In his recent paper “Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal”, Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his objections, and argue that it has crucial advantages over his radical enactivist alternative.

Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology (EM) at its core involves a praxeological, or interactional, respecification of Gestalt phenomena. In early EM, this is pursued through the development of a category of praxeological Gestalten in which social facts (or social units) are respecified as Gestalt phenomena, where members are the constituents and the social unit is the whole or Gestalt, produced praxeologically by the methodic work of its members. In later work, Garfinkel would praxeologically transpose traditional perceptual Gestalt phenomena, such as music, to explore (...) the interactional work done in the production and perception of those phenomena. In developing EM by praxeologically reconfiguring Gestaltism, Garfinkel drew on the constitutive phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch, wherein Gurwitsch sought to integrate Gestalt Psychology and phenomenology. In drawing on Gurwitsch, while also being informed by the work of Schütz and, later, Merleau-Ponty, EM is often depicted as either heavily indebted to phenomenology or as a distinct type of phenomenology: praxeological phenomenology, perhaps. At the same time, parallels have been drawn between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work and EM, since Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology was published in 1967. The parallels drawn have often centred on the treatment of rules and rule-following and on the similarities in the treatment of meaning in EM and in Wittgenstein’s later work. However, given the centrality of Gestalt psychology to the development of EM, it is worth noting that in his later manuscripts Wittgenstein discussed Gestalt phenomena and Gestalt Psychology extensively and in ways that often anticipate what Garfinkel would do with Gestaltist ideas. It is, therefore, worth exploring the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein’s, Gurwitsch’s and Garfinkel’s engagement with Gestaltism. This is what I seek to do in this article. In conclusion, I propose that EM should be seen, like Wittgenstein, as post-phenomenological. (shrink)

1 Context The idea for the current issue of _Philosophia Scientiæ_ emerged from discussions which took place in the Manchester Ethnomethodology Reading Group. This reading group has its origins in Wes Sharrock’s weekly discussion groups, which have taken place in Manchester (UK) since the early 1970s. As the global Covid-19 pandemic hit in early 2020, the reading group moved online, facilitated by Phil Hutchinson and Alex Holder. Being an online reading group opened up participation to people beyond Northwest UK and (...) within weeks the group became global, with the membership including participants logging on from Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the USA. While the name of the group might indicate an exclusive focus on ethnomethodology, following the naming conventions for academic discussion groups, the name really fails to indicate both the heterogeneity of the group’s reading materials, the interests of t... (shrink)

Scheler developed the fundamentals of his theory of emotions and values wanting to overcome the common-sensical empiricist and the critical rationalist approaches to ethics. Both refused that there are laws of essence as regards the character, deployment, evolution, and interconnection/opposition of the emotions and their relatedness to values. Scheler distinguished between mere feeling states and the intentional feelings of something (principally of values). Moreover, he claimed that a normative inner organization of intentional emotive phenomena can be discovered. Thus, a corresponding (...) phenomenological ethics of values, based on the ‘rationality’ of the emotive life itself, appears possible for the first time. After a comprehensive elucidation of Scheler’s and phenomenology’s approach to the matter, I critically reconstruct in some detail Scheler’s analysis of emotions as intentional experiences. I examine the way in which Scheler understands intentionality and the way in which he silently applied it in the case of emotive experiences. He articulates three relevant proposals. Intentional feeling functions are turned toward feeling states as their intentional objects. He also suggests that, e.g., a snow-covered mountain, whose beauty has amazed someone, is also an intentional correlate of this amazement as intentional feeling. Scheler finally maintains his fundamental thesis that values are the intentional objects of intentional emotive phenomena. However, he does not develop a clear and coherent analysis of how the three candidates for the place of the intentional object of an emotion intermingle or are otherwise interconnected. In the end, I survey some other closely related problems, regarding his understanding of reduction and of the status of values, and attempt to trace them all back to Scheler’s phenomenological realism. This examination, however, shows that we can use the latter’s analyses as preparation for a demythologized, this time, concrete phenomenological theory of emotions and values, in the direction of a future critical transcendental and persuasive phenomenological praxeology. (shrink)

