The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Francis Hutcheson’s moral sense theory offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. I introduce Hutcheson’s work in §1 and indicate why the existence of a sixth sense is not implausible. I provide a summary of Robert Cowan and Robert Audi’s respective theories of evaluative perception in §2, identifying three problematic objections: the Directness Objection to Cowan’s ethical perception and the aesthetic and perceptual model objections to Audi’s (...) class='Hi'>moral perception. §3 examines Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, focusing on his discussion of benevolence, the desire for the happiness of others. I deal with the unresolved issues in Hutcheson’s account by recourse to Charles Darwin’s evolutionary perspective on the moral sense in §4, arguing for the moral sense as the second-order faculty for judging benevolence. I return, in §5, to the objections, showing that moral sense theory solves all three problems and therefore offers a satisfactory account of moral perception. (shrink)

My main concern in this paper is to develop some ideas within the Kantian ethical tradition. More precisely, my aim is to develop an ethical perspective that is grounded upon the Kantian ideas of autonomy and ideal of the person (Kant’s notion of humanity) as fundamental starting points for a coherent account of Kant’s ethics in contrast to the deontological duty-based interpretation of his moral philosophy, then sketch, subsequently, some suggestions to show why this reading has more philosophical import (...) than what a deontological reading may provide. I take no issue for the time being however, as to whether or not the perspective I have in mind leads to either a Kantian orthodoxy or a revisionist direction in Kant scholarships. (shrink)

There is now increasing evidence for significant ?moral universals??that is, patterns of ethical principles that are recognized by virtually every human society. James Q. Wilson has assembled an engaging collection of this evidence for the existence of a ?moral sense.? At least in regard to the universality of the key features of sympathy and a sense of fairness or reciprocity, Wilson is right. Indeed, these features are even more universal than Wilson realizes: they extend to our (...) closest nonhuman relatives as well. Yet the claim that these facts are best accounted for by positing the existence of a ?moral sense? remains vague. Particularly when we consider what Wilson calls ?the universal aspiration,? the basis of this tendency in our moral thinking is as likely to lie in our capacity to reason as in our moral sentiments. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that morality faces a justificatory crisis. Rationalism seeks to resolve this crisis by means of a direct response to the moral sceptic--to the person who doubts that there is a rational way of deciding what moral position to adopt or whether to be moral at all. I argue that the very aspirations of rationalism--to seek a refutation of the sceptic that concedes her initial standpoint and to base morality on a formal concept of (...) rationality--are misguided. As an alternative, I introduce an approach which has neither of these aspirations--the substantive approach--and argue that it offers a more satisfactory justificatory ideal than rationalism. When measured by this ideal morality does not face a justificatory crisis. ;I argue that both subjectivist and inter-subjectivist rationalists fail to refute the sceptic. I consider the possibility that there is something specific to subjectivism which gives rise to the appearance that morality faces a justificatory crisis and argue that the justificatory standards set up by inter-subjective rationalism--if not met--equally give rise to the same appearance. Thus, it might be thought that rationalism's failure to refute the sceptic reveals that morality does indeed face a justificatory crisis. Instead, I contend that the rationalistic standards themselves should be rejected. To demotivate rationalism, I argue that the substantive approach makes better sense of our lives. The task of making sense of our lives includes not only the task of making our lives intelligible but also one of rendering them meaningful. With regard to subjectivist rationalism, I argue that agents employ substantive reasons in the attempt to make sense of themselves, that this employment of substantive reasons is part and parcel of a meaningful life, and that rationalism's formal concept of rationality cannot capture this use of these reasons. In the case of inter-subjectivist rationalism, I claim that in criticizing others for, say, cruel acts it is the cruelty of those acts that we should focus on and that in its attempt to refute the moral sceptic rationalism distorts our view on such matters. (shrink)

