Are countries especially entitled, if not obliged, to prioritize the interests or well-being of their own citizens during a global crisis, such as a global pandemic? We call this partiality for compatriots in times of crisis “crisis nationalism”. Vaccine nationalism is one vivid example of crisis nationalism during the COVID-19 pandemic; so is the case of the US government’s purchasing a 3-month supply of the global stock of the antiviral Remdesivir for domestic use. Is crisis nationalism (...) justifiable at all, and, if it is, what are its limits? We examine some plausible arguments for national partiality, and conclude that these arguments support crisis nationalism only within strict limits. The different arguments for partiality, as we will note, arrive at these limits for different reasons. But more generally, so we argue, any defensible crisis nationalism must not entail the violation of human rights or the worsening of people’s deprivation. Moreover, we propose that good faith crisis nationalism ought to be sensitive to the potential moral costs of national partiality during a global crisis and must take extra care to control or offset these costs. Thus, crisis nationalism in the form of vaccine nationalism or the hoarding of global supplies of therapeutics during a global pandemic exceeds the bounds of acceptable partiality. (shrink)

Kristeva points to Montesquieu's esprit général--his notion of the social body as a guaranteed hierarchy of private rights--in this humanistic plea for tolerance and commonality.

Is the project of liberal democracy dissociable from nationality? In this paper I outline and defend the main components of a recent and emerging answer to this question, which I term the "national pluralism" approach. I distinguish national pluralism from both national neutrality and liberal nationalism. In contrast to national neutrality, national pluralism holds that there is an important link between liberal democracy and nationality. In contrast to liberal nationalism, it pleads for pluralistic ways of accommodating (...) multiple national identities within the same political community. Moreover, national pluralism accords no special standing to existing nations. If new national identities emerge, such as an overarching national identity in multinational states or a European national identity, then these should be accordingly recognized. In addition, it can be argued from within this approach that there are also non-identity reasons for pursuing nation-building practices at supranational levels. (shrink)

This article is about the contestation of two different forms of nationalism in Singapore during and after two elections in 2011. Manufactured nationalism is top-down, state-defined and economically driven, concerned mainly about accumulation of national wealth through globalization that would eventually to the masses. This view is promoted by the ruling People's Action Party. The PAP projects Singapore as a state born out of the party's triumph over colonialism, racial violence, and communist insurgency. Popular nationalism, on the (...) other hand, is bottom-up and people driven, concerned about local issues concerning national identity, social cohesion, and an appreciation of local heritage. Proponents of popular nationalism emphasize a common beginning, shared historical memories, several elements of a common culture, and an association with a specific. They view Singapore as a nation-state with a unique and evolving identity destabilized by a liberal immigration policy. The elections generated considerable attention due to the gains by the opposition parties and the public airing of frustrations against the PAP government. These frustrations are strongly driven by the influx of new migrants, especially those classified as by the PAP government. In this article, I argue that popular nationalism has emerged in twenty-first century Singapore and examine the debates over the future of Singapore during and after the elections. (shrink)

Using a multimodal discursive approach, this study explores how the COVID-19 pandemic is constructed and used in press reportage to mobilize intergroup relations and national identities. We examine how press reporting about the development of COVID-19 in Sweden is cast as a matter of nationalism and national stereotyping in the Finnish press. The data consist of 183 images with accompanying headlines and captions published in two Finnish national newspapers between January 1 and August 31, 2020. We found three multimodal (...) rhetorical strategies of stereotyping: moralizing, demonizing, and nationalizing. These strategies construct discourses of arrogant, immoral, and dangerous Swedes sourcing from national stereotypes. The study contributes to current knowledge about the work on national stereotypes by illustrating how they are used in media discourse to achieve certain rhetorical ends, such as to persuade, mitigate, or justify intergroup relations. Furthermore, the study offers insight into the multimodal constructions and functions of stereotypes. (shrink)

Cinema is not only a space in which directors act with the aim of making art, but they also reflect their own testimonies and political perspectives; this study, which claims to be related to representation strategies that contain various interests and desires; It is of the opinion that different ideological approaches are reflected on the screen by political and cultural elites in line with the construction, legitimacy and movement of identities and images. In this study, which examines the Türkiye’nin Kalbi (...) Ankara movie, which was shot in the intense socio-political atmosphere of the 1930s and was shot to tell Turkey's nationalization process and modernization experience through the capital Ankara; the manifestation of the Turkish nation-building process in cinema is discussed through the relationship between nationalism and cinema. (shrink)

Kristeva points to Montesquieu's esprit général -- his notion of the social body as a guaranteed hierarchy of private rights -- in this humanistic plea for tolerance and commonality.

