Results for 'vehicle externalism'

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  1. Vehicle externalism and the metaphysics of the incarnation: a medieval contribution.Richard Cross - 2011 - In Anna Marmodoro & Jonathan Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the Incarnation. Oxford University Press USA.
     
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  2. Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations.Michael Madary - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing.
    Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three (...)
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  3. Active perception and vehicle externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether (...)
     
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  4. The self between vehicle externalism and the Myth of the Cartesian Theatre.Giuseppe Vicari - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):111-128.
     
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  5.  2
    How is Content Externalism Characterized by Vehicle Externalists.Dunja Jutronić - 2024 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 24 (72):351-366.
    Content externalism and vehicle externalism (what-externalism and how—externalism) or more commonly known as the thesis of extended mind, are said to be two totally independent views that ”diverge sharply” (Stanford encyclopedia). There are advocates, adversaries but also ag nostics about the extended mind thesis. The approach has been much debated and the controversies about vehicle externalism are importantly manifold. I am not going into any of them. My aim is different and fo cused (...)
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  6.  82
    From Content-Externalism to Vehicle-Externalism.Crystal L’Hote - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (2):275-287.
    ABSTRACT: Consensus has it that Putnam-Burge style arguments for content-externalism do not strengthen the case for vehicle-externalism, i.e., the thesis that some mental states include as their parts notebooks, iPhones, and other extra-bodily phenomena. Rowlands and Sprevak, among others, argue that vehicle-externalism gets stronger support from Clark and Chalmers’s parity principle and functionalism, generally. I contest this assessment and thereby give reason to reconsider the support that content-externalism provides the extended mind thesis: although content- (...) does not entail vehicle-externalism, as Rowlands argues, neither does functionalism. The functionalist cannot reject the content-externalist argument for vehicle-externalism on these grounds without undercutting her own.Export citation Request permission. (shrink)
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  7. Active perception and vehicle externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether (...)
     
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  8. Putting the brakes on vehicle externalism: two economic examples.Dan Fitzpatrick - 2007 - In Barbara Montero & Mark D. White (eds.), Economics and the mind. New York: Routledge.
     
