We applaud Baumard et al.'s mutualistic account of morality but detect circularity in their articulation of how morality emerged. Contra the authors, we propose that mutualism might account for a sensitivity to convention (the ways things are done within a group) rather than for a sense of fairness. An ontogenetic perspective better captures the complexity of what it means to be moral.

The starting point of the investigation is the correspondence between the term and concept of Ego ("I") and the various types of experience. Two main ways of introducing and applying of the term "I" (Ego) in Russian philosophy are investigated from the semantic-analytical point of view. The first takes the Ego as initially existed either as a spiritual substance or a given form uniting experiences. This way of treating is realized in L. Lopatin's and V. Soloviev's philosophical teachings. The second (...) containing some moments of reflexion on the concept treated the Ego as a result of experience. It was developed in M. Karinskij und G. Spet. In context of difference between the Ego and the subject or consciousness the question of the owner of consciousness is considered. (shrink)

_The human experience has long been characterized by a tension between two fundamental forces: the self-centered tendencies of our ego and the outward-stretching pull of empathy. In the contemporary world, where technology is rapidly amplifying both our individual power and interconnectedness, navigating this tension within an ethical framework has become more crucial than ever. This article argues that a paradigm shift is necessary, one that moves beyond a purely egoistic understanding of the self and redefines it through the lens of (...) empathy. Examining this redefinition through the prisms of neuroscience, moral philosophy, and technological development, we explore the potential for fostering an ethical landscape where individual progress thrives in tandem with collective well-being._. (shrink)

This paper explores issues that arise between Adorno and Marcuse over the potentials and implications of Freudian theory. These concern whether it is possible to expound a non-repressive relationship between what Freud calls the life and death drives, on the one hand, and the ego, on the other, that does not collapse into abstract utopianism or clear heteronomy. After detailing the theory of instincts and ego formation that early critical theory draws from Freud, I argue that neither Adorno nor Marcuse (...) is successful in articulating the possibility of such a non-repressive form of subjectivity: Adorno produces a powerful conception of freedom as non-reductive, communicative reconciliation between ego and instinctual nature, but remains committed to a Freudian conception of the interplay between elements of the psyche that makes it difficult to see how reconciliation could be actualized therein. Marcuse, on the other hand, develops a conception of liberation that largely abandons the ideal of ego autonomy by rendering the ego a spectator to the unfurling of instinctual impulses. In the concluding section, I argue that a more judicious evaluation of the death drive’s contribution to critical thought could clear space for a rapprochement between Adorno and Marcuse, and a more successful incorporation of Freud into critical theory. (shrink)

Originally published in 1957, _New Developments in Analytical Psychology_ built on the work of C.G. Jung. Jung’s researches into the unconscious had led him to study the history of religion and the hitherto little understood psychology of alchemy; they had directed him away from child psychology and also, in later years, away from clinical analysis as well. Nonetheless his discoveries and theories have essential relevance in both these spheres. All the papers in this volume complement and amplify Jung’s work. The (...) author made a special study of child analysis and ego development and here publishes his conclusions in a series of papers. The studies of children led to developments in analytic techniques which are worked out in a longer essay on the transference, to the understanding of which analytical psychology has a unique contribution; they have also stimulated a reassessment of the relation between the concept of archetypes and modern theories of heredity, instinct, neuro-physiology, and evolution, in which there had been much misunderstanding at the time. Michael Fordham was the last of the founders of a movement in psychoanalysis, and pioneered the Jungian analysis of children. This significant, early work can now be read and enjoyed in its historical context. (shrink)

_Requiem for the Ego_ recounts Freud's last great attempt to 'save' the autonomy of the ego, which drew philosophical criticism from the most prominent philosophers of the period—Adorno, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Despite their divergent orientations, each contested the ego's capacity to represent mental states through word and symbol to an agent surveying its own cognizance. By discarding the subject-object divide as a model of the mind, they dethroned Freud's depiction of the ego as a conceit of a misleading self-consciousness and (...) a faulty metaphysics. Freud's inquisitors, while employing divergent arguments, found unacknowledged consensus in identifying the core philosophical challenges of defining agency and describing subjectivity. In _Requiem_, Tauber uniquely synthesizes these philosophical attacks against psychoanalysis and, more generally, provides a kaleidoscopic portrait of the major developments in mid-20th century philosophy that prepared the conceptual grounding for postmodernism. (shrink)

Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up to (...) the notion of the eidos ego in the fourth Cartesian Meditation. In this paper I want to dwell on the most problematic aspects of this theory. After a few preliminary remarks about the intentionality of consciousness (sec- tion 1), I try to place the theory of the substrate of habitualities in the context of Husserl's evolution on the issue of the reflection of the ego on itself (section ~). I briefly follow the threads of Husserl's shifting position from the Logical Investi- gat/ons and Ideas I to Ideas II, the Cartesian Meditations and the Cr/s/s. I indicate Husserl's works are quoted with the following abbreviations: CM = Cartesiani.~he Meditationen, Husserliana Bd. I, hrsg. v. S. Strasser (Den Haag, 195o); Carte- s/an M~, trans. D. Cairns (Dordrecht, 196o ) SW = Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. P. McCormick and F. Elliston (Notre Dame, 198a) IZ = Zur Phttnomenologie des inneren Zeilheun~tseim (z 893-z 917), Husserliana Bd. X, hrsg. v. R. Boehm (Den Haag, 1966 ) Ideen I = ldeen zu einer reinen Ph~nomenologie und ph~nomenologischen Philosophic, Husserliana Bd. III, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, t95o); Ideas I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster, s983) ldeen// = ld., Hussefliana Bd. IV, hrsg. v. M. Biemel (Den Haag, 1952); Ideas I1, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston, London, x 989) FTL = Forma/e und transzendenta~ Log/k, Husserliana Bd. XVII, hrsg. v. P. Janssen (Den Haag, t974) Kr/sh = Kr/s/s der europ~/schen W/ssen~haften, Husserliana Bd. VI, hrsg. v. W. Biemel (Den Haag, 1954) I wish to express my gratitude to Pierre Kerszberg and Alessandra Fussi for their helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper, and to Graham Harman for checking the final version of my English text. [645] 646 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:4 OCTOBER 1994 some historical antecedents, in particular Aristotle, of Husserl's theory of abid- ing properties which, as far as I can see, have not been pointed out before. Husserl's Entwicklungsgeschichte on the topic of the pure ego has already been the object of important scholarly works, of which Kern's 1964 Husserl und Kant seems to me the best example. But what the secondary literature does not do is develop thematically the ambiguities of Husserl's definitions of consciousness and temporality in a unitary and comprehensive way. While I follow the lead of Berger, Broekman, Kern, Marbach,' and others, I find that their work does not sufficiently stress the difficulties at the core ofintentionality and reflective time- consciousness. Therefore, although section 2 is a necessary presupposition for drawing some critical conclusions in the final two sections, it does not exhaust my theme. After clarifying the peculiarity of the notions of essence, intuition, tran- scendental and apriori, as well as their irl:educibility to a Kantian meaning, I turn to the "de facto transcendental ego" resulting from eidetic variation (section 3) in order to introduce an examination of temporality. The difficul- ties in the twofold requirement, namely, that consciousness be the identical subject of its Erlebnisse and be synthetically unified in time, concern the unity, primacy, and mutual relation of time and consciousness in the constitution of our experience. They have been heady pointed out by Ricoeur in his commen- tary on the Cartesian Meditations. But what I want to argue in section 4, going beyond Ricoeur's text, is that the tension between temporally constituted and constitutive consciousness in the ego's reflection on its own retentions and protensions does not simply make the question of time ambiguous, but has crucial and problematic bearings on the very definition of consciousness as intentionality. In this respect... -/- . (shrink)

The Transcendence of the Ego may be regarded as a turning-point in the philosophical development of Jean-Paul Sartre. Prior to the writing of this essay, published in France in 1937, Sartre had been intimately acquainted with the phenomenological movement which originated in Germany with Edmund Husserl. It is a fundamental tenet of Husserl, the notion of a transcendent ego, which is here attacked by Sartre. This disagreement with Husserl has great importance for Sartre and facilitated the transition from phenomenology (...) to the doctrine of Being and Nothingness. (shrink)

Although there have been numerous studies using stress and coping theories to explain the relationship between stress, drinking motives, and depression, few of them have attempted to verify these theories against adult male data. There is also a shortage of Korean studies, both theoretical and empirical, on the role of ego-energy as a moderating variable in the relationship between stress, drinking motives, and depression. This study uses a multiple-group analysis to investigate the moderating effects of the ego-energy on the aforementioned (...) relationship in adult males. A transactional analysis tool showing the total amount of ego-energy called Ego-gram is used in this study. The tool reflects personality traits based on ego-energy state structural and functional analyses. The researchers collected empirical data to test the research model by conducting an online survey of adult males aged 20–50, residing in seven metropolitan cities and in the Gyeonggi Province. The survey yielded 567 samples. The data were then analyzed through structural equation modeling to understand the relationship between various factors. The results showed that, first, stress was positively correlated with drinking motives. Second, drinking motives had some influence on depression. Third, stress, drinking motives, and depression had statistically significant relationships between low-ego-energy and high-ego-energy groups. Overall, this study found a difference between the two ego-energy groups concerning the relationship between stress, drinking motives, and depression. Based on these results, practical implications were discussed as to how to strengthen the ego-energy, while also presenting future research directions to shed light on the precise mechanism of depression. This study is significant for exploring ways in which adult males cope with and prevent stress and depression, while also offering the basic data for improving the mental and physical health of adult males. This study is also significant for drawing attention to the necessity of developing various health and wellness programs adapted to the needs of this specific population segment while providing the data that may serve as the basis for developing such programs. (shrink)

Husserl’s lifelong interest in Kant eventually becomes a preoccupation in his later years when he finds his phenomenology in competition with Neokantianism for the title of transcendental philosophy. Some issues that Husserl is concerned with in Kant are bound up with the works of Lambert. Kant believed that the role played by principles of sensibility in metaphysics should be determined by a “general phenomenology” on which Lambert had written. Kant initially believed that man is capable only of symbolic cognition, not (...) intellectual intuition. Lambert saw an increasing need in mathematics for symbolic cognition as exemplified in his proofs of the irrationality of π and e. Kant takes from Leibniz and Lambert an unrestricted notion of construction, allowing him to view mathematics as constructing its concepts in intuition, while Lambert’s proofs convince him that all mathematical problems are eventually solvable. Husserl criticizes Kant’s intuitionism for its inadequate accommodation of meaning to intuition, which he redresses with his theory of categorial intuition. This may improve on Kant’s intuition of the axiom of parallels but not so clearly on his spatial intuition. Husserl opposes Kant’s view of space as the form of outer intuition with his own view of it as the form of things. Husserl’s exploration of the geometry of visual space, which involves his earliest uses of epoché and reduction, converges however with Hilbert’s logical analysis of Kantian spatial intuition in leading to Euclidean spatial judgments. Hilbert’s analysis leads him to affirm the solvability of all well posed mathematical problems, a thesis complicated by the outbreak of logical paradoxes. Untroubled by such paradoxes, Husserl develops a supramathematics of all possible deductive systems whose completeness implicitly would also provide solutions of all such problems. Husserl’s full transcendental turn coincides with his realization that in effecting his Copernican turn, Kant was really the first to detect the “secret longing” of modern philosophy for a phenomenological clarification of being. Husserl now finds that Kant’s transcendental deductions presuppose a pure ego not adequately analyzed by Kant that survives the phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s idealism leads him to develop his own intuitionism, which adds to Kant’s, a “method of clarification” of mathematical concepts intended to clarify difficult impossibility proofs, but neither Husserl nor Kant base arithmetic on time. Husserl’s critique of the room left in Kant’s idealism, for things in themselves, leads to his own monadological solution of the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl’s final judgment on Kant is that his form of transcendental idealism did not enable him to achieve absolute subjectivity through a genuine transcendental reduction. (shrink)