In lectures and writings in the decades following the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology [1967], Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, developed what he called a “misreading” of the phenomenological writings of Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. Garfinkel’s “misreading” included a selective and creative treatment of themes that Gurwitsch drew from Gestalt psychology, such as figure-ground, Gestalt contexture, and the phenomenal field. Rather than identifying these themes with visual perception demonstrated with picture-puzzles (for example, of animals hidden in (...) foliage) and line drawings of reversible figures, Garfinkel used them to demonstrate praxeological and interactional phenomena: organizations of embodied activity that constitute fields of collective action. Phenomenal fields, for Garfinkel, are formed through embodied work performed in concert with the actions of others. Although Harvey Sacks, the founder of Conversation Analysis, did not explicitly mention Gurwitsch, phenomenology or Gestalt psychology in his writings and transcribed lectures, some of his writings on the sequential organization of conversation seem informed, if only indirectly through his relationship with Garfinkel, by Gurwitsch’s treatment of visual and auditory phenomena. Both Garfinkel and Sacks devised innovative ways to transpose Gestalt phenomena from perceptual psychology to social formations. (shrink)

The article presents an analysis with the method of phenomenological praxeology of two concepts of entrepreneurship: the nineteenth-century concept of Leon Harmel and that of J.-Robert Ouimet. The ontological-ontic coherence functions as the main practical directive of phenomenological praxeology, according to which it is necessary to preserve the ontological-ontic coherence of management in order to ensure the high efficiency of an enterprise and high level of ethics in its command structures. The analysis leads to the conclusion (...) that Harmel’s and Ouimet’s concepts, based on promoting dignity and servant leadership, ensure the ontological--ontic coherence of management and can be seen as a model (as a paradigm) of ethical entrepreneurship. (shrink)

The project of this paper is to synthesize enactivist cognitive science and practice theory in order to develop a new account of pretend play. Pretend play is usually conceived of as a representationalist phenomenon where a pretender projects a fictional mental representation onto reality. It thus seems that pretense can only be explained in representationalist terms. In this paper, we oppose this usual approach. We instead propose not only new explanatory tools for pretend play, but also a fundamental reconceptualization of (...) the phenomena of pretend play, that is, of the very explanandum of theories of pretense. To do so, we suggest combining the turn to action and embodiment in the cognitive sciences with the practice turn in the humanities. From our point of view, pretend play has to be seen in its role in human life as a whole, which is to help children to learn to master the complex sociocultural contingencies of the manifold social practices that make up social reality. Pretend play should therefore be conceived as alternative sense-making that is always related, in varying ways, to ordinary social practices. Pretenders do not need to project mental representations onto reality, but make sense of their surroundings in different ways than encultured adults in ordinary practices. In the paper, we spell out this view and show how it enables an enactivist reconceptualization of imagination, intentions and knowledge, which are usually thought of as being available only to representationalist accounts of pretense. (shrink)

Praxeologism from the napolitan institutionalist phenomenological school is discussed, in the work “Forze, leggi e poteri” by Gino Capozzi, in relation to the Italianius-philosophical tradition. The reflections of the napolitan school center on the individual and his activity, an activity that is..

This article presents a reflection on the education of business leaders. The analy-sis was based on the phenomenological tradition. The phenomenological ap-proach to teaching is a help in revealing the horizons of individuals – persons, not filling them up, e.g. empowering them. These teaching aids should include certain patterns – for the development of a person, not degradation. Unfortunate-ly, training of business leaders is still based on instrumental rationality: academ-ic teaching is more focused on the transfer of knowledge (...) and less on developing the creativity of students. The phenomenological approach postulates that teach-ing should be more focused on fostering creativity. Two stages are important in the teaching process: cognitive and creative. The first step is to explore pre-existing knowledge, the second triggers the creative potential of the student. The ‘3i’ formula is a method which allows for the combination of both steps and the formation of a creative reality. (shrink)

The author Gino Capozzi, founder of the institutionalist napolitan phenomenological school, includes an original and promising exposition based on the contributions of praxeology and praxeologism, in relation to being and what should be the reality of human rights, their genesis, the development of..

