nature of unconsciousness, the text applies Derrida’s criticism of the metaphysical conception of time, which is directed exactly at Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein. In consequence, it turns out that a profound justification seems to exist for the seemingly paradoxical Freudian statement about unconsciousness as linked with, on the one hand, the most primal intuitions still grounded in animism, and on the other, with a continuation of Kant’s teachings. (shrink)

Many philosophers have endorsed G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities – according to which the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts – claiming this principle to be of fundamental importance to ethics. In this paper, I cast doubt on the principle. In Section 1, I provide a provisional reformulation of the principle of organic unities and contrast such unities with mere sums of value. In (...) Section 2, I do some groundwork in order to arrive at an account of the part–whole relation with which the principle of organic unities is concerned. In so doing, I provide some further reformulations of that principle. In Section 3, I discuss the isolation method that Moore proposes for determining the value of something, and then, in Section 4, I begin an extended discussion of a particular example of an alleged organic unity, namely, Schadenfreude. I explain why some philosophers claim that such pleasure constitutes an organic unity, but I also present reasons for denying this claim. In Section 5, I pursue one of these reasons in particular, a reason that appeals to the concept of what I call evaluative inadequacy, and, in Section 6, I seek to motivate this appeal by drawing on the relation between value and fitting attitudes. In so doing, I provide still further reformulations of the principle of organic unities. In Section 7, I entertain objections to my account of Schadenfreude, one of which requires one final reformulation of the principle of organic unities, and then, in Section 8, I discuss the more general objection that, even if my reasons for denying that Schadenfreude constitutes an organic unity are cogent, these reasons do not extend to other alleged organic unities, such as the related phenomenon of Mitleid. In the final section, I address the significance of the debate about whether the principle of organic unities is true. (shrink)

That Wilfrid Sellars claims that the framework of persons is not a descriptive framework, but a normative one is about as well known as any claim that he makes. This claim is at the core of the famous demand for a synoptic image that closes, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” makes its appearance at key moments in the grand argument of, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” and is the capstone of Sellars’ engagement with Kant in, Science and (...) Metaphysics. Whereas mere things can be subject to ought-to-be rules—e.g. a clock ought to chime on the hour—to be a person, as Sellars understands it, is to be subject to ought-to-do rules—e.g. one ought to wind one’s clocks to chime on the hour. Prima facie, though, there is more to being a person than just being subject to ought-to-do rules. For example, on at least some common ways of using ‘person’ to be a person is to have a unified consciousness, i.e. to be a single subject of a manifold of experience persisting through time. Arguably, that is what Kant takes a person to be. What I hope to show here is that it is what Sellars takes a person to be too. I.e. the exciting twist here is that as Sellars sees it being a single subject of experience persisting through time is being subject to a particular kind of ought-to-do rules, namely, those concepts-qua-inferential-rules that are the means by which we represent the world of causally-related objects existing in space and persisting through time. I take Sellars’ reasons for holding this set of theses to be essentially Kantian, and so my procedure for explicating them will be to trace a single philosophical thread through both Kant’s and Sellars’ thinking surrounding these issues. I begin with the historical problematic to which Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is intended as an answer. By what right does one apply the pure a priori concepts of the understanding? As the necessary means for representing the analytic unity of apperception, i.e. for representing oneself as the single subject of experience persisting through time. That leads to a consideration of the question of what the temporally-discursive experiences are of which one is supposed to be the single subject, and what the nature of the relation is of these experiences to such a subject. Here Sellars provides the answer. The question is ill formed. There is no relation of experiences to a subject because experiences are not themselves things. Rather, ‘an experience’ is a nominalization of the verb ‘experiencing’, which is itself a description of the act of a person. That thesis, then, brings us squarely to the question of what the framework of persons is, and why Sellars is so confident that it is an ineliminable feature of any future iteration of the synoptic image of the world. The answer to the latter question is that descriptive images themselves (scientific or manifest) are constituted by the rules that govern them, and it is only persons that can be subject to such rules. So, in the end, we return to Kant’s claim in the Transcendental Deduction that our representation of a world of causally-related objects existing in space and persisting through time is the means by which one represents oneself as the single subject of experience persisting through time. The descriptions that the scientific image provides are only possible, and necessary, because of what Kant would call their “ultimate principle”: the framework of persons. (shrink)

In this paper I set out to problematize what the distinguished evolutionary biologist, Edward O. Wilson, has presented to a popular audience as his consilience worldview. Wilson's consilience worldview is a metaphysical framework that presumes the existence of an underlying unity in the knowledge gleaned from otherwise diverse modes of intellectual inquiry, and details a particular normative approach for its discovery by scientists. After introducing Wilson's consilience worldview (WCW), I review philosophical and historical literature on the role (...) that values play in scientific inquiry and explain how to understand WCW as a problematic bundle of prescriptive claims concerning the appropriate doing of scientific inquiry. Specifically, I examine deleterious implications for the study of human social behavior that result from attempted application of WCW in order to challenge Wilson's claim that WCW is the most profitable or promising research program to adopt in the study of human social behavior (what I describe as the Fertility objection). Then, I present an argument for why readers of Consilience should regard its central thesis, WCW, skeptically, as potentially deleterious to the process and aims of science (what I describe as the Scientific Integrity objection). (shrink)

The article analyzes the problems of unknowability and total unity in the light of philosophy of Semyon L. Frank, set forth by him in the work The Unknowable. The author of the paper considers all the problems that arise as “icebergs” and tries to find the reasons for the distortion of the vision of the “top of the iceberg” and the “underwater part of the iceberg,” which is often unaware. The author examines the problems of the inadequate perception of (...) reality: a narrow “one’s own little world” of the world perception, passed off as the truth in the final instance; absolutization of the mind, which considers itself able to know everything; the cultivation of negative information and cruelty in society; the role of media forming world perception; antagonistic dichotomy of the world perception; lack of a sense of connection of everything that exists, in particular of a sense of unity of “I” and “Thou;” loss of the “culture of heart” and the ability to love. As a result of the analysis undertaken, the author concludes that only by changing the causes that give rise to the “world of evil and separation” can the lost integrity and harmony of man, society and world civilization be restored. The revival of the earth’s civilization is possible only in total unity. (shrink)

