Epistemology

We live in polarizing times. In this book Elmer Thiessen dares to suggest that the solution to the deep divides in our contemporary world and in the church is not to be found in more information, more education, more rationality, or more critical thinking. Instead, we need to cultivate intellectual virtues, such as the love of knowledge and truth, intellectual humility, and committed openness. The penultimate chapter treats intellectual virtues that are more relational in nature--intellectual forbearance, fairmindedness, and intellectual courage. (...) The book explores the biblical and theological grounding of each intellectual virtue and reveals its practical importance for our fractious times, making use of concrete examples throughout. Each of the central chapters begins with a questionnaire aimed at promoting self-examination and stimulating reflection about the virtues and vices under consideration. This is a book for the thoughtful Christian reader aimed at transforming the way we think. (shrink)

In The Road to Wisdom, Francis Collins reminds us of the four core sources of judgment and clear thinking: truth, science, faith, and trust. Drawing on his work from the Human Genome Project and heading the National Institutes of Health, as well as on ethics, philosophy, and Christian theology, Collins makes a robust, thoughtful case for each of these sources -- their reliability, and their limits. Ultimately, he shows how they work together, not separately -- and certainly not in conflict. (...) It is only when we relink these four foundations of wisdom that we can begin to discern the best path forward in life. (shrink)

Epistemic injustice is inherently connected to epistemic power and epistemic agency: understanding and addressing the former allows us to better understand and address the latter, and vice versa. Yet, despite vast and rich discussions of epistemic injustice, which often invoke the notions of epistemic power and epistemic agency, both notions remain undertheorized and hence largely elusive. This book offers a systematic account of epistemic power and agency by turning to the dynamics of epistemic injustice - that is, the many forms (...) epistemic injustice can take, the different sites and mechanisms through which it operates, and the various transformations consequently required to cultivate greater epistemic justice. Adopting standpoint theory both as a theory and as a methodology, the book focuses on several pressing social questions, such as deliberative impasses in divided societies, colonial memory, academic migration, the underrepresentation of members of non-dominant groups in certain fields, and the marginalization of minoritized minds, such as intellectually disabled people and autistics. By analyzing these social questions through the lens of the dynamics of epistemic injustice, the book develops a systematic account of epistemic power and agency. (shrink)

Philosophie im Sinne Adornos bedeutet, die Traditionslinien der Dialektik und der Kritik miteinander engzuführen. Diese Engführung erfolgte bislang vor allem gemäß der Vorgabe Hegels – mit dem Resultat, dass das Profil einer dezidiert negativen Dialektik durch Identitätsdenken überformt und in der Forschung als mangelhafte Kopie der positiv-spekulativen Dialektik gehandelt wurde. Dagegen schlägt diese Arbeit vor, dieses Profil von Kant her zu sichten: Indem die Grundzüge von Adornos Kantinterpretation erhellt werden, soll deren systematische Bedeutung für das adornosche „Antisystem“ zur Geltung gelangen. (...) Negative Dialektik, so die These, ist nur als grenzbegriffliche Reflexion auf den Erkenntnisanspruch der traditionellen Dialektik möglich. (shrink)

This is the first edited volume to be dedicated exclusively to the philosophy of Susan Stebbing (1885–1943)—a pivotal figure in early analytic philosophy and Britain’s first female professor of philosophy who has, until recently, been unjustly neglected. This volume collects eleven new essays that explore various elements of Stebbing’s prolific output. The volume and its contributors aim to reinstate Stebbing’s place in the analytic tradition by examining her ideas in context and elucidating their significance.

عرفت الثقافة مكانة جد متميزة في الأبحاث والدراسات على اختلاف أنواعها وتوجهاتها وتخصصاتها، فالإنسان بطبعه كائن اجتماعي وثقافي، وبهذا يتميز بالتفاعل عبر مجموعة من علاقات اجتماعية متعددة مع الآخر المشابه والمختلف، مما يؤدي إلى ثراء الخبرة والتجربة التي تساعد على التجديد والتحول في طريقة التفكير ونمط العيش وأسلوب الحياة، وخلال هذا التفاعل يتم اكتساب العديد من النماذج والأشكال الثقافية بين الطرفين، الأمر الذي يدفعنا للقول بعدم وجود ثقافة خالصة، وإنما هناك تداخل وتقاطع وتفاعل بين الثقافات. لكل ثقافة هوية، ولكل هوية (...) جوهـر تعبر عنه خصوصيات متفـردة، وتنبثـق منه قيم سامية ومثـل عليا، هي عنوان الأصالة والعراقة اللتين هما القواعد الراسخة للثقافة، والقواسم المشـركة بـين الثقافات الإنسانية جميعا، مها تكن سماتها وقسماتها وطوابعها، ومهما تعددت مصادرها ومنابعها وروافدها. ISBN: 978-9920-568-56-2. (shrink)

