Anglo-Saxon schools of metascience.--Continental schools of metascience.--Toward a theory of research that is neither logical reconstruction nor psychology or sociology of science.--References (p. 420-438).

We present a Kripke model for Girard's Linear Logic (without exponentials) in a conservative fashion where the logical functors beyond the basic lattice operations may be added one by one without recourse to such things as negation. You can either have some logical functors or not as you choose. Commutatively and associatively are isolated in such a way that the base Kripke model is a model for noncommutative, nonassociative Linear Logic. We also extend the logic by adding a coimplication operator, (...) similar to Curry's subtraction operator, which is resituated with Linear Logic's contensor product. And we can add contraction to get nondistributive Relevance Logic. The model rests heavily on Urquhart's representation of nondistributive lattices and also on Dunn's Gaggle Theory. Indeed, the paper may be viewed as an investigation into nondistributive Gaggle Theory restricted to binary operations. The valuations on the Kripke model are three valued: true, false, and indifferent. The lattice representation theorem of Urquhart has the nice feature of yielding Priestley's representation theorem for distributive lattices if the original lattice happens to be distributive. Hence the representation is consistent with Stone's representation of distributive and Boolean lattices, and our semantics is consistent with the Lemmon-Scott representation of modal algebras and the Routley-Meyer semantics for Relevance Logic. (shrink)

Unlike the first generation of critical theorists, contemporary critical theory has largely ignored technology. This is to the detriment of a critical theory of society – technology is now a central feature of our daily lives and integral to the contemporary form of capitalism. Rather than seek to rescue the first generation’s substantive theory of technology, which has been partly outmoded by historical developments, the approach adopted in this article is to engage with today’s technology through the conceptual apparatus offered (...) by the early Frankfurt School. This rationale is guided by the conviction that the core ideas of critical theory still offer a sound basis for assessing the nature of technology today. Through a reconstruction and engagement with some of the core concepts of first-generation critical theory, as well as the work of Bernard Stiegler and Andrew Feenberg, we can arrive at a more robust theory of technology, capable of critically interrogating the role of technology in contemporary society. (shrink)

This article examines the ‘integrated conception of competence’ as conceived by Paul Hager and David Beckett and suggests that its characterization in terms intended to distance it from behaviouristic and reductionist notions of competence is not sufficient to differentiate it from other models. Taking up Hager and Beckett’s idea that competence must be inferred from behaviour, it is suggested that this indicates how the integrated conception is more properly distinguished by virtue of the method used rather than what it is (...) that is assessed. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson, it is argued that it is possible to discern two logically distinct methodological approaches to competence assessment, allowing a clear distinction to be made between the integrated conception and the kind of approach which predominates in the UK’s framework of vocational qualifications. While the latter is shown to be rightly criticized for its deficiencies, in contrast the integrated conception is seen to suggest a methodological approach that is capable of acknowledging the full richness of occupational practice. (shrink)

