I offer a defense of the moral side-constraints to which Robert Nozick appeals in Anarchy, State and Utopia but for which he fails to provide a sustained justification. I identify a line of anti-consequentialist argumentation which is present in Nozick and which, in the terminology of Samuel Scheffler, moves first to affirm a personal prerogative which allows the individual not to sacrifice herself for the sake of the best overall outcome and second moves on to affirm restrictions (i.e., (...) moral side-constraints) which prohibit the individual from suppressing others' exercise of their personal prerogatives even if that suppression would serve the overall good. I argue that one ought to follow this line of anti-consequentialist argumentation all the way to the affirmation of restrictions by showing that the rationale for the adoption of the personal prerogative is not satisfied unless the accompanying restrictions are adopted as well. Footnotesa A distant ancestor of this essay was written during the spring of 1997 when I was a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University. The draft of the present essay was composed during the tenure of a summer research grant from the Murphy Institute of Political Economy at Tulane University. I am very grateful to both institutions and to Ellen Frankel Paul and Mary Sirridge for their exceedingly helpful editorial advice. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer two arguments in support of the proposition that there are sometimes agent-relative prerogatives to impose harm on nonliable persons. The first argument begins with a famous case where most people intuitively agree it is permissible to perform an act that results in an innocent person’s death, and where there is no liability-based or consequentialist justification for acting. I show that this case is relevantly analogous to a case involving the intentional imposition of lethal defensive harm (...) on a nonliable person. In the final part of the paper, I provide a second, independent, argument in support of the proposition that there are agent-relative permissions to foreseeably harm or kill nonliable people under certain conditions. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jonathan Quong tries to offer further support for “the proposition that there are sometimes agent-relative prerogatives to harm nonliable persons.” In this brief paper, I will demonstrate that Quong’s argument implicitly relies on the premise that the violinist in Thomson’s famous example has a right not to be unplugged. Yet, first, Quong provides no argument in support of this premise; and second, the premise is clearly wrong. Moreover, throughout his paper Quong just question-beggingly and without argument (...) assumes that one cannot lose rights in other ways than by one’s own responsible action. I conclude that Quong has failed to provide further support for his thesis. (shrink)

This article uses Ernst Fraenkel’s dual-state framework as an analytical tool to study those conflicting imperatives and constitutional tensions with a focus on the power to detain. This article makes the argument that China has emerged as a dual state with a normal state that functions increasingly with a rule-based government in inter-personal matters and a prerogative state that solidifies control in areas that are regarded as political sensitive. Overall, while the equilibrium between the normative and prerogative (...) states has been evolving in China, it has remained stable. The Party has been able to build a relatively self-defined and self-referencing legal system to provide the certainty and order that the Chinese political economy demands while maintaining a zone of exception, expansive and continuing to evolve, for the prerogative state to safeguard authoritarian rule. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen 's critique of Rawlsian special incentives has been criticised as internally inconsistent on the grounds that Cohen concedes the existence of incentives that are legitimate because they are grounded on agent-centred prerogatives. This, Cohen 's critics argue, invites a slippery slope argument: there is no principled line between those incentives Cohen permits and those he condemns. This paper attempts a partial defence of Cohen : a prerogative can be granted but then its operation internally qualified. A (...) better off person has a prerogative that grounds incentive payment, but that person should be sensitive to the degree of difference between her resources and those of the representative worst off person. This gives a better off person under a distribution a discretion that is then internally qualified by a commitment to an egalitarian ethos. The paper concludes that on balance this is not, in fact, a reasonable view of a prerogative: granting it and then qualifying it in this way undermines the unfettered discretion that should attach to a prerogative. However, Cohen has certainly identified an ambiguity in how we conceive of prerogatives. (shrink)

British higher education has undergone an unprecedented transformation over the past twenty years from an elite and individualised personal option embodied in historic universities (and their qualified institutional imitation in post-war expansion) to an industrialised, mass higher education system designed to produce a standard, reliable, predictable human ‘product’ suited to the putative needs of British industry and commerce. This ‘reform’ or ‘modernisation’ incorporates key features of ‘managerial modernity’ and it has been imposed without effective critique or resistance. In this (...) paper we outline and analyse aspects of the quasi-totalitarian ‘normalisation’ of the education system as a whole, and pose some basic questions about the adequacy of the result as means of intellectual maturation and fundamental socialisation. It is concluded that the limits of ‘accountability’ have been narrowly and prescriptively drawn, and that both the tacit assumptions and targeted outcomes of this facility for social reproduction may be held in part responsible for a reduced and diminished ‘post-humanity’. Some marginal figures offer material for creative resistance, but what resources, if any, do conventional Christian theology, ethics or pedagogic practice offer in the face of this forced homogenisation of the human? (shrink)

This article reviews the medieval law background of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the state as it has been exercised over incompetent persons who formerly were competent adults, concluding that the fiduciary standard implied in the statute De Prerogative Regis (1324), which is the basis for modern guardianship status, requires that the court and guardian adopt an attitude of respectful friendship toward the incompetent person, just as though they were to be accountable to the person himself, were he to (...) recover his faculties and become competent once more. This ficuciary responsibility, originating in the device of the "use" or trust employed for the management of the estates of lunatics, contrasts with the self-interested feudal guardianship used for the custody of "natural fools" or "idiots", who were under paternalistic arrangements. The article argues that because the determination of legal incompetence and the consequent transfer of custody of the person and property of an incompetent person to the state would result in a drastic forfeiture of liberty and property interests were it not for the fiduciary obligation owed by the state to the incompetent, the state is under an obligation to exercise its fiduciary duties in good faith and may not impose states policies or advance state interests of its own in the supervision of the affairs of incompetent persons, apart from interests arising legitimately out of the state's institutional interest in providing competent administration for the benefit of the incompetents themselves. Keywords: concept of the person, Cruzan, feudalism, guardianship, incompetent person, parens patriae CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper challenges a common dogma of the literature on forgiveness: that only victims have the standing to forgive. Attacks on third-party forgiveness generally come in two forms. One form of attack suggests that it follows from the nature of forgiveness that third-party forgiveness is impossible. Another form of attack suggests that although third-party forgiveness is possible, it is always improper or morally inappropriate for third parties to forgive. I argue against both of these claims; third-party forgiveness is possible, and (...) in some cases it is morally appropriate for third parties to forgive (or refuse to forgive) wrongdoers for wrongs done to victims. I also propose an explanation of third parties’ standing to forgive: third parties have the standing to forgive when it is appropriate for them to take wrongs done to victims ‘personally’. While appropriately ‘taking a wrong personally’ does not require seeing oneself as a victim, it typically does require being in some form of personal relationship with victims. Thus, while the standing to forgive is not grounded exclusively in having been wronged, the prerogative to forgive is normally limited to victims and their loved ones. And once we recognize the importance of third-party forgiveness in our moral lives and the norms that govern it, we can more easily adjudicate between competing accounts of the nature of forgiveness.​. (shrink)

