This paper aims to explore the relations between Schutzian theory and hermeneutics. After presenting the connections between hermeneutic thought and Schutz’s work from a historical point of view, it will argue that despite its significant differences from hermeneutic theory, Schutzian theory can be utilized as a kind of proto-hermeneutics. By now, the heterogeneous movement of the interpretive social sciences has reached an established position, but with their growing reliance on the impulses coming from philosophical hermeneutics, the latent problem comes (...) to the foreground: the former demand for an action-theoretical grounding has faded away. Currently, action theory itself is no more dominated by the work of interpretively minded authors, but by the theories of rational choice. This results in a false opposition between the explanatory models, which base their arguments on historical, cultural, and linguistic factors, and those, which focus on the plane of the decisions of individuals. Bypassing the objectivism present in both the rational choice approach and hermeneutics, Schutz’s pragmatic theory of the life-world, originating from both interpretive and pragmatic intellectual influences, may be useful to overcome this opposition, and can serve as a proto-hermeneutical point of departure: that is, as a theory which cannot alone take over the duty of hermeneutics, but which can complement hermeneutics on a fundamental level. (shrink)

Antonio Signorini’s contribution to the constitutive theory of non-linear elasticity is reconstructed and analyzed. Some uninformed opinions suggesting he had a minor role, lacking of significant results, are discussed and refuted. It is shown that Signorini should be rightly credited for being among the first scholars aware of the central problem of non-linear elasticity: the determination of the general form of the elastic potential.

How is it that sounds from the mouth or marks on a page—which by themselves are nothing like things or events in the world—can be world-disclosive in an automatic manner? In this fascinating and important book, Lawrence J. Hatab presents a new vocabulary for Heidegger’s early phenomenology of being-in-the-world and applies it to the question of language. He takes language to be a mode of dwelling, in which there is an immediate, direct disclosure of meanings, and sketches an extensive picture (...) of proto-phenomenology, how it revises the posture of philosophy, and how this posture applies to the nature of language. Representational theories are not rejected but subordinated to a presentational account of immediate disclosure in concrete embodied life. The book critically addresses standard theories of language, such that typical questions in the philosophy of language are revised in a manner that avoids binary separations of language and world, speech and cognition, theory and practise, realism and idealism, internalism and externalism. (shrink)

The basic human ability to treat quantitative information can be divided into two parts. With proto-arithmetical ability, based on the core cognitive abilities for subitizing and estimation, numerosities can be treated in a limited and/or approximate manner. With arithmetical ability, numerosities are processed (counted, operated on) systematically in a discrete, linear, and unbounded manner. In this paper, I study the theory of enculturation as presented by Menary (2015) as a possible explanation of how we make the move from the (...) proto-arithmetical ability to arithmetic proper. I argue that enculturation based on neural reuse provides a theoretically sound and fruitful framework for explaining this development. However, I show that a comprehensive explanation must be based on valid theoretical distinctions and involve several stages in the development of arithmetical knowledge. I provide an account that meets these challenges and thus leads to a better understanding of the subject of enculturation. (shrink)

Recent iterations of feminist theory and activism, especially intersectional, ‘third-wave’ feminism, have cast much second-wave feminism as politically unacceptable in failing to centre the experiences of less privileged subjects than the often white, often middle-class names with which the second wave is usually associated. While bearing those critiques in mind, this article argues that some second-wave writers, exemplified by Shulamith Firestone and Monique Wittig, may still offer valuable feminist perspectives if viewed through the anti-normative lens of queer theory. Queer resists (...) the reification of identity categories. It focuses on resistance to hegemonic norms, rather than on group identity. By viewing Wittig's and Firestone's critique of the institutions of the family, reproduction, maternity, and work as proto-queer — and specifically proto-antisocial queer — it argues for a feminism that refuses to shore up identity, that rejects groupthink, and that articulates meaningfully the crucial place of... (shrink)

`Proto-idea' was a central concept in the thinking of the Polish microbiologist and philosopher of science Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961). Based on studies of the origin of the modern concept of syphilis, Fleck claimed that many established scientific facts are best understood as interpretations of pre scientific, somewhat hazy `proto-ideas' in the framework of a certain `thought-style'. As an example,Fleck saw the modern knowledge of infection as an interpretation of the ancient proto-idea of diseases as caused by minute (...) `animalcules'. However, the epistemological aspects of the concept of proto-ideas have only been sparsely developed and discussed by Fleck and his critics. This paper attempts to bridge the gap. Firstly, I reconstruct the concept of proto-ideasin the context of Fleck's constructivist theory of knowledge. Secondly, I illustrate the relation between Fleck's concept of proto-ideas and his nominalist view on medical taxonomy. Finally, I discuss four philosophical problems implied by Fleck's concept of proto-ideas: (a) the problem of combining two conflicting perspectives on the history of science (b) the problem of accounting for the notion of` continuity' within a non realist theory of knowledge (c) the problem of ascribing no truth-content to proto-ideas, and (d) the problem concerning the non-neutrality of the analyst's viewpoint. (shrink)

Let us suppose that thematic roles, or something very much like them, are needed to describe lexical and semantic patterns in the behavior of verbal predicates. But what about nouns? Is there evidence independent of verbal constructions motivating a system of nominal thematic relations? We suggest that the general problem of argument selection does in fact motivate a set of quintessentially nominal thematic proto-roles which we call Proto- Part and Proto-Whole. These nominal proto-roles are parallel to (...) but distinct from the verbal proto-roles of Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient proposed by Dowty (1991) to account for argument selection in verbal predicates. The resulting theory of nominal argument selection is properly semantic, that is, it distinguishes between argument positions purely on the basis of the semantic entailments of the predicates involved. Furthermore, it is non-dynamic, that is, it describes static patterns of lexicalization without hypothesizing any productive grammatical process that maps semantic arguments to syntactic arguments during the derivation of a sentence. (shrink)

