Results for 'subjective Bayesianism'

968 found
Order:
  1.  26
    (1 other version)Standard Subjective Bayesianism Is Either Inconsistent or a Way to Housetrain Relativism.Helge Malmgren - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Almäng Jan & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--385.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.
    Subjective Bayesianism is a major school of uncertain reasoning and statistical inference. It is often criticized for a lack of objectivity: it opens the door to the influence of values and biases, evidence judgments can vary substantially between scientists, it is not suited for informing policy decisions. My paper rebuts these concerns by connecting the debates on scientific objectivity and statistical method. First, I show that the above concerns arise equally for standard frequentist inference with null hypothesis significance (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  3. The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.
    This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  4. The development of subjective Bayesianism.James M. Joyce - 2004 - In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori, Handbook of the history of logic. Boston: Elsevier. pp. 10--415.
    Though not monolithic, Bayesianism offers a powerful and compelling set of methods for drawing inductive inferences. Its unifying ideas are (a) Pascal’s recognition that uncertainty is best expressed probabilistically and that values of unknown quantities are best estimated using the principle of mathematical expectation, and (b) Bayes’s insight that learning and inductive inference can be fruitfully modeled using conditional probabilities and Bayes’s theorem. The two central challenges for Bayesianism are the problem of the priors, and the development of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  5.  31
    On the principal principle and imprecise subjective Bayesianism: A reply to Christian Wallmann and Jon Williamson.Marc Fischer - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-10.
    Whilst Bayesian epistemology is widely regarded nowadays as our best theory of knowledge, there are still a relatively large number of incompatible and competing approaches falling under that umbrella. Very recently, Wallmann and Williamson wrote an interesting article that aims at showing that a subjective Bayesian who accepts the principal principle and uses a known physical chance as her degree of belief for an event A could end up having incoherent or very implausible beliefs if she subjectively chooses the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  97
    Bayesianism, Analogy, and Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion.Sally Ferguson - 2002 - Hume Studies 28 (1):113-130.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 28, Number 1, April 2002, pp. 113-130 Bayesianism, Analogy, and Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion SALLY FERGUSON Introduction Analyses of the argument from design in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion have generally treated that argument as an example of reasoning by analogy.1 In this paper I examine whether it is in accord with Hume's thinking about the argument to subsume the version of it given (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Bayesianism.James M. Joyce - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling, The Oxford handbook of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 132--155.
    Bayesianism claims to provide a unified theory of epistemic and practical rationality based on the principle of mathematical expectation. In its epistemic guise it requires believers to obey the laws of probability. In its practical guise it asks agents to maximize their subjective expected utility. Joyce’s primary concern is Bayesian epistemology, and its five pillars: people have beliefs and conditional beliefs that come in varying gradations of strength; a person believes a proposition strongly to the extent that she (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  8.  24
    Bayesianism and the Idea of Scientific Rationality.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):33-43.
    Bayesianism has been dubbed as the most adequate and successful theory of scientific rationality. Its success mainly lies in its ability to combine two mutually exclusive elements involved in the process of theory-selection in science, viz.: the subjective and objective elements. My aim in this paper is to explain and evaluate Bayesianism’s account of scientific rationality by contrasting it with two other accounts.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):67-85.
    Objective Bayesianism has been criticised on the grounds that objective Bayesian updating, which on a finite outcome space appeals to the maximum entropy principle, differs from Bayesian conditionalisation. The main task of this paper is to show that this objection backfires: the difference between the two forms of updating reflects negatively on Bayesian conditionalisation rather than on objective Bayesian updating. The paper also reviews some existing criticisms and justifications of conditionalisation, arguing in particular that the diachronic Dutch book justification (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  10. Bayesianism, convergence and social epistemology.Michael J. Shaffer - 2008 - Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219.
    Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11.  77
    From bayesianism to the epistemic view of mathematics: Richard Jeffrey. Subjective probability: The real thing. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2004. Isbn 0-521-82971-2 , 0-521-53668-5 . Pp. XVI + 124. [REVIEW]J. Williamson - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3):365-369.
  12.  71
    Quantum Bayesianism Assessed.John Earman - unknown - The Monist 102 (4):403-423.
