In Book XI of the Confessions Augustine claims that time has its beginning and ending in eternity. In Being and Time, Heidegger claims that death is the ultimate futural possibility for authentic human existence. These two texts, one from the fourth century, the other from the twentieth century, depict two very different perspectives on what limits the human conception of time. Can these perspectives be reconciled? Severson offers a new reading of the Confessions that affirms Augustine's religious quest for (...) understanding while taking into account the constraints of modern criticism. (shrink)

This article considers the childrens writer Alison Uttley, and, particularly, her engagements with debates regarding science and philosophy. Uttley is a well-known childrens author, most famous for writing the Little Grey Rabbit series, but very little critical attention has been paid to her. She is also an important alumna of the University of Manchester, the second woman to graduate in Physics. In particular, the article looks at her novel A Traveller in Time through the lens of her thinking on time, (...) ethics, history and science. The article draws on manuscripts in the collection of the John Rylands Library to argue that Uttley‘s version of history and time-travel was deeply indebted to her scientific education and her friendship with the Australian philosopher Samuel Alexander. (shrink)

Abstract Scientific advances have made the end of life into the primary concern of medicine. But medicine also postpones the end of life, often until the time when we no longer have the mental and physical capacity to deal with it. I argue that we need to develop Nietzsche's idea of timely death, in order to find a moral basis for health care at the end of life, and that the crucial factor is the cultivation of the virtues (...) that would enable us to live in another and more reckless way. We should look on the problem not from the first-person point of view, but from the perspective of the other, and ask ourselves what is most admirable in another person, in his or her attitude to death. The point of timely death is to make death into the completion of life, where life is understood as a moral rather than a biological idea. (shrink)

Examining Levinas’s critique of the Heideggerian conception of temporality, this book shows how the notion of the feminine both enables and prohibits the most fertile territory of Levinas’s thought. According to Heidegger, the traditional notion of time, which stretches from Aristotle to Bergson, is incoherent because it rests on an inability to think together two assumptions: that the present is the most real aspect of time, and that the scientific model of time is infinite, continuous, and constituted by a series (...) of more or less identical now-points. For Heidegger, this contradiction, which privileges the present and thinks of time as ongoing, derives from a confusion about Being. He suggests that it is not the present but the future that is the primordial ecstasis of temporality. For Heidegger, death provides an orientation for our authentic temporal understanding. Levinas agrees with Heidegger that mortality is much more significant than previous philosophers of time have acknowledged, but for Levinas, it is not my death, but the death of the other that determines our understanding of time. He is critical of Heidegger’s tendency to collapse the ecstases of temporality into one another, and seeks to move away from what he sees as a totalizing view of time. Levinas wants to rehabilitate the unique character of the instant, or present, without sacrificing its internal dynamic to the onward progression of the future, and without neglecting the burdens of the past that history visits upon us. The author suggests that though Levinas’s conception of subjectivity corrects some of the problems Heidegger’s philosophy introduces, such as his failure to deal adequately with ethics, Levinas creates new stumbling blocks, notably the confining role he accords to the feminine. For Levinas, the feminine functions as that which facilitates but is excluded from the ethical relation that he sees as the pinnacle of philosophy. Showing that the feminine is a strategic part of Levinas’s philosophy, but one that was not thought through by him, the author suggests that his failure to solidly place the feminine in his thinking is structurally consonant with his conceptual separation of politics from ethics. (shrink)

Retracing the way I have followed since the beginning of my philosophical studies, I focus on the main issues that have guided my teaching and research: Time, Death, and Nothingness, all of which take place in the domain of what I have called “negative philosophy”. My first interest was in the problem of language and logic in their relation to temporality, a special privilege being granted in this respect to poetry; subsequently I concentrated my work on the thematic of (...) death and finitude, in order to show that mourning and relation to absence are what establish a fundamental difference between the human being and the animal; and finally, the critique of Western ontology has brought me to concentrate my research on Eastern thinking, with a special engagement with the thematic of nothingness in Indian and Japanese Buddhism. All my work in philosophy has been guided by Heidegger’s question of the relation between Being and Time. (shrink)

