IntroductionUrinary incontinence is a prevalent disorder amongst older women. Identifying the psychosocial experiences of older women in disease management can improve the patient care process. Hence, the present study aimed to determine the psychosocial experiences of older women in the management of urinary incontinence.MethodsThis qualitative study was conducted using conventional content analysis. The study data were collected via unstructured in-depth face-to-face interviews with 22 older women suffering from urinary incontinence selected via purposive sampling. Sampling and (...) data analysis were done simultaneously and were continued until data saturation. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed using the method proposed by Graneheim and Lundman.ResultsThe results indicated that the older people with urinary incontinence had various psychosocial experiences while living with and managing this disease. Accordingly, four main themes were extracted from the data as follows: “problem incompatibility with the disease,” “mental impasse,” “facing social restrictions,” and “concealment and social escapism.”ConclusionThe findings demonstrated that older people with urinary incontinence experienced significant psychosocial pressures while living with this disorder, which affected their psychosocial well-being. Thus, paying attention to these psychosocial experiences while supporting and taking care of these patients can positively impact their psychosocial health and quality of life. (shrink)

Many women are initially unable to contract the pelvic floor muscles (PFMs) properly, activating other muscle groups before, or instead of, PFM. Numerous authors have proved that biofeedback can be an ideal tool supporting learning of the PFM contraction. However, there is currently a lack of scientific data on how many biofeedback sessions are necessary in this educational process. In this study we aimed at assessing the effects of one-time electromyography (EMG) biofeedback session on the order in which PFM are (...) activated (so called firing order) during conscious contractions in relation to selected synergistic muscles in pregnant, continent women. A randomized controlled trial was conducted in 90 healthy nulliparous women with uncomplicated pregnancies and without diagnosed urinary incontinence. We divided the participants into a biofeedback group (50) and a control group (40). They were, respectively: 30 ± 4 and 30 ± 4 years old, at their 23 ± 5 or 25 ± 7 week of gestation and presented 23 ± 5 or 24 ± 5 kg/m2 BMI value (M + SD). Surface EMG with vaginal probes has been used to assess the PFM firing order in selected tasks: in five 3-s maximal contractions (quick flicks), five 10-s contractions, and in a 60-s contraction (static hold). We used the 1–5 scale, where “1” meant the best score, awarded when PFM was activated first in order. The most important finding of our study is that a single EMG biofeedback substantially improved the PFM contractions in pregnant women. First, when applying one-time biofeedback session, more women maintained correct technique or improved it in the second assessment, compared to the control group (73 vs. 65%). Secondly, using the quantitative and qualitative analysis with the Chi-square McNamara B/C test, in the biofeedback group we observed a statistically significant improvement of PFM firing order in four tasks: in the first quick flicks (p = 0.016), third quick flicks (p = 0.027), fifth quick flicks (p = 0.008), and in the first 10-s contractions (p = 0.046). In the control group we observed better outcome only in one motor task: in the fourth 10-s contraction (p = 0.009). Given the positive effects of a single session of EMG biofeedback on the firing order in the PFM contractions, it should be recommended for pregnant women without urinary incontinence to teach them how to perform PFM exercises correctly. (shrink)