There is a wide consensus among epistemologists that we fail to know lottery propositions (that is, highly likely propositions solely supported by statistical evidence), but there is no agreed-upon explanation of why we fail to know them. Yet, paradoxes surrounding lotteries continue pressing on the need to identify the correct explanation. This dissertation evaluates various explanations of why we do not know lottery propositions, which normally take one of two forms. The first argues that lottery beliefs are true by mere (...) epistemic luck (roughly, luck, chance, or accident in possessing a true belief in a proposition p, which prevents us from knowing p), and provides an account of epistemic luck that entails that lottery beliefs are epistemically luckily true. Here I evaluate and reject an explanation that relies on the largely dominant account of epistemically lucky beliefs as “unsafe true beliefs”. The second argues that lottery beliefs are unjustified (where being justified in believing p is necessary for knowing p), and provides an account of justification with a condition that lottery beliefs or propositions do not satisfy. I divide conditions on justification into “probabilistic” and “non-probabilistic” and argue, contrary to Douven and Williamson (2016), that justification can have a probabilistic condition that lottery beliefs fail to satisfy, thus restoring such accounts as a theoretical possibility to solve the “lottery paradox”. I also argue that among the dominant candidates of non-probabilistic conditions, Smith’s (2016) normic support condition on justification is the only suitable one to explain why we do not know lottery propositions. Alternatively, if lottery propositions are justified, there is nonetheless a solution to the lottery paradox compatible with their possessing such epistemic status, which consists in rejecting the “aggregativity of justification”. I argue that this principle is incorrect, and that preserving it obstructs solving what I identify as the most basic form of the lottery paradox. Finally, I address the legal correlates of lottery propositions –i.e., litigated claims supported by bare statistical evidence. I divide explanations of why such claims do not meet a given standard of proof into two types: externalist and internalist. I present independent problems for two externalist explanations –Pritchard’s (2018, 2022) modal explanation and Blome-Tillmann’s (2017) knowledge-first explanation, and argue that they face such problems in virtue of being externalist. This finding motivates the need to evaluate externalist accounts qua externalist to determine if an externalist account is a viable solution to the “proof paradox”. (shrink)

A long time ago, I heard someone say: “When someone tells you a book changed their life, go read that book.” This simple advice stuck with me, and I keep following it ever since.

Философский анализ сущности информации и ее отношения к материи. Материалистическая концепция информационного познания мира .

This paper reflects on Kantian exchanges between A. W. Moore and Sorin Baiasu. After briefly situating their exchange, I highlight Baiasu’s clarification regarding Kant’s distinction between knowledge and cognition. Although convincing, I suggest that Baiasu’s objections could be strengthened with further discussion of the notion of a thing in itself as a limiting concept, as well as emphasis on Moore’s use of ‘concern’, which might require further clarification. I conclude with broader reflections on what is at stake: not just armchair (...) knowledge, but the coherence and relevance of Kant’s practical philosophy under the assumption of its dependence on transcendental idealism. (shrink)

This essay explores the recurring archetype of forbidden knowledge across ancient civilizations, myths, and speculative history, drawing connections between secret societies, religious texts, and cultural symbolism. Beginning with the concept of hidden oligarchies influencing humanity’s development, the analysis examines the notion of advanced groups—such as the biblical Watchers and Sumerian Anunnaki—who shared forbidden knowledge with humanity, often at great cost. The narrative delves into the parallels between Prometheus’s defiance in Greek mythology and the serpent’s role in the Edenic narrative, suggesting (...) that these stories may echo a deeper historical truth about humanity’s sudden leap in societal complexity. Further, the essay analyzes the Minoan serpent goddess and considers Eve as a potential historical figure deified over time. Ultimately, the essay reflects on the persistent theme of enlightenment and the consequences of seeking hidden truths, inviting readers to question who holds knowledge and what sacrifices are made in its pursuit. (shrink)

Traditional epistemology bases its understanding of cognition on the heuristic short-circuiting of the content with the object of cognition. This short-circuit corresponds to the idea of truth in the sense of some kind of correspondence between the content and the object of knowledge. The problem that arises from this is the question of the verifiability of this correspondence, which would presuppose a transcendent standpoint that, for lack of existence, becomes a mere vanishing point of reflection. The standpoint of reflection corresponds (...) to the adoption of a transcendent standpoint that is nevertheless anchored in the cognizing subject. The question of correspondence thus becomes a question of certainty. This leads to a second, this time theoretical short-circuit, namely the conflation of the actual question of a theory of the phenomenon of cognition, the question of the genesis (or generation) of the content of cognition, with the question of the certainty of this content. This conflation ultimately leads to the question of which (by definition subjective) elements of the cognitive process can guarantee certainty, and thus to a further, third, namely methodological short-circuit through the definition of the (in truth holistic) cognitive situation in terms of a subject-object opposition and the associated exclusion of the knowledge of the empirical natural sciences from cognitive reflection. The aim of this short paper (which is the introduction to a recent publication entitled 'Rehabilitation of Pure Reason') is to find an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of cognition by reversing these short-circuits in reverse order, i.e. by starting from the affirmative acknowledgement of the holism of the real cognitive situation, which excludes subjective certainty as a reasonable goal of cognition from the outset. (shrink)