During the oppressive reign of Louis XIV, Gabrielle Suchon was the most forceful female voice in France, advocating women’s freedom and self-determination, access to knowledge, and assertion of authority. This volume collects Suchon’s writing from two works—_Treatise on Ethics and Politics_ and _On the Celibate Life Freely Chosen; or, Life without Commitments _—and demonstrates her to be an original philosophical and moral thinker and writer. Suchon argues that both women and men have inherently similar intellectual, corporeal, and spiritual capacities, which (...) entitle them equally to essentially human prerogatives, and she displays her breadth of knowledge as she harnesses evidence from biblical, classical, patristic, and contemporary secular sources to bolster her claim. Forgotten over the centuries, these writings have been gaining increasing attention from feminist historians, students of philosophy, and scholars of seventeenth-century French literature and culture. This translation, from Domna C. Stanton and Rebecca M. Wilkin, marks the first time these works will appear in English. (shrink)

During the oppressive reign of Louis XIV, Gabrielle Suchon (1632–1703) was the most forceful female voice in France, advocating women’s freedom and self-determination, access to knowledge, and assertion of authority. This volume collects Suchon’s writing from two works—Treatise on Ethics and Politics (1693) and On the Celibate Life Freely Chosen; or, Life without Commitments (1700)—and demonstrates her to be an original philosophical and moral thinker and writer. Suchon argues that both women and men have inherently similar intellectual, corporeal, and spiritual (...) capacities, which entitle them equally to essentially human prerogatives, and she displays her breadth of knowledge as she harnesses evidence from biblical, classical, patristic, and contemporary secular sources to bolster her claim. Forgotten over the centuries, these writings have been gaining increasing attention from feminist historians, students of philosophy, and scholars of seventeenth-century French literature and culture. This translation, from Domna C. Stanton and Rebecca M. Wilkin, marks the first time these works will appear in English. (shrink)

This research shows how business students’ disciplinary specializations can affect their sense of personal responsibility by providing rationalizations for moral disengagement. It thereby conceptualizes business students’ disciplinary specializations as a key dimension of the business school responsibility learning environment. Students use four main rationalizations to displace responsibility variously away from their own disciplinary specializations, to claim responsibility as the prerogative of their specialization, and to shiftirresponsibility onto disciplinary out-groups. Yet despite their disciplinary identifications, students largely rationalized that their (...) sense of responsibility was an individual matter that was unlikely to be affected by contextual influences, and they attributedirresponsible behavior to incorrigible ‘bad apples.’ A theoretical model is offered which illustrates these dynamics by combining Bandura’s social cognitive theory with social identity theory. The research is based on secondary data, specifically focus-group interviews conducted with undergraduate students at a major Scandinavian business school in connection with the implementation of the UN Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME) initiative. The implications for management education include the need to strengthen students’ ‘disciplinary reflexivity,’ and to explicitly address the tension between students’ disciplinary solidarities and their faith in their own individual moral infallibility. (shrink)

Recent theorizing about the cognitive underpinnings of dilemmatic moral judgment has equated slow, deliberative thinking with the utilitarian disposition and fast, automatic thinking with the deontological disposition. However, evidence for the reflective utilitarian hypothesis—the hypothesized link between utilitarian judgment and individual differences in the capacity for rational reflection has been inconsistent and difficult to interpret in light of several design flaws. In two studies aimed at addressing some of the flaws, we found robust evidence for a reflective minimalist hypothesis—high CRT (...) performers’ tendency to regard utility-optimizing acts as largely a matter of personal prerogative, permissible both to perform and to leave undone. This relationship between CRT and the “minimalist” orientation remained intact after controlling for age, sex, trait affect, social desirability, and educational attainment. No significant association was found between CRT and the strict utilitarian response pattern or CRT and the strict deontological response pattern, nor did we find any significant association between CRT and willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner. However, we found an inverse association between empathic concern and a willingness to act in the utility-optimizing manner, but there was no comparable association between empathic concern and the deontological judgment pattern. Theoretical, methodological, and normative implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

This article examines G. A. Cohen’s endorsement of a hybrid ethical theory and its relationship to his critique of John Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism. Cohen claimed that Rawls’s appeal to special incentives was a distortion of his own difference principle. I argue that Cohen’s acceptance of a personal prerogative (the central element of Samuel Scheffler’s version of a hybrid ethical theory) has several untoward consequences. First, it illuminates how any reasonable challenge to Rawls’s liberalism must recognise Thomas Nagel’s arguments (...) concerning the problems that arise when one attempts to implement a political theory analogous to a hybrid theory of ethics. Second, it undermines Cohen’s critique of Rawls. Third, it undermines the plausibility of Cohen’s ethos-driven social egalitarianism. The article concludes that, despite Nagel’s concerns, the most plausible form of egalitarianism—one that can accommodate the requirements of a hybrid ethical theory—will be Rawlsian, rather than Cohen’s ethos-based system. (shrink)

When do claims to be saved of a small or moderate harm aggregate against a competing claim to be saved from an early death? In this short response to Kamm's Bioethical Prescriptions, I argue for the following answer: aggregation of weaker claims against a life is permitted just in case, in a one-to-one contest, a person with a weaker claim would have a personal prerogative to prioritize her claim over a stranger’s competing claim to life.

This essay reexamines the idea of paternalism and the basis for finding it objectionable in light of recent writings on “libertarian paternalism.” Suggestion: to qualify as paternalistic, an interference that restricts someone’s liberty or interferes with her choice-making with the aim of helping the individual must be contrary to that very individual’s will. A framework for determining the justifiability of paternalistic action is proposed, under the assumption that the individual has a personal prerogative, up to a point, to (...) engage in less than maximally beneficial action. Beyond that point, the content of the will of the individual disposed against interference can extinguish the presumptive wrongness of paternalism. (shrink)

This study aims to characterise Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) members’ perceptions on five main themes associated with ethics reviews, namely, the nature of research, ethical/moral issues, assent, participants’ risk and HREC prerogatives issues. Three hundred and sixteen HREC members from over 200 HRECs throughout Australia responded to an online questionnaire survey. The results show that in general, HREC members’ beliefs are reasoned and align with sound principles of ethical reviews. There seems to be a disposition for living up to (...) ethical/moral values, avoiding the issue of consent waivers and respecting participants’ welfare, as well as a sense of ambiguity about HREC prerogatives. Problematic areas were a tendency towards over-valuing quantitative research methods for their perceived validity and a neutral view on issuing consent waivers to participants with intellectual disability and, finally, the belief that research that limits disclosure, plans deception or actively conceals is morally unjustifiable. Implications for professional development and policy-making are discussed. (shrink)