This article explores the affinities between film and philosophy by returning to a shared meditation on death and the nature of time. Death has been considered the muse of philosophy and can also be considered the muse of film-philosophy. But what does it mean to say that to film-philosophise is to learn to die, or a kind of training for dying? Film is an artistic object that reminds us of death’s inevitability; it is a meditation on the (...) transient and finite nature of time. Films as diverse as Mizoguchi’s Tales of Ugetsu, Resnais’s Hiroshima mon Amour, and Guzmán’s Nostalgia for the Light take an uncanny approach to the subject, expressing the paradoxical coexistence of life and death and of different temporal dimensions. This article explores the philosophical concept of the death-image and time through a Deleuzian approach to cinema, meditating on the flashback, the coexistence of the present and the past, and the emergence of a new type of Lazarean character – one who returns from the dead. The article aims to clarify not simply death’s unquestionable omnipresence in film but also cinema’s role as a contemporary version of the trope of memento mori. (shrink)

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of (...) moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur. (shrink)

This book consists of transcripts from two lecture courses on ethical relation Levinas delivered at the Sorbonne.

This book consists of transcripts from two lecture courses Levinas delivered in 1975-76, his last year at the Sorbonne. They cover some of the most pervasive themes of his thought and were written at a time when he had just published his most important—and difficult—book, _Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence._ Both courses pursue issues related to the question at the heart of Levinas's thought: ethical relation. The Foreword and Afterword place the lectures in the context of his work as (...) a whole, rounding out this unique picture of Levinas the thinker and the teacher. The lectures are essential to a full understanding of Levinas for three reasons. First, he seeks to explain his thought to an audience of students, with a clarity and an intensity altogether different from his written work. Second, the themes of God, death, and time are not only crucial for Levinas, but they lead him to confront their treatment by the main philosphers of the great continental tradition. Thus his discussions of accounts of death by Heidegger, Hegel, and Bloch place Levinas's thought in a broader context. Third, the basic concepts Levinas employs are those of _Otherwise than Being_ rather than the earlier _Totality and Infinity_: patience, obsession, substitution, witness, traumatism. There is a growing recognition that the ultimate standing of Levinas as a philosopher may well depend on his assessment of those terms. These lectures offer an excellent introduction to them that shows how they contribute to a wide range of traditional philosophical issues. (shrink)

The existential analysis -- The death of dasein -- The timeliness of dasein -- The derivation of time -- The time of being.

Rajesh Sampath ABSTRACT: This paper attempts a careful reading of chapter I of Division Two, particularly section 53, on death in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Our aim is to deconstruct some of Heidegger’s assumptions while imagining the margins of his text that could warrant a comparison and contrast with the biblical theological material of ….

Most philosophers in the death literature believe that death can be bad for the person who dies. The most popular view of death’s badness—namely, deprivationism—holds that death is bad for the person who dies because, and to the extent that, it deprives them of the net good that they would have accrued, had their actual death not occurred. Deprivationists thus face the challenge of locating the time that death is bad for a person. This (...) is known as the Timing Problem, which is thought to be one of the biggest challenges facing views holding that death can be bad for the person who dies. Every possible answer to this question has been defended in the literature, yet each answer can seemingly be shown to be subject to compelling objections. In this paper, I argue that the force of the Timing Problem is illusory. Specifically, I argue that the problem, as formulated in the literature, is underspecified. Any adequately precise form of the question ‘When is death bad for the person who dies?’ is one to which there is a clear, decisive, and unproblematic answer. (shrink)