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  9.  13
    The Spread Mind: Phenomenal Process-Oriented Vehicle Externalism.Riccardo Manzotti - 2011 - In Michael Blamauer (ed.), The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism. Ontos Verlag. pp. 79-98.
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  10. Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press. pp. 78--91.
  11. Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure, and Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
    We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice (...)
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  12. The depths and shallows of psychological externalism.Andrew Sneddon - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):393 - 408.
    This paper examines extant ways of classifying varieties of psychological externalism and argues that they imply a hitherto unrecognized distinction between shallow and deep externalism. The difference is between starting points: shallowly externalist hypotheses begin with the attribution of psychological states to individuals, just as individualistic hypotheses do, whereas deeply externalistic hypotheses begin with agent-environment interaction as the basis of cognitive processes and attribute psychological states to individuals as necessary for such interaction. The over-arching aim is to show (...)
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  13. The delocalized mind. Judgements, vehicles, and persons.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):1-24.
    Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...)
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  14. (1 other version)The transparency of mental vehicles.Michael Murez - 2023 - Noûs:1-28.
    Modes of presentation (MOPs) are often said to have to be transparent, usually in the sense that thinkers can know solely via introspection whether or not they are deploying the same one. While there has been much discussion of threats to transparency stemming from externalism, another threat to transparency has gar- nered less attention. This novel threat arises if MOPs are robust, as I argue they should be according to internalist views of MOPs which identify them with represen- tational (...)
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  15. The “New Mind” revisited, or minding the content/vehicle distinction: a response to Manzotti and Pepperell.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (4):461-466.
    I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications (...)
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  16. Active Content Externalism.Holger Lyre - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):17-33.
    The aim of this paper is to scrutinize active externalism and its repercussions for externalism about mental content. I start from the claim that active externalism is a version of content externalism that follows from the extended cognition thesis as a thesis about cognitive vehicles. Various features of active content externalism are explored by comparison with the known forms of passive externalism – in particular with respect to the multiple realizability of the relevant external (...)
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  17. Where is my mind? Mark Rowlands on the vehicles of cognition.Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  18.  28
    (Anti)Realist Implications of a Pragmatist Dual-Process Active-Externalist Theory of Experience.F. Thomas Burke - 2008 - Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):187-211.
    Realism/antirealism issues are considered in light of a pragmatist dual-process active-externalist theory of experience. This theory posits two kinds of experience such that mentality (as a capacity for thinking, hypothesizing, theorizing, reasoning, deliberating) constitutes one of the two kinds of experience. The formal correspondence of theory with facts is characterized in terms of a functional correspondence between these two kinds of experience. Realist and constructivist aspects of this view are then discussed. Active externalism guarantees a kind of ecological realism (...)
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  19. ‘Does Epistemic Naturalism vindicate Semantic Externalism?’- An Episto-semantical Review’.Sanjit Chakraborty - 2017 - RAVENSHAW JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 3:27-37.
    The paper concentrates on how the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts Quine to ponder the naturalized epistemology. W.V. Quine was fascinated by the evidential acquisition of scientific knowledge, and language as a vehicle of knowledge plays a significant role in his regimented naturalistic theory anchored in the scientific framework. My point is that there is an interesting shift from epistemology to language (semantic externalism). The rejection of the mentalist approach on meaning vindicates external (...)
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  20. Review of Mark Rowland's Externalism[REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - unknown
    The book has two di sti ncti ve features. One is that while philosophers’discussions of externalism tend to be very technical, Rowlands presents his own discussion in an accessible manner. The second, more distinctive than the first, is that Rowlands treats the concept of externalism as a topic in both analytic and continental traditions of philosophy. In Chapter 2 Rowlands introduces the Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, which appears inconsistent with externalism. Rowlands claims that Cartesianism consists (...)
     
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  21. (1 other version)Note on Mark Rowland's Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. [REVIEW]Yujin Nagasawa - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:150-151.
    The book has two distinctive features. One is that while philosophers’discussions of externalism tend to be very technical, Rowlands presents his own discussion in an accessible manner. The second, more distinctive than the first, is that Rowlands treats the concept of externalism as a topic in both analytic and continental traditions of philosophy. In Chapter 2 Rowlands introduces the Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, which appears inconsistent with externalism. Rowlands claims that Cartesianism consists of three types (...)
     
