What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the book amply demonstrates why Williams was one (...) of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Spanning his career from his first publication to one of his last lectures, the book's previously unpublished or uncollected essays address metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, as well as the scope and limits of philosophy itself. The essays are unified by Williams's constant concern that philosophy maintain contact with the human problems that animate it in the first place. As the book's editor, A. W. Moore, writes in his introduction, the title essay is "a kind of manifesto for Williams's conception of his own life's work." It is where he most directly asks "what philosophy can and cannot contribute to the project of making sense of things"--answering that what philosophy can best help make sense of is "being human." Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline is one of three posthumous books by Williams to be published by Princeton University Press. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument was published in the fall of 2005. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy is being published shortly after the present volume. (shrink)

In his What is Business Ethics? Peter Drucker accuses business ethics of singling out business unfairly for special ethical treatment, of subordinating ethical to political concerns, and of being, not ethics at all, but ethical chic. We contend that Drucker's denunciation of business ethics rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the field. This article is a response to his charges and an effort to clarify the nature, scope and purpose of business ethics.

This Element critically surveys the full range of G. E. Moore's ethical thought, including: his rejection of naturalism in favor of the view that 'good' designates a simple, indefinable property, which cannot be identified with or reduced to any other property; his understanding of intrinsic value, his doctrine of organic wholes, his repudiation of hedonism, and his substantive account of the most important goods and evils; and his critique of egoism and subjectivism and his elaboration of a non-hedonistic (...) variant of utilitarianism that, among other things, creatively blends aspects of act- and rule-oriented versions of that theory. (shrink)

Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges (...) to Audi's intuitionism. It becomes harder to argue that there are any self-evident propositions at all, or more than just a few such propositions. It is questionable whether all moral propositions that we take an interest in are evidentially connected to self-evident propositions. It is difficult to understand what could guide the sort conceptual revision that is likely to take place in our moral theorising. It is hard to account for the epistemic value of the sort of systematicity usually praised in moral theorising. Finally, it is difficult to see what difference the truth of Audi's ethical intuitionism would make to the way in which we (fail to) handle moral disagreement. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, that's (...) because accepting this conception of our evidential grounds is tantamount to accepting the skeptic's conclusion. We have nothing to fear from arguments for skepticism from skepticism. (shrink)

First published in 1903, this volume revolutionized philosophy and forever altered the direction of ethical studies. A philosopher’s philosopher, G. E. Moore was the idol of the Bloomsbury group, and Lytton Strachey declared that Principia Ethica marked the rebirth of the Age of Reason. This work clarifies some of moral philosophy’s most common confusions and redefines the science’s terminology. Six chapters explore: the subject matter of ethics, naturalistic ethics, hedonism, metaphysical ethics, ethics in relation to conduct, and the ideal. (...) Moore's simplicity of style and precise use of everyday language exercised an enormous influence on the development of analytic philosophy, and they contribute to the continuing resonance of his compelling arguments. (shrink)

This 2001 book is a comprehensive study of the ethics of G. E. Moore, the most important English-speaking ethicist of the twentieth century. Moore's ethical project, set out in his seminal text Principia Ethica, is to preserve common moral insight from scepticism and, in effect, persuade his readers to accept the objective character of goodness. Brian Hutchinson explores Moore's arguments in detail and in the process relates the ethical thought to Moore's anti-sceptical epistemology. Moore was, (...) without perhaps fully realizing it, sceptical about the very enterprise of philosophy itself, and in this regard, as Brian Hutchinson reveals, was much closer in his thinking to Wittgenstein than has been previously realized. This book shows Moore's ethical work to be much richer and more sophisticated than his critics have acknowledged. (shrink)

