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Free will and the dialectic of selfhood: Can one make sense of a traditional free will requiring ultimate responsibility?
Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):25-43 (2009)
Abstract
For four decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to which agents are required to be ultimately responsible for the creation or formation of their own wills (characters and purposes). The aim of this paper is to explain how a free will of this traditional kind -which..Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.
On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will.Robert Kane - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):2-16.
(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Free Will. Blackwell.
II—Acting ‘of One's Own Free Will’: Modern Reflections on an Ancient Philosophical Problem.Robert Kane - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):35-55.
Making Sense of a Free Will that is Incompatible with Determinism: A Fourth Way Forward.Robert Kane - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):5-28.
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