We investigate Maker–Breaker games on graphs of size $\aleph _1$ in which Maker’s goal is to build a copy of the host graph. We establish a firm dependence of the outcome of the game on the axiomatic framework. Relating to this, we prove that there is a winning strategy for Maker in the $K_{\omega,\omega _1}$ -game under ZFC+MA+ $\neg $ CH and a winning strategy for Breaker under ZFC+CH. We prove a similar result (...) for the $K_{\omega _1}$ -game. Here, Maker has a winning strategy under ZF+DC+AD, while Breaker has one under ZFC+CH again. (shrink)

The study of expertise is difficult to do in a laboratory environment due to the challenge of finding people at different skill levels and the lack of time for participants to acquire mastery. In this paper, we report on two studies that analyze naturalistic gameplay data using cohort analysis to better understand how skill relates to practice and habit. Two cohorts are analyzed, each from two different games. Our work follows skill progression through 7 months of Halo matches for a (...) holistic perspective, but also explores low-level in-game habits when controlling game units in StarCraft 2. Players who played moderately frequently without long breaks were able to gain skill the most efficiently. What set the highest performers apart was their ability to gain skill more rapidly and without dips compared to other players. At the beginning of matches, top players habitually warmed up by selecting and re-selecting groups of units repeatedly in a meaningless cycle. They exhibited unique routines during their play that aided them when under pressure. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Fragments LITERARY STUDIES AND THE REPRESSION OF REPUTATION by John Rodden 6 6T A Thomakesorbreaks a writer's reputation?" asked Esquire during VV the mid-1960s. The editors' answer, titled "The Structure of the Literary Establishment," came in the form of a multicolored "chart of power." Included was "virtually everyone of serious literary consequence," whether "writer, editor, agent, or simple hipster." The center of power was indicated, noted the (...) editors, by "the hot red blob in the middle," which oozed over the names of the chief literary makers and breakers.1 In 1977 Esquire drove to the heart of the blob, asking a long list of "knowledgeable" writers, academic critics, andjournalists the question, "Which American writers of this century do you consider the most overand under-rated"? Running below the responses across four pages was a sketch of Father Time, busily at work inflating and bursting bubbles bearing the images of various candidates. No consensus was sought, though Dreiser and Willa Cather fared well, and Pound, Eliot, Hemingway, Mailer, and Edmund Wilson less well. The editors acknowledged that their respondents generously volunteered a number of nonAmericans too (and stretched "writers of this century" back to the Venerable Bede), "proving that once you get started on this kind of thing, it's hard to know where to stop." 2 Unfortunately, reflection on the matter seems to stop at the doorstep of literary studies. "Reputation" is one of those subjects that readers, 261 262Philosophy and Literature critics, and scholars love to talk about, but to which serious attention is rarely paid, even by sociologists of literature—and not at all by literary critics. Separate disciplines are devoted to the study ofwealth and power, yet none to honor or reputation, the third chiefcategory ofclass systems and human motivation.3 A few cultural critics have drawn attention to the ways in which the "institution of criticism"—book publishing, book reviewing, literaryjournalism, scholarly criticism—has exerted influence on public literary taste or the profession of literary studies. But their work has typically criticized "the culture industry" or "the literary-industrial complex," rather than addressed the making of authors' and books' reputations.4 Although semesterly reading lists and even whole libraries testify to the exalted reputations of a few canonized authors, a near-total silence has prevailed in the academy on reputation as a literary issue in its own right.5 That such a central dynamic of literary life—in a sense the defining, controlling category for an essentially honorific activity like literature and literary criticism—should go virtually unattended by critics of literature might seem at first glance a professional conspiracy by Esquire's "blob." Yet the academy's neglectof"the problem ofreputation" is hardly due to outright professional collusion, but rather to a joint matter of institutional and historical factors. These have partly to do with the elusiveness of "reputation" as a concept, which has accommodated the more important repressive factors: the academy's preoccupation with literary interpretation and its persistent habit of averting its eyes from its own institutional history. This essay explores the problematics of literary reputation, the essence of which consists in our unrefiective tendency to assume that what is valued is invariably what is also reputed. II Few readers would deny that authors' reputations bear heavily on practices in publishing and literary journalism. Few even question Esquire 's buried point that "reputations get made" through institutional networks which exchange and distribute information. Yet the literary academy has traditionally relegated the subject to the slick magazines and, more recendy, to the sociology of art and occupations, where it has received scant attention and where literary canons are not made.6 On those rare occasions when journals like The American Scholar have taken up literary reputation as an issue, they have politely asked only the first of Esquire's questions (about underrated books and authors), John Rodden263 characterizing their discussion as "the game" ofrediscovering "neglected books." 7 Indeed the topic may well strike a bit too close to home, as observers as opposed in their literary politics as Norman Podhoretz and Richard Kostelanetz seem to agree.8 For elite institutions and star reputations exist in academe and in the literary... (shrink)