This essay explores Étienne Balibar’s treatment of the conceptual development of a notion of the super-ego in Freud as crucial to Balibar’s own thinking of the connection between politics and psychoanalysis. Via Balibar’s writing, however, it traces the antinomic forces at work in the question of a psychoanalytic supplement of politics, in the process examining not only the psychic conditions of the "political" but also the "politics" of different forms of psychological discourse and debate.

We develop and test a process model demonstrating how leader charisma and constructive and destructive forms of narcissism interact to influence follower psychological empowerment and moral identity, using survey data from 667 direct reports of leaders from 13 different industries. Study results revealed that leader narcissism moderates the relationship between leader charisma and follower psychological empowerment such that when leaders possess a more constructive and less destructive narcissistic personality, their charisma has a stronger positive relationship with follower psychological empowerment. Study (...) results also revealed that follower psychological empowerment mediates the differential interactive effects of leader charisma and constructive and destructive narcissism on follower moral identity. Implications of these results for future theory development, research, and practice are discussed. (shrink)

This study compared professional and amateur classical musicians matched for age, gender, and education on reaction times during the Stroop color-word test, brainwaves during an auditory ERP task and during paired reaction-time tasks, responses on the Gibbs Sociomoral Reflection questionnaire, and self-reported frequencies of peak experiences. Professional musicians were characterized by: lower color-word interference effects , faster categorization of rare expected stimuli , and a trend for faster processing of rare unexpected stimuli , higher scores on the Sociomoral Reflection questionnaire, (...) and more frequent peak experiences during rest, tasks, and sleep. Both groups had high values on the Brain Integration Scale. These findings are interpreted in light of a Unified Theory of Performance, which posits that effectiveness in any area is influenced by one’s level of mind-brain development—emotional, cognitive, moral, ego and cortical development—with higher mind-brain development supporting greater effectiveness in any domain. (shrink)

The author suggests a new model for interpretation of mystical experience, based on a fruitful combination of cognitive psychology and depth psychology. Offering a rather wide definition of mystical experience, the author then turns to two basic assumptions—a general systems approach and an organismic-holistic view of development. Hans Loewald's analysis of primary process cognition is combined with a multi-dimensional model of cognitive activity called "Interacting Cognitive Subsystems" , presented by John D. Teasdale and Philip J. Barnard. These two complementary (...) theoretical perspectives are applied to the analysis of both historical and contemporary examples of mystical experience, understood as a result of a dialectical interplay between these different coding systems, or the marriage between Ego and Id. (shrink)

New emerging biotechnologies, such as gene editing, vastly extend our ability to alter the human being. This comes together with strong aspirations to improve humans not only physically, but also mentally, morally, and socially. These conjoined ambitions aggregate to what can be labelled “the gene editing of super-ego.” This article investigates a general way used to argue for new biotechnologies, such as gene-editing: if it is safe and efficacious to implement technology X for the purpose of a common good Y, (...) why should we not do so? This is a rhetorical question with a conditional, and may be dismissed as such. Moreover, investigating the question transformed into a formal argument reveals that the argument does not hold either. Nonetheless, the compelling force of the question calls for closer scrutiny, revealing that this way of arguing for biotechnology is based on five assumptions. Analysis of these assumptions shows their significant axiological, empirical, and philosophical challenges. This makes it reasonable to claim that these kinds of question based promotions of specific biotechnologies fail. Hence, the aspirations to make a super-man with a super-ego appear fundamentally flawed. As these types of moral bioenhancement arguments become more prevalent, a revealing hype test is suggested: What is special with this technology, compared to existing methods, that makes it successful in improving human social characteristics in order to make the world a better place for all? Valid answers to this question will provide good reasons to pursue such technologies. Hence, the aim is not to bar the development of modern biotechnology, but rather to ensure good developments and applications of highly potent technologies. So far, we still have a long way to go to make persons with goodness gene. (shrink)

‘That in our times a kind of supernumerary person is appearing who is egoless, who in reality is not a human being, is a terrible truth.’ – Rudolf Steiner Are there people on earth today who do not have a self – a human ego or ‘I’? The phenomenon of ‘egolessness’ – the absence of a human being’s core – was discussed by the spiritual teacher Rudolf Steiner in lectures and personal conversations. An egoless individual, he intimated, is an empty (...) sheath through which other spiritual entities could operate. Erdmuth J. Grosse brings together many little-known quotations from Rudolf Steiner’s spiritual research and supports them with a wealth of disquieting reports, testimonies and examples from literature and politics. He places these insights within the broader context of the riddle of the human self, throwing light on the spiritual development of the individual and humanity as a whole. In this thought-provoking study, Grosse goes on to discuss the role of comets, the effects of cyanide on the human constitution – especially in the light of the Holocaust – and the hidden effects of ceremonial magic, occult lodges, cults and sects. In conclusion, he offers positive solutions to humanity’s present predicament by describing the healing impulses of social threefolding, the invisible spiritual beings seeking to help humanity, the role of the gods, the Christ impulse and the true goals of human evolution. (shrink)