Canadians have relatively few binding national myths, but one of the most pervasive and enduring is the conviction that the country is doomed. In 1965 George Grant passionately defended Canadian identity by asking fundamental questions about the meaning and future of Canada’s political existence. In Lament for a Nation he argued that Canada – immense and underpopulated, defined in part by the border, history, and culture it shares with the United States, and torn by conflicting loyalties to Britain, Quebec, and (...) America – had ceased to exist as a sovereign state. Lament for a Nation became the seminal work in Canadian political thought and Grant became known as the father of Canadian nationalism. This edition includes a major introduction by Andrew Potter that explores Grant’s arguments in the context of changes in ethnic diversity, free trade, globalization, post-modernism, and 9/11. Potter discusses the shifting uses of the terms “liberal” and “conservative” and closes with a look at the current state of Canadian nationalism. (shrink)

ExcerptIn the spring of 2021, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, received a non-paper titled “West Balkans—A Way Forward.” The scandalous paper envisaged a redrawing of several national borders in the West Balkans. Among other changes, it proposed “the unification of Kosovo and Albania” and the “joining of larger parts of the Republika Srpska’s territory with Serbia.”1 However, this scandalous proposition, which the EU preferred to meet with silence, was not limited to a redrawing of the borders. What (...) was also scandalous was the ratio of the proposed territorial changes. The redrawing was proposed along the lines of ethnic majorities populating the regions in question (Albanians in Kosovo or Serbs in the Republika Srpska). While the state borders were drawn following a logic of ethnicity, the idea of a multiethnic nation seemed to exceed the imagination of the paper’s authors. For them, nations were to be ethnically homogeneous. (shrink)

Attila M. Demeter, Republikanizmus, nacionalizmus, nemzeti kisebbségek (Republicanism, nationalism, national minorities) Pro Philosophia, Cluj, 2005.

How to reconcile a European identity that is still quite indefinite with the national identities that have been engines of development, but failed to resolve the issue of ensuring peace and eliminating war as a way of settling differences? Solving the problem of European identity vs. national state identity is the cornerstone for the development of new European institutional architecture. The more the future vision of Europe promotes a deeper integration of the current European nation states, the greater is the (...) fear of the latter to the “danger” of losing its identity. What is, in fact, this identity and would be its disappearance a great disaster? How can be lost the national identity and how it could be replaced by a European identity? Here are just some troubling questions that Europeans today consciences. (shrink)

The concern of this paper is to critique the political conception of nationalism as a theory of the nation-state. The basic point of the critique is that when the interests of the nation and the principles of the state coincide there emerges a fierce sense of national identity which endangers moral indifference to outsiders, the people within and outside the national boundary, without remorse. Here the attempt to uphold national identity is something more than nationhood. Besides involving territorial identity, (...) common language, custom and culture essential to the idea of a “nation,” it also upholds the consciousness of these as determining separate rights and allegiances, the idea of attachment to a nation and its interests. Such a consciousness can emerge only on the adoption of certain populist ideas such as racism, ethnicity and even such popular elusive myths as the “greatness” of a nation, the urge for the maintenance of “national character,” etc. Such “nationalist xenophobia” leads to the intensification of the distinction between the “own” and the “other,” “national” and the “alien,” the “citizen” and the “migrant” leading to “ethnic disharmony,” “colour bias,” hatred and suspicion of persons with whom one has lived closely as neighbours for decades. The most popular is the economic discourse of the “migrants” putting the “nationals” out of work. All this has its toll on multi-culturalism and humanitarian concerns. Many affluent nations have become cold to human misery, suffering and deaths from wars, terrorism, acute poverty, political persecution, environmental degradation, etc. This has created an “existential” crisis for millions of people on earth. (shrink)

Accounts that attribute nationalism to capitalism or industrialization face the problem of nationalism in late?stage capitalist, or as some might say, post?industrial, societies. While increasing social significance has been attributed to economic growth throughout human history, reasons for this are far from self?evident. By looking at arguments made by Marx, List, and Smith, a new understanding of the relationship between nationalism and economics emerges?one that explains the attribution of social importance to economic development by revealing it as (...) a function of nationalism. (shrink)

The 1911 eruption of Taal Volcano in the Philippine province of Batangas took an estimated 1,700–2,000 lives and rocked the foundations of the American colonial state in the archipelago. Since 1898, Americans colonized the Philippine future by shifting the benchmarks for a promised but perpetually delayed independence. Central to this strategy was the contention that colonial Bureaus of Agriculture, Forestry, Lands, and Science would attract investment in tropical commodities on the promise of great future returns by managing territory and discipling (...) so-called tribal peoples into a modern labor force. Forecasting was built into the logic and projects of colonial capitalism. Anticolonial critics, in turn, argued that the American failure to react to seismographic readings—to forecast for disaster—exposed the weakness of American claims to the future while the immediate sale of photographs of the dead and tours of the “volcano zone” hindered the relief. Ensuing contests over settlement on volcanoes, the purpose of monitoring, and the visual importance of Taal shows the centrality of volcanoes to colonial science and technocratic nationalism, and of volcanology to the development of humanitarian science and governance. (shrink)

This essay attempts at elucidating the relationships between cosmopolitanism and nationalism and between State and Nation in Fichte’s thought on the basis of the new evidence provided by the critical edition of his works. The analysis of the Reden an die deutsche Nation highlights the ambiguity of the concept of Nation, strictly connected to the thesis of the primacy of Germans. This position is discussed in the light of the reflections devoted to this matter by Fichte in his last (...) months of life, as recorded in his diary. (shrink)