The Multiple Reality theory represents a key piece to understand the socio-phenomenology. It is sustained by a triangulation of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the vitalism of Henry Bergson and the pragmatism of William James (and it has as a background the praxeology of Ludwig Von Mises and ..

The article presents the view that the introduction of the personalistic paradigm into entrepreneurship will enable integral economic growth and remove the causes of today’s crisis, that is economism and instrumental rationality. Personalism, which recognizes man as a conscious person experiencing self and others, has special qualities for application. This is the most useful approach to philosophical and ethical analysis of the modern enterprise. In this article the focus is on a company managed according to personalistic ethics. Entrepreneurship in the (...) personalistic approach is the art of management, which increases the area of common good. (shrink)

In this article, the author carries on his research into works by Dmytro Bohdashevskyi, the famous Professor and Rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy in the early 20th century. The paper covers Dmytro Bohdashevskyi’s theological apologetics of the miracle and the supernatural in biblical narrative. It was established that Kyiv researcher realized the synthesis of epistemological, hermeneutic, dogmatic and religious-practical components in his position. Great attention is paid to his peculiar religious phenomenology, epistemology and praxeology of the Gospel miracles. (...) Bohdashevskyi proposed a phenomenological representation of wonderful events in the acts of life experience. Religious structures such as experiencing the miraculous and experiencing the meeting the Absolute play the most important role. The epistemological basis of Bohdashevskyi ‘s reasoning about miracle in the Bible is the affirmation of its coherence with the human mind. This coherence is based on the act of religious faith in which a sacred rationalization of a miracle takes place. This way of rationalizing Gospel miracles objectively opposes both the primitive magical and the modern rationalistic interpretations of the miraculous. However, the Kyiv apologist sometimes finds himself vulnerable to denying the significance of the act of faith and moving beyond the theological discursiveness to which his rationalist-minded opponents resort. The researcher objectively describes the assumption of the miracle as an intrinsically problematic cognitive act, demonstrating the complexity of human cognition as one of the underlying reasons for the emergence and existence of religion. In this way, D. Bohdashevskyi came very close to the comparison of scientific and extra-scientific knowledge, rational and extra-rational components of cognitive process. Article received 15.08.2019. (shrink)

During the 1992–1993 academic year, Harold Garfinkel offered a graduate seminar on Ethnomethodology in the Sociology Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. One topic that was given extensive coverage in the seminar has not been discussed at much length in Garfinkel’s published works to date: Aron Gurwitsch’s treatment of Gestalt theory, and particularly the themes of “phenomenal field” and “praxeological description”. The edited transcript of Garfinkel’s seminar shows why he recommended that “for the serious initiatives of ethnomethodological investigations (...) […] Gurwitsch is a theorist we can’t do without”. Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological “misreading” is not a mistaken reading, but is more a matter of taking Gurwitsch’s phenomenological demonstrations of Gestalt contextures in phenomenal fields and transposing them for making detailed, concrete observations and descriptions of organizationally achieved social phenomena. Where Gurwitsch addresses the organization of perception as an autochthonous achievement, inherent to the stream and field of individual consciousness, Garfinkel extends and elaborates this field into the social world of enacted practices. The April 1993 seminar also is rich with brief asides and digressions in which Garfinkel comments about his use of Alfred Schutz, his attitude toward publishing, his relationship with Erving Goffman, and many other matters. (shrink)

This paper argues that radical enactivism (RE) offers a framework with the required nuance needed for understanding of the full range of the various forms of pretense. In particular, its multi-storey account of cognition, which holds that psychological attitudes can be both contentless and contentful, enables it to appropriately account for both the most basic and most advanced varieties of pretense. By comparison with other existing accounts of pretense, RE is shown to avoid the pitfalls of representationalist theories while also (...) allowing us to combine the best elements of the praxeological enactivist (Weichold & Rucińska, 2021 ) and Langland-Hassan’s ( 2020, 2021 ) proposals about pretense, while avoiding their key shortcomings. (shrink)