A proper understanding of the Sufi doctrine of the unity of existence is essential for following the later developments of Islamic philosophy. The doctrine of the unity of existence is divided into introversive and extroversive aspects, the former dealing with the unity of the soul of the mystic with God, and the latter with the unity of the cosmos with God. Here this latter aspect of the doctrine is explained through a comparison of the (...) views of Ibn ‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart, both of whom are profoundly influenced by Ibn Sina at precisely the same crucial points, although Meister Eckhart makes explicit reference to Ibn Sina, while Ibn ‘Arabi generally avoids naming him. The theory of the extroversive unity of existence consists of four parts, or rather, it is the product of four steps, each of which is logically based on the previous one: (1) God is the only being or the absolute existence. (2) Everything other than God (i. e., human beings and the cosmos) is nothing or nonexistence. (3) The existence of all things is God’s existence (All are He). (4) The cosmos does not have existence but manifests existence. In other words, it is God’s self-disclosure. (shrink)

This review essay examines three recent books addressing recurring or current controversies in public education. One is historically based, a second focuses on a range of questions, and the third concentrates on the single issue of school choice. All of them, however, may be read against a backdrop of tension among three enduring liberal democratic values: individualism, diversity and unity. Public education is surely aimed at individual success and at preparing future adults to make choices, ideally among a range (...) of opportunities. The existence of a multicultural society and the development of identity politics, however, mean that members of groups often wish to preserve their particular identities despite a common education. Finally, public education has been based on inculcating values that ostensibly we all share in common. Each of these aims may conflict with one or both of the others. Therefore, setting the proper course requires an ongoing attempt to strike the proper balance among them. It is within this framework that I examine these books. (shrink)

While the coexistence of trust and distrust has been acknowledged in previous literature, the understanding of their connection with organisational culture is limited. This study examines how trust and distrust construct the unity and fragmentation of organisational culture. Productive working relationships can be characterised by high trust, but strong ties and high trust may also account for false organisational unity. This study shows that trust and distrust can co-exist and distrust may even increase trust in particular situations. (...) Moreover, we describe how the cognitive and affective components of trust and distrust relate to the unity and fragmentation of organisational culture. We present an empirical case study of a company where tension and distrust between top management, middle management and shop stewards affected the organisational culture. The study contributes to earlier research by discussing trust as a multidimensional and dynamic phenomenon. The study shows how the affective and cognitive components of trust and distrust constitute the unity and fragmentation of organisational culture. We propose that if an organisation is willing to improve its ethics, it should rely on fragmentation rather than unity. (shrink)

A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity problem.First, facts which are grounded are unified by the obtaining of theirgrounds. (...) Second, many ungrounded facts are such that they must obtainif their non-factual constituents exist (e.g. if the property $F$nessis essential to a particular, $a$, then if $a$ exists the fact that$a$ is $F$ must obtain). In this way the obtaining of these facts isexplained by the essence of some of their constituents. I alsoaddress the possibility of facts which are brutely unified(i.e. neither grounded nor essentially unified), and compare theaccount I offer with some of the main alternatives. (shrink)

The pursuit of health is one of the most basic and prevalent concerns of humanity. In order to better attain and preserve health, a fundamental and unified description of the concept is required. Using Paul Tillich's ontological framework, I introduce a complete characterization of health and disease is that is useful to the philosophy of medicine and for health-care workers. Health cannot be understood merely as proper functioning of the physical body or of the separated levels of body, mind, and (...) soul. Rather, the multidimensional unity that is the essence of human life requires a new understanding of health as balanced self-integration within the multiple human dimensions. The ontological description of health and disease has concrete implications for how health-care workers should approach healing. It calls for a multidimensional approach to healing in which particular healing is needed and helpful if it considers the other realms of the human. It reveals the importance of accepting limited health as well as the value of faith understood as an ultimate concern because of its ability to wholly integrate the person. (shrink)

This article does not give the answer to the title question, but is only limited to studying the possibility of giving it. In particular, the author defends that it is legitimate to pose the fundamental question of the philosophy of mathematics and offers several criteria for such a question. As a first approach we propose the question which is incorrect and requires rectification, but is understandable: ‘What is Mathematics?‘. We consider three groups of strategies of responding to it: 1) (...) the question is naive and does not require an answer; 2) the answer is contained in the mathematical knowledge itself; 3) only philosophy can give the answer. Further rectifications to the basic question are questions about the essence and existence of mathematics. The fundamentalist and cultural-historical philosophy of mathematics gave their not fully satisfactory answers to this question in the past century. The dualism problem of philosophy of mathematics is fundamentally resolved through a certain kind of dialectics, which requires the philosophy of mathematics to submit to metaphysics. The unity of existence and essence is considered in the unity of the subject of dialectic - the mathematician who generates the knowledge as self-realization in a series of existential choices, as a means of saving transcendence - the existence ‘toward being‘ rather than ‘toward nothing‘. Positive view of the mathematics turns out to be the explicit expression of negative unity i.e. the subject. (shrink)

Résumé — L’article examine tout d’abord les problèmes, chez Hegel, de la preuve en général et de l’existence de Dieu en général. Puis il examine les différentes formulations des preuves de l’existence de Dieu telles qu’elles sont reprises par Hegel, et notamment celles de la preuve ontologique. L’hypothèse est la suivante : pour Hegel, le Dieu de la religion se fait exister processuellement à l’encontre de ses formes d’existence déficientes. Par là cependant, il se manifeste lui-même, rendant (...) le discours des preuves superflu. Les trois versions de la preuve ontologique – « anselmienne », « kantienne » et « hégélienne » – présentent les trois modes de relation de Dieu comme sujet avec l’objectivité : une unité présupposée, puis niée, et enfin établie comme le résultat d’un processus. Les preuves de l’existence de Dieu, qui restent « représentatives », n’ont pas pour fin d’établir qu’il y a un Dieu en dehors de la pensée, mais de penser Dieu de manière autofondée et donc « vraie ».— The article first examines the problem of the proof in general and that of the existence of God in general for Hegel. It then examines the various formulations of the proofs of the existence of God as they are resumed by Hegel, in particular those of the ontological proof. The hypothesis is the following : for Hegel, the God of the religion makes himself existing in a process against his deficient forms of existence. There however, it manifests itself, making the proofs superfluous. The three versions of the ontological proof – « Anselmian », « Kantian » and « Hegelian » – represent three modes of God’s relation as subject with objectivity : a unity presupposed, then denied, and finally established as the result of a process. The proofs of the existence of God, which remain « representative », do not aim to establish that there is a God outside of thought, but to conceive God in a self-justified and thus « true » way. (shrink)