G. E. Moore was a central figure in twentieth-century philosophy. Along with Russell and Wittgenstein, he pioneered analytic philosophy, and his Principia Ethica shaped the contours of twentieth-century ethics. Indeed, until the publication of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, no single book in moral philosophy was to equal Principia's influence. Unfortunately, however, Principia Ethica has so dominated critical discussions of Moore's work that even experts on his moral philosophy have tended to ignore his Ethics, which he published eight years (...) later. But Ethics is Moore's only other book on moral philosophy, and one of only a handful of post-Principia publications dealing with ethics. Its detailed discussions of utilitarianism, free will, and the objectivity of moral judgements find no real counterpart in Principia while its account of right and wrong and of the nature of intrinsic value deepen our understanding of his moral philosophy. The republication of Ethics thus rounds out our understanding of Moore's ethical thought. But the book's value goes beyond its historical or scholarly interest. A short but philosophically rich text, Ethics stands independent of Principia and repays careful study in its own right. By raising a number of fundamental questions in ethics, questions that remain live today, by proffering clear, credible, and often innovative answers to them, and by doing so with a philosophical skill that is still impressive, Moore's short book is a minor classic. Almost a century after its original publication, it still amply rewards those who read it.This new edition of Moore's Ethics includes his essay 'The Nature of Moral Philosophy' as well as editorial notes, an introduction, and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

This volume collects six of Michael Moore's influential studies on moral and legal objectivity. Presented in an accessible format, the essays are brought together by a thought-provoking introduction. Contents: Introduction ETHICS Moral reality Moral reality revisited Good without God LAW Law as justice The plain truth about legal truth Legal reality: a naturalist approach to legal ontology NAME INDEX.

I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections.

Ethical Intuitionism was the dominant moral theory in Britain for much of the 18th, 19th and the first third of the twentieth century. However, during the middle decades of the twentieth century ethical intuitionism came to be regarded as utterly untenable. It was thought to be either empty, or metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant, or both. This hostility led to a neglect of the central intuitionist texts, and encouraged the growth of a caricature of intuitionism that (...) could easily be rejected before moving on to 'more serious' philosophical theories. More recently, however, this hostility towards ethical intuitionism has subsided. A wide range of moral philosophers, from Aristotelians, to rule-consequentialists, to expressivists, Kantians and deontologists, are beginning to look to the ethical intuitionists's work as a positive resource. It is, therefore, a good time to get clear on what it was that intuitionists said, and re-evaluate their contribution to our understanding of morality. This volume is the first serious engagement with ethical intuitionism in the light of contemporary developments in ethical theory. It contains essays by eminent moral philosophers working in very different traditions whose aim is to clarify and assess ethical intuitionism. Issues addressed include whether the plurality of basic principles intuitionists adhere to can be grounded in some more fundamental principle; the autonomy of ethics and self-evidence; moral realism and internalism; and the open question argument and naturalism. (shrink)

This study uses the ATBEQ, as published by J.F. Preble and A. Reichel (1988) to measure attitudes towards ethical business attitudes held by final year South African Bachelor of Commerce students at Rhodes University. Three samples of students were assessed over three consecutive years of 1989, 1990 and 1991, and results are compared with samples (1988) of American and Israeli students and a sample (1991) of Western Australian students. A significant difference in attitudes was found to exist between the (...) Israeli and South African samples. A factor analysis of the questionnaire identified eleven factors of which seven are theoretically labelled. A revised version of the ATBEQ is suggested which excludes the poorly performing questions. (shrink)

We make decisions all day, don't we? Do I pick up the dog's poop when I take him for his walk? Should I tell Mom where I really went after school? When I see something wrong happening, what should I do? Making a good choice, doing the right thing, or even knowing right from wrong can be hard! In What Would You Do? ​you can practice making hard decisions and have some fun while we explore some everyday dilemmas!​.

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially (...) justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non-inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non-inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non- inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non- inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism’s core claim. (shrink)

The author begins with an outline of Bernard William's moral philosophy, within which he locates William's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defence of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgements and tensed judgements. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the re-adoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in (...) the one case, a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this. Footnotes1 This essay is derived from a lecture entitled ‘Bernard Williams’, delivered at Oxford University in 2000, in the series ‘Oxford Philosophers on Oxford Philosophers’, organized by Peter Hacker and David Wiggins. I am grateful to those who attended the lecture, and to Bernard Williams, for helpful comments. (shrink)