    The idea that the quantum probabilities are best construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum Bayesianism. The present paper aims to identify the prospects and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim that QBism provides a resolution of some of the long-standing foundations issues in quantum mechanics, including the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13.  10
    (1 other version)Bayesianism.Armin Schulz - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo, Key Terms in Logic. Continuum Press. pp. 27.
    Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Objective Bayesianism and the maximum entropy principle.Jürgen Landes & Jon Williamson - 2013 - Entropy 15 (9):3528-3591.
    Objective Bayesian epistemology invokes three norms: the strengths of our beliefs should be probabilities, they should be calibrated to our evidence of physical probabilities, and they should otherwise equivocate sufficiently between the basic propositions that we can express. The three norms are sometimes explicated by appealing to the maximum entropy principle, which says that a belief function should be a probability function, from all those that are calibrated to evidence, that has maximum entropy. However, the three norms of objective (...) are usually justified in different ways. In this paper we show that the three norms can all be subsumed under a single justification in terms of minimising worst-case expected loss. This, in turn, is equivalent to maximising a generalised notion of entropy. We suggest that requiring language invariance, in addition to minimising worst-case expected loss, motivates maximisation of standard entropy as opposed to maximisation of other instances of generalised entropy. Our argument also provides a qualified justification for updating degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalisation. However, conditional probabilities play a less central part in the objective Bayesian account than they do under the subjective view of Bayesianism, leading to a reduced role for Bayes’ Theorem. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  15. Bayesianism and reliable scientific inquiry.Cory Juhl - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
    The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianism is "inductively incomplete" for such agents. Finally a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  16. Quantum bayesianism: A study.Christopher Gordon Timpson - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (3):579-609.
    The Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented. Its conjunction of realism about physics along with anti-realism about much of the structure of quantum theory is elaborated; and the position defended from common objections: that it is solipsist; that it is too instrumentalist; that it cannot deal with Wigner's friend scenarios. Three more substantive problems are raised: Can a reasonable ontology be found for the approach? Can it account for explanation in quantum theory? Are (...) probabilities on their own adequate in the quantum domain? The first question is answered in the affirmative, drawing on elements from Nancy Cartwright's philosophy of science. The second two are not: it is argued that these present outstanding difficulties for the project. A quantum Bayesian version of Moore's paradox is developed to illustrate difficulties with the subjectivist account of pure state assignments. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  17.  90
    Bayesianism, Quo Vadis? —Critical Notice: David Corfield and Jon Williamson , Foundations of BayesianismDavid Corfield and Jon Williamson , Foundations of Bayesianism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 428 pp. $110.00. [REVIEW]Mathias Risse - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):225-231.
    This is a review essay about David Corfield and Jon Williamson's anthology Foundations of Bayesianism. Taken together, the fifteen essays assembled in the book assess the state of the art in Bayesianism. Such an assessment is timely, because decision theory and formal epistemology have become disciplines that are no longer taught on a routine basis in good philosophy departments. Thus we need to ask: Quo vadis, Bayesianism? The subjects of the articles include Bayesian group decision theory, approaches (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  17
    Bayesianism.Jon Williamson & Federica Russo - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo, Key Terms in Logic. Continuum Press. pp. 27.
    Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  18
    Bayesianism.Armin Schulz - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & Federica Russo, Key Terms in Logic. Continuum Press.
    Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?Franz Huber - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
    Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesian confirmation (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  21.  79
    Jon Williamson. In Defence of Objective Bayesianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0-19-922800-3). Pp. vi + 185: Critical Studies/Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Christian Hennig - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (2):219-225.
    The foundations of probability deal with the problem of modelling reasoning in face of uncertainty by a mathematical calculus, usually the standard probability calculus .The three dominating schools in the foundations of probability interpret probabilities as limiting long-run frequencies conceived as an objective property of series of repeatable experiments , or rational betting rates for an individual to bet on the unknown outcome of experiments depending on the individual’s prior assessments updated by evidence , or rational betting rates to bet (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Accuracy and infinity: a dilemma for subjective Bayesians.Mikayla Kelley & Sven Neth - 2023 - Synthese 201 (12):1-14.
    We argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or reject the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn, The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.
