Self-Interest before Adam Smith inquires into the foundations of economic theory. It is generally assumed that the birth of modern economic science, marked by the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776, was the triumph of the 'selfish hypothesis'. Yet, as a neo-Epicurean idea, this hypothesis had been a matter of controversy for over a century and Smith opposed it from a neo-Stoic point of view. But how can the Epicurean principles of orthodox economic theory be reconciled (...) with the Stoic principles of Adam Smith's philosophy? Pierre Force shows how Smith's theory refutes the 'selfish hypothesis' and integrates it at the same time. He also explains how Smith appropriated Rousseau's 'republican' critique of modern commercial society, and makes the case that the autonomy of economic science is an unintended consequence of Smith's 'republican' principles. (shrink)

Self-Interest discusses the reconciliation of inevitable self-concern with its manifest potential for harm. This anthology brings together the efforts of twenty three renown philosophers to address the matter of how to bring about such a reconciliation. The drive for self-preservation, as observed by Aquinas, is the first law of nature. With this self-love, however, comes the threat of "the excessive love of self". Self-Interest brings into discussion the reconciliation of necessary self-concern (...) with its manifest potential for harm. This anthology brings together the work of twenty-three important philosophers to address the question of how to bring about such a reconciliation. Contributors include: Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Aquinas,Hobbes, Nicole, Mandeville, Butler, Hutchenson, Hume, Smith, Kant, Bentham, Mill, James, Nietzsche, Dewey, Rand, and Gauthier. (shrink)

The recent and ongoing refugee crisis in Europe highlights conflicting attitudes about the rights of migrants and refugees to health care in transition and destination countries. Some European and Scandinavian states, such as Germany and Sweden, have welcomed large numbers of migrants, while others, such as the U.K., have been significantly less open. In part, this is because of reluctance by certain national governments to incur what are seen as the high costs of delivering aid and care to migrants. In (...) response to these assumptions, some theorists have argued that the appropriate way to view the health needs of migrants is not in terms of rights, but in terms of the interests of destination and transition countries—and have argued that providing care to migrants and refugees will generate benefits for their host countries. However, self‐interest alone is less effective at motivating the provision of care for health deprivations that do not pose a threat to third parties, or to migrants and refugees in poor or distant countries. In this paper, I argue that while self‐interest is unlikely in itself to motivate the provision of all necessary health care to all migrants and refugees, and may risk stigmatizing already vulnerable persons, it can provide the foundation upon which such motivations can be built. My goal is therefore to show how and why a more just approach to the provision of health care to migrants can and should be derived from narrower, self‐interested commitments to preserving citizen health. (shrink)

Drawing on contrasting theoretical perspectives of self-interest and utilitarian/ethical motivations, we examine the degree to which a company's pace of departure from Russia after the Ukraine invasion is driven by its exposure to the Russian market. Moreover, we investigate whether firm-level political and non-political risks influence the propensity to delay or expedite the exit/withdrawal process. Contrary to utilitarian expectations advocating for ethical exit decisions irrespective of exposure and risks, firms with higher Russian exposure were less likely to exit (...) sooner, indicating a prioritization of business interests over ethical imperatives. This self-interest effect was further amplified by heightened political risks but attenuated by non-political risks. These findings remained consistent across various model specifications, with limited discernible variations based on firm characteristics such as ranking, COVID-19 exposure and risk, past idiosyncratic volatility, or family ownership and control. In addition, an examination of post-exit effects on profitability, risk, cost of capital, and liquidity revealed no statistically significant relationships. Our study highlights the prevalence of self-interest motivations over utilitarian principles, as firms with substantial Russian exposure prioritized safeguarding their business interests in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, even at the potential cost of ethical and social responsibility imperatives. (shrink)

Owing to a genral dissatisfaction with hedonistic theories of value, a number of recent discussions have sought to identify an agent's selfinterest, individual utility, or personal welfare with what the agent most wants to do, all things considered. Two features of these accounts merit special attention for the argument in this paper. First, on such accounts any desire or aversion which persists in the face of complete information is logically relevant to the determination of an agent's self interest. (...) This includes apparently altruistic desires like a desire for another's happiness as well as more narrow and self-regarding desires like a desire to eat a good meal. Second, when the agent finds himself in a situation where he must choose between incompatible desires, his informed preference determines the act which is most in his self-interest. (shrink)

