This paper argues for the contemporary significance of the ‘Critique of Violence’ by proposing a Benjaminian reading of two important analyses of the relationship between history, politics and the Rights of Man: Hegel’s account of the French Revolution and the concept of dissensus proposed by Jacques Rancière. For both Hegel and Rancière, the gap between right and reality – between the ideal of equality, for example, and the existence of concrete inequality – does not warrant a rejection of the Rights (...) of Man. Rather, the gap is a constitutive condition of law and political rights. From the perspective of Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, however, these analyses serve to perpetuate a bourgeois legality, one that both Hegel and Rancière acknowledge can never be realized due to the constitutive discrepancy between right and reality. In preserving the promise of legal equality, these analyses preclude the possibility of a suspension or ‘absolution’ from law. This suspension of law is a task that Benjamin identified with the proletarian general strike, a strategy whose pure violence is supposed to secure what Benjamin described, enigmatically, as a ‘wholly transformed work’. Remarkably, however, the relationship between the suspension of law in a general strike and a total transformation of labour is never clearly defined in the ‘Critique’. This paper will develop an account of this relationship by pursuing the references to Marx’s critical theory of capitalism in Benjamin’s writings. (shrink)

Labour and employment law no longer has a monopoly on regulating labour relations and is facing a crisis as its effectiveness is questioned. Codes of conduct adopted by companies to recognise their social responsibility for the global supply chain are instruments that can usefully complement labour and employment law. The aim of this paper is to analyse in depth the legal nature of codes of conduct and their impact on labour and employment law. Will the use of codes of conduct (...) reinforce the crisis of labour and employment law in the era of globalisation or will these codes be part of a solution to this crisis? Do we have to consider codes of conduct as competitors to labour and employment law or as an opportunity for rethinking the way that labour and employment law norms should be produced and applied? (shrink)

The paper offers a reconstruction of the development of Karl Marx’s thought in 1842 – 1844 proceeding from the philosophy of law and social philosophy to political economy and its critique. It puts forward a new interpretation of the categories “bürgerliche Gesellschaft“, “alienation“ and “alienated labor“. This interpretation shows that the development of Marx’s thought did not proceed from „philosophy“ to “political economy“ or from “humanism“ to “scientism“, but from an “external“ to an “internal“ critique of (...) political economy. (shrink)

The central concern of this article is whether early induction of labor for an anencephalic fetus can ever be morally justified, particularly by a Catholic healthcare ethics committee. By revisiting and refining arguments in articles by Drane (1992) and Bole (1992) published in this journal, a revised argument – consistent with the Catholic moral tradition – can seemingly be constructed that a Catholic healthcare ethics committee might use to justify early induction of labor in some pregnancies involving an (...) anencephalic fetus. Such a revised argument depends upon two central claims; first, that the anencephalic fetus in question is necessarily in the process of dying when early induction of labor occurs, and second, that the fetus is judged to be undergoing extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving their life as a result of receiving ongoing maternal support of a mother’s womb. The revised argument developed in this article aims to utilize the doctrine of double effect in conjunction with these two central claims to justify early induction of labor for anencephalic fetal persons in some circumstances. Unfortunately, the revised argument – if successful – would be at odds with a stance taken in the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 1996 statement “Moral Principles Concerning Infants with Anencephaly.” However, there is reason to believe the revised argument offered in this article is well aligned with other guidance from the USCCB, contained in the publication _Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Healthcare Services_ (2018). This article concludes by noting some important limitations of the argument and offering hope that consideration of the argument ultimately helps to strengthen the Catholic moral tradition. (shrink)

Most people would agree that we should behave and act in a responsible way. Yet only 200 years ago, ‘responsibility’ was only of marginal importance in discussions of law and legal practice, and it had little ethical significance. What is the significance of the fact that ‘responsibility’ now plays such a central role in, for example, work, the welfare state, or the criminal justice system? What happens when individuals are generally expected to think of themselves as ‘responsible’ agents? And what (...) are the consequences of the fact that the philosophical analysis of ‘responsibility’ focuses almost exclusively on conditions of agency that are mostly absent from real life? -/- In this book, Frieder Vogelmann demonstrates how large parts of philosophy have fallen under responsibility’s spell, and he uses a Foucauldian approach in an attempt to break it. The three axes of power, knowledge, and self are used in a detailed analysis of the practical regimes of labour (including the welfare state), criminality (including policing, punishment practices, and criminal proceedings), and philosophy, and of the two subject positions required by ‘responsibility’ – those of the attributors and bearers of responsibility – within them. The power relations between these positions, which Vogelmann carefully excavates from the grounds of our practices, reveal that the deck is stacked unevenly from the start. (shrink)

