Results for 'synthetic necessary truth'

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  1. Synthetic Necessary Truths.H. W. Chapman - 1952 - Mind 61 (243):391 - 394.
  2. (1 other version)Synthetic necessary truth.David Pears - 1950 - Mind 59 (234):199-208.
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    Pears David. Synthetic necessary truth. Mind, n. s. vol. 59 , pp. 199–208.Charles A. Baylis - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):220-221.
  4.  78
    Knowing and Understanding Relations Between Meaning and Truth, Meaning and Necessary Truth, Meaning and Synthetic Necessary Truth.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    The aim of the thesis is to show that there are some synthetic necessary truths, or that synthetic apriori knowledge is possible. This is really a pretext for an investigation into the general connection between meaning and truth, or between understanding and knowing, which, as pointed out in the preface, is really the first stage in a more general enquiry concerning meaning. After the preliminaries, in which the problem is stated and some methodological remarks made, the (...)
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  5. (1 other version)A defence of `synthetic necessary truth'.Stephen Toulmin - 1949 - Mind 58 (230):164-177.
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  6.  38
    Toulmin Stephen. A defence of ‘synthetic necessary truth.’ Mind, n.s. vol. 58 , pp. 164–177.Charles A. Baylis - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):148-149.
  7.  15
    Necessary Truth: A Book of Readings. [REVIEW]A. R. E. - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (2):352-352.
    The average, general readings in philosophy anthology have five to seven readings on necessary truth. This volume has fourteen. The old workhorses are here: Kant on synthetic and analytic propositions, Mill on necessary truths, Ayer on the a priori, Quine, Grice, and Strawson on dogmas of empiricism. In addition, Pap has two items, one in the middle of an exchange with Putnam over reds, greens, and the synthetic a priori. There is a tough logical analysis (...)
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  8. A new problem for the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth.Gillian Russell - 2010 - In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 267--281.
    My target in this paper is a view that has sometimes been called the ‘ Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth ’ and sometimes ‘Conventionalism about Necessity’. It is the view that necessity is grounded in the meanings of our expressions—meanings which are sometimes identified with the conventions governing those expressions—and that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowledge of those meanings or conventions. In its simplest form the view states that a truth, if it (...)
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  9.  64
    Hume and Necessary Truth.W. A. Suchting - 1966 - Dialogue 5 (1):47-60.
    There is a widespread belief, more often implied than explicitly asserted, that Hume considered all necessary propositions to be analytic.Of course Hume did not use the analytic-synthetic distinction explicitly. This only come to the forefront with Kant; and it is Kant who is probably the main source of the above-mentioned belief. Kant ascribed to Hume the view that mathematical propositions are, in his terminology, analytic. If this is correct, then since mathematics was for Hume the paradigm of a (...)
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  10.  64
    Are the Notions 'A Priori Truth' and 'Necessary Truth' Extensionally Equivalent?Edward Erwin - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):591 - 602.
    There is a widely held view that the expressions ‘necessary truth’, ‘a priori truth’ and ‘analytic truth’ either express the same concept or, at least, refer to all and only the same items. Philosophers who hold this view, and who are sometimes described as ‘empiricists’, often draw the conclusion that the truths of logic and mathematics, if necessary, are also a priori and are, in some important sense, empty or not about the world. The subject (...)
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  11.  85
    (1 other version)On Husserl’s Approach to Necessary Truth.Chauncey Downes - 1965 - The Monist 49 (1):87-106.
    The aim of this paper is to investigate some aspects of what Husserl means by “Apriori” in the light of recent considerations concerning the nature of necessary truth. I shall first discuss some of the results of the dispute between Carnap and Quine about analytic sentences. These results bring to the fore linguistic aspects of the problem of necessary truth. It can be shown, I believe, that Husserl’s position is substantially in accord with the basic agreements (...)
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  12.  17
    DPhil Thesis Knowing and Understanding.Aaron Sloman - 1962 - Dissertation, Oxford
    The aim of the thesis is to show that there are some synthetic necessary truths, or that synthetic apriori knowledge is possible. This is really a pretext for an investigation into the general connection between meaning and truth, or between understanding and knowing, which, as pointed out in the preface, is really the first stage in a more general enquiry concerning meaning. (Not all kinds of meaning are concerned with truth.) After the preliminaries (chapter one), (...)
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  13.  40
    Synthetic A Priori Truths In An Artificial Language.R. I. Sikora - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 7:443-460.
    I try to show that there is much sap (synthetic a priori) knowledge although one may not find many, or even any, sap true statements in most natural languages. Reasons are given for the difficulty of expressing sap truths in natural languages, but it is argued that these are not necessary features of language as such. There are, then, sap true statements in some possible languages.Admission of the sap gives one a way of distinguishing logical from metaphysical possiblity. (...)
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  14. Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 231-248.
    This article focuses on the distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, and between a priori truths and a posteriori truths in philosophy, beginning with a brief historical survey of work on the two distinctions, their relationship to each other, and to the necessary/contingent distinction. Four important stops in the history are considered: two involving Kant and W. V. O. Quine, and two relating to logical positivism and semantic externalism. The article then examines questions that have been raised (...)
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  15. Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2016 - Madison, WI, USA: Philosophypedia.
    W.V.O. tried to prove that no statement is necessarily true. In this work, Quine's argument is stated, analyzed, and shown to be a broken argument for a false conclusion. It is shown that necessary truths are as important as empirical truths to the empirical sciences, the reason being that, without necessary truths, there is no way to organize or interpret data. It comes to light that, in addition to being false, every form of extreme empiricism (e.g. Dewey's pragmatism, (...)
     