Jeff Nisker describes his personal experience of a diagnosis of advanced prostate cancer and the kindnesses he received from friendly doctors. He claims that this narrative account supports the promotion of Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) screening for asymptomatic men and impugns statisticians, mistakenly thinking that their opposition to PSA screening derives from concerns about financial cost. The account inadvertently demonstrates the danger of over-reliance on a single ethical tool for critical analysis. In the first part of this response, we describe (...) the statistical evidence. The most reliable Cochrane meta-analyses have not shown that PSA screening saves lives overall. Moreover, the high false positive rate of PSA screening leads to overinvestigation which results in unnecessary anxiety and increased cases of unnecessary sepsis, urinary incontinence and sexual dysfunction. Then we describe how narrative ethics alone is an insufficient tool to make claims about policies, such as PSA screening, which have hidden harms. Although Nisker’s story-telling is compelling and evokes emotions, narrative ethics of this sort have an inherent bias against people who would be harmed by the counterfactual. Particular care must be taken to look for and consider those untellable stories. Ethicists who only consider narratives which are readily at hand risk harming those who are voiceless or protected by the status quo. PSA screening is the wrong tool to reduce prostate cancer deaths and narrative ethics is the wrong tool to appraise this policy. It is vital that the correct theoretical tools are applied to the medical and ethical questions under scrutiny. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Consenting for Novel and Dangerous Surgical Procedures with Minimal Supporting EvidenceMichelle J. ClarkeFrank1 was a 19–year–old man referred to me after a workup for back pain led to the discovery of a large, aggressive tumor in his sacrum. The tumor wrapped around the nerves controlling bowel, bladder, and leg function. We performed a needle biopsy and learned that the tumor was an angiosarcoma, an extremely aggressive and usually deadly (...) form of cancer. However, the tumor was unique in that it theoretically could be cured if removed in one piece. But, to do so would necessitate sacrificing the nerves, leaving the patient irreversibly incontinent, lacking sexual function, and confined to a wheelchair.Once we knew the diagnosis, Frank came to the office with his family to discuss treatment options. He appeared terrified and was almost silent through the appointment, deferring most questions to his parents. Due to the speed of tumor growth, we discussed palliative therapy, conventional treatment, and the one–piece or “en bloc” surgery, which was new and unproven for his disease. Based on the remarkable tumor growth we noted during the work–up, with palliative treatment the patient would likely survive for less than six months. Conventional treatment, in which surgery is done to remove part of the tumor while sparing the nerves to bowel and bladder function, was known to have a high rate of recurrence and death. Further, this tumor didn’t respond well to radiation and chemotherapy, so chance of survival was limited, although his life might have been extended for a short period. Thus our conversation turned to the novel “en bloc” procedure.The en bloc procedure offered a hope of long–term survival unlike the other options. However, this came with an enormous cost. The surgery itself would be planned to occur over three days with five separate surgical teams and a very real chance of major complications or death. Nerves to bowel and bladder would be cut, irreversibly leaving the patient without sexual function, and completely incontinent with a urinary catheter and colostomy. Walking was expected to be disrupted or potentially impossible due to the nerve resection. We went to great lengths over the course of many visits to describe the impact of the surgery on the patient’s function, and the impact on his quality of life. To make matters more challenging, as this procedure was so new and the tumor so rare, research did not yet exist to quantify his likelihood of long–term survival.Personally I was very uncomfortable with the situation. From a medical standpoint, the surgery offered was the best distillation of research and professional experience. En bloc surgery offered the best—if not the only—chance for survival in [End Page 5] this young man. Additionally, having treated many spine–injured patients I was aware that many patients with similar deficits led happy and productive lives following an emotional and physical adjustment period. However the surgery was also extreme. I worried that we would not be able to accomplish the goal of a one–piece resection and would accidentally spill some of the tumor, creating all of the deficits but no survival benefit. Frankly, I thought there was a 25% chance that would happen, which was explained to the family preoperatively. Were we overreaching our abilities and making a dying patient’s life worse by proceeding?Second, I was uneasy about the social situation. The patient’s family was very supportive, traveling with him to all appointments and assisting with his care. The patient himself usually deferred all scheduling to his mother, which wasn’t entirely unusual for such a young man. However it was difficult to grasp how much the patient understood of his disease or supported the plan. We attempted to delve more deeply into his thoughts, including without his parents present, but got only short answers, which revealed little. While the family appeared to have accepted the diagnosis and wanted to get to the business of treatment, the patient seemed to me to still carry the shock of his recent cancer diagnosis. Pushed by the rapid tumor growth, we were limited in how long we could wait for... (shrink)