We study the equilibrium behavior of informed traders interacting with market scoring rule (MSR) market makers. One attractive feature of MSR is that it is myopically incentive compatible: it is optimal for traders to report their true beliefs about the likelihood of an event outcome provided that they ignore the impact of their reports on the profit they might garner from future trades. In this paper, we analyze non-myopic strategies and examine what information structures lead to truthful betting by traders. (...) Specifically, we analyze the behavior of risk-neutral traders with incomplete information playing in a dynamic game. We consider finite-stage and infinite-stage game models. For each model, we study the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) with two different information structures: conditionally independent signals and (unconditionally) independent signals. In the finite-stage model, when signals of traders are independent conditional on the state of the world, truthful betting is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Moreover, it is the unique Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) of the game. In contrast, when signals of traders are unconditionally independent, truthful betting is not a WPBE. In the infinite-stage model with unconditionally independent signals, there does not exist an equilibrium in which all information is revealed in a finite amount of time. We propose a simple discounted market scoring rule that reduces the opportunity for bluffing strategies. We show that in any WPBE for.. (shrink)

An interesting fact about customary international law is that the only way you can propose an amendment to it is by breaking it. How can that be differentiated from plain law-breaking? What moral standards might apply to that sort of international conduct? I propose we use ones analogous to the ordinary standards for distinguishing civil disobedients from ordinary law-breakers: would-be law-makers, like civil disobedients, must break the law openly; they must accept the legal consequences of doing so; and they must (...) be prepared to have the same rules applied to them as everyone else. (shrink)

Philosophical semantics requires an ontology that includes negative as well as positive states of affairs as truth-makers and truth-breakers. Theories that try to do without negative states of affairs while interpreting propositional truth as positive correspondence with existent states of affairs are inherently inadequate and incomplete. A semantics and ontology of negative states of affairs can also do justice to positive states of affairs, since the iterated negative state of affairs that a negative state of affairs exists describes a positive (...) state of affairs, but the iterated positive state of affairs that a positive state of affairs exists never describes a negative state of affairs. Negative states of affairs are not only essential to semantics, but to a complete description of the world; they include phenomena of presence in absence and the metaphysics of gaps, lacks, holes and interstitia. The conceivability of an empty or null universe as consisting of nothing but negative states of affairs recalls a famous problem of Parmenides. (shrink)

Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based upon a well-defined (...) notion of being good enough, and does accommodate group as well as individual interests through the use of conditional preference relationships, whereby a decision maker is able to adjust its preferences as a function of the preferences, and not just the options, of others. This new theory is offered as an alternative paradigm to construct artificial societies that are capable of complex behavior that goes beyond exclusive self interest. (shrink)

Abstract:For many people, the media is the main source of their knowledge and understanding about policing and crime. As a result, a common thread running through content analysis of television police shows is the gap between the “reality” of police work, crime, criminals, and the justice system and the picture painted by media representations. I argue, however, that all representations of social reality are partial and that commercial imperatives, working processes, ideological frames of the makers, and format of individual shows (...) shape and constrain the stories told. Given that police shows can never be totally authentic, I argue that scholars should be exploring the symbolic value of these shows, the types of discourse produced, and whether such shows habituate viewers into ways of thinking about crime and punishment that may be excessively simplified. (shrink)

Formal analyses of Pascal’s Wager have almost all been decision-theoretic, with a human as the sole decision-maker. This paper analyses Pascal’s Wager in a game-theoretic setting in which the deity whose existence the human is considering wagering on is also a decision-maker. There is an equilibrium in which the human chooses to wager that the deity exists and Pascal’s Wager thus operates, but also one in which the human does not wager. Thus, in a game-theoretic setting, (...) Pascal’s Wager is indeterminate: wagering and not wagering are both consistent with equilibrium behaviour. (shrink)

Investigating the causes of unethical behaviors in academia, such as scientific misconduct, has become a highly important research subject. The current performance measurement practices (e.g., equating research performance with the number of publications in top-tier journals) are frequently referred to as being responsible for scientists’ unethical behaviors. We conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders of the higher education system (e.g., professors and policy makers; N = 43) to analyze the influence of performance measurement on scientists’ behavior. We followed a (...) three-step coding procedure and found (1) that the participants described a variety of positive behavioral consequences (e.g., higher productivity) but mainly negative behavioral consequences (e.g., questionable publishing practices) of current performance measurement practices in academia; (2) that scientists’ behavior can be described as gaming performance measurement (i.e., achieving performance goals by reducing performance quality and focusing on those tasks that are measured); and (3) that gaming performance measurement shares the same characteristics as deviant workplace behavior (i.e., a voluntary violation of organizational norms that harms the university). We discuss that gaming performance measurement has not been considered as a type of deviant workplace behavior in the previous literature. Furthermore, we draw from research on deviant workplace behavior and goal setting to discuss psychological processes that may underlie gaming performance measurement. Our results indicate the importance of connecting literature on deviant workplace behavior and goal setting to advance our understanding of gaming performance measurement. (shrink)

Games and Decision Making, Second Edition, is a unique blend of decision theory and game theory. From classical optimization to modern game theory, authors Charalambos D. Aliprantis and Subir K. Chakrabarti show the importance of mathematical knowledge in understanding and analyzing issues in decision making. Through an imaginative selection of topics, Aliprantis and Chakrabarti treat decision and game theory as part of one body of knowledge. They move from problems involving the individual decision-maker to progressively more (...) complex problems such as sequential rationality, auctions, and bargaining. By building each chapter on material presented earlier, the authors offer a self-contained and comprehensive treatment of these topics. Successfully class-tested in an advanced undergraduate course at the Krannert School of Management and in a graduate course in economics at Indiana University, Games and Decision Making, Second Edition, is an essential text for advanced undergraduates and graduate students of decision theory and game theory. The book is accessible to students who have a good basic understanding of elementary calculus and probability theory. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of creating games for change from within an academic context, focusing specifically on the development of educational computer games for middle school girls. The essay addresses larger issues such as the cultural importance of computer games, the difficulty in categorizing a diverse user group such as “girls,” and the ways in which one could design game goals to promote diverse play and learning styles. Through such alternate design strategies, both media makers and students can (...) incorporate significant social intervention into media work. (shrink)