Seeing language as a social practice and national identities as a product of discourse, the study intends to analyze discursive practices employed on social media to create the discourses of sameness and difference in times of national crisis. Following the discourse historical approach, I have illustrated how argumentative strategies and topos have been strategically employed to draw boundaries between Us and Them. In this exploration of exclusionary rhetoric, I have also underlined the use of images, memes and hashtags in the (...) meaning-making process. The study illustrates not only the ways in which the discourse of national identities are constructed, but also how the existing pillars of Pakistani national identities have been transformed and dismantled on social media following a national tragedy. By investigating the digital practices and discourses, this study seeks to understand the construction of Pakistani national identities from bottom-up discourses. (shrink)

There is an increasing turn to nationalism around the world. The advocacy of “America First” policies, the Brexit leave campaign in Britain, and recent elections in Poland and Hungary show evidence of a rise in nationalistic sentiments. One reason given to explain this rise in nationalism is that in an increasingly diverse world stability is not possible without close cultural links between members of society, and that a shared national culture can provide those links. Nationalists argue that a (...) shared national culture is a necessary condition of creating social solidarity that creates social stability. However, the nationalist solution to creating social solidarity can be questioned on a number of counts. First, it relies on a conceptually problematic account of national identity that holds that national identity includes elements like a shared culture, a shared history, and a shared connection to a particular geographic territory. There are reasons to think that this type of account of national identity is closer to an account of ethnicity than an account of national identity. An ethnic nationalism is morally problematic as it contends that one can only have solidarity with those who share one’s ethnicity, and could be used to justify discrimination against ethnic minorities. Second, even if this is the correct account of national identity, it is not the case that a shared culture, a shared history, and a shared connection to a particular geographic territory are necessary or sufficient conditions for social solidarity. Finally, nationalist attempts to protect the national identity of a liberal democracy by restricting all immigration, may actually destroy the values, such as individual rights and limited government of that liberal democracy. (shrink)

Nationalism is a set of beliefs about the nation: its origins, nature, and value. For nationalists, we are particular social animals. On the one hand, our lives are structured by a profound sense of togetherness and similarity: We share languages and memories. On the other hand, our lives are characterized by deep divisions and differences: We draw borders and contest historical narratives. For nationalism, humanity is neither a single species-wide community nor an aggregation of individuals but divided into (...) distinct and unique nations. At the heart of nationalism are claims about our identity and needs as social animals that form the basis of a series of normative claims. To answer the question “what should I do” or “how should I live,” one must first answer the questions “who am I” and “where do I belong.” Nationalism says that our membership in a nation takes precedence and ultimately must guide our choices and actions. In terms of guiding choice and action, nationalist thought proposes a specific form of partiality. Rather than treat the interests or claims of persons and groups impartially, the nationalist demands that one favors one’s own, either as a group or as individual persons. While nationalism does not claim to be the only form of partiality, it does claim to outrank all others: Loyalty or obligations to other groups or identities are subordinated to national loyalty. Together, these claims function as a political ideology. Nationalism identifies the nation as the central form of community and elevates it to the object of supreme loyalty. This fundamental concern for the nation and its flourishing can be fragmented into narrower aims or objectives: national autonomy, national identity, and national unity. Debate on nationalism tends to divide into two clusters, one descriptive and one normative, that only make partial contact. For historians and sociologists, the questions are explanatory: What is nationalism, what is a nation, how are they related, and when and how did they emerge? Philosophers and political theorists focus on the justification of nationalism or nationalist claims: Is national loyalty defensible, what are the limits of this loyalty, how do we rank our loyalties, and does nationalism conflict with human rights? (shrink)

"This is a most timely, intelligent, well-written, and absorbing essay on a central and painful social and political problem of out time."--Sir Isaiah Berlin"The major achievement of this remarkable book is a critical theory of nationalism, worked through historical and contemporary examples, explaining the value of national commitments and defining their moral limits. Tamir explores a set of problems that philosophers have been notably reluctant to take on, and leaves us all in her debt."--Michael WalzerIn this provocative work, Yael (...) Tamir urges liberals not to surrender the concept of nationalism to conservative, chauvinist, or racist ideologies. In her view, liberalism, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice, and nationalism, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity are not irreconcilable. Here she offers a new theory, "liberal nationalism," which allows each set of values to accommodate the other. Tamir sees nationalism as an affirmation of communal and cultural memberships and as a quest for recognition and self-respect. Persuasively she argues that national groups can enjoy these benefits through political arrangements other than the nation-state. While acknowledging that nationalism places members of national minorities at a disadvantage, the author offers guidelines for alleviating the problems involved using examples from currents conflicts in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe.Liberal Nationalismis an impressive attempt to tie together a wide range of issues often kept apart: personal autonomy, cultural membership, political obligations, particularity versus impartiality in moral duties, and global justice. Drawing on material from disparate fields--including political philosophy, ethics, law, and sociology--Tamir brings out important and previously unnoticed interconnections between them, offering a new perspective on the influence of nationalism on modern political philosophy. (shrink)