While the “symbolic” meaning of early body ornamentation has received the lion’s share of attention in the debate on human origins, this paper sets out to explore their aesthetic and agentive dimensions, for the purpose of explaining how various ornamental forms would have led interacting groups to form a cultural identity of their own. To this end, semiotics is integrated with a new paradigm in the archaeology of mind, known as the theory of material engagement. Bridging specifically Peirce’s pragmatic theory (...) and Malafouris’ enactive take on aesthetics allows us to appreciate the formation of aesthetic ideals through the agentive effects of material signs. It is thus proposed that, by attending to the interrelation between form, effect, and affect, members of social groups would have come to appreciate the ways in which their ornamental culture resembles and differs from that of neighbouring groups. Following the Lund conception of cultural semiotics, I argue that models of Ego-culture would have come to evolve along Alter-cultures that also employ ornaments, and against Alius-cultures that have yet to develop or adopt personal decoration. The aesthetic ideals associated with early body ornaments must have therefore played a catalytic role in the formation and communication of group membership. I thus close by proposing that the origins of new cultural identities can be explained by tracing the co-development of ideas and ideals. (shrink)

This article traces the development of Edmund Husserl’s approach to the concept of the ego through the different stages of the evolution of his phenomenological project. The aim is to delineate Husserl’s shifting viewpoints from a Humean to a Kantian perspective, particularly focusing on the transition toward a Kantian transcendental approach. Through an analysis of Husserl’s engagement with Kant’s texts, especially on transcendental apperception, the study reveals how Husserl’s encounters with Kantian philosophy informed his conceptualization of the ego. It (...) further examines the “empty character” of the ego, contrasting Husserl’s and Kant’s strategies to address Humean skepticism and their differing solutions for integrating the egological dimension into subjective experience: The transcendence-in-immanence of the ego for Husserl, the I as analytical form of thoughts for Kant. (shrink)

André Comte-Sponville is a French philosopher-essayist, pondering the problems of morality and life wisdom. He develops the conception of ego-philosophy that is the theory based on the analysis of the subjective existential human experience. As an initial evidence of consciousness and a point of support for philosophical reasoning, he cites feelings of anxiety, despair and suffering. Ego possesses being, it is a subjective reality that is revealed to a man as a result of free and creative perception of the world. (...) This knowledge is always unique, situational, not amenable to formalization and unification, because it is a result of a personal relation of man to the absolute. Ego-philosophy is not a traditional scientific discipline, summarizing specific facts and formulating theories. Ego-philosophy expresses itself in a generally accessible language and appeals to all mankind. This is an art of life wisdom, indicating to the individual a path to true ideals, allowing one to gain dignity and happiness, to free oneself from temptations and passions. Comte-Sponville substantiates the ethical theory that, under the conditions of the crisis of traditional ideas about moral norms, a person must strive to fill the emptiness of the world with his own creative energy, give meaning to life, affirm positive values. The philosopher creates a theory of virtues in which he takes the leading role in sublime love (agape) as the apotheosis of generosity and mercy. In the area of politics, Comte-Sponville adheres to the position of socio-liberalism. Recognizing the economic efficiency of market relations and the principle of freedom action, the philosopher believes that the logic of economic activity does not coincide with socially important tasks and ethical values. In order for society to develop harmoniously, it is necessary to create a welfare state and reliable political institutions that ensure the observance of the principles of humanism, high culture and justice. (shrink)

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, a new Cold War is being waged in our societies. During the Cold War a theoretical model of man was developed by economists and the military, an egotistical being interested only in his own benefit and in duping his opponents to achieve his ends: a modern homo oeconomicus. After his career in the Cold War ended, he was not scrapped but adapted to the needs of the twenty-first century. He became the (...) ringmaster of a new era of information capitalism. He sought to read, control and influence thoughts; to predict, price and eliminate risks. Today stock-market trading is guided by him. He uses computer algorithms and Big Data to build up detailed pictures of our preferences and then suggest and sell goods to us. The model has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We are no longer the masters of our own fate. The Game of Life runs without us. Schirrmacher traces the progress of this extreme rationalization of social life from the Cold War games of the 1950s Rand Corporation to the stock-market trading techniques that brought about the financial crash of 2008, showing how these developments were interwoven with the rise of game theory, rational choice theory and neoliberal economics. The state and politics increasingly submitted themselves to the logic of computerized game theory and an economistic view of the world, evading real decision-making in the process. In this brave new world individuals, alone in front of their computers, may think they are constructing a reality of their own choosing, but in fact they are being manipulated all along by others who are setting the rules of the game. This international bestseller by one of Germanys most distinguished journalists is a powerful indictment of a way of thinking that has become pervasive and threatens to undermine not only parliaments and constitutions but also the sovereignty of the individual to be the person he or she wants to be. (shrink)

This study developed a measure of autonomy for adolescents in contemporary China. First, data from 44 interviewees—40 secondary school students, 2 parents, and 2 secondary school teachers—were used to explore the connotation and theoretical structure of autonomy in adolescents in China. Next, a preliminary Adolescent Autonomy Questionnaire was created from the interview data and administered to 775 secondary school students. Exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis were conducted to verify the factor structure. Finally, 614 secondary school students completed the (...) Adolescent Autonomy Questionnaire, Personal Growth Initiative Scale-II, and Adolescence Ego Identity Crisis Scale to evaluate criterion validity. The final version of the Adolescent Autonomy Questionnaire included 16 items and four subscales: autonomous decision-making, autonomous regulation, autonomous protection, and autonomous problem-solving. The total variance of the cumulative interpretation questionnaire was 62.54%. The CFA results showed that the four-factor model fits the data well: χ2/df = 2.340, CFI = 0.949, RMSEA = 0.042, SRMR = 0.046. Evaluation of the psychometric properties of the Adolescent Autonomy Questionnaire provided support for the reliability and validity of the measure. Thus, it serves as an effective measurement tool for assessing the autonomy of adolescents in China. (shrink)

