O par Fortuna-Virtù é discutido nas diversas análises críticas do pensamento de Machiavelli e, embora tais termos possuam origens e tradições bem determinadas ao longo do pensamento latino, principalmente específicas considerações antigas e medievais em algumas recepções durante o humanismo cívico, suas características elusivas ao longo das argumentações de Machiavelli são mantidas, possibilitando inúmeros debates acadêmicos. Diante da ambivalência e da ambiguidade da ideia de Virtù perante relevantes e variadas tradições, contínuas buscas por clarificação são feitas ao longo do corpus (...) do secretário florentino, associando o termo a outras importantes e centrais reflexões, e.g., desiderio, stato, forza. A instabilidade política, as forças além do controle humano, a imponderabilidade das ações civis são temas recorrentes nas concepções sobre a Fortuna em variadas argumentações desse autor. Em aberto diálogo com os humanistas cívicos que enfatizam maior participação política e social, mesclando embasamento racional, consideração moral e as discussões sobre as formas dos regimes políticos, esse escritor apresenta uma concepção historiográfica, a revigorar tradições do mundo antigo, na criação de uma ordem civil mediante a Virtù, a qual demanda comprometimento pessoal e público na exaltação das potencialidades e dos limites humanos. Reinserir a relevância da paridade entre Fortuna e Virtù em Machiavelli é um passo relevante no combate a leituras anacrônicas. Assim, analisar-se-ão os exemplos mais significativos dos fundadores e dos sustentadores da ordem civil destacados nos textos discursivos do florentino, e.g., Romulo, Numa, Moisés, Cesare Bórgia, Castruccio Castracani. Ao estudar as imagens da Fortuna, em face das concepções políticas e antropológicas do autor, discutir-se-á a centralidade da díade Virtù-Fortuna no desenvolvimento argumentativo de algumas ideias principais desse famoso pensador político. (shrink)

This paper applies emerging research on epistemic virtues to business ethics. Inspired by recent work on epistemic virtues in philosophy, I develop a view in which epistemic virtues contribute to the acquisition of knowledge that is instrumentally valuable in the realisation of particular ends, business ends in particular. I propose a conception of inquiry according to which epistemic actions involve investigation, belief adoption and justification, and relate this to the traditional ‘justified true belief’ analysis of knowledge. I defend the view (...) that epistemic virtues enable and/or motivate people to perform epistemic actions. An examination of the key epistemic virtues of love of knowledge, epistemic courage, temperance, justice, generosity and humility provides some initial evidence suggesting that the way epistemic virtues enable or motivate is by countering a number of biases that have been uncovered by behavioural economics, and also indicates ways in which the instrumental epistemic value view is superior to other approaches to epistemic virtue offered in the literature. (shrink)

This article elaborates on Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, exploring the plausibility of his claim that each praxis has its own appropriate set of virtues. The exploration will be applied to what I term military praxis. Firstly, the article analyses what is meant by the concept of a praxis and how a military praxis can be defined, as well as the wider purpose of military praxis. From there it proceeds to the “internal goods”, the desires, to be realized in joining (...) the military. Which are these desires that are satisfied by participating in military praxis? Next, by combining the preceding steps, the article suggests which virtues are appropriate to the military praxis, focusing on seven virtues of military character: responsibility, competence, comradeship, respect, courage, resilience and discipline. This framework is completed by practical wisdom, the military virtue of intellect. I will conclude my article by elaborating on the role of narrative in integrating the virtues and by giving some concrete directions about ways in which education in the military virtues could take place. (shrink)

Situationists maintain that psychological evidence (e.g., the well-known Good Samaritan experiment) challenges a key assumption of virtue ethics, namely that virtuous people display cross-situational consistency of behavior. This situationist critique is frequently thought to pose a serious threat to virtue ethics. Virtue ethicists have so far mainly put forward conceptual rather than empirical arguments against situationism. In this paper, we examine the extent to which a plausible empirical argument can be developed against situationism, and in favor of (...) virtue ethics. We note that such an argument will naturally entail empirical simplification, and consequently concessions from both sides of the debate will be required. We argue, however, that with such concessions in place, the debate between situationists and virtue ethicists can be captured by a claim about the way that virtuous behavior may change when situations change. We report the results of an experiment (conducted twice, for replication) showing how social science methods can be introduced to the situationism debate to test such a claim empirically. Our results offer tentative support for eudaemonist and agent-based varieties (but not for target-centered) versions of virtue ethics. (shrink)