Prise en un sens englobant, la notion d’affordance permet de penser en première approximation notre rapport perceptuel aux objets et surtout à ce que nous faisons du dit rapport comme sujets. Transférer cette notion psychologique à l’observation des données langagières paraît d’autant plus bienvenu qu’elle porte sur le rapport à l’activité de signifiance, au sens de Gibson. Toutefois, outre les relectures successives qui ont contribué à en ajuster l’application à l’émergence aux conventions culturelles, ou en tant que disposition à agir, (...) certaines approches liées à la phénoménologie – ethnométhodologiques et énactivistes, en particulier – ont pu en discuter l’opérativité. Pour questionner sous sa robustesse la précision de ce concept tel qu’on peut en comprendre la manifestation en discours et en interaction, on posera le caractère transitoire de sa valeur opératoire avant d’observer comment il peut croiser diverses catégories praxéologiques. Une étude de cas d’utilisation d’artefacts pour visualiser et communiquer servira de support à la réflexion. (shrink)

A reflection about the originality and contributions of the phenomenological institutional Naples school of philosophy, represented by its major exponent,Gino Capozzi, in relation to the theory of human rights is developed in this paper. His philosophy is explained in his book “Diritti dell´Uomo,..

Against the many critics who have argued that Pierre Bourdieu favored a deterministic view of human experience and conduct, I argue that his social praxeology is, indeed, a theory of agency. I describe his work as a semiotic phenomenology of habitual discourse. My analysis extends this thinking, converging Bourdieu, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and C. S. Peirce on field, habitus and body. A theory of agency emerges that is a unique interpretation of the process of semiosis and embodied event of communication. (...) My central theme is a critique of the concept of clarity in discourse. (shrink)

The paper examines the relationship between praxeology and Schutzian phenomenology. It does so by tracing and comparing the conceptualizations of sense and sensemaking in both approaches. In a first step the phenomenological concept of mental and subjective sense and meaning is discerned. Subsequently, different disengagements from this concept within interpretative sociologies are reconstructed. It is argued that those disengagements, which seek to replace the understanding of sense and meaning as private,,inner’ entities with notions of the,publicness’ of practical social (...) sensemaking are crucial for advancing a praxeological perspective in social theory. (shrink)

Although Schütz’s relationship with the Austrian school of economics was an intimate one, Lavoie and other Austrian scholars have challenged (a) Schütz’s characterization of praxeology as an objective science of subjective phenomena and (b) the ability of Schütz’s phenomenology, which emphasizes the subjective meanings of actors, to really make sense of spontaneous social orders. It is my contention, however, that Schütz can be adequately defended against both these charges. First, for Schütz, the claim that social science is an objective (...) science of subjective phenomena need not imply apodictic apriorism nor solipsism. Second, in spite of his emphasis on subjective meanings, the study of spontaneous social orders need not be difficult to justify. (shrink)

