In this essay, I focus on Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on human rights. Firstly, I seek to establish his underlying conception of philosophy: although it is impossible to spell out the philosophical foundations of human rights, this does not imply that philosophical thought, in the sense of critical reason, cannot make a useful contribution and provide valuable arguments in support of human rights. Secondly, I examine the related issue of the justification of human rights and assess his theory on (...) the basis of its own conception of a possible foundation. The way we answer the question of coherence also clarifies (a) what model of civil association is compatible with such a foundation, i.e. with such a worldview; (b) what model is absolutely incompatible with it; and finally (c) what intermediate solutions are there, if there are any. I argue that the communitarian variants of the conception of rights are distortions: collective or cultural rights, i.e. rights of a community towards which all of its members have duties, appearing alongside individual rights, trump individual rights, i.e. the rights linked to personhood that once constituted the most effective legal and political means for emancipating the individual from the power of the community. I therefore consider the “Copernican Revolution” of individualism and its consequences in Bobbio’s thought. As the example of personal freedom shows, where rights are ascribed principally to groups or communities rather than to individuals, we have good reason to fear that rights will turn out to be merely the privilege of the few. Once we follow this line of though in Bobbio, the ecumenical openness to alternative approaches and the argument from “the consensus of the people” yield to a clearly universalistic perspective that derives from the Enlightenment and can be interpreted as the product of the specifically modern version of natural law theory. (shrink)

Using new archival material, this article reconstructs the editorial history of Philosophical Grammar, an edition that Rush Rhees crafted from Wittgenstein's papers. Contrasting the often‐held view that Rhees, in editing Philosophical Grammar, arbitrarily interfered with Wittgenstein's Big Typescript, the article illuminates the work, motives and reasons that underlie Rhees’ editing. Although recent philological evidence supports his editorial decisions, Rhees, at the time, made them based on his desire to do justice to his understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical orientation. (...) Against this background, purely text‐philological criticism of Philosophical Grammar seems to come from a philosophical culture that was alien to Rhees. (shrink)

This book is a study in the methodology of philosophical inquiry. It expounds and defends the thesis that systematization is the proper instrument of philosophical inquiry and that the effective pursuit of philosophy's mission calls for constructing a doctrinal system that answers our questions in a coherent and comprehensive manner.

Successful critical thinking in ethics does not proceed directly to an evaluation of ethical phenomena, but rather necessitates the evaluation of one’s own ethical paradigm for truth. This requires the making explicit of one’s own ethical paradigm, something best achieved through a process of comparing and contrasting it with alternative ethical paradigms. This paper presents a pedagogical strategy for making explicit a very basic set of assumptions: those of the Western, liberal, individualist tradition. The author argues that Glaucon’s position in (...) Plato’s Republic is essentially that of the liberal individualist and that, following Glaucon’s speech in Book II, the work presents an alternative to this position. In this light, Plato’s text is a helpful and illuminating counterpoint to Western liberal values. Reading the Republic as a foil to canonical liberal individualist authors (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Madison) offers a unique opportunity to thematize some of our most fundamental moral assumptions and to help students gain the perspective necessary to perform the objective, critical work of ethics. (shrink)

Passmore examines a number of kinds of argument frequently used by philosophers, in an attempt to find out whether there is any kind of reasoning which is especially appropriate for philosophy. He discusses the ways in which philosophers have used deduction, induction, reminders about obvious facts, infinite regress arguments, paradigm case arguments, claims that certain views are self-refuting, and accusations of meaninglessness. Numerous illustrations of these moves in argument, drawn from philosophers from Plato to Popper, help to make this an (...) interesting essay in the philosophy of philosophy.--J. B. S. (shrink)