A adequação dinâmica dos bons exemplos, conformando-os às necessidades impostas pelas circunstâncias, insere Maquiavel nos variados usos da _imitatio_ antiga e renascentista. A _imitação_ deve reavivar as práticas civis e as atitudes de _Virtù_, fornecendo ânimo para a realização das ações políticas e das práticas pedagógicas, conforme a atuação como secretário de Florença e seus escritos políticos, históricos e literários salientam. Desse modo, ao revisar a noção de _imitatio_, especificamente na antiguidade e na renascença, contextualizam-se os argumentos de Maquiavel sobre (...) a possibilidade dos humanos alcançarem a _Virtù_ pela imitação das ações adequadas nos _Discorsi_, no _Príncipe_, nas _Histórias Florentinas_ e na _Arte da Guerra_. Ao propor investigações e análises do passado que produzam utilidade e deleite, realçando _o sabor das ações humanas_, os escritos Maquiavelianos realçam a impossibilidade de uma definição pré-determinada sobre quais opções devam ser usadas e sustentam a possibilidade de duas perspectivas, aparentemente antagônicas, serem escolhidas simultaneamente. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop an ethical framework for the marketing of corporate social responsibility. Methods The approach is a conceptual one based on virtue ethics and on the corporate identity literature. Furthermore, empirical research results are used to describe the opportunities and pitfalls of using marketing communication tools in the strategy of building a virtuous corporate brand. Results/conclusions An ethical framework that addresses the paradoxical relation between the consequentialist perspective many proponents of the marketing (...) of CSR adopt, and ethical perspectives which criticize an exclusive profit-oriented approach to CSR. Furthermore, three CSR strategies in relation to the marketing of CSR are discussed. For each CSR strategy it is explored how a corporation could avoid falling into the promise/performance gap. (shrink)

In this essay, I reflect on the implications of intellectual virtues in scientific endeavor. To this end, I first offer a depiction of scientific endeavor by resorting to the notion of academic attitude, which involves aspects concerning the generation and possession of knowledge. Although there are differences between these activities, they have in common the engagement of diverse intellectual agents (scientists). In this sense, I analyze how intellectual virtues are linked to 1) scientific research tasks, such as theory appraisal, and (...) 2) those tasks of vigilance and intervention in the uses of scientific knowledge. I conclude that intellectual virtues play a leading role in achieving higher quality scientific research and adequate foresight on the uses and impacts of scientific findings. In this order of ideas, I propose an agenda for further inquiries on these matters, highlighting the relevance of reflecting and empirically researching the relationship between intellectual virtues and science, as well as cultivating intellectual virtues in various stages of scientific training. (shrink)

Since the Global Financial Crisis, a surge of interest in the use of finance as a tool to address social and economic problems suggests the potential for a generational shift in how the finance industry operates and is perceived. J. C. de Swaan seeks to channel the forces of well-intentioned finance professionals to improve finance from within and help restore its focus on serving society. Drawing from inspiring individuals in the field, de Swaan proposes a framework for pursuing a viable (...) career in finance while benefiting society and upholding humanistic values. In doing so, he challenges traditional concepts of success in the industry. This will also engage readers outside of finance who are concerned about the industry's impact on society. (shrink)

The present work attempts to evaluate in what manner the Marian virtues marked out throughout the Middle Ages with respect to women, contribute powerfully to the dignification of women and their redemption from the traditional accusations that they are a perverting influence on humanity.

En este artículo el autor propone revisar la idea kantiana de virtud, su relación con el deber, con la razón y con el sentimiento moral: el respeto. También se revisan las ideas de santidad y perfección, como referencia para dos caras del mismo deber y su papel como orientadoras de la facultad de juzgar, demostrando el carácter unitario de la ética kantiana.

A relatively close account of the evolution of analytical philosophy shows that never enjoyed an unique methodology nor a common set of theses. In particular, if we understand that by ‘analytical philosophy’ we refer to a wider philosophical movement than the ‘ordinary language philosophy’, such lack of methodological or substantial coherence is even more evident. Then, it can be asked whether a conceptual description of analytical philosophy at the beginnings of XXI century is possible. As it is proposed, such description (...) is only feasible under an axiological basis, that is, under the commitment with a set of scholar values that give a minimal consistency to philosophical analysis such it is practised nowadays. The nature of those values can be included, generally speaking, in the realm of the epistemological, but what is concretely contended is that it is mandatory to pay attention to its discursive and argumentative nature. This shift of focus allows to surpass the virtues and flaws of analytical philosophy in the 20 nth century and facilitates the re evaluation of its function in the 21 nth one. (shrink)

Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely accepted they are from (...) a third-personal point of view. We show that beliefs formed in a way that is insufficiently first-personal may not be transparently accessible to those holding them. (shrink)

Despite numerous public health organizations supporting the pathologization of obesity and considering recent obesity rates a health crisis, many researchers in the humanities, social sciences, and even in the health sciences remain unconvinced. In this paper, we address a set of arguments coming from these academic fields that criticize medical models of obesity for their supposedly flawed diagnostic categories that shift focus onto individuals and support moralizing judgements. Clarifying some key claims in these models and explicating the view of obesity (...) in terms of energy dysregulation, we aim to tease apart misunderstandings and argue that not only do these models not say what they are often accused of saying, but their apparent vices may actually be virtues in helping to combat stigma. Building on the social psychology of stigma and disease labeling, we then suggest that current medical models are largely supportive of many moral and political aims promoted by critics of these models. (shrink)

This paper faces the projections of the moral philosophy of Cicero on medieval scholastic ethics; it examines the influence of Cicero’s writings dealing with treatment of the justificating way of moral behavior starting from natural human inclinations. First, the article analyses the philosophical elaboration of the theme in the field of ciceronian thinking. Second, already inside the frame of medieval elaborations, the article deals with projections of ciceronian tradition around natural human inclinations in their relations with moral life, in the (...) philosophical developments of Thomas Aquinas about origins of virtue and natural law. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, (...) we will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

This article defends the centrality of practical wisdom in medical practice by building on a monistic view of moral virtue, termed the “Aretai model,” according to which possession of practical wisdom is necessary and sufficient for virtuousness, grounding both moral growth and effective moral behavior. From this perspective, we argue that practical wisdom should be conceived as a cross-situational ethical expertise consisting of four skills:moral perception, moral deliberation, emotion regulation, and moral motivation. Conceiving of practical wisdom as both overall (...) virtuousness and ethical expertise makes it possible to deal adequately with the uniqueness of concrete ethically relevant situations. We contend that this becomes particularly evident in the context of medical practice, both in terms of decision-making and action-taking, especially in the most challenging or contentious clinical cases. We conclude the article by suggesting the potential implications of the Aretai model for continuing education in medical and healthcare professions. (shrink)

Explores the place of intellectual virtues and vices in a social world. Chapters are divided into four sections: Foundational Issues; Individual Virtues; Collective Virtues; and Methods and Measurements.

In this chapter, we will offer a sketch of the state of the art as concerns existing accounts of virtue acquisition in relation to automaticity. In particular, we will focus on the so-called “skill model,” which we aim to improve by questioning its rather common underlying dualistic picture of the mind. Then we will propose an account of skillful emotions by identifying the features that make them both automatic and embedded in an intelligent practice. Finally, we will show how (...) this view can help the skill model by offering a better description of emotion shaping in virtue acquisition. By doing so, we will contend that emotions contribute autonomously and actively to the skillfulness of the habits in which they are embedded. (shrink)

Este trabajo trata de probar la incompatibilidad entre el principio de verificación neopositivista, y las ideas de Wittgenstein acerca del método de verificación como criterio de significatividad. Se muestra que el concepto wittgensteineano de verificación apunta a un saber moverse en un espacio lógico que, en virtud de su multiplicidad, resulta ser pertinente para una proposición dentro de un contexto determinado. Así, un "método de verificación" es -para Wittgenstein- una manera de localizar un camino para ver conexiones pertinentes, y no (...) una estrategia deductiva que se supone garantice, en su último paso, un contacto decisivo con la realidad.Palabras llave: Verificación; método; espacio lógico; multiplicidad; Wittgenstein; Neopositivismo.This essay attempts to prove the incompatibility between the neopositivist verification principle and Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning the method of verification as a criterion of significance. It is shown that the Wittgensteinian concept of verification points to an ability to move in a logical space which, by virtue of its multiplicity, turns out to be pertinent for a proposition within a certain context. Thus, a "method of verification" is -according to Wittgenstein- a way of locating a path to see pertinent connections, and not a deductive strategy which is supposed to guarantee, in its last phase, a decisive contact with reality.Palabras llave: Verification; method; logical space; multiplicity; Wittgenstein; Neopositivism. (shrink)