Motivated by a conviction that mass incarceration and state execution are among the most important ethical and political problems of our time, the contributors to this volume come together from a diverse range of backgrounds to analyze, critique, and envision alternatives to the injustices of the U.S. prison system, with recourse to deconstruction, phenomenology, critical race theory, feminism, queer theory, and disability studies. They engage with the hyper-incarceration of people of color, the incomplete abolition of slavery, the exploitation of prisoners (...) as workers and as "raw material" for the prison industrial complex, the intensive confinement of prisoners in supermax units, and the complexities of capital punishment in an age of abolition. -/- Contents -/- Introduction: Death and Other Penalties Geoffrey Adelsberg, Lisa Guenther, and Scott Zeman -/- Part I. Legacies of Slavery -/- Excavating the Sedimentations of Slavery: The Unfinished Project of American Abolition Brady Heiner -/- From Commodity Fetishism to Prison Fetishism: Slavery, Convict-leasing, and the Ideological Productions of Incarceration James Manos -/- Maroon Philosophy: An Interview with Russell Maroon Shoatz Russell Maroon Shoatz -/- Part II. Death Penalties -/- In Reality-from the Row Derrick Quintero -/- Inheritances of the Death Penalty: American Racism and Derrida's Theologico-Political Sovereignty Geoffrey Adelsberg -/- Making Death a Penalty: Or, Making "Good" Death a "Good" Penalty Kelly Oliver -/- Death Penalty Abolition in Neoliberal Times: The SAFE California Act and the Nexus of Savings and Security Andrew Dilts -/- On the Inviolability of Human Life Julia Kristeva (translated by Lisa Walsh) -/- Part III. Rethinking Power and Responsibility -/- Punishment, Desert, and Equality: A Levinasian Analysis Benjamin S. Yost -/- Prisons and Palliative Politics Ami Harbin -/- Sovereignty, Community, and the Incarceration of Immigrants Matt S. Whitt -/- Without the Right to Exist: Mass Incarceration and National Security Andrea Smith -/- Prison Abolition and a Culture of Sexual Difference Sarah Tyson -/- Part IV. Isolation and Resistance -/- Statement on Solitary Confinement Abu Ali Abdur'Rahman -/- The Violence of the Supermax: Toward a Phenomenological Aesthetics of Prison Space Adrian Switzer -/- Prison and the Subject of Resistance: A Levinasian Inquiry Shokoufeh Sakhi -/- Critical Theory, Queer Resistance, and the Ends of Capture Liat Ben-Moshe, Che Gossett, Nick Mitchell, and Eric A. Stanley. (shrink)

본 논문은 현대영미철학에서 논의되고 있는 복리에 대한 주요 이론 중 쾌락주의와 소망충족론을 중심으로 이 두 이론이 죽음에 대한 타이밍 퍼즐을 해결할 수 있는지를 논의한다. 필자는 우선 타이밍 퍼즐을 논증 형식으로 재구성하고, 쾌락주의자인 에피쿠로스의 입장에서는 이 논증을 거부하기 어렵다는 점을 지적한다. 그런데 펠드먼은 쾌락주의를 지지하는 대표적 영미철학자로서 타이밍 퍼즐에 대해 매우 간명한 해법을 제시하고 있다. 필자는 펠드먼의 해법이 에피쿠로스가 제기한 문제를 잘못 이해한 결과임을 논증한다. 그리고 이를 통해 쾌락주의는 사후 가해의 문제를 해결하지 못하기 때문에 타이밍 퍼즐을 해결하는 데 한계가 있음을 지적한다. (...) 한편 소망충족론은 쾌락주의와 달리 사후 가해의 문제로부터 자유로운 복리 이론이다. 필자는 타이밍 퍼즐과 관련하여 제기되는 소망충족론의 문제점을 살펴보면서 소망충족론 역시 타이밍 퍼즐을 성공적으로 해결하지 못함을 보인다. 특히 소망충족론을 전제했을 때 죽는 이가 죽음의 해로움을 겪는 시점은 소망을 형성하는 생전의 시점도 되기 어렵고 소망이 좌절되는 사후의 시점도 되기 어렵다는 점을 논증한다. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the growing block theory of time has rather surprising, and hitherto unexplored, explanatory benefits when it comes to certain enduring philosophical puzzles concerning death. In particular, I claim the growing block theorist has readily available and convincing answers to the following questions: Why is it an evil to be dead but not an evil to be not yet born? How can death be an evil for the dead if they no longer exist (...) to suffer it? When is death an evil for the one who dies? The ability to give such answers is a significant, but by no means decisive, advantage for the growing block view of time. (shrink)

