La pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau est essentiellement une pensée politique, qui oscille entre un pôle transpolitique, que le citoyen de Genève incarne, par exemple, dans les personnages du législateur, du pédagogue et du sage, et un pôle prépolitique, où figurent l'homme naturel, le marginal et l'homme sensible. C'est en examinant quelques pages de trois grandes oeuvres de Rousseau: l'« Emile », « Du contrat social » et « Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse », que je tenterai d'éclaircir brièvement ces points. (...) Ainsi sera manifestée l'actualité des paradoxes rousseauistes.Rousseau's thought is essentially a political thought that swings from a transpolitical pole, presented through the figures of the legislator, the pedagogue and the wise man, and a prepolitical pole, where we meet natural man, the outsider and the man of exquisite sensibility. This theme is brought to light through a partial analysis of three of Rousseau's major works : " Emile ", " Du contrat social " and the "Nouvelle Héloïse". In this way, it is hoped that Rousseau's paradoxes will be shown to have meaning for our contemporaries. (shrink)

“This book will certainly prove to be a useful resource and reference point … a good addition to anyone’s bookshelf.” Network "This is a superb collection, expertly presented. The overall conception seems splendid, giving an excellent sense of the issues... The selection and length of the readings is admirably judged, with both the classic texts and the few unpublished pieces making just the right points." William Outhwaite, Professor of Sociology, University of Sussex "... an indispensable book for all of us (...) in philosophy and the social sciences who teach and care about the shape of social knowledge in the future." Steven Seidman, Professor of Sociology, State University of New York Albany "For a comprehensive account of the ways in which world transformations affect claims to social scientific knowledge, one need look no further than Gerard Delanty and Piet Strydom's Philosophies of Social Science . ...this collection captures nicely the increasingly engaged political nature of the philosophy of social science. Debates about pragmatism, feminism and postmodernism are particularly well represented" The Australian What is social science? How does it differ from the other sciences? What is the meaning of method in social science? What is the nature and limits of scientific knowledge? This collection of over sixty extracts from classic works on the philosophy of social science provides an essential textbook and a landmark reference in the field. It highlights the work of some of the most influential authors who have shaped social science. The texts explore the question of truth, the meaning of scientific knowledge, the nature of methodology and the relation of science to society, including edited extracts from both classic and contemporary works by authors such as Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Max Horkheimer, Jurgen Habermas, Alvin Gouldner, Karl-Otto Apel, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Dorothy Smith, Donna Haraway, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Derrida and Claude Levi-Strauss. The readings are representative of the major schools of thought, including European and American trends in particular as well as approaches that are often excluded from mainstream traditions. From a teaching and learning perspective the volume is strengthened by extensive introductions to each of the six sections, as well as a general introduction to the reader as a whole. These introductions contextualise the readings and offer succinct summaries of them. This volume is the definitive companion to the study of the philosophy of social science, taught within undergraduate or postgraduate courses in sociology and the social sciences. (shrink)

The Belgian scientific literature dealing with political parties has four main characteristics. First it pays great attention to party doctrines and to parliamentary struggle. Indeed, in the nineteenth century political parties do not strike by their organization, which is still undeveloped, nor by their functions, which are still limited, but by the public debate they are stimulating in Parliament and in the press. Only from the end of the century, when the suffrage is extended, the organization of the parties wilt (...) get more articulated and their functions more complicated. Secondly the literature pays great attention to the legitimation of the political parties, which are still controversial particularly because they should threaten the national union. The authors exert oneselves to prove that parliamentary government is by definition a party government. They distinguish parties from factions in order to make the first acceptable. Thirdly the literature deals with the party system.The Belgian authors take the two party system which exists in Great Britain as example and try to prove that the alternation of two parties, the party of conservation and the party of progress, is necessary for the good working of the institutions. Fourthly, the literature, particularly the historica!, is rather descriptive and is characterized by a lack of comparisons, generalizations and hypothesis.Two periods can be distinguished in the literature. In the first period, 1830-1894, the suffrage is limited and the political scene is dominated by two parties.This period is marked by the publications of Emile de Laveleye, one of the most prolific writers of the second half of the nineteenth century. In the second period, 1894-1914, the advent of the socialist party disturbs the working of the classical party government. Maurice Vauthier is the main author of this period. He tries to establish the characteristics of the party government and its chances in the future. (shrink)