abstract Focusing on the criminal law, I discuss three ways in which analytical philosophers might contribute to the development or health of the law (and of legal theory). The first is as humble under-labourers, who seek only to clarify legal rules and doctrines, but not to criticise them. This modest conception of the role of philosophy, however, proves to be untenable: clarification must become rational reconstruction — an attempt to make rational sense of the law; and rational reconstruction must (...) involve at least an internal critique, which appraises the law in terms of ends, values or principles that the reconstruction discovers within the law. Such an internal critique must then also point beyond itself, to an external critique that appraises law in terms of the broader and deeper political and moral values by which states should be structured; the paper ends by noting some of the problems that such an external critique faces, and some of the problems that philosophers must face in trying to engage with the world of public policy. (shrink)

Following the eclectic itineraries of ‘Near East’ expert, R. M. Graves, this article tells a story of an ongoing Nakba (catastrophe) of small and large legal decisions. Without reducing the human catastrophe of the event of the Nakba (the 1948 Palestinian forced exodus), it engages with it as a legal event that crosses (in this story at least) from Cairo to Jerusalem, from the League of Nations’ era (1920–1946) to the United Nations’ era (1945–), from the governance of labour and (...) gender, to labour partition, and finally to the governance of municipalities through law and expertise. Graves’ relationship to both Cairo and Jerusalem was materialized through different forms of affective legal governance. Graves, who in his own dichotomous words was ‘neither a Zionist nor an anti-Semite’, managed Jerusalem across national lines in the wake of the UN Partition Plan (1947), and as the old empire was withdrawing right before Jerusalem itself became a site of the catastrophe—right before the Nakba. (shrink)

To be human is to be autonomous, yet this is a trait that most of us lack. We are subject to forces external to our being. We are workers; we are citizens; we are needful creatures. Humanity-proper in these times of neoliberal omnipotence is defined differently. The key terms are familiar: personal betterment, personal responsibility, productivity, pleasantness. A forked tongue slithers in our conscience, tells us that these are the traits of the human condition. Through Bataille, this paper argues the (...) substrate of these oft repeated familiar mantras are other. Neoliberal subjects, propelled by need, understand themselves along the axis of the useful choice. The paper turns to myth to understand the interdependence of need and choice, and how this interdependence posits being as always in desire but never in pleasure. Revisiting Don Giovanni, a character central to Acéphalic thought, and the commentary of Søren Kierkegaard, we think in terms of non-abstraction, of pleasurably floating in change, rather than toiling in desire. For it is by grace in the form of chance, that at the very time of transgression, that we – in and for an instant – become human, become as the sacred in the flesh. (shrink)

In a period of rapid internationalization of trade and increased labor mobility, is it relevant for nations to think about their moral obligations to others? Do national boundaries have fundamental moral significance, or do we have moral obligations to foreigners that are equal to our obligations to our compatriots? The latter position is known as cosmopolitanism, and this volume brings together a number of distinguished political philosophers and theorists to explore cosmopolitanism: what it consists in, and the positive case (...) which can be made for it. Their essays provide a comprehensive overview of both the current state of the debate and the alternative visions of cosmopolitanism with which we can move forward, and they will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy, political theory, and law. (shrink)