This article seeks to further our understanding of what methodological nationalism is and to offer some insights towards its overcoming. The critical side of its argument explicates the paradoxical constitution of the current debate on methodological nationalism – namely, the fact that methodological nationalism is simultaneously regarded as wholly negative and all-pervasive in contemporary social science. I substantiate the idea of this paradox by revisiting some of the most successful attempts at the conceptualization of the nation-state that (...) have sought to transcend methodological nationalism in four disciplines: sociology, nationalism studies, anthropology and social psychology. The positive side of my argument offers a distinction between different versions of methodological nationalism with the help of which it tries to address some of the problems found in the literature. Theoretically, methodological nationalism is associated with, and criticized for, its explanatory reductionism in which the rise and main features of the nation-state are used to explicate the rise and main features of modernity itself. Historically, the article reassesses the problem of its prevalence, that is, whether methodological nationalism is a key feature of the history of the social sciences. (shrink)

Starting from a recent ideological and political controversy regarding the devaluation of the concept of “nationalism” in relation to that of ‘patriotism”, the author – following his own years-long investigations on the subject – historically and philosophically reframes each of these concepts from the perspective of rhetoric and argumentation. It is shown, in this context, that the arguments in question are fallacious (and even, in some applications, clearly perverse) and a radical and provocative reformulation of the aforementioned concepts and (...) the controversy involved is proposed – a reformulation which, eventually and at best, may give rise to a new historiography on the subject. (shrink)

The moral issues about nationalism arise from the character of nationalism as a form of partiality. Nationalists care more about their own nation and its members than about other nations and their members; in that way nationalists are partial to their own national group. The question, then, is whether this national partiality is morally justified or, on the contrary, whether everyone ought to care impartially about all members of all nations. As Jeff McMahan emphasizes in [another chapter of (...) the book in which this essay appears], a philosophical examination of this question must consider the specific features of nationalism as one form of partiality among others. Some partiality--for example, toward one's spouse and children--seems morally acceptable and even a duty. According to commonsense moral thinking, one not only may but also should care more about one's family members than about strangers. But other instances of partiality, most notably racial partiality, are in most circumstances widely condemned. Is national partiality more like familial partiality or more like racial partiality? To answer this question, we must know what in general justifies attitudes of partiality. Caring more about certain people is appropriate when one stands in certain special relations to those people. But what are these relations, and to what degree do they hold among members of the same nation? Assuming they are present within families and not within races, to what degree are they present within nations? (shrink)

This book examines the political and moral challenges that face the vast majority of human beings who consider themselves to be members of a nation. It explores nationality through the difficulties and conflicts that have arisen throughout history, and discusses nations and nationalism from social, philosophical, and anthropological perspectives. In this fascinating Very Short Introduction, Steven Grosby looks at the nation in history, the territorial element in nationality, and the complex ways nationality has co-existed with religion, (...) and shows the close link between being human and the concept of nationalism. (shrink)

Human groups, such as families, tribes, and nations, are often perceived as possessing mental qualities and characteristics more or less common to the group as a whole. This ancient tendency to attribute properties of personality or individuality to human aggregates is particularly strong nowadays with regard to nations, the basic units of political action in this age of nationalism and internationalism.In the recent UNESCO study by W. Buchanan and H. Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (1953), based on an (...) eight-nation sample, few findings are more revealing than the low frequency of respondents who declare themselves unable to characterize their own nation. All but a very small proportion gave their views freely when asked to describe the character of their countrymen. When this same question was asked with regard to a series of other nationalities, the “Don't know” responses (“impossible to characterize”) were in some cases much more frequent—up to 71 per cent as in the case of the German sample in regard to the Chinese; in others again very low—down to 3 per cent as in the western European responses regarding the United States. These variations are assumed to reflect differences in the degree of familiarity of nations with each other, depending on their mutual relationships over time, their physical proximity or distance, and so on. (shrink)

Most Third World feminists consider nationalism as detrimental to feminism. Against this general trend, I argue that “polycentric” nationalism has potentials for advocating feminist causes in the Third World. “Polycentric” nationalism, whose proper goal is the attainment and maintenance of national self-determination, is still relevant in this neocolonial age of capitalist globalization and may serve feminist purposes of promoting the well-being of the majority of Third World women who suffer disproportionately under this system.