I consider games with ambiguous payoffs played by non-Expected Utility decision makers. Three equilibrium solutions are studied. Nash equilibrium in which equilibrium mixed strategies must be best responses, Crawford equilibrium in beliefs and pure equilibrium in beliefs in which equilibrium strategies are mixtures of best responses, with the latter restricting best responses to pure actions. I study the interactions between ambiguity preferences on one side and equilibrium properties on the other. I show how the equilibrium concepts differ, computing necessary and (...) sufficient conditions for existence and equivalence. I also show how these solution concepts fare against two fundamental principles of Nash equilibrium in standard games: the principle of indifference and the reduction principle. Given both are central to the computation of Nash equilibrium in games with Expected Utility players, their failure indicates how relaxing the Expected Utility hypothesis may disrupt standard game theoretic results such as the characterization of equilibria in two-player games. (shrink)

Bicchieri's topic is the modeling of interaction between decision makers in situations in which the outcome of the interaction depends on what the parties jointly do. Examples include chess, firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, jury members deciding on a verdict, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships. Rationality assumptions are a basic ingredient of game theory, but though rational choice might be unproblematic in normative decision theory, it becomes problematic (...) in interactive contexts, where the outcome of one’s choice depends on the actions of other agents. Another basic ingredient is the idea of equilibrium play: roughly, an equilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s strategy is a best reply to the other players’ choices. Thus it is individually rational for each agent to play her equilibrium strategy; but, notoriously, such individually rational play can lead to sub-optimal outcomes, as in the well-known prisoner’s dilemma. The relationship between rationality assumptions and equilibrium play is Bicchieri’s main focus. (shrink)

The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, (...) but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximum mutual advantage in the games they play. (shrink)

“Unraveling Braid” analyzes how unconventional, non-linear narrative fiction can help explain the ways in which video games signify. Specifically, this essay looks at the links between the semiotic features of Jonathan Blow’s 2008 puzzle-platform video game Braid and similar elements in Georges Perec’s 1978 novel Life A User’s Manual, as well as in other puzzle-themed literary precursors. Blow’s game design concepts “dynamical meaning” and “game play rhetoric” are explained in relation to a number of Braid levels; along (...) side this analysis is a parallel examination of the relationship between puzzle-makers and puzzle-solvers in Life A User’s Manual, revealed from a close reading of textual and organizational elements of Perec’s novel. Ultimately, Braid and Life A User’s Manual are shown to draw upon the same signifying processes, which are understood by their authors to operate within an implicitly communicative model. “Unraveling Braid”develops this model by positing a theory of storytelling in the imperative mood, in which the representation and arrangement of objects in the visual/organizational space of the text or game world becomes a fundamental rhetorical technique and meaning-maker.This technique signal show the reader/player is meant to progress through the work and interpret it as narrative, telling the reader/player what to do (but not necessarily how to do it). An understanding of “imperative” storytelling, this essay concludes, allows for a discussion of games and other media that denies neither the importance of player interactivity nor that of authorial design. (shrink)

Alfred Müller-Armack was one of the very important policy-makers who initiated the West-German economic recovery after WWII. He devised the underlying economic program of the so-called “German Miracle”, which was not a miracle at all. It was the outcome of a rigorous rule transformation from the bankrupt central planning of the Nazi- regime to a market economic order based on the principles of classical liberalism combined with a social safety net for all who suffered from the terrible consequences of war (...) destruction. He called his program “Social Market Economy”, thereby expressing that the risky game of the market needs a social safety net to make his program acceptable for the majority of the German citizens.Müller-Armack was not only the Head of the Central Policy Unit at the Federal Economic Ministry under Ludwig Erhard for twelve years but also a well-known university teacher of economics. In the tradition of Max Weber he combined this subject with the theory of economic sociology, and especially, the sociology of religion. In this respect he was an early author in the field which nowadays is named “cultural economics”. His publications on the impact of religious beliefs of greek-orthodox societies on the economic performance of South-East European countries are still of great interest for the present debates about the economic consequences of Islam.Alfred Müller-Armack fut l’un des très importants politiciens qui initièrent l’économie de l’ Allemagne de l’Ouest après la 2ème Guerre Mondiale. Il conçut dans ses grandes lignes le programme économique du soi disant « Miracle Allemand ». Ce fut le résultat d’une règle rigoureuse de transformation à partir de la faillite de la planification centrale du régime Nazi vers un ordre marchand fondé sur les principes du libéralisme classique combiné à un filet de sécurité sociale pour tous ceux qui avaient souffert des conséquences terribles des destructions de la guerre. Il appela son programme « Economie sociale de marché », exprimant ainsi que le jeu risqué du marché nécessite un filet de sécurité sociale pour rendre son programme acceptable par la majorité des citoyens allemands. Müller-Armack n’était pas seulement le chef de l’unité politique centrale au ministère fédéral de l’économie sous la direction de Ludwig Erhard pendant 12 ans, mais également un professeur très réputé d’économie à l’université. Dans la tradition de Max Weber, il associe ses sujets avec la théorie économique de la sociologie et plus particulièrement, la sociologie de la religion. Dans cette mesure, il fut un pionnier dans le champ de ce que l’on appelle aujourd’hui « l’économie de la culture ». Ses publications sur l’impact des croyances religieuses des sociétés grecques orthodoxes sur la performance économique des pays du Sud-Est Européen restent d’un grand intérêt pour les débats actuels au sujet des conséquences économiques de l’Islam. (shrink)

