Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit (...) our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk. (shrink)

This target article is concerned with the implications of the surprisingly different experimental practices in economics and in areas of psychology relevant to both economists and psychologists, such as behavioral decision making. We consider four features of experimentation in economics, namely, script enactment, repeated trials, performance-based monetary payments, and the proscription against deception, and compare them to experimental practices in psychology, primarily in the area of behavioral decision making. Whereas economists bring a precisely defined “script” to experiments for participants to (...) enact, psychologists often do not provide such a script, leaving participants to infer what choices the situation affords. By often using repeated experimental trials, economists allow participants to learn about the task and the environment; psychologists typically do not. Economists generally pay participants on the basis of clearly defined performance criteria; psychologists usually pay a flat fee or grant a fixed amount of course credit. Economists virtually never deceive participants; psychologists, especially in some areas of inquiry, often do. We argue that experimental standards in economics are regulatory in that they allow for little variation between the experimental practices of individual researchers. The experimental standards in psychology, by contrast, are comparatively laissez-faire. We believe that the wider range of experimental practices in psychology reflects a lack of procedural regularity that may contribute to the variability of empirical findings in the research fields under consideration. We conclude with a call for more research on the consequences of methodological preferences, such as the use on monetary payments, and propose a “do-it-both-ways” rule regarding the enactment of scripts, repetition of trials, and performance-based monetary payments. We also argue, on pragmatic grounds, that the default practice should be not to deceive participants. Key Words: behavioral decision making; cognitive illusions; deception; experimental design; experimental economics; experimental practices; financial incentives; learning; role playing. (shrink)

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are epistemically opaque in the sense that their inner functioning is often unintelligible to human investigators. Inkeri Koskinen has recently argued that this poses special problems for a widespread view in social epistemology according to which thick normative trust between researchers is necessary to handle opacity: if DNNs are essentially opaque, there simply exists nobody who could be trusted to understand all the aspects a DNN picks up during training. In this paper, I present a counterexample (...) from scientific practice, AlphaFold2. I argue that for epistemic reliance on an opaque system, trust is not necessary, but reliability is. What matters is whether, for a given context, the reliability of a DNN has been compellingly established by empirical means and whether there exist trustable researchers who have performed such evaluations adequately. (shrink)

In psychology, deception is commonly used to increase experimental control. Yet, its use has provoked concerns that it raises participants' suspicions, prompts second-guessing of experimenters' true intentions, and ultimately distorts behavior and endangers the control it is meant to achieve. Over time, these concerns regarding the methodological costs of the use of deception have been subjected to empirical analysis. We review the evidence stemming from these studies.

The following is a set of reading notes on, and questions for, the Neuroeconomics enterprise. My reading of neuroscience evidence seems to be at odds with basic conceptions routinely assumed in the Neuroeconomics literature. I also summarize methodological concerns regarding design, implementation, and statistical evaluation of Neuroeconomics experiments.

This response reinforces the major themes of our target article. The impact of key methodological variables should not be taken for granted. Rather, we suggest grounding experimental practices in empirical evidence. If no evidence is available, decisions about design and implementation ought to be subjected to systematic experimentation. In other words, we argue against empirically blind conventions and against methodological choices based on beliefs, habits, or rituals. Our approach will neither inhibit methodological diversity nor constrain experimental creativity. More likely, it (...) will promote both goals. (shrink)

Routinen, Regeln, Rituale, Institutionen, Sprache, organisatorisches Räsonnieren, Begründen, Entscheiden und Kommunizieren, Vertrauen, Loyalität, Informationsaustausch und Wissenstransfer in Organisationen - sie alle sind auf Fiktionen angewiesen, auf ein vielfältiges Als Ob, auf Vorgriffe, die von ihrer nachträglichen Einlösung zehren, die sie selbst bewirken - jedenfalls bewirken sollen. Das öffnet Fälschungen, Manipulationen, bloßer Signalproduktion, bloß symbolischer Politik und organisierter Scheinheiligkeit Tür und Tor, zumal in einer Hypermoderne, in der die Jagd nach positionalen Gütern, nach ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Positionen mit immer größerer Hebelwirkung, (...) in immer neue Überbietungen treibt. Das Gegenteil zu berechnendem Schein, unter dem wir einander begegnen, ist die nicht auf Berechnung schielende Gabe. Die Logik und Ethik der Gabe ist für die Organisationstheorie von größtem Belang, weil sogar in Organisationen und gerade in Unternehmen Loyalität, Vertrauen, Fairness, Hilfe und Wissen immer auch nach Art einer solchen Gabe gewährt werden müssen - jenseits ökonomischer Kalkulation. (shrink)

Over the past decades psychological theories have made significant headway into economics, culminating in the 2002 (partially) and 2017 Nobel prizes awarded for work in the field of Behavioral Economics. Many of the insights imported from psychology into economics share a common trait: the presumption that decision makers use shortcuts that lead to deviations from rational behaviour (the Heuristics-and-Biases program). Many economists seem unaware that this viewpoint has long been contested in cognitive psychology. Proponents of an alternative program (the Ecological-Rationality (...) program) argue that heuristics need not be irrational, particularly when judged relative to characteristics of the environment. We sketch out the historical context of the antagonism between these two research programs and then review more recent work in the Ecological-Rationality tradition. While the heuristics-and-biases program is now well-established in (mainstream neo-classical) economics via Behavioral Economics, we show there is considerable scope for the Ecological-Rationality program to interact with economics. In fact, we argue that there are many existing, yet overlooked, bridges between the two, based on independently derived research in economics that can be construed as being aligned with the tradition of the Ecological-Rationality program. We close the paper with a discussion of the open challenges and difficulties of integrating the Ecological Rationality program with economics. (shrink)

In diesem Buch geht es um die Bedeutung der Gabe im Gegensatz zum Tausch, mit dem sie gleichwohl verflochten ist. In der einen, der Welt der überreichen ethnologischen, anthropologischen, kulturwissenschaftlichen und -soziologischen Literatur wimmelt es von Gaben, die in der anderen, der Welt der ökonomischen und Rational-Choice-theoretischen Literatur, nicht gesehen, bestritten, unsichtbar gemacht und vielmehr mit Tausch gleichgesetzt werden. In beiden kommen Gaben in Organisationen kaum vor, in der einen, weil man dort Gaben inmitten der Wirtschaft, der Unternehmen, der Organisationen (...) kaum Aufmerksamkeit widmet (obwohl gerade das im Sinne Marcel Mauss' gewesen wäre), in der anderen, weil sie da ein Geben jenseits eines do ut des überhaupt nicht wahrhaben können und wollen. Sonstige Ingredienzien unter anderem: Eine scharfe Kritik der Gabentheorie Bourdieus, eine Erörterung der Missachtung der Gabe bei Luhmann, Konsequenzen für die Organisations- und die Unternehmungstheorie und ein paar launige kleine Stücke zu Weihnachts- und zu Festschriftgaben. Der Autor Dr. Dr. h.c. Günther Ortmann ist ehem. Professor für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Hamburg, zuletzt Professor für Führung an der Universität Witten Herdecke. (shrink)

We applaud the authors' basic message. We note that the negative research emphasis is not special solely to social psychology and judgment and decision-making. We argue that the proposed integration of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and Bayesian analysis is promising but will ultimately succeed only if more attention is paid to proper experimental design and implementation.