Nationalism is often dismissed today as an irrational political creed with disastrous consequences. Yet most people regard their national identity as a significant aspect of themselves, see themselves as having special obligations to their compatriots, and value their nation's political independence. This book defends these beliefs, and shows that nationality, defined in these terms, serves valuable goals, including social justice, democracy, and the protection of culture. National identities need not be illiberal, and they do not exclude other sources (...) of personal identity, such as ethnicity or religion. An ethics that gives weight to special relationships is more effective in motivating people to pursue justice and other values because it connects peoples’ duties to their identity; but this is consistent with recognizing some universal values, such as human rights. There are strong reasons for making the boundaries of states and nations coincide wherever possible, but in other cases, nations can achieve forms of self‐determination that fall short of full sovereignty. Multicultural arguments in favour of identity politics and special rights for minority groups ignore the benefits that such groups derive from participating in a shared national identity and the kind of democratic politics that such an identity makes possible. Although national identities are often said to be in decline in an increasingly globalized world, they serve such important purposes that our aim should be to rebuild them in a form that makes them more accessible to excluded cultural minorities. (shrink)

In this, the first truly philosophical study of nationalism, Paul Gilbert attempts to make sense of the fact that there are different sorts of nationalism—for example, political and cultural—and that each concept functions with a different understanding of what a nation is. He sets out to explore whether there are any common ideas about what constitutes nationhood and whether these “nations” have particular rights due to them. By treating nationalism as a coherent body of ideas, the text (...) permits a rational reconstruction of the origins of nationalist movements. The book also examines the work of many key theorists, including Mill, Hume, Gramsci, and Gellner, in its coverage of secession, immigration, cultural rights and multiculturalism, and the aesthetics of nationalism. (shrink)

While nationalism as a mental model that can be represented in text and talk, it has not been sufficiently examined in discourse studies. This study examines the discourse of nationalism in spoken texts of an elite cohort of Chinese speakers at the World Economic Forum. Through methodological integration of nationalism with the socio-cognitive approach anchored in critical discourse analysis, this study examines the structures of ‘national-We’ and ‘foreign-Others’ pervading discourse and linguistic levels with reference to China-specific origins (...) of nationalistic ideology. By scrutinising appraisals, referential nouns/pronouns and value-laden metaphors as linguistic realisations, this study reveals three nationalistic discourses: an economic-leadership discourse for Self, a deterrent/delegitimisation discourse regarding Others’ threatening actions/views, and a common-community Self discourse that aims to solidify more countries with China in a common community with shared interests and future. The study suggests there is value in integrating sociology-oriented conceptual/theoretical tools with the socio-cognitive approach in disclosing latent ideological configurations. (shrink)

Although nonliberal nationalism has played a prominent role in previously and currently colonized nations of the Third World, its assessment by liberal political theorists has been less than favorable. These theorists believe that nonliberal nationalisms are bound to be oppressive to marginalized members, since they view nonliberal cultures, which such movements aim to protect and maintain, to be essentialist and static monoliths that do not recognize the fundamental value of individual rights. In this article, I defend nonliberal nationalisms of (...) previously or currently colonized nations—what I call nonliberal polycentric nationalisms—by arguing that they can be morally justified, provided that they are democratic. This argument is supported by communitarian constructions of moral agency and culture, which show that nonliberal cultures hold emancipatory potential for the insiders who actively participate in the reconstruction of their national culture. (shrink)

This far-ranging and ambitious attempt to rethink postcolonial theory's discussion of the nation and nationalism brings the problems of the postcolonial condition to bear on the philosophy of freedom. Closely identified with totalitarianism and fundamentalism, the nation-state has a tainted history of coercion, ethnic violence, and even, as in ultranationalist Nazi Germany, genocide. Most contemporary theorists are therefore skeptical, if not altogether dismissive, of the idea of the nation and the related metaphor of the political body as an organism. (...) Going against orthodoxy, Pheng Cheah retraces the universal-rationalist foundations and progressive origins of political organicism in the work of Kant and its development in philosophers in the German tradition such as Fichte, Hegel, and Marx. Cheah argues that the widespread association of freedom with the self-generating dynamism of life and culture's power of transcendence is the most important legacy of this tradition. Addressing this legacy's manifestations in Fanon and Cabral's theories of anticolonial struggle and contemporary anticolonial literature, including the Buru Quartet by Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and the Kenyan writer Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's nationalist novels, Cheah suggests that the profound difficulties of achieving freedom in the postcolonial world indicate the need to reconceptualize freedom in terms of the figure of the specter rather than the living organism. (shrink)

Recent attempts to distinguish a normatively acceptable “civic nationalism"—as distinct from an irrationally tainted “ethnic nationalism"—have failed to take seriously the implications of the transition from the city as the immediate spatial unit of the patria to the more abstract national state that replaced it. The nation‐state has required a mythologizing naturalism to legitimate it, thus blurring the distinction between “civic” and “ethnic.” The urban political experience of the patria is lost to us; cosmopolitan intellectuals should resist the (...) comforting temptation to recover it in the nation, and should recognize civic nationalism for the oxymoron it is. (shrink)

This article describes the various forms of nationalism in political theory and the varieties of nationalism in practical politics. It discusses various elements of nationalism and suggests that the conception of nationalism depends on how national self-determination is understood. It argues that while nationalism serves to bind people to the place that they regard as their national homeland, it is liable for generating indifference or even hostility towards outsiders.

Since Eugen Weber’s (1976) classic work Peasants into Frenchmen, the role of mass education in nation-building has been repeatedly discussed in the literature on nationalism. However, the specific...