This paper reports part of a longitudinal research project, which sought to capture students’ conceptualization of caring practice as they progressed to different levels of study in a nursing diploma programme in Hong Kong. Model emulation was found to be an effective means of focusing students’ learning processes on the moral aspects of nursing practice. The theory of model emulation from a Chinese perspective and how it is applied to create a learning context to allow students to acquire a (...) moral sense of nursing are discussed. The participating students are invited to be sincere enquirers in the pursuit of the good embedded in practice through introspective self-examination and dialogue. They are asked to describe and share their experience of positive and negative examples of nursing in written accounts. Van Kaam’s phenomenological method was adopted to explicate the good and bad constituents of nursing from these examples, with the students assuming an active role in the explication process. The explication reveals that the students were able to articulate the good and bad practices in a variety of patient care situations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT To understand the internal structure of moral positions and the nature of moral disagreements, it would be useful to have a “moral sense” model of our different types of moral sensitivity, from our relatively spontaneous friendliness to our appreciation for traditional community norms, ideal ethical norms, and spiritual appeals to ultimate concern. After the first round of modern moral sense theory in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Edwards, most discussions of the moral (...) class='Hi'>sense concept have centered on general theses about moral value (objective or subjective, rational or emotional) without attending to this complexity. Even though the familiar positions in these discussions are not reconcilable on the plane of ethical theory, they need not be seen as simply antagonistic. Working with clearly differentiated senses of both “moral” and “sense,” this article refashions “moral sense theory” as a way of placing the insights of the classic moral sense theories, ethical rationalism, and a distinctly spiritual sensibility in a conceptually stable and empirically more discriminating order. The article also suggests strengthening the realist premise of moral sensing by invoking the model of a game player’s operational sense of how things are going in pursuit of a game’s objectives. (shrink)

While Kant in his pre-critical work expressed appreciative, albeit reserved, sympathy toward the British moral sense school, in his main works on moral philosophy he harshly rejects the idea that we have a specific moral sense. This change in attitude is, of course, connected to Kant's discovery and formulation of a purely rational moral principle. Still one might ask whether Kant's critique of moral sense theory was really justified. To answer this question, (...) I shall first examine what Kant understands the, or a, moral sense to be. Second, I shall consider which arguments Kant employs to reject any moral sense. Third, I shall explain what Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume meant when discussing moral sense. Finally, I shall show that Kant's moral legalism cannot come to grips with the aspect of moral consciousness, for which the British moral philosophers coined the concept of moral sense, and that therefore Kant's criticism of moral sense theory is unjustified. Während der Kant der vorkritischen Schriften der moral-sense- Schule der Briten zwar nicht ohne Vorbehalte, aber doch mit anerkennender Sympathie gegenübergestanden hat, verwirft er in seinen moralphilosophischen Hauptschriften die Annahme eines spezifischen moralischen Sinnes mit äußerst harschen Worten. Dieser Wandel der Einstellung hängt natürlich mit Kants Entdeckung und Formulierung eines rein rationalen Moralprinzips zusammen. Dennoch stellt sich die Frage, ob Kants Kritik der moral-sense- Theorie wirklich berechtigt ist. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird erstens untersucht, was Kant unter dem oder einem moralischen Gefühl versteht, zweitens wird geprüft, mit welchen Argumenten Kant die Annahme eines moral sense verwirft, und drittens wird mit Bezug auf Shaftesbury, Hutcheson und Hume dargelegt, was diese Theoretiker eigentlich unter einem moral sense verstanden haben. Abschließend wird dargetan, daß Kant mit seinem moralischen Legalismus eben den Aspekt des moralischen Bewußtseins nicht erfassen kann, für den die Briten den Begriff des moral sense geprägt haben, und daß seine Kritik der moral-sense- Theorie insofern unberechtigt ist. (shrink)

Cet article étudie le développement des réflexions de Darwin sur l’éthique, de ses Carnets de notes à La filiation de l’homme . Loin d’être un épiphénomène tardif, l’approche naturaliste de l’éthique de Darwin est largement dessinée dès 1840 : elle explique la convergence du sens moral avec un critère d’utilité rétrospectif . Le travail ultérieur de Darwin clarifie la relation entre instincts et habitudes morales héréditaires, tout en soulignant le rôle central de la sympathie dans l’origine (...) et l’évolution du sens moral.This paper examines the development of Darwin’s reflections on morality, from his Notebooks through The Descent of Man . Far from being a late epiphenomenon, Darwin’s naturalist approach to ethics was largely in place by 1840: it explains the convergence between moral sense and a retrospective utility criterion . Darwin’s later work clarifies the relation between instincts and hereditary moral habits, while underlining the central role of sympathy in the origin and evolution of moral sense. (shrink)