Cet essai se situe sur le terrain de la théologie pour relever l’usage qu’elle en fait comme clef du langage sur Dieu. A ce titre, l’analogie déborde et dépasse le domaine de la logique et de l’épistémologie pour servir une pensée non seulement spéculative, mais encore spirituelle et mystique. Son emploi en théologie traduit l’aspect intellectuel d’une attitude d’abord existentielle et croyante où l’homme se reconnaît comme créature distante de son Créateur, mais surtout en tant que nature raisonnable, comme fait (...) à l’image de Dieu et appelé à la dignité de fils du Dieu Père. La réflexion sur l’analogie nous introduit ainsi inévitablement dans le domaine de l’image dont l’homme ne porte la marque qu’en raison de sa participation à l’image parfaite de Dieu qu’est son Verbe. Si l’analogie suggère la distance entre les termes transcendant et immanent qu’elle relie, ne reviendrait-il pas à l’image d’effectuer leur rapprochement ? S’appuyant sur la théologie de S. Thomas, l’enquête de G. Rémy traite de l’analogie comme outil conceptuel indispensable au discours sur Dieu et le mystère trinitaire ; le relais sera pris par la notion d’image appliquée à l’homme mais dont l’archétype est le Christ.This essay is situated in the area of theology to note how analogy is used as a key to language about God. As such, analogy goes beyond and transcends the domain of logic and epistemology to serve not only speculative but even spiritual and mystical reflection. Its use in theology translates the intellectual aspect of an attitude at first existential and believing, in which man recognizes himself as a creature distant from his Creator, but, above all, as a reasonable nature made in the image of God and called to dignity as the son of God the Father. This reflection on analogy inevitably leads us into the domain of the image, of which man carries only the mark by reason of his participation to the perfect image of God who is his Word. If analogy suggests the distance between the transcendent and immanent terms that it connects, is it not the role of the image to bring them close to each other? Relying on the theology of St. Thomas, the inquiry of G. Remy treats analogy as a conceptual tool that is indispensable to the discourse on God and the Trinitarian mystery. It is relayed by the notion of image applied to man, of which the archetype is Christ. (shrink)

Auschwitz shattered forever the liberal dream of an ultimately perfectible humanity, revealing human sin in all its horrifying possibilities but also revealing the universality of grace.

Después de la muerte de Franco el número de filósofos españoles dedicados a la Estética aumentó considerablemente, aunque todavía hoy el grado de internacionalización de la disciplina no sea el adecuado. El artículo pretende describir la escena pluralista de la Estética española. Para ello, el autor diferencia tres áreas de trabajo mayoritarias entre los estetas españoles: en primer lugar la de los problemas clásicos de la estética, como la belleza, la representación o la emoción estética, en segundo lugar, sobre la (...) filosofía del arte en general y el contemporáneo en particular, y en tercer lugar, el análisis teórico y la explicación crítica de las nuevas corrientes del arte actual. (shrink)

The enlargement of the European Union to include eventually Turkey and the former communist countries is a major challenge for our understanding of the meaning of Europe as a geopolitical, social and cultural space. It is also a question of the identity of Europe as one shaped by social or systemic integration. With the diminishing significance of national borders within the EU, the outer territorial frontier is also losing its significance and Europe will become more and more postwestern. It thus (...) appears that the eastern frontier is more flexible than was previously thought. The EU is now at the decisive point of moving beyond postnationality to a transnational encounter with multiple civilizational forms. Enlargement is not just about getting bigger but is crucially a matter of cultural transformation and therefore it differs from all previous dynamics of Europeanization. Rather than tell the story of Europeanization exclusively as one of national histories and of closure, a civilizational analytic offers the possibility of multiple modernities and thus of a more appropriate theorization of the current situation. (shrink)

One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person’s sense of agency and their sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically schizophrenia challenges (...) our assumptions about the nature of the self. Most theorists endorse the traditional doctrine of the unity of consciousness, according to which a normal human brain generates a single consciousness at any instant in time. In this paper we argue that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is actually a multiplicity: an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. We then consider how certain aspects of self might emerge from this manifold substrate, and speculate about the origin of thought insertion. (shrink)

Il s?agit de nuancer l?opposition massive, mise en place par Michel Foucault dans sa préface à la traduction anglaise du Normal et le patho­logique , entre la tradition phénoménologique et l?épistémologie française. Cette opposition est raffinée sur la base d?une confrontation entre la pensée de Georges Canguilhem et celle du psychiatre allemand Erwin Straus, qui tâche, dans son ouvrage majeur Vom Sinn der Sinne , de poser les fondements d?une psychologie phénoménologique. La confrontation s?organise autour de deux thématiques abordées de (...) manière centrale par les deux auteurs, l?une portant sur la physiologie, le problème du réflexe et les rapports entre le vivant et son milieu, l?autre sur les notions de normal et de pathologique. (shrink)