Ariane Lewis offers a comprehensive and expert review of ethical issues raised by brain death in the United Kingdom and how they compare to management of those issues in the United States (Lewis 20...

In mediaeval Arabic belles-lettres (adab), accounts of lives are usually made up of quite short reports akhbár. These akbar are arranged in different ways, one of which is chronological order, but the compilers of such accounts apparently accord relative insignificance to chronological order. This paper examines some "biographies' compiled by al-Suli and Abú l-Faraj al-Isbaháni, showing that temporal progression can exist in a "biographical" presentation, either alone or more often combined with other ways of organising the material. It then focuses (...) on the placing of subjects' deaths in life accounts and on bow they are integrated with the rest of the material. In conclusion, 1 suggest that when temporal progression is absent in "biographical" presentations, this should be seen as reflecting a mediaeval Arabic approach to life writing which differs from modern expectations but has its own rationale. (shrink)

Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of human identity is care. Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are finite beings related to our own impending death, and both argue that caring has a distinctive, circular and non-instantaneous, temporal structure. In this paper, I explore the way Heidegger and Frankfurt each understand the relations among care, death, and time, and I argue for the superiority of Heideggerian version (...) of this nest of claims. Frankfurt claims that we should conceive of the most basic commitments which practically orient a person in the world and define his identity (“volitional necessities”) as naturalistic facts, foundational for and located completely without the normative space of reasons. In support of this he appeals to the supposedly foundational role played in human life by the instinct for self-preservation, what Frankfurt calls the “love of living.” The claim is that in questions of practical identity there is a definite priority of the factual over the normative. Frankfurt’s naturalistic model of volitional necessity is motivated by a misunderstanding of the temporal structure of care, a misunderstanding that helps lead him to an implausible conception of the basic structures of human identity. Heidegger advances an anti-naturalistic conception of caring, one bound up with his way of understanding how human beings relate to their own future. I argue that the existential, temporal, and normative significance that Frankfurt attributes to the naturalized “love of living” is better captured by the Heideggerian claim that human identity is defined by being “for-the-sake-of” certain projects and commitments, a way of being lived out in the way Heidegger calls “being-towards-death.”. (shrink)

Killing Times begins with the deceptively simple observation—made by Jacques Derrida in his seminars on the topic—that the death penalty mechanically interrupts mortal time by preempting the typical mortal experience of not knowing at what precise moment we will die. Through a broader examination of what constitutes mortal temporality, David Wills proposes that the so-called machinery of death summoned by the death penalty works by exploiting, or perverting, the machinery of time that is already attached to human (...) existence. Time, Wills argues, functions for us in general as a prosthetic technology, but the application of the death penalty represents a new level of prosthetic intervention into what constitutes the human. Killing Times traces the logic of the death penalty across a range of sites. Starting with the legal cases whereby American courts have struggled to articulate what methods of execution constitute “cruel and unusual punishment,” Wills goes on to show the ways that technologies of death have themselves evolved in conjunction with ideas of cruelty and instantaneity, from the development of the guillotine and the trap door for hanging, through the firing squad and the electric chair, through today’s controversies surrounding lethal injection. Responding to the legal system’s repeated recourse to storytelling—prosecutors’ and politicians’ endless recounting of the horrors of crimes—Wills gives a careful eye to the narrative, even fictive spaces that surround crime and punishment. Many of the controversies surrounding capital punishment, Wills argues, revolve around the complex temporality of the death penalty: how its instant works in conjunction with forms of suspension, or extension of time; how its seeming correlation between egregious crime and painless execution is complicated by a number of different discourses. By pinpointing the temporal technology that marks the death penalty, Wills is able to show capital punishment’s expansive reach, tracing the ways it has come to govern not only executions within the judicial system, but also the opposed but linked categories of the suicide bombing and drone warfare. In discussing the temporal technology of death, Wills elaborates the workings both of the terrorist who produces a simultaneity of crime and “punishment” that bypasses judicial process, and of the security state, in whose remote-control killings the time-space coordinates of “justice” are compressed and at the same time disappear into the black hole of secrecy. Grounded in a deep ethical and political commitment to death penalty abolition, Wills’s engaging and powerfully argued book pushes the question of capital punishment beyond the confines of legal argument to show how the technology of capital punishment defines and appropriates the instant of death and reconfigures the whole of human mortality. (shrink)