This paper presents a bivalent extensional semantics for positive free logic without resorting to the philosophically questionable device of using models endowed with a separate domain of “non-existing” objects. The models here introduced have only one (possibly empty) domain, and a partial reference function for the singular terms (that might be undefined at some arguments). Such an approach provides a solution to an open problem put forward by Lambert, and can be viewed as supplying a version of parametrized truth non (...) unlike the notion of “truth at world” found in modal logic. A model theory is developed, establishing compactness, interpolation (implying a strong form of Beth definability), and completeness (with respect to a particular axiomatization). (shrink)

How do we understand other individuals’ actions? Answers to this question cluster around two extremes: either by ascribing to the observed individual mental states such as intentions, or without ascribing any mental states. Thus, action understanding is either full-blown mindreading, or not mindreading. An intermediate option is lacking, but would be desirable for interpreting some experimental findings. I provide this intermediate option: actions may be understood by ascribing to the observed individual proto-intentions. Unlike intentions, proto-intentions are subject to (...) context-bound normative constraints, therefore being more widely available across development. Action understanding, when it consists in proto-intention ascription, can be a minimal form of mindreading. (shrink)

An alternative semantic framework is proposed in the following to reconstruct and make sense of “Eastern logics”: a Question-Answer Semantics (thereafter: QAS), including a set of questions-answers and a finite number of ensuing non-Fregean logical values. Thus, meaning is provided by yes-no answers to corresponding questions about relevant properties. These logical values help to show that the saptabhaṅgī (and its dual, viz., the Buddhist Mādhyamaka catuṣkoṭi) is not a many-valued paraconsistent logic but, rather, a one-valued proto-logic: a constructive machinery (...) that serves as a formal theory of judgment, rather than a Tarskian-like theory of consequence. Such an explanatory model of contradiction assumes a deep redefinition of logical values. (shrink)

The theoretical biology movement originating in Britain in the early 1930’s and the biosemiotics movement which took off in Europe in the 1980’s have much in common. They are both committed to replacing the neo-Darwinian synthesis, and they have both invoked theories of signs to this end. Yet, while there has been some mutual appreciation and influence, particularly in the cases of Howard Pattee, René Thom, Kalevi Kull, Anton Markoš and Stuart Kauffman, for the most part, these movements have (...) developed independently of each other. Focussing on morphogenesis understood as vegetative semiosis, in this paper I will argue that the ideas of these movements are commensurate. Furthermore, synthesising them would enable us to see life processes as proto-narratives. Doing so will involve synthesising biohermeneutics, Peircian biosemiotics with Waddington’s theoretical biology and Piagetian genetic structuralism, and this, I claim, would strengthen the challenge of these traditions to mainstream biology. At the same time, this should contribute to overcoming the opposition between the sciences and the humanities, developing a broader tradition of Schellingian thought which involves developing the humanities and then demanding of the physical and biological sciences that they are consistent with and can make intelligible the emergence of humans as conceived by the humanities. (shrink)

In Plato’s Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger applies a specialized method of inquiry—the “method of collection and division”, or “method of division”—in order to discover the nature of statecraft. This paper articulates some consequences of the fact that the method is both a tool for identifying natural kinds—that is, a tool for carving the world by its joints (Phaedrus 265b-d)—and social kinds—that is, the kinds depending on human beings for their existence and explanation. A central goal of the paper is to (...) illuminate the extent to which this use of the method of division allows us to identify Plato as an early historical forerunner of racialism, which is an ideology according to which humanity divides into races differentiated by heritable physiological, cultural, and intellectual traits, as a way of vindicating oppressive and exploitative social, political, and economic systems. -/- I defend an interpretation of the Stranger’s claim, much discussed in the literature, that the division of humankind into Greek and barbarian is unnatural (Politicus 262c-263a). I argue that, in the Stranger’s view, this division reflects subjective illusion and prejudice, rather than the fundamental, and teleological, structure of human social organization, which concerns how human beings rationally cooperate to self-produce as a species. Nonetheless, the Stranger’s alternative theory of the natural structure of human society, I suggest, is proto-racial in another way. Through a brief consideration of the Stranger’s affirmative and complex division of kinds in the city, I argue that he re-introduces naturalistic foundations for unjust human hierarchies through his alternative theory of natural kinds and human social teleology. (shrink)