North .—What is the trouble about moral facts? When someone denies that there is an objective moral order, or asserts that ethical propositions are pseudo-propositions, cannot I refute him by saying: “You know very well that Brown did wrong in beating his wife. You know very well that you ought to keep promises. You know very well that human affection is good and cruelty bad, that many actions are wrong and some are right”? West .—Isn't the trouble about moral (...) facts another case of trouble about knowing, about learning? We find out facts about the external world by looking and listening; about ourselves, by feeling; about other people, by looking and listening and feeling. When this is noticed, there arises a wish to say that the facts are what is seen, what is heard, what is felt; and, consequently, that moral facts fall into one of these classes. So those who have denied that there are “objective moral characteristics” have not wanted to deny that Brown's action was wrong or that keeping promises is right. (shrink)

I begin with Kant's notion of a maxim and consider the role which this notion plays in Kant's formulations of the fundamental categorical imperative. This raises the question of what a maxim is, and why there is not the same requirement for resolutions of other kinds to be universalizable. Drawing on Bernard Williams' notion of a thick ethical concept, I proffer an answer to this question which is intended neither in a spirit of simple exegesis nor as a straightforward (...) exercise in moral philosophy but as something that is poised somewhere between the two. My aim is to provide a kind of rational reconstruction of Kant. In the final section of the essay, I argue that this reconstruction, while it manages to salvage something distinctively Kantian, also does justice to the relativism involved in what J. L. Mackie calls 'people's adherence to and participation in different ways of life'. (shrink)

New Zealand's health (and disability) ethics committees are children of public inquiries: the ‘Cartwright’ ministerial inquiry of 1988, the ‘Gisborne’ cervical screening ministerial inquiry of 2001, and the Health Select Committee clinical trials inquiry of 2011. The Cartwright inquiry strengthened external scrutiny of research. The Gisborne Inquiry strengthened ethics committee accountability and expertise, and greatly streamlined review process. The Health Select Committee inquiry is further sharpening accountability and process. Under-discussed systemic issues also persist, including: how to keep the ethical (...) primacy of the researcher-participant relationship and of researcher responsibility for good study conduct; whether the point of ethics committees is to facilitate good research as well as to protect participants; and whether ethics committees are just standard public bodies - to be given powers and limitations just like any other administrative tribunal or licensing board. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish whether the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics as applied to business organizations are meaningful in a non-western business context. It does so by building on research reported in Moore : 363–387, 2012) in which the application of virtue ethics to business organizations was investigated empirically in the UK, based on a conceptual framework drawn from MacIntyre’s work. Comparing these results with an equivalent study in Sri Lanka, the paper finds that the categories are meaningful but (...) that there are both similarities to and considerable differences in the content of these categories from the UK study. The paper draws on aspects of institutional theory to explore and explain these findings. Overall, there is supportive evidence that the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics are generalizable, and so can be used to characterize problems of organizational virtue and vice around the world, while providing evidence that there may be polities which are more conducive to the ‘practice-like conduct of production’ : 77–91, 2008). (shrink)

This book is one of the best on the history of ethics—and arguably, on ethical theory more generally—to appear in many years. Readers should consider whether either of these two statements is even an understatement.

A seminal figure in the philosophy of history, culture, and language, Johann Gottfried Herder also produced some of the most important and original works in the history of aesthetic theory. A student of Kant, he spent much of his life striving to reconcile the opposing poles of Enlightenment thought represented by his early mentors. His ideas influenced Hegel, Schleiermacher, Nietzsche, Dilthey, J. S. Mill, and Goethe. This book presents most of Herder's important writings on aesthetics, including the main sections of (...) one of his major untranslated works, Kritische Wälder. These notes, essays, and treatises, the majority of which appear here in English for the first time, show this idiosyncratic thinker both deeply rooted in the controversies of his day and pointing the way to future developments in aesthetics. Chosen to reflect the extent and diversity of Herder's concerns, the texts cover such topics as the psychology and physiology of aesthetic perception, the classification of the arts, taste, Shakespeare, the classical tradition, and the relationship between art and morality. Few thinkers have reflected so sensitively and productively on the cultural, historical, anthropological, ethical, and theological dimensions of art and the creative process. With this book, the importance of aesthetics to the evolution and texture of Herder's own thought, as well as his profound contribution to that discipline, comes fully into view. (shrink)