Die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie geht hinsichtlich ihres Verständnisses von Erkenntnis vom heuristischen Kurzschluss des Inhalts mit dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Diesem Kurzschluss korrespondiert die Idee von Wahrhei im Sinne einer irgendwie gearteten Übereinstimmung zwischen Inhalt und Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Das Problem das daraus entsteht ist die Frage der Überprüfbarkeit dieser Übereinstimmung, die einen transzendenten Standpunkt voraussetzen würde, der mangels Existenz zu einem reinen Fluchtpunkt der Reflexion wird. Der Standpunkt der Reflexion entspricht der Einnahme eines transzendenten Standpunkts, der dennoch im erkennenden Subjekt (...) verankert ist. Die Frage der Übereinstimmung wird so zu einer Frage der Gewissheit. Diese führt zu einem zweiten, diesmal theoretischen Kurzschluss, nämlich der Verquickung der eigentlichen Frage einer Theorie des Phänomens Erkenntnis, der Frage nach der Genese (bzw. Generierung) des Inhalts der Erkenntnis, mit der Frage der Gewissheit dieses Inhalts. Diese Verquickung führt schließlich zur Frage, welche (per definitionem subjektiven) Elemente des Erkenntnisvorgangs Gewissheit verbürgen können, und somit zu einer weiteren, dritten, nämlich methodischen Kurzschluss durch die Definition der (in Wahrheit holistischen) Erkenntnissituation im Sinne eines Subjekt-Objekt-Gegensatzes und den damit verbundenen Ausschluss des Wissens der empirischen Naturwissenschaften aus der Erkenntnisreflexion. Ziel dieser kurzen Arbeit (die die Einleitung zu einer kürzlich erschienen Publikation mit dem Titel: 'Rehabilitation der reinen Vernunft' darstellt), ist es, im Wege der Rückabwicklung dieser Kurzschlüsse in umgekehrter Reihenfolge zu einem adäquaten Verständnis des Phänomens Erkenntnis zu finden, also ausgehend von der affirmativen Kenntnisnahme des Holismus der realen Erkenntnissituation, der subjektive Gewissheit als vernünftiges Erkenntnisziel von vornherein ausschließt. (shrink)

Reconciling the many “faces” of Peirce – the Scientist, Philosopher, and Metaphysician - helps to make sense of the open-endedness and versatility of semiotics. Semiosis, for Peirce, knows no rigid hermeneutic or disciplinary bounds. It thus forces us to be open to interdisciplinary and holistic inquiries. The pragmatic maxim sets limits on metaphysical speculation, but it also legitimates the extension of the experimentalist method into cosmological, metaphysical, and even religious domains. Although Peirce's religious speculations are ultimately unsatisfactory, understanding why Peirce (...) expanded his thinking to such domains reveals the expansionist logic of Peircean semiotics beyond the mere idiosyncracies of the man. The triadic, dynamic logic of pragmatist inquiry seeks to expand to all social processes of fixing belief and forming habits, however quixotic; but it remains dubious whether such expansion can fully comport to the scientific, experimentalist method that Peirce preferred. (shrink)

A gênese deste estudo decolonial começa com o ensaio que empreendia uma discussão sobre Exu e a cultura diaspórica negra. Seus desdobramentos foram responsáveis pelo aparecimento de dois outros estudos: um sobre o Candomblé da Bahia e o sincretismo religioso, e um outro sobre o conceito decolonial de língua-linguagem como encruzilhada. O artigo sobre Exu, escrito em inglês, ainda foi responsável pelo convite para a escritura de um capítulo de livro, também em língua inglesa, sobre direitos humanos, liberdade religiosa e (...) lutas antirracistas na América Latina Diaspórica Negra. Por sua vez, este texto possibilitou o aparecimento de boa parte da discussão que se deu em um capítulo sobre a linha de frente das lutas políticas de Jorge Amado nos 100 anos do Partido Comunista do Brasil, quando o tema da baianidade ganhou corpo. Agora, neste novo estudo, que ora, apresento, a discussão busca responder às questões: “O que é a baianidade?” e “Como a literatura a decodifica ao longo da história?”. Para tanto, utilizo como metodologia a análise pragmática do discurso, tributária da análise discursivo-desconstrutiva, tomando o discurso literário como objeto observável, pois, nessa abordagem, todo discurso é o resultado das condições históricas de produção (cf. ARAÚJO, 2020). Em outras palavras, recorro a obras poéticas de autores baianos (textos, canções), tomadas como discurso para responder a tais questões sobre a baianidade. (shrink)

It is not self-evident what renders conspiracy theories less warranted than justified suspicions of real conspiracies. This thesis is an examination of proposed criteria for distinguishing between the two kinds of conspiratorial allegations. It consists of a critical response to Quassim Cassam’s approach of characterizing conspiracy theories as improbable political propaganda. Issues with his criteria are highlighted and an alternative perspective is introduced. Instead of finding a special feature in the theories, the suggested alternative focuses on epistemological flaws in the (...) theorizing of such theories. Conspiracy theorizing is introduced as a specific way of holding a belief that is self-insulating and thereby immunized to counterevidence. Self- insulating beliefs are compared to Hannah Arendt’s concept of ideology and Karl Popper’s principle of non-falsifiability. (shrink)

Although neoclassical economics faces frequent criticism, it remains the dominant paradigm, largely due to its immunisation strategies that rely on unfalsifiable concepts of utility and rationality. In this paper, I use Karl Popper’s philosophy to assess whether these strategies are justified. Firstly, I reconstruct Popper’s ideas on immunisation strategies, situational analysis, the rationality principle, and the metaphysical research programme. Next, I examine how neoclassical economics’ immunisation strategies counter critiques from behavioural economics. I conclude that neoclassical economics’ method does not produce (...) empirical conjectures. I assess and evaluate this finding in relation to the “rationality principle”, as it parallels neoclassical economics’ optimisation axiom. Furthermore, I explore Popper’s relevance in the context of neoclassical economics’ recent incorporation of behavioural economics’ insights to show that my analysis is not purely historical. (shrink)