Contrasts common‐sense ideas of what is reasonable with current philosophical ideas of rational choice: maximizing self‐interest, efficiency and coherence in pursuit of one's ends, maximizing intrinsic value, and efficiency and coherence constrained by a Kantian ideal of co‐legislation. Contrary to the usual assumptions, the last corresponds more closely to common‐sense ideas than any of the other models do. This is not a proof of the Kantian ideal, or of common sense, but it calls for rethinking assumptions about (...) class='Hi'>self‐regarding and other‐regarding reasons for action. (shrink)

In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means of originally anthropomorphic semiotic concepts. This can be justified if we can show that living systems as self-maintaining far from equilibrium systems create and update some kind of representation about the conditions of their self-maintenance. The point of view is the one of semiotic realism where signs and representations are considered as real and objective natural phenomena without any reference to the specifically human interpreter. It is argued that (...) the most basic concept of representation must be forward looking and that both C. Peirce’s and J. v. Uexküll’s concepts of sign assume an unnecessarily complex semiotic agent. The simplest representative systems do not have phenomenal objects or Umwelten at all. Instead, the minimal concept of representation and the source of normativity that is needed in its interpretation can be based on M. Bickhard’s interactivism. The initial normativity or natural self-interest is based on the ‘utility-concept’ of function: anything that contributes to the maintenance of a far from equilibrium system is functional to that system — every self-maintaining far from equilibrium system has a minimal natural self-interest to serve that function, it is its existential precondition. Minimal interactive representation emerges when such systems become able to switch appropriately between two or more means ofmaintaining themselves. At the level of such representations, a potentiality to detect an error may develop although no objects of representation for the system are provided. Phenomenal objects emerge in systems that are more complex. If a system creates a set of ongoingly updated ’situation images’ and can detect temporal invariances in the updating process, these invariances constitute objects for the system itself. Within them, a representative system gets an Umwelt and becomes capable of experiencing triadic signs. The relation between representation and its object is either iconic or indexical at this level. Correspondingly as in Peirce’s semeiotic, symbolic signs appear as more developed — for the symbolic signs, a more complex system is needed. (shrink)

Moran argues that the ancient Greek philosophers did not really do moral philosophy because they conflated self-regard with other-regard. I argue that on the contrary questions of what is in a person's own interest are moral questions and that self-interest should play a part in moral philosophy.Export citation.

We re-examine the construct of Moral Hypocrisy from the perspective of normative self-interest. Arguing that some degree of self-interest is culturally acceptable and indeed expected, we postulate that a pattern of behavior is more indicative of moral hypocrisy than a single action. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate that a significant majority of subjects exhibited fair behavior, and that ideals of caring and fairness, when measured in context of the scenario, were predictive of those behaviors. (...) Moreover, measures of Individualism/Collectivism appear more predictive of self-interested behavior than out-of-context responses to moral ideals. Implications for research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Some in public relations have suggested that practitioners adopt a philosophy of enlightened self-interest as an ethical baseline. The author contends that such a theory must be rejected because even the enlightened variety does not adequately weigh the needs of significant others - a central consideration in any effort to define ethical behavior. The author maintains that genuine sacrifice - at times required of those desiring to do the right thing - clearly can conflict with any theory espousing (...) self-interest as a baseline. Further, there is a social dimension to ethics. By virtue of occupational title, the author holds that public relations practitioners have a particular responsibility to advance the social order. Ethical behavior - especially as it relates to public relations - must go well beyond a narrow concern that no injustice is done to individual persons. (shrink)

Self-interest is widely accepted as a powerful motivator by both academics and laypeople alike. However, research surrounding the self-interest motive paints a complicated picture of this most important psychological construct. Additionally, research on the social desirability of self-interest has revealed that despite its widespread acceptance, people do not readily accept that self-interest drives their own behaviors. This paper reviews the literature on self-interest and reveals several curious features surrounding its actual (...) effect on helping behaviors, political attitudes and voting, and people's apparent ambivalence toward self-interest as a motive. It is possible that norms against the expression of self-interestedness evolved, creating ambivalence towards this widely accepted construct, subsequently affecting its expression on many human behaviors. (shrink)

