Results for 'personal identity thought experiments'

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  1. (1 other version)On Scepticism About Personal Identity Thought Experiments.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Caroline West & Wen Yu - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 1.
    Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity, and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal (...)
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  2. Can Thought Experiments Solve Problems of Personal Identity?Lukas J. Meier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    Good physical experiments conform to the basic methodological standards of experimental design: they are objective, reliable, and valid. But is this also true of thought experiments? Especially problems of personal identity have engendered hypothetical scenarios that are very distant from the actual world. These imagined situations have been conspicuously ineffective at resolving conflicting intuitions and deciding between the different accounts of personal identity. Using prominent examples from the literature, I argue that this is (...)
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  3. Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity.Michael Omoge - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):69-88.
    Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, (...)
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  4. Thought experiments and personal identity in africa.Simon Beck - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):239-452.
    African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with their emphasis on the importance of community and social relations more widely discussed, but that emphasis has also received much wider acceptance and gained more influence among Western philosophers. Despite this convergence, there is at least one striking way in which the discussions remain (...)
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  5. Thought experiments and personal identity.Stephen Coleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.
    Thought experiments are profitably compared to compasses. A compass is a simple but useful device for determining direction. Nevertheless, it systematically errs in the presence of magnets ...it becomes unreliable near the North Pole, in mine shafts, when vibrated, in the presence of metal ...experts will wish to use the compass as one element in a wider portfolio of navigational techniques. Analogously, thought experiments are simple but useful devices for determining the status of propositions. Sadly, they (...)
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  6.  46
    Thought experiments in personal identity: A dialogue with Beck, Wagner and Wilkes.Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):456-469.
    In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ criticisms and justify (...)
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  7.  46
    Personal Identity and its Boundaries: Philosophical Thought Experiments.Farah Foucquaert - 2003 - Philosophica 72 (2).
  8.  22
    Thought experiments on personal identity.Taeda Jovičić - 1998 - Theoria 41 (2):43-69.
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  9. Personal identity and thought-experiments.Tamar Szabo Gendler - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.
    Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity (...)
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  10. A Hylomorphic Account of Thought Experiments Concerning Personal Identity.David B. Hershenov - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481-502.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity, which maintain that psychology is irrelevant to our persistence, andneo-Lockean accounts, which deny that humans are animals. This paper provides a Thomistic account that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones. This account does not have to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity which matters in survival, (...)
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  11. Technological Fictions and Personal Identity: On Ricoeur, Schechtman and Analytic Thought Experiments.Simon Beck - 2016 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 47 (2):117-132.
    Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman express grave doubts about the acceptability and informativeness of the thought-experiments employed by analytic philosophers (notably Derek Parfit) in the debate about personal identity, and for what appear to be related reasons. I consider their reasoning and argue that their reasons fail to justify their doubts. I go on to argue that, from this discussion of possible problems concerning select thought-experiments, something positive can be learned about personal (...). (shrink)
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  12.  41
    Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments.Tamar SzabÓ Gendler - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.
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  13. (1 other version)Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of personDS a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity andx dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author (...)
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  14. (2 other versions)Real people. Personal identity without thought experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (4):632-633.
     
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  15.  66
    Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Geoffrey Madell - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):515-518.
  16. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric Todd Olson - 1997 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Olson rejects (...)
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  17. Personal Identity, Possible Worlds, and Medical Ethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal (3):429-437.
    Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal (...)
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  18. Madness as method: on Locke’s thought experiments about personal identity.Kathryn Tabb - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):871-889.
    ABSTRACTJohn Locke is famous for popularizing the method of the philosophical thought experiment in discussions of personal identity; the cases introduced in the second edition of An Essay Concerning Understanding are still employed by contemporary philosophers. Here I argue that Locke’s method is nonetheless importantly different from later efforts in ways that can help us better appreciate his larger projects. Rather than pumping the reader’s intuitions in support of his preferred account, Locke’s thought experiments serve (...)
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  19. The metaphysics and metapsychology of personal identity: Why thought experiments matter in deciding who we are.Daniel Kolak - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1):39-50.
    What are the metaphysical and metapsychological boundaries of a person? How do we draw our borders? This much is clear: personal identity without thought experiments is impossible. I develop a new way of conceptualizing physiological and psychological borders leading to a re-evaluation of the problem of personal identity within the contemporary literature, especially Parfit, arguing that we must, necessarily, turn to the conceptual analysis of metaphysical and metapsychological borders. I offer an explanation of the (...)
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  20. Personal Identity Without Persons.Jens David Ohlin - 2002 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    The project takes as its starting point our conflicting intuitions about personal identity exposed by Bernard Williams' thought experiment involving the switching of bodies in "The Self and the Future." The conflicted intuitions are identified as animalist and psychologist and correspond roughly with the two major approaches to personal identity. The traditional strategy to resolve the conflict---thought experiments---is critically examined and the project concludes that proper thought experiments will reveal the conflict (...)
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  21.  37
    Personal identity and mental time travel.Marya Schechtman - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    This paper examines the role of episodic memory, and the broader notion of “mental time travel” (MTT), in constituting personal identity. After arguing that the construal of memory’s role in personal identity found in traditional psychological continuity theories of personal identity is both unrealistic and unsatisfying, the paper endeavors to provide a better account. This begins with recent work in the science and philosophy of memory that sees episodic memory as part of a broader (...)
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  22.  10
    Rethinking Borderline Cases of Personal Identity: A First-Person Perspective.Shewli Dutta - 2024 - Phenomenology and Mind 26 (26):192.
    Personal identity include both first-person and third-person identities. The objective of the essay is to demonstrate the primitiveness of first-person identity, or self-identity, by re-examining a few well-known thought experiments that are referred to as ‘borderline cases of personal identity’. The primary goal of the essay is to demonstrate that no borderline case poses a significant challenge to first-person identity. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first section motivates the (...)
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  23.  94
    Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments Kathleen Wilkes Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 264 pp., £25.00. [REVIEW]Sören Häggqvist - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (1):171-.
  24.  14
    Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments.David Freedman - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (3):177-179.
  25. Empathic access: The missing ingredient in personal identity.Marya Schechtman - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111.
    Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call (...)
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  26.  60
    The Cognitive Value of Fiction in Thought Experiments in Personal Identity.Aleks Zarnitsyn - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 49 (2):62-81.
  27. Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.
    Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, historicism is not automatically preferable to structuralism. Second, I argue that (...)
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  28. The practical importance of personal identity.F. Doepke - 1990 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 83:83-91.
    By a generalization of Parfit’s argument for the unimportance of personal identity in survival, it is argued that the practical significance that appears to attach to our identity belongs to the relation of direct control, which we exercise through will. What explains the special concern and moral responsibility that normally pertains only to ourselves is that it is ordinarily just ourselves whom we animate by our decisions. But thought experiments involving amnesia and replication seem to (...)
     