A central task of schooling is to cultivate reasonableness in students. In this chapter we show how the teaching of reasonableness can be practiced successfully in secondary schools, using materials from the Western Australian curriculum. The discussion proceeds in four stages. We first defend the claim that the teaching of reasonable is a key aim of schooling. Here we offer an account of reasonableness, which we take to be both a skill and a disposition. Students learn (...) class='Hi'>reasonableness through the practice of specific skills such as open and curious questioning, clarifying, and categorizing, and evaluating the merits of each contribution toward the problem or question under consideration. Reasonableness comes about as a joint commitment between the individual and the group to be honest in their views, to take care of those views, and for everyone to recognize that each member is a partial bearer of truth. Secondly, we discuss the pedagogies that cultivate reasonableness. The Philosophical Community of Inquiry is a natural pedagogy for this purpose. This can be supplemented with the thinking tools approach of Cam’s Twenty Thinking Tools or Harvard Project Zero’s Thinking Routines. In addition, we introduce our own two skill-building exercises, the Reasoning Game and the Argument Game. Thirdly, we show how this approach can be applied not just in Philosophy classes, but in the Humanities and Social Sciences. We argue that our approach brings these subjects to life, it develops understanding and reasonableness, and it bumps up student engagement. Fourthly, we discuss the assessment of reasonableness. In this type of learning environment, the way students perform in the philosophical community of inquiry is the focus of assessment. The desirable qualities of being reasonable become the assessment criteria for an on-balanced judgment about the student. (shrink)

In this paper, we set out to investigate the following question: if science relies heavily on induction, does philosophy of science rely heavily on induction as well? Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 14,199) in order to answer this question empirically. If philosophy of science relies heavily on induction, just as science supposedly does, then we would expect to find significantly more inductive arguments (...) than deductive arguments and abductive arguments in the published works of philosophers of science. Using indicator words to classify arguments by type (namely, deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments), we search through our corpus to find patterns of argumentation. Overall, the results of our study suggest that philosophers of science do rely on inductive inference. But induction may not be as foundational to philosophy of science as it is thought to be for science, given that philosophers of science make significantly more deductive arguments than inductive arguments. Interestingly, our results also suggest that philosophers of science do not rely on abductive arguments all that much, even though philosophers of science consider abduction to be a cornerstone of scientific methodology. (shrink)

SummaryChristian theologians can explain the Trinitarian faith today in dialogue with Islamic thinkers as “deepened monotheism”. Therefore it is important to widen the systematic-theological discourse in an ecumenical and transcultural perspective and to retrieve resources from Western and non-Western traditions of Trinitarian thought (I).In this paper I will first work out historically that the Trinitarian creed of Nicea and Constantinople was originally an ecumenical but non-Western creed (II). Afterwards, I investigate the philosophical-theological reflection on the Trinity by Anselm of (...) Canterbury (1033–1109) in the context of early interreligious encounters in the Latin West. Based on biblical, augustinian and Greek sources, he developed an approach to understand the mystery of the Trinity by rational arguments as “deepened monotheism” (III). Then I will proceed to explore the philosophical-theological dialogues on the Trinity from the Arabic philosopher and Syrian-orthodox theologian Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (893–974). Much earlier he developed rational arguments for the Triunity of God with reference to Aristotle. Thereby he answers to anti-trinitarian arguments from Islamic thinkers like al-Kindī and al-Warrāq. He intends that the Trinitarian faith of Christian minorities can thereby be understood and tolerated by Islamic thinkers as rationally founded “deepened monotheism” (IV).In the end I will evaluate what these classics from the Western and non-western traditions of Trinitarian thought contribute to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity today in a pluralistic religious context as “deepened monotheism” (V). (shrink)

Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons (...) for deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons. (shrink)