    This chapter is a philosophical survey of some leading approaches in formal epistemology in the so-called ‘Bayesian’ tradition. According to them, a rational agent’s degrees of belief—credences—at a time are representable with probability functions. We also canvas various further putative ‘synchronic’ rationality norms on credences. We then consider ‘diachronic’ norms that are thought to constrain how credences should respond to evidence. We discuss some of the main lines of recent debate, and conclude with some prospects for future research.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Subjective probability and quantum certainty.Carlton M. Caves, Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):255-274.
    In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that probabilities (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  25. Options and the subjective ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.
    Options and the subjective ought Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-18 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9880-0 Authors Brian Hedden, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  26.  64
    What is probability and why does it matter.Zvonimir Šikić - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):21-43.
    The idea that probability is a degree of rational belief seemed too vague for a foundation of a mathematical theory. It was certainly not obvious that degrees of rational belief had to be governed by the probability axioms as used by Laplace and other prestatistical probabilityst. The axioms seemed arbitrary in their interpretation. To eliminate the arbitrariness, the stat- isticians of the early 20th century drastically restricted the possible applications of the probability theory, by insisting that probabilities had to be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  47
    The Limits of Subjectivism: On the Relation Between IBE and (Objective) Bayesianism.Alexandros Apostolidis & Stathis Psillos - 2023 - In Lorenzo Magnani, Handbook of Abductive Cognition. Springer. pp. 1897-1920.
    Many philosophers claimed that there might be fertile ground for collaboration between IBE and the objective end of the Bayesian methodology. Recent literature is investigated in this chapter, to highlight the latest developments about the possibility of such a collaboration. The merits of the convergence of the two methods are presented. It is argued that arriving on this end is not an easy goal as there are four ways by which subjective considerations may overshadow the objective picture. The existence (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. (1 other version)Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent?Lefteris Farmakis - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (2):163-173.
    Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs's approach and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions.Julia Staffel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1467-1493.
    Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism cannot be followed by human agents, and hence have no normative force for beings like us. This problem is especially pressing since the standard framework of subjective Bayesianism only allows us to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  30. There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.
    The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  31.  34
    The Book of Evidence. [REVIEW]Stathis Psillos - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):740-743.
    Subjective Bayesianism is the current orthodoxy in confirmation theory. In broad outline, this view claims a) that confirmation is a relation of positive relevance, viz., that a piece of evidence confirms a theory if it increases its probability; b) that this relation of confirmation is captured by Bayes’s theorem; c) that, hence, the only factors relevant to confirmation of a theory are its prior probability, the likelihood of the evidence given the theory and the probability of the evidence; (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  84
    Implications of the Dutch Book: Following Ramsey’s axioms.Wei Xiong - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344.
    The Dutch Book Argument shows that an agent will lose surely in a gamble (a Dutch Book is made) if his degrees of belief do not satisfy the laws of the probability. Yet a question arises here: What does the Dutch Book imply? This paper firstly argues that there exists a utility function following Ramsey’s axioms. And then, it explicates the properties of the utility function and degree of belief respectively. The properties show that coherence in partial beliefs for (...) Bayesianism means that the degree of belief, representing a belief ordering, satisfies the laws of probability, and that coherence in preferences means that the preferences are represented by expected utilities. A coherent belief ordering and a utility scale induce a coherent preference ordering; a coherent preference ordering induces a coherent belief ordering which can be uniquely represented by a degree-of-belief function. The preferences (values) and beliefs are both incoherent or disordered if a Dutch Book is made. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  42
    The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson, Christian Wallmann, Jürgen Landes & James Hawthorne - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):123-131.
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  34. Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscript
    In response to two trenchant objections, radical subjective Bayesianism has been widely rejected. In this paper, I seek, if not to rehabilitate subjectivism, at least to show its critic what is attractive about the position. I argue that what is at stake in the subjectivism/anti-subjectivism debate is not, as is commonly thought, which norms of rationality are true, but rather, the conception of rationality that we adopt: there is an alternative approach to the widespread telic approach to rationality, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.
    In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  36. Scotching Dutch Books?Alan Hájek - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.
    The Dutch Book argument, like Route 66, is about to turn 80. It is arguably the most celebrated argument for subjective Bayesianism. Start by rejecting the Cartesian idea that doxastic attitudes are ‘all-or-nothing’; rather, they are far more nuanced degrees of belief, for short credences, susceptible to fine-grained numerical measurement. Add a coherentist assumption that the rationality of a doxastic state consists in its internal consistency. The remaining problem is to determine what consistency of credences amounts to. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  37. The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030.