Recently developed extensions of evolutionary theory are used to explain the human self as an evolved, unitary, and purposeful phenomenon. A basic mechanism that can generate life's agency and goal-directedness is combined with mechanisms that can account for awareness by and of the self, and for the social characteristics of humans. The new theory is largely consistent with major existing theories of the self, in particular theories centred on self-esteem, self-determination theory, and terror management theory. It can therefore be (...) regarded as a meta-theory that brings these theories, and related ones, within a common evolutionary framework. The theory suggests two primary dimensions of the self, the depth of awareness of the self and the social extent of the self. A revised and updated version of this paper can be found as Chapter 13 ('The human self') in my book 'The estimator theory of life and mind: how agency and consciousness can emerge', see VANTET-8 at philpapers . (shrink)

An account of the specific ill of Native American mascots—that is, the particular racism of using Native Americans as mascots, as distinct from other racist portrayals of Native Americans—requires a fuller account of the function of mascots as such than has previously been offered. By analyzing the history of mascots in the United States, this article argues that mascots function as symbols that draw into an artificial unity 1) a variety of teams existing over a period of time (...) and thereby 2) a community of individuals who are thus able to use that team as their own symbolic locus of unification. This unification of teams and their concomitant communities is accomplished by appeal to a symbol that facilitates a particular fantasy of collective identity. The usage of Native American mascots is racist not only because it involves stereotypical portrayals of Native Americans, but because it treats Native persons simply as a means to symbolic unification—and not, importantly, as members of the community they thus serve. In other words, in these cases mascots work as unifying signifiers precisely by being the purely instrumental facilitator of a group's collective fantasy of itself. (shrink)

The article discusses the diversity of the subject field of the philosophy of war as well as the internal integrity of the discipline, united by the focus on the philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of war. The author shows the role of H. Lloyd, who influenced K. Clausewitz, H. Jomini and their followers’ interpretation of the meaning and content of the subject area of the philosophy of war. In the abundance of specific topics addressed by philosophers of this field, the (...) following topics should be noted: the issue of victory and defeat and their interpretation as well as the issue of historical memory. This problem is projected on contemporaneity and reflects the deep connection between peace and war, the dialectic of their relations. The interpretation of certain military and political events is of real interest in the light of the processes of distortion of historical events that have radically affected the course of history. An analysis of the motives and causes of this process is supposes to reconstruct an objective picture of relations between the subjects of international relations in various periods of history. The author finds answers in already existing concepts that have been developed in our time. It is important to mention the project of the French philosopher Charles Renouvier, who put forward the concept of “uchronia,” which became the starting point for the consideration of historical events in the “subjunctive mood.” This genre of historiosophical fantasy was picked up by famous followers – by the former President of France V. Giscard d’Estaing and others. The article provides eyewitness accounts of historical events (in particular, the campaign of Napoleon in Russia) that are historical facts and help to understand the true state of things. The article demonstrates that the philosophical study of the problem of war is important for understanding the origins and essence of relations arising from the transition between peaceful and military states. (shrink)

The Qur’an, a divine book, is a source whose authority is indisputable in terms of being a source of knowledge for Muslims and setting the framework of “speaking” about God and also allowing for the determination of what is moral. The Qur’an’s authority derives from both God Himself and the intra-textual consistency. Reasonal and philosophical justification of such values as freedom, creation, reason, wisdom, endeavor, reliability, and particularly unity of God have been dwelled upon in the present article. At (...) the same time, the visible effects of the aforementioned concepts, which are of great significance in themselves, in the external world, have been examined with their notional immanence and with the exemplarity of the Prophet. It is emphasized that absolute determinism, moral nihilism, and other materialistic views that accept the eternal existence of matter with the Creator lead to a worldview that suspends the freedom of choice and, in particular, the freedom of choosing a religion for humans. As Mu‘tazilah rightly argued in this regard, the essential condition of attaching value to an occurrence is that it must take place in an environment of freedom. The present article signalizes the way to achieve the theory, which we have named as Kalam’s Theory of Freedom, by drawing attention to the existence of some values that can also be reached through sole reason and rationalism intrinsic to the kalam discipline. Ultimately, it illuminates the path where the multicultural world can be a home for all of us without coercion and discrimination. Actions expected to attain their purposes and rationalism considering the possible outcomes of actions, especially pluralist and libertarian education processes, do not allow for ‘a single-valued world’ and nihilism. Qur’an’s warning about chaos is explicit for societies losing their religious, rational, and moral values. (shrink)