Real-world economies are open-ended dynamic systems consisting of heterogeneous interacting participants. Human participants are decision-makers who strategically take into account the past actions and potential future actions of other participants. All participants are forced to be locally constructive, meaning their actions at any given time must be based on their local states; and participant actions at any given time affect future local states. Taken together, these essential properties imply real-world economies are locally-constructive sequential games. This paper discusses a modeling approach, (...) Agent-based Computational Economics, that permits researchers to study economic systems from this point of view. ACE modeling principles and objectives are first concisely presented and explained. The remainder of the paper then highlights challenging issues and edgier explorations that ACE researchers are currently pursuing. (shrink)

Recent debate by feminist scholars in philosophy of sport has been focused on the status of women’s sport as a protected category. Positions have varied significantly, from no need for a protected category anymore—to allow women’s sport to flourish and to give them a fair opportunity, given that men’s sport still dominates, just as it has in the past.It will be argued that: i) the concept of a ‘protected category’ is tied logically to the concept of fair play and has (...) been defined and enforced through the rules in sport and generally requires some kind of certification for inclusion. These specific rules will be analyzed in detail. Having separate women’s events means that logically it must be possible to exclude, and exclusion is not a popular stance as many have argued that the onus is on inclusion from a human rights perspective. Thus, sport policy makers are truly in an intractable position. On the one hand, no qualifying athlete should have to ‘dope down’ (or ‘dope up’) to compete in the Olympic Games. On the other hand, women athletes have argued that sex equality in competitive sport is a legitimate goal and that separating athletes in competition by biological sex traits is the only way to achieve this goal. It seems criminal to ask athletes to ‘dope down’ to be able to compete in the Olympic Games, however, although a new auxiliary rule creating new sub-classification of women athletes with testosterone higher than the stipulated cut off seems logical on the face of it, these cases are statistically rare. It is concluded that the community of women athletes should have the most significant voice, as historically, the criteria for the women’s sport-protected category have been predominantly determined by men. That is not to say that men’s voices, or voices outside of the women’s sports community of practitioners, cannot be heard, but they should not be the deciding factor. (shrink)

A commitment to receive input from stakeholders is often obligatory in the crafting of environmental policies. This requirement is presumed to satisfy certain conditions of democracy. The need for stakeholder input is quite intuitive; public decision makers want to know what their constituents—or at least a limited number of them—think about certain issues. At the same time, individuals, groups, communities, and various interest groups want to learn about the plans that authoritative agencies have concerning those things that affect their daily (...) lives. In light of this widespread commitment to stakeholder input, it is surprising that little attention has been paid to the necessary conditions under which .. (shrink)

Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each (...) player can threaten to retaliate — and carry out this threat in the second stage — if its opponent chose noncooperation in the first stage.Conditions for the existence of different pure-strategy Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, are found, and these results are extended to situations in which the players can select mixed strategies (i.e., make probabilistic threats or choices). Although the Conflict Game sheds light on the rational foundations underlying arms races, nuclear deterrence, and other strategic situations, more detailed assumptions are required to tie this generic game to specific conflicts. (shrink)

This paper investigates how reports concerning a given country’s prospects affect investment decisions in two stylized, artificial organizational settings. We designed a role-game laboratory experiment, where subjects were asked to make investment decisions for two types of fictitious companies from the same country. We found that when available reports included positive country prospects, subjects strategized more on investments regardless of the characteristics of their organization. When reports included negative prospects, however, certain organizational peculiarities influenced the subjects’ interpretations, with decision-makers (...) opting for more prudent plans when managing a more traditional company. Cognitive maps of decision makers showed that subjects considered investment strategies as a means to fulfil a company’s role expectations regarding appropriate decisions. Notwithstanding all caveats due to the artificial and simplified nature of our experimental setting, our findings indicate the need for more research on the effect of reports and prospect analysis on strategic decisions of companies, especially when business prospects are uncertain. (shrink)

One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to (...) enrich the current debate on goaldirected reasoning theories by studying the extent to which the principles of the bargaining theory can be used to formally characterize the concept of mutual advantage in a way which is compatible with some of the conceptually compelling principles of orthodox game theory, such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and non-comparability of decision-makers’ personal payoffs. I discuss two formal characterizations of the concept of mutual advantage derived from the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories: A measure of mutual advantage developed in collaboration with Jurgis Karpus, which is broadly in line with the notion of mutual advantage suggested by Sugden, and the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution function, which is broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie’s solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I discuss the formal properties of each solution, as well as its theoretical predictions in a number of games. I also explore each solution concept’s compatibility with orthodox game theory. I also discuss the limitations of the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories. I argue that each theory offers a compelling explanation of how a certain type of decision-maker identifies the mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games, but neither of them offers a definitive answer to the question of how people coordinate their actions in non-cooperative social interactions. (shrink)

Coall & Hertwig (C&H) demonstrate the importance of grandparents to children, even in low fertility societies. We suggest policy-makers interested in reproductive timing in such contexts should be alerted to the practical applications of this cooperative breeding framework. The presence or absence of a supportive kin network could help explain why some women begin their reproductive careers or.