In this article, I investigate how gendered nationalism is articulated through everyday practices in relation to immigrant integration policy and the intersectional production of inequality in South Korea. By using ethnographic data collected at community centers created to implement national “multicultural” policy, I examine the individual perspectives and experiences of Korean staff and targeted recipients. To defend their own “native” privileges, the Korean staff stressed the gendered caretaking roles of marriage migrants and their contribution to the nation as justification (...) for state support. The migrants, while critical of the familial responsibilities imposed on them in Korea, underscored their gendered value to the nation to offset their subjugated position. The diverging perspectives of the two groups are informed by “everyday” nationalism, generated through constantly gendered terms and effects. Bringing together the literature on nationalism and migration through a focus on reproductive labor, I expose how national boundaries are drawn through quotidian practices of gendered nationalism, with significant implications for gender and ethnic hierarchies. (shrink)

One of the main difficulties facing students today is how to contextualize the post-1990 world. Bringing the Nation Back In: Citizenship, Space, and Culture in Europe and the United States takes as its starting point a series of developments that shaped politics in the U.S. and Europe over the past thirty years: the end of the Cold War, the rise of financial and economic globalization, the creation of the European Union and the development of the postnational. This volume argues we (...) are now witnessing a break with the post-1945 world order and with modern politics. Two competing ideas have arisen--global cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and populist nationalism on the other. The former emerged in the 1990s and is characterized by discourses on globalization, feminism, and postcolonialism, among others. The latter, which emerged after the Great Recession of 2008-2009, consists of a reactionary nationalism that in the years that followed swept to power in the US and several European countries. The present volume argues this polarization of social ethos between cosmopolitanism and nationalism as a sign of a deeper political crisis, which it explores from different perspectives. Rather than taking sides the aim here is to diagnose the origins of the current impasse and to "bring the nation back in" by expanding what we mean by "nation" and national identity and by respecting the localizing processes that have led to national traditions and struggles. (shrink)

Three kinds of nationalism are distinguished and explained: (1) Unifying nationalism, which created Italy, and is the more or less voluntary uniting of similar and usually contiguous territories. (2) Ethnic separatist nationalism, which created Ireland, and is the effort of an ethnic group to establish sovereignty in its historical territory. (3) Ongoing patriotic nationalism, which is found in every nation. Each comes in degrees of civility ranging from the democratic to the murderous.Five criticisms of nationalism (...) are then examined in the light of the three varieties of it: (1) It is a historical novelty only two hundred years old, hence less essential and enduring than often supposed (Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm). (2) Separatist nationalism is acceptable only if its underlying goal is to achieve democracy. (3) Nationalism makes the interests of the state supreme and those of the individualnegligible, racializes ethnic difference, and leads to intolerance and genocide (William Pfaff, Isaiah Berlin). (4) If we encourage separatists the world will fragment into “5,000 countries” (Warren Christopher). (5) Supporting existing borders is simply a better safeguard against war (Pfaff).Each of these criticisms is found wanting. I discuss the difference between loyalties, which are particularistic, and morality including constitutional principles, which are universal, a distinction important both to the critics and to my rebuttal of them. (shrink)