Scholarly opinions vary on what language is, how it evolved, and from where or what it evolved. Long considered uniquely human, today scholars argue for evolutionary continuity between human language and animal communication systems. But while it is generally recognized that language is an evolving communication system, scholars continue to debate from which species language evolved, and what behavioral and cognitive features are the precursors to human language. To understand the nature of protolanguage, some look for homologs in gene functionality, (...) brain areas, or anatomical structures such as the supralaryngeal vocal tract; others point toward primates, their gestural, vocal, multimodal, and in later evolving hominins also their pantomimic communication systems; and still others draw parallels between the musicality that characterizes language and the pitch found in the numerous sounds produced by animals. Accordingly, protolanguage theories today are multiple and diverse, and protolanguages might have also been diverse. This special issue on Evolving (Proto)Language/s for Lingua bundles several of the protolanguage theories that were put forward at the sixth edition of the Ways to Protolanguage conference series, held at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon, in 2019. Not aimed at surveying all the different ways there are to conceptualize, study, and model protolanguage/s, this issue provides interested readers with good overviews on the role played in current theorizing on protolanguage/s by (paleo)anthropology, genetics, physiology, developmental, evolutionary, ecological, and pragmatic research lines. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza las importantes aportaciones de Adam Smith a la teoría del lenguaje. Identifica dos niveles argumentativos coordinados, el primero procedente de la lógica del análisis y la síntesis y el segundo procedente de una interpretación del lenguaje como una herramienta de adaptación y transformación social del entorno natural. Esto permite identificar una “hipótesis del desarrollo” del lenguaje, que evoluciona desde lo homogéneo desarticulado hasta lo heterogéneo articulado. A partir de aquí, se define la especificidad de la teoría (...) del lenguaje de Smith entre los siglos XVIII y XIX, así como sus consecuencias estéticas y educativas. This article analyzes the important contributions of Adam Smith to the theory of language. It identifies two coordinated argumentative levels, the first coming from the logic of analysis and synthesis and the second coming from an interpretation of language as a tool for adaptation and social transformation of the natural environment. This allows identifying a language’s “development hypothesis”, which evolves from the disjointed homogeneous to the articulated heterogeneous. From here is defined the specificity of Smith’s theory of language, between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as its aesthetic and educational consequences. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Berkeley is proto-phenomenologist. The term phenomenology will chiefly be understood in terms of the approach of Edmund Husserl. Berkeley is attentive to the correct use of significations in philosophical exposition, the subjective character of experience, the motility of the perceiver and the transcendence of things. Like the phenomenologists he rejects materialism, naturalism and scepticism. He seeks to preserve the evidences of ordinary perception, setting out an account of scientific theory that can cohere with (...) them. In the first part of this essay I go through some of the more clear-cut ways in which Berkeley anticipates Husserl and some of the latter’s successors. In the second part I lay out their criticisms of Berkeley, also indicating what they hold in common. In the third and final part I consider some of the ways in which Berkeley can meet these criticisms, either readily or through certain qualifications, and I bring out his most significant contributions as a proto-phenomenologist. My aim is to show there are more than traces of the phenomenological attitude in Berkeley. In his efforts to save the appearances, he goes back to that world in which we live and breathe, if not quite have our being. (shrink)

The theory of chemical symbiosis suggests that biological systems started with the collaboration of two polymeric molecules existing in early Earth: nucleic acids and peptides. Chemical symbiosis emerged when RNA-like nucleic acid polymers happened to fold into 3D structures capable to bind amino acids together, forming a proto peptidyl-transferase center. This folding catalyzed the formation of quasi-random small peptides, some of them capable to bind this ribozyme structure back and starting to form an initial layer that would produce the (...) larger subunit of the ribosome by accretion. TCS suggests that there is no chicken-and-egg problem into the emergence of biological systems as RNAs and peptides were of equal importance to the origin of life. Life has initially emerged when these two macromolecules started to interact in molecular symbiosis. Further, we suggest that life evolved into progenotes and cells due to the emergence of new layers of symbiosis. Mutualism is the strongest force in biology, capable to create novelties by emergent principles; on which the whole is bigger than the sum of the parts. TCS aims to apply the Margulian view of biology into the origins of life field. (shrink)

Until now studies on the historical development of atomic spectroscopy have focused on three main aspects-its first applications as a method of chemical analysis, the formulation of spectral laws , and the rise of the old quantum theory. These developments of spectroscopy were based on the same assumption: the invariance of the atomic spectrum after fixing the chemical element . This paper shows that running alongside these lines of research there was another, no less important area of study based on (...) the negation of this assumption. The focus of these latter studies was the behaviour of atomic spectra as a function of different working conditions. English astrophysicist Sir Norman Lockyer played a central role in this research. While studying the effect of temperature on spectral lines and comparing stellar spectra with laboratory spectra, he discovered a new class of spectral lines . In an attempt to explain the origin of these lines, Lockyer, at the beginning of 1897 , hypothesized the 'dissociation' of the chemical elements into simplified forms of matter, named proto-elements. Lockyer's studies are mentioned by Thomson in the paper which introduces the corpuscle for the first time. In this paper we have tried to reconstruct the history of Lockyer's proto-elements and highlight the links between them and Thomson's corpuscle. Our analysis has shown that not only the famous studies on discharges in rarefied gases but also Lockyer's stellar spectroscopy played an important role in the work of J. J. Thomson, convincing him that the atom was complex and divisible. (shrink)

For Hegel, poverty is not simply a misfortune, but, rather, a kind of injury inflicted on one class by another. Though Hegel rejects Marx’s theory of class, he nevertheless anticipates Marx’s idea of the exploitation of one class by another. How, though, do we align this proto-marxist dichotomy between rich and poor with Hegel’s official theory of class; his tripartite theory of estates? I argue that Hegel’s wealthy are chiefly found in the ‘mercantile’ estate, and that they are those (...) intellectual labourers who manage, oversee, and organize the production process. (shrink)

African philosophy of mind is still a developing area of African philosophy. The main issues driving debates in the field include the essential components of the human being (whether this being is wholly physical or partly physical and partly non-material), the relation of the body with the mind or consciousness, whether there is a unifying principle that grounds both body (matter) and consciousness, and whether there is an aspect of the human being that survives biological death. Physicalist theories such (...) as sense-phenomenalism, equi-phenomenalism, and quasi-physicalism have been proposed by some African philosophers as theoretical frameworks for thinking and rethinking the relation of the body with consciousness in the African universe. This chapter examines the plausibility of the three frameworks and argues that the persistence of the quality of subjective experience and the seeming independence of the subjective sphere require a recourse to panpsychism as a theoretical framework that better accounts for the fact of subjective experience. The chapter proposes a moderate version of panpsychism labelled proto-panpsychism as a metaphysical framework that adequately accounts for the phenomenon of consciousness while unifying the African universe of material and non-material entities. (shrink)