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right responds to two dichotomies. One is between the freedom of rational thought in its practical application and the givenness of natural impulses and desires. Against Kant Hegel argues that pure reason alone cannot determine the content of any maxim or principle of action. Thus Hegel must find a way in which the content of natural needs and impulses – the only source of content for maxims of action – can be transfigured into contents of rationally (...) self-given principles and maxims. Hegel also responds to the dichotomy between the individual agent and the social whole within which agents act. Hegel argues that this dichotomy is specious because human beings are fundamentally social practitioners and because neither social practices nor individual agents have priority over the other. There are no social practices without social practitioners and there are no social practitioners without social practices. Hegel’s response to this second dichotomy allows him to respond to the first one as well. The elaboration and specialization of natural needs and desires through exchange relations and the social division of labor transfigures the contents of those needs and desires into collectively self-given ends. The social practices producing this transfiguration and meeting these ends form the contents of implicit principles of right. These implicit principles are collectively self-given because they result from the social practices collectively developed to meet these needs. Only acts that are executed and accepted by an agent are free acts. This strong condition requires that an agent’s intentions correspond to the actual nature and consequences of his or her act. Since the aims, the principles, and the means of action are fundamentally social, these strong constraints entail that free action is possible only within a community which makes known its structure and the role of its members within it and their contribution to it, so that its members can act on the basis of that knowledge. Hegel’s theory of the state is a theory of a communal structure that makes such explicit, free action possible. In briefest compass, Hegel holds that laws are legitimate only insofar as they codify those practices that have been developed in order to achieve human freedom, and laws are obligatory only insofar as they are necessary for achieving human freedom. Hegel’s government is designed to codify and promulgate such laws. Hegel’s legislature is designed to make known to the citizens at large, through their corporate representatives, that laws have such a basis and how individual roles and actions fit within the community as a whole. (shrink)

This volume addresses the long-standing neglect of the category of labour in critical social theory and it presents a powerful case for a new paradigm based on the anthropological significance of work and its role in shaping social bonds.

RESUMEN. Este artículo trata sobre la labor llevada a cabo por el iusfilósofo Luis Recaséns Siches de renovación de la Filosofía del Derecho en España mediante la introducción de los postulados neokantianos y kelsenianos. Lo que se puede denominar el proyecto Recasens fue, sin embargo, abruptamente interrumpido por el estallido de la Guerra Civil. Las críticas al neokantismo que contiene fueron incorporadas en trabajos posteriores de Recasens, así como en la obra del profesor Legaz y Lacambra, conservando de este (...) modo el proyecto algo de su impulso inicial. ABSTRACT. This article addresses the renovation effort conducted by the Law philosopher Luis Recaséns Siches, who aimed to update Philosophy of Law in Spain through the introduction of neokantian and kelsenian postulates. What can be denominated as “the Recaséns’ project” was, however, harshly interrupted by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. The judgments targeting neokantism that can be found in such texts were included in Recaséns’ later publications, as well as in the work of the professor Legaz y Lacambra, hence yielding the project to maintain some of its original impulse. (shrink)

From the perspective of Marek J. Siemek’s theory of modernity, one of the most important problem is to include conflicts into institutional framework of the modern society. He reinterprets Hegel’s dialectics of the struggle for recognition by conceptual tools of Hobbes and Marx in order to uncover hidden assumptions and conditions of possibility of the social rationality. For Siemek, law as purely formal, autopoetic social system or social subject, which produces individual subjects, is the first of the conditions of possibility (...) of modernity. The second one is the convergence of formal and material presuppositions of law—or, speaking generally—the convergence of form and content of the social reason. Form and content, facticity and normativity, instrumentality and communicativity are aspects of the process of rationalization andof the only one reason, self-generating in the history. So for Siemek, the Hegelian model of the struggle for recognition gains its theoretical power only when it is interpreted from the perspective of economical, technical and legal rationalization of modernity. Only such perspective is able to construct “the transcendental social philosophy” which starts from critique of “the non-instrumental reason”. (shrink)

Though most legal and labor historians have depicted an American labor movement that suffered from legal disabilities, American law has never denied organized labor's freedom of association. Quite the contrary, unions have always enjoyed at least some favoritism in the law, and this status provided the essential element to their success and power. But, even during the heyday of union power (1930–47), organized labor never succeeded in gaining all of the privileges that it sought, not enough (...) to stem its current (private-sector) decline back to historically normal levels. This article provides a synoptic overview and reinterpretation of the development of American labor law. (shrink)

As the author points out, a philosophy of labor can be extremely helpful in illuminating the more general problems of social and political philosophy. For those who are unacquainted with the philosophic treatment of labor, especially in Marx, this discussion may be an aid. However, there is a strong tendency to oversimplify throughout the book and the reader frequently feels that the author is by-passing the really difficult issues. The positive thesis is that humanization of the (...) labor world is an urgent task.--R. J. B. (shrink)

This book contains a series of lectures on the philosophy of work, delivered at Duquesne University. From his study of modern philosophy, the author is convinced of the necessity of integrating a philosophy of work into the traditional system of philosophy. His book presents an analysis of labour in function of Marxism, whose starting-point is a philosophy of work and whose end is the redemption of man through labour.