Rules regulating social behavior raise challenging questions about cultural evolution in part because they frequently confer group-level benefits. Current multilevel selection theories contend that between-group processes interact with within-group processes to produce norms and institutions, but within-group processes have remained underspecified, leading to a recent emphasis on cultural group selection as the primary driver of cultural design. Here we present the self-interested enforcement (SIE) hypothesis, which proposes that the design of rules importantly reflects the relative enforcement capacities of competing (...) parties. We show that, in addition to explaining patterns in cultural change and stability, SIE can account for the emergence of much group-functional culture. We outline how this process can stifle or accelerate cultural group selection, depending on various social conditions. Self-interested enforcement has important bearings on the emergence, stability, and change of rules. (shrink)

On taking the common distinction between the legal and the ethical as a point of departure, and in an effort to understand Marshall's approach to self-interest, and thereby to his conception of an ethics of commerce, I read three of his essays in the light of some non-technical writings of Frank Hahn and three other Cambridge intellectuals. My larger project connects self-interest and self-deception to a possible ethics of theorizing in economics, and thereby to the (...) ethics of the relationship between the theorist and the theorized, the analyst and the analyzed. (shrink)

The chapter analyses the debates on the relation between self-interest and sociability in eighteenth-century British moral philosophy. It focuses on the selfish hypothesis, i.e. on the egoistic theory that we are only motivated by self-interest or self-love, and that our sociability is not based on disinterested affections, such as benevolence. The selfish hypothesis is much debated especially in the early eighteenth century (Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Clarke, Campbell, Gay), and then rather tacitly accepted (Hartley, Tucker, (...) Paley) or rejected (Hume, Smith, Reid). It is asserted for example by philosophers with an Augustinian and Epicurean background and by the associationists, yet rejected especially by thinkers inspired by Stoic ideas. In particular for these latter authors, who emphasise the disinterested aspects of moral motivation, the debates on the selfish hypothesis have an important moral dimension. Others again argue that specific kinds of self-interest motivate virtuous actions. (shrink)

Human beings naturally care a great deal for themselves--and couldn't survive otherwise. As Aquinas observed, the drive for self-preservation is the first law of nature. Yet in the imperative of self-love, philosophers have also perceived a tacit threat. Plato reminds us that 'the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences.' And so the inevitability of self- concern must be balanced with its manifest potential for harm. But how is (...) such a reconciliation possible? This collection brings tohether the efforts of twenty- three great thinkers addressing such themes as the nature of self-interest, its connection to benevolence and morality, and its implications for political theory. The philosophical results are rich and varied. Self-Interest is intended for philosophers, students, and anyone inclined to reflect upon a subject of such enduring importance and perplexity as the love of self. (shrink)

When questioned about what ought to be done in a particular scenario, students often ignore moral considerations and appeal to what is in an individual’s self-interest. This paper shows how an instructor can use a student’s habitual inclination to think in a self-interested fashion to guide them into thinking about moral considerations. Rather than drawing a sharp distinction between self-interested thinking and moral considerations, a more plausible account contends that self-interested thinking does not function independently (...) of moral considerations. That is, self-interested thinking reveals itself to be incomplete without some normative conception of the self. In addition to arguing and responding to objections to this position, the paper offers pedagogical advice on how instructors can use a student’s thinking about self-interest to guide them into moral thought. (shrink)

Ancient ethical theories do not, like many modern ethical theories, recognize a gap in the theory between morality and self‐interest. Rather, self‐interest, developed into an appropriate concern with one's happiness, will already incorporate other‐concern, which in the different theories has different scope.

We have taken the “why be moral?” question so seriously for so long. It suggests that we lack faith in the rationality of morality. The relative infrequency with which we ask “why be prudent?” suggests that we have no corresponding lack of faith in the rationality of prudence. Indeed, we have so much faith in the rationality of prudence that to question it by asking “why be prudent?” sounds like a joke. Nevertheless, our reasons and motives to be prudent are (...) every bit as contingent as our reasons and motives to be moral–or so I argue in Sections II and III.A second theme of this essay is thatconflictbetween morality and self-interest is contingent as well. The moral perspective, as characterized in Section IV, does not require a universal regard for others, whereas the kind of self-interested perspective characterized in Section III does not require a wholesale disregard for others. Both perspectives make room for a deep although not universal other-regard–or so I argue in Section V. (shrink)