This paper aims to reassess a notion in the works of the later Husserl that is both historically important and philosophically insightful, but remains understudied, namely, that of type. In opposition to a standard reading which treats Husserl’s type presentations as pre-conceptual habits, this paper argues that these representations are a specific kind of concept. More precisely, it shows that Husserl’s account of type presentations is akin to the contemporary prototype theory of concepts. This is historically important, since the predecessor (...) of the prototype theory is usually said to be Wittgenstein. From a philosophical standpoint, the paper shows that Husserl has an innovative account of the connection between type concepts and their extension. Contrary to the standard view of extensions as sets and thus sharp entities, Husserl develops a correlationalist theory of concepts, according to which, for the specific characteristics in the structure of a concept, there are corresponding characteristics in the arrangement of its members, and vice versa. According to this theory, while sharp concepts lead to sharp extensions, vague concepts such as (proto)type concepts lead to vague extensions. The paper presents this understanding of Husserl in detail and explains its philosophical significance. (shrink)

This article introduces a special issue on mechanisms in language evolution research. It describes processes relevant for the emergence of protolanguage and the transition thereof to modern language. Protolanguage is one of the key terms in the field of language evolution, used to designate a hypothesised intermediate stage in the emergence of language present in extinct hominins: qualitatively different from non-human primate communication in possessing some, but not all, of the features that characterise modern language. Much debate in language evolution (...) focuses on the exact delineation of these features, as well as the means whereby the transitions occurred: first from non-human primate communication systems to protolanguage, and then from protolanguage to modern language. In what follows, we first propose a comprehensive typology of protolanguage debates, taking into account the postulated structural organisation of protolanguage, its functions, and its communicative modality. This makes it possible to show how a specific focus on mechanisms and processes deemed relevant for the emergence of these features allows us to assess the explanatory scope of the existing theories of protolanguage. (shrink)

The constitutive role of technology in the constructive theory of science. Consequences for the philosophy of technology. Technology plays an important role in the constructivistic reconstructions of the natural sciences. However, there is no indepth view or thorough explication of the term "technology" and its connotations and relations in those exercises. Technology, there, is seen as a more or less evident part of the lifeworld's A priori of the natural sciences. This paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of the function (...) of technology in the argumentations chains and proto-theories which shall, in the constructivistic (methodical) theory of sciences, provide the methodical fundament of the sciences. In a second step, the aspects of technology are identified which are indispensable to fulfil the functions of technology in the argumentation chains mentioned above. Finally, these aspects are related to current debates in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Jean-Baptiste Say is largely forgotten in modern economics; if he is remembered and studied, it is for Say’s Law, which was misinterpreted by John Maynard Keynes, and ended up providing the basis for the General Theory. In this chapter, we review Say’s Law and a more correct interpretation. We then use this to highlight the contributions of Say to modern macroeconomics, the microfoundations of macroeconomics, and entrepreneurship theory. Say was an influential French thinker – modern classical liberalism owes much to (...) him, and would be enriched by a rediscovery of his writings. (shrink)

Hume’s examination of the conventions of property, trade, and contract addresses the moral foundations that make business possible. In this light, Hume’s theory of justice is also a foundational work in business ethics. In Hume’s analysis of these conventions, both philosophers and game theorists have correctly identified “proto” game-theoretic elements. One of the few attempts to offer a Humean theory of business ethics rests on this game-theoretic interpretation of Hume’s argument. This article argues that game-theoretic reasoning is only one (...) part of a Humean business ethics and this can be shown by further analyzing Hume’s theory of justice. As we examine his theory, it becomes clear that Hume is not trying to show how it is always rational to respect the rules of business. Hume is not engaging in, or attempting, a reconciliation project and neither is a Humean business ethics. The final section of the article is a brief Humean analysis of the effectiveness of codes of ethics. The purpose of this section is not to decide the issue but to show how a Humean approach is both useful, relevant, and involves more than reconciling rationality and morality. (shrink)

The time for unification in cognitive science has arrived, but who should lead the charge? The immunologist-turned-neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1989, 1992) thinks that neuroscientists should lead--or more precisely that he should (he seems to have a low opinion of everyone else in cognitive science). Someone might think that I had made a symmetrically opposite claim in Consciousness Explained (Dennett, 1991): philosophers (or more precisely, those that agree with me!) are in the best position to see how to tie all the (...) loose ends together. But in fact I acknowledged that unifying efforts such as mine are proto-theories, explorations that are too metaphorical and impressionistic to serve as the model for a unified theory. Perhaps Newell had me in mind when he wrote in his introduction (p.16) that a unified theory "can't be just a pastiche, in which disparate formulations are strung together with some sort of conceptual bailing wire," but in any case the shoe more or less fits, with some pinching. Such a "pastiche" theory can be a good staging ground, however, and a place to stand while considering the strengths and weaknesses of better built theories. So I agree with him. (shrink)