Suyolcu-zāde Nahrī Aḥmad (d.1182/1768-1769) was an important sûfî poet being a member of Ismā‘īl Rūmī branch, the sect of Qādiriyya. He carried out the duty of spiritual and ethical guidance at Qādiriyya Lodge in Tekirdağ. Besides his sûfî character, he was a poet having an extensive knowledge about the theoretical and aesthetical bases of Dīwān literature. The only original copy of Nahrī’s Dīwānçe including his poems registered in the Vatican Library, Turkish Manuscripts, nr. 235. There are forty-five Turkish, twelve Arabic (...) and three Persian poems by Nahrī in this copy. The goal of this article is to present the formal and contextual features of Nahrī’s poems in Dīwānçe in the light of the analysis on some poems that we chose. Any study was not found about the poet’s life and poems in the literature review we made. In this study, poems are classified according to the verse form and the language, and the number of couplets, type of prosody, form, style and content of the chosen poems are evaluated accordingly. This study has importance in terms of providing insight about the Religious-Sûfîstic belief in the region and period of Nahrī Aḥmad who was a sûfî poet and a member of Qādiriyya sect. In addition, the study gives information about many important influencers of the period, particularly Niyāzī-i Miṣrī and inform the readers about these influencers’ and sûfîs’ effects on Nahrī’s poems and ideas. The study also makes contribution to determining literary-sûfistic terminology of 18th century.Summary: Suyolcu-zâde Nahrī Aḥmad (d.1182/1768-1769) was a member of Qādiriyya Dervish Convent in Tekirdag where he was born. He became the head sheikh of this convent following his father Sheikh Muḥammad Efendi and worked for the convent in several ways. Nahrī Aḥmad moved back to his hometown in 1182/1768-1769 after completing his Hajj duty and died soon after that. Nahrī had two works according to Osmanlı Müellifleri (Ottoman Authors) and it is stated that the first one of these two works is about “unity of existence”. It should be mentioned that we haven’t found a copy of this work yet. The other work of Nahrī is his Dīwānçe, which includes his poems. The only copy of this significant work is registered in Vatican Library, Turkish Manuscripts, nr. 235. In this study, we had the chance to determine a third work of Nahrī which has never been mentioned in the related literature. This third work that we determined is based on the information in an Arabic poem on the page 21a of the poet’s Dīwānçe. This book that we determined is an interpretation book completed in 1166/1752-53 but Nahrī Aḥmad didn’t mention the name of the work. Nahrī Aḥmad was a spiritual guide and sufi, and he was assigned to the duty of showing the true path in dervish lodge following his madrassa education, learning Qādiriyya lodge’s morals and methods and completing his “spiritual journey”. Besides these, he was a significant poet who could write poems in Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages and he was literary competent who knew the theoretical and aesthetic rules of Dīwān literature and used these features professionally in his works. When Nahrī’s poems are analyzed, it can be seen that he adopted the understanding of existence, knowledge and belief based on Islamic Sufism. Besides, it can be seen that he internalized the significant Religious-Sufi Turkish literature figures including especially Yūnus Emre.In the copy of his Dīwānçe, registered in Vatican Library, there are forty-five Turkish, twelve Arabic and three Persian poems. There are two other poems that weren’t written by Nahrī in the same work. These poems were written by a poet with penname of ‘Ᾱrif in the period when Nahrī’s son Muḥammad Muṣlih al-Dīn was the head sheikh in the same Dervish convent. These historical poems are significant as they describe the re-building of ruined Tekirdag Qādiriyya convent after Nahrī’s period. The goal of this article is to present the formal and contextual features of poems in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe on the basis of chosen poems. As far as we could determine, there is no other study on Nahrī’s works. Nahrī’s Dīwānçe wasn’t a kind of rearranged work of collected poems. Therefore, we classified the poems in terms of the form and language and evaluated the number of couplets, aruz prosody, shape, type and content. Poems of Nahrī in Dīwānçe in terms of verse style are: Four Turkish, three Arabic, one Persian ode, one Turkish compounded stanza, seventeen Turkish, nine Arabic and one Persian major stanza, three Turkish five-line stanzas, two Turkish pentastichs, eighteen Turkish and one Persian lyric.Nahrī Aḥmad wrote five-line stanzas for three of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s lyrics and one of Bāqī’s lyrics. He wrote parallel poems about one pentastich, one lyric and one other poem written in a specific style of blank verse of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. Besides, there is also an original poem that is quite unique in the work. Nahrī wrote five couplets before each verse in Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s ode which resulted in the creation of a common ode. Poems in Dīwānçe are contextually religious-Sufi based. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, Ismā‘īl Rūmī who was the founder of the order of Rūmiyya branch and other sheikhs of Qādiriyya dervish order are the main names mentioned in the poems. One other significant point in Nahrī’s poems is that he had a deep love and respect for Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. There are praises, quintets and parallel poems about Miṣrī in Dīwānçe which shows Niyāzī-i Miṣrī’s effect on his work. This effect is so great that it covered not only the content but also there are the signs of the effect in terms of metaphoric language, words and verses. It can be said that ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī and Niyāzī-i Miṣrī, a member of Khalwatī order, were two significant names that surrounded the mental world of Nahrī, located in the texture of his poems and gave characteristic features to his works. There is a great number of historical poems in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe. He wrote twenty-six historical verses about various historical issues such as birth and death, construction of mosque, dervish monastery, zawiya, pavilion, repairing of mansion, renovation of dervish convent, enthronement of Sultan and appointment of Grand Vizier. Also, there are some other important parts in Nahrī’s Dīwānçe such as invocation, praise and self-adulation.Although there are not many poems in the previously mentioned copy in Vatican Library, there are various names mentioned in these poems. When these poems are analyzed, it can be seen that there are the names of some prophets, some companions of Prophet Muḥammad such as ‘Alī, Ja‘far al-Sādiq, some Persian legendary characters such as Afrāsiyāb, Rustem and Anūshirwān, some Sufi names such as Manṣūr al-Hallaj, Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Shams al-Dīn of Tabrīz, Ḥācī Bektash Velī, Ibn al-‘Arabī and Bāyazīd al-Bisṭāmī, philosopher Galen and famous love heroes Laylā and Majnūn. That is to say, the poet has a rich world of references. On the other hand, there are the names of some works mentioned in Dīwānçe. Epistle of Niyāzī-i Miṣrī named Devre-i ‘Arshiyya, and Ibn al-‘Arabī’s al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya are the other names mentioned in the work. Name of the places included in Nahrī’s poems are: Aden, Aqmescit, Baghdad, Baghcesaray, Baṭḥā, Balkh, Dimashq, Ḥijāz, Iraq, Iran, Cairo, Ken‘ān, Karbalā, Qılburun, Crimea, Kirmān, Egypt, Nemce, Rūm, Sanaa, Shām, Yemen. This study has importance in terms of providing insight about the religious-sûfî belief in the region and period of Nahrī Aḥmad who was a sûfî poet and a member of Qādiriyya sect. In addition, the study gives information about many important influencers of the period, particularly Niyāzī-i Miṣrī. Moreover, it informs the readers about these influencers’ and sûfîs’ effects on Nahrī’s poems and ideas. The study also makes contribution to determining literary-sûfistic terminology of 18th century. (shrink)

While there are many studies that address how well Japanese companies have adopted explicit CSR practices, our understanding of their own views on such practices is still limited, particularly of the difference in their views before and after the process of making implicit CSR explicit. The present research thus aims to address this apparent change by providing comparative case studies of two Japanese companies selected from two different time periods. The findings indicate there is a continuity observable in the mindset (...) of these companies not a change. This contradicts existing literature and suggests that the process of making CSR explicit has not been accompanied by any real change in their mindset. The result shows that ethically questionable practices have been going on behind the explicitly articulated CSR policies and implies the difficulties of delegating the power to address societal issues to business organisations. This is important particularly now when the expectations of the public regarding the responsibilities of business towards society are on the rise. (shrink)

This book's aims are to determine the importance of legal philosophy in legal education and in addition to develop alternative methods for teaching law in general and the philosophy of law in particular. In this context, the individual essays in this volume discuss the alternatives and tendencies in the quest for an adequate model of teaching and learning jurisprudence. Common to all of them is a commitment to the necessary integration of theoretical and practical knowledge, of traditional case and (...) lecture methods with non-traditional models such as cinema, drama, and literature, and of the dominant legal perspective with alternative approaches utilizing information technologies such as computers and the internet. Effective teaching and learning must favor critical and strategic thinking, dialectical and dialogical inquiry or research, problem-solving, role-playing, and skill-developing over mere rote memorization of existing rules and standard answers. (shrink)

