Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...) thought, phenomenal character, and the speckled hen objection to modest foundationalism. (shrink)

Presents translations of five dialogues from Plato, as well as additional notes on history and mythology.

In this paper, I provide a novel approach to the issue of religious diversity: I reject classical pluralist approaches to the issue, such as John Hick’s, and argue that their attempts to construe commonalities between the religions are contrived. The reason that they attempt to find commonalities at all costs is that they presuppose a bivalent notion of truth according to which that which is different is false. I suggest that, in order to get a robust theory on religious diversity (...) off the ground, we should rely on the notion of justification rather than that of bivalent truth. Justification is pluralizable, dependent upon the circumstances, whereas bivalent truth is not. Armed with a pluralizable notion of justification, we can acknowledge that other religious beliefs are genuinely different without necessarily being false: They can be justified, given the circumstances a believer of a different religion is in. Perceiving religious differences in this way allows to liberate the interreligious dialogue from the pressure to find commonalities between religions at all costs, to respect the religious Other in her Otherness, and to ‘mirror’ one’s own religion in light of other religions. (shrink)

To speak of ‘the real subject’ or ‘the primary aim’ of a Platonic dialogue usually means to magnify one aspect of it at the expense of other aspects as important. Such is not my intention. It is quite clear, however, without prejudice to the philosophic value of any of the topics discussed, that the Protagoras is an attack upon the sophists as represented by Protagoras, the greatest of them. Hippias and Prodicus are present and some of the great man's glory (...) is reflected upon them; they are also no doubt to some extent implicated in his defeat, though they seem quite unaware of the fact. (shrink)

_Plato's Thought_ offers an excellent introduction to Plato, guiding the reader through Plato's Theory of Forms, and examining his views on art, education and statecraft. This edition includes an introduction, bibliographic essay, and bibliography by Donald Zeyl.

Grote's powerful defence of Thrasyllus' canon should have taught us at least not to reject lightly any dialogue which, like the Hippias Maior, is there classed as genuine. The burden of proof lies with those who attack our dialogue. Raeder, Ritter, and Apelt consider it to be genuine, while Ast, Jowett, Horneffer, and Röllig declare against it, as also Gomperz, Zeller, and Lutoslawski.

The classical Athenian philosopher Socrates was tried in 399 BCE on the basis of two notoriously ambiguous charges: corrupting the youth and impiety (in Greek, asebeia). A majority of the 501 dikasts (Athenian citizen-jurors) voted to convict him. Socrates was ultimately sentenced to death by drinking a hemlock-based liquid. This well-known account of the trial is by Plato, one of Socrates' students and a famous philosopher in his own right. Whether Socrates was punished unjustly is a contested issue which to (...) this day inspires discussions about the nature and meaning of justice. (shrink)

Diachronic perceptual atomism is the view that the contents of experience do not involve temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, such as motion, succession, or duration, but only 'snapshots' of the world. Traditionally, atomism has not been a very popular view. Indeed, many philosophers think that it is obviously false and that the main debate about time consciousness takes place between models which reject atomistic commitments. This antiatomistic sentiment can be traced back to William James's slogan that 'a succession of feelings, (...) in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession'. In this paper I argue, first, that the arguments typically launched against atomism in the spirit of James's slogan fail; and second, that the viability of atomism depends on what the conditions for a mental event's being an experience are. In particular, I argue that if a mental event is an experience only if it fulfils certain downstream conditions, which concern the role of the event in the subject's cognitive life, then atomism fails. Otherwise, it is in fact a viable and in many ways attractive view. It follows from my discussion that, contrary to popular belief, atomism is by no means obviously false. Rather, its viability depends on one's further views about the relationship between experience and cognition. (shrink)

Contains the _Poetics _ and the first twelve chapters of the_ Rhetoric_, Book III.

Ist das Spurenlesen archaischer Restbestand eines \textgreaterwilden Wissens\textless oder läßt es sich in allen entfalteten Zeichen-, Erkenntnis- und Interpretationstechniken aufspüren? Wie kann das Spurenlesen vom Textlesen und vom Interpretieren sprachlicher und bildlicher Zeichen abgegrenzt werden? Bilden Spuren die Nahtstelle der Entstehung von Sinn aus Nichtsinn? Verbinden sie unsere Zeichenpraktiken mit der Dinghaftigkeit, Körperlichkeit und Materialität der Welt? Werden Spuren entdeckt oder werden sie im Akt des Spurenlesens überhaupt erst hervorgebracht? Das sind Fragen, auf die der Band Antworten sucht. Seine Leitidee (...) ist, daß das Spurenlesen eine Orientierungstechnik und eine Wissenskunst verkörpert, die nicht nur in der Philosophie und den Geisteswissenschaften, sondern auch in den Naturwissenschaften wirksam wird. (shrink)