This paper examines the madness of Gerard de Nerval, the nineteenth-century French writer. It looks at his account of mental disturbance, how he responded to the psychiatric profession and how he reacted to being diagnosed as insane. It considers his autobiographical novella of madness, Aurelia, which he began at the suggestion of his alienist, Dr Emile Blanche, and while he was still an asylum inmate. Nerval's story raises important questions about the nature of madness. Is it, as he contended, a (...) mystical experience revealing truths about spiritual worlds inaccessible to the ‘sane’? Does psychiatry fail to understand it and inappropriately reduce it to the categories of scientific reason? Or are such notions of the spiritual value of madness guilty of the charge that they romanticise insanity? Do they make extravagant claims for an experience that is often disturbing and debilitating? What is the relationship between madness and recovery? Should an individual try to forget their experience of mental disturbance once they recover, or should they examine what the event reveals about themselves? Can the language of madness be decoded to unveil profound truths as Carl Jung and R.D. Laing have suggested, or is it, as the psychiatrist German Berrios maintains, merely a series of ‘empty speech acts’, signifying nothing? And finally, how does one avoid writing about madness, and instead write madness? (shrink)

Anglo-Saxon schools of metascience.--Continental schools of metascience.--Toward a theory of research that is neither logical reconstruction nor psychology or sociology of science.--References (p. 420-438).

We present a Kripke model for Girard's Linear Logic (without exponentials) in a conservative fashion where the logical functors beyond the basic lattice operations may be added one by one without recourse to such things as negation. You can either have some logical functors or not as you choose. Commutatively and associatively are isolated in such a way that the base Kripke model is a model for noncommutative, nonassociative Linear Logic. We also extend the logic by adding a coimplication operator, (...) similar to Curry's subtraction operator, which is resituated with Linear Logic's contensor product. And we can add contraction to get nondistributive Relevance Logic. The model rests heavily on Urquhart's representation of nondistributive lattices and also on Dunn's Gaggle Theory. Indeed, the paper may be viewed as an investigation into nondistributive Gaggle Theory restricted to binary operations. The valuations on the Kripke model are three valued: true, false, and indifferent. The lattice representation theorem of Urquhart has the nice feature of yielding Priestley's representation theorem for distributive lattices if the original lattice happens to be distributive. Hence the representation is consistent with Stone's representation of distributive and Boolean lattices, and our semantics is consistent with the Lemmon-Scott representation of modal algebras and the Routley-Meyer semantics for Relevance Logic. (shrink)

Book Reviews in this ArticlePaul GochetMaurice BoudotKlaus‐Henrik JacobsenLèon BrunschvicgAndrè Bièler.

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

This article addresses the question of engagement in French philosophy from the Munich Agreement to the Korean War. It focuses on establishing a little-known fact about the history of the concept of engagement: the role played by the individual and social ethics developed by Husserl in the early 1920s, through its personalist reception, in the genesis of the philosophies of engagement during our reference period. Paul-Louis Landsberg was, with his Reflections on Personal Engagement (1937), the main architect of the renewal (...) through which French personalism, breaking away from the strategy of purity, became a personalism of engagement. In the early 1920s, he had attended Husserl’s lectures in Freiburg, as he explained in the posthumous tribute “Husserl and the Idea of Philosophy” (1939). What did he take from Husserl? What did he choose to abandon? With the failure of transcendental rationalism, had rationalism reached the exhaustion of its meaning and the depletion of its possibilities? The philosophies of engagement that developed in post-war France stemmed largely from a critique of Husserlian rationalism, either by seeking to go beyond rationalism—the strategy of personalism—or by seeking to rebuild it on different grounds, not as transcendental rationalism, but as engaged rationalism. (shrink)

For some thirty years, a handful of architects has been trying to call into question the primacy that the history of architecture has given to monumental buildings. The representatives of this trend want to get away from the short chronology, common since the Italian Renaissance, and react against the dominant international functionalism that has too little respect for the local cultural contexts. It is under the influence of this “vernacular” approach that the small traditional structure became as legitimate an object (...) of research as the well-known buildings. This approach, innovative and audacious as it was, broke with a Utopian vision of a large part of modern architecture. It led the architects concerned to turn toward non-European countries and to focus their attention on the connections between indigenous housing patterns and cultures. From this decentralization ethno-architecture was born by which we understand the study of preindustrial, “traditional” habitats and housing. Inspired by Panofsky, Eliade, and Lévi-Strauss and familiar with the social sciences, these researchers appropriated the conceptual tools of anthropology. They opened up important fields of research in Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, and Africa and reaped a rich harvest of ethnographic materials. It quickly became clear to them that the so-called “traditional” house developed, in imitation of palaces and temples, from the culture of a given population and that it was informed by the religious images of the inhabitants as much as by its most sacred buildings. (shrink)