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  38. Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  39.  12
    Reasonable doubt and reasonable priors.Yuval Abrams - forthcoming - Episteme.
    What is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) for a Bayesian? Is thinking of BARD in terms of probabilities a nonstarter? I propose an account of BARD compatible with Subjective Bayesianism that rejects the view that BARD is met by a threshold probability. BARD is a judgment, not merely about the credal state the factfinder endorses as her own (i.e. not merely as one’s own credence in guilt), but as about alternative possible credences, specifically those the factfinder does (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  88
    The Ambiguity Dilemma for Imprecise Bayesians.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    How should we make decisions when we do not know the relevant physical probabilities? In these ambiguous situations, we cannot use our knowledge to determine expected utilities or payoffs. The traditional Bayesian answer is that we should create a probability distribution using some mix of subjective intuition and objective constraints. Imprecise Bayesians argue that this approach is inadequate for modelling ambiguity. Instead, they represent doxastic states using credal sets. Generally, insofar as we are more uncertain about the physical probability (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Reid's defense of common sense.P. D. Magnus - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-14.
    Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. How Uncertain Do We Need to Be?Jon Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1249-1271.
    Expert probability forecasts can be useful for decision making . But levels of uncertainty escalate: however the forecaster expresses the uncertainty that attaches to a forecast, there are good reasons for her to express a further level of uncertainty, in the shape of either imprecision or higher order uncertainty . Bayesian epistemology provides the means to halt this escalator, by tying expressions of uncertainty to the propositions expressible in an agent’s language . But Bayesian epistemology comes in three main varieties. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43.  97
    Why I am not a QBist.Louis Marchildon - 2015 - Foundations of Physics 45 (7):754-761.
    Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, is a recent development of the epistemic view of quantum states, according to which the state vector represents knowledge about a quantum system, rather than the true state of the system. QBism explicitly adopts the subjective view of probability, wherein probability assignments express an agent’s personal degrees of belief about an event. QBists claim that most if not all conceptual problems of quantum mechanics vanish if we simply take a proper epistemic and probabilistic perspective. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44.  45
    Underconsideration in Space-time and Particle Physics.J. Brian Pitts - unknown
    The idea that a serious threat to scientific realism comes from unconceived alternatives has been proposed by van Fraassen, Sklar, Stanford and Wray among others. Peter Lipton's critique of this threat from underconsideration is examined briefly in terms of its logic and its applicability to the case of space-time and particle physics. The example of space-time and particle physics indicates a generic heuristic for quantitative sciences for constructing potentially serious cases of underdetermination, involving one-parameter family of rivals T_m that work (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45.  42
    (1 other version)Goals and the Informativeness of Prior Probabilities.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2017 - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    I argue that information is a goal-relative concept for Bayesians. More precisely, I argue that how much information is provided by a piece of evidence depends on whether the goal is to learn the truth or to rank actions by their expected utility, and that different confirmation measures should therefore be used in different contexts. I then show how information measures may reasonably be derived from confirmation measures, and I show how to derive goal-relative non-informative and informative priors given background (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  7
    Evidential Probability.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - In Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
    The chapter bases a theory of evidential probability on the equation of knowledge with evidence. It is a form of objective rather than subjective Bayesianism. Updating on new evidence is structured in a way that allows propositions to lose as well as gain probability. The account is integrated with possible worlds models of epistemic logic. Since one does not always know what one knows, the accessibility relation is not an equivalence relation, which has the effect that prior probability (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  96
    Mathematics, Science, and Confirmation Theory.Christopher Pincock - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):959-970.
    This paper begins by distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic contributions of mathematics to scientific representation. This leads to two investigations into how these different sorts of contributions relate to confirmation. I present a way of accommodating both contributions that complicates the traditional assumptions of confirmation theory. In particular, I argue that subjective Bayesianism does best accounting for extrinsic contributions, while objective Bayesianism is more promising for intrinsic contributions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. How to Undermine Underdetermination?Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, John G. Bennett & Megan D. Higgs - 2015 - Foundations of Science 20 (2):107-127.
    The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.
    ABSTRACTRational agents have consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  50. Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.
1 — 50 / 968