This paper explores Beck’s theory of original representing in order to discuss both its historical and theoretical relevance and its implications concerning Kant’s views on the capacity to judge. My first concern will be to highlight the main points of Beck’s Kant interpretation and to show at which points he misunderstands Kant. My analysis also contains a positive aspect, for I adopt Beck’s claim that there is only one possible standpoint from which critical philosophy ought to be judged. Unlike Beck, (...) I shall argue that this standpoint is that of Judgment’s normativity. I will consider the normative structure of Judgment from three perspectives: the proto-synthetic import of sensibility; the normative character of the pure concepts of the understanding; the lawfulness of the principles of the understanding. My basic idea is that only a normative account of Judgment can prove how and why all experience depends on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. On Kant’s account, the capacity to judge applies transcendental rules to establish the laws which make our experience and knowledge both possible and legitimate. Every single object is an object of experience only insofar as it conforms to the normative structure of Judgment. For Kant, to constitute an object means to apply the rules which make something possible as an object of experience and cognition. (shrink)

This book presents 18 essays by leading scholars covering mortuary analysis, the archaeology of foraging and agricultural societies, cultural evolution, and archaeological method and theory, which transcend the processual/postprocessual debate in archaeology and provide examples of how archaeologists think about, and go about, studying the past. As archaeology encounters the 21st century, debate over the nature of the discipline dominates professional discourse. Archaeologists are embattled over isms: processualism, postprocessualism, scientism, and humanism are ubiquitous buzzwords in the literature. Yet archaeology is (...) a craft practiced by individuals, learned from and influenced by other individuals. Sometimes a peson, through sheer force of intellectual spirit, rises above the debate to make a mark on the field in ways that cross out schools, paradigms, and factions. It is fitting to look back at the influence one such individual has had on archaeological methods, theory, data collection, and syntheses over the last half century. This volume draws on the experience of students and colleagues who worked with and were strongly influenced by James A. Brown's approach to the past. The volume is divided into five categories, each reflecting one distinctive facet of Brown's affect on archaeology: mortuary analysis, foraging and horticultural societies, complex agriculturalists, proto-historic and historic societies, and method and theory. These diverse categories, with articles by archaeologists of many backgrounds, are drawn together by the threads of Brown's intellectual legacy. Not all authors here are in agreement with Brown's views on their subjects, but all acknolwedge that his work in the area sets a standard that needs to be met if one is to succeed. (shrink)

The author discusses the mode of introduction of religious testimonial knowledge as a response to skepticism. It is argued that Professor Greco's Answer to The Argumentfrom Peer Disagreement (Part Three; Application to the three skeptical arguments) requires accepting the thesis that has the same conceptual grounding as the skeptical statements about the impossibility to share any belief. Taking into account this common grounding, it is desirable to explain the statement “A major motivation for anti-skepticism about testimony is anti-skepticism in general" (...) (Part Two). The theory of religious testimonial knowledge uses the statement, which can be grounded by accepting the Mental Holism. However, the Mental Holism is also a possible grounding for some skeptical theses. Thus, a philosopher who assumes religious testimonial knowledge takes not only an anti-skeptical position, but also can take a “proto-skeptical" position. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: How Eliminativism Became Embroiled in the Theory of Reference Stich on the Meta‐theory of Reference, and Eliminativism Stich's Way Out The Easy Way Out The Theory of Reference and How Sentences Code for Content Coda Notes and References.

In the period 1875-1920, a debate about the generality and applicability of evolutionary theory to all organisms was motivated by work on unicellular ciliates like Paramecium because of their peculiar nuclear dualism and life cycles. The French cytologist Emile Maupas and the German zoologist August Weismann argued in the 1880s about the evolutionary origins and functions of sex (which in the ciliates is not linked to reproduction), and death (which appeared to be the inevitable fate of lineages denied sexual conjugation), (...) an argument rooted in the question of whether the ciliates and their processes where homologous to other cellular organisms. In the beginning of the twentieth century, this question of homology came to be less important as the ciliates were used by the British protozoologist Clifford Dobell and the American zoologist Herbert Spencer Jennings to study evolutionary processes in general rather than problems of development and cytology. For them, homology mattered less than analogy. This story illustrates two partially distinct problems in evolutionary biology: first, the question of whether all living things have common features and origins; and second, whether their history and current nature can be described by identical mechanisms. Where Maupas (contra Weismann) made the ciliates qualitatively the same as all other organisms in order to create a cohesive evolutionary theory for biology, Jennings and Dobell made them qualitatively different in order to achieve the same end. (shrink)