We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and its place in moral epistemology is important. Yet, I (...) argue, that existing accounts of moral inquiry do not give us the resources to do so. This paper develops a positive account of hermeneutical inquiry. I argue that when we engage in hermeneutical inquiry, we search for an apt perspective on our situation. (shrink)

C.D. Broad’s Reflections stands out as one of the few serious examinations of Moral Sense Theory in twentieth century analytic philosophy. It also constitutes an excellent discussion of the interconnections that allegedly exist between questions concerning what Broad calls the ‘logical analysis’ of moral judgments and questions about their epistemology. In this paper I make three points concerning the interconnectedness of the analytical and epistemological elements of versions of Moral Sense Theory. First, I make a (...) general point about Broad’s association between the Naïve Realist Moral Sense Theory (an epistemological view) and Objectivist Moral Sense Theory (a ‘logical analysis’). Second, I raise doubts about one of Broad’s arguments that Trans-Subjectivist Moral Sense Theory (logical analysis) can account for the apparent synthetic necessity of general moral propositions (epistemological). Third, I briefly discuss a view about logical analysis that should be of interest to contemporary Moral Sense Theorists – Neo-Sentimentalism – and respond to an argument whose conclusion is that this analysis is incompatible with a particular kind of epistemological view. (shrink)

Has Darwinian science made natural theology obsolete, as many Christian scholars now believe? In this article, the author assumes that natural theology does not take place in a religious vacuum but instead borrows its sense of god from this or that specific faith tradition. Its task is not to arrive at an understanding of the divine mystery different from that of systematic or doctrinal theology. As the author shall argue here, however, the empirical grounding essential to natural theology must (...) be considerably more comprehensive and more profound than that provided by the natural sciences, mainly because the latter usually leave out any mention of the most striking of all natural phenomena – the human mind and its mysterious operations.The author maintains that an exclusively Darwinian narrative cannot fully explain why your mind is restless for truth or why you should trust your mind. The point of natural theology is to ask whether nature as a whole is intelligible apart from the reality of God. The author’s point is that an empirical survey of nature that restricts itself to following the modern scientific method’s habitual exclusion of thought from its survey of nature cannot succeed in making nature intelligible.Contribution: This article argues that evolutionary explanations alone are not enough to account for all that is happening in human understanding and knowing. In the light of evolutionary biology, we must note that even human intelligence, which formerly seemed to elevate our species to a perch above nature, now appears to be an unexceptional product of chance, deep time and natural selection. ‘Thought’, the name we may give to the most splendid of all evolutionary outcomes, is taken to be a product of impersonal natural selection and so also are our moral instincts. (shrink)

Recent research in moral psychology has highlighted how the current internal states of observers can influence their moral judgments of others’ actions. In this article, we argue that an important internal state that serves such a function is the sense of control one has over one’s own actions. Across four studies, we show that an individual’s own current sense of control is positively associated with the intensity of moral judgments of the actions of others. We (...) also show that this effect extends not only to judgments of rightness and wrongness (Study 1), but also to assignments of reward and punishment (Study 2). Finally, we demonstrate that this effect is based on the current experience of control by showing a moderation of the effect via motivational states (promotion; prevention) that either lead one to incorporate or disregard internal states when making judgments (Study 3) and by subtly manipulating participants’ sense of control (Study 4). (shrink)

This study adopts a hermeneutic, practice-based approach to Responsible Innovation to explore how a reflective and proactive attitude can be implemented in a start-up context. We hypothesised that a moral hermeneutics framework - rooted in post-phenomenology and theories on technology-induced value change - could provide a way to understand how practitioners in a start-up make sense of the different kinds of responsibilities in their work, balancing professional demands and standards of excellence with broader ecological and social commitments. Using (...) in-depth interviews with the team members of a start-up R&D laboratory, we explored how they interpret their responsibilities-as-(moral)-obligations. Our findings suggest that the syntactical ways team members make sense of the relationship between these responsibilities can be useful for understanding how reflexivity can surface in this environment. We conclude by proposing that less conciliatory interpretations of conflicting responsibilities may lead to a collective search for practical solutions addressing these tensions, as long as it is embedded in a collective dialogue involving the other members’ moral perspectives and technical expertise. (shrink)