The paper begins by exploring whether a “tendency to avarice” exists in most capitalist business organisations. It concludes that it does and that this is problematic. The problem centres on the potential threat to the integrity of human character and the disablement of community.What, then, can be done about it? Building on previous work (Moore, 2002) in which MacIntyre’s notions of practice and institution were explored (MacIntyre, 1985), the paper offers a philosophically based argument in favour of the rediscovery of (...) craftsmanship by those who work in business organisations, and the exercise of craftsmanship in community.The practical implications for individuals of this way of conceptualising business, and the virtues which must then come to the fore, are discussed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Human Enhancement? Defining Human Enhancement The Therapy–Enhancement Distinction Human Enhancement Scenarios Untangling the Issues in Human Enhancement Restricting Human Enhancement Technologies?

The paper builds on the postulate of “myths we live by,” which shape our imaginative life (and hence our social expectations), but which are also open to reflective study and reinvention. It applies this principle, in particular, to the concepts of love and vulnerability. We are accustomed to think of the condition of vulnerability in an objectifying and distancing way, as something that affects the bearers of specific (disadvantaged) social identities. Against this picture, which can serve as a pretext for (...) paternalist and controlling attitudes to the groups in question – notably to women – Anderson urges us to reimagine our vulnerability as a condition not merely of exposure to violence but of openness to mutual affection, love, and friendship. Hegel’s celebrated image of the owl of Minerva, which takes wing only with the coming of dusk, suggests an association of (philosophical) wisdom with negativity – with the experience of death or loss. Anderson, by contrast, proposes an alternative and more hopeful image of the dawn of enlightenment, in the guise of new ethical dispositions shaped by an emancipatory (and so, no longer an oppressive or sexist) conception of our capacity for love. Her main interlocutors or influences in this piece are Judith Butler (who contributes the idea of a “relational ontology”), Michèle Le Doeuff, and Mary Midgley. (shrink)

All psychology research should strictly adhere to ethical principles outlined by the researcher's local governing body. In the UK, this is the British Psychological Society (BPS). However, in papers advising on methodology used in psychophysiology (a research area within psychology), issues linked to ethics are rarely mentioned despite the invasive nature of this type of research. Guidelines published by local governing bodies are never mentioned. In this paper, important ethical issues in psychophysiology research are discussed with respect to (...) BPS guidelines. Recommendations are made for ensuring ethical practice when conducting psychophysiology research. This paper is intended for those new to psychophysiology research (postgraduate and undergraduate students) and should be read in conjunction with the BPS ‘Code of ethics and conduct’. (shrink)