Originally published in 1925, C. Delisle Burns’ _The Philosophy of Labour _attempts to lay down key aspects of labour and the working class of that time period, covering aspects such as economic obstacles, standards of living and patriotism. Burns does not draw on past philosophers or sociological thinkers of the working-class and instead chose to focus only on the attitude of the workers in factories, mines, roads, railways and other forms of manual labour. This title will be of interest (...) to students of philosophy. (shrink)

Should the regulation of production and distribution in a socialist society be based on the law of value? In this article we ask (1) Is this question not based on an ontological understanding of labour, on a rational and therefore conceptual understanding of abstract labour and, ultimately, a transhistorical understanding of value and the so-called ‘law of value’?; (2) is it not precisely this deception and power of the fetishism of commodities that, by eternalising value and the ‘law of value’, (...) limits the horizon and perspective of ‘realistic politics’ (Realpolitik)?; and (3) whether this question does not treat socialism as a political situation where the solution to its ‘economic’ problem is unrelated to its very identity? In order to answer these questions, we provide a novel understanding of Marx’s fundamental category of value, its substance, form and magnitude, with the help of the German expression Formgehalt, translated as form-content. (shrink)

An instrument of wealth accumulation and racial segregation in housing markets, the intersections between zoning and labor are often overlooked. Extending theories of space, race, and class, and drawing on historical and archival evidence, I elaborate three ways that American land-use zoning emerged to shape labor markets in the early 20th century: (1) zoning constrained households from engaging in subsistence and direct market activity, acting as a regulatory source of labor commodification; (2) zoning first emerged as a (...) xenophobic tool for regulating labor competition; and (3) zoning introduced racialized boundaries distinguishing formal work from a sphere of economic informality. I illustrate these theoretical-historical propositions with a study of the frontier origins of American land-use zoning laws in late-19th -century Los Angeles. This first and influential approach to residential zoning emerged amid racial dynamics of western settlement and the class politics of a national “free” labor market. I demonstrate how efforts to regulate the settlement and labor practices of poor urban households and Chinese immigrants on in Los Angeles became the direct legal basis for the dichotomous categories of “residential” and “industrial” districts that the city first defended before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1915. By theorizing the intersections of land-use zoning and labor markets, this paper provides a theoretical framework and historical genealogy for future work to consider entanglements of housing and labor politics amid the concurrent flexibilization of work and land use in the present. (shrink)

At the end of 1907 within a couple of months Lunačarskij met both Gor’kij and Brzozowski in Italy and found many important points of contact with each. To compare Lunačarskij’s thought at that time with Brzozowski’s “philosophical program” of 1907 casts some new light on the great variety of interpretations that enlivened Easter European Marxism at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the one hand, it explains Lunačarskij’s “economism” as distinct both from Brzozowski’s extreme anthropologism and Gor’kij’s “cosmism”; on (...) the other, it shows that Lunačarskij’s “philosophy of labour” promoted a violent attitude of conquest and humankind’s domination of nature. Although he criticized Brzozowski’s sympathies with German Idealism, Lunačarskij shared with him a deep appreciation of human creative power, which is evident in his peculiar form of collectivism as well. (shrink)

Law No. 11,340/2006, also known as the "Maria da Penha" Law, was created after the condemnation to exclusively protect women victims of violence. In Article 9, § 2, item II, there is a specific rule on the employment contract, which allows the judge to ensure that women in situations of domestic and family violence maintain the employment relationship for up to six months. During this period, women have the right to be absent from work, thus contributing to the preservation of (...) their physical and psychological integrity. The objective of this paper is to better analyze how the international system may further contribute to increasing the labor legal protection of women victims of domestic violence. A prospective-documentary technique was employed to analyze the Brazilian domestic legislation and the international system, including norms of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS). These analyses reveal that despite the separation of social phenomena – domestic violence occurring in the private sphere, and work belonging to the public sphere of the victim's life – international principles, so-called soft law rules, can be used to further enhance the protection of women victims of domestic violence in Brazil. These women require a whole set of mechanisms that protect their physical, psychological, and emotional integrity, but also guarantee financial and professional support. This multidimensional response to domestic violence is central to a country that ranks 5th in the world for femicide. (shrink)