이 글은 ‘『화엄경』「십정품」에 담긴 철학적 사유 -10가지 삼매를 중심으로-’에 대하여 살펴본 논문이다. 본 논문의 내용은 크게 2가지 측면에서 접근하여 분석해보았다. 먼저 제Ⅱ장에서『화엄경』 ｢십정품｣의 정의와 중심사상을,「십정품」의 구조와 이름에 담긴 함의, 이품의 청자와 설주보살에 대해 살펴보고, 「십정품」의 핵심사상은 무엇인지 살펴보았다. 그리고 제Ⅲ장에서는「십정품」의 열 가지 삼매에 담긴 철학적 사유를 10가지삼매 명칭에 담긴 의미, 10가지 삼매에 담긴 철학적 특성을 살펴본 다음, 10가지 삼매의 위상과 의의에 대하여 고찰해보았다.BR 이러한 분석을 통해 알 수 있는 사실은『화엄경』「십정품」에 담긴 10가지 삼매에 담긴 철학적 사유는 우리 인간의 내면을 정화하고 물질적인 (...) 것으로부터 오는 상대적인 박탈감에서 벗어날 수 있는 유익한 가르침이 담겨있다는 것이다. 이것을 이품의 설주보살인 보현보살이 부처님을 대신하여 10가지 선정의 작용(用)을 설해주고 있다. 따라서『화엄경』「십정품」의 열 가지 삼매에 담긴 철학적 특성은 세계에 집착하지 않고 모든 중생들을 친근하지만 욕심내어 집착하지 않으며, 모든 분별에 흔들리지 않는 자유자재한 마음에 있다고 하겠다. 그러므로 이품에서 교설된 10가지 선정은 지금 우리가 처한 현실의 이치를 正思惟하고, 생각을 안정케 하여 산란치 않게 하는 작용으로써 매우 유용한 가르침인 것이다. (shrink)

This paper presents a philosophical critique of intuitionism and other current theories of rationality that underlie and, in some cases, question the cogency of codes of ethics. A classical theory of rationality is defended and a concept of ‘reasonableness’ is developed as an ideal-type in setting out the principles for an effective ethical education that can form the basis for implementing a code of conduct.

The old quarrel between the logical empiricists or pragmatists and the defenders of metaphysics is still far from being settled. This situation is at least partly due to the fact that neither of the two antagonists has a clear insight in the historical background, the systematical validity, and the practical purposes of the concepts and methods used in traditional philosophy. Therefore further clarification is needed.The following paper does not claim to give final definitions and decisions. It will rather try to (...) draw the attention to certain ways of reasoning still very widespread in metaphysics and moral theory. Their careful analysis may throw light on some of the so-called eternal philosophical problems. (shrink)

The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral liberalism scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be (...) to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi is noted for its advocacy of many different perspectives—chickens, cicadas, fish and the like. There is much debate in the literature about the implications of Zhuangzi’s pluralist inclinations. I suggest that Zhuangzi highlights the limitations of individual, perspectivally-constrained, knowledge claims. He also spurns the ‘view from nowhere’ and is sceptical about the possibility of an ideal observer. For him, wisdom consists in understanding the epistemological inadequacies of each perspective. I propose that Zhuangzi’s philosophy offers significant insights to an (...) increasingly globalized world characterized by a plurality of ethical and value commitments. It does not assume there will necessarily be universal agreement or a standardized answer. Most importantly, it is a position that seeks to augment self-understanding and enrich the self in dialogue with and response to others. (shrink)

A critical element in building stronger health systems involves strengthening good governance to build capacity for transparent and fair health planning and priority setting. Over the past 20 years, the ethical framework Accountability for Reasonableness has been a prominent conceptual guide in strengthening fair and legitimate processes of health decision-making. While many of the principles embedded within the framework are congruent with Western conceptualizations of what constitutes procedural fairness, there is a paucity in the literature that captures the degree (...) of resonance between these principles and the views of decision makers from non-Western settings; particularly in Africa, where many countries have only recently, within the last 20-30 years, become more democratic. This paper contributes to the ethics literature by examining how Ethiopian decision makers conceptualize fair and legitimate health decision-making, and reflects on the degree of conceptual resonance between these views and the principles embedded in A4R. A qualitative case study approach from three districts in Ethiopia was undertaken. Fifty-eight decision makers from district, regional, zonal, and national levels were interviewed to describe their conceptualization of fairness and legitimacy in the district health planning process. Findings revealed that Ethiopians have a broad conception of fairness and legitimacy that while congruent with procedural justice, also aligned with principles of distributive and organizational justice. Researchers and practitioners seeking to strengthen procedural fairness in health priority setting must therefore recognize the significance of other philosophical dimensions influencing how fairness and legitimacy of health decision-making are constructed within the Ethiopian setting. (shrink)