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  22. Reconciling justificatory internalism and content externalism.Chris Tillman - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
    At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1 I explain the threat to (...)
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  23. Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content.Karina Vold & Dirk Schlimm - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3757-3777.
    Vehicle externalism maintains that the vehicles of our mental representations can be located outside of the head, that is, they need not be instantiated by neurons located inside the brain of the cogniser. But some disagree, insisting that ‘non-derived’, or ‘original’, content is the mark of the cognitive and that only biologically instantiated representational vehicles can have non-derived content, while the contents of all extra-neural representational vehicles are derived and thus lie outside the scope of the cognitive. In (...)
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  24.  47
    Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.
    It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument (...)
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  25. Predictive processing and extended consciousness: why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head and the DEUTS argument won’t let it leak outside.Marco Facchin & Niccolò Negro - 2023 - In Mark-Oliver Casper & Giuseppe Flavio Artese (eds.), Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations. Springer Verlag.
    Consciousness vehicle externalism is the claim that the material machinery of a subject’s phenomenology partially leaks outside a subject’s brain, encompassing bodily and environmental structures. The DEUTS argument is the most prominent argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. In a recent series of publications, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have deployed such an argument to claim that a prominent view of neural processing, namely predictive processing, is fully compatible with CVE. Indeed, in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, a proper (...)
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  26. Extended minds and prime mental conditions: probing the parallels.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - In Carter Joseph Adam, Clark Andy, Kallestrup Jesper, Palermos Spyridon Orestis & Pritchard Duncan (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 147-161.
    Two very different forms of externalism about mental states appear prima facie unrelated: Williamson’s (1995, 2000) claim that knowledge is a mental state, and Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind hypothesis. I demonstrate, however, that the two approaches justify their radically externalist by appealing to the same argument from explanatory generality. I argue that if one accepts either Williamson’s claims or Clark & Chalmers’ claims on considerations of explanatory generality then, ceteris paribus, one should accept the other. This conclusion (...)
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  27.  60
    Socially Extended Cognition and Shared Intentionality.Holger Lyre - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:351766.
    The paper looks at the intersection of extended cognition and social cognition. The central claim is that the mechanisms of shared intentionality can equally be considered as coupling mechanisms of cognitive extension into the social domain. This claim will be demonstrated by investigating a detailed example of cooperative action, and it will be argued that such cases imply that socially extended cognition is not only about cognitive vehicles, but that content must additionally to be taken into account. It is finally (...)
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  28.  44
    Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change.Pierre Steiner - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):547-569.
    Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think (...)
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  29. The Revolution will not be Optimised: Radical Enactivism, Extended Functionalism and the Extensive Mind.Michael Wheeler - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):457-472.
    Optimising the 4E revolution in cognitive science arguably requires the rejection of two guiding commitments made by orthodox thinking in the field, namely that the material realisers of cognitive states and processes are located entirely inside the head, and that intelligent thought and action are to be explained in terms of the building and manipulation of content-bearing representations. In other words, the full-strength 4E revolution would be secured only by a position that delivered externalism plus antirepresentationalism. I argue that (...)
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  30. Access Internalism and the Extended Mind.Declan Smithies - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-41.
    The main goal of this chapter is to argue that accessibilism in epistemology is incompatible with vehicle externalism in philosophy of mind. As we shall see, however, there are strong arguments for both of these positions. On the one hand, there is a compelling argument for vehicle externalism: the parity argument from Clark and Chalmers 1998. On the other hand, there is a compelling argument for accessibilism: the Moorean argument from Smithies 2012. If accessibilism is incompatible (...)
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  31. Extending Existential Feeling Through Sensory Substitution.Jussi A. Saarinen - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-24.
    In current philosophy of mind, there is lively debate over whether emotions, moods, and other affects can extend to comprise elements beyond one’s organismic boundaries. At the same time, there has been growing interest in the nature and significance of so-called existential feelings, which, as the term suggests, are feelings of one’s overall being in the world. In this article, I bring these two strands of investigation together to ask: Can the material underpinnings of existential feelings extend beyond one’s skull (...)
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  32. Nativism and the Theory of Content.David Pitt - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:222-239.
    Externalism is the view that the intentional content of a mental state supervenes on its relations to objects in the extramental world. Nativism is the view that some of the innate states of the mind/brain have intentional content. I consider both “causal” and “nomic” versions of externalism, and argue that both are incompatible with nativism. I consider likely candidates for a compatibilist position – a nativism of “narrow” representational states, and a nativism of the contentless formal “vehicles” of (...)
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  33. The normativity of action.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.