From its inception in Kant's efforts to articulate a "religion within the limits of reason alone," the Continental tradition has maintained a strict division of labor between theological and philosophical reflection on religion. In what follows, I examine this continental legacy in the context of Jacques Derrida's recent work on the concept of responsibility. First I discuss three guiding themes (the limits of speculative analysis, the idea of nondogmatic religion, and the importance of the other) that characterize the continental (...) tradition's general orientation toward philosophy of religion, as well as Derrida's approach to the concept of responsibility. I turn next to elucidating Derrida's account of responsibility as developed in "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority" and The Gift of Death. I conclude with a discussion of the uses and limits of this account for religious (and theological) reflection, as well as for the task of articulating a contemporary continental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The emergence of so-called ‘gig work’, particularly that sold through digital platforms accessed through smartphone apps, has led to disputes about the proper classification of workers: Should platform workers be classified as independent contractors (as platforms typically insist), or as employees of the platforms through which they sell labor (as workers often claim)? Such disputes have urgency due to the way in which employee status is necessary to access certain benefits such as a minimum wage, sick pay, and so (...) on. In addition, classification disputes have philosophical significance because their resolution requires some foundational account of why the law should make a distinction between employed and freelance workers in the first place. This paper aims to fill this foundational gap. Central to it is the idea that employment involves a worker ceding certain freedoms in return for a degree of security, at least with respect to income. Insofar as the misclassification objection has force against digital platforms, it is when a platform is attempting to have it both ways: Workers are giving up freedom but not being granted a proportionate increase in security. As I shall explain, this approach offers some flexibility as to how actual disputes might be resolved – justice may be indifferent between whether platforms offer greater security or permit workers greater freedom, provided they do at least one of these things. (shrink)

This is Volume 9 of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. It contains papers on democracy, the law, political liberalism, voting, social experimentation, state neutrality, equality and incentives, self-ownership, drugs and prostitution, and Lincoln. Chapters include: “Challenging Democratic Commitments: On Liberal Arguments for Instrumentalism About Democracy” (Daniel Viehoff); “Emotional Abuse and the Law” (Elizabeth Brake); “Practical Political Liberalism” (Caleb Perl); “Beyond the Voting Debate” (Brookes Brown); “Social Experimentation in an Unjust World” (Jacob Barrett and Allen Buchanan); “State Neutrality and the (...) Dismantling of the Gendered Division of Labour” (Anca Gheaus); “If It’s Not Your Talent, How Come You’re Getting an Incentive?” (Peter Dietsch); “(Owning) our Bodies, (Owning) our Selves?” (Sean Aas); “Self-Sovereignty, Drugs, and Prostitution” (Peter de Marneffe); “Lincoln as Political Philosopher” (William A. Edmundson). (shrink)