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  16.  74
    Empiricism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. [REVIEW]G. H. B. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):151-152.
    Munsat’s objective in collecting eleven selections on the analytic-synthetic distinction is to acquaint the beginning or intermediate student with the major aspects of the issue. The selections are presented in historical sequence and Munsat has effectively edited the works such that one can easily follow the development of the distinction without having to contend with excessive peripheral material. The editor provides a short introduction to the varieties of truth as well as prefatory notes to each selection. Beginning with (...)
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  17.  10
    The analytic-synthetic distinction.Stanley Munsat - 1971 - Belmont, Calif.,: Wadsworth Pub. Co..
    First truths, by G.W. von Leibniz.--Necessary and contingent truths, by G.W. Leibniz.--Of proposition, by T. Hobbes.--Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by I. Kant.--Kant, by A. Pap.--Of demonstration, and necessary truths, by J.S. Mill.--Views of some writers on the nature of arithmetical propositions, by G. Frege.--What is an empirical science, by B. Russell.--Two dogmas of empiricism, by W.V.O. Quine.--The meaning of a word, by J. Austin.--In defense of a dogma, by H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson.
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  18. Kant and the foundations of analytic philosophy.Robert Hanna - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the connections between them. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defense of Kant's theory of (...)
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  19. A Revolution in Method, Kant's “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws.Martha I. Gibson - 2011 - Kant Studien 102 (1):1-21.
    In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object's relation to our (...)
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  20.  77
    Two Notions Contrasted: 'Logical Geography' and 'Logical Topography' Variations on a theme by Gilbert Ryle: The logical topography of 'Logical Geography'.Aaron Sloman - unknown
    This paper distinguishes two versions of Ryle's notion of 'logical geography'. Logical geography: The network of relationships between current uses of a collection of concepts. (Probably what Ryle meant by the term.) Logical topography Features of the portion of reality, or types of portions of reality, related to a given set of concepts, where the reality may be capable of being divided up in different ways using different networks of relationships between concepts. -/- Studying/analysing logical topography includes evaluating the alternative (...)
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  21.  59
    Lessons from the logic of demonstratives: what indexicality teaches us about logic and vice versa.G. Russell - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New waves in philosophical logic. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper looks at what David Kaplan's work on indexicals can teach us about logic and the philosophy of logic, and also what Kaplan's logic (i.e. the Logic of Demonstratives) can teach us about indexicals. The lessons are i) that logical consequence is not necessary truth-preservation, ii) that that the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth (also called conventionalism about modality) fails, and iii) that there is a kind of barrier to entailment between non-context-sensitive and context-sensitive claims.
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  22. Passive Knowledge: How to Make Sense of Kant's A Priori - Or How Not to Be “Too Busily Subsuming”.Antonopoulos Constantin - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):39.
    Subjectivists, taking the “collapse” of the observation-interpretation contrast much too seriously, are led to imagine that even perceptual knowledge is active. And therefore subject dependent. Turning the tables on this popular trend, I argue that even conceptual knowledge is passive. Kant’s epistemology is conceptual. But if also active, then incoherent. If synthetic a priori truths are to follow upon our mental activity, they were neither true nor, far less, a priori before that activity. “A priori” and “active” are contradictory (...)
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  23. Meaning without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning without Analyticity).H. G. Callaway - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it (...)
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  24. A Myth about Logical Necessity.J. Bennett - 1961 - Analysis 21 (3):59-63.
    In these few pages I shall try to demonstrate the emptiness of the most cumbersome piece of unexamined intellectual baggage at present being hauled about by English philosophers. I here cite one example to be going on with, at the end of the paper I shall give a handful more, and it would be easy to multiply the number by ten from the writings of reputable philosophers. The outstanding philosophical achievement of the ha1f-century which has just drawn to a close (...)
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  25. Kant's Philosophy of Geometry.William Mark Goodwin - 2003 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    In my dissertation, I argue that contemporary interpretive work on Kant's philosophy of geometry has failed to understand properly the diagrammatic aspects of Euclidean reasoning. Attention to these aspects is amply repaid, not only because it provides substantial insight into the role of intuition in Kant's philosophy of mathematics, but also because it brings out both the force and the limitations of Kant's philosophical account of geometry. ;Kant characterizes the predecessors with which he was engaged as agreeing that mathematical judgments (...)
     