Abstract: To respond to globalization-related challenges, many contemporary political theorists have argued for forms of democracy beyond the level of the nation-state. Since the early 1990s, however, political theory has also witnessed a renewed normative defense of nationhood. Liberal nationalists have been influential in claiming that the state should protect and promote national identities, and that it is desirable that the boundaries of national and political units coincide. At first glance, both positions—global democracy and nationalism—seem to contradict each other. (...) We do not share this oppositional picture. Developing a more harmonic picture of nationalist ideals and cosmopolitan visions is the aim of this essay. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the examination of political discussion carried out in the journal „Prúdy“ in the decades preceding and following the World war I. The aim of the examination is to indicate the fundamental topic of the discussion. According to the author it was the problematic of conservatism, which had been discussed in the referential frame of the Slovak nationalism as a part of the cultural conflict, taking place between various groups of the national elite. The Slovak political (...) thinking remained for a long time marked by a cultural „schism“ between modernism and traditionalism. The discussion in the journal „Prúdy“ is therefore an important source for those, who are interested in the manners and conceptions of Slovak political modernism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sacrificial Nationalism In Henrik Ibsen's The Pretenders William Mishler University ofMinnesota Even during his lifetime, the ambiguity essential to Henrik Ibsen's dramatic method gave rise to considerable interpretive debate. In the near century since his death new approaches to his work have steadily continued to arise in accord with the changes in critical and literary theory. We have had, writes Charles Lyons in a recent survey, Ibsen "the (...) realist, the iconoclast, the successful or failed idealist, the poet, the psychologist, the romantic, the antiromantic" (4). The extraordinary "hermeneutic generativity" evinced by Ibsen's plays cannot be attributed, in my view, solely to their aesthetic excellence or to changes in critical fashion, but as much or even more to the fact that they touch in a prescient way on conundrums inherent in modern life that are both fundamental and particularly intractable. In The Pretenders, for example, Ibsen composed an artistic meditation on the nature of nationalism which, seen from today's vantage point, can be called prophetic. The question the work implicitly poses might be formulated as follows: Is it possible for modern people to create a nation-state on a basis other than the threat of reciprocal violence? In other words, can a modern state attain to a condition ofpeace that would amount to something other that the mere stasis of fear? And if the answers to this question is negative—the work clearly asks—what will prevent the modern nation-state, which lacks the safeguards and restraints formerly supplied by various institutions of transcendent authority, from falling into desperate conditions? These are questions that are easy, even unavoidable, to pose today when we witness with horror the fires ignited by nationalism around the world. In mid-nineteenth century, however, when Ibsen wrote The Pretenders, the situation was vastly different. Then was the high noon of nationalistic optimism in Europe and America and elsewhere, the euphoric cultural moment when in the wake of the French and American Revolutions small 128William Mishler elites in numerous countries were shifting their spiritual and philosophical allegiance from outmoded agencies of order (religious, humanistic, transnational ) to the ethnically ordered collective. The story of this shift is a familiar one, no doubt, but one whose lessons only now are becoming fully apparent. In mid-nineteenth century Norway, nationalist enthusiasm was the order of the day. Accorded its independence from Denmark in 1814, and with it the end to 400 years of subjugation, Norway had good grounds to be enthusiastically self-preoccupied. Its historians engrossed themselves in the fervent recital of the national past, its artists worked to create works that celebrated the Norwegian spirit and projected images of future national greatness. In short, as the literary histories designate it, this was Norway's period of National Romanticism, and it was in this atmosphere that Ibsen in 1850, age 21, began composing plays. For the first dozen years of his career all of his plays were written in the National Romantic mode. It is true that his first play, Catalina, takes its subject matter from Roman history, but it is a Roman history largely stripped of its specificity and adapted for purposes ofpsychological allegory. Ibsen's next four plays all use material drawn from Norway's history and folklore. The Pretenders, begun in 1858 and completed in 1864, was the last and by common consensus the greatest of these. The most Shakespearean of Ibsen's plays, its plot material was taken from Norwegian historian P. A. Munch's account of Norway's civil wars in the thirteenth century. Ibsen chose the climactic moment when several of the deceased King Sverre's heirs were laying claim to the throne, directing his attention to the two major contenders, Sverre's grandson Hâkon and his rival Duke Skule, his maternal uncle and former guardian. The play traces the course of their rivalry from its inception to the final confrontation in which Skule is killed and Norway is united under King Hâkon. From the early days of Ibsen criticism the biographical approach, later amplified by various thematic readings, has been the dominant one to The Pretenders. In this view Skule and Hâkon are seen as vehicles... (shrink)

A literary debate occurred during 1969 and 1970 as Soviet society stepped into the holistic transition to conservatism. In the debate process, liberals in the journal Novyi Mir interpreted Soviet patriotism based on cultural pluralism and censured Russian nationalists of the journal Molodaia Gvardiia for deviating from Lenin’s ideas on the nationality question and obscuring the demarcation between patriotism and Russian chauvinism. Conversely, nationalists in Molodaia Gvardiia emphasized their validity in reviving the Russian tradition to defend the national culture (...) from Western cultural penetration and responded that Western cosmopolitanism was the innate character behind the words of Novyi Mir. The contention gradually stirred up so much public attention that Soviet authorities decided to quiet down the contestation. Eventually, the editorial boards of Novyi Mir and Molodaia Gvardiia were reshuffled, although the Soviet authorities sheltered Molodaia Gvardiia to some degree. The result of the debate was affected by a combination of synthesized factors: the background of rising Russian nationalism, the ideological rhetoric of the debate, and the influences of the opinions of international media and officials toward either side. Whatever individual preferences the authorities had, the principles of the Era of Stagnation (Zastoi) were the guidelines in dealing with the debate. (shrink)

John O'Neill argues in a recent article, ‘Should Communitarians be Nationalists?’, that communitarians are wrong to be committed to the defence of ties of nationhood, both because the nation‐state's rise is associated with the disappearance of the ties of community and because the nation is an illusory community. I argue that the evidence that communitarianism is committed as charged to the defence of nationality is unconvincing. Further, the familiar accusation that the nation is a false or unreal community is (...) neither perspicuous nor obviously true. It is important to evaluate the significance and worth of the nation as a community independently of the nationalist prescription that the nation and the state should coincide. The important question is not whether the political community should be a nation, but what sort of community the nation should be. (shrink)

This book discusses the justifications and limits of cultural nationalism from a liberal perspective. Chaim Gans presents a normative typology of nationalist ideologies, distinguishing between cultural liberal nationalism and statist liberal nationalism. Statist nationalisms argue that states have an interest in the cultural homogeneity of their citizenries. Cultural nationalisms argue that people have interests in adhering to their cultures and in sustaining these cultures for generations. Gans argues that freedom- and identity-based justifications for cultural nationalism common (...) in literature can only support the adherence thesis, while the historical thesis could only be justified by the interest people have in the long-term endurance of their personal and group endeavors. The Limits of Nationalism examines demands often made in the name of cultural nationalism, such as claims for national self-determination, historical rights claims to territories and demands entailed by cultural particularism as opposed to cultural cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Must liberalism, in dealing with issues of basic rights and primary goods, take into account national belonging as a particularly important form of cultural belonging? The paper first discusses liberalism which is frequently defined as difference-blind and which considers citizens solely on the basis of some of their abstract and common features. The alternative position is liberal nationalism, according to which individuals and their primary goods stand at the center of considerations of justice, but which also finds it impossible (...) to ignore cultural belonging when discussing primary goods and basic rights of individuals. In discussing the strategy which affirms national cultural belonging as a precondition for autonomy, an attempt is made to show that this is not a sufficient basis for the role of a special national cultural belonging in the definition of primary goods, because even if a national cultural belonging is needed for practicing autonomy, specific national cultural belonging isn’t. (shrink)