INCONTINENCE, HONOURING SUNK COSTS AND RATIONALITY According to a basic principle of rationality, the decision to engage in a course of action should be determined solely by the analysis of its consequences. Thus, considerations associated with previous use of resources should have no bearing on an agent’s decision-making process. Frequently, however, agents persist carrying on an activity they themselves judge to be nonoptimal under the circumstances because they have already allocated resources to that activity. When this is the case, (...) agents are said to be honouring sunk costs. Honouring sunk costs is thus typically viewed as irrational economic behaviour. Two striking findings of the psychological literature on the sunk cost effect are that it is, in general, not lessened by having taken previously courses in economics, and that agents who did take such courses and that do honour sunk costs seem to be frequently aware of a cognitive dissonance in their behaviour. Davidson’s account of the possibility conditions of incontinent action renders continent action materially unfeasible. The very idea of incontinent action becomes thus a hollow one. I’ll present an alternative description of these possibility conditions that renders continent action materially feasible, and both, continent and incontinent action, cognitively plausible. In a nutshell, my proposal rests upon the drawing of an essential cognitive contrast between explicit processes of deliberative reasoning and lower level heuristic procedures. I conclude the paper arguing that my redescription of incontinent action accounts for the above mentioned cognitive dissonance effect better than the alternatives and that viewing at least an important subset of behaviours of honouring sunk costs as incontinent actions will enable us to consider them as peculiar manifestations of a more general and meaningful pattern in human behaviour. (shrink)

In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be at (...) odds with his performing the action at issue. More precisely, in intentionally and freely A-ing at t, S performs a full-blown akratic action if and only if, at t, S consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not doing an A at t. What I am after in this paper is an account of a comparable, full-blown variety of incontinent believing, and an explanation of its possibility. (shrink)

The traditional problem of incontinence raises the question of whether there is any way to account for action contrary to judgment. When one acts, rather than only being acted upon by circumstances, the action is explained in terms of the reasons for action one judges oneself to have. It therefore seems impossible to explain action that iscontrary to such judgment. This paper examines the question of how such explanation would be possible. After excluding accounts that either eliminate incontinence (...) or render it inexplicable, I argue that genuine incontinence would require three components: first, a distinction between the types of judgments simultaneously present in the agent; second, the Aristotelian idea that not all of those types of judgments can be directly action-guiding; and third, that the judgments that are action-guiding can be pre-conceptual perceptions. I then use elements of Collingwood's aesthetics to make the case that although such pre-conceptual perceptions would not be propositional judgments and the relationship between them and the behaviors of the agent could not be causal, those behaviors could still qualify as incontinent actions. (shrink)

Alfred Mele has recentIy attempted to direct attention to a neglected species of irrational belief which he calls ‘incontinent belief’. He has devoted a paper and an entire chapter (chapter eight) of his book, Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 1987) to explaining its logical possibility. In what follows, I will appeal to familiar facts about the difference between belief and action to make a case that it is entirely unproblematic that incontinent belief is logically possible. In the process, I will call (...) into question the philosophical intercst of incontinent belief. If what I say is correct, incontinent belief does not warrant the attention of philosophers of mind. (shrink)

The “formidably brilliant” Žižek considers sexuality, ontology, subjectivity, and Marxian critiques of political economy by way of Lacanian psychoanalysis. If the most interesting theoretical interventions emerge today from the interspaces between fields, then the foremost interspaceman is Slavoj Žižek. In Incontinence of the Void (the title is inspired by a sentence in Samuel Beckett's late masterpiece Ill Seen Ill Said), Žižek explores the empty spaces between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and the critique of political economy. He proceeds from the universal dimension (...) of philosophy to the particular dimension of sexuality to the singular dimension of the critique of political economy. The passage from one dimension to another is immanent: the ontological void is accessible only through the impasses of sexuation and the ongoing prospect of the abolition of sexuality, which is itself opened up by the technoscientific progress of global capitalism, in turn leading to the critique of political economy. Responding to his colleague and fellow Short Circuits author Alenka Zupančič's What Is Sex?, Žižek examines the notion of an excessive element in ontology that gives body to radical negativity, which becomes the antagonism of sexual difference. From the economico-philosophical perspective, Žižek extrapolates from ontological excess to Marxian surplus value to Lacan's surplus enjoyment. In true Žižekian fashion, Incontinence of the Void focuses on eternal topics while detouring freely into contemporary issuesfrom the Internet of Things to Danish TV series. (shrink)