This study critically reviews four decades of academic research on the Shroud of Turin, a highly debated archaeological artifact. Employing advanced epistemological methods such as argument mapping and Bayesian analysis, the study systematically evaluates the two leading hypotheses: the medieval creation of the Shroud and its authenticity as the burial cloth of Jesus of Nazareth. This examination suggests a warrant for the proponents’ belief in the authenticity hypothesis. It highlights the vitality and complexity of the controversy surrounding the dating and (...) image formation process of the Shroud of Turin. (shrink)

In addition to existing practices and norms within the institutions to which they belong, scientists form an epistemic community. The flow of information, the processes of belief formation, and the assumptions scientists are making determine the structure of an epistemic community. Members of such communities can be categorized as epistemic experts or epistemic agents. In exceptional circumstances, such as the crisis caused by the global coronavirus pandemic, the existing organization, conventions, and rules within the epistemic community are disrupted. In times (...) of crisis, epistemic agents’ trust in experts becomes as crucial as scientific knowledge. Trust epistemic agents have in experts may decrease in crisis situations and affect experts’ roles within the epistemic community. This puts epistemic experts in the position of needing to reestablish their trustworthiness through various rhetorical attempts. Here, we examine some of those attempts from the existing framework of rhetorical strategies used to reestablish or defend one’s own expert role, but on novel data. To that end, we use examples of epistemic experts’ justifications when confronted with public questioning about their behavior amidst the coronavirus crisis. We analyze experts’ rhetorical approaches via qualitative content analysis and replicate four rhetorical strategies experts use when defending their epistemic positions that are previously established in analyses of similar cases in other crisis situations. (shrink)

This book stands as a critique of racial capitalism and heteropatriarchy. Vergès, a Réunion-born independent scholar, defends a decolonial feminist approach to fight against the coloniality of power and advocates for a maroon political disobedience grounded in the possibility of futurity (38). Her book, soon to be translated in English, calls for a depatriarchalizing of revolutionary struggles (19) and questions the privilège de la blanchité (49) in the making of a civilizational feminism that continues to dismiss the experiences of racialized (...) bodies today. Astonished by France's constant dismissal of slavery and colonialism in the contemporary understanding of its society, she poses that such avoidance is grounded in France's "passion pour les principes abstraits plutôt que pour l'étude des réalités" (52). While the first part of the book opens with the racialized figure of travailleuses domestiques, leading Vergès to critique the constant overlooking of indigenous struggle in imperial feminism, the second half of the book calls into question the fundamentalism of laïcité that subsequently develops against the background of a certain Orientalism centered around the white liberal elite. She highlights how "[l]es femmes racisées sont acceptées dans les rangs des féministes civilisationnelles à la condition qu'elles adhèrent à l'interprétation occidentale du droit des femmes" (79). (shrink)

L’Autre, avant d’être un corps présent dans le temps, est d’abord un relief dans le paysage d’un monde commun, une forme perspective que le "je" choisit ou non de recevoir. Ce relief, s’il a longtemps été pensé depuis une autorité déterminant la place à laquelle et depuis laquelle l’Autre devait répondre, deviendra, on l’espère, l’espace possible d’une rencontre. Lorsque ce relief se présente au monde, lorsque l’Autre devient simultanément cette chose voyante et visible, son espace d’expression s’ouvre pour devenir un (...) entourage, une enveloppe mobile et pénétrable. (shrink)

Les écrans imprègnent la quasi totalité de nos modes de vivre ensemble. Comme autant d'aimants ils produisent une adhérence senso- rielle dont il devient difficile de se détacher. -/- Il apparait que la marche des sociétés humaines s'effectue désormais se- lon le mode unique de la computation numérique. -/- Cherchons le contre- courant de ce que nous imposent les interfaces.

To speak about revolution, either as an event or as a concept, must appear presumptuous at a moment when racial discrimination, fascist politics, and the totalitarian war against women and minorities are amplified by a market economy based on systemic division. In the digital present, the systematization of division is magnified by newly algorithmic structures of machinic capitalism. In that context, the more the intellect aims to grasp the depth of revolutionary actions, the less the latter seem to make sense. (...) In other words, both the failure and the promise of revolution have created a modern paradigm to address the political struggles of our times, one that is cyclically repeating itself to challenge the limits of humankind. And yet, one can always find reasons to interrogate the symptoms of revolutionary tragedies that proliferate against a background of intellectual numbness. (shrink)

With the concept of the technical image, Flusser indicates a historical shift in the structure of Western society.1 Technical images, as found in photographs, films, videos, computer terminals, and television screens, designate images produced by an apparatus designed to create programmed information. Contrary to traditional images which carry significance through representation as seen in paintings, technical images are surfaces that operate according to “inverted vectors of meaning.”2 The meaning of a technical image is not found in what the image signifies (...) but in what it projects. In other words, technical images are less about the representation of the world and more about modeling the subject’s relation to and vision of reality. As such, technical images are “instructional programs” designed to inculcate significance, shape behavior, and direct subjects on how to make sense of the world.3 The surfaces of technical images move away from a mimetic representation of the real to inscribe concepts as connotative, as opposed to denotative, forms of signification. However, traditional images and technical images are not entirely disconnected from one another. Together they shape the posthistorical phase of humanity, a phase in which humans’ relationship to reality is increasingly conditioned and modulated by embedded codification. This codification is produced by apparatuses that calculate probability. These apparatuses are opaque because they no longer require the knowledge of their operation by the subject that handles them. In other words: traditional images are “observations of objects,” while technical images are “computation of concepts.”4. (shrink)