Bernat argues for a unified brain-based determination of death (UBDD), noting that it “conceptually justifies” death determination both in Donation after Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) a...

In light of recent writing on politics and violence within contemporary continental philosophy, this text revisits Derrida's frequently articulated philosophical opposition to the death penalty. This essay expresses dismay at a certain theoretical discourse today that finds within itself the resources to mount a defence from within the humanities of political violence and by extension an overt justification of the death penalty. Slavoj Žižek's essay on Robespierre is unpicked as one such representative text. It is contrasted to Derrida's (...) scrupulous reading of Kant as an advocate of the death penalty. This essay seeks to name and question a new Maoist, thanato-theological current in contemporary theoretical writing and should be considered as an opening salvo in a sustained future challenge to such thought. (shrink)

Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased—a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues—need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), makes (...) death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which my death is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm. (shrink)

통상 죽음과 결부된 시간은 낫을 들고 쫒아오는 유령으로 그려진다. 이런 맥락에서 시간이란 태어남이라는 기점으로부터 죽음이라는 종점을 향해 쏘아진 화살의 형상을 갖기에, 인간의 유한성은 한층 부각된다. 반면 들뢰즈에게 죽음과 결부된 시간은 전적인 변환의 계기로서 고찰된다. 그에게 시간이란 수동적 자아의 부단한 ‘종합’의 산물이기에 각각의 종합의 단계들마다 우리에게 상이한 계기들을 제공하고 그 세 번째 국면에 이르러 시간은 개체가 나와 자아의 죽음을 경험하는 가장 급진적인 변화의 형식으로 기능한다. 세번째 종합에 상응하는 어떤 죽음의 체험이 있는 것이다. 이처럼 시간의 종합 속에서 한 개체를 이전과는 전혀 다른 (...) 개체로 변화·생성시키는 사건을 들뢰즈는 ‘비인칭적 죽음’이라고 명명한다. 이로써 들뢰즈는 역설적이게도, 삶 속에서의 죽음, 즉 삶 속에 현전화된 개체의 역동적인 발생운동을 죽음이라는 말로 명명한다. (shrink)

Personal time, as opposed to external time, has a certain role to play in the correct account of death and immortality. But saying exactly what that role is, and what role remains for external time, is not straightforward. I formulate and defend accounts of death and immortality that specify these roles precisely.

According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivation approach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example but also (...) in Fischer and Brueckner’s approach itself. Here I argue that by paying special attention to a certain feature of Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, we can dispense of not only Johansson’s criticism but also of Purves’s objection to Fischer and Brueckner’s approach. (shrink)