I compare the discussion on exclusivism in religion to the discussion on exclusivism in general. With defenders of religious exclusivism, such as Plantinga, I argue that it is a subset of general exclusivism and is as little blameworthy as the latter is. This explains why defenders of religious exclusivism are right in assuming that the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the critics of exclusivism. Yet, this answer solves only part of the problem. It answers only the first (...) order question of whether it is legitimate to hold exclusivist truth claims in religion. It does not answer the second order question of how, in what spirit, they should be held. I argue that there are contexts in which exclusivist truth claims should be held in a humble fashion, for example contexts in which (cognitive) ambiguity reigns. If they are held in those contexts in an overconfident fashion, they are epistemically and/or morally blameworthy. Since religion is characterized by a measure of (cognitive) ambiguity, exclusivist religious truth claims should be held in a humble fashion. They are thus blameworthy if held in an overconfident fashion. Yet, if held in a modest spirit, there is nothing wrong with religious exclusivism. (shrink)

This report highlights and explores four questions that arose from the workshop on temporal experience at the University of Toronto, May 20th and 21st, 2013.

This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What can we learn about the nature of time from the nature of ordinary experience?

In chapter I, different types of interpretations of Lessing’s ring-parable are introduced. After a summary of them , the different types are sketched and their plausibility is evaluated . I suggest preferring the interpretation according to which Lessing suggests that, although the truth of religion is undecided, we can nevertheless be epistemically justified to continue believing in our Christian, Jewish, Muslim ...religion . In chapter II, I defend the philosophical tenability of Lessing’s solution. He does not advocate the philosophically untenable (...) idea that truth can be relativized . His contentions should be interpreted as not primarily targeting questions of truth proper but, rather, questions of justification. After sketching the difference between accounts of justification and of truth proper, I show in which fashion Lessing answers questions of justification . In chapter III, I show that a solution along Lessing’s lines brings fresh and promising resources to the study of the philosophy of religion. What I call the standard paradigmin the philosophy of religion, viz. the attempt to demonstrate the truth or falsity of religion, has provided inconclusive results in my judgment. And there is little hope that the decisive argument for or against religion will surface in the foreseeable future. Thus I suggest that, rather than devoting our energies to the standard paradigm, we should devote them to what I call the new paradigm. According to the latter, the question whether or not certain religious utterances are epistemically justified rather than the question whether they are true is crucial . Finally, I show in which fashion William James, Alvin Plantinga, and my own coherentist holism are all proponents of this new paradigm, thus intellectual allies of Lessing. (shrink)

By way of their genre, inaugural lectures are condensed and rather broad since they are addressed to a mixed audience. The following theses develop and defend my thoughts on the ‘justified religiou...

English summary: It seems that reason is less a universal principle than something inherently bound to the contexts in which it appears. These contributions to a conference held on the occasion of Christoph Schwobel's 60th birthday explore the character of reason's manifold contexts: the grounding of reason in the inner word of God 's Trinitarian life as well as the disclosure of reason and and its limits in human conversation. German description: Vernunft scheint in der Gegenwart weniger ein allgemeines Prinzip (...) als eine in Kontexte eingebundene Grosse zu sein. Die Beitrage einer Tagung anlasslich von Christoph Schwobels 60. Geburtstag, gehen der Frage nach dem Charakter dieser Kontextbindung nach: der Begrundung der Vernunft im trinitarischen Gesprach wie der Erschliessung und Problematisierung der Vernunft im menschlichen Gesprach. Mit Beitragen von V. Brummer, G. van den Brink, C. Drobe, H. J. Eckstein, D.-M. Grube, J. Halfwassen, S. Heine, F. Hermanni, E. Herms, W. Harle, W. Homolka, W. Jeanrond, R. W. Jenson, D. Kelsey, A. F. Koch, A. Kupsch, V. Leppin, P.-C. Lai, P. Lo, A. Min, J. Moltmann, M. Muhling, P. Peterson, M. Sarot, F. Schweitzer, A. Torrance, J. Webster, M. Welker, M. Wendte, M. Wisse, H. Wisskirchen und L. Zak. (shrink)