This paper examines the use of language in the legal processes established by Law 4921/2022 through a social lens, focusing on the digital transformation of the Greek Public Employment Service (DYPA) and the enactment of rigorous active labor market policies (ALMPs). By analyzing relevant documents, the study reveals a neoliberal orientation that prioritizes individual responsibility over traditional state welfare activities. While the advantages of digitalization—such as improved efficiency in job placement and streamlined administrative processes—are acknowledged, the paper also raises (...) significant concerns about the implications of digital literacy disparities, data privacy issues, and the ethical considerations surrounding the profiling of job seekers. Ultimately, the paper provides a detailed analysis of these legislative changes, situating them within the broader socio-economic context of Greece, and highlights the insufficient protection of the unemployed. It further demonstrates that active labor market policies are inextricably linked to the integration of technology, with this relationship anticipated to intensify in the future, particularly given the rapid expansion of Artificial Intelligence (AI). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Affective Foundation of Society in Nietzsche's PhilosophyJihun JeongIntroductionNietzsche believes that the different human types should be allowed to thrive and not be reduced into uniformity, as he says "nothing should be banished more than... the approximation and reconciliation" of the different types (KSA 12:10[59]).1 He sees the approximation as a reflection of democratic values and monolithic morality that he opposes. Instead, he believes that humans should be naturalized and (...) allowed to live in accordance with their own nature. To achieve this, Nietzsche proposed "the great politics," which "makes physiology into the ruler over all other questions" to "breed humanity as a whole" so that "one affirms what one is, one denies what one is not" (KSA 13:25[1]). In this way, Nietzsche thinks the different types should live in accordance with their respective nature.In The Antichrist, Nietzsche argues that "every healthy society" consists of different physiological types.2 He repeatedly says that "Nature, not Manu," separates these physiological types of the hierarchical order,3 which is "merely the sanction of a natural order, natural lawfulness of the first rank." While each type has "its own hygiene, its own realm of work, its own feelings of perfection and mastery" (A 57), this rank order is "the sanctioning of a natural distance between several physiological types," which are "determined and best developed for different activity," like "division of labor" (KSA 13:14[221]). Therefore, Nietzsche describes the physiological types divided in a healthy society as "differently gravitating" and "mutually conditioning" types (A 57). In order for a society to be healthy as a whole, individuals should be neither uniform nor scattered, but should be in an organized structure together. This structure is "opposed to an atomistic anarchy." A "human community is a unity [Einheit]," and "all unity is unity only as organization and co-operation." In [End Page 1] this way "a ruling structure," which does not exist as one, "means one [Eins]" (KSA 12:2[87]).However, what is it that produces this unity? Nietzsche's envisioned "naturalization of human beings" (KSA 9:11[211]) involves a society where different types live actively in accordance with their nature or respective physiological constitution. However, the existence of different types does not ensure the formation of society as a whole. Individuals of different types with different power will not automatically gather to form a society if they remain merely as individuals. In other words, if there is no social character in nature itself, a society could be seen to be formed "by accident," as Hobbes understands (42). What then is the basis that allows individuals to be incorporated into the social order? This article explores the social aspect of Nietzsche's understanding of nature, particularly with attention to his idea of affects, which will lead us to the idea of the affective foundation of society in his philosophy.4Nietzsche often describes nature as something chaotic that is elusive, uncertain, indifferent to human affairs, and without purpose and mercy. Thus, he writes, "how could you live according to this indifference? Living—is that not precisely wanting to be different than this nature? Is living not assessing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?" (BGE 9) In this regard, the first point to note is that the "nature" of which Nietzsche speaks involves human nature strong enough to play with chaos and even to defy nature's indifference and brutality. As Conway points out, "the 'return to nature' that he envisions thus involves a return to human nature as the sole authority or justification for the nomothetic preferences required by the restricted economy of Life" (42–43). It is human nature to impose order on the natural world, transforming its amorphous state into a structured form of life, and to create a hierarchy of values in nature's indifference—this is perfectly natural and is the task of the philosophers. Therefore, rather than settling in "the infinite domain of Chaos" as Seung argues (292), Nietzsche reminds us of human nature: "We speak of nature and, in doing so, forget ourselves: we ourselves are nature" (WS 327). In this respect, the affirmation of nature... (shrink)

This is the second volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Since its revival in the 1970s political philosophy has been a vibrant field in philosophy, one that intersects with jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory. OSPP aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in political philosophy and these closely related subfields. The papers in this volume address a range of central topics and represent cutting edge work (...) in the field. They are grouped into three main themes: ideal theory, the moral assessment of states, and issues in social reliations. (shrink)

The sole available comprehensive history of social law and the model of social welfare in Germany. The book explains the origins since the medieval times, but concentrates on the 19th and 20th centuries, especially on the introduction of the social insurance 1881-1889, of the expansion of the system in the Weimar Republic, under the Nazi-System and after World War II in the FRG and the GDR. The system of social welfare in Germany is one of the pillars of economic stability.

The first book to explore the philosophical foundations of labour law in detail, including topics such as the meaning of work, the relationship between employee and employer, and the demands of justice in the workplace.

Discover how philosophy is essential to the creation, development, application and study of international lawNew for this editionUpdated to cover recent developments in international law, including the 2008 world financial crisis and its effect on international economic and financial law, and the Obama administrations approach to international law in the war on terror Each chapter includes suggestions for further reading, including the most current sources from 2016Anthony Carty tracks the development of the foundations of the philosophies of international law, (...) covering the natural, analytical, positivist, realist and postmodern legal traditions. You'll learn how these approaches were first conceived and how they shape the network of relationships between the signatories of international law.Key featuresExplores four areas: contemporary uncertainties; personality in international law; the existence of states and the use of force; and international economic/financial lawThe historical introduction gives you an overview of the development of the philosophy of international law, from late-scholastic natural law to the gradual dominance of legal positivism, and to the renewed importance of natural law theory in legal philosophy todayRevises the agenda for international lawyers: from internal concerns with the discipline itself outwards to the challenges of international society. (shrink)