Pitanje ovoga članka jest treba li nacionalnu pripadnost uvrstiti na popis primarnih dobara, odnosno, postoji li snažna veza između nacionalne pripadnosti i primarnih dobara o kojima se govori u klasičnoj liberalnoj formulaciji do mjere da njezina zaštita zaslužuje uvrštenje među njih. O ovom pitanju, na izravan ili manje izravan način, raspravljaju vodeći autori liberalne nacionalističke paradigme. U ovom tekstu posebno se raspravlja pretpostavljena veza između zaštite nacionalne pripadnosti i primarnog dobra društvenih osnova samopoštovanja. Unatoč određenoj potrebi javnog priznanja nacionalne pripadnosti, (...) utemeljenje njezine zaštite na razini primarnih dobara, barem kada je riječ o argumentu koji se poziva na društvene osnove samopoštovanja, nije uvjerljivo.The issue regarded in this article is whether we have to include national belonging in the list of primary goods, i.e., whether there is a strong connection between national belonging and primary goods about which the classical liberal theory speaks, such that the protection of national belonging must be included in the list of primary goods. Leading authors in the liberal nationalist paradigm, more or less directly, discuss about this issue. In this paper, the supposed connection between the protection of national belonging and the social bases of selfrespect is specifically discussed. Despite the reasons for some public protection of national belonging, its foundation at the level of primary goods, at least as far as it concerns the argument that relies on the social bases of selfrespect, is not plausible. (shrink)

No one will deny that the history of the last two centuries is incomprehensible without some insight into the meaning of nationalism. In the modern world, references to ‘nation’ and ‘national feelings’ are political forces of the first order that have played a much greater role than have references to other ideas that had raised expectations among political thinkers. Nevertheless, it is not a simple matter to define nation and nationalism; the terms have a weak analytical and explanatory (...) power. We lack a definition that would allow us to determine unequivocally and objectively whether or not we have to do with a nation. Many objective criteria for identification are proffered individually or in combination. None, however, has been consistently satisfactory.A first superficial examination shows that nationalism has a chameleon-like character. It is presented, and we experience it, as a liberating force freeing individuals and peoples from social and political serfdom. Linked to this liberal ‘Risorgimento-nationalism’, which coincided with the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, was the hope for a better future, for economic prosperity and for the reification of such universal values as human rights, equality, justice and the constitutional democratic rule of law. Yet nationalism has also appeared to include an imperialistic tendency towards domination, belligerent aggression and expansion, racism and exclusion, authoritarianism and rightist radicalism, a blind and infatuated cult of ones’ own. International conflicts were fought and legitimized in the name of nations’ ‘natural’ borders, in terms of return to the homeland, of irredentism.Seen thus, there seems to be two nationalisms: one liberal, liberating nationalism of peoples and another official or state nationalism that proceeds from the nation state and serves its needs. The question is whether this superficial distinction gains any insight. Often, once national liberation has been accomplished and the nation state established, nationalism of peoples is mobilized by and for state nationalism. Nor should we forget that the nationalism of peoples has from the start the establishment of its own nation state as its goal. From this it is evident that our understanding of nationalism is hindered by its seldom being observable in a pure state. It is nearly always linked to other political, social, and religious ideas and values which in turn strengthens its grasp on hearts and minds. (shrink)

The article looks into the history of the Albanian national question and the Balkans. It talks about the intellectual movement known as the Albanian National Renaissance which was considered the key catalyst of many important processes for the organization of Albanians. It mentions the Albanian nationalism that represents a sui generis nationalism, which has gone through transformations over time and created as an intellectual and cultural nationalism through a nationwide movement.

ABSTRACT It is widely supposed by both its proponents and critics that communitarianism is committed to the defence of lies of nationhood: the nation forms a surviving communal attachment in a world in which the individual is otherwise denuded of ties of community. I argue in this paper that this assumption is mistaken. It depends on a romantic image of the nation which was constructed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That image hides the recent historical origins of the nation (...) and its foundation in the suppression of older allegiances or their later privatisation; it continues to disguise the illusory nature of the national community. The nation is not a surviving pre‐modern community to which individuals are attached as a bulwark against the impersonality of public life in modern society. Rather the nation is one of the main vehicles for the construction of the modern unencumbered self. Communitarians need not be committed to the defence of the specifically modem forms of public irrationality and immorality that nationalism embodies. (shrink)