The text translated, “Das Wissen von fremden Ichen,” bears particular importance for the early phenomenological movement for two reasons. The first is Lipps’ refutation of the theory that knowledge of other selves arises by way of an inference from analogy. Lipps first developed his account of empathy to explain that we tend to succumb to geometric optical illusions because we project living activity into inanimate objects. In sum, Lipps’ groundbreaking article on The Knowledge of Other Egos deserves as much interest (...) from the philosophical community today as it had in the past. The figure of Lipps the philosopher needs to be taken into consideration anew among other much-celebrated proponents of the phenomenological movement. The supporters of that theory, however, demand that we ought to be able to pick out a justification for the existence of objective reality from the fact of our sensations by way of thought alone. (shrink)

Certainly many in “Western” philosophy and psychology have conceived of the human subject in the Cartesian or neo-Cartesian tradition, as a self subsisting, self identical, monadic consciousness or Ego, which is to say as an essentially unchanging, substantial subject, initially isolated or separate from the world and others. On the other hand Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu and other “non-Western” traditions, adopting a more holistic approach, have argued that such a reified,atomistic and hypostatized conception of the self is illusory. However, suggesting that (...) from at least since the time of Hume, and later, in Hegel, there has been an alternative “Western” view of consciousness, self-consciousness and identity, the development of which can be traced through the Phenomenology, Existentialism and Poststructuralism of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida and others, the paper attempts to show how this evolving view may now contribute to a sophisticated and nuanced understanding and confirmation of the wisdom of “non-Western” conceptions. (shrink)

This article brings out certain philosophical difficulties in Lacan’s account of the mirror stage, the initial moment of the subject’s development. For Lacan, the “original organization of the forms of the ego” is “precipitated” in an infant’s self-recognition in a mirror image; this event is explicitly prior to any social interactions. A Hegelian objection to the Lacanian account argues that social interaction and recognition of others by infants are necessary prerequisites for infants’ capacity to recognize themselves in a mirror (...) image. Thus mutual recognition with another, rather than self-recognition in a mirror, is what makes possible subsequent ego-formation and self-consciousness. This intersubjective critique suggests that many of the psychoanalytic consequences that Lacan derives from the mirror stage (e.g., alienation, narcissism, and aggressivity) may need to be rethought. (shrink)

In this article, we introduce our interactive art installation Neuro Mirror that was developed in 2017 for the Cybernetic Consciousness [?] exhibition that was held in 2017 at the ITAU Cultural in Sao Paulo. This artwork enables participants to interact with their own images and those of their alter egos with the help of digital mirrors. The installation consists of three screens. The middle one shows a live image of the participant that is somewhat distorted. The one on the left (...) side also displays an image of the interacting person, but with a time delay of a few seconds. On the right screen, however, another person is shown – a young man, who is acting and moving his head. In fact, this person is programmed to be an avatar or an alter ego who reacts to the participant. He ‘learns’ new behaviours by observing and imitating the participant and reacts accordingly. A neural network programme was developed to enable him to predict the participant’s next actions from his previous ones. (shrink)

Derrida's work encompasses dynamic spatial dimensions to understanding as a pervasive theme, including the search for a ‘new psychoanalytic graphology’ in Writing and Difference. This preoccupation with a spatial text for repression also occurs later in Archive Fever. Building on Derrida, this paper seeks to develop key aspects of a new dynamic psychoanalytic graphology through diametric and concentric interactive spatial relation. These spatial movements emerge from a radical reconstruction of a neglected aspect of structural anthropologist Lévi-Strauss’ work on spatial relations (...) prior to myth. This psychoanalytic graphology is argued to silently pervade Freud's own direct accounts of repression. This graphological domain is developed through diametric and concentric spatial movements across common concerns of Derrida and Freud such as inversions, interruption and restoration, regarding traces in the unconscious. A spatial text is uncovered for diverse features of Freudian repression, including ambivalence in obsessional neurosis and psychosis, splitting of the ego and repetition compulsion. This psychoanalytic graphology challenges the construction of a restricted subjectivity based on repressive diametric spatial relations. It goes beyond Freud's logocentric repression, resonant with Derrida's more radical call for a wider spatio-temporal understanding of structures of differential relation, prior to causality and myth. (shrink)

The current stage of the development of amateur stayer running practices can be characterized as personality-building, since the main goals of runners (especially marathon runners and super marathon runners) are not so much related to strengthening health, as to the sphere of personal improvement and self-knowledge: the development of will, character, testing yourself in an extreme situation, testing previously inaccessible emotions and states of consciousness. The object of the study is ego texts (books for a wide audience, including (...) the online "samizdat") of modern Russian running enthusiasts. The method of studying these texts is the biographical method, which makes it possible to determine the multidimensional influence of running activity on fundamental changes in personality development and the formation of her life path. The analyzed biographies inherit both the confessional tradition of Augustine (the contrast of the aimless and vicious "pre-race" life, as well as the traumatic experience of running neophyte and significant achievements in many areas of personal development after the adoption of the values expressed through running Coubertin's "religio athleticae"), and the adventurous and heroic biographical tradition noted by M. M. Bakhtin, inherent in the Renaissance, as well as romanticism and Nietzscheanism with their focus on the formation (in our case, through a stayer run) of a new (or "super-") person. The qualitative result of running activity is the achievement by the subject of a new stage of development – a person running (homo currens), which is characterized by activity, mobility, heroism, asceticism, striving for maximum self-realization, achieving harmony of body and spirit. Homo currens opposes both virtual pastime and the fetishization of comfort culture, suggesting, referring to the concept of Viktor Frankl, filling life with new meanings and values through overcoming the inevitable suffering for a stayer run. Amateur running is considered by writers as a publicly available and effective means of gaining physical, mental and social well-being, which expresses its humanistic essence and gives philosophical and anthropological significance to the works under study. (shrink)