Is there a rational requirement enjoining continence over time in the intentions one has formed, such that anyone going in for a certain form of agency has standing reason to conform to such a requirement? This paper suggests that there is not. I argue that Michael Bratman’s defense of such a requirement succeeds in showing that many agents have a reason favoring default intention continence much of the time, but does not establish that all planning agents have such a reason (...) in every case of intending. I then defend an account on which such a reason is grounded in the need to maintain the capacity to commit oneself to a practical option. But although I think this applies more widely than Bratman’s account, it is also not a reason that any planning agent has in every case. I tentatively conclude that although we have many good reasons to stick with our intentions once we have formed them, it is not required by rationality. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest a reconstruction of the traditional concepts of con-tinent and incontinent action. This reconstruction proceeds along the lines of a standpoint of bounded rationality. My suggestion agrees with some relevant aspects of Davidson’s treatment of this topic. One of these aspects is that incontinent action is typically signalled by the following two subjective experiences: a feeling of surprise towards one’s own action and a difficulty in understanding oneself; another is that incontinence cannot simply be disposed (...) of in terms of some inability of the agent to avoid “succumbing to temptation”; still another is the view that inconti-nent action is common in real human affairs. But my suggestion dis-agrees with other relevant aspects of Davidson’s treatment of inconti-nence too. In particular, it avoids what I take to be its two major draw-backs. These are a view of continent action that falls prey to a com-pletely unrealistic concept of psychological rationality and the idea that incontinence necessarily involves a dimension of essential irrationality. (shrink)

토마스 아퀴나스의 자제력 없음 논의는 아리스토텔레스로부터 많은 영향을 받았음에도, 그만의 독특함이 여실히 드러나는 중요한 문제이다. 토마스는 『윤리학주해』, 『신학대전』, 『악론』에서 ‘선택으로 말미암지 않고(non ex electione)’, ‘선택하면서(eligens)’, ‘감정으로 인해(ex passione)’라는 세 가지 계기를 통해 자제력 없음을 설명한다. 토마스는 자제력 없음을 ‘선택에서 어긋나는 것’으로 설명하면서도, 자제력 없음에 ‘선택한다’는 설명을 주고 있다. 즉, 자제력 없음에 개입하는 ‘선택’은 아리스토텔레스와 갈라서는 토마스만의 새로운 이론임을 드러내는 동시에, 일견 상충되어 보이는 문제를 안고 있다. 이에 우선 토마스의 자제력 없음을 면밀히 분석하여 선택과 관련된 진술이 주는 외견상의 모순을 푸는 것이 (...) 본 논문의 하나의 목표이다. 이러한 분석을 통해 필자는 토마스가 의지와의 깊은 연관 속에서 자제력 없음을 다루고 있음을 드러내며, 그럼에도 불구하고 토마스가 자제력 없음에서 핵심으로 파악하고 있는 것이 감정이라는 점을 밝힐 것이다. 이 논의를 토대로, 자제력 없음의 제일원인을 의지에서 찾고 이로 인해 자제력 없음을 의지의 약함과 동일하게 이해하는 입장을 비판적으로 검토하며, 이 둘의 관계를 정확하게 설정하는 것이 본 논문의 다음 목표이다. 토마스는 자제력 없음뿐만 아니라 의지의 약함에서도, 의지가 아닌 ‘감정’에 제일원인으로서의 설명력을 부여하고 있다. 즉, 자제력 없음의 제일원인은 감정이며 의지의 약함의 제일원인도 감정이므로, 이 둘은 ‘감정’을 매개로 연결된다. 이때 의지의 약함은 모든 감정에, 자제력 없음은 욕망에 관련된 감각적 욕구에 관련되기 때문에, 자제력 없음이 의지의 약함에 포함되는 것이 이 둘의 구체적인 관계로 적절하다. 이처럼 자제력 없음과 의지의 약함을 분석할 때, 그 중심에는 ‘감정’이 놓여있으며, 감정을 간과해서는 안 될 중요한 요인으로 바라볼 때에야 비로소 자제력 없음과 의지의 약함은 온전히 이해될 수 있다. (shrink)

Moral incontinence (that is, knowing what one ought to do but doing otherwise) has often been explained in terms of psychological incapacity/inability (that is, “ought but can’t”). However, Socrates and others have argued that, whenever it is physically possible to act, there can be no rupture between judgment and behavior and therefore there are no instances of “ought but can’t”.The analysis that follows will conclude either that Socrates was correct in holding that there are no ruptures between judgment and (...) behavior or that, if there are such ruptures, then explanations in terms of psychological incapacity/inability are inappropriate. (shrink)

Discusses Aristotle's limitation of incontinence proper to the field of temperance, temptation by noble ends, the nature of incontinent ignorance, and what it is to use one's practical knowledge.