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have (...) particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers. (shrink)

What is it for an agent to have a reason to do a certain action? Does this mean that she would desire to do the action under specified conditions, or that there is some external consideration, which she ought to follow? The former affective (i.e., desire-based) theory is ascribed to Humeans, whereas the latter cognitive theory is adopted by Kantians. The debate between the two views has seemingly ended up in a theoretical standoff, and most of the theorists of practical (...) reason have recently turned their attention to the motivational attitude—preceded either by affective attitudes or by cognitive attitudes—as a necessary constituent of having a reason. They contend that an agent has a reason to f only if, on certain occasions, she would be motivated to f: I refer to it as Motivation Reason Internalism. In this paper, I argue that Motivation Reason Internalism is a mirage; it does not obtain necessarily. I classify major versions of Motivation Reason Internalism into three idealized counterfactual versions, arguing that they obtain only contingently, since they all face counterexamples. The Motivation Reason Internalist might attempt to dodge the counterexamples by appealing to Contextual Motivations Reason Internalism, but I show that this move also fails. I discuss a third cause for motivation, some unconscious cause, other than cognitive or affective attitudes, which can still be a motivation maker or breaker. These unconscious causes, such as an underlying biological inclination or psychological bias, functions as motivation maker/breaker but not a reason maker/breaker. This makes room for a variety of cases in which we have reason to perform an action in the absence of any kind (i.e., actual or counterfactual) of motivation. (shrink)

A series of imitation games involving 3-participant (simultaneous comparison of two hidden entities) and 2-participant (direct interrogation of a hidden entity) were conducted at Bletchley Park on the 100th anniversary of Alan Turing’s birth: 23 June 2012. From the ongoing analysis of over 150 games involving (expert and non-expert, males and females, adults and child) judges, machines and hidden humans (foils for the machines), we present six particular conversations that took place between human judges and a hidden entity that produced (...) unexpected results. From this sample we focus on features of Turing’s machine intelligence test that the mathematician/code breaker did not consider in his examination for machine thinking: the subjective nature of attributing intelligence to another mind. (shrink)

A decision maker bets on the outcomes of a sequence of coin-tossings. At the beginning of the game the decision maker can choose one of two coins to play the game. This initial choice is irreversible. The coins can be biased and the player is uncertain about the nature of one (or possibly both) coin(s). If the player is an expected-utility maximizer, her choice of the coin will depend on different elements: the nature of the (...) class='Hi'>game (namely, whether she can observe the outcomes of the previous tosses before making her next decision), her utility function, the prior distribution on the bias of the coin. We will show that even a risk averter might optimally choose a riskier coin when learning is allowed. We will express most of our results in the language of stochastic orderings, allowing comparisons that are valid for large classes of utility functions. (shrink)

This paper presents a new solution to the problems for orthodox decision theory posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives. I argue that a key question raised by consideration of these gambles is whether evaluative compositionality (as I term it) is a requirement of rationality: is the value that an ideally rational agent places on a gamble determined by the values that she places on its possible outcomes, together with their mode of composition into the gamble (i.e. the (...) probabilities assigned to them)? The paper first outlines a certain simple response to the Pasadena game and identifies two problems with this response, the second of which is that it leads to a wholesale violation of evaluative compositionality. I then argue that rationality does not require decision makers to factor in outcomes of arbitrarily low probability. A method for making decisions which flows from this basic idea is then developed, and it is shown that this decision method (Truncation) leads to a limited — as opposed to wholesale — violation of evaluative compositionality. The paper then argues that the truncation method yields solutions to the problems posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives that are both attractive in themselves and superior to those yielded by alternative proposals in the literature. (shrink)

Policy makers and economists alike failed to predict the financial crisis of 2008. Their failure is due not only to the difficulties in predicting events in a complex world, but to the self-referential character of modern macroeconomics. Instead of seeking new empirical insights about economic behavior, macroeconomists have become creators of computer games—content to develop models that are internally consistent but have no necessary connection to the real world. Economic modeling aspires to be scientific in its deductive consistency and rigor. (...) However, even the natural sciences require a good dose of induction, which, in turn, entails varying one's method of study based on the phenomenon one is studying. (shrink)

Given the portion of his life spent at military schools, it is striking that Ender and his peers apparently never study military ethics. The ethical lessons Ender and his peers might have learned are so obviously relevant to operations against the buggers that you cannot help but ask how the I.F.'s leadership could have failed to teach military ethics at all. This chapter presents some highlights of Western thinking on the ethics of war and analyzes Ender's education and actions in (...) light of those moral traditions. Ender's Game teaches powerful lessons for students of just war theory and the just war tradition because it asks questions that matter to everyone, from national decision‐makers all the way down to individual soldiers. Genocide and xenocide are extreme in their quantity of killing, but not necessarily in their moral magnitude. (shrink)