We can often achieve together what we could not have achieved on our own. Many times these outcomes and actions will be morally valuable; sometimes they may be of substantial moral value. However, when can we be under an obligation to perform some morally valuable action together with others, or to jointly produce a morally significant outcome? Can there be collective moral obligations, and if so, under what circumstances do we acquire them? These are questions to which philosophers (...) are increasingly turning their attention. It is fair to say that traditional ethical theories cannot give a satisfying answer to the questions, focusing as they do on the actions and attitudes of discreet individual agents. It should also be noted that the debate surrounding collective moral obligations is ongoing and by no means settled. This chapter discusses and compares the different attempts to date to answer the above questions. It proposes a set of meta-criteria—or desiderata— for arbitrating between the various proposals. (shrink)

Many commentators suppose that morality, objectively construed, must possess a minimal sort of explanatory relevance if moral realism is to be plausible. To the extent that moral realists are unable to secure explanatory relevance for moral facts, moral realism faces a problem. Call this general objection an “explanatory objection” to moral realism. Despite the prevalence of explanatory objections in the literature, the connection between morality’s explanatory powers and moral realism’s truth is not clear. This (...) paper considers several different reasons for subjecting morality to explanatory scrutiny and concludes that none of them uncover a special or compelling explanatory problem for realism. In light of these difficulties, an alternative account of the connection between moral realism and moral explanation is developed. Not only does this account make sense of explanatory objections to realism, it turns out that realists may have the resources to defend themselves against this explanatory concern, properly understood. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to present the interesting dichotomy which is closely linked to the problems of professional ethics. This fundamental philosophic-ethical problem is known as the problem of role morality. The question which arises is: Can special social roles create their own unique moral obligations that may differ or be even inconsistent with our everyday moral requirements which arise from common sense morality (such as honesty, fair play or respect for others)? And if (...) yes, is this conduct morally defensible or even desirable? (shrink)

The article begins by surveying defences of moral realism and noting the revival of an ontology of ‘moral properties’. Such a position tends either to invite accusations of espousing metaphysically ‘queer’ properties, or to fall back on a weak (e.g. externalist) version of moral realism. Norman attempts to find a way through these difficulties by exploring the idea of ‘moral vision’, suggesting that this is best understood not as the intuiting of special moral properties but (...) as a matter of ‘seeing patterns’ in our lives and experiences. Such an account of moral vision can explain how it can be both cognitive and action‐guiding. (shrink)

On 27th December 1831, HMS Beagle set out from Plymouth under the command of Captain Robert Fitzroy on a voyage that lasted nearly 5 years. The purpose of the trip was to complete a survey of the southern coasts of South America, and afterwards to circumnavigate the globe. The ship's geologist and naturalist was Charles Darwin. Darwin kept a diary throughout the voyage in which he recorded his daily activities, not only on board the ship but also during (...) the several long journeys that he made on horseback in Patagonia and Chile. His entries tell the story of one of the most important scientific journeys ever made with matchless immediacy and vivid descriptiveness. (shrink)

In two places, Nicolas Malebranche makes a strange moral argument that he presents as an advantage of his occasionalist metaphysics. Because God is the only true cause, every choice of sin can only be given causality by God's power. Every sinner, therefore, profanely forces God to serve sin; to avoid such sacrelige, the occasionalist has extra reason to avoid sin. My analysis of Malebranche's reasoning shows how this initially perplexing argument does indeed work and, in fact, provides a useful (...) example of how several distinct pieces of his philosophical theology come together to form a surprisingly cohesive argument. (shrink)

Complementing the publication of Darwin's notebooks and correspondence, this work provides access to the last remaining unpublished source of Darwin manuscript materials. It is a catalog to and a complete transcription of the marks and annotations he made in the margins of his books. The margin comments throw light on Darwin's immediate reactions to his reading matter; further comments on slips of paper stuck inside the covers of the books reveal more considered evaluation. These comments are also (...) fully transcribed. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