Despite the recent upsurge of interest in comparative political theory, there has been virtually no serious examination of Buddhism by political philosophers in the past five decades. In part, this is because Buddhism is not typically seen as a school of political thought. However, as Matthew Moore argues, Buddhism simultaneously parallels and challenges many core assumptions and arguments in contemporary Western political theory. In brief, Western thinkers not only have a great deal to learn about Buddhism, they have a great (...) deal to learn from it. To both incite and facilitate the process of Western theorists engaging with this neglected tradition, this book provides a detailed, critical reading of the key primary Buddhist texts, from the earliest recorded teachings of the Buddha through the present day. It also discusses the relevant secondary literature on Buddhism and political theory, as well as the literatures on particular issues addressed in the argument. Moore argues that Buddhist political thought rests on three core premises--that there is no self, that politics is of very limited importance in human life, and that normative beliefs and judgments represent practical advice about how to live a certain way, rather than being obligatory commands about how all persons must act. He compares Buddhist political theory to what he sees as Western analogues--Nietzsche's similar but crucially different theory of the self, Western theories of limited citizenship from Epicurus to John Howard Yoder, and to the Western tradition of immanence theories in ethics. This will be the first comprehensive treatment of Buddhism as political theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Psychological Courage”Andrew Moore (bio)Putman’s abstract tells us that “philosophy has never addressed the type of courage involved in facing the fears generated by our habits and emotions.” Later he says “almost never.” I think either claim overstates the case. True, Aristotle’s main concern is with courage as a martial virtue, and his central case is the soldier at war. Most translations of Nicomachean Ethics thus talk of (...) “bravery,” rather than “courage.” Aristotle also says, however, that “certainly the brave person is also intrepid... in sickness” (1115b1–2). In sickness, we often face pain and suffering, fear of further sickness, and death. Aristotle takes these to be central concerns: “Then what sorts of frightening conditions concern the brave person? Surely the most frightening; for no one stands firmer against terrifying conditions. Now death is most frightening of all....” (1115a25–26). We may conclude that in Aristotle at least, some attention is paid to psychological bravery or courage. Even if Aristotle had paid no attention to psychological courage, it is still an open question whether his general account of bravery or courage in Book 3, chapters 6–9 of Nicomachean Ethics could be applied also to Putman’s psychological cases, in which the source of fear and object of courage are internal to the agent’s psychology. Even if not, the Aristotelian might still try, as Putman himself notes, to absorb psychological courage into the virtue of “temperance.” I shall not pursue any of these possibilities further here.I turn now to Putman’s general account of courage, and to the way he distinguishes its psychological from its other varieties. His view is that types of courage are to be distinguished from one another in terms of the fear to be faced, and the goal to be attained. Physical courage responds to a fear of death or physical harm. Moral courage responds to a fear of loss of ethical integrity or authenticity. Psychological courage addresses fear of psychic instability or loss of self. It involves us in facing our irrational fears and anxieties, ranging from bad habits and compulsions to phobias. Different kinds of psychological courage then arise from the different sources of the fear of psychic instability. Quick generalizations about the goal to be obtained from various kinds of courage are harder to come by, but in one way or another, they all concern facing up to or confronting fear.A problem for Putman’s general theoretical framework is that fear seems in fact to be inessential to courage. Socrates was a paradigm case of the morally courageous person, as Putman notes, and yet (as Putman also notes) this consisted at least in part in his fearless defense of his moral convictions, even in the face of death. Plato’s Socrates did not face fear.If he had, he would not have had Socratic virtue. We must conclude either that he lacked [End Page 13] courage, or that fear is not necessary to courage. I favor the latter view.If courage is not necessarily a matter of facing fear, then what is it? I suggest that is a matter of facing personal risk or threat. Usually, of course, we respond fearfully to personal threat or risk. But that is not always or essentially so. Socrates and others can still be courageous, even if they face their personal risk or threat without fear. A risk-based conception of courage can also distinguish physical, moral, and psychological courage from one another, in terms of the source of the risk to which they respond. For example, psychological courage is at issue wherever a person is facing up to personal risks generated by her or his own habits, dispositions, commitments, and so on. Note too that fears are not the only elements of one’s own psychology that might generate personal risk. My innocent kindness, for example, might be an ingrained disposition which puts me at risk of cruel exploitation. Facing up to this trait of mine seems to me to be an instance of courage, just as is facing up to my debilitating fears. I probably do not fear my own innocent kindness, though if I strongly identify... (shrink)

Bioethics has dedicated itself to exploring and defending both reasons for and against certain aspects of clinical care, biomedical research and health policy, including what decisions must be made, who should make them, and how they should be made. In pediatrics, it’s widely acknowledged that parents’ reasons may matter pragmatically; attending to parents’ reasons is important if we want to work with families. Yet the conventional view in pediatric ethics is that parents’ reasons are irrelevant to whether a decision is (...) permissible or impermissible according to accepted ethical standards. In this paper, we explore whether parents’ reasons matter ethically and, if so, in what way and for whom. First, we clarify what we mean by ‘reasons.’ Second, we provide an overview of how reasons are typically treated in medical decision-making and pediatric ethics. Third, we analyze a hypothetical pediatric case to illustrate how changing reasons can transform ethical analyses, including by contributing to where and how clinicians and ethicists draw the boundaries intrinsic to common pediatric ethical frameworks. We push back against the conventional view and argue that parents’ reasons matter ethically in several ways. We call for further research on the role of parents’ reasons in clinical ethics deliberation. (shrink)

This paper contrasts the normative foundations of the stakeholder and shareholder theories of the firm. It demonstrates how the shareholder theory of the firm appears to have at least as much normative support as stakeholder theory and suggests that a way forward may be for a variant of pure shareholder theory to emerge.