The dichotomy and mutual exclusiveness of the somatic feeling theory and cognitive theories of emotion has been the most deeply entrenched presupposition of emotion theory throughout the 20th century. In the first part of this paper I give a succinct review of both theoretical strands and of the most influential arguments which have been raised against them. This leads me to diagnose an argumentative stalemate: Both approaches have serious shortcomings which can only be overcome within the framework of the other. (...) In the second part I argue that if one adopts a Representational theory of sensory states and understands occurrent emotional states as complex intentional states of a particular sort, this impasse can be overcome, and both theoretical strands can be reconciled. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that, historically, Christianity emerges out of Judaism by way of a paradigm shift in Thomas Kuhn’s sense of the word and that this emergence has normative consequences regarding the legitimacy of Christianity. Paradigm shifts are characterized by observational anomalies triggering particular kinds of theoretical modifications, e.g. meaning-changes of key terms, leading to a coherent re-disclosure of reality. The first Christians underwent such a paradigm shift: The anomalous experience that the dead Jesus has risen triggered theoretical modifications – (...) the term ‘Messiah’ underwent a meaning-change – so that reality could be coherently re-disclosed as eschatological reality. If Christianity emerges by way of a paradigm shift, this shift should be the foundation of Christological theorizing: Rather than basing Christology on what the ‘historical Jesus’ did or said, the reconstruction of Jesus as the Christ in the context of this shift is foundational for Christ... (shrink)

Two eleven-year-old boys face a bulletin board, arranging silver thumbtacks into shapes of fighter planes. They have arrived early for an after-school puppet workshop. Both boys are under five feet tall: the thin one sports a green terrycloth wristband and a big fro. “The girls like the poof,” he says. The other boy has a fuller body, a haircut similar to the Fab Four in the late sixties, and wears wide-leg jeans and a red t-shirt that brushes his kneecaps. The (...) boys talk while puncturing the corkboard with tacks. I like this game. It’s Star Miner. There’s this thing. It’s a ship that looks like this. The other ships are too detailed. You try and blow up a jet thingy, it spirals and can catch on .. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

In this article, I argue that Barth resists the modern “turn to the subject” and that important features of his approach can be explained as being motivated by this resistance. Under the parameters of this “turn”, the human subject occupies a position which should be reserved for God. As an antidote to this turn, Barth suggests an exchange of subjects: The role that the subject occupies under subjectivist parameters should be taken over by a Trinitarian notion of God. This suggestion (...) explains to a great extent the approach he takes since his famous “breakthrough” and explains also his harsh rejection of Brunner. (shrink)

SummaryIn this article, I argue that Barth resists the modern “turn to the subject” and that important features of his approach can be explained as being motivated by this resistance. Under the parameters of this “turn”, the human subject occupies a position which should be reserved for God. As an antidote to this turn, Barth suggests an exchange of subjects: The role that the subject occupies under subjectivist parameters should be taken over by a Trinitarian notion of God. This suggestion (...) explains to a great extent the approach he takes since his famous “breakthrough” and explains also his harsh rejection of Brunner.ZusammenfassungIn diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass eine der treibenden Kräfte von Barths theologischem Ansatz seine Opposition gegen den »turn to the subject« in der Philosophie und der Theologie ist. Er kritisiert alle Formen der Theologie, bei denen das Subjekt im Mittelpunkt steht. Demgegenüber setzt er betont den Gottesbegriff in die Funktion ein, die der Subjektbegriff in der subjektzentrierten Theologie inne hat.Die seit der Moderne verbreitete Idee, dass ein Erkenntnisgegenstand zunächst als möglich aufgewiesen werden muss, bevor über seine Realität etwas ausgesagt werden kann, steht im Mittelpunkt von Barths Kritik seit seiner »Wende«: Während in der englischen Übersetzung vom »Unterricht in der christlichen Religion« dieser Punkt verloren zu gehen droht, wird im deutschen Original deutlich, dass, in theologicis, die Realität der Möglichkeit vorgeordnet wird.Nach einem kurzen Exkurs zur Entstehung der subjektzentrierten Philosophie bei Descartes und Kant wird gezeigt, wie die Theologie durch diesen »turn to the subject« beeinflusst ist. In Kap. VI wird aufgewiesen, dass ein nicht zu entschärfender, prinzipieller Gegensatz besteht zwischen subjektzentrierter Theologie und traditioneller Theologie bezüglich der Frage, wer im Mittelpunkt steht, das Subjekt oder Gott. Nachdem das Thema des Subjektwechsels im »Unterricht« genauer analysiert worden ist, wird gezeigt, dass Barths berühmtes »Nein!« voraussetzt, dass Brunner genau diesen Wechsel nicht mit vollzieht und darum noch subjektzentrierten Kategorien verhaftet ist. (shrink)

This volume synthesizes cutting-edge philosophical reflections on interpretation with their application to the practice of interpreting religious texts, combining new philosophical insights with a thorough analysis of their application to religion.