One of the goals of computerized tutoring systems is to optimize the learning of facts. Over a hundred years of declarative memory research have identified two robust effects that can improve such systems: the spacing and the testing effect. By making optimal use of both and adjusting the system to the individual learner using cognitive models based on declarative memory theories, such systems consistently outperform traditional methods. This adjustment process is driven by a continuously updated estimate of the rate of (...) forgetting for each item and learner on the basis of the learner's accuracy and response time. In this study, we investigated to what extent these estimates of individual rates of forgetting are stable over time and across different materials. We demonstrate that they are stable over time but not across materials. Even though most theories of human declarative memory assume a single underlying rate of forgetting, we show that, in practice, it makes sense to assume different materials are forgotten at different rates. If a computerized, adaptive fact-learning system allowed different rates of forgetting for different materials, it could adapt to individual learners more readily. (shrink)

One of the goals of computerized tutoring systems is to optimize the learning of facts. Over a hundred years of declarative memory research have identified two robust effects that can improve such systems: the spacing and the testing effect. By making optimal use of both and adjusting the system to the individual learner using cognitive models based on declarative memory theories, such systems consistently outperform traditional methods (Van Rijn, Van Maanen, & Van Woudenberg, 2009). This adjustment process is driven by (...) a continuously updated estimate of the rate of forgetting for each item and learner on the basis of the learner's accuracy and response time. In this study, we investigated to what extent these estimates of individual rates of forgetting are stable over time and across different materials. We demonstrate that they are stable over time but not across materials. Even though most theories of human declarative memory assume a single underlying rate of forgetting, we show that, in practice, it makes sense to assume different materials are forgotten at different rates. If a computerized, adaptive fact‐learning system allowed different rates of forgetting for different materials, it could adapt to individual learners more readily. (shrink)

The fields of machine learning (ML) and cognitive science have developed complementary approaches to computationally modeling human behavior. ML's primary concern is maximizing prediction accuracy; cognitive science's primary concern is explaining the underlying mechanisms. Cross-talk between these disciplines is limited, likely because the tasks and goals usually differ. The domain of e-learning and knowledge acquisition constitutes a fruitful intersection for the two fields’ methodologies to be integrated because accurately tracking learning and forgetting over time and predicting future performance based on (...) learning histories are central to developing effective, personalized learning tools. Here, we show how a state-of-the-art ML model can be enhanced by incorporating insights from a cognitive model of human memory. This was done by exploiting the predictive performance equation's (PPE) narrow but highly specialized domain knowledge with regard to the temporal dynamics of learning and forgetting. Specifically, the PPE was used to engineer timing-related input features for a gradient-boosted decision trees (GBDT) model. The resulting PPE-enhanced GBDT outperformed the default GBDT, especially under conditions in which limited data were available for training. Results suggest that integrating cognitive and ML models could be particularly productive if the available data are too high-dimensional to be explained by a cognitive model but not sufficiently large to effectively train a modern ML algorithm. Here, the cognitive model's insights pertaining to only one aspect of the data were enough to jump-start the ML model's ability to make predictions—a finding that holds promise for future explorations. (shrink)

In this book Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen address the complexities of his question "Is affirmative action morally justifiable?" by analyzing the prevailing contemporary arguments both for and against affirmative action. The book applies current political philosophy to demonstrate that arguments on both sides justify different conclusions given different specific cases, though it ultimately does argue in favor of affirmative action based on the relative strength and significance of the anti-discrimination- and equality of opportunity-based positions.

When we read On the Origin of Species, we cannot help but hear echoes of the Wealth of Nations. Darwin’s “economy of nature” features a “division of labour” that leads to complexity and productivity. We should not, however, analyze Darwin’s ethics through this lens. Darwin did not draw his economic ideas from Smith, nor did he base his ethics on an economic foundation. Darwin’s ethics rest on Smith’s notion—from the Theory of Moral Sentiments—of an innate (...) human faculty of sympathy. Darwin gave this notion an evolutionary interpretation, concluding that any species of social animals that develops a high enough level of intelligence will evolve moral principles. But the specific moral principles evolved by any particular species will vary, depending on that species’ particular evolutionary history. Darwin’s theory of moral sentiments thus diverged profoundly from Smith’s, while remaining in the same intellectual lineage. Although my reading of Darwin’s ethics departs from the dominant trend, it is not without precedent. A century ago, William James propounded a similar interpretation of Darwin. James’s interpretation has been largely forgotten, but he had Darwin right. It seems that James then developed his own moral philosophy on what he saw as a Darwinian foundation. It may be that James read Darwin’s evolutionary ethics through a pragmatic lens and so refashioned it, in his turn, into something again profoundly different from what Darwin had conceived, but again remaining in the same intellectual lineage. (shrink)

Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s (...) own theory of moral practice and its evolution is correct, then the actual moral practice does-and in fact must-incorporate norms, which have the form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and, therefore, any (normative) moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must also include categorical imperatives. (shrink)

Hume's moral theory, I shall here argue, is explicitly and in fundamental ways a common sense theory. It is widely accepted, of course, that Hume found moral distinctions to rest on sentiment, and that he found in the principle of sympathy the means by which individual sentiments come to be experienced by others. What has not received adequate attention is Hume's concern to refute moral skepticism and his explicit reliance on appeals to “common sense,” nor,so (...) far as I know, has anyone suggested how these several features coalesce in an outlook which is appropriately designated a common sense theory. To support my claim I shall first show that Hume is not, as is widely supposed, what we would term a “subjectivist” in morals, and that in fact he means to establish, in at least two important senses of the term, the “objectivity”of morals. (shrink)

Many moral philosophers tend to construe the aims of ethics as the interpretation and critique of ‘common-sense morality’. This approach is defended by Henry Sidgwick in his influential The Methods of Ethics and presented as a development of a basically Socratic idea of philosophical method. However, Sidgwick's focus on our general beliefs about right and wrong action drew attention away from the Socratic insistence on treating beliefs as one expression of our wider dispositions. -/- Understanding the historical contingency (...) of Sidgwick's approach to ethics can help us reflect on whether there are other ways in which modern ethics can be Socratic. (shrink)

This article examines Pauline Kleingeld’s “volitional self-contradiction” (VSC) interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. It begins in §1 with an outline of Kleingeld’s interpretation and then proceeds in §2 to raise some worries about how the interpretation handles Kant’s egoism example. §3 considers VSC’s handling of the false promise example comparing it in §4 with the Logical/Causal Law (LCL) interpretation, which arguably does better than its VSC competitor in handling this example. §5 deploys the LCL interpretation to consider the (...) related objections that the VSC interpretation is “superfluous” or at least “misguided” as a (formal) criterion of the permissibility of action on a maxim. These objections, it is argued, help reveal two distinct roles for contradictions in Kant’s applications of the formula of universal law – one for delivering moral judgments and one reflective of a formal coherence constraint on all deliberation having psychological significance for agents who contemplate violating duty. Disentangling these helps reveal some of the complexity in the use to which Kant puts the formula of universal law in his sample applications revealing the true significance of what Kleingeld refers to as volitional self-contradiction. In §6 is summary. (shrink)

“Spousal revenge” killers murder their child apparently out of a desire to cause harm to their ex-partner, the child’s other parent. Standard explanations of these killings fail to provide an adequate solution to what I call the problem of spousal revenge filicide. This is the problem of how a killer comes to take their rage at their former partner out on their own child and how that child can be dehumanized to the point of murder. Although the dehumanization of the (...) victim is acknowledged to occur, why it occurs is not well understood. Here, I offer an hypothesis that the killer fails to represent their child as a moral subject with a mind of their own. This is due to a deficit in the killer’s capacity for person perception which is, by hypothesis, pathological. As such, the killer experiences the child as an object, rather than a person, which is of significant emotional value to the other parent. The specificity of this disorder explains why the ex-partner themselves is not targeted, and it explains how the killer is able to understand that killing the child will harm the other parent. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of human rights has long been monopolised by what might be called the ‘natural-law view’. On this view, human rights are fundamental moral rights which people enjoy solely by virtue of their humanity. In recent years, a number of theorists have started to question the validity of this outlook, advocating instead what they call a ‘political’ view. My aim in this article is to explore the latter view in order to establish whether it constitutes a valuable alternative (...) to the ‘natural-law view’. In particular, I distinguish between three ways in which human rights can be political: in relation to their (1) iudicandum, (2) justification and (3) feasibility constraints. I argue that it makes sense to think of human rights as political in relation to both their iudicandum and their justification but in a way that is not always adequately captured by proponents of the political view. Moreover, I also claim that, if we take the political view seriously, we still need to engage in the sort of abstract moral reasoning that characterises the natural-law approach and which proponents of the political view significantly downplay. (shrink)