This article applies the tools of experimental philosophy to the ongoing debate about both the theoretical viability and the practical import of partially aggregative moral theories in distributive ethics. We conduct a series of three experiments (N=383): First, we document the widespread occurrence of the intuitions that motivate this position. Our study then moves beyond establishing the existence of partially aggregative intuitions in two dimensions: First, we extend experimental work in such a way as to ascertain which amongst existing versions (...) of partial aggregation (localised vs. global) chimes more fully with moral common sense. Specifically, we document how, in tie-breaking cases, ‘irrelevant goods’ judgments (Kamm) are just as robust as the original aggregative/non-aggregative pair of judgments that constitute partial aggregation. Second, by pairing laypeople’s moral judgments in standard cases with their intuitions about the limits of permissible self-prioritisation, we investigate whether one prominent explanation of why irrelevant claims may not be aggregated (Voorhoeve’s ‘personal prerogative’ argument) can be said to underpin people’s intuitions about the (ir)relevance relation of claims in conflict cases. We close with a discussion of our findings’ practical and theoretical import and highlight avenues for future research. (shrink)

For persons serving life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences in California, a commutation usually offers them the sole glimpse of hope for release from prison. While governors were reluctant to consider any sentence reductions from 1975 to 2016, commutations—including those for LWOP—have become a more frequent occurrence since. Yet, little is still known about how governors have justified reducing a sentence that initially offered no prospect of release from prison. Given the apparent change in practice, themes emerging from the content of 177 gubernatorial (...) commutation summaries granted to persons serving LWOP sentences between 2017 and 2021 are analyzed in this paper. Through open coding, rehabilitative indicators (programming and institutional conduct) emerged as necessary preconditions for a commutation, while retributive factors (a reassessment of the nature of the crime and the prerogative to adjust excessive prison sentences or to correct sentencing errors) complemented sentence reductions. The findings expose the ethical issues that arise from an LWOP sentence and the subsequent commutation. More specifically, they shed light on the commitment offenses underlying commuted LWOP sentences and raise questions regarding the penal objectives that are supposed to be accomplished with permanent imprisonment. (shrink)

How much personal partiality do agent-centred prerogatives allow? If there are limits on what morality may demand of us, then how much does it permit? For a view Henry Shue has termed ‘yuppie ethics’, the answer to both questions is a great deal. It holds that rich people are morally permitted to spend large amounts of money on themselves, even when this means leaving those living in extreme poverty unaided. Against this view, I demonstrate that personal permissions are (...) limited in certain ways: their strength must be continuous with the reasons put forward to explain their presence inside morality to begin with. Typically, these reasons include non-alienation and the preservation of personal integrity. However, when personal costs do not result in alienation or violate integrity, they are things that morality can routinely demand of us. Yuppie ethics therefore runs afoul of what I call the ‘continuity constraint’. (shrink)

Care for older persons in India is considered to be the prerogative of the family, particularly the adult children. The legal and policy discourse reiterates this notion as well. In a country that glorifies the notion of filial piety, one finds a rising number of instances of parental neglect and abuse over the last decade. Against this background, it is important to revisit the existing laws, especially the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act (2007) which aims (...) to provide relief to aggrieved parents and senior citizens. In this Article, I analyse the relevant laws and discuss the nature of complaints lodged by elderly parents at the Maintenance Tribunal in Kolkata (India). The nature of intergenerational disputes and the way they are dealt with by the Tribunal highlight the law’s inability to imagine a world of needs beyond the economic needs of survival. Despite a few positive measures, the law presently falls short of interpreting the social ‘needs’ of belongingness, retaining authority and a position of importance in the family, a set of needs that often remain unspoken and are therefore disregarded by the law’s agent (the Tribunal judge in this case). I argue that in the process of translating the ‘needs’ of older persons into ‘rights’ through the application of the law, justice is disserved. (shrink)

The 1924 Church reform, through which the Romanian Orthodox Church decided to adopt the Revised Julian Calendar, led to dissent movements, mostly comprised of peasants, especially in the villages of Moldavia and Bessarabia. Considering the calendar change a heresy, these groups soon developed into religious communities that came to be known as Old Calendarists, or “stylists,” followers of “the old-style calendar.” Led by defrocked priests and monks who rejected the reform, the groups very quickly became the target of the secret (...) police and the Gendarmerie. What also drew the attention of the authorities and the Orthodox Church was that women, especially the younger ones, seemed to play important roles within the communities, not only in terms of membership, but also in preserving and spreading the Old Calendarists’ beliefs and religious ideas. As many members of the communities were being arrested, and their churches were destroyed, these women also suffered imprisonment, monastic incarceration, or were forced to hide from the authorities in caves or huts that they built in the woods. Though subjected to various forms of persecution, which continued through the communist period, the majority of them held strong to their beliefs and contributed to the forging of a religious identity. Using archival documents, in the forms of letters, postcards, photos, and declarations as primary sources, and drawing on interviews conducted with contemporary nuns and members of the Old Calendarist communities, the present article explores the personal stories of young Old Calendarist women. Building upon the work of Anca Șincan, this article challenges the notion that transmission of religion was the exclusive prerogative of older women. (shrink)

Recent debate regarding transgender persons’ bathroom-utilization prerogatives raises broader issues concerning current practices of sex segregation more generally. I argue that the only consistently Progressive position on bathroom access is an outright opposition to any form of bathroom segregation. This opposition, in turn, entails a thorough-going rejection of all types of sex- and gender-segregation. I then suggest that Progressives uncomfortable with such wide-ranging implications may wish to consider the merits of a certain Traditionalist position on such matters—one that counsels caution (...) and legislative forbearance when it comes to overturning long-standing customs (such as those embodied in current practices of sex-segregation). (shrink)

Phenomenology as rhetoric The literature on ‘nursing phenomenology’ is driven by a range of ontological and epistemological considerations, intended to distance it from conventionally scientific approaches. However, this paper examines a series of discrepancies between phenomenological rhetoric and phenomenological practice. The rhetoric celebrates perceptions and experience; but the concluding moment of a research report almost always makes implicit claims about reality. The rhetoric insists on uniquely personal meanings; but the practice offers blank, anonymous abstractions. The rhetoric invites us to (...) believe that knowing is subjective and involved, but at the same time it recommends a technique (bracketing) which can only represent a crude, and entirely misconceived, gesture towards objectivity. Finally, the rhetoric claims that generalisation is beside the point; but the majority of researchers generalise anyway. In quietly ignoring their own rhetoric, ‘phenomenologists’ appropriate scientific prerogatives illegitimately. For their methods do not entitle them to lay claim to anything resembling ‘objectivity’, or generalisability, or ‘reality’, or theoretical abstraction. Like other researchers, they want to talk in generalisable terms about reality; they want to be objective, they want to do theory. But they are saddled with a philosophy that is disabling, because it says they can only talk about perceptions, and meanings, and uniqueness. (shrink)

In this paper, we assume that organ donation policy in the United States will continue to be based on an opt-in model, requiring express consent to donate, and that families will continue to have the prerogative to make donation decisions whenever the deceased person has not recorded his or her own preferences in advance. The limited question addressed here is what should be done when a potential donor dies unexpectedly, without any recorded expression of his or her wishes at (...) hand, while a family decision is being sought. (shrink)