Strategic interactions have been studied extensively in the area of judgment and decision-making. However, so far no specific measure of a decision-maker's ability to be successful in strategic interactions has been proposed and tested. Our contribution is the development of a measure of strategic ability that borrows from both game theory and psychology. Such measure is aimed at providing an estimation of the likelihood of success in many social activities that involve strategic interaction among multiple decision-makers. To construct (...) a reliable measure of strategic ability, that we propose to call ``Strategic Quotient'' (SQ), we designed a test where each item is a game and where, therefore, the individual score obtained depends on the distribution of choices of other decision-makers taking the test. The test is designed to provide information on the abilities related to two dimensions, mentalization and rationality, that we argue are crucial to strategic success, with each dimension being characterized by two main factors. Principal component analysis on preliminary data shows that indeed four factors (two for rationality, two for mentalization) account for strategic success in most of the strategically simpler games of the test. Moreover, two more strategically sophisticated games are inserted in the test and are used to investigate if and to what extent the four factors obtained by simpler games can predict strategic success in more sophisticated strategic interactions. Overall, the collected empirical evidence points to the possibility of building a SQ measure using only simple games designed to capture information about the four identified factors. (shrink)

Policy-makers use different decision-making strategies and base their decisions – more or less explicitly – on both expert knowledge and opinions in order to cope with the sheer complexity of societal challenges and the political environment. Most politicians rely to some extent on personal ideology in the implementation of public policies. Potential decision biases such as ‘repair service behavior’ – the human tendency to try fixing what appears to be most problematic at first – also influence decision-making. While ideology plays (...) a prominent role in politics, we know too little about its effect on political decision-making. Some researchers would argue that the use of ideology and repair service behavior facilitate the decision process, while others suggest that it adversely affects the ability to make objective decisions. Using a political microworld simulation that reproduces complex real-world problems, we investigate the effects of repair service behavior and personal ideology on performance in a dynamic decision-making task. Although repair service behavior was not associated with performance, the results suggest that personal ideology significantly impaired goal attainment. Despite clear instructions to be as objective as possible and think critically in completing the task, ideology was powerful enough to disrupt objective policy-making, as indicated by the deviation from optimal scores and the overall microworld task goal, i.e., to win votes and be re-elected by the end of the game. (shrink)

Despite a strong sensitization to the corruption problem and a large body of interdisciplinary research, scientists have only rarely investigated which motivational, volitional, emotional, and cognitive components make decision makers in companies act corruptly. Thus, we examined how their interrelation leads to corruption by proposing an action model. We tested the model using a business simulation game with students as participants. Results of the PLS structural equation modeling showed that both an attitude and subjective norm favoring corruption led to (...) a desire to act corruptly. Given high perceived behavioral control, this desire was transformed into an intention that finally resulted in corrupt action. Components related to general private and professional goals did not allow for any prediction. Based on these results, we discuss preventative measures and methods for combating intra- and inter-organizational corruption. (shrink)

Understanding the spread of national public policies to increase the percentage of women on boards is often presented using different types of institutional theory logic. However, the importance of the political games influencing these decisions has not received the same attention. In this article, we look beyond the institutional setting by focusing on the role of actors. We explore processes that include who the critical actors that drive and determine these policies are, and what motivates them to push for change. (...) We employ a processual design approach using a longitudinal country-comparative case study exploring the case of Norway, England, Germany and Italy. We map the political games, both inside and outside legislative areas, including the micro-politics among various actors and groups of actors in the selected countries. Data are collected through participation observations, interviews and text analyses. The study contributes by filling important gaps in the literature by embedding the discussion about women on boards in politicking and national public policies and by introducing dynamic perspectives. Finally, by using a processual design approach, we capture the reality of the women on board debates at different points of time and in different actor and motivational contexts. The study has consequences for how policy-makers and businesses may follow up and act, based on the debates. (shrink)

By the early 2020s, emotional artificial intelligence will become increasingly present in everyday objects and practices such as assistants, cars, games, mobile phones, wearables, toys, marketing, insurance, policing, education and border controls. There is also keen interest in using these technologies to regulate and optimize the emotional experiences of spaces, such as workplaces, hospitals, prisons, classrooms, travel infrastructures, restaurants, retail and chain stores. Developers frequently claim that their applications do not identify people. Taking the claim at face value, this paper (...) asks, what are the privacy implications of emotional AI practices that do not identify individuals? To investigate privacy perspectives on soft non-identifying emotional AI, the paper draws upon the following: over 100 interviews with the emotion detection industry, legal community, policy-makers, regulators and NGOs interested in privacy; a workshop with stakeholders to design ethical codes for using data about emotions; a UK survey of 2068 citizens on feelings about emotion capture technologies. It finds a weak consensus among social stakeholders on the need for privacy, this driven by different interests and motivations. Given this weak consensus, it concludes that there exists a limited window of opportunity to societally agree principles of practice regarding privacy and the use of data about emotions. (shrink)

Despite the power of VR in immersing viewers in an experience, it generally only targets viewers via visual and auditory cues. Human beings use more senses to gather information, so expectedly, the full potential of this medium is currently not yet tapped. This study contributes in answering two research questions: How can conventional VR ads be enriched by also addressing the forgotten sense of smell?; and Does doing so indeed instill more engaging experiences? A 2 × 3 between-subjects study is (...) conducted, whereby an existing branded VR commercial is augmented with “sound” and “scents.” The power of these sensory augmentations is evaluated by inspecting emotional, cognitive and conative dimensions of customer engagement. The results identify product-scent congruence as a deal-maker, albeit product-scent incongruence is not necessarily a deal-breaker. The article concludes with further research avenues and a translation into managerial implications. (shrink)