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  29. Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments.Simon Beck - 2009 - South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.
    Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which (...)
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  30.  27
    Identity Theft: A Thought Experiment on the Fragility of Identity.David Menčik - 2020 - Conatus 5 (1):71.
    This paper intends to discuss some aspects of what we conceive as personal identity: what it consists in, as well as its alleged fragility. First I will try to justify the methodology used in this paper, that is, the use of allegories in ontological debates, especialy in the form of thought experiments and science fiction movies. Then I will introduce an original thought experiment I call “Who am I actually?,” one that was coined with the (...)
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  31. Cognition, Persons, Identity.Simon Beck - 2003 - Alternation 10 (1):195-215.
  32. Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study.Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.
    Williams (1970) argues that our intuitions about personal identity vary depending on how a given thought experiment is framed. Some frames lead us to think that persistence of self requires persistence of one's psychological characteristics; other frames lead us to think that the self persists even after the loss of one's distinctive psychological characteristics. The current paper takes an empirical approach to these issues. We find that framing does affect whether or not people judge that persistence of (...)
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  33. Towards an Animalist Conception of Personal Identity.Keith Hess - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In this dissertation, I defend an answer to the following question in the diachronic personal identity debate: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for our persistence over time? Two popular approaches to answering this question are the psychological and the somatic approach. On the former approach, we persist in virtue of some sort of psychological continuity. So, some proponents of the psychological approach think that we cease to exist if we lose certain features of our psychology such (...)
     