Moritz Geiger developed an original phenomenological account of the splitting of the Ego in two papers, written in 1911 and 1913. Husserl read the 1911 paper as he was working on preliminary manuscripts to Ideas I. The first part of Husserl’s comments focused precisely on the splitting of the Ego. In this paper I will answer three questions: What is the historical-philosophical context of Geiger’s and Husserl’s discussion on the splitting of the ego? What are the phenomenological features of the (...) splitting of the ego? What is the relevance of Geiger’s account of the splitting of the ego, for the further development of Husserl’s phenomenology? Reading Geiger was, indeed, the first occasion in which Husserl started to develop his own phenomenological account of the splitting of the ego. This will prove itself to be crucial for his mature analyses on the phenomenological reduction, as Husserl will distinguish more clearly between reflection and splitting of the ego. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between skin, ego and second skins. It does so conceptually by re-examining Freud’s suggestion, in The Ego and the Id, that the ego is first and foremost a bodily entity, while also being a projection of a surface (i.e. skin). Drawing upon Anzieu, a dynamic model of inter-weaving surfaces can be seen to underpin an understanding of the ego — and skin ego. This model is fundamentally spatialized. Even so, an appreciation of the spatialities of (...) skin and ego can be developed further. To illuminate these spatialities, this article examines two key experiences of T.E. Lawrence during his military service in Arabia (c. 1917), as he describes them in his autobiographical account Seven Pillars of Wisdom. In a meeting with British military police, and in the notorious Deraa rape incident, what is at stake is Lawrence of Arabia’s skins. Reading these experiences using Freud and Anzieu, the article argues that these events re-present an ongoing chafing of Lawrence’s skin, ego and second skins, which can be called his ‘skin of suffering’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne long-running conundrum in Husserlian phenomenology revolves around the question of the identity of what Husserl calls the transcendental ego, a mysterious figure that he identifies as the subject of a genuinely transcendental phenomenology. In dialogue with both Husserl and his assistant and collaborator Eugen Fink, I attempt in this article to give a solid account of the identity of this transcendental ego, and in particular to explain the connection between this figure and the empirical ego of the individual phenomenologist. (...) I make particular reference to Fink's depiction of a "personal union" between these two egos in his Sixth Cartesian Meditation and to certain unclear hints in Husserl's 1923/1924 lectures on First Philosophy. Ultimately, I develop my own account of such a union, which explains the transcendental ego as a certain mode in which the phenomenologist might investigate his own experiences. On this basis, I argue, the status of phenomenology as a transcendental discipline can be understood without subjecting that discipline to certain criticisms that have been levelled against it. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation for Sartre’s account of the unity of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego. I will argue that it is only once The Transcendence of the Ego is read alongside other texts written around the same time, such as The Imaginary, that we can understand how Sartre believes it is possible for consciousness to be unified without an I. I begin by setting out the Kantian context that Sartre develops for (...) his views, before looking at Sartre’s arguments themselves. I then turn to some of the difficulties other readers have encountered with making sense of the arguments of the Transcendence of the Ego. I argue that it is only in relation to Sartre’s account of what he calls the illusion of immanence in The Imaginary, that we can make sense of Sartre’s account of consciousness, before reconstructing what I take to be Sartre’s position drawing on Sartre’s references to Bergson and Spinoza. (shrink)

Choosing to interact with others in an online forum provides an opportunity for exploring one’s own identity. With each new group joined, a person must make decisions about self-presentation and react to an audience. Such decisions continue as social interactions occur and relationships develop. This paper discusses how bloggers who have affiliated with each other to form a loosely knit community develop largely pseudonymous identities along with norms surrounding the development and performance of identity. The study is ethnographic and (...) longitudinal, examining a community of academics who blog and comment alongside each other in a diaristic manner. Focal areas include blog elements through which identity may be expressed, namely (1) Name and blog title; (2) Profiles; (3) Post content; (4) Voice; (5) Affiliations; and (6) Visual design; the effect of pseudonyms on blog authors and readers; and how issues of privacy and trust are manifest in the community. (shrink)

b>: The problem of how physical systems, such as brains, come to represent themselves as subjects in an objective world is addressed. I develop an account of the requirements for this ability that draws on and refines work in a philosophical tradition that runs from Kant through Peter Strawson to Gareth Evans. The basic idea is that the ability to represent oneself as a subject in a world whose existence is independent of oneself involves the ability to represent space, and (...) in particular, to represent oneself as one object among others in an objective spatial realm. In parallel, I provide an account of how this ability, and the mechanisms that support it, are realized neurobiologically. This aspect of the article draws on, and refines, work done in the neurobiology and psychology of egocentric and allocentric spatial representation. (shrink)