Philosophical semantics requires an ontology that includes negative as well as positive states of affairs as truth-makers and truth-breakers. Theories that try to do without negative states of affairs while interpreting propositional truth as positive correspondence with existent states of affairs are inherently inadequate and incomplete. A semantics and ontology of negative states of affairs can also do justice to positive states of affairs, since the iterated negative state of affairs that a negative state of affairs exists describes a positive (...) state of affairs, but the iterated positive state of affairs that a positive state of affairs exists never describes a negative state of affairs. Negative states of affairs are not only essential to semantics, but to a complete description of the world; they include phenomena of presence in absence and the metaphysics of gaps, lacks, holes and interstitia. The conceivability of an empty or null universe as consisting of nothing but negative states of affairs recalls a famous problem of Parmenides. (shrink)

As professional football stadiums continue to grow in popularity worldwide, fans are able to watch the game in closer proximity, but the design of professional football stadiums to shorten the distance between fans and the playing field also exacerbates the impact of the home advantage on the referee’s decision to call a penalty. Studies have confirmed the existence of the home advantage and found that experienced referees can reduce the impact of this interference, but the neural mechanisms behind this (...) phenomenon have not been adequately investigated. In this study, we designed a soccer referee decision making task based on a home field effect scenario in a real soccer game, and used event-related potentials to compare the decision making and EEG differences between individuals with different experience levels when faced with foul actions under spectator noise interference. The experiments showed that individuals with different experience levels triggered a significant ERN EEG component when performing the penalty decision task under the home field effect factor, suggesting that the interference of the home field effect may lead referees to correct their previous decision-making behavior patterns in the penalty decision and reduce unfavorable calls against the home team. In contrast, referees with officiating experience elicited smaller ERN amplitudes compared to other subjects, suggesting that experience factors may inhibit this tendency to change behavioral patterns. This study suggests that in response to the increasing trend of professional football stadiums, policy makers should place more emphasis on enhancing the experience level of referees in the training of referees to ensure the fairness of the game. (shrink)

Contemporary art is brimming with images of a future shaped by environmental destruction, technological innovation, and new forms of sociality. This article looks beyond the content of such images in order to examine the infrastructures that underpin them. Paying attention to two key infrastructures in particular—the Cold War faith in prediction and the extraordinary explosion of scenario planning in the years that followed—the article explores the ways in which speculation was transformed into a tightly defined field of expertise straddling military, (...) policy, and corporate worlds. No longer the preserve of prophets or mystics, the speculative infrastructures incubated within organizations such as the RAND corporation were underwritten by cybernetics, game theory, and systems analysis, all of which helped give prediction a veneer of scientific credibility. And yet, as the planning tools of the postwar era lost their predictive edge, new techniques came to exert influence in a world dominated by the uncertainties of looming environmental catastrophe. The future was no longer thought to emerge from the present in a linear fashion but unfold along a series of branch points that allowed decision makers to navigate through a landscape of uncertainty. Tracing the genealogy of forms of prediction and scenario planning from the mid-twentieth century to the present day, this article places futurological tools in the context of an expanded field of speculative practices that include works of art. Projects by the likes of Stephen Willats, Experiments in Art and Technology, the Harrisons, and others not only generate alternative images of the future but also rework the infrastructures by which such images are conceptualized and produced. (shrink)

Are humans fair by nature? Why do we often willingly trust strangers or cooperate with them even if those actions leave us vulnerable to exploitation? Does this natural inclination towards fairness or trust have implications in the market-place? Traditional economic theory would perhaps think not, perceiving human interaction as self-interested at heart. There is increasing evidence however that social norms and norm-driven behaviour such as a preference for fairness, generosity or trust have serious implications for economics. This book provides an (...) easily accessible overview of economic experiments, specifically those that explore the role of fairness, generosity, trust and reciprocity in economic transactions. Ananish Chaudhuri approaches a variety of economic issues and problems including: Pricing by firms Writing labour contracts between parties Marking voluntary contributions to charity, Addressing issues of environmental pollution, Providing micro-credit to small entrepreneurs, Resolving problems of coordination failure in organizations. The book discusses how norm-driven behaviour can often lead to significantly different outcomes than those predicted by economic theories and these findings should in turn cause us to re-think how we approach economic analysis and policy. Assuming no prior knowledge of economics and containing a variety of examples, this reader friendly volume will be perfect reading for people from a wide range of backgrounds including students and policy-makers. The book should appeal to economics undergraduates studying experimental economics, microeconomics or game theory as well as students in social psychology, organizational behaviour, management and other business related disciplines. (shrink)

For too long, a majority of economic stories speak of perfectly informed, fully rational optimisation within a purely materialistic world – leaving a lack of evidence and explanation regarding human decision makers and entrepreneurs revolutionising the decision space. Strands like game theory and institutional economics have already adopted a more practical view. Evolutionary and behavioural economics were finally able to establish the necessary links to other disciplines – like psychology and informational science. This paper recaps selected parts of the (...) literature that favour a conceptional view of computational agents. Firstly, we invite economic modellers to question the microfoundation of their assumptions with regard to the individual or to an aggregate level of human behaviour that they truly refer to. Secondly, we illustrate the potential, as well as the limitations, that computational agents exhibit – with regard to the incorporation of creativity as the main source of innovative behaviour. Thirdly, this rather superficial collection of ideas serves as a position paper for future approaches. (shrink)