Despite its familiarity and widespread acceptance, the concept of “brain death” remains incoherent in theory and confused in practice. Moreover, the only purpose served by the concept is to facilitate the procurement of transplantable organs. By abandoning the concept of brain death and adopting different criteria for organ procurement, we may be able to increase both the supply of transplantable organs and clarity in our understanding of death.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the “Epicurean view” — the view stating that death cannot intelligibly be regarded as an evil for the person who dies because the alleged evil lacks a subject or “recipient.” An argument is then presented in opposition to this view that possesses two key components. The first is an account of the “Values Connect with Feelings” requirement, according to which the connection need not be actual, but merely possible and that the requirement (...) is satisfied provided that the relevant object, state, or event is a possible object, even if it is not a possible cause, of the relevant feelings. The second key component is the employment of a four-dimensional framework that makes it possible to claim that temporally distant events or states, like spatially distant events, exist, and thus are possible objects of relevant feelings. (shrink)

In this article, Volodymyr Yermolenko examines the power of ideas to shape social and political events. He is particularly interested in the way misguided or false ideas about Russian and Ukrainian history and politics have contributed to the current Russia-Ukraine war. He also reflects on the way this war has transformed his understanding of some key philosophical concepts, including life, death, and social solidarity.

Lucretius points out a puzzling asymmetry in our attitudes towards our prenatal non-existence and our post-mortem non-existence. Normally, we view birth as a happy occasion, and death as a sad event. Some philosophers argue that these asymmetry in our attitude is justified by the A-theory of Time, which reflects the common sense way of thinking about time, and so they discredit the B-theory of Time. In this paper I critically examine these claims and argue that this belief is false. (...) Our attitude is neither justified nor discredited by anything which is in debate between the A-Theory and the B-theory of time. Thus the existence of this asymmetry does not favor one theory over the other, and the dispute between the two theories will have to be settled on other grounds. (shrink)

Failures in research ethics review examinedThe recent tragic death of Ellen Roche1 provides valuable lessons for research ethics review. The reasons for the wrongful administration of hexamethonium stem from researchers failing to act in certain ways, not from deliberate malicious or negligent actions.FIRST FAILING AND FIRST LESSON: PUBLICATION BIASThe first major failing was the failure of researchers who conducted the 1978 San Francisco study of hexamethonium to report similar adverse reactions.The tendency of researchers to fail to publish disappointing results2 (...) or results which are unattractive to them or their sponsors' interests has been well documented.3 It is called publication bias. An important part of publication bias is the failure to report all relevant or potentially relevant results. As this case illustrates, researchers must report or make available all research results, even negative results, and all potentially relevant outcomes of that research. If researchers believe an adverse event is unrelated to the study, they should explain why they believe this rather than omitting the event from their report. Elimination of publication bias is essential to scientific progress, to the protection of participants in research and in maintaining public faith in the integrity of scientists and doctors. Ethics committees and journals should make it clear that all adverse events—related or unrelated—to a project must be acknowledged, evaluated and further details made available to other researchers or the public if requested.SECOND FAILING: FAILURE TO CONDUCT A SYSTEMATIC REVIEWBut there is a more important failing. The most disturbing feature of this case was that literature documenting the pulmonary toxicity of hexamethonium was available before the trial began.In the study protocol submitted to the ethics committee, the researcher cited four reports involving 20 patients given inhaled hexamethonium without adverse event. However, Johns Hopkins investigators found a number of reports between 1953 and 1962, …. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 1-3.

“Only a living person can be a dying one,” writes Augustine in De ciuitate dei 13.9. For Augustine, this strange fact offers us an occasion for reflection. If we are indeed racing toward the end on a cursus ad mortem, when do we pass the finish line? A living person is “in life”, while a dead one is post mortem. But as ciu. 13.11 asks: is anyone ever in morte, “in death?” This question must be asked alongside an earlier (...) one, which had motivated Augustine’s struggle in Confessiones 11.14.17 to make sense of time from the very beginning: quid est enim tempus? What is at stake here is whether or not there is such a thing as an instant of death: a moment when someone is no longer alive but not yet dead, a moment when they are “dying” in the present tense. If we want to understand Augustine’s question about the time of death in ciu. 13, then we have to frame it in terms of the interrogation of time proper in conf. 11. (shrink)