L’application du modèle démocratique aux relations familiales au tournant des années 1970, en promouvant l’égalité entre les sexes et l’autonomie des individus, n’a pas été sans générer de multiples décalages entre cette volonté transformatrice et les pratiques familiales concrètes, jusqu’à favoriser un processus de monoparentalisation dans nombre de situations marquées par les références traditionnelles asymétriques. La précarisation, économique, relationnelle et sociale, d’un nombre croissant de femmes en situation monoparentale qui s’en suit rappelle la nécessité de penser et d’accompagner le processus (...) de démocratisation des relations privées pour éviter de faire porter aux plus démunis le poids d’une modernisation encore bien souvent conflictuelle. (shrink)

L’artification au sens fort est un phénomène qui remonte à Duchamp et à ses ready-mades. Je propose de comprendre ces processus comme des processus de « cognification », consistant à transformer en dispositifs de réflexion tout objet ou action non cognitif. Un exemple classique est la découverte d’une boîte à chaussures de Gabriel Orozco à la Biennale de Venise en 1993. L’artification récente de la recherche montre que les projets de recherche artistique, en plus d’être des outils de réflexion, peuvent (...) transmettre une véritable connaissance des faits. Deux exemples sont proposés, l’un de l’artiste allemand Hito Steyerl et l’autre du groupe international Forensic Architecture. (shrink)

In the name of freedom. The actuality of Heidegger’s question concerning technology In his lecture ‘The question concerning technology’ (1953) Heidegger opens up a fruitful new sight on technology, when he understands its essence, not as a neutral instrument, but, with Aristotle, as a way of revealing. When the Greek technè is still a bringing-forth in the sense of poièsis, modern technology’s way of revealing has become a challenging, an ordering, a setting-up. For all things that are produced or touched (...) by it, this means that they are ordered to stand by (bridging space), to be immediately at hand (bridging time), not for its own sake, not even for man’s sake, but only to be on call for a further ordering. Heidegger’s questioning reveals a more original concept of freedom, that of governing the open. In his lecture ‘Releasement’ (1955) he advocates a double attitude towards technology, that of releasement, a simultaneous allowing and letting go of the technical things and an openness to the secret of being. (shrink)

La philosophie politique, dans sa tradition dominante, prend essentiellement en vue la possibilité d’une continuité plus ou moins harmonieuse entre personne et société, entre individu et communauté – que ce soit dans la figure du contrat, de l’association, du transfert de forces ou dans celle de l’universalité concrète de l’État. La pensée du politique autorisée par l’éthique de Levinas frappe de discontinuité les formes et les instances d’homogénéisation ou de dialectisation qui découlent de ce modèle. Elle propose une pensée de (...) l’altérité comme interruption radicale mais fragile des totalisations et des autonomisations de la politique. Dans le contraste entre visage et personne, entre proximité duelle et multiplicité des tiers, dans l’équivoque même de la personne, dans l’inspiration de la société et de la politique par ce qui vient avant elles, une pensée de la Justice s’esquisse, originale et profonde. (shrink)

A necessary refinement of the concept of circular reasoning is applied to the self-and-universally-referential inductive justification of induction. It is noted that the assumption necessary for the circular proof of a principle of induction is that one inference is valid, not that the entire principle or rule of induction governing that inference is true. The circularity in an ideal case is demonstrated to have a value of lin where n represents the number of inferences asserted valid by the conclusion of (...) the justifying argument, and the ‘I’ represents the inference necessarily assumed valid.An induction antinomy modeled after Russell’s antinomy of the set of all and only non-self-containing sets is derived. Isomorphic antinomies are noted to be derivable for other arguments of philosophical interest, including those purported to undermine theories of determinism, relativism, and skepticism, and including the one that Descartes reduced and converted to ‘Cogito, ergo sum’. (shrink)

In this influential work, first published in English in 1963, Durkheim and Mauss claim that the individual mind is capable of classification and they seek the origin of the ‘classificatory function’ in society. On the basis of an intensive examination of forms and principles of symbolic classification reported from the Australian aborigines, the Zuñi and traditional China, they try to establish a formal correspondence between social and symbolic classification. From this they argue that the mode of classification is determined by (...) the form of society and that the notions of space, time, hierarchy, number, class and other such cognitive categories are products of society. Dr Needham’s introduction assesses the validity of Durkhiem and Mauss’s argument, traces its continued influence in various disciplines, and indicates its analytical value for future researches in social anthropology. (shrink)