This article advances a critical gender lens on the sociology of religion by arguing that “doing gender” and “doing religion” function as intertwined systems of accountability. To demonstrate the inextricability of these two systems, this study analyzes open-ended survey data from 576 Jewish women who wear kippot. These women’s responses reveal that this religious practice is fraught with social sanctions on the basis of the women’s simultaneous gender deviance and religious deviance. These women are not read as simply “doing Jewish” (...) when they wear kippot; rather, they are read as doing something that is implicitly gendered, such as “doing religious feminism.” It appears that when Jewish women “un/re/do religion,” they simultaneously “un/re/do gender” and vice versa: gender scripts and religious scripts are inextricably intertwined. (shrink)

Heidegger has been blamed for being obsolete, irrelevant, ignorant and even dangerous in relation to contemporary philosophy of technology. Based on mainly two texts from Heidegger’s post-war production, “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Only a God can Save Us”, this commentary to Don Ihde’s article tries to show how Heidegger actually makes sense to philosophy of technology. The sheer fact that many postmodern thinkers, among those Don Ihde, are constantly ‘measuring’ their line of thoughts and use of concepts against (...) Heidegger’s original thinking is proof of this relevance. I think that Heidegger, despite his despicable political and moral convictions, is needed when it comes to a critique and understanding of contemporary technological innovation and development in relation to what it means to be human. Most important is to stress that Heidegger was not a technodystopian, which a thorough reading of the two selected texts clearly shows. On the contrary, Heidegger points at the existential dialectical essence in technology, which means that both damnation and redemption can be mediated by technology. (shrink)

This article develops an Aristotelian account of moral obligation, and defends the account in the face of certain standard Kantian criticisms.Specifically, Aristotelian obligations may be interpreted as being dependent on virtue in such a way that they do not apply to non-virtuous agents, and therefore lack universality. The article draws on various aspects of Aristotle’s own work to set out an initial account, and then on recent discussions within the analytic tradition on this subject.An Aristotelian position is developed which (...) focuses on the distinction between the subjective and objective senses in which virtues of character need to be understood. At the objective level, the virtues are the dispositions required for any human being to live the best life.At the subjective level, the virtues are the dispositions of character which are present in certain persons, but absent in others. It is at the objective level that we can locate an Aristotelian account of how the demands of practical reason ground universal moral obligations. (shrink)

The question what makes us human is often treated as a question of fact. However, the term 'human' is not primarily used to refer to a particular kind of entity, but as a 'nomen dignitatis' -- a dignity-conferring name. It implies a particular moral status. That is what spawns endless debates about such issues as when human life begins and ends and whether human-animal chimeras are "partly human". Definitions of the human are inevitably "persuasive". They tell us about what (...) is important and how we should live our lives as humans, and thus help us to make sense of what we are. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Calum Miller skillfully and creatively argues for the counterintuitive view that there aren’t any good reasons to believe that non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense. By Miller’s lights, such reasons are either weak in their own right or they also favor the view that non-human animals don’t feel morally relevant pain. In this paper, I explain why Miller’s view is mistaken. In particular, I sketch a very reasonable abductive argument (...) for the conclusion that non-human animals feel morally relevant pain. This argument shows that, even in the face of Miller’s moderate skepticism about whether non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense, it’s still more epistemically reasonable to believe that non-human animals feel pain in a morally relevant sense than not. In which case, I conclude that Miller has failed to show that there aren’t any good reasons to believe that non-human animals don’t feel pain in a morally relevant sense that don’t also count in favor of the view that non-human animals don’t feel morally relevant pain. (shrink)