This chapter and the one that follows analyze and elucidate the normative structure of utilitarianism. Although Moore did not consider himself a utilitarian, it becomes evident as the book proceeds that he accepts utilitarianism’s consequentialist account of right and wrong despite rejecting its hedonistic value theory. These opening chapters are a model of analytic exposition as Moore lays out utilitarianism’s theoretical commitments and contrasts various distinct but closely related normative theses. Moore expounds the utilitarian theory with far greater precision than (...) the classical utilitarian thinkers ever achieved. (shrink)

Ethics and Educational Technology explores the creation and implementation of learning technologies through an applied ethical lens. The success of digital tools and platforms in today's multifaceted learning and performance contexts is dependent not only on effective design and pedagogical principles but, further, on an awareness of these technologies' interactions with and implications for users and social systems. This first-of-its-kind book provides an evidence-based, process-oriented model for ethics in technology-driven instructional design and development, one that necessitates intentional reflective practice, (...) a critical and theoretically informed interrogation of technology, and a participatory, emancipatory approach to technology design and applications. Rich with real-world ethics examples and design cases, supported by reflection questions and applied activities, and attentive to ethical codes among preeminent educational technology organizations, this is an ideal resource for students, faculty, researchers, and professionals across educational technology, instructional design, learning sciences, learning engineering, organizational training, and other disciplines. (shrink)

In this response, I dispute Professor Narbonne’s thesis on the literary leeway of the poet, emphasizing the constraints on poetic license from both the nature of the genre and the ethical and educational role tragedy played for Aristotle in civic life.

Clinical ethics committees, with their typical threefold function of education, policy formation, and consultation, are present in nearly all U.S. hospitals today, and they are increasingly common in other healthcare settings such as long-term care and even home care. Ethics committees are at least as prevalent in Canadian hospitals as they are in U.S. hospitals, and their presence is growing in Europe, much of Asia, and Central and South America. Although ethics committees serve a variety of needs, their ultimate goal (...) ought to be to promote ethical practices or, in other words, to engender the integration of ethics into the life of the medical center. Of the three primary functions of ethics committees, ethics consultation has historically been the most controversial and problematic, and consult services in many healthcare institutions have struggled to thrive. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither (...) necessary nor sufficient conditions for the justification of our moral beliefs and (2) help ethical intuitionism to deal with the fundamental problem of peer disagreement over our basic moral intuitions. In doing so, I sketch out a novel and attractive diachronic way of thinking about peer disagreement more generally. (shrink)

William K. Frankena has himself authoritatively and engagingly narrated the itinerarium of his mind from youthful cognitivism in ethics, as a beginner ‘of Calvinistic background and Hegelian sympathies’ who contrived to combine ‘naturalism about “good” with intuitionism about “ought” ’, to his mature noncognitivist rationalism as a major philosopher of sophisticated analytic technique and Calvinist sympathies. A number of his characteristic earlier opinions were elaborated in response to the writings of G. E. Moore; and this body of work as (...) a young man contains the seeds of his later development. Yet the past thirty years have radically altered the perspective from which Moore and his influence are now viewed. What changes does our altered perspective on Moore make to our understanding of Frankena? (shrink)

“Perfect Day” by Lou Reed and “Village Ghetto Land” by Stevie Wonder are prime examples of “melic” irony in song—cases in which expressive irony is achieved through the interplay and tension between a song’s lyrics and its musical accompaniment. But how exactly can a song achieve this ironic effect, especially if, as formalists maintain, music on its own is incapable of meaning, much less communicative irony? In this paper, I illuminate this type of irony by applying a Gricean account of (...) verbal irony to song. I explore the complexities of this application, and suggest that, through ironic interplay with lyrics, the music of a song can acquire semantic capacities of its own. (shrink)

Asserts the need for Americans to reclaim their traditional values of freedom, democracy and fairness and offers alternatives to accepting political and economic absolutes.