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  26. Moral Properties: Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals.James Carl Klagge - 1983 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    I formulate and defend a realist theory of the truth of moral judgements according to which moral properties are synthetically but necessarily determined by natural properties of people, actions, or states of affairs. This view can be found in Moore's later ethical writings. The view reconciles two apparently conflicting intuitions: Moral properties supervene upon natural properties, but judgements about moral properties are generally not entailed by any judgements about natural properties. The view is realist in the sense that moral (...)
     
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  27.  1
    Waismann: From Wittgenstein's Tafelrunde to His Writings on Analyticity.Gregory Lavers - 2019 - In Dejan Makovec & Stewart Shapiro (eds.), Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 131--158.
    Gregory Lavers gives us a timeline of Waismann’s career, an overview of Waismann’s most significant publications in this later period and a detailed walkthrough from the first to the last paper of Waismann’s series on analyticity, “Analytic - Synthetic”. Lavers closes his paper with comparisons of Waismann and Quine as well as Waismann and Carnap. Both Waismann and Quine argue that the concept of analyticity is vague and both reject reductionism. However, behind these superficial similarities we find fundamentally different (...)
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  28. Analyticity again.Ernest Lepore - manuscript
    It would be ever so nice if there were a viable analytic/synthetic distinction. Though nobody knows for sure, there would seem to be several major philosophical projects that having one would advance. For example: analytic sentences2 are supposed to have their truth values solely in virtue of the meanings (together with the syntactic arrangement) of their constituents; i.e., their truth values are supposed to supervene on their linguistic properties alone.3 So they are true in every possible world (...)
     
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  29. A Defense of Internal Realism: Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes.Gabor Forrai - 1993 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    The purpose of the dissertation is to defend and elaborate on internal realism, a doctrine first put forward by Hilary Putnam. Chapter 1 surveys the current philosophical conceptions of truth and reference, a necessary background for the ensuing discussion. Chapter 2 explains the metaphysical realism vs. internal realism controversy. Internal realism is construed as consisting of three theses: the ontological mind-dependence of the world, verificationism about truth , and conceptual relativism . Chapter 3 offers an internal realist (...)
     