    The concept of action is playing an increasingly prominent role in attempts to explain how subjects can represent the world. The idea is that at least some of the role traditionally assigned to internal representations can, in fact, be played by the ability of subjects to act on the world, and the exercise of that ability on appropriate occasions. This paper argues that the appeal to action faces a serious dilemma. If the concept of action employed is a representational one, (...)
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  34. Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy.Itay Shani - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-26.
    This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world—a conclusion which follows from (...)
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  35.  19
    The Extended Mind: Was ist eigentlich mit "Mind" gemeint? Zum Verhältnis von Geist und Kognition.Jan G. Michel - 2015 - In Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.), Ist der Geist im Kopf? Beiträge zur These des erweiterten Geistes. Brill/mentis. pp. 57-82.
  36. Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an (...)
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  37. Common-sense functionalism and the extended mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.
    The main claim of this paper is that Andy Clark's most influential argument for ‘the extended mind thesis’ (EM henceforth) fails. Clark's argument for EM assumes that a certain form of common-sense functionalism is true. I argue, contra Clark, that the assumed brand of common-sense functionalism does not imply EM. Clark's argument also relies on an unspoken, undefended and optional assumption about the nature of mental kinds—an assumption denied by the very common-sense functionalists on whom Clark's argument draws. I also (...)
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  38. Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit (...)
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  39. Erweiterte Kognition und mentaler Externalismus.Holger Lyre - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (2):190-215.
    Recent developments under the keywords dynamicism, embodiment and situated cognition suggest the view that cognitive systems are not confined to the neural sys‐tem but leak into the world beyond the traditional system boundaries. This is the thesis of extended cognition. Such an extension of the cognitive vehicles leads to a new kind of content externalism, known as active externalism. The essay pursues three objectives: firstly, to distinguish the theses of extended cognitive and active externalism. Secondly, to delineate (...)
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  40. Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive.Dr Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1-19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM), at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an adequate (...)
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  41.  60
    Human-Extended Machine Cognition.Paul Smart - 2018 - Cognitive Systems Research 49:9–23.
    Human-extended machine cognition is a specific form of artificial intelligence in which the casually-active physical vehicles of machine-based cognitive states and processes include one or more human agents. Human-extended machine cognition is thus a specific form of extended cognition that sees human agents as constituent parts of the physical fabric that realizes machine-based cognitive capabilities. This idea is important, not just because of its impact on current philosophical debates about the extended character of human cognition, but also because it helps (...)
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  42. The spread mind. Is consciousness situated?".Riccardo Manzotti - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):55-78.
    If phenomenal experience is a physical phenomenon, it must occur at some spatial and temporal location. Can consciousness be situated in such a strong sense? Although the importance of embodiment and situatedness is often mentioned, most neuroscientists and philosophers alike consider phenomenal experience as an outcome of neural activity. In this paper, the question I would raise is whether the physical underpinnings of conscious experience may be identical with processes temporally and spatially extended beyond the boundary of the skull and (...)
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  43.  93
    Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded.Richard Menary - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we (...)
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  44. Superdupersizing the mind: Extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports in (...)
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  45. Affordances and the normativity of emotions.Rebekka Hufendiek - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4455-4476.
    The normativity of emotions is a widely discussed phenomenon. So far embodied accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the various aspects of the normativity of emotions. In this paper it shall be pointed out that embodied accounts are constrained in the way they can account for the normativity of emotions due to their commitments to naturalism, externalism, and anti-vehicle-internalism. One way to account for the normativity of emotions within a naturalist framework is to describe the intentional objects (...)
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  46. Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.
    This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one approach to naturalising content – to giving a naturalistic account of what makes an entity a representation and in virtue of what it has the content it does. It argues for pluralism about the metaphysics of content and suggests that a good strategy is to ask the content question with respect to a variety of predictively successful information processing models in experimental psychology and cognitive (...)
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  47. Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...)
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  48. Whose Consciousness? Reflexivity and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Mark Siderits, Ching Keng & John Spackman (eds.), Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 121-153.
    If I am aware that p, say, that it is raining, is it the case that I must be aware that I am aware that p? Does introspective or object-awareness entail the apprehension of mental states as being of some kind or another: self-monitoring or intentional? That is, are cognitive events implicitly self-aware or is “self-awareness” just another term for metacognition? Not surprisingly, intuitions on the matter vary widely. This paper proposes a novel solution to this classical debate by reframing (...)
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  49.  57
    Externalisms.Maria Cristina Amoretti & Riccardo Manzotti - 2012 - Rivista di Filosofia 103 (1):41-68.
  50. Boundless thought. The case of conceptual mental episodes.Pierre Steiner - 2012 - Manuscrito 35 (2):269-309.
    I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is (...)
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