In this topical book, Boudewijn de Bruin examines the ethical 'blind spots' that lay at the heart of the global financial crisis. He argues that the most important moral problem in finance is not the 'greed is good' culture, but rather the epistemic shortcomings of bankers, clients, rating agencies and regulators. Drawing on insights from economics, psychology and philosophy, de Bruin develops a novel theory of epistemic virtue and applies it to racist and sexist lending practices, subprime mortgages, CEO (...) hubris, the Madoff scandal, professionalism in accountancy and regulatory outsourcing of epistemic responsibility. With its multidisciplinary reach, Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis will appeal to scholars working in philosophy, business ethics, economics, psychology and the sociology of finance. The many concrete examples and case studies mean that this book will also prove useful to policy-makers and regulators. (shrink)

Mentioning products or brands on Facebook enables individuals to display an ideal self to others through a form of virtual conspicuous consumption. Drawing on conspicuous donation behaviour literature, we investigate ‘conspicuous virtue signalling’, as conspicuous consumption on Facebook. CVS occurs when an individual mentions a charity on their Facebook profile. We investigate need for uniqueness and attention to social comparison information as antecedents of two types of CVS–self-oriented and other-oriented. We also explore the relationship between CVS and self-esteem, and (...) offline prosocial and unethical behaviour intentions. Data from two studies, a college survey and an adult survey via MTurk, were analysed using structural equation modelling. Results indicate that NFU predicts both forms of CVS, while ATSCI influences both forms of CVS for adults and other-oriented CVS for students. Self-esteem is enhanced by self-oriented CVS. Self-oriented CVS predicts donation intention whereas other-oriented CVS significantly reduces donation intention for both samples. Furthermore, a significant relationship between CVS and purchase intention of counterfeit luxury goods is revealed. Findings provide insights into conspicuous virtue signalling and the relationship between CVS on Facebook and offline behavioural intentions. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned (...) both with his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard. (shrink)

In this study, we evaluate how individual virtues and inter-organizational management control systems influence buyer–supplier performance through relationship quality. Results from a sample of 232 firms confirm that virtues and IOMCS relate positively to relationship quality and performance, respectively. However, IOMCS lose their positive influence on relationship quality when considered along with virtues. That is, when both variables enter the regression model simultaneously, virtues win. This interesting finding has particular resonance at a time when research on ethics still needs to (...) reinforce its positive effects on the practice of management. (shrink)

This article rereads Benedict de Spinoza and recent interpretations of him as an epistemic democrat through the prism of contemporary debate on the conditions for deliberation in a democracy. Through a reconstruction of Spinoza's arguments and theories of deliberation and its preconditions, we argue that, for deliberation to produce the benefits Spinoza recognizes, the process must be inclusive, and those deliberating must be both intellectually humble and autonomous. This interpretation is new and diverges from those recently advanced by Justin Steinberg (...) and Sandra Leonie Field. In particular, on our reading, Spinoza's critique of humility does not extend to intellectual humility as it is understood today in political theory. Both autonomy and humility, as epistemologically conceived by political theorists today, can therefore be considered Spinozian civic virtues. (shrink)

In his only treatise explicitly devoted to the life of the statesman, De Iosepho, Philo of Alexandria expresses ambivalent views about politics. A careful examination of the line of argument of this work shows, however, that Philo’s views can be essentially read as a development in negative terms of his statement that politics is only an “addition” to virtue and wisdom. Especially, he argues that the statesman is «by all means an interpreter of dreams», since his activity has its (...) limits within the human condition, which - because of its uncertainty and confusion - resembles daydreaming. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, Ewin's view of Thomas Hobbes's moral philosophy offers a fresh counterpart to most current analytical readings of Hobbes by recent American scholars, such as Gregory Kavka and Jean Hampton. Staying close to Hobbes's text, this Australian professor is continuously in debate with these two authors, criticizing their game theoretic reconstruction of Hobbesian philosophy. Ewin's main purpose seems to be the revival of Hobbes's reputation as a moral philosopher.