레비나스 철학의 요지는 타자와의 관계에서 주체성을 재정립하는 것으로 이해될 수 있다. 그는 『전체성과 무한』(1961)을 지나 『존재와 달리』(1974)에 이르면서 주체성 개념을 발전시킨다. 이 글은 우선 레비나스의 주체성 개념이 어떻게 발전하는가를 두 대표 저작을 중심으로 분석할 것이다. 전기 레비나스의 주체성에서 ‘재현과 소유의 양식으로 자기동일화하는 자아’와 ‘얼굴의 계시에 응답하는 자아’가 불분명하게 공존한다면, 후기 레비나스의 주체성에서는 ‘자기동일시적 자아’로부터 ‘타인을 위한 자기’가 분명하게 구별되고 우위를 차지함을 확인하게 될 것이다. 다음으로 그 주체성이 타인을 위한 책임 자체라는 레비나스의 주장을 어떻게 받아들여야 좋을지의 문제를 다루면서 레비나스를 동감 윤리학이나 (...) 신학적 윤리학으로 독해하는 해석에 반대할 것이다. 결론적으로 나는 ‘말해진 것’과 구별되는 ‘말함’에서 주체가 타인을 위해 타인에게 내놓인다는 논제 그리고 인간실존의 의미는 타인을 위한 책임에 달려있다는 논제를 기초로 레비나스에게서의 책임 정초의 문제를 다룰 것이다. (shrink)

Bergson argues in his Creative Evolution that life has to be defined as an élan vital, that is, as a driving force that presses forward incessantly, overcoming obstacles to its progress and exploding in a variety of directions at once. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud elaborates a critique of such a vitalistic notion of the drives. For him, the drives are not only sources of excitation, but also forces that resist change and that cause the body's movements and activities (...) to stagnate. Freud ascribes a remarkable name to these conservative and stubborn tendencies at work in the body, viz. the death drive. I argue that this drive is to be understood as a force in life that resists life and that, instead of following a course of progression and development, consists in a production of antiproductivity. I show how Freud is led to reconsider a vitalistic conception of the drives by means of a study of phenomena of repetition. One suggestion that Freud makes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which I examine in detail, is that the ego-drives are the “myrmidons of death.” To clarify this claim, I consider a remark that he makes on the viscosity of the drives and melancholia in his short essay On Transience. (shrink)

This book provides a very accessible general introduction to the Jungian concept of ego development and Jung's theory of personality structure--the collective unconscious, anima, animus, shadow, archetypes.

Haartman's analysis of ecstatic experience in early Methodism is contextualized within a brief review of the history of the movement and the theological assertions that underlay these religious behaviors. Wesley emphasized individual, as opposed to institutional religion and affrmed inductive as contrasted with deductive theology. "Sanctification," Wesley's term for personality transformation, is seen as positive ego development rather than regressive splitting of the ego. Maslow's "peak experience" is affrmed as a valid model for analyzing ecstatic behaviors. Methodism no longer (...) emphasizes such forms of religious expression. (shrink)

The main theory at the core of this monograph is that the person is an entity ontologically new, since she is able to perform an act of self-transcendence, which is meant as her critical distancing from her own “self”, understood as subject of social recognition (Anerkennung), in order to open to the encounter with the world (Weltoffenheit). This allows us to consider a person in a new way, different both from confessional interpretations that see her only as a center of (...) the spirit and from reductivistic views. Schelling examines the act of self-transcendence through the concept of ecstasy, whereas Scheler associates it with the phenomenological reduction. The act of self-transcendence, that Schelling sees as originated by the “hunger of being”, is at the roots of the formation process of a person (Bildung): the person takes her shape by exiting from her own self-referential dimension and encountering otherness. If considered from this viewpoint, Plato’s “epimeleia heautou” exceeds an intimistic perspective: the “care” is no more a solipsistic self-care, but rather becomes the care through which the person transcends her own self to open to the relationships with otherness. It turns, therefore, into a care for world-openness (care for Weltoffenheit). The transformation of the individual and of society so becomes the double-faced aspect of the same process. The development of this set of problems occurs through a dialogue with Schelling’s and Scheler’s positions, but it is also supported by a historical-philosophical investigation, that for instance provides evidence of the influences of Schelling’s Berlin period on Scheler’s last theories and on the philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. Schelling was the first to conceive the concept of “eccentricity” in an anthropological sense, since until then the term had been confined to Kepler’s astronomy. Consequently, the planets’ elliptic (eccentric) movement heightens to an emblematic metaphor of human nature and freedom. The monograph also examines a possible convergence between Plato’s epimeleia heautou and Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. The book ends with a chapter on the topic of Vorbild. The exemplary testimony, that is Vorbild, becomes witnessing evidence immune from any pedagogical-moralistic intent: in fact, if it should relapse into the rhetoric of the “wish to give a good example”, it would immediately conform to the opposite logic of the model. A model is universal in so far as it makes everyone more like the others, nullifying the diversity, whereas exemplariness is universal in so far as it makes everyone more unique and motivates each one to follow her own characteristic path of existential trans-formation. Exemplarity doesn’t convey any contents, but rather encourages a kind of solidaristic involvement. Yet there are also negative exemplarities (Gegenbild) that place obstacles in the formation and block the existence of the personal center. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that Kant's first Critique was merely a codification of the Newtonian physics. Kant not only had no doubt about the principles of classical mechanics, but he even tried to prove that no other principles of physics are possible. According to the principles of his epistemology, no matter how much the "material" of experience may increase, its form will remain forever the same, since it is determined by the fixed and static character of the perceiving subject. More (...) concretely: it is inconceivable that in some distant future facts will be discovered which would contradict the Euclidian character of space, the principle of the constancy of material substance, the principle of spatio-temporal continuity of all changes, or the principle of strict causality. Why this alleged impossibility? Kant's answer was simple: because the principles just mentioned are not empirical generalizations; they do not stem from experience at all. On the contrary, they precede experience because they make every experience possible; or, in Kant's jargon, they are transcendental conditions of experience. They belong to the innate structure of the epistemological subject, and it is due to their action that the structured and organized perception arises. It is true--and Reichenbach did not fail to notice it--that Kant hypothetically considered the possibility of beings endowed with a different cognitive apparatus. This, according to Reichenbach, would imply the possibility of some cognitive forms intermediate between such hypothetical beings and human beings. But this evolutionist interpretation of Kant is very questionable; the fact that this was done by Helmholtz should not blind us to the fact that it is completely foreign to the whole spirit of the Kantian philosophy. Evolution and change in general were regarded by Kant as legitimate concepts only within our sensory and introspective experience; from the transcendent realm of "things-in-themselves" they were completely excluded. This view was a natural and inevitable consequence of the Kantian claim that time is merely a form of our perception, whether external or internal; hence the timelessness of the transcendental Ego and the utter impossibility of any kind of evolution in our cognitive faculties. (shrink)