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  34.  81
    Personal identity in the light of brain physiology and cognitive psychology.John Thomas Wilke - 1981 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 6 (3):323-334.
    The concept of the person, and the notion that the latter is an entity separate and distinct from other persons, has persisted as one of the more secure ‘givens’ of philosophical thought. We have very little difficulty, in observer language, in pointing to a person, describing his or her attributes, distinguishing him or her from other persons, etc. Likewise, it is ordinarily not much of a problem to subjectively experience, both sensorially and conceptually, the self – that is, to (...)
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  35.  94
    Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and Externalism.Alisa Mandrigin - unknown
    According to the psychological account of personal identity for someone to be one and the same person over time Y today must have some of the beliefs, desires, intentions and memories that X had yesterday, as well as some memories of the events that happened to X yesterday. But, on this account, we have the undesirable result that persons can be reduplicated unless we add an additional requirement: Y is uniquely psychologically continuous with X. In an attempt to (...)
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  36.  87
    Countering the appeal of the psychological approach to personal identity.David Hershenov - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (3):447-474.
    Brain transplants and the dicephalus (an organism just like us except that it has two cerebrums) are thought to support the position that we are essentially thinking creatures, not living organisms. I try to offset the first of these intuitions by responding to thought experiments Peter Unger devised to show that identity is what matters. I then try to motivate an interpretation of the alleged conjoined twins as really just one person cut off from himself by (...)
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  37.  21
    Identity and Thought Experiment. [REVIEW]A. D. H. - 1981 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (3):602-603.
    The author, a member of the faculty in philosophy at Visva-Bharati University, produced this volume under appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, after having studied in England. These four essays are concerned with recent analytic thought, concentrating upon the problem of identity and the experiments of reflection which have appeared in modern British philosophy, such as Strawson’s world of nothing but sound. Chandra’s central concern is to analyse the relationship between identity (...)
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  38.  47
    Beyond Personal Identity: Dogen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-Self (review).Carl Olson - 2005 - Buddhist-Christian Studies 25 (1):200-202.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Beyond Personal Identity: Dōgen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-SelfCarl OlsonBeyond Personal Identity: Dōgen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-Self. By Gereon Kopf. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 2001. 298 + xx pp.This work of comparative philosophy focuses on the problem of the self by comparing Western existential and phenomenological thought with Zen thinkers such as Dōgen and Nishida. In addition to such thinkers (...)
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  39. The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of (...)
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  40.  97
    Substance and the Concept of Personal Identity.Jens Kipper - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    In this paper, I identify and discuss the following feature of our judgments about hypothetical scenarios concerning the identity of persons: with respect to the vast majority of scenarios, both members of a pair of logically complementary propositions about personal identity are conceivable. I consider a number of explanations of this feature that draw on the metaphysics and the epistemology of personal identity, none of which prove to be satisfactory. I then argue that in order (...)
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  41. Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them.Simon Beck - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199.
    ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we (...)
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  42.  20
    The Non-Identity Problem and the Admissibility of Outlandish Thought Experiments in Applied Philosophy.Adrian Walsh - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):229-246.
    The non-identity problem, which is much discussed in bioethics, metaphysics and environmental ethics, is usually examined by philosophers because of the difficulties it raises for our understanding of possible harms done to present human agents. In this article, instead of attempting to solve the non-identical problem, I explore an entirely different feature of the problem, namely the implications it has for the admissibility of outlandish or bizarre thought experiments. I argue that in order to sustain the claim (...)
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  43.  82
    Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance Directives.Andrea Ott - 2009 - The Pluralist 4 (2):38 - 54.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Personal Identity and the Moral Authority of Advance DirectivesAndrea OttSection 1What is the metaphysical basis for respecting an advance directive first drawn up by an individual who is competent but who is at present rendered incapacitated?1 What are the roles of autonomy, personal values, integrity, and beneficence contained within said respect? In this section the positions of two prominent philosophers, Ronald Dworkin and Jeff McMahan, will (...)
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  44.  81
    A Humean Argument for Personal Identity.Amihud Gilead - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (1):1-16.
    Considering various arguments in Hume’s Treatise, I reconstruct a Humean argument against personal identity or unity. According to this argument, each distinct perception is separable from the bundle of perceptions to which it belongs and is thus transferable either to the external, material reality or to another psychical reality, another bundle of perceptions. Nevertheless, such transference (Hume’s word!) is entirely illegitimate, otherwise Hume’s argument against causal inference would have failed; furthermore, it violates private, psychical accessibility. I suggest a (...)
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  45.  5
    Hume on the Self and Personal Identity ed. by Dan O’Brien (review).Bridger Ehli - 2024 - Hume Studies 49 (2):377-380.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume on the Self and Personal Identity ed. by Dan O’BrienBridger EhliDan O’Brien, ed. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. xxiv + 321. Softcover. ISBN: 9783031042751. $129.99This is an engaging collection of essays on a central topic in Hume’s philosophy. Perhaps Hume’s best-known contribution to the philosophy of the self is his denial, in section 1.4.6 of the (...)
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  46.  46
    The Tale Parfit Tells: Analytic Metaphysics of Personal Identity vs. Wittgensteinian Film and Literature.Rupert Read - 2015 - Philosophy and Literature 39 (1):128-153.
    [B]ecause I have shown my hands to be empty you must now expect not only that an illusion will follow but that you will acquiesce in it.Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving oneself.What has to be overcome is not difficulty of the intellect but of the will.“Are you watching closely?”The last line of Parfit’s description of the “branch-line case” of tele-transportation, the very epicenter of his hugely influential thought experiment that famously proposes a radically new view on “ (...) identity,” runs as follows: “[W]hile I stand here speechless, I can see and hear myself, in the studio on Mars, starting to speak.”1 Parfit, notoriously, goes on to argue that the “branch-line” version of me, the “I” in the.. (shrink)
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  47. The Impossibility of Mind-swapping sort of Thought Experiments in the Study of Personal Identity.Mostofa Nazmul Mansur - 2010 - Copula 27:12.
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  48. David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions.Robert S. Henderson - 1990 - Hume Studies 16 (1):33-44.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions Robert S. Henderson Scholarly reflection on Hume's "doctrine" ofselfand personal identity continues to focus on the sections "Of Personal Identity" and the "Appendix" toA Treatise ofHuman Nature. To answer the question of why we have so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successiveperceptions which make up experience, Hume says that (...)
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  49. Personal identity and the self.Rory Madden - 2024 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a 'no-bearer' theory of experience, and the 'no-self' contention that self-representations are about no real entity, before introducing a positive hypothesis about the objects of our self-representations: the 'animalist' claim that we are biological organisms. Section 3 discusses the classic challenge to animalism that brain transplantation is something we could survive but no animal could survive. This challenge introduces positive alternatives (...)
     
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  50. These bizarre fictions: Thought-experiments, our psychology and our selves.Simon Beck - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.
    Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
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