About the Republic is the only commentary left by Averroes, the Commentator, so called on behalf of his commentaries on Aristotle’s work. Although the original in Arabic is lost, there is a medieval version in Hebrew and two later translations in Latin from the Hebrew version. Averroes’ Commentary on the ‘Republic’ – divided in three Books – can be considered an original work as only 1/3 of it corresponds to the platonic treatise. Averroes presents in it aristotelic concepts drawn from (...) the Nicomachean Ethics and also several notions from Alfarabi’s political works. He also presents his own thoughts and offers criticisms of his own society. KEY WORDS – Plato’s Republic; a commentary or an original work? Ethics. Politics. Cardinal virtues. Ideal city. Education. (shrink)

RESUMO: Tradução dos passos 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B da Epitome de Etica Estoica, do filósofo estoico e doxógrafo alexandrino Ário Dídimo. Não há traduções em língua moderna das obras completas de Ário Dídimo. Assim, para esta tradução, usamos a fixação da exposição sobre a ética estoica presente em Estobeu, realizada por Pomeroy. A seção que traduzimos versa sobre o conceito estoico de excelência, explicando o que ela é, quais as virtudes que dela participam, e como. Por antítese, Ário Dídimo também elucida o (...) conceito estoico de vício, o que ele é e qual a sua taxonomia. ABSTRACT: Translation of 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B of the Epitome of Stoic Ethics by the Stoic philosopher and Alexandrian doxographer Arius Didymus. There are no translations of Arius Didymus' complete works into modern languages. Thus for this translation we utilized Pomeroy's fixation of the exposition of Stoic ethics found in Stobaeus' Florilegium. Parts 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B deal with the Stoic concept of excellence, explaining what excellence is, what virtues participate in it, and how. Arius Didymus also explains the Stoic concept of vice, what it is, and its taxonomy. (shrink)

This paper considers Cicero's political and legal philosophy, focussing on the ciceronian concepts of republic, law and virtue, on which Cicero's systematic construction of the State and the Right rests.

Resumo: A honra foi amplamente tratada por diversos autores antigos, tais como Aristóteles e Cícero. No medievo, Tomás de Aquino retoma alguns temas da Antiguidade, oferecendo uma formulação nova. Para isso, ele se serve do conceito de dulia, superando o tradicional binômio com a latria. Na realidade, ele reputa à dulia uma virtude anexa à justiça que visa prestar honras ou homenagens aos homens excelentes, em particular aos virtuosos. De fato, o Estagirita já considerava a honra como um “prêmio da (...) virtude”. Nesse contexto, se percorre todo corpus thomisticum para analisar o conceito de dulia e de honra, quando esta se refere ao assunto tratado. Para isso, se pergunta o que é a dulia propriamente, a quem deve ela ser prestada, se a honra pode ou deve ser desejada, o papel da magnanimidade, como e para que se honra. A proposta tomasiana poderia trazer um novo olhar a respeito da temática, infelizmente um pouco esquecida nos dias de hoje.: Honor was amply dealt with by several ancient authors such as Aristotle and Cicero. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas revisited certain themes from Antiquity, offering new formulations. To do this, he used the concept of dulia, going beyond the traditional contrast with latria. He regards dulia as a virtue connected to justice and that seeks to pay honour or homage to excellent men, particularly virtuous ones. In fact, Aristotle already regarded honour as a “reward for virtue”. In this article, the body of Thomistic work is explored in order to analyse the concept of dulia and honour. To this end, it is asked what dulia truly is, to whom it should be rendered, whether honour can or should be desired, what the role of magnanimity is, and how honour should be shown and for what. The Thomistic proposal offers a new outlook on a subject which, unfortunately, has been somewhat neglected in the present day. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo explora el estatuto del arte en la filosofía de Spinoza, en el marco de la inversión copernicana que da origen a la estética y del barroco holandés. Si bien el pensamiento spinozista se inscribe en la conversión antropológica, en donde lo bello resulta ser un efecto en el sujeto y no una cualidad de los objetos, su comprensión del arte es inasimilable a la “estética” como ámbito diferenciado y autónomo que se consolida en el siglo XVIII, (...) y más bien concibe el arte integrado a la vida y a la experiencia común -a la vez que, en cuanto praxis de origen corporal al alcance de cualquiera, presenta puntos de contacto con las vanguardias históricas del siglo XX-. Spinoza, según se propone en este texto, concibe la producción de “obras de arte” menos como un hecho estético que como una actividad corporal éticamente orientada a la vida buena.: The present work explores the status of art in the philosophy of Spinoza, within the framework of the Copernican revolution that gives rise to aesthetics and the Dutch Baroque. Although the Spinozist thought is inscribed in the anthropological conversion by virtue of which beauty turns out to be an effect on the subject and not a property of objects, its understanding of art is unassimilable to "aesthetics" as a differentiated and autonomous area that it was consolidated in the eighteenth century, and rather conceived art integrated to life and common experience -at the same time, as praxis of bodily origin within the reach of anyone, presents points of contact with the historical avant-gardes of the twentieth century-. Spinoza conceives the production of "artworks" less as an aesthetic fact than as a body activity ethically oriented to the good life. (shrink)