The phenomenon of «оrbanism» as a derivative of the perception of the politician and Prime-Minister of Hungary V.Orban is considered on the basis of the contradictions of the ontological aspects of the internal and external political background of his field of activity. It is noted that in Hungary «оrbanism» is perceived not as an artificially constructed slogan that highlights the activities of the country’s prime minister, but as a manifestation of healthy conservatism and the antithesis of the values of liberal (...) democracy, which are declared to be one of the pillars of building a united Europe. It is proved that in the person of the politician Orbán, «оrbanism» became a product of the national, cultural and historical retrospective of Hungary, which united a fairly significant part of society and Hungarian emigrants who, due to insurmountable circumstances, found themselves abroad. The article proposes to consider the phenomenon of «оrbanism» as a certain synthesis of five steps-strategies, which V.Orban successively implements in the country. They are as follows: step 1) adoption of the new Constitution of the country; step 2) the labor state instead of the market; step 3) regulation of emigration policy; step 4) compliance with the national energy policy; step 5) dialogue with the Hungarian diaspora and restraint in border conflicts. Collectively, these strategic steps are aimed at strengthening the national sovereignty of Hungary in the EU and weakening the «pressure» of the Eurobureaucracy. It is stated that for the national project «sovereign Hungary in the EU», which is aimed at the future, this means the presence of the Hegelian «basis» in the political prerogatives of the FIDES party, which gives this project an expected orbit and predictable result. Its main guidelines are the preservation of statehood within the EU, limiting the power of the Eurobureaucracy, productive cooperation with all partner countries, and distancing from conflicts that could harm the country’s national interests. (shrink)

Il est communément porté au crédit de saint Thomas d’Aquin d’avoir renouvelé et enrichi la compréhension de la personne grâce à la notion jusqu’alors inédite de « relation subsistante ». Le présent article se propose de replacer cette découverte dans sa perspective propre, celle d’un théologien chrétien qui, sans prétendre épuiser conceptuellement un mystère reçu dans la foi, s’efforce néanmoins de rendre raison de la distinction réelle des personnes divines au sein de l’indivise Trinité. On examine d’abord comment saint Thomas (...) a su reprendre, éclairer et nouer par intégrations successives chacun des éléments de la célèbre définition de la personne léguée par Boèce. On est alors en mesure de suivre pas à pas la démarche d’analogie, aussi rigoureuse qu’audacieuse, qui permit à l’Aquinate de discerner, dans cette ratio commune et si humaine de la personne, l’éclat incomparable d’un nom divin. Mais, si l’on désire approcher de plus près le distinctif propre de la personne en Dieu, il n’est d’autre voie que de pénétrer dans la révélation trinitaire qui oblige et qui seule autorise à transcender la frontière du relatif et de l’absolu pour penser enfin, avec Thomas, la « relation comme subsistante », prérogative unique et bienheureux secret de la tripersonnalité divine.Thomas Aquinas is often given credit for having renewed and enriched the concept of personhood, thanks to the previously unheard of notion of « subsisting relation ». This paper proposes to place this discovery in its proper perspective, that of a Christian theologian who, without pretending to exhaust conceptually a mystery received in faith, endeavors nevertheless to provide an account of the real distinction between the divine persons of the undivided Trinity. We begin with an examination of how St. Thomas was able to take up, clarify and shape by successive integrations the famous definition of personhood left by Boethius. This places us in a position to follow step by step the analogical approach, as rigorous as it is audacious, that allows Aquinas to discern, in this common and so human ratio of « person », the incomparable radiance of a divine name. Yet if one desires to draw nearer to the distinctiveness of personhood in God, there is no other way than to penetrate divine revelation, which requires and which alone authorizes transcending the frontier between the relative and the absolute, to think finally, with Thomas, about « relation as subsistent », a unique prerogative and happy secret of the divine tri-personality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The emerging discourse concerning the desirability of intervention in senescence to achieve radical life extension for persons has featured some striking blurring in traditional liberal and conservative commitments and positions. This affords an opportunity for re‐evaluation of these same. The canonical conservative view of the intrinsic value of life is re‐examined and found primarily to involve a denial of human prerogative, rather than an active underwriting of the value of life extension. A critique is offered of an attempted (...) argument against aging intervention from a proto‐conservative worry about a purported threat to human nature. Immortality is found to be a red herring, but a revealing one. Further, the classic liberal view is examined and found wanting in terms of the gravity of its own commitment to, and fullness of its account of the value of life, and the value of life extension. An analysis of the liberal conception of personhood is proposed that both defines persons necessarily as processes, and demonstrates the inalienable quality of the value of life extension to persons so defined. (shrink)

Journal of Human Values, Volume 28, Issue 1, Page 11-19, January 2022. This work is a study of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics to characterize the good: the good that features in education and good life. Nicomachean Ethics teaches us that human good is neither in thought/theory, nor in action/practice alone, it is neither an exclusively individual prerogative, nor an outright social preserve. And, human good is impossible without education. The practice of education can neither be isolated nor conceptualized apart from (...) the demands of human life. If education is for human well-being—for human good—the good then is not in action alone, but action in accordance with the excellence of the actor. What unifies reason and action, knowing and doing is learning to be an excellent person—a person who is well-disposed in her affections and action, whose judgements are true, and decisions correct; and whose intellect and character are in harmony with the human nature. (shrink)

Introduction: Preference, Choice and (Libertarian) Paternalism Kalle Grill & Danny Scoccia This special issue originated in a workshop organized by one of the editors, Kalle Grill, at Umeå University in March 2014, with funding from The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences. The theme of the workshop was Respecting Context-Dependent Preferences. Contributors to this issue who were also speakers at the Umeå workshop are Richard Arneson, Kalle Grill, Jason Hanna, Sven Ove Hansson, Robert Sugden, and Torbjörn Tännsjö. The other (...) speakers at the workshop were Luc Bovens, Sarah Conly, Fabienne Peter and Danny Scoccia. Preferences are context-dependent when they are determined by circumstances other than the contents of the alternatives that preferences range over, such as the way alternatives are presented. As behavioral research increasingly indicates, many of our preferences are context-dependent in this sense. Context-dependence raises difficult issues for many areas of moral and political philosophy. Importantly, the fact that preferences are not in any obvious way based on settled values or considered judgments may cast doubt on liberalism’s stance on when paternalism is morally objectionable: What exactly is liberal antipaternalism supposed to protect, if not settled preferences? What about paternalism that operates by influencing the formation of preferences? Should we, as proposed by so called "libertarian paternalists", shape the choice environment so as to promote choices that are conducive to health, wealth and happiness over the long run? More generally, we may inquire what respect for persons should mean given the context-dependence of their preferences. Several articles in this issue deal with the plausibility of libertarian paternalism and the nudging it endorses. Sugden argues that those who take context-dependence to justify paternalism often rely on ideas of latent preferences that lack a convincing psychological explanation. William Glod argues that, because of informational constraints, nudging often fails to track people's actual preferences. Hanna, in contrast, defends nudging against the objection that it is manipulative. Andres Moles surveys some legitimate aims for which nudging can be justified. The remaining articles either take a more general view of context-dependence, or investigates it in some specific context: Arneson considers, in light of the debate on libertarian paternalism, the general concept of paternalism, and proposes a new theory for when paternalism is justified, in terms of a limited prerogative to be imprudent. Grill argues that respect for persons should be pluralist and include respect for their choices as well as their preferences, even when these two come apart. Tännsjö re-considers, in the light of context-dependence, his earlier rejection of any form of coercive care. Hansson contributes a historical perspective with a discussion of John Stuart Mill's three principles regulating the extent of individual liberty. The guest editors wish to thank the journal editors for giving us the opportunity to produce this special issue. We are grateful also to the reviewers who have helped in the editorial process, and to Margaret Dancy, the Managing Editor, for her friendly support throughout. (shrink)