My topic in this essay is the comparative moral value of self-interest and altruism. I take self-interest to consist in a positive attitude toward one's own good and altruism to consist in a similar attitude toward the good of others, and I assess these attitudes within a general theory of the intrinsic value of attitudes toward goods and evils. The first two sections of the essay apply this theory in a simple form, one that treats (...) class='Hi'>self-interest and altruism symmetrically. The third section examines whether the theory can be revised to accommodate an apparent asymmetry in our common-sense thinking about self-interested and altruistic attitudes. I will start by assuming that each person has a good, or that certain states of the person are intrinsically desirable and others undesirable. Of course, philosophers have disagreed for centuries about what this good consists in, or what particular states are desirable. Welfarists take each person's good to consist in pleasure, the fulfillment of her preferences, or something describable as “welfare” or “happiness.” Perfectionists hold that certain states of a person are good apart from any connection with happiness. Thus, some perfectionists hold that knowledge, achievement, and deep personal relations are good independently of how much a person wants or enjoys them. For the purposes of this essay it does not matter much which initial claims about the good we accept. To discuss issues about self-interest and altruism we need only some initial theory of each person's good, whatever its specific content. Consequently, and to cover as many bases as possible, I will start by assuming a mixed welfarist-perfectionist theory of the good, one claiming that pleasure, knowledge, and achievement are all intrinsically good. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The need to cooperate in countless ways in a democracy raises the fundamental question posed by the prisoner's dilemma: How can self‐interested individuals cooperate? Tocqueville recognized this problem and anticipated the most convincing solution to date: Robert Frank's conception of emotions as “commitment devices.” Tocqueville's analysis of the miscalculations of modern “individualism,” which lead people first into isolation and then into servitude, mirrors the failure of conscious rationality in the prisoner's dilemma. Conversely, Tocqueville emphasizes emotional “habits of the (...) heart” as the key to resisting the blandishments of individualism. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’s radical tendency to view natural law as a means of individual self-preservation sparked critical responses among natural law theorists in England and continental Europe. This chapter compares how two of Hobbes’s immediate successors and critics – Richard Cumberland and Samuel Pufendorf – dealt with the potential conflict between self-interest and the requirements of natural law. The chapter shows how both intended to reply to Hobbes in their own distinctive ways by attempting to show that the (...) ultimate aim of natural law, imposed by God, obligated people to promote the common good of humankind as a whole rather than mainly function as the means for individual and social utility. They did not, however, consider self-interest to be merely destructive for social cooperation and natural law. Both argued in their distinct ways that self-interest is the most effective motivation for people to consider the advantage of others and it leads them to promote the common good. This chapter also points out notable differences between Cumberland’s and Pufendorf’s treatment of the relation between the private good and the common good. (shrink)

How can we effectively promote the public’s prevention of coronavirus disease 2019 infection? Jordan et al. found with United States samples that emphasizing either self-interest or collective-interest of prevention behaviors could promote the public’s prevention intention. Moreover, prosocially framed messaging was more effective in motivating prevention intention than self-interested messaging. A dual consideration of both cultural psychology and the literature on personalized matching suggests the findings of Jordan et al. are counterintuitive, because persuasion is most effective (...) when the frame of the message delivered and the recipient of the message are culturally congruent. In order to better understand the potential influence of culture, the current research aimed to replicate and extend Jordan et al. findings in the Japanese context. Specifically, we examined the question whether the relative effectiveness of the prosocial appeal is culturally universal and robust, which types of ‘others’ especially promote prevention intention, and which psychological mechanisms can explain the impact of messaging on prevention intention. In Study 1, we confirmed that self-interested framed, prosocially framed, and the combination of both types of messaging were equally effective in motivating prevention intention. In Study 2, we found that family-framed messaging also had a promoting effect similar to that from self-interested and prosocial appeals. However, the relative advantage of prosocial appeals was not observed. Further, a psychological propensity relevant to sensitivity to social rejection did not moderate the impact of messaging on prevention intention in both studies. These results suggest that since engaging in the infection control itself was regarded as critical by citizens after public awareness of COVID-19 prevention has been sufficiently heightened, for whom we should act might not have mattered. Further, concerns for social rejection might have had less impact on the prevention intentions under these circumstances. These results suggest that the relative advantage of a prosocial appeal might not be either culturally universal or prominent in a collectivistic culture. Instead, they suggest that the advantages of such an appeal depends on the more dynamic influence of COVID-19 infection. (shrink)