There are two axes of Leibniz’s philosophy about bodies that are deeply inter- twined, as this paper shows: the scientific investigation of bodies due to the application of mathematics to nature – Leibniz’s mixed mathematics – and the issue of matter/bodies ide- alism. This intertwinement raises an issue: How did Leibniz frame the relationship between mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics? Due to the increasing application of mathe- matics to natural sciences, especially physics, philosophers of the early modern period used the (...) reliability of mathematics to predict phenomena as the basis to infer the metaphysical outlook of nature. I argue that although Leibniz thought metaphysics must be scientifically informed and that mathematics is a valuable instrument to understand nature, metaphysics is more fun- damental than mathematics and natural sciences. By highlighting the foundational relation be- tween metaphysics and the sciences, this paper showcases an argument for the reality of bodies: the ideality of bodies, necessary for epistemic purposes, is not proof that they are not real. Keywords: Metaphysics, Application of Mathematics, Body, Idealism, Fundamentality. (shrink)

Varios enfoques teóricos y disciplinas se han comprometido con el problema de nuestra relación cognitiva con los animales (e incluso entre ellos). De qué forma lograr el mejor acercamiento es aún un tema controversial. En este trabajo, analizamos algunas de las posibilidades presentadas en los últimos años. Cuando el acceso cognitivo al psiquismo animal se realiza por vía naturalista, abierta a la psicología, una de las alternativas brindadas es la llamada Teoría de la Mente (ToM). La Teoría de la mente, (...) también conocida como lectura de la mente, mentalización o atribución de estados mentales, sería la capacidad de atribuir a otros sujetos estados mentales, como deseos y creencias, lo que supondría que el sujeto en cuestión dispone de algo así como una “teoría” de la mente del otro. En 2008 Call y Tomasello revisaron la pregunta que lanzó la investigación de ToM tres décadas antes: “¿Tiene el chimpancé una teoría de la mente?”. 10 años antes, había un consenso considerable de la literatura experimental de que la ToM sería una propiedad exclusiva de los humanos. Call y Tomasello concluyeron en 2008 que las cosas habían cambiado: varias tareas evidenciaron que los simios eran sensibles a las metas e intenciones que subyacen en las acciones de los demás simios. Para este enfoque, es crucial decidir si el comportamiento, que es una variable observable, es un fiel reflejo de lo que está pasando al nivel mental. Presentamos el simulacionismo como una alternativa a la ToM. La primera persona es la perspectiva desde la cual trabajan los simulacionistas, ya que a partir de los datos observacionales y actitudes que “el otro” aporta, pueden “ponerse en su sitio” para así, simular y comprender sus estados mentales. La ToM y el simulacionismo suelen caracterizarse dentro del mismo enfoque (teorías mentalistas). Sin embargo, los simulacionistas niegan la implicación de cualquier tipo de teorización, ya sea personal o subpersonal, al producirse el acceso cognitivo. Cuando el estudio de la mente se realiza mediante disciplinas científicas, psicología, neurociencias, etc., los métodos utilizados por las ciencias positivas deben enfrentarse al problema de la subdeterminación teórica por parte de la evidencia empírica. Tales limitaciones pueden ser sorteadas si nos acercamos al tema a través de la psicología animal o la fenomenología y no desde un enfoque que tome como modelo epistemológico principal a la física. Mostramos que los enfoques empáticos, y las perspectivas de segunda persona son ejemplos de este tipo de acercamiento. Debido al problema de la subdeterminación teórica, dado un conjunto finito de “hechos empíricos”, existen muchas teorías rivales que son corroboradas por tal conjunto. Esto implica que no podremos decidirnos por una de las teorías rivales contando sólo con el cuerpo evidencial en cuestión. El análisis de los casos presentados muestra que el problema de la subdeterminación teórica pocas veces es considerado por los científicos que tratan el comportamiento animal. Concluimos que las discusiones presentadas muestran una complejidad que invita a un acercamiento multidisciplinar, y que aún estamos lejos de llegar a un consejo general sobre la cuestión. (shrink)

The circle (pi-diameter-circumference) (0-1-2) (1-2-3) is absolute intelligence. Produces (from a human point of view) an infinite set of opposite pairs. Resolved by the circular-linear relationship between conservation and symmetry (Noether's Theorem). Pi produces a circular-linear relationship between a diameter and a circumference, forcing humans to construct and, then, interpret, symbolic systems. This book examines the conservation of symmetry using a universal mandala (an unlimited set of universal mandalas). Provides a logical explanation for a unified intelligence in Nature. Written in (...) 2005 before the current Circular Theory diagram was created (2007) online (Foundational Issues). Updated, summarized and abridged Circular Theory @ The Circular Theory (2024) on PhilPapers and, also, Medium publication The-Circular-Theory. Most succinct visual explanation of The Circular Theory at Truth 2011 updated and consolidated and completed in Intelligent Design 2025 (both on Phil Papers) (presently at no charge) (on Amazon at $200). (shrink)