In the modern world, provincialism in reflective thinking is dangerous, possibly tragic. If philosophy is to fulfill one of its main functions—that of guiding the leaders of mankind toward a better world—its perspective must become worldwide and comprehensive in fact as well as in theory. This, the motivating theme of the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii in the summer of 1949, is likewise the theme of this volume, the complete report of that Conference. The goal (...) of the eminent philosophers participating was the discovery of avenues of progress toward a synthesis of Oriental and Occidental thought. They attempted to reach tentative conclusions in the fields of methodology, metaphysics, and ethical theory. Conference activities consisted of meetings, lectures, discussions, undergraduate courses, and graduate seminars. As far as possible, the proceedings were limited to the study of East-West philosophy; extensive attention was not given to the strictly religious aspects of any philosophical tradition. Participants in the Conference were convinced that philosophy is now entering upon a new stage of development which will be characterized by trans-cultural cooperation and world perspective. This development can be of tremendous significance in world thought and eventually in the lives and actions of the people of the world. Twenty-three of the formal papers presented at the Conference comprise the substance of this book; a significant proposal for synthesis is stated or implied in almost every one. A comprehensive introduction by the editor, a summary of the results and conclusions of the Conference seminars, a who's who of contributors, and an exhaustive index round out the volume. (shrink)

Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists (...) like Hutcheson and Hume, Moore gave full marks to Sidgwick. According to Moore, Sidgwick was the “only . . . ethical writer” to have clearly seen the irreducibility of ethics’ defining notion.2 Nevertheless, twentieth-century meta-. (shrink)

The debate concerning corporate moral agency is normally conducted through philosophical arguments in articles which argue from only one point of view. This paper summarises both the arguments for and against corporate moral agency and concludes from this that the arguments in favour have more weight. The paper also addresses the way in which the law in the U.K. and the U.S.A. currently views this issue and shows how it is supportive of the concept of corporate moral agency. The paper (...) concludes by considering the implications of the debate for business ethics in general, and stakeholder theory and virtue ethics in particular. (shrink)

Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is necessary to formally incorporate the intentional idiom into the language of behavioral science to promote explanations and interpretations of behavior that are comprehensive in scope. Notwithstanding Professor Foxall's arguments, radical behaviorists hold that the circumstances identified by the use of the (...) intentional idiom are accommodated by the radical behaviorist language of contingencies, not only for prediction and control but also for explanations and interpretations. Of central importance is that individuals may have histories that lead them to generate descriptions of past and present behavior, as well as descriptions of prevailing circumstances that have caused that behavior or are likely to cause that behavior in the future. The resulting verbal behavior may then enter into contingencies influencing their behavior, although the extent to which it does so varies across individuals as a function of their histories. Overall, the way that the pragmatism of radical behaviorism conceives of the nature and contribution of covert events differs appreciably from the way Professor Foxall conceives of the nature and contribution of intentional phenomena. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Military and Technology A Nano‐Enabled Military A Nano‐Enabled Defense System Ethical Concerns.

Within bioethics, two issues dominate the discourse on suffering: its nature (who can suffer and how) and whether suffering is ever grounds for providing, withholding, or discontinuing interventions. The discussion has focused on the subjective experience of suffering in acute settings or persistent suffering that is the result of terminal, chronic illness. The bioethics literature on suffering, then, is silent about a crucial piece of the moral picture: agents’ intersubjectivity. This paper argues that an account of the intersubjective effects of (...) suffering on caregivers could enrich theories of suffering in two ways: first, by clarifying the scope of suffering beyond the individual at the epicenter, i.e., by providing a fuller account of the effects of suffering (good or bad). Second, by drawing attention to how and why, in clinical contexts, the intersubjective dimensions of suffering are sometimes as important, if not more important, than whether an individual is suffering or not. (shrink)