This article assumes that the key element in Relativism is the denial of any comparability between different moral codes. Each system of morality is, according to the relativist, defined internally to any given culture, as parallels with examples in sport might illustrate, and as two key examples from recent moral disputes amply show. While classical writers such as Hume and Bentham, each in his way a kind of utilitarian, certainly intended to be absolutist, it might nevertheless be argued (...) that they left the way open to relativism despite their intentions. The absolutist needs to establish a common moral standard of some kind which can be used as a standard of comparison between apparently different moral codes. Hume's assumption that we share the disposition to sympathy with others seems far too optimistic; and Bentham's attempt to be scientific presupposes a shared view both of values and of the canons of moral reasoning; but there is arguably no such shared view. Might some version of Aristotelianism be a more promising approach? The article ends with an ariswer to this question. /// O presente artigo parte do pressuposto de que o elemento-chave do Relativismo é a negação de toda e qualquer comparabilidade entre diferentes códigos morais. Cada sistema de moralidade é, de acordo com o relativista, deftnido internamente nos termos de cada cultura determinada, tal como se pode ilustrar com exemplos do mundo do desporto, e dois exemplos tirados da discussão moral mais recente amplamente demonstram. Enquanto que escritores clássicos tais como David Hume e Jeremy Bentham, cada um deles utilitarista à sua maneira, pretendiam certamente ser absolutistas, a verdade é que, argumenta o autor do artigo, ambos deixaram, apesar das suas intenções, o caminho aberto ao relativismo. O absolutista necessita de alguma forma de estabelecer um padrão moral comum que possa ser usado como termo de comparação entre códigos morais aparentemente diferenciados. O pressuposto de Hume de que nós partilhamos uma inclinação para a simpatia em relação a outros seres humanos parece demasiado optimista; por seu lado, a tentativa de Bentham de corresponder às expectativas da ciência pressupõem, por seu lado, uma visdo comum dos valores e dos cânones do raciocínio moral. O problema, porém, é que se pode demonstrar não existir uma tal visão comum. Assim, pergunta o autor do artigo, não será de considerar uma certa versão do Aristotelismo como uma abordagem mais promissora? A resposta a esta questão constitui a parte final do artigo. (shrink)

Recent explorations into Sigmund Freud's intellectual development by Frank Sulloway and Lucille Ritvo have directed attention to the significance of evolutionary theory for psychoanalysis. In this paper I shall pursue the exploration by showing how Darwin was received by members of the so-called Helmholtz circle and certain of Freud's teachers in the University of Vienna medical school. I will make the point that the Leibniz–Kant background of these several scientists was important for this reception. I will argue that the (...) Leibniz–Kant tradition came forward to Freud by two roads, Helmholtz's unconscious inference as foundation for a physiology of the senses, and Arthur Schopenhauer's not unrelated uses of the principle of sufficient reason to explain the possibility of lawlikeness in a universe of lawless energies. Finally, I will suggest ways in which Freud received and used the tradition. (shrink)

Ideology, especially in relation to science, has a negative connotation and is used in a pejorative sense. During the past few decades, historians of science have begun to argue that all biology is and was embedded in sociopolitical ideology. Ernst Mayr has insisted that Darwinism was not an ideology, but rather an “anti-ideology” that for the first time in history attributed the origin of species to natural causes. This chapter challenges the view that there was no scientific alternative to (...) Darwinian evolution. On the contrary, it contends that a naturalistic theory of the origin of species existed long before Charles Darwin, that this theory represented a scientific alternative to Darwinism, and that Darwin refused to engage with it for reasons of strategy. The chapter also argues that the Darwinian choice did good to the life sciences but also caused damage as a result of scientific shortcomings that were essential to Darwin's positions. In other words, it supports the contention that Darwinian biology bears the hallmark of an ideology. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to make sense of Marx's own view about justice in the light of the controversy between classical Marxism and normative Marxism. Normative Marxism claims that Marx's condemnation of capitalist exploitation and his conception of communism entertain a principle of justice, while classical Marxism does not allow any such principle in Marx's thought. However, I argue that although Marx uses normative terms, he does not provide any specific theory of justice. Marx's condemnation of capitalism (...) is based on the real interests of the workers, not on their moral norms, and his communist principle is a principle of distribution (as a principle of equality), not a principle of justice. (shrink)

Wendy Donner'sThe Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophyis an important and thought-provoking addition to the growing body of literature seeking to rescue Mill's practical philosophy from the rather lowly place it occupied in the estimation of many philosophers earlier this century, and to present him as a philosopher whose views form a coherent, systematic whole that can still contribute significantly to numerous moral and political debates. The book proposes an interpretation of the whole of Mill's (...) practical philosophy, and attempts to reveal how aspects of Mill's thought, hitherto considered incompatible, actually mutually support one another. At the same time, Donner sets many of Mill's positions in the context of contemporary moral and political philosophical debates, and finds that on a number of important issues, his thought stands up rather well against more recent work. (shrink)