Against the many critics who have argued that Pierre Bourdieu favored a deterministic view of human experience and conduct, I argue that his social praxeology is, indeed, a theory of agency. I describe his work as a semiotic phenomenology of habitual discourse. My analysis extends this thinking, converging Bourdieu, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and C. S. Peirce on field, habitus and body. A theory of agency emerges that is a unique interpretation of the process of semiosis and embodied event of communication. (...) My central theme is a critique of the concept of clarity in discourse. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objectivo mostrar até que ponto o princípio de subjectividade presente na Escola Austríaca de Economia se revela fundamentado na tradição fenomenològica de Edmund Husserl e no seu pensamento acerca da constituição intersubjectiva do mundo da vida. Nesse sentido, o autor propõe uma hermenêutica realista, e não relativista, posicionando-se em função de um projecto mais global de fundamentar na hermenêutica algumas das principais posições da Escola Austríaca de Economia, pelo que o artigo propõe significativas pistas para uma (...) releitura não só da praxeologia de Ludwig von Mises e da ordem espontânea de que fala Friedrich von Hayek, mas também da noção de middle ground proposta por Israel Kirzner e, não menos, de toda a temática relacionada com a empresarialidade. Por outro lado, posicionando-se numa perspectiva de superação da dialéctica entre teoria e história, entre "a priori" e "a posteriori", o artigo representa também uma chamada de atenção para a importância que deveria ter o estudo do pensamento de Edmund Husserl no âmbito das Ciências Sociais. This article aims in the first place at demonstrating how Edmund Husserl's idea of the intersubjective constitution of the life-world represents an appropriate explanation of the principle of subjectivity inherent to the theorizing of the Austrian School of Economics. In order to do this, the author proposes a realistic and non-relativistic view of hermeneutics, whereby his goal is precisely to demonstrate how much the Austrian School of Economics is grounded in hermeneutics. In this sense, the article suggests a new reading of Ludwig von Mises's praxeology, of Friedrich von Hayek's theory of the spontaneous order and a reinterpretation of Israel Kirzner's middle ground position and the corresponding theory of alertness. Positioning itself beyond the discussion between theory and history, or the debate if the prevalence should belong to the "a priori" or to the "a posteriori", the article suggests that Husserl's phenomenology should be considered as a road that deserves to be taken by all social sciences. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to tackle the problem of living together – as dignified human beings – in a certain territory in the field of social philosophy, on the theoretical grounding ensured by some remarkable exponents of the Austrian School − and by means of the praxeologic method. Because political tools diminish the human nature not only of those who use them, but also of those who undergo their effects, people can live a life worthy of a (...) human being only as members of some autarchic or self-governing communities. As a spontaneous order, every autarchic community is inherently democratic, inasmuch as it makes possible free involvement, peaceful coordination, free expression and the free reproduction of ideas. The members of autarchic communities are moral individuals who avoid aggression, practice self-control, seek a dynamical efficiency and establish a democratic public discourse. (shrink)

In her introduction to this collection, Tymieniecka presents her phenomenology of life - the leitmotif of the three-volume anniversary publication of Analecta Husserliana - as something that stands out from preceding historical attempts to investigate life in an 'integral' or 'scientific' way. After an incubation lasting throughout the 2000 years of Occidental philosophy, this scientific phenomenology/philosophy of life at last uncovers the entire area of the 'inner workings of Nature', exposing the way in which the 'sufficient reason' and the 'ground' (...) of beingness as such crystallise out of the 'onto poietic' process. This onto-poietic process, continuing as it does in the human creative condition, also reveals the authentic genius of the works of the human spirit. This new and original philosophy, free of fallacious simplifications, speculations and reductionism, opens up a basic starting point for all philosophy. Life, 'the theme of our times', at last receives a profound philosophical treatment. (shrink)

orbit and far beyond it. Indeed, the immense, painstaking, indefatigable and ever-improving effort of Husserl to find ever-deeper and more reliable foundations for the philosophical enterprise (as well as his constant critical re-thinking and perfecting of the approach and so called "method" in order to perform this task and thus cover in this source-excavation an ever more far-reaching groundwork) stands out and maintains itself as an inepuisable reservoir for philosophical reflec tion in which all the above-mentioned work has either its (...) core or its source. In fact, in his undertaking to re-think the entire philosophical enterprise as such and to recreate philosophy upon what he sought to be at least a satisfactorily legitimated basis, Husserl, through his already systematised and "authorized" work, and his courses, and later on in his spontaneous reflection (which did not find its way into a definitive corpus but was nevertheless sufficiently coherent with his previously established body of thought to be considered a continuation of it), uncovers perspectives upon the universe of man and projects their new philosophical thematisation that brings together all the attempts by philosophers (e. g., Merleau-Ponty, who drew upon this material and found there his own inspiration) who succeeded him with foundational intentions; it also gives a core of philosophical ideas and insights for the youngergenerationofphilosophers today. (shrink)