"Με την τεράστια ανάπτυξη της τεχνολογίας, μια εντελώς νέα φτώχεια έχει επέλθει στην ανθρωπότητα. Και η ανάποδη πλευρά αυτής της φτώχειας είναι ο καταπιεστικός πλούτος των ιδεών που έχουν εξαπλωθεί μεταξύ των ανθρώπων, ή μάλλον τους έχουν κατακλύσει εντελώς - ιδέες για την αναβίωση της αστρολογίας και τη σοφία της γιόγκα.... Πράγματι (ας το παραδεχτούμε), η φτώχεια της εμπειρίας μας δεν είναι απλώς σε προσωπικό επίπεδο, αλλά φτώχεια της ανθρώπινης εμπειρίας εν γένει. Ως εκ τούτου, ένα νέο είδος βαρβαρότητας... Και (...) τώρα πρέπει να κάνουμε ένα βήμα πίσω και να κρατήσουμε τις αποστάσεις μας. " Οι παραπάνω λέξεις γράφτηκαν από τον Walter Benjamin το 1933. Τώρα ακούγονται σαν καθυστερημένη προειδοποίηση, καθώς το τεχνολογικό σύστημα έχει αποικίσει κάθε πτυχή της ζωής μετά την ψηφιακή οντολογική επανάσταση. Μα είναι και μια προτροπή για εμάς, τους κατοίκους ενός ψηφιακού κόσμου που μας είναι συνάμα οικείος και ανοίκειος. Ας ακολουθήσουμε την προτροπή του, ας κάνουμε ένα βήμα πίσω και ας κρατήσουμε τις αποστάσεις μας για να διακρίνουμε τους μετασχηματισμούς που φέρνει η πιο προκλητική όψη της σύγχρονης τεχνολογίας, η Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη. Άραγε φτάσαμε στην εποχή της τεχνολογικής αναπαραγωγιμότητας του προσώπου; Μήπως η Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη είναι η τεχνολογική μοναδικότητα που θα αντικαταστήσει τη συνείδηση; Μήπως το ανθρώπινο υποκείμενο καταστεί περιττό; Αλλά ποιος το κρίνει αυτό, αν όχι το ανθρώπινο υποκείμενο; Η απόκριση στο αίνιγμα της τεχνολογικής σφίγγας είναι φιλοσοφική και πολιτική. Η κριτική του ψηφιακού λόγου περνά από την κριτική της Τεχνητής Νοημοσύνης, δηλαδή την αυτοκριτική της ανθρώπινης υποκειμενικότητας στον ορίζοντα του δημοκρατικού ψηφιακού ανθρωπισμού. (shrink)

This study examines the epistemological implications of the adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in researches within the information age. Focusing on the particular case of Margaret Lawrence University, a leading research institution situated in Galilee, Ika North-East Local Government Area of Delta State, Nigeria, this study assesses the implications of AI-aided research and questions the integrity of AI-generated knowledge. Precisely, this study discusses the epistemological status of AI-generated knowledge by weighing the prospects and shortcomings of using AI in research. Also, (...) this study explores a number of ethical considerations associated with AI-aided research, such as potential bias, digital piracy, and the risk of misinterpretation of results. Collectively, the Findings of this study reveal that although AI has great potentials for advancing research, it has far-reaching implications for the integrity of research. This study concludes by recommending a number of measures which can be employed to foster responsible use of AI in research and ultimately ensure research integrity in Margaret Lawrence University and elsewhere. (shrink)

New Realism is a movement in philosophy initiated in 2011 by Maurizio Ferraris (University of Turin) and Markus Gabriel (University of Bonn). It has already had success in prompting debates on the perspectives for a realist turn in philosophy. Hundreds of articles pro and contra New Realism have been published, some authored by distinguished contemporary thinkers. All over the world, there have been international forums related to the movement. The main task of New Realism is to develop a theoretical alternative (...) to postmodernism and other antirealist traditions in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Ahlak ve ahlaki değerler insanın varoluşuyla başlayan bir olgudur. Ahlak, insanın yaşamını devam ettirmesi için gereklidir. Ahlâki değerlerden uzak bir ferd düşünülemeyeceği gibi, milletler ve toplumlar da düşünülemez. Ahlâkî değerler insanları ister istemez kuşatır ve yaşamın idamesini sağlar. İnsan varlığının yaşam koşullarını bu denli etkileyen bir olguyu tez konusu seçmemdeki amacı, özelde Stoa Ahlakı’nı, genelde ise ahlak felsefesini araştırmak ve ahlak olgusunu anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmaktır. Stoa Okulu milattan önce üç yüzlü yıllarda Kıbrıslı Zenon’un (335-264) öncülüğünden kurulmuştur. Kıbrıslı Zenon insan için (...) en önemli olanın ahlak olduğunu ve ahlak felsefesi (etik) yapmanın felsefenin en temel sorunu olduğunu vurguluyordu. Ahlak felsefesi dışındaki diğer bilimler ahlak felsefesi (etik) yapmak için gereklidir. Zenon’dan sonra gelen filozoflar da aynı çizgiyi takip etmişlerdir. Onun bu felsefi düşüncesi Stoa Okulu’nun son filozofu olan Roma İmparatoru Marcus Aurelius Antoninus’a (121-180) kadar sürdü. Ahlâkın üzerinde bu denli çok durmuş olan bu felsefî anlayışın ahlâkının ne olduğunu anlamak için, dikkate alınması gerektiğini düşünmekteyim. İnceleme konum olan “Stoa Okulu’nda Felsefe ve Ahlak” yukarıda belirttiğim hususa değinen bir çalışmadır. Bu çalışmamın ilk bölümünde Stoa Okulu’nun tarihi gelişimini, temel görüşlerini ve diğer felsefî akımlarla etkileşimini anlattım. Bunu yapmamdaki amacım, Stoa’nın ahlâk anlayışını açıklamaya bir ön hazırlık teşkil etmesiydi. İkinci bölümde ahlak felsefesi ve ahlâk felsefesi yönünden Stoa’yı etkileyen filozoflara değindim. Üçüncü bölümde ise, bütün bunlardan faydalanarak Stoa ahlâkı üzerinde durdum. Son bölümde, fatalizm- kadercilik kavramları çerçevesinde, Stoa fatalizmine ve İslam kaderciliğine değindim. Bu bölüm özellikle Fatalizm ve kadercilik kavramlarının karıştırılması ve birbirinin yerine kullanılması açısından önemliydi. Buna elimden geldiği kadar açıklık getirmeye çalıştım. (shrink)