Objective: To evaluate moral development as an indicator of the capacity to consent among two groups of patients from the Hospital de Clínicas in Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil.Method: Fifty-nine adolescents and 60 patients over 60 years of age participated in a cross-sectional study to assess moral development using Loevinger’s model of ego stages.Results: Age and moral development showed no association, with most participants in the two groups being in the conscientious phase.Conclusions: Age is probably not an adequate (...) variable to measure decision-making capacity, because questions of medical consent relate to participants’ own personal health. Decision-making capacity should be viewed as a continuous function. While the age of the person whose consent is needed should be considered, age alone, from a moral perspective, is not the main determinant of this capacity. (shrink)

Scholars have researched the role of parents in the development of the child. Families play a critical role in the development of a young child. According to Freud, many adult symptoms of anxieties are rooted in childhood experiences, and that a child's development would influence how the child would behave as an adult and that their actions may correlate to something that occurred in their childhood. Erikson's theory of ego development stated that the ego, which is (...) the centre of each person's individuality, could not be understood in isolation from the others and the wider world around it. Research has also been done on the way that a person's faith develops. In his book, Stages of Faith, Fowler developed a theory of six stages that people go through as their faith matures. Keeley, combined his knowledge of education with his passion for children's ministry and published a book with the title, Helping Our Children Grow In Faith. As a theology student with a background in Early childhood development, the researcher believes that these two academic areas should be utilised together to assist parents in the process of the child's faith development during its formative years. Osmer's core task of Practical Theology, and its four questions, will be used to determine parents' roles in the faith development of their children. Empirical data gathered in a study by Nel and Van der Westhuizen will be used. When all four questions are answered, this study will deduce useful guidelines for parents. The importance of the role that parents play in the faith development of children is immense. A baby's or an infant's interaction with his or her parents forms the basis on which he or she will build their developing faith. If this foundation is not placed down correctly, problems might arise later in the child's faith development. (shrink)

The idea of human freedom is essentially rooted in the concept of human development, according to Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen's 'Development as Freedom' thesis (which outlines an entitlement to the capacity- building process). And the idea of human progress is a construct that is designed around the axis offreedom. What is freedom? Is it only lack ofsocietal constraint, withdrawal of discipline and punish, willing suspension of the panoptic super ego that they address as the 'mainstream'? Or is freedom (...) a concept much more fundamental, to be read into the texts of Rabindranath Tagore, Romain Rolland or Walden? Sociologists claim that civilization is what we are and culture is merely an arrangement of artifacts that we happen to use during the course of our politics of everyday life. Civilization, however, is also a system of values that is handed down generations as a movement of socialization that laymen identify as 'progress'. (shrink)

The author of the article contrasts the objection to transhumanism, which proceeds from the fact of success technoscience, with the objection, that takes the very fact of technoscience as a problem. Transhumanism itself gives rise to the problematization of science. It is the top of its development, and at the same time it fits into a single line of continuity of the forms of transformation of human nature known in history, as another, new link of it, following Christianity in (...) this serie. The identification of this kind of "religious" roots of transhumanism brings back the relevance of the problem of the connection between science and Christianity and provides additional resources for reviewing this problem today. The author of the article shows the connection between the problem of the mathematization (transformation) of nature, known even to the Eleatics, the new possibilities opened for it by Christianity, and the new European tradition of the I-cogito. The Cogito presented itself as a human nature transformed through union with God, as the very unit that Zeno had once sought, but never found. But while posing as something new to western european philosophy and thus defining its development, the cogito was not what it claimed to be. The transition from Descartes' pseudo-discoveries to Zeno's conclusions was inevitable. It has declared itself as a transition from classical epistemology to non-classical epistemology. In view of the fact that non-classics do not just indicate the failure of the classics, but call into question the very possibility of science, two paths open up: the way back or the way forward. The way back brings us back to the problem of the genesis of science, to a radical revision of its possibility. The way forward is the path of transhumanism as a rehabilitation of the pseudo-unity of the I-cogito in the new, extremely favorable conditions, when postmodernism has already abolished the polarization of the top and the bottom, the upper and the lower, that set the problem of unity. (shrink)

In this article the relations between philosophy and applied ethics are considered. The presented deliberation is concentrated on the question whether philosophy has contributed to applied ethics, especially to business ethics. Trying to find an answer to this question I will refer to the discussion which was started by R. Rorty in which he presented his own point of view on the issues related to moral development and the role of philosophy and philosophers in the modern world. Rorty points (...) at proper tools which, in his opinion, can be helpful to business ethicists and formulates the goal they should try to aim at. His opinions has started a vivid discussion. Patricia H. Werhane, Daryl Koehn and Richard T. De George try to discuss with Rorty’s statement. They oppose Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not more relevant to applied ethics than any other academic disciplines. They point to the facts which document philosophers’ contribution in forming business ethics. This article presents their arguments as well as an attempt of their critical assessment. (shrink)