In Nicholas Smyth’s recent article, “When Does Self-Interest Distort Moral Belief,” he argues that self-interest undermines justification for moral belief if it justifies itself. In so doing, he opposes the standard account, which says that, to the extent that a person’s moral belief is explained by her egoistic or parochial interests, that belief is less justified. However, Smyth’s attack on the standard account, and the principle that he proposes to replace it with, do not withstand critical (...) scrutiny, and that is what this article is intended to show. To that end, the article is divided into three sections. In the first, I explain the standard account and provide some background. In the second, I critically examine Smyth’s three arguments against the standard account. In the third, I explain and attack Smyth’s own principle. I conclude that Smyth’s principle should not be accepted, and the standard account should not be rejected, at least on the basis of Smyth’s arguments: self-interest undermines justification in general, as per the standard account, not only when it justifies itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Interest and Public Interest m Shaftesbury's Philosophy STANLEY GREAN THE SEV~NTEENTrt-CV.NTVRYproblem of the relationship of self-interest and public interest was carried over by the third Earl of Shaftesbury into the eighteenth century where it became a major issue for generations of British moralists. His own preoccupation with the problem began at an early date in his career, for the lnquiry Concerning Virtue or (...) Merit (1699), the first draft of which he wrote in his twenties, deals with it at length,1 and it is, according to him, the "main problem" of that work. This interest must have been deepened by his knowledge and experience of the bitter and tumultuous factional strife of the seventeenth century. There was also a family tradition of public life, the first Earl having been one of the foremost statesmen in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. The third Earl himself was briefly a figure of some importance on the political scene, serving in Parliament for two sessions? Something of Shaftesbury's character and point of view is revealed in the independent position which he took on certain issues during this time. With the emergence of the Whig and Tory parties a new emphasis was being placed on party organization. The principle of party loyalty "was indeed the only loyalty that was practised by some very important statesmen in the reigns of James, William and Anne.''s Though in general Shaftesbury supported Whig principles and policies, he refused to follow the Whig "party line" on every issue even though sometimes bitterly censured for failing to do so.4 Shaftesbury held that a legislative proposal should be judged on its own merits and not by its source? While recognizing t The first publication of the Inquiry was apparently unauthorized. A revised form appeared as Treatise IV in the 1711 edition of Characteristics. 2In the Commons, 1695-1698, and the Lords, 1700-1701. Ill health forced his retirement from politics. s George M. Trevelyan, History of England (3 vols.; New York: 1952), II, 260. 4Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, ed. Benjamin Rand (London: 1900), p. 300. Referred to henceforth as LiIe, Letters. See the comment by the fourth Earl in Life, Letters, pp. xxi-xxii; also Thomas Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (New York: 1883), pp. 10-12. [37] 38 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the social value of political parties, it was consistent with Shaftesbury's theory that he insisted that party loyalty must at times be superseded by loyalties to larger interests or to the larger community of which one is a member. In his writings Shaftesbury carried on a continual campaign against the type of reductionism which seeks to explain all human behavior by "that one principle and foundation of a cool and deliberate selfishness.''8 Thus, he attacks Epicurus and Lucretius among the ancients, and Hobbes, Lord Rochester, and La Rochefoucault among the moderns. For these "narrowminded philosophers," "interest, interest comes in ever and anon, and must seem a kind of key to things with which it has nothing to do."' One of Shaftesbury's lines of attack is to point out that psychological egoism, when pressed, proves to be meaningless. If everything one does is attributed to self-interest, he asks, what meaning does the tertn "self-interest" have? If there is no real alternative to egoism, and all actions are equally egoistic, then the very term "egoism" loses significance. It would apparently be impossible to be more or less self-centered. Thus, we would lose an important practical principle of differentiation. The English philosopher pictures the defenders of egoism as saying: "Act as disinterestedly or generously as you please, self still is at the bottom, and nothing else." Now if these gentlemen who delight so much in the play of words, but are cautious how they grapple closely with definitions, would tell us only what self-interest was, and determine happiness and good, there would be an end of this enigmatical wit. For in this we should all agree, that happiness was to be pursued, and in fact was always sought after; but whether found in following Nature, and giving way to... (shrink)

The essays trace, from the ancient Greeks to the present, the use of self-interest to explain political life.