My present inclination is to say that both identity and relational analyses are intelligible hypotheses. I reject the identity analysis, looking rather to relations between different phases to secure the unity of a particular over time. But I do not think that the identity view can be rejected as illogical. If it is to be rejected, then I think it must be rejected for Occamist reasons. The different phases exist, and so do their relations. These phases so related, (...) it seems, are sufficient to secure identity through time for all particulars. I suggest, then, that the identity view of identity through time is not illogical. The question is rather whether it is a postulation which is fruitful, or expedient, or which we are compelled, to make. (Armstrong p. 70, 1980) This paper considers this view, articulated by Armstrong and argues that recent work on persistence sheds light on this issue. (shrink)

Sadreddin Konevi is one of the most important statesmen of the unity of existence. Konevi was not content with just commenting on the works of her sheikh Ibn al-Arabi, he also produced many works and offered different perspectives on many Sufi issues with his own original interpretations. His esoteric comments regarding the name of Allah and the spiritual secrets it indicates are particularly striking. Konevi, which explains in depth the manifestations of the level of divinity and the name (...) of Allah in the ontology that emerged in the idea of unity of existence, states that all the divine tricks of this name, which is dominant in the level of unity, are completed after the level of ahadiyyah, that is, the level of oneness where there is no manifestation. He explained that it is a level of existence in which God is manifested. Konevi, like his sheikh Ibn al-Arabi, named the reality of muhame-diyye, which is the manifestation of Allah, as the 'real Adam' and 'human reality', which collects all the existing truths in itself. Konevi, who concluded in detail the stages of suluk and ascension that must be performed in order for the perfect human being to reach the manifestation of God, that is, the level of divinity, interpreted the inner secrets of this name. He also emphasized why it is the most encompassing and important name among the divine names of Allah, and also explained the symbolic meanings of the five letters that make up this name. Konevi, who examines the letter "Elif" in terms of its utterance in the verses, the unification of the manifestation from the unseen to the manifestation, its being a symbol of the divine breath, and its writing in terms of three movements, intermittent, expanding and cyclical, examines the symbolic meanings of these movements in depth. Konevi presented a symbolic interpretation of the letters that form the name of Allah on what the two letters "lam" and "he", like the letter elif, signify inwardly at the levels of beings. In this study, we tried to explain Konevi's ontological explanations of the name of Allah, how and which beings are marked in the terminology of unity of existence, and the daily interpretations of the symbolic works of the letters that make up this name. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the complex relations between aesthetics and phenomenology as they show themselves within the core locus of their interplay—the realm of the visible and the invisible. To do so, the paper examines a specific case study, a Rembrandt painting—A Woman Bathing in a Stream (1654)—through which the discussion illuminates the interconnected and inseparable relationship between aesthetics and phenomenology in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the visible and the invisible. The reading addresses both dimensions of the visible: the (...) essential intersubjective aspect of life and its complex visual representation in art. To achieve this, the paper first explores Merleau-Ponty’s late aesthetic ontology—a phenomenology that perceives the aesthetic realm, particularly the visible domain, as originating from human corporeal existence, thereby redefining the act of seeing and the concepts of the visible and the invisible; I show the manner in which invisible elements permeate our visual experience in the Rembrandt painting and in seeing as such. The paper also reveals the unique ontological role of painting and the painter in unveiling the aesthetic world, and in guiding the philosopher toward a vision that true philosophy—phenomenology—must embrace. The paper concludes by rethinking the significance of aesthetics, and especially, the arts, to phenomenological thought, and the necessity of phenomenology to aesthetic thought. (shrink)

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts (...) for someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 369-372 [Access article in PDF] Unity of Agency and Volition:Some Personal Reflections Stephen Weiner The issues of unity of agency, self-as-narrative, and more generally, volition are highly personal to me. Indeed, I would say I have frequently been obsessed with them. I am 52 years old, and date the onset of my psychiatric symptoms—my long-term misery—very specifically: 11:00 pm Pacific Standard (...) Time, August 28, 1965. At almost precisely that time, I started obsessing that I was homosexual and, in fact, turning into a girl. Within days, derealization followed: for instance, the houses in my neighborhood seemed one-dimensional—they seemed as though they were painted, as though I could stick my hand or an object through them. Colors seemed less bright as well—but I hardly had words for all this at the time: it was an overwhelmingly preverbal feeling, but I found some words for it.I was also depressed, and knew I was depressed—that is, I was worried, had trouble sleeping, and had suicidal thoughts and feelings. Within weeks, I asked my parents if I could see a psychiatrist, and I did. I remember asking my psychiatrist if he ever thought about the possibility that everything might be an illusion, and he quoted the refrain from "Row, Row, Row Your Boat": "merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, life is but a dream." But just asking him produced a chilling feeling that he did not exist and, largely for this reason, I did not mention unreality feelings again to therapists for another 20 years.So, like Dr. Wells' patient Edward, described by James Phillips (2003), I was in trouble; like Edward, I was starting to construct a narrative. I started feeling that I had "to tell my story" at about this time—before then, I had not felt a need to do that. That may be partly because young children take life for granted (at least, I did), and it may be partly because suffering, by its very nature, demands explanation; both reasons were probably operating—certainly, both my parents told me years later that I had seemed emotionally distressed as a child, and my mother told they would have given me Ritalin if it had been available. So, to other people (my parents and my teachers) I was mentally ill in some sense, and I have some pretty clear memories of what I now recognize as depression, especially in the second and third grades; but I did not think of myself as sick and I did not think of myself as suffering—and I did not experience the duality (at least) of selves that I started to experience almost immediately in August 1965.Phillips further points out that the "future Edward" could look back in his narrative, at a later age, and reconstruct his history either as someone with a continuing mental illness, or as someone who had attained a secure, healthy adulthood and saw his experience as adolescent pain in the service of ultimate adult health and integration. I see my story, I am sorry to report, as [End Page 369] one of unremitting basic pain but with the positive dimension that I was able to go on, obtain a good education, work a good deal in my adult life, and father a child. But my narrative—and am I not, as a highly verbal person, almost constrained to think of my life as a narrative?—has been one, as Phillips (following Kleinman) realizes, of suffering. It is, above all else, an illness narrative. I find the approach of J. Melvin Woody (2003)—of privileging performing and performing arts and spatial metaphors over story—less relevant and true to myself, although I see no reason to argue with Mary's preference for such forms. It may be that the temporal discontinuities she has experienced predispose her to see herself in such terms—may, in fact, necessitate doing so. I am not exactly sure why, but it probably has to do with acting, with trying on and performing one role... (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that Kant employs a single conception of reason throughout his analysis of the fundamental principles of natural science, morality and politics, rational religion, and the practice of philosophy itself, and that this conception is that reason is the source of the ultimate goals or ideals for our conduct of both inquiry and action, but never a faculty that yields cognition of objects that exist independently of us, whether sensible or supersensible. In Neiman’s words, “The (...) basis of Kant’s reconception” of reason “is the denial that the rational is, or is centrally concerned with, the cognitive”, and the heart of his thesis of the unity of reason is his view that “the regulative principles of reason... shape our actions in science, morality, religion and philosophy itself”. Neiman’s work is refreshingly ambitious in its attempt to demonstrate that these generalities hold for all four of the areas she lists, but the general claims themselves will not come as a surprise to contemporary students of Kant. So for the work to succeed, it would have to break new ground in either the detailed analysis of the regulative functions of reason or in our understanding of reason’s general function in unifying the several branches of philosophy as Kant understands it. In my view, the book does neither. Neiman offers some interesting insights about Kant’s treatment of science, morality, and religion, but does not offer a rigorous analysis of the structure of Kant’s thought in any of these areas that goes beyond what many others have already provided. More importantly, she misses the opportunity to make a major advance in our understanding of the general structure of Kant’s thought. For what she describes is really similarities in our use of reason in the various areas of our inquiry and conduct; she does not show how Kant uses his conception of reason to unify the apparently disparate realms of theory and practice, or, in his terms, of nature and freedom. This task dominates the Critique of Judgment, where, far from merely recapitulating his previous accounts of the regulative use of reason in both science and morality, Kant argues as he never did before that we must be able to see the realms of nature and freedom not merely as compatible but as unified, yet also makes explicit the regulative status of reason and of this vision of unity precisely by stating his theory of the unity of reason as the culmination of a theory of reflective judgment. Neiman largely ignores Kant’s own most mature account of the unity of reason. (shrink)