The article examines the main meanings of the concept of “social philosophy” and reveals three such meanings. First, social philosophy presents the views of a particular thinker on society and its nature. Second, social philosophy is the study of the most general laws of development of nature and society. Third, social philosophy is a value- worldview analysis of the most urgent and complex problems of social development, including philosophical criticism of the prevailing ideas in this society (...) and the search for constructive value alternatives. The author adheres to the third approach to understanding the meaning of social philosophy and gives two examples of socio-philosophical work: 1) analysis of the problem of labor in Russia in the context of the dominance of the theory of ‘catching up’ modernization; 2) analysis of the problem of democracy in the context of prevailing ideas about the inevitability of political authoritarianism as the main path of development of Russian civilization. (shrink)

Childhood looms large in our understanding of human life as it is a phase through which all adults have passed. Childhood is foundational to the development of selfhood, the formation of interests, values and skills and to the lifespan as a whole. Understanding what it is like to be a child, and what differences childhood makes, are essential for any broader understanding of the human condition. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is an outstanding reference (...) source to the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting subject and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into five parts: ¿ Being a child ¿ Childhood and moral status ¿ Parents and children ¿ Children in society ¿ Children and the state. Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state, and if so why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are they different from adults¿ rights? What gives people a right to parent? What role, if any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexuality and disabilility in childhood, and about racialised children? How should society manage the education of children, and what values should inform such practices? What is a good school? How are children¿s lives affected by being taken into social care? The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics as well as those in related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth work, neuroscience and anthropology. (shrink)

Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation. A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself. I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this account, labour in Brzozowski’s (...) idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted human power. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of labour through a diremptive reading of Polish philosopher Stanisław Brzozowski’s essay “Prolegomena filozofii ‘pracy’” written in 1909. This essay appears as a chapter in his main work Idee: wstęp do filozofii dojrzałości dziejowej, first published in 1910. In “Prolegomena,” Brzozowski defines labour as an inner gesture that delineates the duration of life. In the interpretation of this definition the influence of Henri Bergson on Brzozowski’s thought is stressed. Inspired by Bergson, Brzozowski understands labour as (...) the only ground-creating—and therefore metaphysical—activity of humanity, when faced with the absence of transcendent grounds for existence in modernity. Emphasis is placed on Brzozowski’s insistence in “Prolegomena” that labour is irrational in its delineation of the absolutely new. He describes it as the α of the inner gesture of labour that cannot be known until it is performed. This unknown α is interpreted as his way of describing the groundlessness of the ground-creating activity of labour, and that this groundlessness means that labour eludes the control of the subject. (shrink)

In this Article, I contest on both theoretical and empirical grounds the progressive agenda, as represented by Hanoch Dagan, that seeks to advance the unionization movement in the name of individual autonomy and property. Theoretically, the Article shows that the common-law account of autonomy, which stresses freedom of action from external constraints involving the use or threat of force, provides the best analytical framework, one that undermines the modern progressive case for collective bargaining by workers. The negative account of autonomy (...) applies to all persons; its correlative duties are simple. It applies regardless of the overall level or distribution of wealth. It is scalable from small to large societies. And it forces employers to respect the full range of material and psychological needs in order to recruit and retain their workers. In contrast, the modern progressive alternative imposes no clear correlative duties on employers. It has no obvious way to constrain the dominance of union forces. And its commands are sufficiently complex that they are often not understood by the workers whom they are intended to protect. Empirically, this Article shows that the institutional rigidity of union structures in dynamic markets fails; and it rejects the claim that individual workers are wedded to their current employer, given competitive forces that allow for rapid entry and exit. Given the long-term systematic advantages of the classical liberal model, it is no surprise that unions are generally in decline in major industrial societies. (shrink)

This book argues for evolutionary epistemology and distinguishing functionality from physicality in the social sciences. It explores the implications for this approach to understanding in biology, economics, psychology and political science. Presenting a comprehensive overview of philosophical topics in the social sciences, the book emphasizes how all human cognition and behavior is characterized by functionality and complexity, and thus cannot be explained by the point predictions and exact laws found in the physical sciences. Realms of functional complexity – such as (...) the market order in economics, the social rules of conduct, and the human CNS – require a focus on explanations of the principles involved rather than predicting exact outcomes. This requires study of the historical context to understand behavior and cognition. This approach notes that functional complexity is central to classical liberal ideas such as division of labour and knowledge, and how this is a far more powerful and adequate account of social organization than central planning. Through comparison of these approaches, as well as its interdisciplinary scope, this book will interest both academics and students in philosophy, biology, economics, psychology and all other social sciences. (shrink)