What could ground normative restrictions concerning cultural appropriation which are not grounded by independent considerations such as property rights or harm? We propose that such restrictions can be grounded by considerations of intimacy. Consider the familiar phenomenon of interpersonal intimacy. Certain aspects of personal life and interpersonal relationships are afforded various protections in virtue of being intimate. We argue that an analogous phenomenon exists at the level of large groups. In many cases, members of a group engage in shared (...) practices that contribute to a sense of common identity, such as wearing certain hair or clothing styles or performing a certain style of music. Participation in such practices can generate relations of group intimacy, which can ground certain prerogatives in much the same way that interpersonal intimacy can. One such prerogative is making what we call an appropriation claim. An appropriation claim is a request from a group member that non-members refrain from appropriating a given element of the group’s culture. Ignoring appropriation claims can constitute a breach of intimacy. But, we argue, just as for the prerogatives of interpersonal intimacy, in many cases there is no prior fact of the matter about whether the appropriation of a given cultural practice constitutes a breach of intimacy. It depends on what the group decides together. (shrink)

Questions about the dignity of the human person give rise to many of the most central and hotly disputed topics in bioethics. In _A Defense of Dignity: Creating Life, Destroying Life, and Protecting the Rights of Conscience_, Christopher Kaczor investigates whether each human being has intrinsic dignity and whether the very concept of "dignity" has a useful place in contemporary ethical debates. Kaczor explores a broad range of issues addressed in contemporary bioethics, including whether there is a duty of "procreative (...) beneficence," the ethics of ectopic pregnancy, and the possibility of "rescuing" human embryos with human wombs or artificial wombs. _A Defense of Dignity_ also treats issues relevant to the end of life, including physician-assisted suicide, provision of food and water to patients in a persistent vegetative state, and how to proceed with organ donation following death. Finally, what are the duties and prerogatives of health care professionals who refuse in conscience to take part in activities that they regard as degrading to human dignity? Should they be forced to do what they consider to be violations of the patient's well being, or does patient autonomy always trump the conscience of a health care professional? Grounded in the Catholic intellectual and moral tradition, _A Defense of Dignity_ argues that all human beings from the beginning to the end of their lives should be treated with respect and considers how this belief should be applied in controversial cases. "_A Defense of Dignity_ provides a skillful, informed, and clear philosophical analysis, from a natural law perspective, of a range of controversial, and sometimes complex, bioethical questions concerning the beginning and end of life. Few authors approach bioethics from a natural law perspective, and few do it as well as Christopher Kaczor. The book should be of interest not only to natural law philosophers and their students, but also to anyone interested in bioethics." —_John Keown, Georgetown University__ "Moral questions at the beginning and ending of life and controversies over liberty of conscience are among the most vexing and important issues of our day. Christopher Kaczor brings his characteristic moral seriousness and philosophical good sense to his treatment of these issues, all of which implicate the key concept of human dignity. This eminently readable collection will provide an invaluable resource for educators and students alike." — Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina_ “Indispensable. Kaczor untangles the various meanings of human dignity to undertake a reexamination of the most serious and difficult issues in medical ethics. The book combines clarity with philosophical precision, faithfulness to Catholic teaching with a thorough engagement with critics." —_J. Budziszewski, University of Texas at Austin_. (shrink)

Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This (...) paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality through the lens of the domains of permissible and required partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss agent-centred moral options that concern permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. I then focus on required partiality, which concerns associative duties that go beyond our general duties to others and require us to give special priority to people who are close to us. I discuss some notable features of associative duties and the two main objections that have been raised against them: the Voluntarist and the Distributive objections. I then turn to the justification of partiality, focusing on underivative approaches and reasons-based frameworks. I discuss the reductionism and non-reductionism debate: the question whether partiality is derivative or fundamental. I survey arguments for ‘the big three’, according to which partiality is justified by appeal to the special value of either projects, personal relationships, or individuals. I conclude by discussing four newly emerging areas in the debate: normative transitions of various personal relationships, relationships with AI, epistemic partiality, and negative partiality, which concerns the negative analogue of our positive personal relationships. (shrink)

BackgroundThe assessment of patients’ decision-making capacity is ubiquitous in contemporary healthcare. This paper examines the ethics of undisclosed probing of capacity by psychiatrists. The discussion will refer to the law in England and Wales, though the highlighted issues are likely to be relevant in similar jurisdictions.Main textDecision-making capacity is a private attribute, and patients may not necessarily be aware that one of their personal abilities is being explored. Routine exploration of capacity has not historically been a part of psychiatric (...) examination, but it is now difficult to avoid during psychiatric interview.Ethical practice and shared decision-making require patients to be aware that their decision-making may be evaluated by the doctor at some point, and the potential implications of an objective professional conclusion of incapacity. Case law directs that patients should be informed about any assessment of their decision-making ability, though the extent to which this has translated into practice is unclear. However, explanation about the assessment may cause a patient to react negatively, which may impede therapeutic engagement and constitute an ethical dilemma. It is argued that in the absence of systemic measures, professionals should retain the discretion to decide whether a particular patient should be informed about the impending probe into their decision-making ability, or not. In the latter instance, concealment of information about the assessment or its purpose should be subject to the caveats and safeguards associated with any recourse to therapeutic exception.ConclusionThe necessity to mandatorily inform patients about assessment of their capacity introduces a novel ethical dilemma for psychiatrists. The negotiation of this dilemma should not be the prerogative of the clinician, and requires systemic initiatives to ensure universal awareness of patients about the possibility of their capacity being assessed during their journeys through healthcare systems. (shrink)

Les travaux et publications récents concernant le très abondant matériel de l’Artémision de Thasos permettent de proposer une première vue d’ensemble. Nous sommes ici dans une situation privilégiée puisque nous savons par les sources écrites qu’il s’agit d’un sanctuaire consacré à Artémis. Le matériel votif du sanctuaire permet-il alors de dégager un aspect particulier de la personnalité d’Artémis à Thasos ? Si quelques offrandes sont clairement le signe d’une dévotion de jeunes filles et de femmes ou sont directement à mettre (...) en relation avec les attributions d’Artémis, force est de constater, à ce point d’avancée des recherches, l’absence d’offrandes vraiment originales, et en particulier le nombre très réduit de représentations de la déesse dans son sanctuaire, ce qui ne permet guère de déterminer une fonction précise de celle-ci à Thasos. Recent research and publications on the very numerous votive offerings found in the Thasian Artemision allow us to provide a preliminary overview. The context is favourable, since written evidence informs us that this sanctuary was dedicated to Artemis. Do the offerings found in the sanctuary allow us to point out a particular aspect of the Artemis’ personality in Thasos? Some offerings clearly indicate that girls and women worshipped the goddess, or else they can be directly related to Artemis’ prerogatives. However, we can infer from current investigation that no truly original offerings are attested and that the goddess herself is very rarely represented on offerings in her shrine. Thus this evidence does not allow us to define a precise function of Artemis in Thasos. (shrink)