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  30. What a maker’s knowledge could be.Luciano Floridi - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):465-481.
    Three classic distinctions specify that truths can be necessary versus contingent,analytic versus synthetic, and a priori versus a posteriori. The philosopher reading this article knows very well both how useful and ordinary such distinctions are in our conceptual work and that they have been subject to many and detailed debates, especially the last two. In the following pages, I do not wish to discuss how far they may be tenable. I shall assume that, if they are reasonable and (...)
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  31.  4
    Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.Arturs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3).
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing (...)
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  32. Necessary truth and a priori truth.David Bostock - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):343-379.
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  33.  15
    Necessary truth.R. C. Sleigh (ed.) - 1972 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
    pt. 1. De dicto: Necessary and contingent truths, by G. W. Leibniz. New essays concerning human understanding, by G. W. Leibniz. Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant. On the nature of mathematical truth, C. G. Hempel. Two dogmas of empiricism, by W. V. O. Quine. In defense of a dogma, by H. P. Grace and P. F. Strawson. The a priori and the analytic, by A. Quinton. The truths of reason, by R. Chisholm.--pt. 2. (...)
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  34.  8
    A Priori Knowledge and Analytic Truth.Albert Casullo - 2003 - In A Priori Justification. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
    This chapter addresses two questions: Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Is the analytic/synthetic distinction cogent? The epistemic significance of the first derives from the assumption that synthetic a priori knowledge raises difficult explanatory problems that are circumvented by analytic a priori knowledge. The epistemic significance of the second derives from the assumption that if the analytic/synthetic distinction is not cogent, then the cogency of the a priori/a posteriori distinction is also doubtful. It is argued that (...)
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  35.  12
    On Knowledge: Proposing a Knowing-Understanding Dialectic in the Context of Finding More Cohesive Epistemic Approaches of Truth.Iustin Floroiu - 2024 - Open Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):556-569.
    Given the high advances done in the scientific field, especially with regard to the quantum fields of study, the epistemic approach to doing science changed drastically. Thus, it is reasonable and necessary to create a model of thought for explaining possible solutions. Such a solution can be understood through the implementation of a new dialectic method that is promising to a descriptive approach to how knowledge is processed and handled cognitively and what roles synthetic apriorisms and intuition play (...)
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  36. In Carnap’s Defense: A survey on the concept of a linguistic framework in Carnap’s philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning (...)
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  37.  82
    Necessary truth and proof.Stephen Read - 2010 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 51 (121):47-67.
    What makes necessary truths true? I argue that all truth supervenes on how things are, and that necessary truths are no exception. What makes them true are proofs. But if so, the notion of proof needs to be generalized to include verification-transcendent proofs, proofs whose correctness exceeds our ability to verify it. It is incumbent on me, therefore, to show that arguments, such as Dummett's, that verification- truth is not compatible with the theory of meaning, are (...)
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  38. Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that (...)
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  39. From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence.Joshua Rasmussen - 2013 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):19-30.
    I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing propositions. The crux of the argument marks out a pathway to the conclusion that necessary truths cannot themselves be necessarily true unless they necessarily exist. I motivate the steps in the argument and then address several standard objections, including one that makes use of the distinction between ‘truth in’ and ‘truth at’. The purpose of the argument is to generate deeper insights into the nature of propositions and (...)
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  40. Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.Arturs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):302-307.
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing (...)
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  41. Necessary truths.Alex Byrne - unknown
    analytic tradition, from its early 20th-century roots in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell through Saul Kripke’s pioneering advances in..
     
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  42. Necessary Truth a Book of Readings.L. W. Sumner & John Hayden Woods - 1969 - Random House.
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  43.  71
    Necessary truth.H. G. Alexander - 1957 - Mind 66 (264):507-521.
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  44. Necessary Truths and Perception: William James on the Structure of Experience.J. M. Edice - 1969 - In James M. Edie (ed.), New essays in phenomenology. Chicago,: Quadrangle Books. pp. 233--255.
     
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  45.  16
    (2 other versions)Are Necessary Truths True by Convention?Karl Britton, J. O. Urmson & W. Kneale - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):201-202.
  46.  35
    Necessary Truths and Postulational Method.Stephen O. Mitchell - 1959 - Modern Schoolman 37 (1):49-52.
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    Necessary Truths and St. Thomas Aquinas’ Definition of ‘Law’.Shane D. Drefcinski - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 37 (2):601-617.
    What is the nature of law? The question that St. Thomas Aquinas answers in Summa Theologica I-II continues to be a crucial question in contemporary philosophy of law. Various scholars of jurisprudence attempt to identify the necessary features of law. Yet they struggle with the question, what kind of necessity is involved? Is it conceptual necessity? Metaphysical necessity? In this paper, I explore an alternative way of distinguishing different kinds of necessity that is found in Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s (...)
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  48.  15
    Mechanism Models as Necessary Truths.Ingvar Johansson - 2019 - In Michael Robert Matthews (ed.), Mario Bunge: A Centenary Festschrift. Springer. pp. 241-262.
    The paper argues that there is a fruitful analogy to be made between classic pre-analytic Euclidean geometry and a certain kind of mechanism models, called ideal mechanisms. Both supply necessary truths. Bunge is of the opinion that pure mathematics is about fictions, but that mathematics nonetheless is useful in science and technology because we can go “to reality through fictions.” Similarly, the paper claims that ideal mechanisms are useful because we can go to real mechanisms through the fictions of (...)
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  49.  3
    Knowing Necessary Truths.Manuel Rebuschi - unknown
    How account for the intuitive difference between simply knowing a necessary proposition, and knowing that it is a necessary truth? In the paper it will be shown that two-dimensional semantics does not do the job in an adequate way. A solution is provided which is based on Hintikka's worldlines. Assuming a slight extension of the syntax, modal epistemic logic can thus deal with classical puzzles like knowledge of identities.
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  50. Necessary Truth.W. V. Quine - 1966 - In . pp. 48-56.
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