The tradition descending from Frege and Russell has typically treated theories of meaning either as theories of meanings, or as theories of truth conditions. However, propositions of the classical sort don't exist, and truth conditions can't provide all the information required by a theory of meaning. In this book, one of the world's leading philosophers of language offers a way out of this dilemma. Traditionally conceived, propositions are denizens of a "third realm" beyond mind and matter, "grasped" by mysterious Platonic (...) intuition. As conceived here, they are cognitive-event types in which agents predicate properties and relations of things--in using language, in perception, and in nonlinguistic thought. Because of this, one's acquaintance with, and knowledge of, propositions is acquaintance with, and knowledge of, events of one's cognitive life. This view also solves the problem of "the unity of the proposition" by explaining how propositions can be genuinely representational, and therefore bearers of truth. The problem, in the traditional conception, is that sentences, utterances, and mental states are representational because of the relations they bear to inherently representational Platonic complexes of universals and particulars. Since we have no way of understanding how such structures can be representational, independent of interpretations placed on them by agents, the problem is unsolvable when so conceived. However, when propositions are taken to be cognitive-event types, the order of explanation is reversed and a natural solution emerges. Propositions are representational because they are constitutively related to inherently representational cognitive acts. Strikingly original, What Is Meaning? is a major advance. (shrink)

1) Gaukroger estimates that there exist two irreconcilable theses in the Cartesian method in the Rules. The first thesis concerns the problem of the cognitive grasp of inference, the other the problem of the method of discovery. Descartes, by integrating deduction as a simple object of intuition, rejects the psychologicalinterpretation of inference, and elevates deduction to the status of a necessary condition of knowledge. On the other hand, the problem of the method of discovery requires that inference produces a new (...) truth as its conclusion. Descartes takes the algebraic solution of equations as the model of this method. But this orientation leads Descartes to deny all cognitive function operating in the inference of synthetic form. Thus, according to Gaukroger, these two theses tendto be opposed, calling into question the unity of the method. 2) We admit the cognitive analysis of Gaukroger on the Cartesian inference. However, Gaukroger does not see the importance of “the natural power of the mind” in the Rules. Indeed, the cognitive role of inference is always understood by Descartes, in light of this natural power. Thus, the main role of the method is to teach ways of increasing this power. Descartes tries to pose, by the algebraic treatment of questions, an analogy between the mathematical order and the order of the operations of the mind, enabling him to discover pure schemes of these operations. And, It is by theses schemes that the mind exercise itself in order to increase its natural power. For this reason, we must reconsider Gaukroger’s thesis that Descartesassimilates literally the method of discovery and algebraic solution, as well as his thesis of the inconsistency of the Cartesian method. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 369-372 [Access article in PDF] Unity of Agency and Volition:Some Personal Reflections Stephen Weiner The issues of unity of agency, self-as-narrative, and more generally, volition are highly personal to me. Indeed, I would say I have frequently been obsessed with them. I am 52 years old, and date the onset of my psychiatric symptoms—my long-term misery—very specifically: 11:00 pm Pacific Standard (...) Time, August 28, 1965. At almost precisely that time, I started obsessing that I was homosexual and, in fact, turning into a girl. Within days, derealization followed: for instance, the houses in my neighborhood seemed one-dimensional—they seemed as though they were painted, as though I could stick my hand or an object through them. Colors seemed less bright as well—but I hardly had words for all this at the time: it was an overwhelmingly preverbal feeling, but I found some words for it.I was also depressed, and knew I was depressed—that is, I was worried, had trouble sleeping, and had suicidal thoughts and feelings. Within weeks, I asked my parents if I could see a psychiatrist, and I did. I remember asking my psychiatrist if he ever thought about the possibility that everything might be an illusion, and he quoted the refrain from "Row, Row, Row Your Boat": "merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, life is but a dream." But just asking him produced a chilling feeling that he did not exist and, largely for this reason, I did not mention unreality feelings again to therapists for another 20 years.So, like Dr. Wells' patient Edward, described by James Phillips (2003), I was in trouble; like Edward, I was starting to construct a narrative. I started feeling that I had "to tell my story" at about this time—before then, I had not felt a need to do that. That may be partly because young children take life for granted (at least, I did), and it may be partly because suffering, by its very nature, demands explanation; both reasons were probably operating—certainly, both my parents told me years later that I had seemed emotionally distressed as a child, and my mother told they would have given me Ritalin if it had been available. So, to other people (my parents and my teachers) I was mentally ill in some sense, and I have some pretty clear memories of what I now recognize as depression, especially in the second and third grades; but I did not think of myself as sick and I did not think of myself as suffering—and I did not experience the duality (at least) of selves that I started to experience almost immediately in August 1965.Phillips further points out that the "future Edward" could look back in his narrative, at a later age, and reconstruct his history either as someone with a continuing mental illness, or as someone who had attained a secure, healthy adulthood and saw his experience as adolescent pain in the service of ultimate adult health and integration. I see my story, I am sorry to report, as [End Page 369] one of unremitting basic pain but with the positive dimension that I was able to go on, obtain a good education, work a good deal in my adult life, and father a child. But my narrative—and am I not, as a highly verbal person, almost constrained to think of my life as a narrative?—has been one, as Phillips (following Kleinman) realizes, of suffering. It is, above all else, an illness narrative. I find the approach of J. Melvin Woody (2003)—of privileging performing and performing arts and spatial metaphors over story—less relevant and true to myself, although I see no reason to argue with Mary's preference for such forms. It may be that the temporal discontinuities she has experienced predispose her to see herself in such terms—may, in fact, necessitate doing so. I am not exactly sure why, but it probably has to do with acting, with trying on and performing one role... (shrink)