Brian McLaughlin, in “Incontinent Belief” (Journal of Philosophical Research 15 [1989-90], pp. 115-26), takes issue with my investigation, in lrrationality (Oxford University Press, 1987), of a doxastic analogue of akratic action. He deems what I term “strict akratic belief” philosophically uninteresting. In the present paper, I explain that this assessment rests on a serious confusion about the sort of possibility that is at issue in my chapter on the topic, correct a variety of misimpressions, and rebut McLaughlin’s arguments as they (...) apply to the psychological possibility of strict akratic belief and to the etiology of beliefs generally. (shrink)

Argumentation virtue theory is a new field in argumentation studies. As in the case of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the study of virtue argumentation draws its inspiration from the works of Aristotle. First, I discuss the specifics of the argumentational virtues and suggest that they have an instrumental nature, modeled on the relation between the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ and the moral virtues. Then, inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia, I suggest that a theory of fallacy in (...) argumentation virtue theory can be built upon the concept of ‘incontinence’. (shrink)

In philosophy of action, we typically aim to explain action by appealing to conative attitudes whose contents are either logically consistent propositions or can be rendered as such. Call this “the logical criterion.” This is especially difficult to do with clear-minded, intentional incontinence since we have to explain how two judgments can have non-contradicting contents yet still aim at contradictory outcomes. Davidson devises an innovative way of doing this but compromises his ability to explain how our better judgments can (...) cause our continent behaviors. In this essay, I preserve Davidson’s approach to the logical criterion but deviate from his broader theory of action by developing a default-interventionist dual systems theory of action. To do this, I focus on the dynamical relationship between System 1 and System 2: the logical construction of value judgments in System 2 from System 1 and the imaginative construction of non-propositional conative attitudes in System 1 from System 2. I draw on Street’s Humean constructivism and Peacocke’s theory of imagination for logical and imaginative construction, respectively. Within this framework, I provide a new definition of continence and incontinence that satisfies the logical criterion and explains how our better judgments can cause our continent behaviors. (shrink)

Tired of being weak-willed? Do you want to end procrastination and back-sliding? Are you envious of those paragons of self-control who always do what they consider best? Thanks to a breakthrough in therapeutic philosophy, you too can now close the gap between what you think you ought to do and what you actually do. Just send $1000 to the address below and you will never again succumb to temptation. This is a MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE. The first time you do something that (...) you know to be irrational, your money will be refunded, no questions asked. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 5, August 2019, Page 570-578.

Included among the many topics on which Aristotle writes in the Nicomacheon Ethics is an account of incontinence or akrasia. Many controversies have arisen among interpreters of Aristotle on this issue, and a few of these disputes will be discussed in this paper. In the first part of this paper I shall indicate the usual way of reading Aristotle's account of incontinence, which I shall call the natural interpretation. In the second section I shall raise some apparent difficulties (...) with the natural interpretation by pointing out three passages in the Nicomacheon Ethics which seem to be inconsistent with it. Finally, in the concluding three sections of this paper I shall argue that the three passages allegedly inconsistent with the natural interpretation can be shown to be consistent with the general line of argument that the natural interpretation takes Aristotle to be following. In showing how these passages can be reconciled with the usual way of reading Aristotle's account of akrasia, a much clearer and more complete picture of what his view is emerges. In addition, this reading makes Aristotle's account of incontinence more philosophically acceptable - though it is not without its problems - than it is normally supposed to be. (shrink)