'[T]he good man should be a lover of self.' Aristotle wrote. 'For he will both himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows … '. Yet in much of contemporary moral philosophy, concern for one's own interests is considered a non-moral issue, while concern for the interests of others is paradigmatically moral. Indeed, a central issue in ethical theory involves the proper balance to be struck between prudence and morality, between the pursuit of one's own good (...) and the pursuit of the good of others. When deliberating over what action to take, should one weigh one's own interests more heavily than those of others? Or is it possible to accommodate both self-interest and regard for others, to show that we have self-regarding reasons for helping others? The twelve essays in this volume - written from a range of perspectives - address these questions and examine related issues. (shrink)

Arne Neass’ Ecosophy and the Stoic attitude towards environmental ethics are often believed to be incompatible primarily because the first is often understood as championing an ecocentric standpoint while the latter espouses an egocentric (as well as an anthropocentric) view. This paper argues that such incompatibility is rooted in a misunderstanding of both Ecosophy and Stoicism. Moreover, the paper argues that a synthesis of both the Ecosophical and Stoic approaches to environmental concerns results in a robust and satisfying attitude toward (...) the environment, namely an enlightened self-interest, which not only guards our fragile environment from abuse, but also provides self-interested reasons and motivations for the protection of our natural surroundings. (shrink)

Altruism and the medical profession have been linked throughout the history of medicine. Students are drawn to the calling of medicine because of altruistic values, dedication to service, and the desire to alleviate suffering and promote healing. Despite a dedication to these values, altruism in medicine is threatened by empathy erosion that develops in the clinical years of medical school and an increasing rate of medical student burnout. Currently, there are two widespread movements in medicine aimed at addressing the dual (...) loss of altruism and physician and student burnout—professionalism and wellness. Despite widespread recognition of the problems and programs aimed at improving them, there has been little headway, and even calls to abandon altruism in the modern marketplace of medicine. What is needed is not an abandonment of a fundamental, defining value of the profession, but a re-evaluation of the meaning of altruism in medicine and a framework that allows for students and physicians to provide altruistic care for a sustainable, rewarding career in the healing profession. This paper proposes the Enlightened Self-Interest in Altruism model as an ethical framework to allow medical students to synergize the interests of the self with those they serve in a mutually beneficial relationship to improve patient care and the healthcare system at large. The ESIA model acknowledges that egoism and altruism are intertwined, dynamic motivators of behavior. In the enlightened self-interest approach, the interests of the group are also the interests of the self. The physician–patient relationship is a dyad in which egoism and altruism may converge in an enlightened way that acknowledges that the interests of one are the interests of the whole. This is a paradigm shift from the historical view of egoism and altruism as opposing motivations. This paper will present the threats to altruism, explore the interface of egoism and altruism in a clinical vignette, and then present the ESIA framework as an educational approach to aligning the interests of providers and patients to prevent burnout and promote altruism. (shrink)

A spate of recent attacks on the rationality assumption in economic theory is noticed. Some of these attacks are fresh and, in many ways, original, but the central ideas underlying them are not new. They appear to have been provoked by the direction in which much of mainstream economics has been moving in recent years. On the other hand, it is suggested here, certain developments in contemporary economics, associated particularly with the revival of interest in the Austrian paradigm, offer (...) afresh understanding of the way in which the rationality assumption, its role in economics properly understood, is able to meet these old?new attacks. (shrink)

It is often argued that cosmopolitanism faces unique motivational constraints, asking more of individuals than they are able to give. This ‘motivational problem’ is held to pose a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism, as it appears unable to transform its moral demands into motivated political action. This article develops a novel response to the motivational problem facing cosmopolitanism, arguing that self-interest, alongside appeals to sentiment, can play a vital and neglected, transitional role in moving towards an expanded cosmopolitical condition. (...) The article explicates the ‘motivational problem’, analyses the relationship between self-interest and sentimental cosmopolitanism in addressing it, and develops a series of claims that self-interest can be one important component in what we label as ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’. In doing so, we argue that self-interested motivations can be compatible with sentiment-based approaches, rendering them more plausible. In addition, two expected critiques of self-interested ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ are tackled: (A) That it cannot address feasibility constraints, and (B) That self-interested motivations cannot meet what an ‘authentic’ cosmopolitanism entails. We refute and challenge these critiques and outline three conditions in which self-interest can advance a transitional form of cosmopolitanism, while also being compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large. (shrink)