One of the fundamental problems of Theoretical Mysticism is the explanation of the world as being something other than God after having accepted the Unity of Existence. This paper seeks to present, after having explained certain necessary premises, the theory of manifestation as one that can explain and analyze multiplicity. In this article we especially seek to solidify the relation of such claims to mystics in general and to the adherents of the Ibn ‘Arabian school of thought in (...) particular. This is especially important because in some of the works of many specialists in this field we find that some unrealistic claims have been definitively attributed in to the Great Sheikh. The only way to counteract such false claims, in any field, including Theoretical Mysticism, is to make it binding upon ourselves to delve into the views of others in a cautious way. We must take the apparent meanings of the sayings of the mystics as a proof in this matter. Therefore the method of research of the writer of this article is to relate the sayings of the Great Sheikh and his commentators while commentating upon and analyzing them as well. (shrink)

The oil industry has played a major role in the economy of modern Iran and Malaysia, especially as a source of transnational exchange and as a major factor in industrial and urban development. During the previous century, the arrival of oil companies in the Persian Gulf, brought many changes to the physical built environment and accelerated the urbanization process in the port cities. Similarly, the development of the national oil industry had a huge impact on post-independence Malaysia, affecting balance sheets, (...) the environment, and society. Oil significantly changed Malaysia’s position in the global economy and transformed a predominantly agricultural country into a major producer of petroleum and natural gas. Through implementing the analytical, historical and comparative perspectives, this paper focuses on the legacy of oil cities in the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea as the birthplaces of the oil industry in two regions, whose geopolitical importance along with oil’s historical significance has the potential for representing national unity, political memory and collective shared identity. In proposing this grounding, the paper seeks to approach the heritage of oil as a particular form of industrial heritage. This research analyses the future of energy heritage, existing Covid-related challenges, political tensions and examines the various impacts, transitions and capacities associated with the current international relations, post-pandemic urban developments, and the post-oil future to pave the way to these nascent areas of industrial heritage and oil heritage in Iran and Malaysia. (shrink)

Hegel's _Phenomenology_ is considered by many to be the most difficult book in the philosophical canon. While some authors have published excellent essays on various chapters and aspects of the book, few authors have successfully tackled the whole. In _The Unity of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit_", Jon Stewart interprets Hegel's work as a dialectical transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy, providing from this unified standpoint a case for Hegel's own conception of philosophy as a system. In restoring them to their (...) larger systematic contexts, Stewart clarifies Hegel's individual analyses, as well as indicating the meaning and significance of the transitions and illustrating the parallelisms between the respective analyses. Many of Hegel's main themes- universal-particular, mediacy-immediacy-are traced through the text, demonstrating Hegel's formal continuity. By examining at the microlevel the particulars of the dialectical movement, and by analyzing at the macrolevel the role of the argument in question in the context of the work as a whole, Stewart provides a detailed analysis of the _Phenomenology_ and a significant scholarly demonstration of Hegel's own conception of the _Phenomenology_ as a part of a systematic philosophy. (shrink)

In the universe, there are countless pairs of opposites. In Chinese philosophy, there are general names for these opposites, i.e., yin and yang. In this paper I argue that the unity of opposites is a theme common to Heraclitus, a pre-Socratic philosopher, and Laozi, the best known Daoist. More specifically, I argue that both Heraclitus and Laozi believe the following: 1) opposites produce and depend on each other, without one there can’t be another; 2) each thing in the universe (...) consists of opposites and is a unity of opposites, there is nothing that is absolutely one-sided; 3) the conflict between opposites changes everything and makes new things possible. Nothing is at rest and new beings constantly come to exist, since there is constant struggle between opposites. As far as their views on the unity of opposites are concerned, Heraclitus’s and Laozi’s philosophies are extremely similar. (shrink)

Understanding comes in a variety of forms. This essay argues for the unity of these forms, against the common tendency to view them as fundamentally heteronomous, or disunified. After identifying ten core features of genuine understanding, which enable an argument for the existence of two distinct types of understanding, theoretical and practical, the essay poses a dilemma for theories that view them as disunified. Subsequently, it develops and defends a general account of understanding in terms of conceptions. What (...) unifies diverse forms of understanding, on this account, is a generic cognitive structure—given by the notion of a noetic conception—that is realized in different ways in various cases. (shrink)

The hypothesis of a theoretical unity between On Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics presents a major challenge to scholars attempting to unify the criteria of analysis. This paper examines this problem and proposes a middle ground between the perspectives of Woods and Boger to address this crucial question: If a unitary and coherent theory of deduction exists, why does not the technical apparatus of syllogistic modes for analyzing fallacies appear in SE? This paper makes useful contributions to the discussion (...) on the internal unity of Aristotle's logical writings on around categorical syllogistics and the doctrine of sophistical refutations. (shrink)

From a felt, introspective perspective, one can identify various kinds of unity amongst all of one’s experiential parts. Most fundamentally, all of the states you are experiencing right now seem to be phenomenally unified, or, felt together. This introspective datum may lead one to believe that where consciousness exists, it always has this structure: there is always a numerically singular subjective perspective on a unified experiential field. In this dissertation, I expose this intuition and subject it to critical scrutiny.