Analisamos a crítica de Georges Politzer (1998) à hipótese freudiana do inconsciente (Freud, 1996, 2018), com base na abordagem que adotamos, a Perspectiva de Segunda Pessoa, desenvolvida mais recentemente por Diana Pérez e Antoni Gomila (2018, 2021). Em específico, buscamos entender melhor o reconhecimento de estados psicológicos através do relato pessoal, buscando superar a dicotomia epistemológica entre primeira e terceira pessoa, na qual se concentra Politzer. Nossa contribuição para os estudos em Filosofia da Psicologia consiste em delimitar e extrair consequências (...) específicas do âmbito próprio de casos de segunda pessoa, como na prática clínica aqui focalizada, a fim de robustecer abordagens cuja tentativa de compreensão dos fenômenos psicológicos parecia até então limitada. (shrink)

A widely accepted principle in the literature on self-verifying knowledge holds that thinking ‘I think’, or a thought of the form ‘I think that p,’ makes it true. However, thinking ‘I think’ is an analytically complex act that could be made true either by the act of first-personal reference, the act of predication, or the composite referential and predicative act. I argue that Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, holds the unusual first kind of view, according to which ‘I (...) think’ is fundamentally made true, and first-personally justified, by the act of first-personal reference. The result is twofold: first, Kant’s view yields a novel way of thinking about the justification of ‘I think’—it need not appeal to a complex second-order thought to the effect of “I am thinking ‘I think’”—and second, it yields a solution to an interpretive puzzle about the relationship between Kant’s puzzling remarks about ‘I think’ in the Paralogisms and in the Deduction. If Kant is right, then ‘I think’ has a unique epistemology derived from the mere act of self-reference. (shrink)

In the introduction part of this thesis, which aims to discuss the place and importance of religious experience in Ghazali's system of thought, the place of religious experience in philosophy of religion and the place of Ghazali's religious experience in history are examined. In the first chapter, the concepts of religion, philosophy and experience are explained and their place in the framework of religious experience is explained. The possibility of religious experience, the types of religious experience and especially the concept (...) of intuition have been emphasized and the value of religious experience has been tried to be revealed in terms of being an evidence for the existence of God. In the second chapter, the life of Ghazali, the crisis he experienced in 1095 and the spiritual depression he had as a result of the religious experience that emerged as a result of this were discussed and his experience and thought shaped around it were examined. The mystics who determined the perception of religion, and the mental development theory that Ghazali developed as a result of his experience are explained. This theory is important in terms of forming a basis for his understanding of knowledge based on religious experience. In the third chapter, Ghazali's understanding of religious experience is emphasized. In this section, Ghazali's concept of religious experience and other related concepts are explained. Then, his efforts to ground the revelation and all kinds of knowledge with this religious experience were emphasized, and his 'revival' activity towards religion, philosophy, theology, fiqh, and mysticism was discussed. Ghazali rejects the grounding of knowledge with sense organs and reason and claims that knowledge should be grounded by revelation/inspiration or intuition. This claim has been discussed in various examples, and finally, an evaluation of the understanding of religious experience that is the basis of knowledge has been made and the issue of whether there is evidence for the existence of God or not has been discussed. In the end, religious experience determined his whole thought system from beginning to end. He reinterpreted everything according to religious experience and his revival project greatly influenced the Islamic world and thought after him. Keywords: Philosophy of Religion, Ghazali, Ihya (Revival), Mysticism, religious experience. (shrink)

İnsanın dış dünyadan bilgiyi elde etme şekli tarih boyunca tüm çağlarda ve toplumlarda insanların üzerinde düşündükleri bir olgu olmuştur. Düşünürler bunun için çeşitli iddialar ileri sürmüşlerdir. Bu iddialardan biri, bilginin kaynağının kalp olduğudur. Kalp ise duygu kavramıyla ilişkilendirilmiş ve bilginin kaynağı bu şekilde duygu temelli açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Duygu ise ‘sezgisel bir yetenek’ olarak tanımlanmış ve duygunun sezgiyle ilişkisine vurgu yapılmıştır. Antik Yunan’da Homeros ve Sokrat öncesi düşünürler ve Aristoteles düşünmenin ve bilincin merkezi olarak kalbi kabul etmiştir. Eski Mısır medeniyetinde de (...) kalp ön plandadır ve ölen firavunların kalbi çıkarılarak özel bir kâsede muhafaza edilmiştir. Kutsal kitaplarda bilgi verici bir organ olarak kalbe vurgu yapılmıştır. İbn Sina ve Farabi, Aristoteles’ten etkilendikleri için kalbe ağırlık veren açıklamalar yapmıştır. İbn Sina, kalbin beyne önceliği olduğunu söyler: “Kalbin duyusu, özellikle de dokunmanın duyusu, bizatihi beynin duyusundan daha büyüktür. Bu yüzden de kalbin ağrılarına tahammül edilemez.. Sonuç olarak kalp kendisinden güçlerin beyne feyezan ettiği ilk ilkedir. Bu güçlerin bazılarının fiilleri de beyinde ve beynin parçalarında tamam olur.” . (shrink)