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Beitrag konzentriere ich mich auf Bayers Interpretation von Luthers Rechtfertigungsverständnis als promissio. In Teil I skizziere ich Bayers zentralen Gedanken, dass dieser Begriff als performativer Sprechakt in Austins Sinne verstanden werden muss, d.h. als ein Akt, der durch seinen Vollzug neue 〉Tatsachen〈 konstituiert und nicht nur schon existierende Tatsachen registriert. Die Worte der Absolution registrieren nicht, dass der Sünder gerechtfertigt ist, sondern vollziehen die Rechtfertigung, wenn sie im richtigen Kontext gesprochen werden.In Teil II beurteile ich die Konsequenzen dieser (...) Interpretation der Rechtfertigung. Einerseits schlage ich vor, dass Bayers Interpretation die Aspekte des Rechtfertigungsverständnisses zum Ausdruck bringt, die für das Luthertum charakteristisch sind und verteidigt werden sollten. Andererseits jedoch kritisiere ich Bayers Behauptung, dass dieses Verständnis der Rechtfertigung als promissio alle Versuche unterminiert, theologische Aussagen zu verifizieren. Ich fasse diese Spannung zwischen der religiösen, pro-lutherischen Perspektive und der philosophischen, Luther-kritischen Perspektive in einem Dialog zwischen dem lutherischen Herzen und dem philosophischen Verstand zusammen.In Teil III stelle ich dar, dass diese Spannung zwischen dem lutherischen Herzen und dem philosophischen Verstand nicht leicht aufzulösen ist, da beide auf ihre Weise wertvoll sind. Trotzdem mache ich in der Konklusion zwei vorsichtige Vorschläge: Der erste besteht darin, dass der Gedanke der 〉Verifikation〈 in einer im weitesten Sinne pragmatischen Form rekonstruiert werden sollte, um aus lutherischer Perspektive akzeptabel zu sein. Der zweite Vorschlag besteht darin, den nicht-relationalen Hintergrund, der vorausgesetzt ist, wenn Rechtfertigung relational interpretiert wird , als ein 〉Vorurteil〈 im Sinne Gadamers zu verstehen, d.h. als in jedem Akt des Verstehens vorausgesetzt und doch jederzeit revidierbar.SummaryIn this contribution, I focus on Bayer's interpretation of Luther's concept of justification as promissio. In part I, I sketch Bayer's central idea that this concept is to be understood as a performative speech-act in Austin's sense, i. e. as an act constituting novel ‘facts’ while being performed rather than registering already existing ones. The words of the absolution do not only register that the sinner is justified but, when being spoken in the proper circumstances, actually do justify him.In part II, I evaluate the consequences of this interpretation of justification. On the one hand, I suggest that Bayer's interpretation captures the aspects of the concept of justification which are characteristic of Lutheranism and should be defended. On the other hand, however, I criticize Bayer's contention that his concept of justification as promissio undermines all attempts to verify theological claims. I summarize the tension between the religious, pro-Lutheran perspective and the philosophical, Luther-critical perspective in a dialogue between Lutheran heart and philosophical mind.In part three, I suggest that there is no easy way out of the tension between Lutheran heart and philosophical mind since both are valuable in their own way. Nevertheless, I offer two cautious suggestions by way of conclusion: The first is that the idea of ‘verification’ should be reconstructed in a pragmatic spirit in order to be acceptable from a Lutheran perspective. The second is that the non-relational background which is presupposed by construing justification in a relational fashion should be construed as a Gadamerian ‘prejudice’, i. e. as being presupposed in every act of understanding, yet, as always being open to revision. (shrink)