BackgroundMental stress and imbalance of its two neural stress systems, the autonomic nervous system and the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis, are associated with chronic prostatitis/chronic pelvic pain syndrome and erectile dysfunction. However, the comprehensive analyses of psychological stress and stress systems are under-investigated, particularly in CP/CPPS patients complicated by lower urinary tract symptoms and ED.Materials and methodsParticipants were 95 patients in CP/CPPS+ED group, 290 patients in CP/CPPS group, 124 patients in ED group and 52 healthy men in control group. The National (...) Institutes of Health Chronic Prostatitis Symptom Index, the International Index of Erectile Function-5 and the International Prostate Symptom Score were used for assessing the disease severity of CP/CPPS, LUTS and ED. Psychometric self-report questionnaires including the Beck Anxiety Inventory, Perceived Stress Scale, Type A Personality Test and Symptom Checklist 90 were completed for distress from physical symptoms. Twenty-five subjects per group were randomly selected for further investigating the changes of the HPA axis and ANS. Saliva samples were taken on 3 consecutive days at 8 specific times with strict reference to time of morning awakening for evaluation of free cortisol. Heart rate variability as marker of the ANS was measured using 24 h electrocardiography, and time-and frequency-domain variables were analyzed.ResultsThe BAI and SCL-90 scores were significantly higher in the CP/CPPS+ED, CP/CPPS and ED groups compared with the control group. The PSS scores of both groups with ED were significantly higher than the control group. Compared with the CP/CPPS group, the differences of PSS, SCL-90 and TAPT scores were statistically significant in CP/CPPS+ED patients. The IPSS scores were shown to have significantly positive correlations with BAI, PSS and SCL-90 in the CP/CPPS patients. However, in all subjects, the IIEF-5 scores were shown to have significantly negative correlations with BAI, PSS, SCL-90 and quality of life score in NIH-CPSI. Cortisol awakening response parameters and diurnal cortisol levels did not significantly vary between the four groups. Time-dependent parameters of HRV also did not differ significantly across groups. In the frequency domain analysis, low frequency was significantly lower in ED patients when compared with CP/CPPS+ED patients and healthy controls, high frequency power was significantly higher in healthy controls compared to patients with ED, CP/CPPS and CP/CPPS+ED, and the CP/CPPS+ED group had significantly higher LF/HF ratio than the control group.ConclusionCP/CPPS and ED patients score exceedingly high on most psychosocial variables. The symptom scores of LUTS and ED positively correlate with the severity of psychological stress. Our findings also suggest that the ANS sympathovagal imbalance is associated with ED and LUTS in CP/CPPS, whereas HPA axis activity is not. (shrink)

This cross-sectional study, which included men aged 20–40 years, aimed to determine the relationships among type D personality, depressive symptoms and lower urinary tract symptoms in young men. An internet-based questionnaire was administered, and General demographics, International Prostate Symptom Scores, Type D Scale-14 scores, and Depression and Somatic Symptom Scale scores were analyzed. A total of 3,127 men were included; of these, 762 reported moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms, and 1,565 met the criteria for type D personality. Men (...) with type D personality had significantly higher body mass index and total and sub-scores for the International Prostate Symptom Score and Depression and Somatic Symptom Scale. Furthermore, the type D personality group had a higher prevalence of lower urinary tract symptoms, particularly voiding symptoms. Univariate analysis revealed that all parameters, except for body mass index, were significant predictors of moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms. Multivariate analysis showed that age >30 years, type D personality, and depressive and somatic Depression and Somatic Symptom Scale sub-scores were independent predictors of moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms. Regarding Type D Scale-14 subscales, social inhibition, rather than negative affectivity, impacted moderate/severe lower urinary tract symptoms. Mediation analysis revealed that depressive symptoms mediated the relationship between type D personality and lower urinary tract symptoms. This study established correlations between type D personality, depressive symptoms, and lower urinary tract symptoms. As previous studies suggested that patients with type D personality are less likely to consult and adhere to treatment, and are at higher risk for depression, urologists should therefore actively recognize patients with TDP. (shrink)

Acetyltransferase enzymes expressed in hepatic and extrahepatic tissues are products of an acetyltransferase gene locus. Acetylation capacity is regulated by simple autosomal Mendelian inheritance of two codominant alleles at this locus. Human slow acetylators are predisposed to bladder cancer from arylamine chemicals. The role of the bladder in arylamine metabolism and of bladder acetyltransferases in the etiology of bladder cancer is not fully understood, but the acetylator genotype‐dependent expression of arylamine N‐acetyltransferase and N‐hydroxyarylamine O‐acetyltransferase in bladder cytosol may contribute towards (...) the genetic predisposition of human slow acetylators to arylamine‐induced bladder cancer. (shrink)