Thurneysen 이래 1차 엔딩과 오그먼트가 지시사에서 기원한 독립적 파티클이라는 주장은 학계의 암묵적 전제가 되었다. 각각은 어간의 뒤와 앞에 붙어 현재(hic-et-nunc, here & now)와 과거(illic-et-tunc, there & then)를 지시한다. 그러나 전통적 이론 및 최근의 이론에는 몇 가지 모순점들이 존재한다. 첫째, 근접과 원접의 의미를 갖는 1차 엔딩과 오그먼트가 모두 근접 지시사에서 기원하는 모순이 있다. 둘째, 후두음 이론(laryngeal theory)에 따라 복원된 지시사 *h1e-와 *h1i-가 반드시 1차 엔딩 *-i로 전환되지는 않는다. 셋째, 의미론적으로 대칭되며 현재와 과거를 지시하는 접사가 각각 어미와 어두에 오는 형태론적 비대칭성이 존재한다. (...) 어순을 중시하는 Lehmann의 완료 어미 기원론과 Kiparsky의 Conjunction Reduction 이론도 오그먼트와 1차 엔딩의 기원과 비대칭성에 대하여 충분한 설명을 주지 못한다. 필자는 ‘현재가 과거의 열쇠’라는 Uniformitarian Principle에 따라 현재 관찰할 수 있는 일반적 언어현상과 아르메니아어의 화석 언어적 특성에서 오그먼트의 기원을 찾고자 하였다. 엑센트는 문법적 범주라는 전제하에 엑센트에 수반되는 모음약화 및 무게보상 현상으로 오그먼트와 2차 엔딩의 관계를 해석하고, 그 근거를 화석 언어로 가정한 아르메니아어에서 찾고자 하였다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Moral Theory by John MarshallMartin HarveyJohn Marshall. Descartes’s Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 177. Cloth, $35.00.In this concise, well-wrought and provocative work, John Marshall sets two primary goals for himself: 1) to show that Descartes, contrary to the received view, does provide us with the foundational elements of a full fledged ethical theory, and 2) to prove, again contrary to standard interpreters, (...) that Descartes’s early theory of morals, as sketched in the Discourse, is at one with the later theory propounded in The Passions of the Soul and numerous correspondences with Princess Elizabeth.The book is divided into three parts. The first section includes a thorough discussion of Descartes’s self-described morale par provision which provides the philosophical inquirer with practical guidance while the theoretical foundations of his or her belief system are shorn by radical doubt. These four maxims—to follow the customs of one’s country, practice one’s faith and rely on the opinions of the wise, to act resolutely in the face of uncertainty, to master one’s passions and to live the life, at least in Descartes’s case, of a philosopher—should not, Marshall argues, be viewed as ‘provisional’ in a pejorative sense (16–19). Instead, Marshall claims that Descartes takes them to be derivable from his four rules of method (14; 32–33). Therefore, the morale par provision is not some sort of “convenient” compromise but actually forms the second order core of a viable ethical theory (16). The second part, Descartes’s “Final Morality” is devoted to exploring Descartes’s conception of virtue and his notion of the good life (57). Succinctly, the good life for Descartes is happiness which, according to Marshall, in a very weakly Neo-Stoic sense is taken to consist in virtue and wisdom. Formally defined, Cartesian virtue is “the disposition always to judge as well as we can what is the best plan of action and to adhere strictly to that plan” (63). In turn, in a letter to Elizabeth, we are informed that behaving virtuously requires one to display strength and firmness of will, to judge well, and to possess well ordered desires—evidence which Marshall takes to show a close correspondence with the maxims of the earlier morale par provision. (74–5). Contra commentators such as Geroult, an apparent conceptual continuum between the early and later theories thereby obtains. (See Martial Geroult, Descartes’s Philosophy Interpreted according to the Order of Reasons, translated by Roger Ariew [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985], Chapters 19–20.)Unfortunately, and as Marshall readily admits, Descartes provides us with little substantive guidance concerning his axiology and theory of right action. Thus, the third, and more “speculative” part of the work seeks to correct this deficit by delving into a proposed Cartesian metaethics (115). Marshall begins by fleshing out Descartes’s [End Page 677] concept of the Summum Bonum, i.e., virtue. Cartesian virtue is a second-order good which instructs us to strive after and promote various intrinsically valuable first-order goods such as joy, knowledge, friendship, free will, the love of God, etc. (118). As such, Descartes seems to provide us with a fairly straightforward teleological conception of ethics. Nonetheless, when we turn to moral theory proper, Marshall wants to claim that Descartes exhibits certain proto-Kantian leanings, entailed by his concept of generosite as discussed at length in The Passions. The genereux, i.e., those who display generosite, are individuals who, Marshall argues, always act with “respect” towards others and thus treat their fellows both benevolently and justly (152). The basis for this respect is to be found, and this is somewhat of a stretch, albeit an interesting one, in our mutual capacity for free and rational willing (156). From here, of course, it would be a rather short step to Kant. More work needs to be done, however, to square this seemingly non-consequentialist conception of right action with Descartes’s teleological axiology.Regardless, Marshall has accomplished his first task—the normative theory outlined in The Passions, although rudimentary, certainly deserves to be viewed as ethical, not simply prudential, in... (shrink)

In James Gouinlock's essay "Dewey's Theory of Moral Deliberation," he argues that Morton White and Charles L. Stevenson's criticisms of John Dewey's ethical theory are based upon fundamental misinterpretations of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation. In this paper, I attempt, in the spirit of Gouinlock's 1978 essay, to widen and enrich the discussion of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation by relating it to a claim of political philosophers and theorists that is recently in vogue, namely, that Dewey's writings contain a (...) nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic theorists contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement and collective action. If Deweyan democracy is identified with deliberative democracy, do Dewey scholars risk making Dewey's democratic vision a useless relic for theorizing about democracy in the wake of the deliberative turn? The paper is organized into four sections. In the first, I summarize the positions of those scholars defending the view that John Dewey was a proto-deliberative democrat, in effect anticipating the deliberative turn in democratic theory. The second section examines Gouinlock's thesis that despite White and Stevenson's mistaken accounts, Dewey offered a distinctive and insightful way of understanding moral judgment. In the third section, my analysis reveals the political dimension of Dewey's theory of moral deliberation. The fourth and concluding section explores the lesson that my analysis might impart to commentators enamored with the idea that Dewey's vision of democracy is essentially deliberative. (shrink)

There are two fundamental questions concerning the choice and presence of objects in various formal systems: Where do these objects come from? What do we know about them? To answer these questions I introduce the notion of a proto-ontology as the pre-theoretic realm of entities from which the basic objects – individuals – of the formal system S are postulated. The pragmatic aspects of such choices are investigated with regard to first-order logic, both pure and applied, set theory and (...) mereology. It is claimed that the postulated objects enter the formal system S with a package of properties and relationships, the recognition of which depends on the interpretation and application of the available predicates of S. If these properties and relationships are not made explicit, a possible clash may arise between them and the properties and relationships “assigned” to the individuals of S by the interpreted predicates of S. As regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics, I contend that logic can perhaps be viewed as the articulation of the fundamental features of proto-ontological objects without which no discourse or theory would be possible. In this sense logic could also be viewed as a theory and method of the construction of a well-articulated metaphysical theory. (shrink)