Our romantic lives are influenced, to a large extent, by our perceptions of physical attractiveness – and the societal beauty standards that shape them. But what if we could free our desires from this fixation on looks? Science fiction writer Ted Chiang has explored this possibility in a fascinating short story – and scientific developments might, in the future, move it beyond the realm of fiction. In this paper, I lay out the prudential case for using “attraction-expanding technology,” and then (...) consider it from a moral point of view. Using the technology would, in one respect, be morally good: it would benefit those whom prevailing beauty standards marginalize. But attraction-expanding technology also raises a moral concern – one that can be cast in non-harm-based and harm-based terms. I argue that the non-harm-based objection should be rejected, because it is incompatible with a moral principle central to queer rights. And the harm-based objection, I argue, is outweighed by the benefits of attraction-expanding technology, and undermined by the prerogative you have over your personal romantic choices. I conclude by considering whether, from the perspective of society, the development of attraction-expanding technology would be desirable. (shrink)

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the main legal documents governing the movement of refugee and asylum seekers across international borders. As the number of displaced persons seeking refuge has reached unprecedented numbers, states have resorted to measures to circumvent their obligations under the Convention. These range from bilateral agreements condemning refugees to their vessels at sea to the excision of certain territories from national jurisdiction. While socio-economic developments and the rise of the worldwide web have led (...) to deterritorialization of vast domains of the economy and the media which enable them to escape from state control, territorial presence, whether on terra firma or on vessels at sea which are functional surrogates for territorial sovereignty, continues to be the basis for the entitlement to human and citizens’ rights. We are facing a dual movement of deterritorialization and territorialization at once, both of which threaten the end of the 1951 Convention. This article is an exercise in non-ideal theory which, nonetheless, has implications for a seminal question in ideal democratic theory as to how to define and justify the boundaries of the demos. If the demos refers to the constitutional subject of a self-determining entity in whose name sovereignty is exercised, regimes of sovereignty, including those which govern the movement of peoples across borders, define the prerogatives as well as obligations of such sovereign entities under international law. The period ushered in by the 1951 Convention was such a sovereignty regime which today may be nearing its end. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Painful Lack of ConnectionChristopher Bailey (bio)Keywordsdepression, detachment (as a defense), empathy, evolution, masculinityI greatly appreciate the incredibly thoughtful responses to my clinical anecdote, “A Painful Lack of Wounds.” There is, in some more than others, a peculiar aura of detachment that, for me, evokes the very abyss (and its lack of an opposing force) that Colin and I found ourselves staring into that day. I realize, of course, (...) that some level of detachment is necessary to allow airspace for intellectual arrivals and departures.Detachment, moreover, is a form of emotional and psychological escape. In contrast with physical escape, detachment makes something that is present seem absent and, in that regard, is more like camouflage than flight. In some of the responses, therefore, I find myself tuning out the intellectual labyrinth and tuning in to how well it obscures its creator. What wounds or weaknesses, I wonder, is the author trying to hide? Insulin-dependent diabetes? An inferiority complex? Cannot climb chain-link fences? Is he or she hiding these problems from him- or herself? Or just the rest of us?This drive to connect, to regain the biological and the personal, was the ultimate point of my anecdote. I am not suggesting that human beings are biologically built for warfare or that all forms of pathology, at one time, must have conferred some evolutionary advantage. But as omnivorous, social primates, we are definitely adapted for engagement (of all varieties).Certainly, we need to avoid overidentification or sweepingly premature conclusions. Still, no doctor would deny his or her nostrils if cued by a foul, fetid odor to examine a patient for bed sores or gangrene. Likewise, we cannot in our clinical efforts recoil from the same instincts for sniffing out pathology that once made us successful predators. To paraphrase Jeffrey Masson and Susan McCarthy, the authors of When Elephants Weep, when one feels, from observing a bear, that the bear is sad, chances are the bear is sad. To call this anthropomorphizing is a much less parsimonious explanation than the possibility that evolutionary cousins can accurately read one another. And if inter-mammalian empathy is not too much of a stretch, we can probably trust what we feel from an animal of our own species.Granted, it is a long way from feeling to formulation. I chose to write about Colin because he expressed a kind of craving I am finding in a lot of men these days. I do not doubt that cultural pressure, heaped on personal issues and genetic prerogatives, can push a man to place heroism at the center of his psychic universe. Nonetheless, I find it odd that ostensibly comprehensive formulations, like the biopsychosocial model, fail to acknowledge the greater ecosystem in which we dwell. The wheelchair-accessible communities we have created to detach from natural selection are [End Page 249] the same frictionless planes on which masculinity, like a grotesque evolutionary artifact, tends to stumble nowadays.In short, were we not so dependent on the very things we call progress, had we not atrophied from a well-adapted ape to one that can die of hypothermia in 50° weather, I doubt if Colin's insecurity (or anyone's) would be so great. Not that I did not challenge Colin on aspects of his self-doubt. But I did not see it as “inappropriate” either. And although I agree a sense of helplessness can be both cause and effect of depression, his self-doubt, to me, was more than just a “cognitive error” unconsciously conceived as cover for a dark mood. Nondepressed people, after all, score higher than their depressed counterparts on measures of self-deception. The same false sense of security that we, as a culture, have coasted on for decades was shattered for Colin in Iraq. And I believe that is a good thing.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Clinical Anecdotes: A Painful Lack of WoundsCommentary: The Nature of Proof in PsychiatryCommentary: Truth and Healing a Veteran's DepressionCommentary: Inappropriate RegretCommentary: The Cultural Context of Post-traumatic Stress DisorderCommentary: Explication or Explanation?Commentary: The Importance of What Psychiatrists Care AboutCommentary: Mourning or MelancholiaResponse: A... (shrink)

By now, everybody has heard of the `bourgeois public sphere,' that moment in history when a rising merchant class felt empowered enough to deliberate public policy rationally and universalistically, and to transmit its conclusions to the powers-that-were with the expectation of being taken seriously. By academic standards Habermas's thesis has become a household word, perhaps because it offers a nostalgic reminder of a lost utopia of participatory democracy, or because it offers hope of what yet might be — if we (...) could only learn to translate the seventeenth century into the ostensibly compatible conditions of a modernity in which widespread education, universal suffrage and the new communications technologies would seem to invite such translation.But this is not the whole of Habermas's thesis, nor its most original part. The rest of it revolves around the `representative public sphere' which refers both to the period that preceded, and the period that followed, that of the newly autonomous bourgeoisie. In the earlier period, it refers to the person of the monarch, to the dazzle and charisma of his regalia, symbols of the legitimacy of his rule and the unity of his realm. That's not such a new idea either.What is new is Habermas's suggestion that the period following the `bourgeois public sphere' — that is, our here and now — is essentially a return to the charisma of the `representative public sphere,' not that of the absolute monarch to be sure, but of a political and economic establishment that has armed itself with image makers and spin doctors who dazzle and charm in the name of the legitimacy and prerogatives of their clients. As Calhoun puts it, summarizing Habermas, “By means of these transformations, the public sphere has become more an arena for advertising than a setting for rational/critical debate. (shrink)

We usually think nothing of our practice of ‘giving up’ on someone who has behaviors or attitudes that are morally criticizable—after all, it is my prerogative to choose with whom I will associate, and exclusion seems to be an unobjectionable part of my toolkit of social sanctions. However, this paper will argue that it is in many cases impermissible to give up on a morally unpleasant person—in fact, it would be to make an unjustified exception for oneself.