ArgumentThe article describes a special type of scientific and philosophical “non-conformism” as exemplified in the versatile work of Richard von Mises. While the historical impact of von Mises' practical and organizational work in applied mathematics is beyond doubt, it is shown that von Mises' insistence on cognitive connectibility of various scientific domains was not, in the end, successful although it stimulated the theoretical discussion considerably. Von Mises developed a principally critical attitude towards what he considered “one-sided” in several streams of (...) modernity and tended to be “anti-modern” even in those of his activities which belonged to “modernism.” Reasons can be found in his biographical experiences, in particular in his unorthodox academic education and repeated emigrations. Thus biographical research has considerable potential for historical explanation. The paper delves into the existing premises and sources for a scientific biography of Richard von Mises which is yet to be written, and publishes in the appendix a revealing biographical sketch authored by von Mises' widow, the applied mathematician Hilda Geiringer. (shrink)

In his early interpretation and representation of the oral teachings of the Hasidic masters, Martin Buber engaged in issues pertinent to the critique of language (Sprachkritik,) of the fin-de-siècle. Associated pre-eminently with Fritz Mauthner and his circle, the critique of language (Sprachkritik) questioned the epistemological status of language, wedded as it is to the divisive Erfahrungswelt. By drawing attention to ecstatic speech, which paradoxically gives expression to the experience (Erlebnis) of the ineffable unity of existence, Buber adumbrates a (...) solution to the cognitive limitations of language. Refracted through Lebensphilosophie, he distinguishes between language as bound to Erfahrung and speech as nurtured by Erlebnis. Whereas language is propelled by conceptual and propositional forms of cognition, speech, principally sustained by metaphors evoked by an experience of the noumenal. Through an examination of his interpretive translation of a well-known Hasidic parable, this article explores how he amplifies this distinction by means of a semantic transformation of the key mystical metaphor of 'ahizat ' enayim (lit. seizing the eyes). Discerning the hermeneutical layers of Buber's rendition of the parable, we argue that his own ambiguous propositional casting of the metaphor entraps him into the very problem he sought to overcome. /// O presente artigo tem como ponto de partida o facto de que na interpretação e representação que dos mestres do Hasidismo fez logo na primeira fase da sua actividade como intelectual, Martin Buber assumiu como próprias questões especialmente pertinentes para uma crítica da linguagem (Sprachkritik) típica da época fin-de-siècle. Associada de modo particular a Fritz Mauthner e ao seu círculo, a Sprachkritik interrogava-se sobretudo acerca do estatuto epistemológico da linguagem, conectada como ela estava com uma Erfahrungswelt que era, desde logo, fonte de divisão. Nesse sentido, a autora do artigo defende que ao chamar a atenção para o discurso ecstático, o qual de modo paradoxal dá expressão à experiência (Erlebnis,) da unidade inefável da existência, Martin Buber pretende fazer vir ao de cima uma solução para o problema das limitações cognitivas da linguagem. Com efeito, mediante recurso à Lebensphilosophie, Buber distingue entre linguagem enquanto ligada à Erfahrung e discurso enquanto que propriamente alimentado pela Erlebnis. Ou seja, Buber reconhece que a linguagem esta animada por formas conceptuais e proposicionais de cognição, ao passo que o discurso aparece sobretudo sustentado por metáforas evocadas por uma experiência do noumenal Em suma, ao focar a sua atenção numa análise da tradução interpretativa que Buber faz de uma bem conhecida parábola Hasídica, o presente artigo explora de que modo o pensador judeu amplifica esta distinção mediante uma transformação semântica da principal metáfora mística do 'ahizaí 'enayim, ou seja, literalmente, da confiscação dos olhos. Tudo isso de modo a discernir os estratos hermenêuticos da interpretação buberiana da parábola, acabando a autora por mostrar de que modo Martin Buber ao dar uma forma propo-sicional ambígua à metáfora acabou por se encerrar no exacto problema que, desde logo, tinha procurado ultrapassar. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SUBSTANTIAL UNITY OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES ACCORDING TO JOHN POINSOT JOHN D. KRONEN The University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota EVERY SUBSTANCE metaphysician must answer several difficult questions peculiar to his or her ontology. In this paper I will examine John Poinsot's answer to two of these questions, one concerning the nature of the form of substantial composites, and one concerning which material objects are substantial composites. (...) I shall argue that Poinsot's answers to these questions show the untenability of a structuralist view of substantial form and of a reductive materialist view of living beings. But before considering these questions I must briefly outline Poinsot's view of what the general nature of substance is, as explained in his treatise on material logic.1 Poinsot's Account of Substance in General In the section of his Material Logic concerned with the categories Poinsot gives a succinct account of the nature of substance 1 Cursus Philosophicus thomisticus; vol. I, Ars logicae prima et secunda pars, ed. P. Beato Reiser (Turin, Italy: Marietti, 1820), Q. XV, pp. 523-527. It should be noted that I am not concerned in this paper with describing either the psychological origin of the notion of substance, or of justifying it against phenomenalism. My only aim is to show how such a view of substance leads to a certain notion of form when it is applied, so to speak, to material objects. For an interesting account of the origin of the concept of substance in Poinsot see John Deely, Tractatus De Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: The University of California Press, 1985), p. 86, n. 16. Deely takes it that Poinsot has a deeper categorial scheme than that of Aristotle from which the latter's scheme "emerges," as it were. In this article, then, I am not concerned with that deeper scheme which Deely refers to in this interesting note. 599 600 JOHN D. KRONEN in general and of its relation to the supposit and to the act of existing. He notes that by " substance " narrowly considered is meant that kind of essence to "which it is due to exist in itself as opposed to that kind to which it is due to exist in another" (i.e., an accident).2 He defends this as the primary " definition " 3 of substance against the other definition of it which is " that which stands under accidents," on the grounds that a thing must exist in itself, at least ontologically speaking, before it can support accidents 4 and that to define substance as that which supports accidents is to define it in relation to other things, not itself. This point is important because many modern and contemporary philosophers who have attacked the notion of substance have done so by arguing that there are no beings which stand under accidents. For Poinsot this attack, even if successful, would show that there are no accidents, not that there are no substances. Poinsot insists that " substance " connotes a quiddity to which to exist in itself is due since actual existence does not belong to the essence of any created thing.5 Further, Poinsot insists that to exist in itself " connotes more than a mere negation of existing in another; rather it connotes a positive perfection." This is because to exist in a dependent way is to exist in an imperfect way, so to exist independently must be to exist in a more perfect way.6 Finally, Poinsot distinguishes between the substance and the supposit. The substance is the complete nature of the thing, while 2 Ibid., p. 523. a " Substance " as a supreme genus cannot strictly be defined since it cannot be differentiated from any higher genus. 4 Haec autem proprietas existendi per se intelligitur vel secundum considerationem absolutam et in ordine ad se, et sic dicitur subsistens, quasi non indignes alio ut sustentetur, sed in se sistens; vel dicitur secundum habitudinem ad alia, quatenus ilia sustentat in esse, et sic dicitur non solum subsistens, sed etiam substans. Ibid., p. 523. 5 ••• esse actu per se vel in alio non est ipsa quidditas substantiae vel accidentis, quia esse seu existere in nulla quidditate creata... (shrink)