A new approach to policy analysis is formulated within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. A policy is defined as a plan of action for a decision maker (DM) that specifies the DM’s intended action starting at every possible state in a graph model of a conflict. Given a profile of policies, a Policy Stable State (PSS) is a state that no DM moves away from (according to its policy), and such that no DM would prefer (...) to change its policy given the policies of the other DMs. The profile of policies associated to a PSS is called a Policy Equilibrium. Properties of PSSs are developed, and a refinement is suggested that restricts DMs to policies that are credible in that they are in the DM’s immediate interest. Relationships with existing stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution are then explored. (shrink)

Models of ethnic violence have primarily been descriptive in nature, advancing broad or particular social and political reasons as explanations, and neglecting the contributions of individuals as decision-makers. Game theoretic and rational choice models recognize the role of individual decision-making in ethnic violence. However, such models embrace a classical economic theory view of unbounded rationality as utility-maximization, with its exacting assumption of full informational access, rather than a model of bounded rationality, modeling individuals as satisficing agents endowed with evolved (...) domain-specific competences. A newer theoretical framework hypothesizing the existence of a human coalitional psychology, an evolved domain of competence, allows us to make sense of core features of memorial narratives about ethnic violence. Qualitative data from the interviews of fifty-seven participants who were impacted by the Croatian Homeland War support expectations entailed by a coalitional psychology model of ethnic strife. (shrink)

In the probability literature, a martingale is often referred to as a “fair game.” A martingale investment is a stochastic sequence of wealth levels, whose expected value at any future stage is equal to the investor’s current wealth. In decision theory, a risk neutral investor would therefore be indifferent between holding on to a martingale investment, and receiving its payoff at any future stage, or giving it up and maintaining his current wealth. But a risk-averse decision maker would (...) not be indifferent between a martingale investment and his current wealth level, since he values uncertain deals less than their mean. A risk seeking decision maker, on the other hand, would readily accept a martingale investment in exchange for his current wealth, and would repeat this investment any number of times. These ideas lead us to introduce the notion of a “risk-adjusted martingale”; a stochastic sequence of wealth levels that a rational decision maker with any attitude toward risk would value constantly with time, and would be indifferent between receiving its pay-off at any future stage, or giving it up and maintaining his current wealth level. We show how to construct such risk-adjusted investments for any decision maker with a continuous monotonic utility function. The fundamental result we derive is that a pay-off structure of an investment (i) is a risk-adjusted martingale and (ii) can be represented by a lattice if and only if the pay-off functions are invariant transformations of the given utility function. (shrink)

This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called `Simultaneous (...) Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons. (shrink)

There is a tendency in decision‐making research to treat uncertainty only as a problem to be overcome. But it is also a feature that can be leveraged, particularly in social interaction. Comparing the behavior of profitable and unprofitable poker players, we reveal a strategic use of information processing that keeps decision makers unpredictable. To win at poker, a player must exploit public signals from others. But using public inputs makes it easier for an observer to reconstruct that player's strategy and (...) predict his or her behavior. How should players trade off between exploiting profitable opportunities and remaining unexploitable themselves? Using a recent multivariate approach to information theoretic data analysis and 1.75 million hands of online two‐player No‐Limit Texas Hold'em, we find that the important difference between winning and losing players is not in the amount of information they process, but how they process it. In particular, winning players are better at integrative information processing—creating new information from the interaction between their cards and their opponents’ signals. We argue that integrative information processing does not just produce better decisions, it makes decision‐making harder for others to reverse engineer, as an expert poker player's cards act like the private key in public‐key cryptography. Poker players encrypt their reasoning with the way they process information. The encryption function of integrative information processing makes it possible for players to exploit others while remaining unexploitable. By recognizing the act of information processing as a strategic behavior in its own right, we offer a detailed account of how experts use endemic uncertainty to conceal their intentions in high‐stakes competitive environments, and we highlight new opportunities between cognitive science, information theory, and game theory. (shrink)

Rules are a central component of such diverse enterprises as law, morality, language, games, religion, etiquette, and family governance, but there is often confusion about what a rule is, and what rules do. Offering a comprehensive philosophical analysis of these questions, this book challenges much of the existing legal, jurisprudential, and philosophical literature, by seeing a significant role for rules, an equally significant role for their stricter operation, and making the case for rules as devices for the allocation of power (...) among decision-makers. (shrink)

How can audiences interact creatively, wisely and peaceably with the many different forms of violence found throughout today's media? Suicide attacks, graphic executions and the horrors of war appear in news reports, films, web-sites, and even on mobile phones. One approach towards media violence is to attempt to protect viewers; another is to criticize journalists, editors, film-makers and their stories. In this book Jolyon Mitchell highlights Christianity's ambiguous relationship with media violence. He goes beyond debates about the effects of watching (...) mediated violence to examine how audiences, producers and critics interact with news images, films, video-games and advertising. He argues that practices such as hospitality, friendship, witness and worship can provide the context where both spectacular and hidden violence can be remembered and reframed. This can help audiences to imagine how their own identities and communities can be based not upon violence, but upon a more lasting foundation of peace. (shrink)