Were terrorists ever to effectively deploy weapons of mass destruction, medical practice would be quickly transformed. Many ordinary clinicians would be asked or required to treat unfamiliar yet serious medical conditions in a setting of overwhelming urgency and impossible odds. Clinical focus would shift from doing good things for a succession of individual patients to considering many patients at once, a change that could beget loss of trust and rapport with patients. Clinicians might also experience restrictions in personal liberties (...) and appropriation of their property. The purpose of this essay is to develop a teleological framework for undertaking this transformation. In ordinary clinical medicine, the elusiveness of the individual telos (i.e., the good for the individual) is acknowledged in procedures (such as social history taking, informed consent and outpatient scheduling) designed to protect patients' (and clinicians') prerogatives to interpret the telos for themselves. In mass casualty scenarios, on the other hand, the telos is standardized and regarded as an Immediate Object (usually as a state of affairs in which survival is maximized and permanent disability is minimized). Clinicians who provide mass casualty care will face a number of ethical challenges that can be negotiated by appealing to the political and ethical rationale, and limits, pertaining to the pursuit of aggregate survival as an Immediate Object. (shrink)

is an unusual phenomenon. The concern with rights different citizens have in different societies is legal rather than philosophical. It is frequently somewhat a technical matter for jurisprudence to decide exactly what rights a citizen has in a given situation and how he might best exercise his rights. Often, to be sure, the legal technicalities involve matters of principle, and if so these should be made explicit. For this, too, there is a need less for philosophy and more for jurisprudence, (...) for detailed legal study. For example, the problems concerning interests of third parties - related to the questions of when is a third party an aggrieved person, so-called, and what are the rights of the aggrieved third party - have been taken up, in the sixties, by diverse federal courts of the United States, with the aim of increasing individual rights when these are encroached upon by public agencies.1 Although this may call for much philosophical commentary, it is clearly more a legal matter than a philosophical concern. Even the broadly philosophical question of rights within a legal system requires a greater degree of legal than philosophical considerations. Recently H.L.A. Hart, the foremost living legal philosopher, has cited Sir Henry Maine (1891) and William Warwick Buckland (1950) approvingly to support his view that even "Roman law never achieved a clear concept of a legal right." 2 It is not clear to a philosopher what "a clear concept of legal rights" might be, and a philosopher like Hannah Arendt never. concerned herself with this matter when she expressed her admiration for the rights of a Roman citizen to his privacy.3 Regardless of whether we admire or deplore this, we can agree that at least in principle a Roman citizen had more rights and prerogatives within his family than any modern civilized law would ever permit. A philosopher with only a modicum of sensitivity can say that although Rome was not a democracy, and even though in Rome the rights of women and children (not to mention slaves) were not recognized, the rights of citizens to privacy and to be free of the need ever to prove their innocence have nevertheless become the foundation stones of modern liberal individualistic democracy.. (shrink)

Actualmente, la reflexión sobre la imagen se centra mayoritariamente sobre su masiva presencia y su interminable reproducción. En este trabajo nos centraremos, a la inversa, en cómo las imágenes se destruyen masiva y sistemáticamente. Si el examen interdisciplinar es una prerrogativa fundamental en los estudios visuales, el volumen Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Ashgate 2013), compilado por excelentes históricos y arqueólogos, ofrece a los filósofos un modelo importante de colaboración a la hora de pensar qué son las imágenes. El (...) propósito de este trabajo es presentar y discutir brevemente algunos aspectos originales de estos ensayos, enfatizando la importancia de los distintos modos y motivos por los que nuestros antepasados no solo han creado, sino también han destruido imágenes. Distinguiendo la iconoclasia del simple vandalismo, podemos descubrir una ambigüedad fundamental según la cual quien intenta preservar las imágenes, acaba con destruirlas y quien aparece como destros antepasados no solo han tructor, logra fertilizar nuevas concepciones y significados para su propia tradición figurativa. Quizás esta ambigüedad no sea algo que las imágenes sufren desde fuera, sino que sea algo connatural a la imagen misma. Y si es así, quien hoy estudia la vida de las imágenes, quizás podría encontrar un acceso privilegiado en esa a través una lógica paradójica que destaca como las imágenes mueren. PALABRAS CLAVESICONOCLASIA, ICONOFÍLIA, FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA DE LAS IMÁGENES, ESTUDIOS VISUALES.ABSTRACTContemporary thought on images focuses mostly on their massive presence and their endless reproduction. On the contrary, in this paper, I will focus on how images have been massively and systematically destroyed. If the interdisciplinary exam is a fundamental prerogative in visual studies, the volume Striking Images, Iconoclasms Past and Present (Ashgate 2013), compiled by excellent historians and archaeologists, could offer to philosophers an important frame of teamwork in thinking what the images are. The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss briefly some original aspects of these essays, by emphasizing the importance of means and reasons through which our ancestors have not only created, but also destroyed images. Once distinguished iconoclasm and mere vandalism, we could discover a fundamental ambiguity whereby any person who tries to preserve the images, finishes with wrecking them; while on the contrary somebody who appears as a destroyer, succeeds to fertilize new concepts and meanings for his/her own figurative tradition. Perhaps this ambiguity is not something that image suffers extrinsically, but something inherent to the image itself. And if it is so, he/she who wants to study the life of images, could perhaps find a privileged access to it, through a paradoxical logic that explains, instead, how images die.KEYWORDSICONOCLASM, ICONOPHILIA, PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY OF IMAGES, VISUAL STUDIES. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mary as the Exemplar of the Body's PovertyAngela FranksRecent MariologyFollowing the trajectory of Mariology and Marian devotion for the last century or so is enough to give one whiplash. On the one hand, the declaration of the doctrine of Mary's Assumption in 1950 by Pope Pius XII represents a strand of Mariology that emphasizes her divinely granted prerogatives and glory. In popular piety, this dogmatic emphasis was mirrored by (...) devotional practices that stressed Mary's mediatorial power.1 On the other hand, many theologians were concerned that such teaching and practice obscured the centrality of Christ, the Church, and the liturgy in Christian life.2 One could see the placing of Mary within chapter 8 of Lumen Gentium less than fifteen years after the declaration of the Assumption as a rebalancing of Mariology. Lumen Gentium (LG) resituated Mary within the doctrine of the Church, echoing patristic equations of Our Lady with the Church.3 One unintended effect of the conciliar move, however, was to make devotion to Mary seem unnecessary, despite the efforts of [End Page 1097] post-conciliar popes to encourage Marian piety—in particular, John Paul II, with his Marian motto Totus Tuus.John Paul II is in many ways an exemplar of conciliar Marian devotion. His Mariology integrates Mary into ecclesiology by emphasizing her role as the paradigmatic follower of Christ.4 This discipleship is, he is careful to say, due to her maternal role and the extraordinary graces that followed from it.5 But these graces did not eliminate her need to follow her son closely; rather, they made such discipleship possible.This interplay between Mary's need and the unique graces granted to meet that need is perhaps clearest in John Paul II's presentation of Mary's faith.6 This attitude of faith is "central" to John Paul II's presentation of Mary in the encyclical Redemptoris Mater (RM), according to Joseph Ratzinger.7 Because of her faith, which is based on the prior action of God in her life (§38, quoting LG §60), she is due "a wealth of praise" that "is more than ever necessary today" (RM §34). In John Paul II, the seeming either-or of twentieth-century Mariology is dissolved, but through the introduction of a causal relationship between the two. In other words, [End Page 1098] Mary's poverty—her need for and receptivity to God—is what makes her able to be rich, to be worthy of a wealth of praise.Perhaps surprisingly, John Paul Il's presentation of Mary as transparent to the mystery of Christ echoes his theology of the body. There, he repeats a hylomorphic maxim: "The body reveals the person." In this revelation, the poverty and the wealth of the body coincide. The body is of great dignity: it can reveal the person. But it is also poor, because it does not reveal itself but rather is transparent to the inner personal mystery. In this, it resembles Mary.This essay will pick up the trail laid down by John Paul II by examining Mary under the rubric of her poverty. Her poverty, I will argue, is exemplary for the poverty of the body, and neither Mary nor the body can be understood properly without understanding poverty. In this essay, I will explore these topics by looking at the Mariology of John Paul II and Hans Urs von Balthasar, before turning to what this Mariology means for the body and for creation in general.Mary's PovertyRedemptoris Mater presents Mary as a model of pilgrim faith, one who "goes before" us on the pilgrimage (RM §§5–6 and 25–28). Mary's reliance upon faith places her among the anawim, the poor of the Lord. John Paul II quotes §55 of Lumen Gentium to note that Mary "stands out among the poor and humble of the Lord, who confidently await and receive salvation from him" (RM §§8 and 11). As the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith under Joseph Ratzinger wrote around the time of the Marian encyclical, she is "totally dependent upon God and completely directed towards him, and at the side of her Son, she is... (shrink)