IN THIS ESSAY I ENGAGE THE DEBATE AMONG THEOLOGIANS, PHILOSOphers, and economists on the proper role of self-interest in the pursuit of economic well-being. Often, neither economists' use of self-interest nor critics' rejection of it is carefully specified. I consider conditions under which acting in one's self-interest is theologically and morally proper. Specifically, I argue that for socioeconomically disadvantaged persons, increased exercise of self-interest should not be regarded as sinful but as a (...) fitting expansion of agency and well-being. Contextual factors of distribution and the quality of social relations must inform any analysis of self-interest. I introduce a theological perspective on self-interest within an egalitarian Christian framework and suggest ways in which this approach enables further theological and ethical reflection on the proper role of self-interest. (shrink)

Foundations of Economic Personalism is a series of three book-length monographs, each closely examining a significant dimension of the Center for Economic Personalism's unique synthesis of Christian personalism and free-economic market theory. In the aftermath of the momentous geo-political and economic changes of the late 1980s, a small group of Christian social ethicists began to converse with free-market economists over the morality of market activity. This interdisciplinary exchange eventually led to the founding of a new academic subdiscipline under the rubric (...) of economic personalism. These scholars attempt to integrate economic theory, history, and methodology with Christian personalism's stress upon human dignity, humane social structures, and social justice. This volume presents the methodological and theoretical foundations for economic personalism through a detailed investigation of human action from two different, yet complementary perspectives: from the personalist perspective of Karol Wojtyla in the Acting Person , and the free-market perspective of Ludwig von Mises in Human Action . By comparing and contrasting the viewpoints of Wojtyla and Mises, the authors develop a comprehensive praxeology capable of analyzing human action from moral and economic perspectives. Beyond Self-Interest illustrates how a unified praxeology could encourage more sustained analysis of the moral dimensions of economic activity while simultaneously softening the utilitarian prejudice of contemporary economic analysis. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of the conflict between morality and self-interest typically proceed on the assumption that we have a relatively unproblematic understanding of self-interest. That assumption can be challenged by asking how to relate acts of self-interest and acts of integrity. I argue that when we are talking about motivations, it is better to keep the motivation of self-interest distinct from the motivation of integrity. But the term “self-interest” can also be (...) used to refer to an end, and acts of integrity may sometimes serve the end of self-interest. Against an identity-independent conception of interests (which gives to acts of integrity a possible instrumental value in achieving some interests), I argue in favor of an identity-dependent conception of interests that makes interests relative to the evaluative perspective of someone with a particular identity that acts of integrity help to preserve. (shrink)

There is a well-worn image and phrase for libertarianism: "atomized individualism." This hobgoblin has spread so thoroughly that even some libertarians think their philosophy unreservedly supports private persons, whatever the situation, whatever their behavior. Smith's Self-Interest and Social Order in Classical Liberalism, corrects this misrepresentation with careful intellectual surveys of Hume, Smith, Hobbes, Butler, Mandeville, and Hutcheson and their respective contributions to political philosophy.

ABSTRACT Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics showed that the public, politicians, and bureaucrats are often public spirited. But this does not invalidate public-choice theory. Public-choice theory is an ideal type, not a claim that self-interest explains all political behavior. Instead, public-choice theory is useful in creating rules and institutions that guard against the worst case, which would be universal self-interestedness in politics. In contrast, the public-interest hypothesis is neither a comprehensive explanation (...) of political behavior nor a sound basis for institutional design. (shrink)

The number and scale of business associations focused on corporate responsibility and sustainability has grown dramatically in recent decades and they are becoming influential actors in both national and international governance. Yet surprisingly little research exists on such organizations and recognition of the organizational lineage they share with special interest groups is yet to be examined—are industry business associations merely lobbies for their members’ own interests or are they viable self-regulatory institutions capable of addressing contemporary social and sustainability (...) issues? This paper identifies and reviews fragmented insights from literatures that address this question. Drawing on various streams of research within the political science, economics and management disciplines that provide diverse lenses on the phenomenon of business associations, it juxtaposes and groups them into two broad perspectives: business associations as special interest groups that are detrimental to society ; business associations as self-regulatory institutions capable of addressing contemporary challenges. (shrink)