Contemporary social and political theory is not wholly sufficient for dealing with environmental issues unless it will be more informed by political theories of justice. I present the view that environmental justice can be fruitfully approached from the point of view of contemporary social contract theory, mainly the one inspired by the work of John Rawls. Healthy natural environment is indispensable for many reasons for every human society; however, nature possesses also value going beyond pure instrumentality for human beings. (...) Because humans can have great impact on natural environment in either positive or negative way, this entails duties on their part. Society’s dealings with the environment are regulated by laws and other publicmeasures, which in turn have their deeper justification in general theory of justice of that particular society. The article tries to show that contemporary social contract theory can fruitfully grasp principles of environmental justice, which could lead to more environment sensitive policies and be acceptable from liberal point of view at the same time.Politické myšlení nemůže adekvátně reagovat na environmentální problémy současné společnosti, pokud nebude více pracovat s konceptem environmentální spravedlnosti. V tomto článku se snažím ukázat způsob, jak může být otázka environmentální spravedlnosti uchopena pomocí teorie společenské smlouvy v podání Johna Rawlse. Lidé mají svoji činností významný dopad na životní prostředí, což má za následek nerovnou distribuci environmentálních dober a škod. Proto existují vůči ostatním lidem povinnosti vyplývající ze spravedlnosti vztahující se na environmentální oblast. Environmentální otázky se nicméně musí řešit pomocí závazných společenských pravidel, která mají podobu zákonů vynucovaných státem. Tyto zákony mají své hlubší ospravedlnění právě v určité teorii spravedlnosti, která zakládá jejich legitimitu. Ve článku se snažím ukázat, že pomoci teorie společenské smlouvy lze konstruovat soubor principů environmentální spravedlnosti pro společnost, která se chce stát více odpovědnou vůči životnímu prostředí a zároveň fungovat podle liberálních principů. (shrink)

Neutral monist, panpsychist, naturalist, and phenomenological interpretations of James's theory of mind are canvassed. Culling the true tenets from each, I make a case for a reconciling view on the basis of a distinction between mental and proto-mental properties. The resulting interpretation is compared to two forms of panpsychism identified by T Nagel in his essay of that name.

Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to (...) the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity. (shrink)

1. Clark’s book is a detailed study of the nature of sensory representation. It is highly informed by empirical results in the psychology of perception, and philosophically rich and significant. I admire the book and learned a great deal from reading it. As it covers a wide range of topics, and as I have no overarching critique to present, in this commentary I will briefly address three issues that come up in the book: Clark’s relational type-identity thesis for sensory qualities, (...) his theory that sensory representations involve proto-singular terms referring to spatio-temporal regions in the subject’s environment, and his interesting proposal concerning color to treat it as “difference coding”. Some of my remarks will be critical, but others will just explore some of the implications of his view. 2. Clark distinguishes “phenomenal properties” from “qualitative properties”, the former being appearance properties of things in the world (their colors, shapes, tastes, odors, etc.) and the latter being the properties of sensations by virtue of which they are sensations of their corresponding phenomenal properties. So when I see a red ball I am “directly” aware of the ball’s redness and roundness - it appears red and round to me. This awareness of the ball’s redness and roundness is accomplished, however, by my having a visual experience with certain qualitative properties; those that are of the sort one has when seeing something as red and round. It is these latter qualitative properties that are the subject of his relational type-identity thesis. Before addressing that thesis, however, I want to quickly note and respond to another point Clark makes concerning the qualitative properties of sensory states. He.. (shrink)

An important work by 20-century philosopher Hans Blumenberg, here translated into English for the first time, The Laughter of the Thracian Woman describes the reception history of an anecdote best known from Plato's Theaetetus dialogue: while focused on observing the stars, the early astronomer and proto-philosopher Thales of Miletus fails to see a well directly in his path and tumbles down. A Thracian servant girl laughs, amused that he sought to understand what was above him when he was not (...) mindful of what was right in front of him. Blumenberg sees the story as a highly sought substitute for our missing knowledge of the earliest historical events that would fit the label "theory." By retelling the anecdote, philosophers reveal their distinctive values regarding absorption in curiosity, philosophy's past, and the demand that theorists abide by sanctioned methods and procedures. In this work and others, Blumenberg demonstrates that philosophers' most beloved images and anecdotes have become indispensable to philosophy as metaphors; that is, as representations whose meanings remain indefinite and invite frequent reinterpretation. (shrink)