İnsanın dış dünyadan bilgiyi elde etme şekli tarih boyunca tüm çağlarda ve toplumlarda insanların üzerinde düşündükleri bir olgu olmuştur. Düşünürler bunun için çeşitli iddialar ileri sürmüşlerdir. Bu iddialardan biri, bilginin kaynağının kalp olduğudur. Kalp ise duygu kavramıyla ilişkilendirilmiş ve bilginin kaynağı bu şekilde duygu temelli açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Duygu ise ‘sezgisel bir yetenek’ olarak tanımlanmış ve duygunun sezgiyle ilişkisine vurgu yapılmıştır. Antik Yunan’da Homeros ve Sokrat öncesi düşünürler ve Aristoteles düşünmenin ve bilincin merkezi olarak kalbi kabul etmiştir. Eski Mısır medeniyetinde de (...) kalp ön plandadır ve ölen firavunların kalbi çıkarılarak özel bir kâsede muhafaza edilmiştir. Kutsal kitaplarda bilgi verici bir organ olarak kalbe vurgu yapılmıştır. İbn Sina ve Farabi, Aristoteles’ten etkilendikleri için kalbe ağırlık veren açıklamalar yapmıştır. İbn Sina, kalbin beyne önceliği olduğunu söyler: “Kalbin duyusu, özellikle de dokunmanın duyusu, bizatihi beynin duyusundan daha büyüktür. Bu yüzden de kalbin ağrılarına tahammül edilemez.. Sonuç olarak kalp kendisinden güçlerin beyne feyezan ettiği ilk ilkedir. Bu güçlerin bazılarının fiilleri de beyinde ve beynin parçalarında tamam olur.” . (shrink)

This article considers the contribution of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology to the scientific realism debate by thematizing the problem of dubitability. After first considering the rigorous standards for apodictic evidence in phenomenology, particularly in terms of the intuitive givenness of evidence, I consider how scientific theory is open, in principle, to doubt. I argue that phenomenology has both a critical and descriptive function for scientific theory: it clarifies what scientific theory can or cannot tell us about the world, both possibly and (...) necessarily; and it describes the meaningfulness that scientific theory can have for us in our experience of the world—that is, in the living flow of conscious experience that is indubitably real. As such, I explain how phenomenology can take scientific theory as a serious field of investigation. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of information beyond its common role as descriptive data. It suggests that information operates as an intrinsic structure, influencing and defining systems across different dimensions and contexts, much like a universal “instruction set.” From societal bonds to natural phenomena, information is not passive but dynamic and often self-propagating, like a force. This document examines the function, autonomy, and density of information, considering it as fundamental to existence itself.

In this essay, I fill this gap in knowledge by arguing that the central object of Fanonian dialectics is violence (anticolonial guerilla warfare), the achievement of the decolonized Black nation and the eventual creation of a new anti-colonial (Pan-African) world order over and against its dialectical negation: Neo-colonialism via colonial counterinsurgency. Furthermore, I argue that Fanon’s dialectical thought helped lay the basis for the emergence of a new theory of revolution against US empire coined by Huey P. Newton as intercommunalism. (...) The complementarity and conceptual harmony between Fanon’s and Newton’s dialectical thinking about US/colonial empire, counterinsurgency, the imperative of creating new forms of humanism, and the lumpen masses as primary agents in the revolutionary transformation of society comprise what I call the ‘empire as pacification’ thesis. (shrink)

En este artículo reflexionamos respecto de la técnica de observación en la metodología de las ciencias sociales. Nos proponemos construir una mirada amplia sobre la técnica de observación, que articule aspectos técnicos/operativos con reflexiones epistemológicas. Con este fin, discurrimos acerca de las cuestiones epistemológicas más relevantes a tomar en consideración, proponemos una clasificación de tipos de observación que sintetiza algunas de las definiciones existentes, y recuperamos algunos aprendizajes respecto del uso de la técnica en una experiencia de investigación empírica sobre (...) travestis/transmigrantes. Proponemos que la observación de campo comprende un conjunto de variantes que tienen en común la orientación teórica, la planificación flexible y la sistematización de registros, así como el hecho de diferenciarse tanto de la observación experimental como de la observación cotidiana. A su vez, postulamos cuatro ejes para ordenar las variantes de la observación de campo: participante-no participante, revelación-ocultamiento de la identidad del observador, estructurada-no estructurada, mediada tecnológicamente-no mediada tecnológicamente. En el plano operativo, destacamos la entrada a campo, la atribución de identidades y la negociación de roles como aspectos decisivos. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that surveillance capitalism and computational propaganda can undermine democratic equality. First, I argue that two types of resources are relevant for democratic equality: 1) free time, which entails time that is free from systemic surveillance, and 2) epistemic resources. In order for everyone in a democratic system to be equally capable of full political participation, it’s a minimum requirement that these two resources are distributed fairly. But AI that’s used for surveillance capitalism can undermine the (...) fair distribution of these resources, thereby threatening democracy. I further argue that computational propaganda undermines the democratic aim of collective self-determination by normalizing relations of domination and thereby disrupting the equal standing of persons. I conclude by considering some potential solutions. (shrink)