This article inquires into that which articulates the two texts brought together by Heidegger in Identity and Difference. It sets out from the indications provided in the Preface of the work concerning the “harmony” that reigns between what is at stake at the heart of the two texts, namely what Heidegger respectively calls the Ereignis (event of appropriation) and the Austrag (reconciling difference). The understanding of this harmony makes it possible to approach that which unveils itself as the articulation of (...) Being, but in so doing also raises the difficult problem of the very possibility of thinking Being setting out from its essential withdrawal. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

The Crises of the Economy-World and the Overcoming of Capitalism : From the 1970s to the New Century. The current crisis of neoliberalism can only be understood if we resituate it within the context of the historical dynamic of the capitalist mode of production. The precedent most often cited is that of the 1929 crash. There is however another comparison which is equally apposite, the comparison with the structural crisis of the 1970s. How are we to compare the economic factors (...) which are involved here, the conditions which led to the crisis and their political consequences ? Can we argue that the current crisis is ushering in a new phase of capitalism, or that it is opening up a number of alternative paths ? These are some of the crucial issues addressed here by Gérard Duménil in the questions put to Immanuel Wallerstein. (shrink)

The problem of violence for social theory is not only a normative question which can be answered in political-ethical terms, but it is also a cognitive question relating to the definition of violence. This cognitive question is one of the main problems with the contemporary discourse of violence and it is this that makes the idea of a cosmopolitan public sphere particularly relevant since it is in public discourse that cognitive models are articulated. The real power of cosmopolitanism lies in (...) communicative power, the problematizing, the reflexive transformation of cultural models and the raising of `voice'. Unless global civil society is based on a cosmopolitan political sphere there is the danger that it will be disembodied and helpless in the face of new forms of violence. (shrink)

While there is often good reason to study our world by abstracting properties from its parts to the point where the result can be modelled as mechanisms, there is no need to do so when humans are ….

En tant qu’être sensible, à la fois sentant et senti, le corps ne cesse d’interroger les philosophes sur le sens et les enjeux de cette sensibilité, par laquelle chacun est toujours déjà en relation avec le monde, avec les choses, avec les autres. La relation érotique pose de façon cruciale la question de l’unité du sensible : si l’union des corps n’est pas unité, mais séparation, cette unité est-elle pour autant impensable? Où la situer? Plus fondamentalement peut-on penser l’être sensible (...) du corps à partir d’une philosophie du sujet et de ses catégories (je/tu, moi/toi, le même/l’autre)? Ou faut-il adopter un point de vue plus large, celui de l’Être qui ouvre notre corps sensible à d’autres types de corporéité (artistique, politique, historique)? C’est l’occasion de croiser et de confronter les approches d’Emmanuel Lévinas et de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, pour tenter d’éclairer l’aventure à laquelle notre corps nous convie : et si le corps avait quelque chose à nous apprendre? Et s’il renouvelait la question du sens? (shrink)

Cet article se propose d’interroger la compréhension par Hegel de sa propre pensée comme « fin » de l’histoire de la philosophie. Il montre tout d’abord de quelle manière cette compréhension est bien incontestable chez Hegel. Il entreprend ensuite d’analyser la signification essentielle, mais éminemment complexe que revêt la notion de fin ici en question. Il cherche enfin à établir que loin d’être le gage d’un dogmatisme intempérant, la position de fin de la philosophie que Hegel impute à sa pensée (...) est au contraire l’expression de son antidogmatisme résolu qui entend restituer la vérité à son essence dynamique et inquiète, et, de là, à son historicité foncière.This article sets out to inquire into Hegel’s understanding of his own thought as the “end” of the history of philosophy. It shows firstly how Hegel unquestionably understood his philosophy this way. It then sets out to analyse the essential, but highly complex meaning taken on by the concept of “end” in question here. It seeks finally to establish that, far from being a token of immoderate dogmatism, the view of being the end of philosophy which Hegel attributes to his thought is, on the contrary, the expression of his resolute opposition to dogmatism which seeks to restore truth to its dynamic and restless essence, and hence to its fundamental historicity. (shrink)