Theoretical minimal RNA rings attempt to mimick life’s primitive RNAs. At most 25 22-nucleotide-long RNA rings code once for each biotic amino acid, a start and a stop codon and form a stem-loop hairpin, resembling consensus tRNAs. We calculated, for each RNA ring’s 22 potential splicing positions, similarities of predicted secondary structures with tRNA vs. rRNA secondary structures. Assuming rRNAs partly derived from tRNA accretions, we predict positive associations between relative secondary structure similarities with rRNAs over tRNAs and genetic code (...) integration orders of RNA ring anticodon cognate amino acids. Analyses consider for each secondary structure all nucleotide triplets as potential anticodon. Anticodons for ancient, chemically inert cognate amino acids are most frequent in the 25 RNA rings. For RNA rings with primordial cognate amino acids according to tRNA-homology-derived anticodons, tRNA-homology and coding sequences coincide, these are separate for predicted cognate amino acids that presumably integrated late the genetic code. RNA ring secondary structure similarity with rRNA over tRNA secondary structures associates best with genetic code integration orders of anticodon cognate amino acids when assuming split anticodons (one and two nucleotides at the spliced RNA ring 5′ and 3′ extremities, respectively), and at predicted anticodon location in the spliced RNA ring’s midst. Results confirm RNA ring homologies with tRNAs and CDs, ancestral status of tRNA half genes split at anticodons, the tRNA-rRNA axis of RNA evolution, and that single theoretical minimal RNA rings potentially produce near-complete proto-tRNA sets. Hence genetic code pre-existence determines 25 short circular gene- and tRNA-like RNAs. Accounting for each potential splicing position, each RNA ring potentially translates most amino acids, realistically mimicks evolution of the tRNA-rRNA translation machinery. These RNA rings ‘of creation’ remind the uroboros’ (snake biting its tail) symbolism for creative regeneration. (shrink)

Summary For the study of the first year of life, Sander, Stern, and Gomez each chose the adult–infant relationship as the unit of analysis; they followed its development, respectively, in moments of meeting, in the proto-conversation and in the focus of attention. The authors explicitly refer to the Gestalt theory and support the need to interpret the behavior of the child as part of a wider context, as the experiences of a person in relation since birth.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.3 (2001) 67-88 [Access article in PDF] In the Wake of Cultural StudiesGlobalization, Theory, and the University Tilottama Rajan 1 Theory today has become an endangered species, as evidenced by the resistance to difficult language. This is not to deny that it leads a quasi-life as the domesticated ground for what has replaced it, or as a form of prestige: a signifier for "cutting-edge" discourses. But in using (...) the term here, I refer to the work that came into prominence after the Johns Hopkins conference on "The Structuralist Controversy" (1966), the modes of thought it made possible, and the antecedents for such thought going back to the late eighteenth century. Like the humanities generally, this Theory has become submerged in Cultural Studies, 1 which displaced it in the nineties as a central concern of institutes, interdisciplinary programs, and lecture series. "New" academic undertakings in the humanities are by definition those that have a cultural focus. Occasionally we come across programs in "Theory and Cultural Studies" which equate fields that could overlap dialogically but are not identical.Let us grant that practices at the ground level of teaching are more diverse because hiring has occurred over generations; or that there are no absolute epistemic shifts because of what Mary Poovey calls a process of "uneven development," in which "emergent" "rationalities" develop from "and retain a constitutive relationship to... residual domains" [Social Body 14-19]. At the level of marketing and image (and thus also the self-image of academics), Cultural Studies has become the primary focus of North American academic publishing in the humanities, 2 which thus reimagines itself in terms of the globalism of culture rather than the nationalism of "literature," even as the wider [End Page 67] technocratic apparatus thereby reduces the entire humanities to a form of "area studies." And as Heidegger presciently saw in 1938, publishing is a form of governmentality: through the "prearranged and limited publication of books," publishers "bring the world into the picture for the public and confirm it publicly" [139]. On the other side, if a space has been kept for Theory, it has migrated out of English into continental philosophy departments and book series. The result has been an esotericizing and narrowing of Theory to post-Heideggerian French philosophy: the most powerful current in American continental philosophy departments—hence the survival of Derrida but not the early Foucault, and hence the survival of a Derrida very different from the one who made an impact in the seventies. 3Why did Cultural Studies so readily replace Theory? And why focus on the loss of Theory rather than literature, which has also entered the domain of the residual? After all, Anthony Easthope, a decade ago, saw Theory as no more than the "symptom" of a crisis leading from the collapse of literature to the emergence of Cultural Studies [5]. In starting with the cathexis onto "culture" of an academic desire once mediated through "Theory," I suggest that both Theory and Cultural Studies are encyclopedic organizations of knowledge that have therefore served as meta- or flagship disciplines for the humanities. Constituted outside the regular structure of departments in programs and "centers," both have been responsible for a decentering innovation (recognizing the emergence of knowledges outside traditional boundaries) and a recentering of the humanities' "mission" by which it addresses the university at large. The encyclopedic impulse goes back a long way, whether it takes form in such gatherings as the early cabinets of curiosities, in universities as attempts to gather different disciplines into an institutional plurality, or in actual encyclopedias. Enkyklos paideia, meaning "circle of learning," is a gathering of subjects that are meant to be interrelated as knowledge by a single individual, in contrast to indexical systems (such as dictionaries), which are secondary reference tools that store information outside the mind for selective retrieval by different people. Actual encyclopedias, from Anglicus and Vincent of Beauvais to the Encyclopédie and Hegel's "philosophic encyclopedia," have thus been intimately tied up with existing or projected organizations of knowledge. They have functioned as proto-universities... (shrink)

The extent to which God grounds normativity within natural law theory is analyzed. I examine Hugo Grotius’s understanding of natural law and human nature and show that Grotius makes few explicit metaphysical commitments which makes his view open to development in at least two different ways. Then a Thomistic view of natural law and human nature is developed. It is shown that Grotius’s position could be developed as a proto-new natural law theory, but this leaves it open to powerful (...) objections from Fulvio Di Blasi and other Thomistic philosophers. Finally, I argue that a view can be developed in such a way as to take on certain elements of the Thomistic view, particularly its metaphysics, but still maintain the famous Grotian claim that human nature can establish normativity without God. The key to this is the distinction between the order of knowing and the order of being. (shrink)