Cardiology is characterized by its state-of-the-art biomedical technology and the predominance of Evidence-Based Medicine. This predominance makes it difficult for healthcare professionals to deal with the ethical dilemmas that emerge in this subspecialty. This paper is a first endeavor to empirically investigate the axiological foundations of the healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital. Our pilot study selected, as the target population, cardiology personnel not only because of their difficult ethical deliberations but also because of the stringent conditions in which they (...) have to make them. Therefore, there is an urgent need to reconsider clinical ethics and Value-Based Medicine. This study proposes a qualitative analysis of the values and the virtues of healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital in order to establish how the former impact upon the medical and ethical decisions made by the latter. (shrink)

Nuestro trabajo intenta presentar, en su primera parte, la práctica de la filosofía clínica a partir de su pertinencia dentro de la filosofía antigua (clásica) en tanto ejercicio espiritual de transformación de sí. Con ello se quiere referir con el concepto de espíritu en comprender un ejercicio no como producto sólo del pensamiento sino a una totalidad psíquica y emocional del individuo, en sentirse dentro de la perspectiva del todo. Era un arte de vivir, un modo de vida que intenta (...) comprender más profundamente la totalidad de la existencia. La filosofía no es una disciplina que perseguía plantarse ante la dimensión única del conocimiento teórico sino en el marco del yo y del ser: consiste en un itinerario, un proceso, un viaje para la ampliación de la conciencia, que busca aumentar la captación, la atención, la vivencia y expansión del ser. En su segunda parte nos adentramos a examinar la figura del tirano en y como conciencia política degradada. Para ello nos centramos en el proceso de la personalidad de la condición de lo tiránico y del tirano dentro de la vida política, pero también como éste se nos presenta como germen en nosotros mismos y de cómo se establece a partir de ello –junto a las condiciones sociales requeridas-, su existencia proyectada en un individuo particular. La filosofía clínica es una filosofía crítica en la medida que tiene por asunto el pensamiento en sí mismo; es una filosofía con conciencia de sí misma; coloca al pensamiento en una sala de observación y cuidados intensivos ¿Se trata de comprender la política como un ejercicio espiritual? Por supuesto, un ejercicio cotidiano a lo largo de nuestra existencia, donde pueda permitirnos desarrollar una atención,una inteligencia, un crecimiento y una transformación de nuestra individualidad social autónoma como ciudadano de una región y del mundo, pero comprometida con su comunidad de vida. De un modo de aprender el dominio de uno mismo, del cumplimiento de los deberes, de la libertad pública y privada, que nos lleva a renunciar de todo aquello que no dependa de nosotros y ocuparnos de lo que sí depende; mantener una rectitud de acción en conformidad con el grado de evolución de nuestra razón. On the tyranny in Plato Our work attempts to present, in its first part, the practice of clinical philosophy from its relevance as a spiritual exercise of self-transformation within ancient (classical) philosophy. The¡ concept of spirit is meant to bring about an understanding of this exercise not as a sole product¡ of thinking, but as the involvement of the individual’s psychic and emotional totality, which entails that the individual should feel as a part of the whole. It was an art of living, a way of life that attempts to understand more deeply the totality of existence. Philosophy is not a discipline that sought to face the sole dimension of theoretical knowledge. Rather, it is built around the framework of self and being. It consists of a route, a process, a journey to broaden consciousness. It seeks to increase uptake, attention, experience and expansion of being. In the second part we examine in depth the figure of the tyrant as degraded political consciousness. To this aim we focus on the process of the personality of the tyrannical and the tyrant within political life, but also on how the latter is a seed within ourselves, and on how, on this basis,his existence projected onto a particular individual becomes established –together with the required social conditions. Clinical philosophy is a critical philosophy inasmuch as its subject-matteris thought in itself; it is a philosophy with self-awareness; it places thought in an observation and intensive care room. Are we to understand politics as a spiritual exercise? Of course, an everyday exercise throughout our existence, which enables us to develop a degree of attention, intelligence, growth and transformation of our social autonomous individuality as citizens of a region and the world, while sill committed to our life community. It enables us to learn self-control, to carry out our duties, to exercise public and private freedom, in a way that makes us give up everything which doesnot depend upon us and pay attention to what actually does. It enables us to maintain rectitude of action, in agreement with our reason’s degree of evolution. (shrink)