A horseshoe is regarded as a lucky, perhaps even romantic, symbol of our industrial heritage. Why is it, then, that much of English literature, from Mandeville's ‘Grumbling Hive’ on, portrays business in a murky light? The paper begins with an analysis of this phenomenon and concludes that it is the institutionalisation and legitimisation of avarice and its consequential effects that gives rise to such a portrayal. A horseshoe has also been used as a convenient means of conceptualising an answer to (...) the questions this conclusion raises: ‘Who should control the corporation and for what ends?’ (Mintzberg 1985) and discussing recent developments in corporate social responsibility. Drawing on research evidence the paper demonstrates how corporations are simultaneously under pressure from society and responding to its concerns. The paper concludes that these current developments can at best ameliorate the situation, and that what is necessary is to rediscover the notion of corporate virtue, instead of putting virtue at the service of vice. (shrink)

If a painting or a sculpture needs to be supplemented and explained by words, it means either that it has not fulfilled its function or that the public is deprived of vision. They had manufactured a technology of universal incomprehension. If one is uncomfortable with a commitment one’s theory is saddled with . . . one must reformulate one’s theory. These three citations define the scope and interest of my argument regarding twentieth-century formalist art and visual communication. Formalist art (...) “needs to be supplemented and explained in words” (Gabo) regarding reference and meaning and therefore fails as visual media, because formalists unwittingly “manufactured a technology of .. (shrink)

In Rethinking Applied Ethics Today, this paper would like to advance the concept of Ethics Consulting as a means of applying Applied Ethics in the practice of Bioethics. Applied Ethics is frequently described as a discipline of Philosophy that concerns itself with the application of moral theories such as deontology andutilitarianism to real world dilemmas. These applications however often remain restricted to the academic world and rarely reach the actual practice of those in urgent need of ethical guidance. Ethics (...) Consulting is an emerging concept in the field of Applied Ethics, but has already shown great potential in extending the gains of academic thought to everyday deliberations on ethical dilemmas. Connected to the Coherence and Common-Morality Theories in Bioethics, the focusof Ethics Consulting has since the mid-1980’s shifted from issues of content to those of process - from what the ethicist knows to what the ethicist does or enable. This shift not only remodelled the ethicist’s role to that of a facilitator in an inherently social process of moral inquiry, but also added the responsibility of keeping moral reflective spaces open where sound and shared processes of ethical deliberation can take place. Applying these developments in the Namibian context has already proved to be of great value to patients and Medical Aid Funds and also holds great potential in addressing the ethical demands placed on medical practitioners and clinics. (shrink)

While addiction is not a legal defense in any legal system, the chapter assays whether it should be. The conclusion is largely negative, denying that there should be any general defense but allowing that in certain cases at least a partial defense would be appropriate. The chapter rejects the shibboleths commonly asserted in this area: that no addict can be excused because he or she was responsible for becoming an addict in the first place and that all addicts must be (...) excused because addiction is a brain disease. A more piecemeal, nuanced approach is taken to the issue. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper is a further development of two previous pieces of work (Moore 2002, 2005) in which modern virtue ethics, and in particular MacIntyre’s (1985) related notions of “practice” and “institution,” have been explored in the context of business. It first introduces and defines the concept of corporate character and seeks to establish why it is important. It then reviews MacIntyre’s virtues-practice-institution schema and the implications of this at the level of the institution in question—the corporation—and argues that the concept (...) of corporate character follows from, but is a novel development of, MacIntyre’s schema. The paper contrasts corporate character and virtues with the more familiar concepts of corporate culture and values. The constitutive and substantive elements of corporate character, including the essential corporate virtues, are then drawn out and illustrated with reference to the cases explored in Koehn (1998). Finally, the paper acknowledges and counters a specific criticism of this approach. (shrink)

Many countries project that they will have difficulty to meet their demand for primary care based on an inadequate supply of primary care doctors. There are many reasons for this, and they tend to vary by country. The policy options available to these countries are to increase the number of local primary care doctors, recruit doctors from other countries, ration primary care, shift more primary care to specialists, or authorize other disciplines to provide primary care. This article examines lessons learned (...) in the United States over the past 50 years and proposes that expanding the use of nurse practitioners is the best solution when measured by feasibility, costs, ethics, and scope of the care delivered. Using nurse practitioners trained in country meets the World Health Organization global code of practice regarding the international recruitment of health personnel. (shrink)