This article examines non-statutory executive powers, which are commonly employed in the modern state but rarely studied as a distinct concept. The article assesses three treatments of these powers available in current English public law—prerogative, common law powers which rely on analogies between the state and legal persons, and judicial review—and argues that they fail to provide a proper balance between legality and need. Royal prerogative connotes a shrinking reservoir of ancient powers, while non-statutory powers respond to unexpected (...) futures and statute’s intrinsic eventual failings. Analogies to legal persons fail to address the particularities of executive powers. Judicial review provides only a partial solution, since absence of parliamentary approval is not, in itself, ground for special treatment of executive action. The author joins calls for theoretization of public law and advances a model of executive powers that draws on a composite theory of the executive branch and its functions.This article examines non-statutory executive powers, which are commonly employed in the modern state but rarely studied as a distinct concept. The article assesses three treatments of these powers available in current English public law—prerogative, common law powers which rely on analogies between the state and legal persons, and judicial review—and argues that they fail to provide a proper balance between legality and need. Royal prerogative connotes a shrinking reservoir of ancient powers, while non-statutory powers respond to unexpected futures and statute’s intrinsic eventual failings. Analogies to legal persons fail to address the particularities of executive powers. Judicial review provides only a partial solution, since absence of parliamentary approval is not, in itself, ground for special treatment of executive action. The author joins calls for theoretization of public law and advances a model of executive powers that draws on a composite theory of the executive branch and its functions. (shrink)

In this important book Peter G. Brown seeks to chart a new future for the species that share the earth. He offers an innovative, yet historically grounded, argument for human rights to bodily integrity; to moral, religious, and political choice; and to subsistence that all persons owe each other irrespective of nationality. He also argues that we have direct moral obligations to non-humans - he calls this 'respect for the commonwealth of life'. Honouring these obligations requires a thorough regrounding of (...) human institutions. Through a series of careful arguments the reader is shown: *How we could reconceptualise economics from a growth orientation to an economics of stewardship as a moral end.*How governments could be thought of as trustees to protect human rights and commonwealth of life.*How civil society could be organised and property rights reconceptualised in service of these objectives.The book concludes with the argument that traditional prerogatives of nation states need to be transparent to enforceable international standards concerning human rights and the commonwealth of life, and offers a practical agenda for beginning this fundamental reorientation. (shrink)

Leadership is at the core of Christianity; it operates from the paradigm of God’s revelation to humanity through creation. The creation of the world and the creation of Imago Dei are markers of the service that God has maintained from creation to the fulfilment of soteriology (Gn 1:26, 3 and I Cor 15:42). The early church’s worship of Christ, at least in the Didache, stemmed from the fact that this Hebrew prophet was a servant of God and was YHWH in (...) the flesh. The early teachings of the church were service to the world. This article contends that Christianity faces a crisis because of neglect of the nuclei of Christian theology and faith oriented around the real or physical person of Christ and service to others. The emphasis of this article focuses on kenosis as a prerogative of true Christian faith and leadership. A kenotic model of leadership is service to humanity and the world. The article seeks reflection on the theological importance of kenosis, which interacts with creation and creature. This approach will highlight underlying theology for leadership as it relates to the person of Christ. (shrink)

A common objection to consequentialism is that it makes unreasonable demands upon moral agents, by failing to allow agents to give special weight to their own personal projects and interests. A prominent recent response to this objection is that of Samuel Scheffler, who seeks to make room for moral agents by building agent-centred prerogatives into a consequentialist moral theory. In this paper, I present a new objection to Scheffler's account. I then sketch an improved prerogative, which avoids this (...) objection by incorporating a non-proportional account of the relationship between values, costs and reasons. (shrink)

There is a common understanding of Nietzsche’s views on ethics according to which he believes that one ought to or should act on the appropriate criteria, and that the appropriate criteria are relative to one’s status. Everyone’s actions should be governed by some normatively compelling consideration, but there are different considerations for different persons. One set of rules, perhaps, obtains for the weak, sickly masses; another set of rules applies for the strong, creative types. The superior types cannot be bound (...) by the same consideration that apply to others because their flourishing or their projects are too important, or more simply their natural superiority entitles them to greater prerogatives.... (shrink)