The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, (...) blindsight and self-disorders in schizophrenia, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This collection is the final volume of a four book survey of the state of phenomenology fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl. Its publication represents a landmark in the comprehensive treatment of contemporary phenomenology in all its vastness and richness. The diversity of the issues raised here is dazzling, but the main themes of Husserl's thought are all either explicitly treated, or else they underlie the ingenious approaches found here. Time, historicity, intentionality, eidos, meaning, possibility/reality, and teleology are (...) the main concerns of this collection devoted to studies in aesthetics, metaphysics and literary interpretation, written by such authors as, among others, R. Cobb-Stevens, C. Moreno Marquez, J. Swiecimski, Sitansu Ray and M. Kronegger. These original studies of phenomenological aesthetics and literary theory by scholars from all parts of the world were gathered by the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learn ing during the year 1988/89 during its assessment of the phenomeno logical movement, fifty years after Husserl's death. IX A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ix. (shrink)

This title presents a comprehensive guide to interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) which is an increasingly popular approach to qualitative inquiry taught to undergraduate and postgraduate students today.

The book moves from descriptive through to more interpretative phenomenological methods to enable the reader to learn to use the main approaches to ...

Despite a long history of researchers who combine phenomenology with qualitative or quantitative methods, there are only few examples of working with a phenomenological mixed method—a method where phenomenology informs both qualitative and quantitative data generation, analysis, and interpretation. Researchers have argued that in working with a phenomenological mixed method, there should be mutual constraint and enlightenment between the qualitative and quantitative methods for studying consciousness. In this article, we discuss what a framework for phenomenological mixed methods (...) could look like and we aim to provide guidance of how to work within such framework. We are inspired by resources coming from research in mixed methods and existing examples of phenomenological mixed-method research. We also present three cases of phenomenological mixed methods where we study complex social phenomena and discuss the process of how we conducted the studies. From both the research inspiration and our own studies, we depict the landscape of possibilities available for those interested in mixing phenomenology with qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as the challenges and common pitfalls that researchers face. To navigate in this landscape, we develop a three-fold structure, focusing on the phenomenological frame, the phenomenologically informed generation of qualitative and quantitative data, and the phenomenologically informed analysis and interpretation of data. (shrink)

Discusses the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology which operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; challenges long-standing assumptions about the practice of grounding the science of psychology in empiricism and asserts that the broader philosophy of phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development"--Provided by publisher.

Affordances are possibilities for action offered by the environment. Recent research on affordances holds that there are differences in how people experience such possibilities for action. However, these differences have not been properly investigated. In this paper I start by briefly scrutinizing the existing literature on this issue, and then argue for two claims. First, that whether an affordance solicits action or not depends on its relevance to the agent’s concerns. Second, that the experiential character of how an affordance solicits (...) action depends on the character of the concern to which it is relevant. Concerns are conceived of as bodily forms of responsiveness, and solicitations are experienced through this responsiveness. The main aim of this paper is to make clear that an understanding of experiential differences in solicitations has to be based on a phenomenological appreciation of how one experiences one’s responsiveness to those solicitations. In the remainder of the paper I show how such a phenomenological appreciation reveals several characteristics of our responsiveness and I briefly explore three of them: valence, force and mineness. In the final section I discuss the self-referentiality of affordances in light of the current proposal, and argue that this self-referentiality is broader than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

In light of recent criticisms by Woodward (2017) and Rescorla (2018), we examine the relationship between mechanistic explanation and phenomenological laws. We disambiguate several uses of the phrase “phenomenological law” and show how a mechanistic theory of explanation sorts them into those that are and are not explanatory. We also distinguish the problem of phenomenological laws from arguments about the explanatory power of purely phenomenal models, showing that Woodward and Rescorla conflate these problems. Finally, we argue that (...) the temptation to pit mechanistic and interventionist theories of explanation against one another occludes important and scientifically relevant research questions. (shrink)

THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research (...) manuscripts of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A. (shrink)