In dieser Aufsatzsammlung werden die Probleme und Konsequenzen des Offenbarungsbegriffs im Denken Paul Tillichs untersucht. Zunächst wird dieser Begriff näher thematisiert anhand der Fragen, wie dieser gewonnen wird und welche Rolle dabei die Phänomenologie spielt, ob dessen Ausarbeitung zu stark von subjektivistischen Voraussetzungen geprägt ist und wie sich die Offenbarungserkenntnis zur wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis verhält.Im Anschluss daran werden charakteristische Aspekte von Tillichs Theologie analysiert: sein Postulat mystischer Unmittelbarkeit als Grund von Offenbarung, die Frage nach der Rolle der Erfahrung bei der Begründung (...) von Offenbarungserkenntnis, seine Korrelationsmethode, d.h. die Zuordnung von philosophischen Fragen und theologischen Antworten, sowie die Bedeutung von Tillichs Christologie - in der Spannung zwischen absoluten Geltungsansprüchen und deren Relativierung - für den interreligiösen Dialog heute. Auf diese Weise wird deutlich, dass die Impulse von Tillichs Ansatz von bleibender Bedeutung für die gegenwärtige Theologie sind, besonders was das Gespräch mit den nicht-christlichen Religionen und der Philosophie angeht. (shrink)

The relationship between religion and contingency is investigated historically and systematically. Its historical part comprises analyses of important philosophers’ interpretation of this relationship, viz. that of Leibniz, Kant, Lessing, Jaspers, and Heidegger. Its systematic part analyses how this relationship should be currently interpreted.

In Karl Barth’s famous ‘Epistle to the Romans’, Second edition, the negation seems to be dominant: Each and every possibility to ‘have’ God, i.e. to cognize Him, is denied. More precisely speaking, Barth proposes a dialectics of negation and affirmation within which the negation seems to be dominant: He alludes frequently to the possibility to cognise God but then denies that possibility. An important question in Barth-research is thus how this dialectics is to be interpreted. Most Barth-researchers approach this question (...) via ‘ideengeschichtliche’ means, i.e. via the question what the background of Barth’s dialectics consists of. In chapter I, I scrutinize both of the currently prevailing paradigms for explaining the background of Barth’s dialectics: In line with the majority of current researchers on the issue, I suggest that the neo-Kantian ‘dialectics of origin’ has influenced the formulation of the dialectics in Romans II. Karl Barth became familiar with that dialectics through his brother Heinrich Barth, a neo-Kantian . However, against a recent trend in Barth-research, I suggest that the influence of Sören Kierkegaard’s ‘dialectics of existence’ should not be underestimated. Karl Barth used both sorts of dialectics side by side . In chapter II, I draw the systematic consequences of the ‘ideengeschichtliche’ considerations of chapter I. First, I suggest that philosophical explanations of the above sort account for the basic ‘raison d’être’ for there being such a dialectics, non-philosophical explanations for its specific shape. That is, the classical psychological explanations of the dialectics of Romans II explain the reason why he emphasizes the negation within the dialectics that strongly but cannot sufficiently explain the fact that there is such a dialectics. In II, 2, I utilize the above considerations to answer the classical question whether the negation has priority over the affirmation. I deny that. Barth emphasizes the negation within the dialectics of affirmation and negation strongly in order to reject the thendominant Liberal Theology. Yet, conceptually, his dialectics presupposes a more fundamental affirmation, viz. that God is totaliter aliter. But is the affirmation that God is ‘totaliter aliter’ not inconsistent? Either He is ‘totaliter aliter’ – in this case we cannot say anything meaningful about Him, not even that He is ‘totaliter aliter’. Or, else, we can say something meaningful about Him. But then He is not truly ‘totaliter aliter’. I suggest that a transcendental strategy provides interesting possibilities for getting out of that impasse: By holding that God is to be postulated on transcendental grounds rather than to be cognized in the proper sense of the word, it becomes possible to hold both that God is ‘totaliter aliter’, non-approachable and that we can claim that in a meaningful fashion. I admit, though, that applying transcendental strategies for theological purposes is not without problems. Yet, the prospects they provide for theological theorizing makes it worth investigating them further in spite of their problems. (shrink)

In this article, evidentialism is refuted by relying on William James’ article ‘The Will to Believe’. After an introduction into the notion of ‘evidentialism’ and James’ attack on it , I distinguish between two sorts of evidentialisms, truth-oriented evidentialism and quiescent evidentialism . In 2.3–2.5, I criticize these forms of evidentialism on the grounds that the first has very limited applicability and the second leads to absurd consequences when applied in the moral domain. In section 3, the evidentialist challenge to (...) religion is refuted by arguing that, first, truth-oriented evidentialism is of only very limited applicability for criticizing religion and second, that quiescent evidentialism cannot be applied in certain situations , particular religious claims being among them. (shrink)