As the story is often told, P4C was established after Matthew Lipman, then a professor of education at Columbia University, observed a deficiency in reasoning skills among his students and colleagues during the student protest of April 1968. Lipman pondered whether there might be a way to enhance the critical thinking skills of individuals through an educational reform; and thus, P4C was born. Consequently, Lipman and P4C are frequently presented as beacons of hope for a more sustainable democratic future in (...) the face of systemic discrimination, pervasive private interests and corruption, and the erosion of justice. I contend that this narrative relies on the delegitimization of a successful grassroots anti-racist campaign against the aggressive gentrification of Black and Puerto Rican families that Columbia had undertaken. Building on Darren Chetty’s critique of reasonableness in P4C, I present the conventional narrative of P4C’s origin as an instance of reasonableness' gatekeeping function in philosophy for children. I specifically argue that the narrative of Columbia 1968 serves as an explicit example of how reasonableness can silence successful pro-Black educational reforms by labeling the actions of students as “unreasonable”. In other words, this paper highlights a significant oversight in P4C practitioners' awareness of their own discipline, particularly in relation to the racial politics of the 1960s. (shrink)

An attempt to show the possibility of penetrating into the ultimate nature of things through the development of what the author calls "buddhi" or "philosophical" reason. Overcoming the limitations of "logical" or "scientific" reason as exemplified in classical physics, philosophical reason reconciles the dualism between knower and known and reveals the unity of the "within" and "without" of nature. This insight into ultimate reality occurs in a state of "dreamless sleep." The world of the "not-self" or of objects (...) is disclosed by philosophical reason to be in its essence spiritual. The external world is a configuration of the unified self.—L. W. (shrink)

Recent work in the philosophy of religion has broken through disciplinary boundaries and ventured into new areas of inquiry. Examining aspects of the rationality of faith or bringing philosophical techniques to bear on particular religious texts or doctrines, this collection deepens our understanding of the connections between faith and reason.

This paper serves as a call to philosophers both to create more precollege philosophy programs, and to push back against the instrumentalization of the value of philosophy. I do not intend to defend the intrinsic value of philosophy in this paper, though in an indirect way I will offer a defense of the value of precollege philosophy. I discuss the history, theory and practice behind the Utah Lyceum, a precollege philosophy summer camp program I helped create in rural Utah. I (...) argue that philosophy summer camps such as the Lyceum are in a unique position to push back against the increasing vocationalization of education by building a curriculum on what I call “reasonableness.” In short, reasonableness is a form of rationality that necessarily includes a social component. Focusing on this social aspect, I distinguish three levels at which philosophical dialogue occurs: interpersonally, intratextually, and intertextually. I argue that by employing this distinction we can facilitate better philosophical dialogue and better aid our students in becoming reasonable. (shrink)

The central question of this contribution is: Why argumentation theory? Its points of departure are: (1) argumentative discourse is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion based on the merits of the argumentative moves that are made (“effectiveness through reasonableness”); (2) argumentation theory concentrates on the problems involved in the production, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. The comprehensive research program that needs to be carried out to tackle these problems includes philosophical, theoretical, empirical, analytical, and practical research. (...) It is illuminating to see to what extent these five components are given their due in the versions of the research program of the currently most prominent approaches: (1) the formal logical, (2) rhetorical/pragmalinguistic, (3) informal logical, and (4) pragmadialectical paradigm. Based on the research results, the discipline should serve several practical objectives: (1) providing a profound understanding of the concept of argumentation and a sound body of knowledge about the ways in which argumentation manifests itself; (2) assisting people in getting a better grip on the argumentative discourses they encounter in public life; (3) supplying tools for improving the quality of argumentative practices. The different versions of the research program implemented in the four approaches are not equally strongly designed to serve these practical objectives. Three basic problems complicate the treatment of argumentative discourse: (1) the natural communication predicament; (2) the varying institutional constraints on argumentative discourse in different macro-contexts; (3) the higher order conditions for resolving a difference that are prerequisites for reasonable argumentative discourse. (shrink)